The decision made by the Government to move forward with Trident replacement and the vote in Parliament in March 2007 do not constitute the final word but the first step in a long process. Further major decisions are required, not least of which is the crucial main gate decision in 2012-2014.

Future decisions will be subject to a number of dynamics. With a major capital spending programme through the 2010s the Royal Navy’s budget and wider MOD spending could be squeezed to the extent that procuring four new ballistic missile submarines begins to look unattractive, particularly if the UK faces an economic downturn over the next decade. Procuring Trident’s successor will cost £15-20 billion. MOD is also procuring or planning to procure the new Astute-class attack submarine (£3.5bn for the first three of a possible seven), six Daring-class Type-45 destroyers (£3.6bn), the two new aircraft carriers and Joint Combat Aircraft (£12-14bn), the Future Rapid Effects System range of armoured vehicles for the Army (£6bn for 3,500 vehicles), 232 Typhoon fighter aircraft (£21bn), and 14 new Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (£13bn). This comes at a time when three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff are arguing that the Government is underfunding the armed services and short changing troops in the field.[59]

Progress on nuclear proliferation and steps towards nuclear disarmament at the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conference could erode the rationales presented by the Government for replacing Trident. Parliamentary resistance in Westminster on grounds of cost, relevance or international political impact could also constrain and undermine the Trident replacement process.

Scottish civil, parliamentary and Executive opposition could prove politically insurmountable. On May 3, 2007 the Scottish National Party gained a majority in the Scottish Parliament. The SNP and the majority of Scottish MPs are committed to a nuclear weapon-free Scotland. On June 14, 2007 the Scottish Parliament voted overwhelmingly against the British Government’s decision to replace Trident by a vote of 71 to 16 with 39 abstentions. Opinion polls show a majority of Scots opposed to Trident replacement.[60]

The Government, however, is convinced that Trident is a strategic military and political asset and has shaped the debate to reflect that conviction. It cannot conceive of not having nuclear weapons, primarily because it now has them. But if Britain did not now have nuclear weapons it is very unlikely that it would seek to acquire them[61] – suggesting that the strategic need identified by the Government is less urgent and essential than claimed.

As far as the Government is concerned, replacing Trident is the answer, but it is not at all clear what the question is. The Government has tried to argue that future strategic nuclear threats are the question, but the rationales presented to support this argument can be unpicked to reveal a shaky foundation.

A more powerful argument can be made that challenges the relevance of Trident replacement to the strategic deterrent tasks asked of it and exposes the potential liability it poses in terms of the impact on the non-proliferation and disarmament norms at the heart of the NPT.

Compelling arguments can also be made that replacing Trident is the answer to a different question, or set of questions, to do with maintaining a close defence relationship with America, maintaining the ability or confidence to engage in ‘liberal interventionist’ activities as a self-proclaimed ‘force for good’, a strong desire on behalf of the Labour Party not to revisit in any way the unilateralist debates of the 1980s, a strong historical association between an ‘independent’ British nuclear arsenal and status as a major power, and a powerful gut-feeling not to leave France as the only nuclear weapon state in Europe.[62]

Nowhere are these issues addressed in the Government’s White Paper and they have only been superficially examined in the wider debate. But, as George Lee Butler argues, it is essential that “the root causes, the mindsets and the belief systems” that underpin the commitment to a nuclear defence policy and nuclear exceptionalism are brought to light and better understood.[63]

Finally this government has repeatedly committed itself to a process of multilateral nuclear disarmament and the norms established by the NPT. It regularly articulates a self-identity as a ‘force for good’ in international security affairs. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government to fully support and resource detailed examination of the issues highlighted under question two in collaboration with external expertise and with nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states where appropriate and feasible.

It is equally crucial that Parliament be given the information and opportunity to scrutinise, question and challenge Government decisions on the long-term Trident replacement programme through its committees and parliamentary debate.

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