

# UN & CONFLICT MONITOR

A DIGEST OF NEWS AND DOCUMENTS  
FOCUSING ON THE UN'S ROLE IN CONFLICT  
PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND  
RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING,  
PEACEBUILDING AND PEACEMAKING

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## EDITORIAL STATEMENT

The *UN and Conflict Monitor* is a quarterly publication produced jointly by the UN and Conflict Unit, UNA-UK and the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. It aims to provide data and ideas relevant to the international humanitarian community faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. The *Monitor* includes information and documentation about peacekeeping deployments and policy debates and lists conferences, research, publications and training events. It is available on-line at the homepages of the CCR and the UNA-UK [*See back cover*]. The *Commentary* section provides short commentaries from experts and practitioners. In this issue, Michael Yermolaev discusses the evolution of contemporary Russian peacekeeping.

The *Monitor* is linked to a list of UK-based Conflict Resolution Organisations. Information on the organisations is updated regularly and contains a guide to internet links which provide a comprehensive survey of conflict analysis, conflict data and conflict resolution work world-wide. The most recent version of the list is available at the CCR Website.

The regional sections in the *Monitor* comprise a digest of material taken from UN sources and the world media, including: *All Africa News Agency; Concord Times (Freetown); The Economist; The Financial Times; The Guardian; The Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg); The Nation (Nairobi); North African Journal; Panafrican News Agency; The Progress (Freetown); The Times; UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN); UN Wire; The US Department Of State; and the Washington Post*. These sections do not necessarily reflect the views of the UN and Conflict Unit.

**Project Directors:** Prof. Tom Woodhouse, Prof. Oliver Ramsbotham and Mr Malcolm Harper

**Editor:** Alexander Ramsbotham

**Editorial Assistant:** Karl Limbert

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*Enquiries about the UN & Conflict Monitor should be directed to:*

<p>Alexander Ramsbotham  UN &amp; Conflict Unit, UNA-UK  3 Whitehall Court  London, SW1A 2EL  Tel: +44 (0)20 7930 0316  Fax: +44 (0)20 7930 5893  <a href="mailto:UNandC@compuserve.com">UNandC@compuserve.com</a></p>
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# AFRICA

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## ANGOLA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1975** Internal violence followed Angola's achievement of independence from Portugal; the USSR and Cuba supported dos Santos' MPLA government, while the US, Zaire and South Africa supported the opposition force, UNITA; **1989** International negotiations led to the deployment of a UN force (UNAVEM I) to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops; **1991** The Bicesse Accords addressed the wider issues of the conflict, including elections overseen by UNAVEM II; **1992** On losing elections, UNITA reverted to violence; **1994** UN-sponsored cease-fire negotiations led to a peace settlement, the Lusaka Protocol; **1995** UNAVEM III was deployed to monitor the Lusaka Protocol; **1997** MONUA was established to oversee remainder of peace process; **1998** Armed clashes continued between MPLA and UNITA; in response to violations of its commitments, UN sanctions were introduced against UNITA; **1999** The deteriorating security situation induced the Angolan government to request the withdrawal of MONUA, whose mandate subsequently expired in February; all out war ensued.

### SG'S UNOA REPORT (S/2000/23)

The 14 January report covered developments since October 1999.

#### Political Aspects

The government's successful military campaign over the preceding months had re-established authority in territory previously occupied UNITA.

On 11 November 1999, President José Eduardo dos Santos offered that all UNITA members who surrendered to government would be allowed to carry out political activities and that the Lusaka Protocol remained a valid basis for the Angolan peace process; he further outlined a programme of action towards legislative and presidential elections, although with no timetable.

The expert panel of the Security Council Committee visited Angola and surrounding countries in October 1999 to discuss ways of improving sanctions.

UNITA indicated in November 1999 that the Russian crew members of an aircraft shot down by UNITA

were alive and were being held hostage, and that they would be released on humanitarian grounds.

#### Military Aspects

The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) succeeded making military advances against UNITA positions and in capturing significant amounts of UNITA weapons. However, the military operations on the eastern and southern Angolan borders spilled into Zambia and Namibia where, in addition to influxes of refugees, bombing and shelling incidents were reported on both sides of the border.

Security conditions had reportedly improved in the north-eastern region of the country, while most areas in Cuanza Sul province and the southern region had also undergone a relatively long period of calm.

#### Human Rights Aspects

The UN's lack of access to most parts of Angola meant that little information was available about the treatment of the civilian population in former UNITA-controlled areas, nor about abuses perpetrated by UNITA. However, it did appear that various military elements, including UNITA, had looted crops and destroyed property.

Projects run by the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) focused on: training prosecutors and judges; improving infrastructure, public access to law and court proceedings; and on the need for law reform.

#### Humanitarian Aspects

The humanitarian situation remained precarious. An estimated 3.7 million civilians were affected by the war, including nearly 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some 42% of children under 5 were underweight and likely to develop subsequent health problems, if they survived.

One third of the Angolan population lived in inaccessible areas, although it was anticipated that the extension of state administration into former UNITA-controlled areas would extend humanitarian access.

The security situation had limited humanitarian agencies to working in provincial capitals, which could only be reached by expensive air transport. And the reporting period had seen a massive increase in landmine incidents. The last quarter of 1999 had seen continuing serious macroeconomic difficulties for the Angolan economy, leading to deterioration of all key economic indicators.

#### TENSION BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND ANGOLA

In early January, Zambia was reportedly dispatching reinforcements to its borders with Angola, prompting fears of increasing tension between the two

countries. Zambia had denied allegations that it allowed UNITA to traffic diamonds and supplies through Zambian territory, however, in February 1999, the Angolan government nevertheless let off bombs in Lusaka in retaliation.

Zambia subsequently refused the Angolan government's request to be allowed to attack UNITA positions from Zambia, obstructing the Angolan army offensive which had been launched from bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Namibia. Since agreeing to allow Angolan attacks from its territory in January 2000, Namibia became embroiled in the Angolan conflict and around 8,000 Angolan refugees entered Namibia. The violence was threatening Namibia's tourist industry.

A January report by British pressure group Global Witness declared that Angola's increasing oil revenues largely helped to destabilise the country: most of the money bypassed the official budget and went directly to the presidency, from where it was used for arms purchases.

#### AID MISSIONS CANCELLED

A World Food Programme (WFP) report issued during the week beginning 28 February declared that several humanitarian missions in many areas of Angola had been postponed due to lack of security, including rising crime levels in Luanda, insecurity along major roads and violence between government forces and UNITA. In response, USAID released funds to recruit five field security officers to support UN and NGO humanitarian operations. In early March, WFP was providing assistance to 1,135,594 Angolans.

### BURUNDI

#### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1962** *Burundi achieved independence from Belgium;* **1972** *The Hutu wrested power from the Tutsi, during which some 200,000 Tutsi were killed;* **1987** *Pierre Buyoya assumed power, allowing a Hutu cabinet majority and Prime Minister;* **1993** *Hutu Melchior Ndadaye succeeded Buyoya in presidential elections, but both he and succeeding President Cyprien Ntaryamisa were killed;* **1996** *Buyoya seized power militarily, prompting regional sanctions against his regime;* **1998** *Burundi's two main political parties, the Hutu-led FRODEBU and Tutsi-led UPRONA, agreed a political partnership and a transitional constitution although sporadic violence continued throughout the country;* **1999** *Nelson Mandela was appointed as mediator in the Burundian peace process after the death of Julius Nyerere.*

#### MANDELA DEMANDS PEACE PLEDGE

In early January, Nelson Mandela called on Burundi's politicians to make a commitment to peace during forthcoming negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. Mandela was to act as mediator at the peace talks, due to open in late February. He sought to place the peace process in the international spotlight by inviting both President Bill Clinton and French Prime Minister Jaques Chirac to participate.

However, Burundi's leader Pierre Buyoya continued to sue for war and reportedly stated that most of the state's resources would be spent on defence and security. Buyoya claimed that his predominantly Tutsi army was on the verge of securing victory over the various insurgent Hutu groups. However, analysts suggested that little had changed and that the insurgents were still attacking civilian targets such as schools and health posts. Intelligence reports propounded that the Hutu groups used a network of bases in Tanzania to move back and forth across the border. Thousands of Burundian civilians had also fled into Tanzania. A 22 January *Economist* report cited rumours that Burundian forces were being joined by armed groups from Rwanda, ready to use the same tactics as witnessed in 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Amnesty International accused government forces of murdering more than 40 civilians in a single operation during January, which the government denied. However, the government was coming under increasing external pressure. On 19 January, Burundi agreed to dismantle 10 of its 50 regroupment camps, ostensibly due to improved security.

Regional sanctions against Buyoya and the withholding of aid by most western donors had had a severe impact on Burundi's economy.

Mandela continued to push for an 'all inclusive' peace process including full representation of all opposition forces. The National Convergence for Peace and Reconciliation comprised politicians from across the spectrum and identified itself as moderate. However sceptics reportedly dismissed it as being designed by Buyoya to manipulate the Arusha talks to his own ends.

#### BURUNDI'S REGROUPMENT CAMPS

A 3 March *All Africa News Agency* article reported allegations that soldiers guarding so-called Regroupment Camps were guilty of human rights abuses. The government claimed that the camps were designed to protect the Hutu civilian population from opposition attacks and to prevent them assisting opposition fighters. However, the report suggested that they were actually intended to clear the countryside around Bujumbura, so that anyone subsequently caught there would be liable to summary execution as an opposition fighter.

Many detainees were dying of disease; the camps contained scant medical facilities and responsibility for feeding camp populations was left to aid agencies. There were indications that detainees who had previously had no affinity with opposition groups had become sympathetic towards them in response to their brutal treatment and the loss of their livelihoods as a result of their incarceration.

### BURUNDI PEACE TALKS ON TRACK

On 6 March, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma concluded a four day visit to Burundi, ending two weeks of intense South African involvement in peace initiatives there. Mandela had mediated for the first time in multiparty negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, during the previous week. He denied claims by predominantly Hutu parties that South Africa was biased against them. He urged that Tutsi control of Burundian politics, commerce and the military must be addressed.

Mandela berated Burundi's predominantly Hutu opposition groups for targeting civilians. The leaders of the two principal opposition factions, Jean-Bosco Ndaradengwe and Cossan Kabura of the of the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL, respectively, were invited to the talks for the first time, but failed to appear.

A 6 March *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg) article asserted that President Laurent Kabila was employing Ndaradengwe's militia in the DRC conflict, while Mugabe was believed to view Burundian opposition fighters as a means to allow a Zimbabwean withdrawal from the conflict while still resisting anti-Kabila forces in DRC.

Mandela had secured the participation of radical Tutsi party, the Rally for Democracy and Economic Social Development (RADDES). On 22 February, Clinton had addressed delegates by video linkup.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1979** Tyrannical leader Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa was overthrown in a French-backed coup; **1992** Elections led to the accession of André-Félix Patassé; **1996** Patassé was challenged by three successive army mutinies; **1997** The Bangui Agreement provided for a comprehensive solution to the conflict, including the deployment of a French-backed inter-African peacekeeping force (MISAB); **1998** After the withdrawal of French support, MISAB was replaced by a UN force (MINURCA).

### MINURCA MANDATE ENDS

During the week beginning 14 February, Kofi Annan announced the expiry of the mandate of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) on 15 February. Annan asserted that MINURCA had facilitated:

- The establishment of suitable conditions for national elections;
- The restructuring of the country's security forces;
- The training of police and gendarmes;
- And the launch of economic and social reforms.

MINURCA was to be replaced by a UN Peace-Building Support Office (BONUCA).

Opposition leader Abel Goumba lamented that the mission had withdrawn before the 1997 Bangui peace accords had been fully implemented.

## CONGO BRAZZAVILLE

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1979** Denis Sassou-Nguesso came to power and established Congo-Brazzaville as a Marxist one-party state; **1985** Sassou-Nguesso was forced to rely on the Presidential Guard to quell popular riots after the army refused to intervene; **1992** Sassou-Nguesso lost out in elections to Pascal Lissouba; **1997** After six months fighting between Sassou-Nguesso's militia and Lissouba's army, Lissouba was overthrown and fled the country, allowing Sassou-Nguesso to assume control, although violence has since continued.

### UNICEF ANNOUNCES RETURNEES

A 7 March UNICEF report asserted that internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees in Congo Brazzaville were returning to their homes and villages, in particular in areas where security was guaranteed, encouraged by the decline in military activity and the December 1999 cease-fire agreement between the government and opposition groups. Around 370,000 people returned in January, and some 200,000 IDPs were expected to return home by May 2000, so by then some 600,000 people might have returned overall, around three-quarters of the total displaced in late 1998 and 1999.

Economic Minister Henri Djombo declared that 3,000 militia fighters had handed over some 5,000 weapons by March. Voluntary disarmament of militias was due for completion in May. The UNICEF report revealed that over 50% of school-age children remained outside the education system, and most schools were in disrepair.

## CÔTE D'IVOIRE

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1960** On 7 August, Côte d'Ivoire achieved independence from France under the presidency of Felix Houphouët-Boigny. **1980** Economic decline in the 1980s fomented increasing resentment of the government and massive popular protests forced the legalisation of opposition parties and the first contested presidential election in October, won by Houphouët-Boigny; **1993** Houphouët-Boigny was succeeded on his death by Henri Konan Bédié, who then won presidential elections in 1995; **1998** In September, demonstrators protested a constitutional revision granting the president enhanced powers, while Bédié also tried to exclude his main political rivals through repressive and constitutional means; **1999** Bédié was ousted in a coup d'état led by the military.

### COUP IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

On 24 December 1999, Côte D'Ivoire President Henri Konan Bedie was deposed in a military coup led by General Robert Guei. The coup appeared to enjoy popular support: the run up to elections, scheduled for early 2000 had seen Bédié's popularity progressively decrease. He had previously attempted to ban his rival, Alassande Outtara, from competing by declaring him a foreigner. A warrant was issued for Outarra's arrest and Bédié began a xenophobic campaign against Dioualla-speaking citizens from the north of the country. Bédié's government was also suspected of corruption and had become notorious for its intolerance of dissent.

Despite assurances from Guei that he wanted to create conditions for democracy, fair elections and a quick transfer to civilian rule, analysts suggested that the coup might favour Ouattara and the northern population. Guei had cancelled the arrest warrant for Ouattara, fuelling rumours that he was likely to lead the embryonic government of national unity. Although Outtara's party was the smallest, four of its members were made part of the junta.

### ECOWAS INSISTS ON JUNE TRANSFER

A 16 February *PANA* report stated that, on that day, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate declared that the June deadline for the transfer of power from the military to elected civilians had not changed. The announcement came in response to the transition time-table released Guei citing late October as the transfer date.

According to a 9 March *PANA* report, the Ivorian human rights league urged Guei's military regime to

put a stop to violations of human rights perpetrated by soldiers and police in the name of national security. Alleged criminals were reportedly killed and their bodies displayed on national television on the strength of mere accusations.

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1960** Following hasty independence, the army mutinied prompting Belgium to redeploy troops to the Congo; a UN force (ONUC) was then mandated to restore law and order and oversee the withdrawal of Belgian soldiers; **1961** ONUC was authorised to use force to remove Belgian troops from the Katanga province, which then renounced its secession; **1964** ONUC withdrew having largely failed to consolidate government authority; **1970** Joseph Mobutu became president, renaming the country Zaire; **1997** An opposition military coalition, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, ousted Mobutu and Laurent Désiré Kabila took over as president; **1998** Former members of the coalition rose against Kabila, backed by Rwanda and Uganda; Kabila received assistance from Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; the conflict took on an ethnic element when Kabila publicly identified the opposition as Tutsi; **1999** In July, the main combatants signed the Lusaka peace accord to end the conflict, but violence continued in many parts of the country.

### MONUC EXPANDED

On 24 February, the UN Security Council authorised the expansion of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from 500 to 5,537 military personnel [*see Documentation and Sources*], although deployment was conditional upon guarantees of security and co-operation by the parties to the conflict. However, the cease-fire agreement had been regularly violated and there were frequent reports of President Laurent Kabila asserting that observers should only be deployed in areas under opposition control.

A 25 February *Panafrican News Agency* report cited a senior UN official as declaring that the UN would continue progressively with the deployment of MONUC without waiting for perfect conditions. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet was to visit the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in early March to get assurances of co-operation from the parties. Also, regional leaders involved in the conflict reaffirmed their commitment to the cease-fire at a meeting in Lusaka on 23 February.

## HOLBROOKE URGES US SUPPORT FOR MONUC

During the week beginning 28 February, US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, emphasised the risk of a resurgence of genocide in DRC as he attempted to persuade the US Congress to support MONUC. At the same time, there were reports of several thousand deaths in the Ituri region of north-eastern DRC as a result of violence between Hema and Lendu tribespeople.

The relationship between these groups was compared to that between Hutus and Tutsi, where the traditional Lendu farmers were largely governed by Hemas. Although the fighting was largely distinct from other violence in the area, it also involved foreign troops.

Around this time, Kabila's position appeared to be strengthening: the January special DRC session in the Security Council had reinforced his position as the country's legitimate ruler against foreign intervention, while dislike of Rwandan and Ugandan troops was improving his popularity in opposition-controlled areas. At a press conference on 7 March, Kofi Annan urged a cautious approach to the deployment of MONUC.

## ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1970s-80s** Haile Mariam Mengistu's Communist Dergue government habitually underwent factional challenges to its power; **1989** Combined forces from Tigre and Eritrea won military victories in Ethiopia's northern Tigre province; **1991** Mengistu fled Addis Ababa and Meles Zenawi assumed power; **1993** Eritrea achieved independence; **1998** Continuing disagreements over border demarcation led to conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Badme region; an externally arranged cease-fire was agreed to facilitate peace negotiations, but was mainly used by both sides to re-group for further fighting; **1999** Fighting again broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia and also extended into Somalia.

## US URGES PEACE

On 10 March, the US Department of State announced that the Special Envoy of the President and the Secretary of State, Anthony Lake, had recently returned from a two-week mission to the region to support mediation efforts fronted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

During mediation efforts, respective Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders, Isaias Afwerki and Meles Zenawi, reaffirmed commitments to the Framework Agreement and Modalities for Implementation,

which was endorsed by the at the July 1999 OAU Summit in Algiers. There was consensus over some provisions of the Technical Arrangements, although others needed additional mediation to garner acceptance of the whole document by both parties. Both leaders further reaffirmed their confidence in the OAU mediation initiative.

## LIBERIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1980** Samuel Doe seized power from William Tolbert; **1989** Charles Taylor's NFPL invaded Liberia and factional violence ensued; **1990** The Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force was deployed to forcibly establish peace; **1993** The Cotonou Accords were signed between the main factions, establishing a comprehensive peace process and UNOMSIL was deployed alongside ECOMOG; however, the deal soon broke down leading to further violence; **1995** The Abuja Agreement again established a cease-fire and comprehensive peace process; **1996** After heavy fighting in Monrovia in the spring, both the cease-fire and peace process were eventually restored; **1997** Elections placed Charles Taylor in power; **1999** Taylor ordered ECOMOG to leave Liberia.

## TAYLOR'S MIXED RECORD

An 8 January *Economist* article noted that the transition to peace in Liberia was by no means complete. Peace had only come about as a result of President Charles Taylor neutralising any effective opposition to his government and he had attained power on the implicit threat that he would have returned to violence had he not been elected.

The article suggested that opposition politicians were being harassed or had disappeared, while Liberian radio, the most broadly accessible broadcast medium, was controlled by Taylor. Taylor also allegedly maintained political control through organisations such as the Anti-Terrorist-Unit, run by his son.

The Liberian economy had been ruined by the civil war and the remainder was now controlled by Taylor and his allies. Taylor also stood accused of embezzling \$1million of state funds in 1984, but was unlikely to be charged.

## NIGERIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1960** Nigeria gained independence on 1 October; **1966** Military leaders seized political control in response to popular rioting; a second military coup in July saw Colonel Yakubu Gowon gain power; **1967** On 30 May, Ibos declared independence in the eastern region as the Republic of Biafra, prompting civil war; **1970** Biafra surrendered to the federal government; **1975** Gowon was replaced by Brigadier Muritala Rufai Mohammed in a bloodless coup; **1979** The election of Alhaji Shehu Shagari to president saw a return of civilian rule; **1985** Having succumbed again to military rule the previous year, another military coup saw Major General Ibrahim Babangida seize power; **1993** Babangida ignored the results of 12 June presidential elections, but resigned in August; **November** the military again seized power, appointing Sani Abacha president; **1998** Abacha died on 8 June and was succeeded by General Abdulsalam Abubakar; **1999** In February, presidential elections returned General Olusegun Obasanjo to power with a large majority.

### VIOLENCE IN SOUTH WEST NIGERIA

Support for the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), a group formed in 1995 to campaign for the autonomy of the Yoruba people in south west Nigeria, increased rapidly following reports of police brutality against it. The government blamed OPC for a recent wave of violence in the area and President Olusegun Obasanjo had ordered the police to suppress the group.

During November 1999, 100 people were killed in Lagos in a clash between OPC members and Hausa traders from the north of the country, and in January 2000 the Bariga police chief was allegedly abducted and murdered.

On 13 January, Obasanjo publicly admonished Lagos State Governor Bola Tinubu over the security situation, threatening to impose a state of emergency if the situation did not improve. Tinubu pointed out that responsibility for security lay with the federal not local administration.

Tinubu drew parallels with the events of the 1960s, when a state of emergency imposed by the government led to a series of military coups and to civil war. He intimated that the president's cautions over the situation in Lagos contained a hidden agenda from the north of the country.

### RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

The imposition of *sharia* law in various Nigerian states was prompting outbreaks of violence with

Christian communities. In Kaduna, demands for *sharia* law by Moslems prompted widespread violence on the streets of the state capital, Kaduna.

Moslem demands for *sharia* were believed to be reactions to rising crime figures and the long-term effects of military rule. There was also a political dimension, however, as Islamic law had prevailed in Nigeria for centuries until British and subsequently military rule had restricted it to family matters.

A 14 March PANA report stated that governor Ahamed Makarfi claimed that instability Kaduna had in fact been organised by discontented external elements and formed part of plot by opponents of democracy to destabilise the Obasanjo's government.

Makarfi warned that, without urgent action, people who claimed to be protecting national security could seize power, interpreted as a veiled reference to the military. He added that the military should accept responsibility for inserting contradictory provisions when it contrived the 1999 constitution. According to Makarfi, some 320 people had been killed in the violence.

## RWANDA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1962** Rwanda gained independence from Belgium; **1964** Hutu perpetrated a genocidal massacre of Tutsi, many of whom fled to Uganda; **1973** Hutu General Habayarimana replaced Kayibanda as President; **1990** Opposition Tutsi in Uganda (RPF) invade Rwanda; **1993** A UN force (UNAMIR) was deployed to provide humanitarian aid and supervise the transition to an elected coalition government; **1994** In April, both Habayarimana and the President of Uganda were assassinated precipitating widespread violence and the suspension of UNAMIR; between April and June, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered by Hutu extremists; some 1.7 million Hutu fled to Zaire; French intervention (Opération Turquoise) escorted the fleeing Hutu to refugee camps in neighbouring countries; **1995** the UN set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try the perpetrators of the genocide; **1999** In December, the UN released a self critical report on its role in the 1994 genocide.

### TEST CASE FOR ICTR

A 9 March report in *The Nation* (Nairobi) declared that International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) currently had 39 detainees, all of whom were high ranking political, military and media leaders. Seven people had been convicted so far, including the prime minister at the time of the genocide, Jean

Kambanda. The maximum sentence that the ICTR could impose was life imprisonment, compared with the death penalty allowed by Rwanda's own court.

The report suggested that the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza represented a test of the tribunal's integrity and independence. Barayagwiza had been prosecuted by ICTR on seven counts relating to genocide and crimes against humanity. However, in November 1999, he had been released on the grounds that his rights had been violated as he had been detained too long without being brought to trial.

## SIERRA LEONE

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1991** *The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government;* **1992** *A new government assumed power in a coup, but was still opposed by the RUF;* **1996** *Despite continued hostilities, Ahmed Téjan Kabbah was elected president; the Abidjan Accord was subsequently agreed with the RUF;* **1997** *Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); the Conakry Agreement between the parties in the Autumn was never implemented;* **1998** *Continued unrest induced ECOMOG to intervene to remove the junta with the help of Kamajor militias; Kabbah was restored to power in Freetown, but violence continued throughout the country; in the summer, the UN deployed UNOMSIL to operate alongside ECOMOG;* **1999** *Continuing atrocities, mainly by the RUF, intensified Sierra Leone's humanitarian crisis; an eventual peace agreement brokered by the UN controversially incorporated the RUF into the government;* **October** *The Security Council approved a 6,000-strong peacekeeping force to oversee the implementation of the Lomé peace agreement.*

### SG'S UNAMSIL REPORT (1) (S/2000/13)

On 11 January, Kofi Annan reported on developments in Sierra Leone since 6 December 1999. Nigeria decided to repatriate its troops serving with ECOMOG, prompting Annan to request the expansion of UNAMSIL.

#### Political and Security Situation

The end of December and beginning of January saw ECOMOG continue its withdrawal and the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF) challenge implementation of some of the aspects of the peace process.

On 29 December 1999, RUF leader Foday Sankoh outlined alleged violations of the Lomé Peace

Agreement, including that RUF had not been provided sufficient financial resources to allow participation in cease-fire monitoring mechanisms or its transformation into a political party. Also, UNAMSIL would not be allowed to deploy in RUF areas until the district-level cease-fire monitoring committees were in place.

The security situation remained precarious, including the temporary detainment of two MSF personnel by RUF Commander Sam Bockarie. Lawlessness levels were rising, particularly around Freetown and Lungi and Port Loko; there were many cease-fire violations and incidents of civilian harassment by former Sierra Leonean army elements in the Occra Hills region.

More than 6,000 ex-combatants were in DDR centres as at 10 January. There was also unrest among ex-combatants in DDR camps at Lungi and Port Loko. The payment of the first tranche of \$150 of their allowances bought temporary calm at the end of December, but the discharge of ex-combatants from the camps was delayed due logistical problems.

#### Human Rights/Humanitarian Situation

The human rights situation improved towards the end of December; continuing sporadic attacks on civilians in the Port Loko area decreased following the establishment of UNAMSIL patrols. The good harvest improved the humanitarian situation in some parts of country, although around 2.6 million civilians had remained without sufficient access to relief in the Northern Province. RUF detainment of relief workers forced humanitarian agencies to scale back operations in RUF/AFRC areas. However, there was good progress in accessible areas.

#### Mandate of an Expanded Mission

Although operating under the consent of the parties, UNAMSIL was required to deter attempts to derail the peace process. In addition to its current mandate, the proposed concept of UNAMSIL operations would include:

- a presence at key locations and government buildings;
- additional security at DDR sites and protecting and destroying weapons and ammunition collected from ex-combatants;
- mobile patrols;
- patrols and, if necessary, armed escorts on major roads;
- the deployment of the UNAMSIL rapid reaction element;
- maintaining close co-ordination with the Sierra Leonean law enforcement authorities.

The expanded UN force would require up to 11,100 military personnel, including:

260 military observers; 12 infantry battalions; force and sector headquarters personnel; 2 military

engineer companies; adequate medical personnel and facilities; communications and transport units; a helicopter and aviation element; and other military support elements.

Mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal platoons would be deployed as well as a mine action office within UNAMSIL to co-ordinate mine action activities

### **Civilian Police**

Up to 60 UN civilian police advisers would be required to advise and assist the government and local police officials and to advise on law and order at DDR sites and population. UNAMSIL also needed to be prepared to help the government maintain law and order at DDR sites, and so the government needed to deploy a credible law enforcement presence at the sites.

### **DIAMOND MINING SUSPENDED**

Sankoh suspended all diamond mining during the week beginning 22 January without explanation. He had been appointed Chair of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development - which was charged with elaborating a government policy for mining and selling the country's diamonds.

During the war, Sankoh's forces had sold diamonds in Liberia or Guinea, often in exchange for weapons. In 1995, the government began to employ foreign mercenary soldiers in the mines. However, they were soon replaced by ECOMOG troops who exploited diamond profits, and a 29 January *Economist* report stated that they also made strategic deals with the RUF over mining.

The government received no revenue from the \$30 million diamond trade (compared with \$500million before the war) and Sankoh's Commission had no authority and had never actually convened a meeting of its members.

Analysts suggested that Sankoh's declaration was in fact timed to coincide with the arrival of an international committee charged with monitoring the peace accords in line with his presidential ambitions.

### **SG'S UNAMSIL REPORT (2) (S/2000/186)**

The 7 March report covered developments in the UNAMSIL area of operation since 11 January.

### **Security Situation and Demilitarisation**

The security situation generally remained tense and volatile. Sierra Leone police activities were limited to the western part of the country. Police still lacked the necessary personnel, facilities and equipment to fulfil essential tasks.

The DDR programme remained slow. As at 1 March, some 17,191 combatants had been disarmed, (4,051 RUF, 8,851 loyal and ex-Sierra Leone Army, and 4,289 CDF). There was concern over the low quality of surrendered weapons and the ratio of collected arms to the number of ex-combatants. On 10 February, a community rehabilitation and reintegration programme was launched to provide resources for eligible projects.

### **Human Rights and Humanitarian Aspects**

The human rights situation remained a cause for serious concern, in particular around Port Loko due to looting of villages, house burnings, harassment and abduction of civilians, rape and sexual abuse, mostly by ex-Sierra Leone Army elements. There were particular problems in RUF-held areas. UNAMSIL had recently discovered illegal detention centres.

However, there was a significant increase in the release of children, mostly ex-combatants, by ex-Sierra Leone Army elements from the Occra Hills (48 children) and Kabala (329 children).

The first multisectoral humanitarian assessment in the north of the country since October 1999 revealed that the widespread malnutrition that was prevalent six months previously had been temporarily alleviated due to the recent harvest.

### **Steps Ahead**

Annan grouped main steps ahead under four headings:

- early disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all ex-combatants;
- extension of state authority throughout the country;
- national reconciliation and democratisation;
- and improving indigenous security capacity.

### **State Authority & Reconciliation/Democratisation**

The primary obstacle to extending of state authority to the provinces was denial of access by RUF to areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Annan urged that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Commission be established soon and that support be given to transform the RUF into a political party. All political parties should be able to take part in campaigning for elections in 2001.

The military reintegration plan envisioned the establishment of an 8,500-strong armed force. Screening for personnel was scheduled for April/May.

## UNAMSIL Contributions, as at 1 March 2000

Bangladesh 12 (MO), 12 (T); Bolivia 4 (MO), 4 (T); Canada 5 (MO), 5 (T); China 6 (MO), 6 (T); Croatia 10 (MO), 10(T); Czech Republic 5 (MO), 5(T); Denmark 2 (MO), 2 (T); Egypt 10 (MO), 10 (T); France 3 (MO), 3 (T); Gambia 26 (MO), 26 (T); Ghana 4 (MO), 3 (SO), 774 (Tr), 781 (T); Guinea 12 (MO), 3 (SO), 776 (Tr), 791 (T); India 14 (MO), 18 (SO), 1,473 (Tr), 1,505 (T); Indonesia 10 (MO), 10 (T); Jordan 5 (MO), 5 (T); Kenya 11 (MO), 10 (SO), 816 (Tr), 837 (T); Kyrgyzstan 2 (MO), 2 (T); Malaysia 10 (MO), 10 (T); Mali 8 (MO), 8 (T); Nepal 6 (MO), 6 (T); New Zealand 2(MO), 2 (T); Nigeria 4 (MO), 9 (SO), 3,241 (Tr), 3,254 (T); Norway 5 (MO), 5 (T); Pakistan 10 (MO), 10 (T); Russia 15 (MO), 15 (T); Slovakia 2 (MO), 2 (T); Sweden 3 (MO), 3 (T); Thailand 5 (MO), 5 (T); UK 15 (MO), 8 (Tr), 23 (T); Tanzania 12 (MO), 12 (T); Uruguay 11 (MO), 11 (T); Zambia 11 (MO), 11 (T); Total 260 (MO), 43 (SO), 7,088 (Tr), 7,391 (T).

Civilian police deployed (6): Ghana, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia and Norway.

## SC URGES TOUGHER UNAMSIL STANCE

An 11 March report in the *Concord Times (Freetown)* stated that a closed session of the UN Security Council on 8 March had decided to support a tougher stance by UNAMSIL against opposition leaders to encourage compliance with the provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

According to a Western diplomat, this could include the use of force; British Ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, had said in Freetown on 9 March that UN forces could employ force to disarm fighters.

A 13 March report in *The Progress (Freetown)* stated that arms and ammunition seized by RUF fighters from Guinean troops on their way to join UNAMSIL had reportedly arrived in the RUF strongholds of Kialahun in eastern Sierra Leone and Kambia in the north.

The equipment included armoured cars and military personnel light vehicles. A local newspaper article had recently reported Sankoh as instructing RUF fighters to rearm, as UN troops wished to arrest him for war crimes and other human rights abuses. There were fears that the RUF wished to use seized armaments to re-launch major fighting in Sierra Leone.

## SUDAN

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1956** Independence was achieved; **1965** Elections confirmed the dominance of the Umma party, after several years of military rule; **1969** General Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry seized power; civil war continued between north and south until 1972; **1983** War resumed between the predominantly Arab government forces in the north, influenced by the National Islamic Front (NIF), and Christian opposition forces in the south, led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA); **1985** Nimeiry was removed by the army and replaced by Sadiq al-Mahdi on an Islamist platform; **1989** Particularly in response to the economic and humanitarian impact of the war, the army resumed power under General Omar el-Bashir; **March** A consortium of UN and non-government agencies launched a major relief effort in response to massive civilian suffering (Operation Lifeline Sudan); **1993** Increasing international isolation of the government, forced Khartoum to convert to civilian authority; **1998** In response to terrorist attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, on 20 August, the US bombed a pharmaceutical factory near Khartoum that allegedly manufactured chemical weapons; Washington accused Sudan of involvement with Osama bin Laden, whom it believed to be responsible for the attacks on US embassies.

### DEADLOCK IN SUDAN

In January 2000, the main parties to the conflict in Sudan appeared to have reached a stalemate. During the week beginning 15 January, an oil pipeline was blown up for the second time and Canadian company, Talisman Energy was under pressure from the Canadian government for allegedly financing the war. Also, Sudan's Arab neighbours were increasingly suspicious of its form of Islamism.

Meanwhile, the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) were also counting the costs of the conflict. Although the desire for an independent south, or at least freedom from northern Islamic domination, remained entrenched, southerners were divided along ethnic lines and had become weaker militarily. Large numbers of SPLA fighters had become disillusioned with the fighting and had reportedly given up.

A 22 January *Economist* report suggested that pressure was mounting on SPLA leader John Garang to sue for peace and that the group had been deserted by many of its international allies: Ethiopia and Eritrea were embroiled in conflict and Uganda was involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a December 1999 agreement with the

Sudanese government promised to stop supporting insurgent groups within each others territory. However, there were still significant cleavages between the north and south. The south continued to resent perceived political and economic domination by the north.

Analysts suggested that peace in Sudan depended on resolving two key issues: the cleavage between north and south and the rifts between northern politicians. The latter was believed to be easier to achieve than the former: the removal of Sudan's Islamist parliamentary speaker Hassan Turabi from office had allowed the government to improve relations with two exiled northern politicians, Sadiq al Mahadi, leader of the Umma Party, and Muhammad Osman Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party.

However, whilst in exile, northern opponents of Turabi forged alliances with the SPLA to form a united opposition: the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Further, although the SPLA was nominally committed to a secular, decentralised Sudan, it was in practice at the heart of the southern secessionist movement, whereas the northern opposition preferred to maintain the unity of the country.

The IGAD had secured a commitment amongst all parties to a referendum on the future of the south, including the option of independence. However, Egypt strenuously objected to the break up of Sudan, primarily due to concern over the possible creation of a new state on the strategically important upper Nile region.

#### NGOS WITHDRAW FROM SUDAN

During the week beginning 28 February 2000, eleven aid agencies withdrew from Sudan after refusing to sign an agreement with opposition forces outlining strict guidelines for their continued operations in the country in-line with opposition objectives. UN agencies had not been required to sign. The eleven agencies claimed to be responsible for most aid deliveries in the country. Also, the European Union, which financed 40% of humanitarian assistance in Sudan, primarily via NGOs, had decided to halt further payments. Both national and opposition fighters were benefiting from aid deliveries, and the US Congress had urged that humanitarian assistance be delivered directly to the opposition.

#### SUDAN EXTENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY

On 12 March, the Sudanese Council of Ministers announced the extension of the state of emergency in the country for an additional nine months; it had initially been declared for three months in December 1999. Persistent internal feuding was cited as a prime reason for the extension.

A 13 March PANA report asserted that the emergency formed part of Bashir's campaign to rein in politicians he accused of attempting to wield influence over his government, including Turabi. Bashir subsequently disbanded the largely appointed parliament. He further ended the mandates of all state governors, some of whom were replaced.

## UGANDA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1962** Uganda achieved independence from Britain; Sir Edward Mutesa was elected president; **1966** Prime Minister Milton Obote seized control of the government; **1971** Colonel Idi Amin deposed Obote and began a period of autocratic rule; **1976** Amin declared himself president for life; **1979** Amin was deposed by a combined force of Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles; **1980** Obote won elections under dubious conditions; **1985** A military coup installed General Tito Okello in power; **1986** Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) seized power and Museveni was declared president; **1990** Museveni supported exiled Rwandan Tutsis' invasion of Rwanda; **1996** Museveni was elected president, but violence continued in Uganda, primarily against the extremist Lord's Resistance Army based in Sudan; **1997** Uganda assisted in ousting Mobutu Sese Seko from power in Zaire; **1998** Museveni subsequently helped try to depose Mobutu's successor Laurent Kabila; **1999** Uganda signed the Congo peace agreement, although fighting continued.

### CONTINUED INSTABILITY IN UGANDA

Attacks by the armed Ugandan opposition group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which had been operating on the Ugandan-Congolese border since 1996, had created some 120,000 displaced civilians in the area. An upsurge of violence since November 1999 had seen over 150 people killed. ADF attacks from bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) formed part of the Ugandan government's justification for its involvement in the DRC conflict.

In northern Uganda, the December 1999 peace agreement with Sudan had failed to prevent violence by the Lord's Resistance Army opposition group, operating from government-held Sudanese bases, creating doubts over Sudan's commitment.

## AFRICA GENERAL

### AFRICA MONTH AT THE COUNCIL

January was nominated *Africa Month* by the US during its presidency of the UN Security Council. The idea was developed by Richard Holbrooke, US Ambassador to the UN, after a tour of the continent in December 1999. Amongst other things, attention focused on: AIDS, refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and conflict. Analysts noted the foresight in seeing the Council's potential for discussing broad social themes as well as traditional security issues.

The AIDS debate had defined the rapid spread of AIDS in Africa as a potential security problem rather than just a public health issue. On the issue of refugees and IDPs, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata complained that no agency was currently responsible for IDPs and called for the establishment of new mechanisms to deal with issues relating to them. Experts pointed out that this raised difficult questions regarding to sovereignty.

Kofi Annan chaired a special session on conflict. He persuaded leaders to re-commit themselves to the fragile peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Holbrooke managed to ensure that all seven leaders involved in the DRC peace process were present, including the normally reticent President Laurent Kabila.

US Senator Jessie Helms, a notorious critic of the UN, also addressed the Council, where he invited representatives to speak to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee annually. Holbrooke claimed that this marked the beginning of the end of hostilities between Congress and the UN.

### DIAMONDS FUEL AFRICAN CONFLICTS

A 16 March *Times* report revealed that three diamond merchants in Antwerp were responsible for handling 80% of the world's rough diamonds. Meanwhile, a 15 March report from the UN Angola Sanctions Committee asserted that UNITA covertly sold diamonds in the city. The UN report cited lax controls in Belgium, and criticised the Belgian authorities for failing to crack down on suspect brokers, dealers and traders.

The *Times* report stated that UNITA had earned nearly £2 billion in diamond sales since 1992. Illegal diamonds from Sierra Leone also ended up in Antwerp. A recent report by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) further alleged that the neither the Belgian diamond industry nor the Belgian government were interested in the source of diamonds arriving in Belgium. The *Times* report

suggested that the findings were not only embarrassing for the Belgian government, which prided itself on supporting human rights, but also led to fears that Western consumers would consequently boycott diamonds.

But, diamonds accounted for 7% of Belgium's exports, while analysts conceded that diamonds were easy to smuggle and that it was difficult to determine their origin. However, the Belgium system could be tightened, as currently: diamonds' country of origin was decided by where they were imported from, rather than they were mined, allowing groups to channel the gems through other countries, while the industry was largely self-policing.

Belgian authorities pledged to introduce a range of measures, including: improving the diamond certification system; more rigorous customs inspections; and including UN observers in the Diamond High Council.

### AFRICAN INITIATIVE ON SMALL ARMS

On 15 March, ten African countries in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) signed the Nairobi Declaration, designed to stem the proliferation of small arms. The agreement pledged to strengthen surveillance and intelligence networks and to increase co-operation among police, intelligence and customs officials. A 15 March *UN Wire* report stated that there were an estimated 100 million illegal small arms in Africa.

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## THE AMERICAS

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### CANADA

#### LESS CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING SUPPORT

A 4 March *Economist* report suggested that the tightening of Canada's federal budget over recent years, combined with pressure for more integration into US military structures, was restricting the country's long-standing support for international peacekeeping efforts.

Canadians were involved in 65 different peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and in mid-1999 some 4,400 troops were deployed in peacekeeping. However, by summer 2000, although the Canadian contingent in Bosnia would be reinforced, withdrawals from East Timor and

Kosovo would reduce Canadian contributions to 3,000. Canadian enthusiasm was also dampened by an inquiry into torture allegations against Canadian peacekeepers serving with the mission Somalia in 1993 and other detrimental effects of involvement in operations. At the same time, Canada was spending a lot on upgrading its military hardware in order to increase inter-operability with the US.

## COLOMBIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1998** *Conservative Pastrana was elected President in place of Liberal Ernesto Samper; in November, Pastrana withdrew the army from a large area in the south of the country to facilitate negotiations; the demilitarised zone came under de facto FARC control; FARC met with American diplomats in Costa Rica in December; 1999 FARC suspended peace talks, insisting that the government must crack down on its paramilitaries; FARC then killed three US nationals in March; Washington increased aid to the armed forces, ostensibly for use against drug traffickers, and withdrew official contact with FARC until the killers were handed over; FARC launched a massive offensive during the build-up to negotiations with the government in the summer.*

### US ANNOUNCES AID TO COLOMBIA

On 11 January, President Bill Clinton announced that the US would provide \$1.3 billion in aid to the Colombian government and army. On the same day, the FARC broke a three week cease-fire launching attacks that left four people dead. A counter attack by the army resulted in 20 deaths - most of them members of FARC.

The aid was ostensibly intended to be used in the fight against drugs. The precise details of the donation were not released, but Peter Romero, assistant Secretary of State for the Americas, stated that it would establish two anti-narcotics battalions, trained and equipped by the US. A similar unit was already active in southern Colombia.

The US gave Colombia \$300 million in military aid during 1999, making it the largest recipient of aid after Israel and Egypt. Similarly, the trade in narcotics continued to flourish, and the amount of land used for drug cultivation was at an all time high. The new anti-narcotics battalions were to be 950-strong and the deal also included the supply of 63 helicopters: 30 Blackhawks and 33 Hueys.

Since 1998, the Colombians had also had an intelligence sharing agreement with the US and Romero confirmed that a budget had been established for anti-narcotics intelligence. Military

officials in Colombia stated that this would fund a US-built intelligence centre capable of receiving information from spy planes and satellites.

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright insisted that the donation was not part of a counter-insurgency programme. However, experts pointed out that the two were difficult to separate in practice. The new battalions would be trained in counter insurgency and would be required to engage the guerrillas who controlled the drugs. Increasing US involvement in Colombia led to speculation that it could find itself being sucked into the on-going civil war.

### ELN DEMANDS DEMILITARISED ZONE

During February 2000, the 5,000-strong National Liberation Army (ELN) was negotiating for its own de-militarised zone in the south of Bolivar department. In response, local residents opposed to such a development enforced their own participation in forthcoming peace talks with the government. Some 45 local farmers believed to be sympathetic towards the ELN were killed by right-wing paramilitaries in villages near the town of Ovejas. Also, the FARC rejected the paramilitaries' request to be included in negotiations.

In response to renewed international pressure, the government declared that security forces had killed 72 paramilitaries and had captured nearly 500. However, a Human Rights Watch report released during the week beginning 28 February asserted that at least nine of Colombia's 18 army brigades still maintained links with paramilitaries. Senior US State Department Official Thomas Pickering promised that aid would not be supplied to military units against which there was evidence of human rights abuses.

### EFFICACY OF MILITARY AID QUESTIONED

A 4 March *Economist* suggested that the quest for peace in Colombia in fact necessitated strengthening the country's democratic institutions towards guaranteeing security and justice for all Colombians, including demobilised opposition fighters. Colombia's armed forces required radical reform, as currently they were largely reactive, lacked mobility and relied over heavily on ill-trained conscripts. Ten years of US aid had so far enabled Colombia's national police to execute sophisticated anti-drugs operations but had failed to provide security for most of the population.

US policy resulted from perceptions that similar tactics had successfully reduced coca production in Peru and Bolivia. However, the report suggested that these reductions had in fact led to an increase in coca production in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, as sources for drug production were merely relocated.

## MILITARY COMMANDERS DISMISSED

A 9 March *Financial Times* report stated that, on 8 March, Colombian Vice-President Gustavo Bell announced the dismissal of at least seven senior military commanders on charges of collaborating with paramilitary groups. Bell, who is also Colombia's human rights co-ordinator, declared that his government was taking all measures to curb ties with paramilitaries.

On 5 March, some sixteen people had been killed in different incidents across Colombia. At least six suspected opposition sympathisers died at the hands of a 100-strong gang of rightwing paramilitaries in the village of San Miguel del Tigre.

## ECUADOR

### ECUADOR'S PRESIDENT OUSTED

Jamil Mahuad, Ecuador's first democratically elected President, was ousted in a bloodless coup during the week beginning 23 January. The coup was staged by a coalition of farmers from the Andean highlands, led by Antonio Vargas, and a group of nationalist junior army officers, led by Colonel Lucio Gutierrez.

Whereas the junta had reportedly planned to replace Mahaud's 17 month-old centrist regime with a populist government, in the immediate aftermath of the coup the head of the armed forces, General Carlos Mendoza assumed leadership of the junta and had ousted Mahaud. However, on 22 January, in the face of US warnings that a military government would face international isolation, Mendoza had Gutierrez arrested and handed power to Mahaud's former Vice President, Gustavo Noboa.

The post-coup regime reportedly appeared likely to command a greater level of support than Mahaud. However, experts noted that Noboa would have to deal with the same political and economic problems which had hamstrung the Mahuad administration. The economy was in a ruinous state: GDP had fallen by 7% and much of the banking system had collapsed in the wake of the *El Nino* flooding and the 1998 fall in the price of Ecuador's oil exports. The fiscal deficit had risen to 5% of GDP, inflation was at 61% and the *sucre* had been devalued by 65% against the dollar.

## HAITI

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1990** Elections monitored by a UN observer mission (ONUVEH) returned Jean Bertrand Aristide as President; **1991** Aristide was overthrown and exiled in a coup headed by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras **1993** Aristide was returned as president and a UN mission (UNMIH) was deployed to assist the peace process; however, UNMIH's military contingent was prevented from deploying and violence on the island increased; **1994** The Security Council authorised the deployment of a multinational force (MNF), prompting the Haitian regime to concede to resign and co-operate with MNF; the deployment of MNF allowed Aristide to return to Haiti; **1995** A relatively secure environment allowed MNF to withdraw and UNMIH presided over elections which returned Rene Preval to power; **1997** Successive evolutions of the UN presence resulted in the deployment of MIPONUH, with an exclusive police mandate; however, unrest has continued.

### SG'S MIPONUH REPORT (S/2000/150)

The 25 February 2000 report covered the activities of the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) since 18 November 1999 and progress towards a phased transition to an International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) by 15 March 2000.

### Political Situation and Elections

The security situation in Haiti was characterised by frequent demonstrations and incidents of violence and robbery. The political climate was dominated by pre-electoral activities which included election-related disturbances and organisational problems and delays. However, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) had thus far proceeded with the implementation of its electoral timetable towards holding legislative and local elections as scheduled on 19 March 2000.

A 4 January 2000 CEP conference secured commitments by many political parties to an electoral code of ethics binding them to pursue their electoral objectives by non-violent means. The voter registration campaign was launched on 24 January 2000, but registration began late some areas due to electoral violence.

### Haitian National Police/Justice System

Since November 1999, the number of capital crimes against police had declined considerably, while the number of officers accused of human rights violations and other abuses had also been declining for several months.

The Port-au-Prince Government Prosecutor Florence Matthieu was dismissed by the Minister of Justice on 10 February 2000 for alleged serious professional mistakes.

The former general of the Haitian armed forces, Claude Raymond, died on 9 February having been held in pre-trial detention since July 1996: this re-emphasised the need to address the issue of prolonged pre-trial detention and the non-execution of judicial release orders. After a long period of interruption, jury trials were held in several jurisdictions in December 1999, suggesting an increased commitment to restoring credibility and confidence in the judicial system.

#### **MIPONU Composition, as at 21 February 2000**

[*Special Police Unit (SPU); Civilian Police (CP)*]  
Argentina 110 (SPU); Benin 5 (CP); Canada 17 (CP); France 30 (CP); Mali 15 (CP); Niger 3 (CP); Senegal 6 (CP); Togo 7 (CP); Tunisia 3 (CP); US 23 (CP); Subtotal 110 (SPU), 109 (CP); Total 219.

## UNITED STATES

### **CLINTON TO CONSIDER NMD**

The failure of a test of the proposed US National Missile Defence (NMD) system in January led to speculation over its future. After signing the National Missile Defence Act (NMDA) in 1999, President Bill Clinton was due to examine proposals in summer 2000. The system aimed to provide defence for all fifty states against limited missile attack by supposed rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq or Iran.

Missile tests by the Pentagon were on-going, with the next scheduled for April 2000. The Department of Defence was due to report to the president on the technological feasibility of the project in June 2000. Clinton stated that he would base his decision on three additional criteria:

- An assessment of security threats faced by the US;
- The cost of the project;
- And its likely significance for US national security, in particular arms control agreements with Russia.

The Pentagon required two successful tests to continue with the system: sixteen more tests were planned, but a previously successful, more basic test reportedly worked more through chance than design. Failure of the April test would set back the project, but US law would still oblige Clinton to press on as soon as technology would allow.

Sceptics voiced concerns over both the feasibility of the project and its impact on the Anti-Ballistic

Missile (ABM) treaty and other arms limitation agreements. Analysts suggested that Republican Party members also calling for delays were holding out for a Republican President who would sanction more robust defence arrangements.

Senior Administration officials asserted that the NMDA would neither undermine the Russian nuclear deterrent nor harm the ABM treaty – provided Russia agreed to limited alterations to it. The North Korea rocket test over Japan in 1998 ended US Defence officials' belief that there would be a considerable wait before they faced a realistic missile threat from rogue states.

Continuing US/Russian negotiations during January did not progress very far. Analysts suggested that hopes for cuts in Russia's nuclear arsenal would be dashed if the US were to renege on the current terms of the ABM treaty, while Moscow also stated that under such circumstances it would consider itself free to review previous arms control agreements.

However, Russia also lacked funds to maintain its current weapons levels and also acknowledged missile threats from unpredictable states. Analysts suggested that agreeing to alterations in the ABM treaty would enable Russia to maintain a negotiated limit on defences, whilst possibly securing technical help and new limitations on strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Beijing was worried that missile defences in Asia and America would undermine its deterrent.

A 22 February *Financial Times* report asserted that the NMD test scheduled for 27 April was postponed for two months by US defence planners. The report suggested that, as a result, Clinton might not be in office long enough to decide whether to proceed with the project and that there were doubts over the Defence Department's ambition to have the system approved and completed by 2005.

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## ASIA

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### INDIA/PAKISTAN

#### **CONCERN OVER CLINTON'S INDIA VISIT**

In early January, India accused Pakistan of sponsoring and directing the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight. The hijackers had murdered one civilian passenger and had demanded the release of three militants opposing Indian rule in Kashmir; the terrorists' demands were eventually met. The incident exacerbated already tense relations between

India and Pakistan after the conflict in Kashmir and the military coup in Pakistan in 1999.

On 24 January, the Indian Defence Minister stated that Pakistan's nuclear capability would not deter India from pursuing a conventional war of self-defence in Kashmir. Similarly, President Musharaf stated that an Indian breach of the line of control would be met with decisive action. There had been an increase in the level of violence in Kashmir since Pakistan pulled out in July 1999.

In February, concerns emerged over the timing of President Bill Clinton's planned March visit to India. India and Pakistan had increasingly become the focus of US attention after breaking the global moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons in 1998. America initially imposed economic sanctions and exerted political pressure on both states to: roll back their nuclear programmes; sign both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and curtail their long-range missile development. However, most of the sanctions were later dropped and US diplomats began to urge restraint as opposed to actual roll-back. Some experts suggested that a presidential visit might be interpreted as acceptance of India's nuclear capacity.

The US continued to insist on Indian adherence to a number of measures, including to:

- the CTBT;
- make efforts to halt the production of fissile materials for bomb production;
- show restraint in the amount of warheads deployed;
- tighten export controls on sensitive technology;
- and improve relations with Pakistan.

However, India's 1999 draft nuclear doctrine had outlined the addition of hundreds of nuclear warheads to its arsenal. Furthermore, it was not clear whether Clinton would be able to persuade the Indian government to sign the CTBT after the Senate's failure to ratify it during 1999. Experts also noted that technical help from America to make India's warheads safer and more secure would be in contravention of the NPT.

### US/INDIAN RELATIONS IN FOCUS

Clinton's arrival in India on 19 March would be represent the first visit to the country by a serving US president since Jimmy Carter's 1978 visit. According to a 17 March *Financial Times* report, the US was attempting improve relations with India having sided with Pakistan during the Cold War era.

Analysts suggested that Pakistan had never been able to match India's conventional military superiority, but had been emboldened by its new nuclear equality. Clinton's decision also to visit Pakistan

came despite opposition from both Indian officials and many members of his administration. Analysts stated that the visit was intended temper perceptions that the attempted *rapprochement* with India would not alienate Pakistan, as well as to curb its further isolation which risked encouraging its political and economic disintegration.

Clinton wished to discuss with Musharaf the return to democracy, reinforcing anti-terrorism efforts and restraining the development of Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. Clinton also wanted to reinvigorate dialogue between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Pakistan was seeking international mediation over Kashmir, but India had opposed this.

However, the report suggested that tension would remain regarding differences over the nuclear issue. Efforts to persuade India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had not been improved by the US Senate's rejection of the treaty in 1999.

## INDONESIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE (EAST TIMOR)

**1975** In August, the pro-independence *FRENTIL* group won control of East Timor; Indonesia invaded in December; **1976** East Timor was annexed by Indonesia, although this has never been recognised by the UN; **1991** Indonesian troops killed up to 250 civilians at a funeral in Dili; **1998** President Suharto was replaced by Habibie in May, who pledged autonomy for East Timor; **1999** Habibie extended his pledge to independence; **May** Portugal and Indonesia agreed to a UN-sponsored referendum on East Timor's future status; in June, the vote was postponed to the end of August in response to attacks by pro-Indonesian militia in which government security forces were complicit; **August** The referendum was eventually held and overwhelmingly opted for independence; this prompted widespread violence throughout the province; **September** The Security Council authorised an Australian-led peacekeeping force (*INTERFET*) to help restore stability.

### VIOLENCE IN MOLUCCA ISLANDS.

During the week beginning 1 January 2000, violence erupted between the Muslim and Christian communities on the Indonesian Molucca Islands, resulting in over 400 deaths. Although Muslims made up 90% of Indonesia's overall population, the population of the Moluccas was divided equally between Muslims and Christians.

During ex-president Suharto's 32 years of rule, discussion of religious, ethnic or separatist issues was strictly prohibited between the two communities.

However, the removal of Suharto had allowed issues to resurface.

President Abdurrahima Wahid dispatched troops to the region to aid local police. Although there had been concern that the army was responsible for inciting trouble elsewhere in Indonesia, the local commander was keen to stress the armed forces' impartiality.

### **INDONESIA THREATENED BY INSTABILITY**

Violence again broke out on the Indonesian island of Lombok during the week beginning 22 January. Fighting between Christians and Muslims led to dozens of churches and homes being burned during riots in the capital, Mataram. Two people were killed and several thousand tourists fled to nearby Bali.

The spread of conflict across the Indonesian archipelago and the increasingly hardline positions adopted by military leaders led to speculation that a coup might be imminent in Jakarta. The armed forces were said to be uncomfortable about the potential consequences of human rights inquiries by the government and the UN: it seemed likely that high level military officials would be accused of war crimes in East Timor and Aceh in both reports.

Although the rumours were at best vague, American Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke warned against the severe repercussions for Indonesia of any such action. Wahid also cautioned that an attempted coup would be met with harsh response. Wahid attempted to defuse matters by asking the UN to leave the examination of atrocities in East Timor to the Indonesian investigators.

### **SG'S UNTAET REPORT (S/2000/53)**

The 26 January report covered events in the UNTAET operational area since 25 October 1999.

Before UNTAET's arrival, the administrative and security vacuum in East Timor meant that the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), a coalition of the pro-independence groups, and the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) had assumed responsibilities for local authority, and in some cases a security role.

After his arrival in November, in response to the administrative vacuum, UNTAET head Sergio Vieira de Mello and Timorese leaders established the National Consultative Council of East Timor (NCC). NCC comprised 15 members:

- seven representatives from the CNRT, including its president, José Alexandre (Xanana) Gusmão;
- one from the Catholic Church;
- three representatives of pro-autonomy political groups outside CNRT;
- and four from UNTAET.

### **Relations with Indonesia**

On 27 October, the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal was initiated to address humanitarian relief, while the World Bank took the lead in putting together a joint assessment mission, including agency experts and East Timorese, to assess longer-term requirements over the whole range of issues that would have to be addressed.

### **Security**

Following the arrival of INTERFET, there was little threat of violence for most people; however, the crime rate increased, as well as some attacks against returning refugees believed to have held pro-autonomy sympathies. Poverty and the lack of employment opportunities was exacerbating unrest.

There were continuing incidents on the borders between West and East Timor, particularly the Oecussi enclave, involving direct fire at INTERFET troops and at East Timorese civilians, resulting in injuries to INTERFET personnel, and injuries and deaths for some militia fighters. On 12 January, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), INTERFET and UNTAET signed a memorandum regulating co-operation in the border areas.

As of 24 January, 185 military observers were deployed in the mission area. INTERFET was to hand over to UNTAET in February. UNTAET's military component would comprise around 8,500 troops and military observers from 27 countries.

### **Humanitarian Situation**

On 21 November 1999, UNTAET's Humanitarian Component took over responsibilities for humanitarian co-ordination.

Under half of the East Timorese population had access to safe drinking water and sanitation before the referendum, and many water systems were damaged or destroyed during the subsequent violence. It was anticipated that some 35,000 homes would be repaired through UNTAET-sponsored shelter programmes.

At the time of writing, some 131,935 refugees had returned from West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. However, the conditions of camps in West Timor still caused serious concern; UNHCR estimates suggested that at least 157 of the 4,000 refugees in the Tua Pukan camp had died over a six-week period from malaria, diarrhoea and other illnesses. Pro-autonomy militias continued to impede access of UN personnel to the camps.

## **Governance, Public Administration and Justice**

A skeleton Governance and Public Administration Component was making efforts to create administrative structures to implement public policy and to deliver essential services; immediate priorities included:

- restoring infrastructure;
- providing basic social services;
- recruiting civil servants;
- and reviving trade and commerce.

The Transitional Judicial Service Commission was established on 5 January; it selected an initial corps of 10 judges and prosecutors and has suggested a list of 6 defence lawyers. In mid-January, UN civilian police and the East Timorese judiciary accepted responsibility for arrests and detentions.

### **Police**

On 7 January 2000, the Police Commissioner assumed his position; at the time of writing, 400 civilian police personnel had been dispatched to the mission area from 29 countries:

Argentina (10), Australia (41), Austria (10), Bangladesh (9), Brazil (10), Canada (11), China (15), Egypt (4), Ghana (26), Gambia (25), Jordan (16), Malaysia (20), Nepal (9), New Zealand (10), Nigeria (21), Norway (1), Pakistan (4), Philippines (21), Portugal (4), Russia (6), Senegal (19), Spain (3), Sri Lanka (29), Sweden (10), Thailand (2), UK (14), US (44), Zambia (1) and Zimbabwe (5).

The UN police were unarmed, although the carrying of sidearms could be authorised when deemed necessary. In co-operation with the UNTAET human rights office, the civilian police and INTERFET investigated alleged atrocities around the referendum.

### **OFFICIALS VISIT ACEH AND MOLUCCA**

Wahid and Sukarnoputri visited Aceh and the Molucca islands, respectively, on 25 January. However, apparently for security reasons, Wahid did not visit the provincial capital Banda Aceh, but instead travelled to the island of Sabang, which had not experienced serious violence.

Moreover, rather than holding talks with community leaders or with opposition fighters on possible solutions to the conflict, Wahid largely avoided discussing issues which had led to the violence.

Members of the Free Aceh Movement had previously stated that they would only negotiate if a referendum on independence was on the agenda. However, Wahid subsequently stated publicly that this was out of the question, for fear of sparking the break up of Indonesia. Sukarnoputri's visit to the Molucca islands similarly revealed little about the

government's plans for resolving the Muslim/Christian violence there.

### **REPORTS BY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS**

The UN and Indonesian commissions on human rights abuses in East Timor delivered their reports on 31 January 2000. Both asserted that the Indonesian armed forces had colluded with local militias in rape, torture, murder and the forced removal of thousands of East Timorese.

The report of the Indonesian commission named 33 people, including armed forces chief General Wiranto and five other military leaders, as liable to face further criminal investigations.

The UN report did not name names, although it did state that the violence in East Timor would have been impossible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the senior military command. It also called for the establishment of an international tribunal, held in both Indonesia and East Timor, to prosecute those who were responsible for the human rights violations. Wahid took steps to reduce the army's power by phasing out the seats which had previously been reserved for them in parliament.

### **STATE OF EMERGENCY IN EAST TIMOR**

During the week beginning 5 February, East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao appealed to neighbouring states that East Timor was in a 'period of emergency': there was no government and it appeared that the temporary UN administration would have to govern for at least a year. The CNRT, the closest body to a government-in-waiting, was internally divided and had been unable to agree on possible presidential candidates. Some of its members had fought one another in a previous civil conflict prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Gusmao insisted that he did not want the job.

The economy had also been decimated by the conflict. The World Bank estimated that the cost of rebuilding the economy could amount to around \$300 million over the next three years. Widespread unemployment had also encouraged crime.

On 10 February, after a spate of violence, UN police officers were issued with side-arms. A legal system was under construction and eight judges and two prosecutors had been hastily trained. The local population was reluctant to participate in the fledgling system for fear of reprisals.

In January, Wiranto had eventually agreed to be suspended and on 28 February, some 74 military officers were reshuffled. The report suggested that, as a result, senior military positions had now been filled with reformers, strengthening military accountability to the government.

## UNTAET ADMINISTRATOR RESIGNS

A 15 March *UN Wire* report stated that UNTAET Administrator Jarat Chopra resigned through frustration over negotiations on the World Bank-funded Community Empowerment Project, as well as over UNTAET's reluctance to establish a timetable for independence. Chopra further criticised reluctance by the UN to delegate responsibility to the local community, asserting that UN officials were using UNTAET as a means of personal advancement within the UN.

Francisco Guterres, a legal advisor to the CNRT further protested that East Timorese had been left out of decisions over the social and governmental structures. Gusmao further declared that UNTAET was less willing to use the robust rules of engagement than INTERFET had been, making it more vulnerable to violence by pro-Jakarta militias.

## ACEH SEPARATISTS SUPPRESSED

A 14 March *Financial Times* report suggested that the separatist movement in Aceh was being brutally suppressed by Indonesian security forces. Since its launch in January, the crackdown had claimed between 200 and 300 lives and had driven both violent and non-violent opposition in Aceh into retreat.

Many attacks were aimed against civilians and had led to evacuation of villages. The army had effectively been given a free hand in Aceh and Wahid's efforts at winning over the Acehnese were progressing slowly: the first trial of troops for past atrocities was scheduled in April and a forthcoming autonomy law would offer the island control over most of its domestic revenues.

## NEPAL

### INSTABILITY IN NEPAL INCREASES

On 16 February, half of the Nepalese ruling party's parliamentarians demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai; two days later 11 cabinet ministers resigned and then, on 19 February, 15 police officers were killed by Maoist opposition fighters. All of these incidents highlighted increasing instability in the country.

A 3 March *Economist* article suggested that the timing and nature of Bhattarai's eventual departure might further impact on Nepalese stability, where low-level insurgency already threatened to escalate. A weak government also reduced the effectiveness of negotiations and so the likelihood of a cease-fire. In response to government plans to give police wider ranging powers, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Asma Jahangir warned that violence from both sides would encourage further reprisals. The government admitted to 436 deaths at the hands of police during the year up to November 1999, while a significant proportion of the estimated 5,000 people arrested over the preceding four years had reportedly disappeared or had been tortured.

## SRI LANKA

### SECURITY TIGHTENED IN SRI LANKA

Security was tightened in Colombo on 6 January following the 5 January bombing of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's office, which killed thirteen people and injured twenty-four. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were believed to be responsible. The explosion was the third against Sri Lanka's political elite in as many weeks. President Chandrika Kumaratunga had been wounded in an 18 December attack. On 21 December, Kumaratunga had been returned for a second term with a 51% majority.

During the week beginning 21 February, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek revealed that he would broker negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Vollebaek had visited Sri Lanka earlier in February to lobby for support that Norway be appointed a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, and there was speculation over his genuine commitment to the peace process.

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# EUROPE

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## BOSNIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1980** Nationalist tendencies promoted by the death of Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia were accelerated during the 1980s by economic decline and the end of the Cold War; **1990** Bosnian Serbs rejected the results of elections in Bosnia; **1992** Bosnian independence was recognised by the international community, spurring inter-communal violence; the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia (UNPROFOR) was extended to Bosnia; **1993** UN safe havens established against Serb aggression were largely under-resourced and ineffective; **1995** Croatia's recapture of the Krajina region from the Serbs and NATO air strikes against them led to the Dayton agreement, ending the war. Bosnia was divided between a Muslim-Croat Federation and a Serb Republic, governed by a tripartite Presidency. A NATO-led force (IFOR) was deployed to police the agreement in conjunction with an international civilian component; **1996** IFOR handed over to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR); **1999** Military stability contrasted with continued nationalist political tendencies.

### SG'S UNMIBH REPORT (S/2000/215)

The 15 March report reviewed developments in the area of operations of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) since 17 December 1999. By 1 March, over 5,500 officers had been registered and 3,300 had been pre-screened for the Law Enforcement Personnel Registry. More than 320 minority police officers were attending courses or had already graduated from police academies in both entities.

Also on 1 March, the inter-entity Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters (MCMP) was established to facilitate inter-entity law enforcement agreements and to set up procedures for the recruitment and voluntary redeployment of minority police officers. Integration of specialised police forces had also been completed.

However, there was severe obstruction and delay to the integration of Bosniac and Croat police officers in canton 7 (Herzegovina-Neretva) and the establishment of the State Border Service.

By 1 March, 643 international Police Task Force (IPTF) officers were fully co-located at 204 local police locations. But, the continued presence of

mono-ethnic intelligence agencies within multi-ethnic police buildings continued to create distrust and apprehension.

New procedures and legal provisions for arrest and police custody were drafted, based on European standards, and were to be tested at selected police stations. On 20 January, the Brcjko District Police Service was established, involving 320 officers and comprising 45% Serbs, 37% Bosniacs, 16% Croats and 2% others.

### Observations

Annan complained that, despite progress in other areas, Bosnian Croat authorities had refused to integrate the Ministry of the Interior and the local police force on the west side of Mostar, while Republika Srpska has missed key benchmarks for minority recruitment.

UNMIBH was preparing to support forthcoming legislation being considered by the parliaments of both entities to review the qualifications, performance and appointments of all prosecutors and judges in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General commended the UNMIBH project to establish a Bosnia and Herzegovina police contingent for service in UN peacekeeping operations. The first such contingent, comprising 16 police officers from both entities and all three ethnic groups, successfully completed a two-week IPTF training course in February and was expected to be deployed to the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

### IPTF Composition, as at 1 March

Argentina 32; Austria 37; Bangladesh 29; Bulgaria 35; Canada 19; Chile 11; Denmark 29; Egypt 33; Estonia 5; Fiji 14; Finland 11; France 105; Germany 163; Ghana 98; Greece 7; Hungary 37; Iceland 3; India 123; Indonesia 30; Ireland 35; Italy 20; Jordan 117; Kenya 7; Lithuania 2; Malaysia 43; Nepal 18; Netherlands 52; Nigeria 15; Norway 21; Pakistan 113; Poland 51; Portugal 33; Romania 18; Russia 21; Senegal 16; Spain 53; Sweden 54; Switzerland 6; Thailand 5; Tunisia 2; Turkey 31; Ukraine 30; UK 77; US 176; Total 1,837.

Head of UNMIBH: Jacques Paul Klein. Head of IPTF: Commissioner Detlef Buwitt.

## CROATIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1991** As part of Yugoslav nationalist momentum, Croatia declared independence, prompting Serbs to seize eastern Slavonia and Krajina; **1992** A UN force (UNRPOFOR) was deployed to the area, primarily to protect humanitarian deliveries; **1994** A cease-fire between Zagreb and representatives of Krajina broke down over Krajina's political status; **1995** In March, a UN force (UNCRO) replaced UNPROFOR in the Serb-held parts of the country; a massive Croat offensive in August then recaptured Krajina and western Slavonia; **1996** UNCRO was withdrawn; a UN administration (UNTAES) was authorised to oversee the peaceful transition of eastern Slavonia to Croat rule; another UN presence (UNMOP) was authorised to oversee the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula; **1998** UNTAES was replaced by a UN civilian police presence (UNPSG) to monitor the performance of the Croatian police; later in the year, UNPSG handed over to an OSCE mission; **1999** President Tudjman died in December prompting hopes for a more moderate and open political system.

### SG'S UNMOP REPORT (S/1999/1203)

The 31 December 1999 report covered developments in the mission area of the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) since 12 October 1999.

Developments in the region had not allowed a further reduction of UNMOP personnel. Although the situation remained stable, neither Croatia nor the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had implemented a comprehensive demining programme.

### Demilitarised Zone and Confidence-Building

The withdrawal of Yugoslav Army units from the demilitarised zone was completed on 11 December 1999. The Yugoslav authorities then removed all restrictions on the movement UNMOP personnel, although Croatia continued to require UNMOP to provide advance written notice before patrolling the north-western part of the zone. The long-standing violations of the security regime in the UN-controlled zone continued unchanged.

Recommendations and options for confidence-building were conveyed to the parties by the UN Secretariat during October 1999, covering basic elements of the disputed issue, confidence-building measures and freedom of movement for local civilians, of which the full realisation of the demilitarised zone constituted an important step forward. The remaining permanent violations now needed to be addressed.

### Observations

Despite progress in stabilising and demilitarising the territory, Annan lamented the lack of concurrent progress at the political level. Confidence-building measures and moves to increase stability on the ground could supplement but not replace substantive negotiations. Under the reciprocal arrangements used in the negotiations so far, Zagreb was expected to host the fifth round of negotiations; talks should resume as soon as possible, at least at the expert level, hopefully as soon as the forthcoming elections in Croatia were over.

### Composition and Strength of UNMOP Military Elements, as at 31 December 1999

Argentina 1; Bangladesh 1; Belgium 1; Brazil 1; Canada 1; Czech Republic 1; Denmark 1; Finland 1; Ghana 2; Indonesia 2; Ireland 1; Jordan 1; Kenya 1; Nepal 1; New Zealand 2; Nigeria 1; Norway 1; Pakistan 1; Poland 1; Portugal 1; Russia 1; Sweden 1; Switzerland 1; Ukraine 1; Total 27.

The Chief Military Observer was Colonel Graeme Williams (New Zealand).

### NEW GOVERNMENT IN CROATIA

A 75% turnout at national elections in Croatia on 2 and 3 January saw a majority of 70% vote to remove from government the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was founded by the late Franjo Tudjman and had ruled since 1990. They were replaced by an alliance comprising Social Democrats (SDP) and Social Liberals (HSLs).

Analysts noted that the incoming government would be faced with deep rooted problems, including: public distrust of government officials; economic recession; international isolation; and highly centralised political power. The coalition pledged to diffuse political power and to curb the powers of the core executive. It would need a two thirds majority in order to reform the constitution. SDP leader Ivica Racan, tipped to lead a coalition government, would head the new administration. Racan also pledged to de-politicise the army, the police and the security services and to bring them under Parliamentary control.

Reform of the economy appeared to be a more formidable task, however. Croatia's GDP shrank by 2% during 1999, and unemployment stood at around 20%.

Croatia had lost international support because of Tudjman's refusal to fulfil the obligations of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Analysts suggested that Racan would have to confront some sensitive issues, such as encouraging the return of Serbs who had been expelled to parts of Yugoslavia and Bosnia. This was likely to be problematic since Croats now

occupied many Serb houses, especially in areas such as Eastern Slavonia and Krajina.

### CROATIAN LINKS WITH ICTY STRAINED

On 9 March, Prime Minister Racan welcomed EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten and other officials in Zagreb. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had requested the extradition of indicted war crimes suspect Mladen Naletilic. Naletilic was recently passed fit for travel following protracted delays due to ill health.

On 3 March, ICTY announced its longest sentence yet against Tihomir Blaskic, a Bosnian Croat general convicted of commanding troops responsible for the massacres of Bosnian Muslim civilians. In response to the sentence, some 5,000 largely right wingers protested in Zagreb.

The sentence was also believed to have wrong-footed the government, which had been trying to restore links with the ICTY following years of non-co-operation by Tudjman's government. The EU pledged only to reopen full relations with Zagreb on condition of evidence of co-operation with ICTY.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

### OPPOSITION PARTIES REMAIN SPLIT

An 8 January *Economist* report stated that, despite controlling most of the more sizeable towns, Serbia's main opposition parties were unable to mount a serious challenge to Slobodan Milosovic's continued incumbency, as their leaders in Belgrade were deeply divided. The largest opposition group, the Alliance for Change, had suspended its nightly rallies in Belgrade. Similarly, opposition politician Vuk Draskovic consistently blocked any initiatives for opposition parties to work together.

Internal divisions within the opposition parties were damaging their chances of electoral success. A recent poll in the town of Nis showed that although 20% of the electorate backed Draskovic in local elections, only 10% would vote for him in a national election.

Moreover, Milosovic had been consolidating political power by means of an aggressive propaganda campaign. He claimed to have repaired the worst of the damage brought about by NATO bombing and he had begun to place restrictions on the media. In late December 1999, Milosovic sacked three outspoken judges and expelled two formerly leading members of his ruling Socialist Party.

## GERMANY

### CUTS IN GERMAN DEFENCE SPENDING

Although all European states had reduced defence expenditure during the 1990s, Germany had made the sharpest reductions: in 1999 it devoted only 1.5% of GDP to defence, compared with the UK (2.6%), France (2.8%) and the US (3.2%). The 2000 defence budget was to be reduced by DM. 2 billion, with a further DM. 1.7 billion spread over the next three years.

These reductions could curtail Germany's role in the proposed European rapid reaction force, discussed at the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki. The cuts could also damage Germany's standing within NATO, while US Defence Secretary William Cohen complained that the reductions might also have a lasting impact on the whole alliance. Rupert Scharping, the German Defence Minister, further warned that the cuts could reduce Germany's capacity to play a part in future peacekeeping.

## KOSOVO

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1974** Marshal Tito's constitutional reform provided considerable autonomy for Kosovo; **1987** Slobodan Milosevic assumed power in Yugoslavia; **1989** Kosovo was stripped of its autonomy; **1991** Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo proclaimed independence; **1995** Kosovo was omitted from the Dayton agenda while the EU recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo as part of Serbia; **1998** Skirmishes in Drenica led to Serb security forces displacing 250,000 Kosovar Albanians; **September**, Milosevic agreed to cede some autonomy to Kosovo; **UNSC Resolution 1199** demanded a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Serb troops and the opening of direct negotiations; **October**, under threat of NATO air-strikes, Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal of Serb troops, a cessation of violence and the deployment of a 2,000-strong Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) under the OSCE; however, the KLA rejected the agreement; **December** Renewed armed conflict broke out between the KLA and Serbian forces; **1999** A proposed settlement during the second round of talks at Rambouillet was accepted by the KLA but rejected by Milosevic; **March**, NATO began an air campaign against Serb forces; **10 June** UNSC resolution 1244 confirmed the end of the war and established military and civilian missions in the Province; however, violence continued between Serb and Albanian communities prompting many Serbs to leave.

## **KFOR TROOPS ATTACKED IN MITROVICA**

On 20 February, Serbs attacked 2,300 US peacekeepers and UN police searching houses under a KFOR initiative to seize illegal weapons in Mitrovica, in response to escalating violence between Albanian and Serb communities in the town. Two bouts of violence over the previous two weeks had left at least 10 people dead and dozens injured.

Mitrovica was under the jurisdiction of French peacekeepers and the town's Albanian Mayor, Bajram Rexhepi, complained that KFOR was not fulfilling its obligation to protect the population. He further accused Belgrade of deliberately introducing police and paramilitaries to the region to encourage instability and to discredit the international community's efforts.

According to UN estimates, around a quarter of the town's Albanian population had fled their homes over the previous fortnight, while Serbs in the north of Mitrovica professed to feeling abandoned by the international community.

## **ALBANIANS FOMENT INSTABILITY**

In mid-February, Kosovo Albanian fighters were allegedly fomenting instability in Albanian-speaking towns within Serbia. Serbian security forces had been deployed in response, resulting in a flow of Albanian refugees into Kosovo itself, which in turn prompted Macedonia to place its forces on increased alert.

In Mitrovica, Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Bernard Kouchner, was attempting to maintain ethnic coexistence on both sides of the Ibar river dividing the town. There were still an estimated 2,500 Kosovo Albanians resident in the Serb-dominated sector north of the river in January, although intimidation was increasingly convincing them to leave. On 2 February, a bus carrying Serbs was hit in a rocket attack.

French peacekeepers were accused of bias towards the Serb community in Mitrovica as a result of their handling of inter-communal violence in the city. Consequently, NATO was patrolling Mitrovica with troops from other countries, including Americans who were most resented by Serbs.

## **KOSOVO PLEDGES NOT HONoured**

A 3 March *Financial Times* report stated that the continuing problems in Kosovo would be improved if pledges of resources and money were honoured by the international community. The report asserted that the problem was not related particularly to troop numbers, but KFOR was hamstrung on the use of some of these troops. Fears of casualties had reportedly convinced the US not to allow its

personnel into northern Mitrovica, requiring an increased French presence there.

More worrying was the lack of police. Although Kouchner had originally requested 6,000 international police, only 4,800 were authorised, and only half of that number had been deployed. There was also a dearth of prosecutors and judges. Although many administrative costs in Kosovo should be met through local customs duties and taxes, there was still a gap that relied on foreign donations.

## **SG'S UNMIK REPORT (S/2000/177)**

The 3 March report covered developments in the UNMIK area of operation since 23 December.

### **Political Situation**

The three major Kosovo Albanian political parties (the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, the party coalition of United Democratic Movement led by Rexhep Qosja, and the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK) led by Hashim Thaci) had started to work together in the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). All Kosovo Albanian parties were also preparing for eventual municipal elections in the course of 2000.

Kouchner intensified efforts to ensure the participation of representatives of the Kosovo Serb community in JIAS: an agreement in principle was reached between UNMIK and the Kosovo Serb National Council (SNC) regarding the need to enhance security, increase the UNMIK presence in Serb-populated areas and ensure greater access of the Kosovo Serb population to essential public services. However, these efforts were hampered by continuing political divisions within the Kosovo Serb community and the deterioration of the security situation in Mitrovica.

### **Security Situation**

Despite the severe security problems in Mitrovica, the international community was strongly resisting the *de facto* partition of the city. Kouchner was attempting to emphasise freedom of movement for Kosovo Albanians, security for Kosovo Serbs, and orderly returns for both towards establishing a visibly different administration for the town. Elsewhere in Kosovo, violent crime was generally slowing down.

Cross-boundary incursions by Yugoslav police were reported in the Gnjilane region from Albanian-dominated areas in Serbia. Consequently, international patrols along Kosovo's eastern border with Serbia were increased and permanent boundary checkpoints were set up. Armed Albanians in military uniform were observed around Dobrosin.

## **Transformation of Former Combatants**

At the completion of demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) on 19 September 1999, almost 6,900 rifles, 300 pistols and 900 support weapons and 300 anti-tank weapons had been handed in. An additional 1,300 rifles, 300 pistols, 81 support weapons and 18 anti-tank weapons had been confiscated from KLA members, while nearly 2,800 assorted weapons were confiscated from non-KLA Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic groups.

The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was formally established on 21 January; its total strength of 5,052 members (including 2,000 reservists not on active duty) was to be selected by early March; 10% of positions were reserved for minorities. There remained concern over alleged KPC involvement in illegal law enforcement activities.

## **UNMIK Police**

As of 1 March, some 2,361 officers were serving as part of the UNMIK police, nearly 65% of the total authorized strength of 3,618. In response to the violent outbreaks in Mitrovica, by the end of February 310 additional officers were deployed to the region. KFOR would continue to provide primary law and order services in the Pec region until UNMIK reinforcements were available.

Insufficient numbers of UNMIK police and the absence of special police units meant that responsibility for managing major public disorder incidents remained with KFOR. However, at least three special police units were expected to arrive in March.

## **Protection of Minorities and Human Rights**

There were continuing serious violations of human rights, primarily on an ethnic basis against Kosovo Serbs, Roma and Slavic Muslims.

The inter-agency Ad-Hoc Task Force on Minorities was working to enhance physical protection and freedom of movement of minority populations, as well as to engage in longer-term confidence-building measures. Initiatives to enhance minorities' security and access to basic services included: targeted deployment of KFOR and UNMIK police officers; installation of enhanced physical security measures in minorities' homes; KFOR-escorted UNHCR bus lines between minority enclaves; and a targeted distribution network for health care and food.

Human rights violations were also increasing within the Kosovo Albanian community, primarily against suspected collaborators with the prior Serbian authorities. There were reports of trafficking of women for prostitution. A shelter for women at risk was opened on 18 February.

## **Detained and Missing Persons and Returns**

An estimated 1,600 Kosovo Albanians were being detained in Serbia. As of 21 February, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that there were around 3,000 cases of mainly Kosovo Albanian missing persons since the beginning of the armed conflict in January 1998, but also comprising 400-500 Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. It was believed that many of these were dead.

Most Kosovo Albanians who had fled the province during the conflict had returned (830,000). It was estimated that more than 25,000 refugees, including Albanians, Serbs and Roma, were still in neighbouring countries. As of 1 February, it was further estimated that there were some 235,000 registered internally displaced persons from Kosovo in both Serbia and Montenegro.

## **Humanitarian Aid, Mine Action and Development**

Since June 1999, one of the largest international relief operations in *per capita* terms had successfully avoided another humanitarian crisis in Kosovo during the current winter.

The Mine Action Programme was to hand over activities to a national demining body in 2001. There had been over 424 mine-related casualties, including 92 fatalities, since June 1999. To date, over 16,100 houses and 82% of all schools had been cleared of mines, while over 2,740 cluster bombs, 2,430 anti-personnel mines, over 2,300 anti-tank mines and 8,400 unexploded ordnance had been cleared from public places.

Annan intended to phase out UNMIK's humanitarian affairs component by mid-2000 and the mission was now planning an orderly transition to development assistance. On 29 December 1999, Kouchner appointed 301 judges and prosecutors and 238 lay judges.

## **Penal System**

The prison in Prizren was fully operational as the first penal institution be staffed and managed by locals under UNMIK supervision. However, detention capacities were still inadequate. The main obstacle to opening more detention facilities was a lack of expert international staff to manage the facilities and supervise the local guards who were currently in training.

## **ALBANIANS ACCUSED OF RIGHTS ABUSES**

According to a 15 March article in the *UN Wire*, a UN human rights report stated that the KPC had not been adequately supervised: civilians had been detained, tortured and killed by several KPC members, and other KPC personnel had attempted

illegally to undertake law enforcement activities, had enforced local taxes on local businesses and had threatened UN police.

Also, US army officials stated that, as part of a lessons learned programme, the US military had begun extensive riot control training in Kosovo following attacks against unprotected troops by Serbian demonstrators in Mitrovica in February.

A 15 March *Guardian* report declared that Kouchner's decisions were being constantly second-guessed by the Security Council, while he had little control over KFOR. Kouchner was also struggling to convince foreign governments to contribute to reconstruction efforts in Kosovo, while Milosevic was trying to destabilise the province.

## MONTENEGRO

### MONTENEGRO CONSIDERS INDEPENDENCE

A 29 January *Economist* article reported that Montenegro was considering independence from Yugoslavia. President Milo Djukanovic, along with coalition partners in his government, apparently favoured closer links with the European Union and America. Djukanovic, who once supported the Serbian cause, also sought to portray himself as the only credible alternative to Milosovic in Yugoslavia.

Western governments advised caution. It was feared that a move towards independence might prompt civil conflict amongst the Montenegrin Slav community, 50% of whom defined themselves as Serbian. There was also concern that Milosovic might attempt to re-assert control from Belgrade, either by inciting trouble amongst the Serb diaspora in Montenegro, or by victimising Muslims in Serbia.

Also, the constitutional court of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) ruled that use of the D-Mark by Montenegro was illegal. A 28 February report in the *Financial Times* warned that the decision would exacerbate strained relations between Montenegro and Serbia.

Djukanovic's constitutional adviser accused Belgrade of political pressure and asserted that federal institutions were not recognised by Montenegro. According to the report, independent lawyers in Belgrade agreed that the decision had been politically motivated.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1921** Ireland was partitioned; **1939** The IRA bombing campaign began in England; **1949** The Ireland Act decreed that Westminster would decide whether Northern Ireland (NI) would remain part of the UK; **1969** British troops were dispatched to NI following riots in Belfast and Londonderry; **1972** Some 497 deaths occurred, including 13 killed by British soldiers on Bloody Sunday; the NI Stormont parliament was replaced by direct rule from Westminster; **1973** The Sunningdale agreement strove to introduce new power-sharing structure; **1974** Unions blocked Sunningdale and direct rule was resumed; **1984** The conservative party conference in Brighton was bombed; **1985** The Anglo-Irish agreement provided Dublin with consultative rights in NI affairs; **1994** The IRA and loyalist paramilitaries announced a cease-fire; **1996** The IRA cease-fire was suspended with bombs in Canary Wharf and Manchester; **1997** The Labour election victory in the UK prompted the IRA to renew its cease-fire and Sinn Fein re-entered negotiations; **1998** The Good Friday Agreement foresaw the devolution of power from London to a new assembly and NI executive, including cross-community participation, approved in referendums in NI and the Irish republic; **August** a bomb laid by the republican splinter group the Real IRA killed 28 people in Omagh; **1999** US Senator George Mitchell brokered talks between the parties in October; as decommissioning continued to dominate the Good Friday agenda; eventually, the NI executive was convened; **2000** The threat of UUP leader David Trimble's resignation in response to a lack of movement on decommissioning prompted new NI Secretary Peter Mandelson to suspend the executive.

### NORTH SOUTH COUNCIL MEETS

The first meeting of the Ministerial Council on 13 December, linking the government of the Irish Republic (the Dail) and the previously devolved administration in Northern Ireland, split Republican opinion. While Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness, the new education minister, described the council as a first step towards the unification of Ireland, critics dismissed the body as being impotent because of its limited jurisdiction and complained that it institutionalised partition.

Analysts suggested that the council was crucial to Sinn Fein's political strategy to gain representation in both the north and south of Ireland, arguing that party leader Gerry Adams had refused a seat on the council so that he could stand for election in County Louth, just south of the border with Northern Ireland.

## **RUC REFORM RESISTED**

Proposals to restructure the predominantly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) into a police force with a 50% Catholic membership and no overt British symbolism were met with protest during the week beginning 22 January. Unionists objected mainly to the symbolic reforms, such as changing the name of the force and its insignia.

UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson praised the RUC record, but insisted that transformation of the force was essential to the establishment of new political institutions in Northern Ireland.

Mandelson's plan incorporated much of the Patton report issued in late 1999; new recruits to the Police Service of Northern Ireland would not serve under that name until late 2001, while the date for the change of insignia was also deferred. Reforms were to be phased in gradually and with regard to the security situation. Reductions in the force strength from the present 13,500 to around 7,000 would come through voluntary redundancy.

Catholic nationalist groups generally supported the plans and the UK government asked them to encourage young Catholics to join the new force. However, Adams suggested that Republicans would withhold judgement until the relevant legislation was passed.

## **DECOMMISSIONING THREATENS COUNCIL**

On 4 February, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble threatened to resign as first minister of the Ministerial Council over the continuing lack of progress on decommissioning. He had promised his party's ruling council in November 1999 that he would resign if no movement on the issue had occurred before their next meeting on 12 February 2000.

Sinn Fein protested that the Good Friday agreement had set the deadline for decommissioning in May 2000, describing Trimble's date as artificial. Analysts suggested that internal divisions might have prevented Sinn Fein from taking action, as the IRA rank and file had lost confidence in the political leadership of Adams and McGuinness and were fundamentally opposed to the North South Council.

Eventually, Mandelson suspended the Ministerial Council on the grounds that Trimble's possible resignation represented a sufficient threat to the peace process.

## **AHERN URGES WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS**

On 12 March, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern urged the British government to move to withdraw troops from Northern Ireland, declaring that the

continued deployment of security forces in border areas remained a source of harassment and annoyance. He added that it would make a significant addition to confidence-building if the public felt assured that every organisation involved in the Northern Ireland was visibly rejecting a return to violence. All actors needed to ensure that the conditions of the Good Friday agreement were fully implemented, including the de-escalation of military dispositions by security forces.

On 17 March, Trimble raised the possibility of power-sharing with Sinn Fein ahead of IRA arms decommissioning, but only on condition of guarantees on disarmament. The suggestion came as part of a St Patrick's day speech during Trimble's visit to Washington. Previously, the UUP had been demanding that decommissioning precede a resumption of power sharing.

In response, Sinn Fein Chair Mitchel McLaughlin raised the possibility that the two sides could agree. President Bill Clinton had previously urged both sides to overcome their differences. However, some UUP members subsequently hinted at a revolt within the party.

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

### **CUTS UN BRITISH DEFENCE BUDGET**

There was speculation in the British press that cuts in UK defence expenditure had left the armed forces in disarray. Two Senior Field Commanders reportedly stated that a third of the radios used in Kosovo had not worked, that the standard artillery rifle was unreliable and that night vision equipment was inadequate. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) also released figures to Parliament which stated that only 53 out of the 186 RAF Tornado GR1/4 bombers were ready to fly, while only 34 out of 90 Harriers and 28 out of 76 Jaguars were serviceable. Further allegations centred on the naval fleet, including that it could not afford the fuel oil to put ships to sea and that those ships that were at sea had to observe a speed limit of 15 knots.

The MoD strenuously denied the stories, although it did acknowledge that the Treasury had secured £1 billion in defence budget cuts and that the MoD had been forced to find another 3% in efficiency savings.

In response, the MoD pointed out that, far from being grounded, 26 out of 42 ships were currently at sea and that most planes would be able to fly very quickly if required. They also stressed that all Royal Airforce aircraft on active service abroad, in the Middle East or the Balkans, were in proper working order.

## **BRITISH MINISTERS CLASH OVER NMD**

A 22 March *Financial Times* report stated that a rift had emerged between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MoD over America's National Missile Defence (NMD) system. In response to a question whether Britain would cooperate with the proposed system if it went ahead, senior Defence Minister Geoff Hoon asserted that Britain was historically sympathetic towards requests for assistance from Washington, while FCO Minister Peter Hain highlighted the potential conflict of interest between the NMD and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

The report asserted that Washington had suggested Fylingdales in the north of England as a site for ground-based radar to detect attacks against America. Hoon said that the ABM treaty was between the US and Russia and so it was debatable whether a deployment in the UK would breach the treaty. However, Hain declared that NMD might dominate the review conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York in April.

## **EUROPE GENERAL**

### **PROGRESS ON EU DEFENCE CAPABILITY**

In March, the European Union (EU) was due to set up its own political and military committees and recruit military staff towards establishing its own defence identity. It was anticipated that by the end of 2000 it would be able to take over defence tasks of the Western European Union (WEU).

Analysts suggested that a major hindrance to EU defence capability was EU governments' meagre defence spending, in comparison with the US. European countries lacked both equipment and experience of planning and running combined defence operations.

During the week beginning 26 February, EU observers were monitoring the first joint exercise testing procedures to enable the WEU to use NATO assets. Analysts predicted tension between European countries favouring a distinct EU defence identity rather than those who wished to continue efforts in close conjunction with NATO.

### **SOLANA REQUESTS MORE POLICE**

On 3 March, the EU security and foreign affairs representative, Javier Solana, urged EU justice and home affairs ministers meeting in Portugal to make more police officers available for international peacekeeping operations. He asserted that the strength of police forces should not be defined only in regard to domestic requirements. Solana

highlighted the need for more officers in Kosovo, or risk it becoming a source of political instability and a bastion of organised crime within Europe.

Military intervention represented only the beginning long-term international involvement in crises. Such complex crises required more than just the traditional means of foreign policy, including the re-establishment of law and order. European expertise in this area meant that EU countries had a particular responsibility, reinforced by the development of a common European security and defence policy.

### **ROBERTSON SUPPORTS ESDI**

In a 7 March *Financial Times* report, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson asserted that a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was necessary to match the EU's unprecedented economic and political unity and strength.

Europe needed to make a greater contribution within NATO to balance the US contribution. There were also likely to be occasions when Europe needed to take the lead in security challenges, which, in the post-Cold War era, were not related to the Soviet Union but were likely to be regional conflicts and internal conflicts within small countries. Such challenges would not necessarily involve the US.

Unlike in the more distant past, over the previous year the EU had taken steps to make ESDI a reality: including Solana's appointment and the creation of a Political and Security Committee within a supporting military staff to advise on security. The recent EU Helsinki summit had envisaged, by 2003, the establishment of a capability to deploy a corps 50-60,000 troops within 60 days which could be maintained in theatre for a year.

Robertson asserted that the new NATO command structure enhanced flexibility and was designed to enable European-led operations employing NATO capabilities and assets. Robertson revealed that the EUROCORPS headquarters, a non-NATO European grouping, would take charge of KFOR in April, under NATO command and with NATO troops.

However, there were still issues to be resolved, including:

- ensuring that non-EU members of NATO, including Turkey and Norway, fitted into EU-led operations;
- close NATO/EU co-operation;
- and coherent defence planning.

Robertson denied that this could lead to the break-up of NATO, as a fully separate European security defence arrangement without the US could not work in the foreseeable future; key US strategic capabilities included logistics and strategic lift.

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# MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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## ALGERIA

### FIGHTERS SURRENDER UNDER AMNESTY

The Algerian government claimed that 80% of Islamist opposition fighters had surrendered under an amnesty that expired on January 13. On 11 January, the government had struck a deal with the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the largest armed opposition group and the military wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), by which its units would be pardoned in exchange for disbandment; since 1997, the AIS had already been observing a cease-fire, and so its break-up would not directly affect security.

Analysts noted that whilst urban areas in Algeria had stabilised, rural areas continued to experience violence. Some 700 people had reportedly been killed between July 1999 and early January 2000.

There was little information on the groups which had not surrendered, although it was believed that they were among the most dedicated and extreme. A number of armed bands operating without central control were loosely referred to as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

After the amnesty expired, the army announced that it would take a hard line with opposition groups. However, foreign diplomats pointed out that the army had pursued counter-insurgency policies before without any great success, involving indiscriminately shelling areas where attacks were thought to have originated before dispatching tanks to mop up the fighters.

Analysts suggested President Abdulaziz Bouteflika was using the amnesty more as a means of consolidating political support than as a genuine quest for peace. In September 1999, an impressive turnout had approved the deal in a referendum. Bouteflika allegedly then bribed opposition leaders with key appointments. Despite coming to power with the support of a cadre of generals who dominate Algerian politics, Bouteflika pledged to dismantle their monopoly on lucrative imports.

A 29 January *Economist* report suggested that Bouteflika had not properly addressed the question of Islamic influence in Algerian politics. He had not lifted the eight year old ban on the FIS, which had looked set to win the 1992 elections until they were cancelled by the army, plunging the country into

civil war. It was suggested that Bouteflika's deal with the AIS was designed to undermine the authority of the FIS.

### FINANCIAL COSTS OF ALGERIAN WAR

A 28 February article in the *North African Journal* stated that, according to Bouteflika, the civil war in Algeria had cost the nation's economy some \$20 billion since it broke out in 1992. In 1995 alone, 1,040 state-owned companies, 2,850 individual houses and 156 state buildings had been destroyed by opposition forces. However, Algeria's oil and gas industry, which was the country's primary economic base, had been unaffected as it was protected by Algerian security services and foreign companies' private security teams.

## EGYPT

### VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

At least twenty people were killed during communal violence between Muslim and Christian communities in the village of Al Koseh in Sohag province on 31 December. Massive police intervention was required to stop the violence, which was the worst of its type for 20 years.

The fighting provoked fears amongst Egypt's 6 million Coptic Christians of a return to the violence of the early 1990s, when Islamist militants waged a war in the south, targeting Christians and foreign tourists as well as security forces. The insurgency cost 1,000 lives until imprisoned militant leaders declared a cease-fire. The recent violence did not appear to have been the work of an organised group although many of the tensions which had previously given rise to violence remained. Sohag province experienced widespread lawlessness and a low literacy rate, while government development funds were mainly channelled into cities.

In 1998, the police arrested 500 of Al Koseh's 40,000 mainly Coptic inhabitants. Many detainees claimed to have been tortured and there were further allegations of arbitrary arrests. However, the charges were firmly denied and the government took steps to improve relations with Christian communities: restrictions on the building of Churches were relaxed and lands confiscated from the Coptic church after the 1952 revolution were returned.

## IRAQ

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1968** Ba'ath party seized power; **1979** Saddam Hussein succeeded as president; **1980** War broke out between Iraq and Iran **1988** A cease-fire was agreed between the two sides; **1990** Iraq seized Kuwait; a US-led UN task force liberated Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, although Saddam remained in power; **1991** The cease-fire agreement provided for the UN to set up an observer force (UNIKOM) to monitor the Iraq/Kuwait border and, as part of Baghdad's commitments to dismantle its capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, a weapons inspection team (UNSCOM) and comprehensive sanctions against Iraq; in response to Baghdad's repression of Kurdish communities in northern Iraq and Marsh Arabs in the south, the UN established both areas as safe havens and no-fly zones; **1997** Saddam expelled US members of UNSCOM; **1998** Kofi Annan brokered a peaceful solution to the resulting stand-off; twice more Saddam halted weapons inspections, eventually prompting four days of air strikes by the UK and US; **1999** Baghdad confronted UK and US planes patrolling the no-fly zones, prompting periodic attacks against Iraqi military targets; **December** The Security Council agreed a new inspections team (UNMOVIC) and conditions to remove sanctions; however, there was still disagreement both within the Council and with the Iraqi authorities, and so progress remained stalled.

### UNMOVIC SUCCEEDS UNSCOM

In December 1999, the Security Council finally decided to replace UNSCOM with a new mission to inspect Iraqi weapons production: the Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans Blix (Sweden), was appointed as UNMOVIC head. After taking up office on 1 March, Blix would have 45 days to produce an organisation plan.

However, the Iraqi government stated that it did not recognise UNMOVIC's jurisdiction. Although President Saddam Hussein's government was still subject to sanctions, there were reports that foreign firms and governments were attempting to improve relations. UN inspectors reportedly estimated that the sanctions were being flagrantly ignored at borders with Jordan and Turkey.

Saddam's administration appeared to have further consolidated its grip on power. His security services were operating at full strength, and rumours of a protest against his regime from southern Iraq had died out. US intelligence reports suggested that Iraq

had rebuilt most of the buildings destroyed by American bombing in December 1998.

A 12 February *Economist* report suggested that, although food and medical supplies had increased under the oil-for-food programme, Iraqi officials continued to hamper distribution. American and British UN representatives put a number of humanitarian contracts which they regarded as dubious on indefinite hold.

### UN AID OFFICIALS IN IRAQ RESIGN

On 13 February, Chief UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator Hans von Sponeck resigned his post; and on 14 February, the head of the World Food Programme in Iraq, Jutta Burghardt, also resigned. Von Sponeck complained that the oil-for-food programme did not nearly cover Iraq's requirements for medicine or infrastructure support. He declared that UK and US vetoes at the UN held up essential contracts and that placing the blame on Baghdad obscured the effects of sanctions. Sixteen months previously, von Sponeck's predecessor Denis Halliday had also resigned over similar issues.

On 2 March, Blix announced that Baghdad should be given very little notice of UNMOVIC inspections, in order to enhance their credibility. Unannounced inspections had been some of the confrontational issues between Iraq and UNSCOM. Blix further intended to change UNMOVIC's organisational structure to help prevent individual governments from exploiting the inspection teams. He said that the UK and US bombing of Baghdad in 1998 and subsequent attacks against radar sites in no-fly zones had undermined inspections.

### ANNAN URGES TARGETED SANCTIONS

In a 14 March report, Kofi Annan urged the UN to adopt more targeted sanctions against Baghdad in order to temper their effects on Iraqi civilians, through lifting the cap on Iraqi spending on its oil industry. However, diplomats stated that the proposals would do little to improve the UN humanitarian programme in the country, as they did not significantly address foreign oil investment. In particular, China, France and Russia wished to restore trade relations with Iraq.

The report asserted that the UN's oil-for-food programme had raised over \$13 billion for food, medicine and other vital supplies; patient attendance had increased by 46% in 1999; hospitals were able to meet 90% of essential drug requirements; and sanitation had improved in 13 out of 15 provinces.

## MIDDLE EAST PEACE

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1985** Israeli forces established a security zone with the South Lebanese Army militia in southern Lebanon against terrorist attacks from the area; **1993** Following years of disputes between Israelis and Palestinians since the establishment of Israel after WWII, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo agreement, providing for a five-year plan to hand control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip back to the Palestinians; **1995** Rabin was assassinated by Jewish extremists; **1996** Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Israeli Prime Minister and obstructed the Oslo process; Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian Council; **1998** Under the Wye agreement, Arafat and Netanyahu appeared to achieve progress over interim issues of the Oslo Accords; however, it began to break down almost immediately; **1999** Ehud Barak was elected Israeli Prime Minister and pledged to advance the peace process with the Palestinians, establish relations with Syria and end violence in southern Lebanon; negotiations between Israel and Syria suffered setbacks, and hostilities continued in Lebanon.

### ISRAELIS OPPOSE GOLAN WITHDRAWAL

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak concluded a round of peace talks in West Virginia on 10 January. On the same day, 150,000 demonstrators in Tel Aviv protested against Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

The anti-withdrawal movement was largely made up of Golan settlers, many of whom had lived there for more the 30 years after Israel captured the territory from Syria. Despite the opposition, Barak remained confident that voters would accept a peace deal which would improve national security. Israel reportedly demanded the following clauses in the deal:

- extensive limits on Syria's right to cross the Golan plateau and the land around Damascus;
- verification and monitoring agreements, including an Israeli presence in a surveillance station on Mount Hermon under US control;
- full diplomatic relations;
- trade and tourism agreements;
- and Syrian controls over Hizbullah forces following Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon.

Syria argued that withdrawal should extend to the 4 June 1967 line, which reached the Sea of Galilee, whereas Israel argued that it would withdraw to the international border agreed by Britain and France in 1923. The difference was small but significant.

Other anti-withdrawal protesters complained at the reluctant negotiating style adopted by Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa. Although Barak downplayed the significance of this, analysts suggested it could affect public opinion, and a growing list of regional leaders, including - Anwar Sadat (Egypt), King Hussein (Jordan) and Yasser Arafat (Palestine) - all attested to the crucial role of public opinion in the peace process.

### VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

During the week beginning 5 February, fighting broke out between Lebanese Hizbullah guerrillas and Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. Having announced its intention to withdraw from south Lebanon by summer 2000, Israel protested that its soldiers could no longer be targets for Hizbullah. Further, after re-starting a dialogue with Syria, Israel had expected the Syrian's to exercise some control over the guerrilla forces.

Over the preceding fortnight, five Israeli soldiers were killed by Hizbullah anti-tank missiles fired into fortified Israeli positions. Hizbullah also intensified attacks on the Israeli-supported South Lebanon Army (SLA). Israel retaliated on 7 February, bombing three large electricity installations. Lebanese officials estimated the cost of the damage at \$40 million.

Hizbullah attacks on 8 February killed another Israeli soldier and on the same night, Hizbullah positions were bombed in south Lebanon. The fighting continued at lower intensity for one week. Whilst hostilities continued, American diplomats shuttled between all sides in an attempt to salvage the Israeli/Syrian/Lebanese dialogue.

Israel claimed that Hizbullah had escalated the conflict by contravening understandings to protect civilians, established in the wake of Israeli bombardment at Qena in southern Lebanon in April 1996, during which 100 Lebanese civilians had been killed.

Specifically, Hizbullah was accused of launching weapons from within Lebanese villages, while Israel also violated the protocol by targeting Lebanon's infrastructure, although Israeli bombs had not killed any civilians. Analysts interpreted the Israeli response as a move to coerce Syria into controlling Hizbullah.

### PALESTINIAN TALKS SIDELINED

Israel and the Palestinians failed to reach agreement over the finalisation for the framework settlement over outstanding issues by the 13 February deadline. Analysts suggested that the stalemate was the result of increased emphasis placed by Israel on a settlement with Syria. On 3 February, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rejected Barak's suggestion to

postpone the deadline for a framework agreement. Arafat was also unsympathetic to Barak's justification that domestic political difficulties had hampered tackling the issue of Jerusalem before the end of the peace process.

Israel's Peace Now movement declared that, since coming to power, Barak had authorised some 4,028 new homes in Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, 2,149 of which around East Jerusalem; Barak's predecessor Binyamin Netanyahu had authorised on average 3,000 new houses a year during his tenure.

### ISRAELI DILEMMA OVER LEBANON

On 5 March, the Israeli cabinet approved Barak's pledge to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July. However, a 7 March *Financial Times* report asserted that violence would continue unless the withdrawal formed part of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

The report suggested that, theoretically, a unilateral withdrawal should see an end to Hizbullah violence and, hence, rob Syria of a bargaining chip over the Golan Heights. However, Lebanon was likely to require Syrian approval before it would sign a peace treaty with Israel reining in Hizbollah or other armed groups. Thus, in fact, attacks could enter Israel itself, leading to reprisals against Lebanon. A unilateral withdrawal could also imply a military victory for Hizbullah and to suggest to that force would succeed in driving Israel from occupied territories.

### SYRIA RALLIES PAN-ARAB SUPPORT

Over the weekend of 13/14 March, a Foreign Minister-level meeting of the Arab League in Beirut urged its members to reconsider normalising relations with Israel if there was no progress in peace negotiations. Israel asserted that this would not help to revive the peace process.

Arab ministers had also suggested boycotting multilateral regional talks which had been re-launched in February. At the same time, Lebanon predicted that a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon could lead to another war.

A 16 March *Financial Times* report stated that Barak wanted to remove Jerusalem from the agenda of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks as he had failed to garner sufficient coalition support. Government officials declared that, as a compromise, Barak was to recognise the Palestinian state.

However, Palestinian officials warned that continued negotiations relied on Jerusalem being part of a final peace accord. Barak was eager to postpone discussion of the status of Jerusalem and officials claimed negotiation would be easier with Palestine as a sovereign state.

## WESTERN SAHARA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1974** Spain announced its withdrawal from Western Sahara and ordered a referendum to decide its future status as independent or part of Morocco; however, conflict developed between Morocco and the POLISARIO front; **1991** A cease-fire agreement led to the establishment of MINURSO to oversee the referendum. However, although the cease-fire largely held, disputes over voter eligibility delayed the referendum; **1997** Threats to withdraw MINURSO led to agreement over eligibility and the start of identification; **1999** MINURSO remained in place as the identification process continued amid persisting delays; prospects of resolution appeared bleak.

### UNCERTAINTY OVER REFERENDUM

A January Secretary-General's report stated that a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara would not be held until at least 2002. Since the establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), a voter eligibility dispute concerning the origins of the tribes had lasted seven years and resulted in only 2000 extra voters; eventually, an electoral roll of around 86,381 names was compiled. However, Morocco subsequently orchestrated an appeal on behalf of almost all of those applicants which the UN had deemed illegitimate. This meant that the process of compiling the roll had to be re-started. Analysts predicted that this could take up to two years.

King Mohammed, who assumed power in Morocco in 1999, responded to secessionist demands with a number of ameliorative moves, including relaxing restrictions on freedom of speech.

Analysts stated that, contrary to Morocco's hopes, nationalist sentiment was still strong amongst the Sahrawi: during autumn 1999, pro-POLISARIO Sahrawi demonstrators had clashed with Moroccan security forces in the worst violence in the disputed territory for nine years.

MINURSO reportedly pressed the Security Council to consider alternative programmes as a means of resolving the dispute. Western Sahara was viewed as the greatest barrier to regional trade amongst neighbouring states such as Algeria and Mauritania and there were fears that the violence could affect the stability of the entire region. UN officials returning from East Timor had reportedly questioned the prudence of a referendum in Western Sahara, fearing that Moroccan troops could follow the example of their Indonesian counterparts.

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# RUSSIA & THE FSU

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## CHECHNYA

### CHECHENS EVACUATE GROZNY

During the week beginning 31 January, Chechen opposition fighters evacuated Grozny, contradicting Russian plans to trap them in the capital and force a surrender. Chechen fighters had previously asserted that the evacuation was tactical, but in fact it came earlier than anticipated and suffered heavy casualties.

A 25 February US government report criticised Russia's human rights record in Chechnya, including cases of rape, beatings and torture of civilians during fighting in the town of Alkhan-Yurt. There had been little progress in bringing perpetrators to justice.

In mid-February, human-rights groups further accused Russian troops of killing dozens of civilians in Grozny, while conditions in the Chernokozovo filtration camp were reportedly abominable. During the week beginning 14 February, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, warned that Moscow's indiscriminate bombing in Chechnya must not be exacerbated by denying fundamental human rights.

In early March, Russian minister Vladimir Rushailo announced that Russian police were ready to take over from the army in Chechnya after the capture of the last opposition stronghold.

### CHECHEN NEIGHBOURS ANXIOUS

A 9 March *Financial Times* report asserted that Azerbaijan and Georgia were in danger of being drawn into the Chechen conflict as fighting had moved to the southern region of Chechnya and Russian forces were attacking opposition positions near the Georgian border.

Moscow officials accused Azerbaijan and Georgia of offering transit for opposition fighters and equipment, which both governments had denied. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided to expand its monitoring mission along the Georgia-Chechnya border. Analysts suggested that Georgia was central to regional development, which was already affected by de-stabilising factors such as the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and continued economic problems. Meanwhile, Georgia was also strategically important as a conduit for hydrocarbon reserves in the region and the US was eager to use Georgia to

secure newly independent states in the area under western influence.

On 13 March, Russian authorities announced the capture of the senior opposition leader and fighter Salman Raduyev. On the same day, the leader of a Council of Europe delegation, Lord Judd (UK), urged an urgent investigation into alleged human rights abuses by both Russian and Chechen forces, as well as negotiations between Moscow and Chechen leader Maskhadov. However, Moscow's spokesperson Sergei Yastrzhembsky ruled out this latter request.

## GEORGIA

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1991** Georgia's declaration of independence encouraged similar ideals amongst the large Abkhaz majority in Abkhazia; **1992** Despite the more moderate stance of new Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, Abkhaz dissatisfaction, with Russian support, developed into violent opposition to the Tbilisi government; **1993** An Abkhaz military defeat of Georgian forces, prompted a Russian-brokered cease-fire and de facto Abkhaz independence; the intended deployment of a UN Force (UNOMIG) to oversee the cease-fire was suspended as violence again broke out; **1994** A new cease-fire agreement led to the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force and the expansion of UNOMIG; the involvement of CIS troops spelled the end of Russian support for the Abkhazians and firmed up Georgian-Russian relations; however, Abkhazia declared sovereign independence, hamstringing the peace process; **1995** Negotiations re-opened the peace process towards Abkhazian autonomy; **1999** There was no real progress over the main issues of the settlement process.

### SG'S UNOMIG REPORT (S/2000/39)

The Secretary General's 19 January report covered events in the area of operation of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) since 22 October 1999.

### Political Aspects

The convening of the ninth session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on 18 and 19 January in Tbilisi represented a resumption of the negotiation process after a nine-month hiatus. The two sides reached agreement on:

- The protocol establishing a mechanism for joint investigation of violations of the Moscow Agreement and other violent incidents;

- The disinterring and reburial of Georgian remains buried near Sukhumi and assistance from the Georgian side in locating the buried remains of Abkhaz killed during the war;
- And further steps towards rehabilitating and using of the Inguri dam and power station.

They also agreed to revive negotiations on a draft document on peace and the non-resumption of hostilities.

Georgian parliamentary elections on 31 October 1999 returned the ruling Citizens Union of Georgia to power with a clear majority. There were no elections for the districts of Abkhazia; parliamentarians already representing those constituencies retained their seats.

Abkhaz “presidential elections” on 3 October 1999 re-appointed Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, and a subsequent cabinet reshuffle saw *de facto* Prime Minister Sergei Bagapsh, who had led the Abkhaz delegation in the Geneva peace process, replaced by Viacheslav Tsugba.

In November, Georgia and Russia agreed that Russia would withdraw two of its four military bases in Georgia by 1 July 2001, including the base at Gudauta, Abkhazia.

#### Observations

Refugee and IDP returns needed to be addressed urgently, initially to the Gali district in its old borders to enable the provision of humanitarian assistance and the establishment of secure conditions. The Secretary-General highlighted the prolonged absence of UNOMIG monitoring in the Georgian-controlled upper part of the Kodori Valley since the hostage-taking incident of 13 October 1999 and urged the Georgian authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in upholding security in this area.

#### UNOMIG Contributions, as at 1 January 2000

[*Military Observers*] Albania 1; Austria 5; Bangladesh 7; Czech Republic 4; Denmark 5; Egypt 3; France 3; Germany 10; Greece 4; Hungary 7; Indonesia 4; Jordan 6; Pakistan 6; Poland 4; Republic of Korea 3; Russia 3; Sweden 5; Switzerland 4; Turkey 5; UK 7; US 2; Uruguay 3; Total 101.

Dieter Boden assumed duties as head of UNOMIG on 24 November 1999; Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Pakistan) took over as Chief Military Observer on 31 December 1999.

## TAJIKISTAN

### CONFLICT PROFILE

**1991** *Tajikistan achieved independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Communist Party successfully implemented a coup in Dushanbe and installed Rahmon Nabiev as President, subsequently consolidating his position through rigged elections; 1992* *Tajik opposition movements combined as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the war began; the government resigned as a means to stop the fighting, but the Supreme Soviet, under Imomali Rakhmonov, seized power and installed a new government, whose crackdown on the UTO effectively ended the war; however, sporadic violence continued; 1993* *Russian and CIS troops were deployed in Tajikistan; 1994* *the Tehran Agreement established a cease-fire in the country and questionable elections returned Rakhmonov to power; the UN deployed an observer mission (UNMOT) to support the agreement; 1997* *The Moscow Protocol established principles for a political solution to the conflict; however, progress in the peace process has been very slow and sporadic violence has continued.*

### TAJIK ELECTIONS

Tajikistan held its first multi-party elections on 27 February for the lower chamber of the new parliament. International monitors complained that the ballot fell short of minimum standards, but analysts believed the results nevertheless represented an adequate reflection of Tajik politics. Since the signing of the 1997 peace agreement between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the government, UTO’s 5,000 fighters had been integrated into the Tajik army, UTO’s constituent groups had been legalised as political parties, and UTO representatives had been appointed to a third of the posts in the interim administration.

Observers suggested that forthcoming Senate elections would help to consolidate the peace agreement, but marginalised political groups were likely to continue violence on some levels. However, positive signs of economic growth since the peace deal were likely to encourage stability, and pledges of foreign investment would probably continue this trend.

A 4 March *Economist* report suggested that the political scene in Tajikistan was likely to have a regional impact: it was the first country to legalise an Islamic opposition party, providing encouragement to similar groups in surrounding states. The report stated that in 1999, Islamic opposition fighters led an insurgency in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan from bases in Tajikistan where they were provided protection by

leading Islamic politicians. Thus, the likely resumption of such hostilities in spring 2000 would test the solidity of democratisation in Tajikistan.

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## INTERNATIONAL

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### ECONOMIC BASIS FOR CONFLICTS

A 4 March *Economist* report suggested that, according to a forthcoming report by the International Committee for the Red Cross, competition for wealth and resources was becoming the major cause of new wars. Instability could derive from corruption and banditry, as in Sierra Leone, or in other cases, protracted wars which might have originated along ethnic or ideological lines were partly sustained by illegal trading.

For instance, the initially ideological conflict in Angola was now perceived as a contest for oil by the government and diamonds by the opposition UNITA; Khmers Rouges operations in Cambodia had been financed by illegal timber trading. The article suggested that fighting could provide cover for illegal trading and armies saw war as a means of accumulating wealth or of surviving.

The commercial basis for violence hampered resolution, as combatants with no political goals were less likely to be open to negotiation and would not welcome mediation. Thus, international initiatives to halt illicit commercial activities might be more effective, including interrupting arms supplies to private armies, banning illegal diamond trading or tackling the demand for drugs.

However, sanctions could increase the power of fighters through increased prices for smuggling activities in war zones. Thus, the third parties becoming involved in conflicts should bear in mind that their spending in war zones might encourage inflation and aid could support opposition groups.

### ANNAN DISCUSSES PREVENTION

In an article in *Economist 2000*, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that, over the following twenty years, people must learn how to prevent conflicts as well as how to intervene in them. Even the costliest preventive programmes were far cheaper in both financial and human terms than the least expensive interventions. A recent study by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict estimated that the cost to the international community of intervening in seven major wars during the 1990s, excluding Kosovo and East Timor, was \$199 billion. Inclusive of these two conflicts, the costs were around \$230 billion, whereas effective prevention could have saved most of this huge sum.

Annan outlined three main reasons why prevention had so far failed:

1. a reluctance amongst one or more belligerents conflict to accept external intervention of any kind;
2. through lack of political will at the highest levels of the international political community;
3. because of a lack of integrated conflict-prevention strategies within the UN system and the international community.

Annan argued that without the political will to act, no amount of improved co-ordination or early warning would translate awareness into action.

However, the Secretary-General warned that preventing conflict would be a difficult task. Although the costs of prevention would have to be paid in the present, its benefits lay in the distant future. These benefits were not often tangible: when prevention worked, nothing happened.

There were also major problems with institutional co-operation. Departments responsible for security within national governments and international organisations often knew little about development or governance; equally, those responsible for the latter rarely thought of them in security terms.

The UN argued that good governance, democratisation, respect for human rights and policies for equitable and sustainable development were key factors in conflict prevention over the long term. Democracies had far lower levels of internal violence than non-democracies and non-violent responses to conflict were the essence of democracy. Annan suggested that in an era when 90% of wars took place within states, the importance of the above factors could not be overstated.

There was also a reduction in the incidence of conflict during the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1992, eight wars had begun per year; the current average was about two a year. This meant that between 1992 and 1998 the scope and intensity of armed conflict was reduced by around 33%.

### **RWANDA FAILURE FUELS REFORM**

A 10 March report by the *UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)* stated that Kofi Annan had established a new UN commission to examine and make recommendations on UN peacekeeping operations, to be chaired by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi. On 7 March, Annan told a news conference that impetus for such reforms had been accelerated by recent highly-critical reports on the UN's role during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the 1995 fall of Srebrenica in former Yugoslavia.

The Secretary-General asserted that the new commission would improve clarity on what the UN was trying to do and getting nuts and bolts right when the UN decided to act. Annan declared that it was essential to examine critically past lessons and improve the structure and management of the UN response. The adequacy of UN mandates, particularly in relation to vulnerable citizens, had been rigorously discussed during recent Security Council discussions on the deployment of additional military personnel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It had been pointed out that some individual members offered much larger forces to peacekeeping operations under multinational force arrangements than when the UN itself was involved. Often, UN peacekeepers were given low and arbitrary ceilings on troop numbers while resources did not always match the mandate.

The Brahimi commission would examine the quality UN operations' mandates and the type of resources offered in support of such operations. The commission was due to report in July in time for the UN Millennium Summit in September.

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## DOCUMENTATION & SOURCES

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<b>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO</b>
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### **SC Resolution 1291, 24 February (S/RES/1291)**

#### *SELECTED EXTRACTS*

“The Security Council,

... Emphasizing that phase II of the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) should be based on the following considerations:

- a) that the parties respect and uphold the Ceasefire Agreement and the relevant Council resolutions;
- b) that a valid plan for the disengagement of the parties' forces and their redeployment to [Joint Military Commission] JMC-approved positions is developed;
- c) that the parties provide firm and credible assurances, prior to the deployment of MONUC forces, for the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and related personnel;

Decides to extend the mandate of MONUC until 31 August 2000;

Authorizes the expansion of MONUC to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers, or more, provided that the Secretary-General determines that there is a need and that it can be accommodated within the overall force size and structure, and appropriate civilian support staff in the areas, inter alia, of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical support and administrative support ...;

Decides that the phased deployment of personnel ... will be carried out as and if the Secretary-General determines that MONUC personnel will be able to deploy to their assigned locations and carry out their functions as described ... below in conditions of adequate security and with the cooperation of the parties, and that he has received firm and credible assurances from the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to that effect;

Decides that MONUC will establish, under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a joint structure with the JMC that will ensure close coordination during the period of deployment of MONUC, with co-located

headquarters and joint support and administrative structures;

Decides that MONUC, in cooperation with the JMC, shall have the following mandate:

- a) to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- b) to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all the parties' military forces;
- c) to develop, within 45 days of adoption of this resolution, an action plan for the overall implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned with particular emphasis on the following key objectives: the collection and verification of military information on the parties' forces, the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups referred to in ... the Ceasefire Agreement, and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- d) to work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military captives and remains in cooperation with international humanitarian agencies;
- e) to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces;
- f) within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related *matériel* to the field, including to all armed groups;
- g) to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers ...;
- h) to cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue, provide support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate other United Nations agencies' activities to this effect;
- i) to deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of mine action activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency mine action activities as required in support of its mandate;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence ...”.

## SIERRA LEONE

### SC Resolution 1289, 7 February (S/RES/1289)

#### *SELECTED EXTRACTS*

“The Security Council,

... Decides that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

... Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL shall be revised to include the following additional tasks, to be performed by UNAMSIL within its capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground:

- a) To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport;
- b) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares;
- c) To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;
- d) To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities;
- e) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction, authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil the additional tasks set out above, and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

Decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL, as revised, shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of adoption of this resolution;

Authorizes the increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical personnel of UNAMSIL proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 January 2000”.

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# POLICY DEBATES & ISSUES

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## **The P5 and the Slow Pace of Security Council Reform**

*THIS REPORT IS PRODUCED BY THE UN AND CONFLICT UNIT, UNA-UK, AND IS WRITTEN BY KARL LIMBERT AND ALEXANDER RAMSBOTHAM*

### **Introduction**

Kofi Annan's Millennium Report, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, released on 3 April 2000, highlights the urgent need for reform of the Security Council. In the report, Annan stresses that it is vital:

*To reform the Security Council, in a way that both enables it to carry out its responsibilities more effectively and gives it greater legitimacy in the eyes of all the world's peoples.*

Indeed, the size and structure of the Security Council has been contested since its creation. In 1945, many member states argued vigorously against permanent membership and the power of veto awarded to China, France, Russia the United Kingdom and the United States - the Permanent Five (P5). However, it was acknowledged that such arrangements reflected the overriding global political influence of the P5 and that, without these privileges, the US and USSR would not ratify the UN Charter. Thus, under Article 25 of the Charter, member states agreed to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council". In 1965, the number of non-permanent seats on the Council were increased from six to ten in an amendment to article 23, to reflect the increase in UN membership, and to improve representation of the African and Asian regions.

Pressure for reform intensified after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR, the rise of Germany and Japan as global powers, the relative decline of Britain and France and an expansion in UN peacekeeping had all combined to increase demands that the Council's membership and composition be reconsidered. In particular, member states argued that the existing permanent membership was anachronistic, that the Council's limited size was disproportionate to that of the General Assembly, and that the five regional groupings (Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Other States) were not equally represented. Indeed, Annan's Millennium Report stressed that:

*Based on the distribution of power and alignments in 1945, the composition of the Council today does not*

*fully represent either the character or the needs of our globalised world.*

### **Open Ended Working Group**

In response to the increasing concern of UN member states, an Open Ended Working Group was established in the General Assembly in 1993 to hear proposals and to seek out areas of agreement regarding Security Council reform.

However, apart from a handful of reforms designed to increase transparency in Council procedure, the Working Group has achieved very little. The most divisive issues have related to the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership and the use of the veto. This lack of movement can be attributed to two principal factors: the diversity of opinions over the key issues; and reluctance by the P5 to consider all but the most conservative proposals. With this in mind, we can examine the various reform proposals.

### **Permanent Membership**

There is widespread consensus that any expansion of the Council's permanent membership must include Japan and Germany, as the second and third largest financial contributors to the UN respectively, after the US. However, this would increase domination of the Council by Northern industrialised states and, in particular, the inclusion of Germany would give Europe three permanent seats. Moreover,

There is also broad support for extending permanent membership to states from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Non Aligned Movement (NAM), which accounts for two thirds of the UN membership, has stated that any such expansion must include two seats for Africa. Thus, inclusive of Germany and Japan, this category could be enlarged by six places. However, the P5 would be likely to reject such a proposal on the grounds that it would make the Council unwieldy. Moreover, other states have questioned whether financial contributions to the UN were a valid basis for permanent membership. The Foreign Minister of Mexico famously told the General Assembly that, if this were the case, then a permanent seat should be awarded to CNN boss Ted Turner, who has given \$1 billion to the UN.

The UK has proposed offering permanent seats to Germany and Japan and regional seats to Africa, Latin America and Asia. In this way, the political weight of Germany and Japan would be recognised and geographical representation in the Council would be improved. Arguments in favour of such a compromise include that the membership of other UN bodies already rotates on a regional basis, such as the western group in ECOSOC, where member states simply take turns.

However, arguments against include that the precise modality for election has not been specified in the case of the rotating seats for the Security Council, nor is it clear whether each region would have to elect states in the same way. There are also political problems. First, the NAM would be likely to oppose this proposal as it provides for only one African seat. Second, there are suggestions that, for reasons of fairness, all of the permanent seats should be occupied on a rotating regional basis. Indeed, Ambassador Fulci in 1998 suggested the establishment of a European seat. However, none of the P5 are likely to agree to such a proposal and the Brazilian representative in 1998 warned that there was a risk that such a trend could lead to the establishment of a United Regions as opposed to a United Nations.

### **The Veto**

The problem of the veto cuts across the enlargement issue, the most fundamental question addressing its continued existence. Since the veto has often been used indiscriminately by the members of the P5 to further their own national interests, often at the expense of the collective, there have been vociferous calls from inside and outside the UN for its abolition. Understandably, the P5 has resisted such demands and the Charter empowers it to quash any such move. However, the end of the Cold War has seen a marked reduction in the number of times the veto has been used, convincing many member states to suggest voluntary ways of limiting its effect. Germany, for example, has proposed that any use of the veto must be followed by an explanation before the General Assembly; the NAM has asked that the permanent members agree not to use the veto and to express a firm commitment to its being phased out in the long term; Italy has argued that the use of the veto should require the agreement of two permanent members; and other states have suggested restricting its use to Chapter VII issues only.

Another key question relates to whether new permanent members should be given the power of veto. The P5 have fudged this issue by insisting that the debate on offering the veto to new permanent members be postponed until after they have taken their seats. This contradicts repeated calls by the Working Group that the issues in the reform package be considered as an integrated whole. Ultimately, there would appear to be little qualitative difference between permanent rotating seats without the power of veto and the existing non-permanent seats.

### **Non-Permanent Members**

In response to the lack of movement on the veto and permanent membership, the NAM has also focussed on what it refers to as its 'fall back position' of enlarging the non-permanent membership from ten to twenty-one. This is a good deal more than any of the

P5 have proposed. The UK and US both support the creation of four new non-permanent seats for the Asian, African, Latin American and Eastern European groups. More importantly, the US and Russia have both told the Working Group that they are unwilling to discuss any reform issues outside the quantitative parameters of 21 Council members in total. However, the P5 are perhaps more likely to move on this issue than either the veto or the permanent membership.

A problem with the NAM fall back position is that it also includes a possible reduction in the representation of the Western European and Other States group in the Council. Since this could involve the loss of one permanent seat, the proposal is likely to meet with strong opposition from the P5. However, the fact remains that this group is over represented in the Council with three permanent seats and two non-permanent seats.

### **Conclusion: Effectiveness vs Legitimacy**

Kofi Annan's Millennium Report emphasised the inherent tension between effectiveness and legitimacy in the Security Council:

*The Council must work effectively, but it must also enjoy unquestioned legitimacy. Those two criteria define the space within which a solution must be found.*

As we have discussed, reform of the Council - probably through enlargement - is essential to increasing its legitimacy. However, the relationship between enlargement and efficiency is not clear. For instance, it is debatable whether the Council's present structure allows it to function efficiently. Recent events have highlighted the fact that the permanent members continue to pursue national interests over the collective. The Council was pressurised by China to abandon the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia because of that country's ties with Taiwan, while, as mentioned above, many southern states complain about Council bias towards regions where they have political, economic or other interests.

However, lack of effectiveness in decision making has been a common and vociferous complaint against the Council. A recent example was its failure to reach consensus over Kosovo, allowing NATO to take unilateral action without explicit Council authorisation. The P5 members have tended to use such arguments as the rationale for maintaining their exclusive positions. Here, the stance of Russia has proved the most entrenched. At a recent meeting of the General Assembly, Russian Ambassador to the UN, Sergei Lavrov, declared that

*[an] inevitable prerequisite of reform was the full maintenance of the full status of the incumbent permanent members of the Council.*

He also argued that the veto must not be touched since it had proven

*[an] irreplaceable tool for co-ordinated Council activities and to arrive at balanced decisions.*

Although such conservative arguments by members of the P5 are often perceived primarily as means to maintain their privileged positions, it should be acknowledged that there are genuine reasons behind their position. The predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations, had a much more cumbersome decision making system, vastly restricting its capacity to reach agreement. Article 5 of the League's Covenant required unanimity for most substantive decisions, allowing the national interests of individual member states to override the organisation's collective aspirations. Furthermore, this state of affairs dissuaded many powerful states from engaging fully with the League (the US actually refused to join), seriously diluting the League's authority and power. Thus, if only for pragmatic reasons, it is important to acknowledge the ideals of the P5 states and strive to secure their support for any reform measures that are introduced, without, however, pandering entirely to their more self-interested ambitions. Thus, while the various arguments relating to Security Council reform appear complex and intractable, the Secretary-General's recent statements have highlighted the necessity to reach agreement in order to maintain the legitimacy, authority and effectiveness of the UN as a whole.

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## CONFERENCES AND RESEARCH

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### **Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre**

The Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programmes.

Information on courses run by the Pearson Centre is available from the Registrar at:

Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100 Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada.

Tel: (902) 638-8611 ex. 109; Fax: (902) 638-8888;  
Email: registrar@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca  
Internet: <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca>

### **Peacekeeping Citation List: Centre for Defence Information**

For information on research in the peacekeeping area, contact Colonel Dan Smith at:

Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700; Fax: (202) 862 0708;  
Email: [dsmith@cdi.org](mailto:dsmith@cdi.org);  
Internet: <http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/>

### **UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping, including demining, mission up-dates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel contributors, rapid deployment facilities, and training is available on-line at:

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/>

### **UNITAR POCI**

The UN Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI) provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the courses is available on-line at:

<http://www.wm.edu/unpeacek/index.html>

### **University of Colorado**

The University of Colorado provides a website containing information and useful internet links in the field of peace and conflict research. It can be accessed at:

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# COMMENTARY

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## **The Basis of Russia's Contemporary Peacekeeping: Evolution and New Trends of Development.**

MICHAEL YERMOLAEV,

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STUDIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA

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### **Introduction**

New risks and challenges in the post-Cold War period convinced Russia to start a revision process of its views on the nature of national security and the role of the military in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Armed conflicts in the former Soviet Union forced Russia not only to establish its peacekeeping potential from scratch, but initiated employment of its military, police and civilian personnel in new types of missions, including peacekeeping and peacemaking. Subsequently, Russia became involved in all types of UN-led peacekeeping missions: from 1973 to 1998, Russia participated in eleven out of forty-eight operations.

Also, since 1992 Russia's military has been involved in so called CIS-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the "near abroad". Furthermore, Russia not only took part in peacekeeping training with leading western countries under NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme, but also, from 1995 Russia began to participate in NATO-led multinational operations, including in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This article considers three main issues:

1. exploring the main phases of the evolution of Russia's peacekeeping;
2. the fundamental legal and political framework of Russia's international peacekeeping.
3. and, in the light of NATO's actions in Yugoslavia and its new Strategic Concept, some perspectives on the development of Russian peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **The Main Phases of Russian Peacekeeping**

#### **The First Phase (1989-1992)**

Most changes that took place at this stage became possible only due to the beginning of Gorbachev's policy of *Perestroika*. In Particular, the USSR started the process of revising its policy toward UN peacekeeping operations. The USSR accepted the basis of "classic" peacekeeping. It also seriously

expanded its participation in those UN peacekeeping missions it considered relevant to its national interests: civilian representatives were involved in the operation in Namibia; and participation in UN military observer-type operations was drastically intensified. From April 1991 Russia's UN military observers (UNMOs) were involved in two newly established UN missions: "UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission" (UNIKOM) and "UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara" (MINURSO). From October 1991 to March 1993 Russia's military also took part in one of the biggest and challenging UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Furthermore, the Soviets from 1990 began to repay their debt to the UN special budget for peacekeeping and removed all "political" restrictions on employment of their military personnel under UN operational command. In particular, from spring 1988 Soviet UNMOs began to fulfil all types of operational duties in UNTSO, including patrolling in the Sinai, Israel and Lebanon (which had previously been prohibited by Moscow). Finally, the USSR started to perceive a useful role for the UN in managing the political settlement of armed conflicts world-wide, including in the areas of its former dominance in the developing world. Hence, the USSR co-operated actively with the US and other leading western countries in the design of the UN forces for Namibia, Angola, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Cambodia.

A distinguishing feature of Russia's foreign and defence policy from 1989-1991 was its orientation on the establishment of direct military-to-military contacts with leading western states, including the USA and the UK. Also, in spite of its traditional partner relations with Iraq, the USSR permitted the passage of the UN Security Council resolution in 1991 which enabled USA-led multinational coalition forces to intervene into the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

Finally, during the heads-of-state level UN Security Council meeting in New York on 31 January 1991, which was intended to demonstrate the final end of the Cold War period, the leading powers requested the UN Secretary-General "to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping". This resulted in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992.

#### **The Second Phase (1992-1995)**

This was the most controversial period in the history of Russia's contemporary peacekeeping. Russia's increased contribution to the international community's peacekeeping activities was notable. Russian military, civilian and police personnel began to participate in newly established UN, OSCE and

other international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions world-wide; in particular: from March 1992 in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia); from August 1993 in Georgia; and from February 1995 in Angola. Russian military also participated in Mozambique, from December 1992 to December 1994, and in Rwanda from October 1993 to March 1996.

However, Russian involvement in so called “near abroad” operations raised a lot of criticism. On the positive side, Russia officially articulated its adherence to the basic principles and norms of international peacekeeping, established in *An Agenda for Peace*. Also, the principles of “classic” or “consensual” peacekeeping formed the basis of the CIS collective peacekeeping regulations; in particular they were included in the Kiev Agreement on Collective Security Forces (March 1992) and Tashkent Protocol on Collective Forces (July 1992). Moreover, Russia contributed to maintaining peace in former “hot spots” in the “near abroad”, which in turn created conditions for political negotiations for peace settlements. For example, from 23 June 1994, Russia participated in the CIS-led operation in Georgia-Abkhazia.

On the other negative side, however, some key provisions of the mandates issued by the CIS Council for these operations were not completely fulfilled, including in Georgia-Abkhazia. There were criticisms that Russian peacekeeping operations failed to fulfil the requirements set out in the various CIS agreements and that Russia used the name of the CIS to give a cloak of international respectability to its pursuit of Russian national interests.

Drawbacks to Russian peacekeeping over the past decade include:

- the absence of conceptual vision and political and legal bases for the use of military force for peacekeeping functions;
- concession to national state interests;
- low effective training system for all categories of peacekeepers;
- and external factors, including the behaviour and technologies used for conflict management by the leading states, which have influenced the views of Russian politicians and military authorities on the character and limits of modern peacekeeping.

### **The Third Phase (1996-present)**

This phase is characterised by the further enlargement of Russia’s involvement in international peacekeeping; crucial factors determining such policy include:

- from 1996 Russia’s military began to participate in NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans. Such close and effective co-operation

demonstrated that Russia and the US\NATO’s military can collaborate effectively.

- and the signing of the Founding Act On Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation determined a vast field for strategic partnership, including in military fields. NATO’s and Russia’s respective military authorities were tasked with exploring a further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping operations and the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

In 1997-1998 the first ever joint Russian-American military research project explored lessons from operations in Bosnia. The possibilities of engaging Russia’s military assets during joint peacekeeping were examined, in particular the possibilities of using Russian strategic air lift assets. However, NATO’s role in the Kosovo crisis raised serious concerns in Russia about the nature of its relations with US\NATO in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **The Legal Basis for Russian Peacekeeping**

Contemporary Russian peacekeeping is based on several national federal laws and Presidential Decrees that established a legal framework for the employment of Russia’s military abroad. National laws and other acts predetermine the character of Russian peacekeeping, including general principles of the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

#### *The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993*

According to the Constitution, the President of Russia is in charge of all issues relating to the guidance of foreign and defence policies: *Russia’s military can only be sent abroad for participation in peacekeeping operations under Presidential Decree.*

#### *Federal Law: About the Defence*

Approved by the Council of Federation on 15 May 1996, this law asserts that “The Council of Federation decides the issue about the possibility of the employment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation”. Thus, Presidential power to send military for overseas duties is balanced by the *Council of Federation’s prerogative power to take the final decision* on this issue. In principal, the *Duma can use its budgetary rights to influence the decisions and plans* of the President of Russia.

#### *Federal Law “On the procedure of allocation of military and civilian personnel for participation in the peacekeeping and peacemaking activity”*

Approved by the State Duma on 26 May 1995 and signed by the President on 23 June 1995, this Law states that “Peacekeeping and peacemaking activities – are peacekeeping operations and other measures, which are applied by the UN Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter, by regional organs

or within the framework of regional organs or agreements of Russian Federation, or on the basis of bilateral and multilateral international accords of the Russian Federation and which according to the UN Charter are not enforcement activities (further on in the text – peacekeeping activities), as well as international enforcement activities with the use of armed forces, which are carried out under the decision of the UN Security Council, which is taken in accordance with the UN Charter for removing the threat to peace, break of peace or act of aggression”.

*Presidential Decree 1300: “The Concept of National Security of Russia”*

The Decree was signed on 17 December 1997 and represents a strategic vision of the present status of national security, the role and functions of armed forces in new geopolitical environment, and mechanisms and means which will be used by Russia to provide its national security and interests on long-term perspective.

A 1996 Presidential Decree established a special contingent, designated and trained exclusively for peacekeeping missions. The total strength of Russia’s peacekeeping force (RPKF) was determined as 22,000 personnel, that implies 17 motor rifle and 4 airborne infantry battalions, as well as support and service units. However, the character of employment of RPKF abroad, in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo, have demonstrated strong disagreements between high military command not only on the essence and norms of contemporary peacekeeping, but on the issues of what military formations are to be used for such functions.

### **The Political Framework of Russian Peacekeeping**

The political framework of Russian peacekeeping is based on national regulations, as well as rules and procedures adopted in the organisations under whose auspices the international peacekeeping is being organized, including the UN, OSCE, CIS or NATO format. In addition to the main legislative, presidential and governmental institutions dealing with peacekeeping, there is also the little known but important “Interagency Commission for Co-ordination of Russia’s Participation in the Peacekeeping Activities”, established on 19 November 1993 by the Council of Ministers. In 1993, the Commission determined conditions for participation in UN, OSCE or other international peacekeeping and peace making operations:

- conformity of PKO with the advancement of Russia’s national interests, fulfilling the goals of foreign and defence policy;
- the existence of international dispute requiring settlement through peaceful means or threat to the international peace and security;

- the presence of clear political aims and a clear mandate for PKO;
- the consent of the government (in cases of internal conflicts) and appropriate parties for the establishment of a PKO, except in extreme cases (violation of peace or act of aggression) and/or exerting direct threat to national security of Russia and its borders; close links between the establishment of PKO with tasks of assistance to the political process of peaceful settlement of the dispute;
- the availability of resources adequate to the mandate of a PKO, and readiness of proper states to allocate contingents and to provide financing;
- and a relatively clearly determined period of PKO in the mandate, and conditions for termination of the operation, because “entrance” and “exit” from PKO is as important as its establishment.

A solid base for future joint CIS peacekeeping was laid down on 3 October 1997, when the CIS Council of Defence Ministers approved the “Manual On Training and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations in the CIS”. Key provisions included:

- correspondence of decisions taken by the Council of the Heads of States on the conduct of PKO to international norms and the CIS Charter;
- the consent of the parties involved in the conflict on the employment of Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the zone of conflict;
- total impartiality;
- strict and precise fulfilment of the tasks, in accordance with the Mandate;
- guaranteed provision of health and life of Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF);
- non-involvement of the CPKF into the activities of conflicting sides, if their activities do not pose a threat to the personnel of the CPKF and are not directed to hinder the fulfilment of PKO’s tasks;
- openness of intentions and activities of the CPKF personnel in the PKO;
- participation as many as possible of the CIS states in the peacekeeping operation to give it impartial and objective character.
- anticipating incidents likely to provoke violence and undertaking timely actions to prevent them. this would allow the quick deployment of CPKF’s units interposing them between the two sides;
- the personnel of the CPKF must respect the host country’s laws and government’s authority.

Joint peacekeeping training and exercises between Russia-USA-UK and Russia-NATO in 1994-1999 enabled agreement on key provisions for Rules of Engagement (ROE).

In general, the ROE for a Peacekeeping force permit the use of (the minimum) force necessary for:

- self-defence or defence of other peacekeeping personnel under attack;
- stopping attempts to disarm or seize peacekeeping military or civilian personnel;
- preventing a forceful attempt to prevent peacekeeping personnel from carrying out their tasks;
- and defending peacekeeping personnel and property from attack.

### **Perspectives on Russian International Peacekeeping**

Three primary factors are likely to impact upon the character of Russian international peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

First, the character of relations and outcomes of Russia-NATO joint military peace support operations in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo).

Second, the character of state power in Russia, especially after Presidential elections in the year 2000. Support for involvement in international peacekeeping by a large group of politicians and military contrasts with a group of influential governors or heads of republics who complain that, under the present economic situation, Russia must drastically restrict its expenditure everywhere.

Third, status of Russia-US relations. Russia's strong opposition to NATO's military campaign in Yugoslavia brought a wave of anti-American rhetoric in Russia. After the end of NATO's bombardment, Russian paratroopers crossed from Bosnia and took control of the airport in Pristina. Officials in Moscow insisted that this was a defensive move to keep NATO from assuming complete control of what was supposed to be a UN operation.

### **Conclusion**

There are clear indications that Russia will continue to be involved in international peacekeeping operations. However, the scale of such involvement will depend upon a selective approach and strategic interests. In the medium term, Russia is likely to try to strengthen CIS Collective conflict management potential.

NATO's military campaign in Kosovo negatively influenced Russian-US and Russian-NATO relations. Contrary to the western position, Russia, China and India resolutely condemned not only NATO's air campaign as a means of resolving internal and international disputes, but also the manner and outcomes of such air bombardment against a sovereign state.

Russia could focus its peacekeeping potential on political settlement of existing conflicts and 'hot spots' in the territory of the CIS member-states. If Russia manages to establish CIS joint crisis reaction mechanisms, which subsequently may lead to the establishment of CIS crisis reaction force, this would allow Russia:

- to maintain stability in the post-Soviet environment;
- to defend its regional interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and;
- to be able to meet new challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Middle East.