

# UN & CONFLICT MONITOR

A DIGEST OF NEWS AND DOCUMENTS  
FOCUSING ON THE UN'S ROLE IN CONFLICT  
PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND  
RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING,  
PEACEBUILDING AND PEACEMAKING

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## EDITORIAL STATEMENT

The *UN and Conflict Monitor* is a quarterly publication produced jointly by the UN and Conflict Unit, UNA-UK and the Centre of Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. It aims to provide data and ideas relevant to the international humanitarian community faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. The *Monitor* includes information and documentation about peacekeeping deployments and policy debates. It is available on-line at the homepages of UNA-UK and the CCR (*see back cover*).

The *Commentary* section provides short commentaries from experts and practitioners. This issue features a discussion of the issues surrounding American plans to establish a National Missile Defence Programme, presented by Alexander Ramsbotham, Head of the UN and Conflict Unit, UNA-UK.

The *Monitor* is linked to a list of UK-based Conflict Resolution Organisations. Information in the list is updated regularly and contains a guide to internet links which provide a comprehensive survey of conflict analysis, conflict data and conflict resolution work world-wide and is available at the CCR web-site.

The regional sections of the Monitor comprise a digest of material taken from UN sources and the world media, including: All Africa News Agency; Angola Peace Monitor; Associated Press; The Economist; The Financial Times; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; Internews; Newsweek International; New Vision (Kampala); Panafrican News Agency; The Progress (Freetown); Reuters; The Telegraph; THIS DAY (Lagos); UN Integrated Regional International News Agency; UN WIRE; and The Washington Post. The digest does not necessarily reflect the views of the UN and Conflict Unit.

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# AFRICA

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## ANGOLA

### BACKGROUND

**1975** Internal violence followed Angola's achievement of independence from Portugal; the USSR and Cuba supported dos Santos' MPLA government, while the US, Zaire and South Africa supported the opposition force, UNITA; **1989** a UN force (UNAVEM I) was deployed to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops; **1991** The Bicesse Accords addressed the wider issues of the conflict, including elections overseen by UNAVEM II; **1992** On losing elections, UNITA reverted to violence; **1994** Negotiations led to a peace settlement, the Lusaka Protocol; **1995** UNAVEM III was deployed to monitor Lusaka; **1997** MONUA was established to oversee remainder of peace process; **1998** Violence continued between MPLA and UNITA; UN sanctions were introduced against UNITA, seen as the primary culprit; **1999** Deteriorating security induced the Angolan government to request MONUA's withdrawal by February; all out war ensued; **October**, UNOA was deployed to liaise with Angolan civilian authorities and assist Angolans in capacity building, humanitarian assistance and human rights.

### CHURCHES JOIN TO URGE PEACE

An 8 July *Economist* report highlighted the importance of Angola's Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches to a huge proportion of the population. In April, Angola's churches had established a joint committee, COIEPA, demanding that the ruling MPLA and UNITA join a national peace-building dialogue. However, following previous failed attempts at political cooperation with UNITA, the MPLA was continuing to resist all calls for peace through dialogue and remained intent on achieving military victory, enjoying the support of the UK and US in this.

However, COIEPA asserted that there was no end to violence in sight after 18 months of fighting, claiming that previous peace processes had failed because they had excluded ordinary Angolans. COIEPA thereby promoted the inclusion of churches and other civil groups in the peace process, rather than concentrating on the distribution of power and resources amongst belligerents. The *Economist* report stated that COIEPA had already demonstrated its power to mobilise people through significant attendance at rallies and other events, and the MPLA had begun to acknowledge its importance, at least rhetorically.

### SG'S UNOA REPORT (S/2000/678)

The Secretary-General's 12 July 2000 report covered developments in Angola since my 11 April.

### Political Developments

The political and military situation in Angola remained unstable: UNITA continued its guerrilla activities, causing an increase in the total numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. There was an influx of refugees into neighbouring countries, particularly Namibia and Zambia, and also an increase in tensions between Angola and Zambia: both governments accused each other of violations of territory, and the Angolan authorities alleged that Zambia continued to support UNITA. However, on 1 July 2000 it was announced that an agreement had been reached between the two countries to establish a 10-member Joint Verification Team to investigate charges of border violations.

### Military Situation

The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) seized UNITA territory in various areas and continued to reduce UNITA's ability to undertake conventional military actions. However, in response, UNITA reverted to guerrilla-type activities. In May, Zambia alleged that Angolan forces in pursuit of UNITA on Zambian territory clashed with Zambian troops. Similar operations carried out with the permission of the Namibian authorities resulted in the Angolan government taking control of almost all of its southern border. Namibian security had reportedly sealed the border in the Caprivi Strip to prevent the retreat of UNITA forces into Namibia. UNITA then reportedly carried attacks in Namibia.

### Human Rights & Humanitarian Situation

The overall human rights situation in Angola remained grave, but there appeared to be indications that the government might recognise the existence of abuses and would develop regular procedures to redress them.

The humanitarian situation remained precarious. Over 1 million people still relied on food distributions and an estimated 2.5 million people received some kind of humanitarian assistance. Only limited progress was made in improving general living conditions.

UN agencies expressed serious concern about the possible onset of hunger in certain locations unless urgent steps were taken from September onwards. WFP estimated that the number of people in need of food assistance would increase from 1.1 million to 1.5 million. Humanitarian access increased as new locations came under government administration. Road access remained restricted and over 70% of all humanitarian assistance was delivered by air. At the end of June, there were an estimated 2.5 million IDPs.

## Socio-economic Situation

The efforts of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to advance sustainable development were severely hampered by continuing instability. Some 78% of the rural population and 40% of urban dwellers lived below the poverty line. The economy also continued to face serious macroeconomic instability: by the end of May there was a 96.3% accumulated inflation rate. In urban areas, the continuous influx of IDPs and poor maintenance reduced access to piped water, education and health, etc. Agriculture and manufacturing production was very poor.

## CONCERN OVER FOOD PIPELINE

A 23 September *UN Integrated Regional Information Network* report stated that the WFP had reiterated its concerns over a break in the food aid pipeline for Angola after November and that large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were being created each week.

The new head of the UN Angola Sanctions Committee, Paul Heinbecker (Canada), returned from a two-day fact-finding visit to Angola. According to a 25 September *Panfrican News Agency* report, the Angolan government stated that it still awaited the arrival of 30 members of UNOA specifically mandated to monitor compliance with the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accord. Heinbecker had succeeded Robert Fowler in August.

## BURUNDI

### BACKGROUND

**1962** Burundi achieved independence from Belgium; **1972** Hutus wrested power from Tutsis, during which some 200,000 Tutsis were killed; **1987** Pierre Buyoya assumed power, allowing a Hutu cabinet majority and Prime Minister; **1993** Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu) succeeded Buyoya in presidential elections, but both he and succeeding President Cyprien Ntaryamisa were killed; **1996** Buyoya seized power militarily, prompting regional sanctions against his regime; **1998** Burundi's two main political parties, FRODEBU (Hutu) and UPRONA (Tutsi), agreed a political partnership and a transitional constitution although sporadic violence continued throughout the country; **1999** Nelson Mandela was appointed as mediator in the Burundian peace process after the death of Julius Nyerere.

## MANDELA PEACE OBJECTIVE

A 12 August *Economist* report stated that Nelson Mandela was aiming to establish a peace agreement in Burundi by 28 August, although Burundi's leaders and opposition forces were not being co-operative. Mandela's mediation team had drawn up a draft settlement plan, which the parties to the conflict were considering.

The proposal included provisions for a new political order based on justice, good government and democratic principles, as well as for the deployment of international peacekeepers, refugee repatriation schemes, reconstruction budgets and training programmes. The draft further recommended establishing a national truth and reconciliation commission and an international commission of judicial inquiry to investigate genocide and other crimes. Meanwhile, however, the conflict in the country continued unabated; President Pierre Buyoya had not demonstrated much enthusiasm in the transition to democracy and had criticised the peace proposal.

Support for the proposal primarily emanated from the predominantly Hutu Burundian Democratic Front (FRODEBU), which won elections in June 1993. However, its leader Melchior Ndadaye had been assassinated after only four months in office. In July 1996, Buyoya had ousted the last FRODEBU President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, in a coup.

Objection to the proposal mainly stemmed from the Tutsi population, who generally opposed any constitutional arrangements which might return FRODEBU to power, claiming that it had a covert genocidal agenda. The *Economist* stated that even Burundian moderates were opposed to the signing of a peace agreement while so many grievances remained unresolved in the country. Government insistence on a ceasefire before a political settlement was being undermined by the fact that opposition violence appeared to be increasing.

## SOME MOVES TOWARDS PEACE

A 20 September *Panfrican News Agency* report stated that an inter-Burundi peace agreement was signed in Arusha on 28 August. Buyoya declared that the agreement provided comprehensive responses to all issues relating to violence, including opposition forces' conditions for signing a ceasefire. Buyoya described a forthcoming summit in Nairobi to negotiate a ceasefire as an attempt by Mandela to convince armed opposition groups, who were expected to participate in the meeting, to join the peace process.

However, week-long negotiations in Arusha ultimately ended without significant progress, particularly in relation to the primary tasks of naming a transitional leader and forming an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC). However, a 2 October *TOMRIC Agency* report asserted that there was agreement that IMC membership be raised from 12 to 29 to ensure that all 19 parties that had previously signed the peace agreement were represented. Moreover, both Hutus and Tutsis agreed that each nominate three eminent Burundians for inclusion in the IMC; four other committee members would be nominated by the UN, the OAU, the Great Lakes Region and the Burundi government.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

### BACKGROUND

**1979** Colonel Bokassa was overthrown in a French-backed coup; **1992** Elections led to the accession of André-Félix Patassé; **1996** Patassé was challenged by three successive army mutinies; **1997** The Bangui Agreement provided for a comprehensive solution to the conflict, including the deployment of a French-backed inter-African peacekeeping force (MISAB); **1998** After the withdrawal of French support, MISAB was replaced by a UN force (MINURCA); **September** Presidential elections returned Patassé to power; **2000** Increased stability allowed MINURCA to be replaced by MONUCA in February to support peacebuilding efforts.

### SG'S BONUCAR REPORT (S/2000/639)

The Secretary-General's 29 June 2000 report stated that the political scene in Central African Republic (CAR) was dominated by the challenge to the government of Prime Minister Anicet Georges Dologué: the ruling Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC) was dissatisfied at the distribution of cabinet posts, particularly the selection of Dologué as Prime Minister. The government was also plagued by financial scandals. Two former mutineers were rehabilitated and appointed to key government positions and the revision of the Electoral Code was completed.

### Human Rights situation

There was an alarming increase in reports of extrajudicial killings and summary executions and the perpetrators appeared to be acting with impunity. UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCAR) and the Ministry of Defence undertook a short-term intensive human rights training session in May for 50 police officers, 50 gendarmes and 50 officers from the Central African armed forces (FACA).

### Military and Security Situation

The military and security situation remained relatively calm. As part of the security sector reform programme, the Special Force for the Defence of the Republican Institutions (FORSDIR) was dissolved and replaced by a Special Unit in charge of Presidential Security (UPS). However, police deficiencies meant that UPS was undertaking law and order-related tasks. Banditry was an on-going problem.

### Economic Situation

CAR's economic performance was encouraging, including a 20% rise in revenue generation since 1999. However, government expenditures needed to be brought under tighter control and the economy was facing new difficulties including the severe fuel

shortage. A donor meeting convened in New York in May received pledges of over \$38 million.

## DRC

### BACKGROUND

**1960** Following independence, the army mutinied prompting Belgium to redeploy troops to the Congo; a UN force (ONUC) was then mandated to restore law and order and oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops; **1961** ONUC was authorised to use force to remove Belgian troops from the Katanga province, which then renounced its secession; **1964** ONUC withdrew having largely failed to consolidate government authority; **1965** Joseph Mobutu established military rule; **1970** Mobutu became president and subsequently renamed the country Zaire; **1997** An opposition coalition, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, ousted Mobutu and Laurent Désiré Kabila took over as president; **1998** Former members of the coalition rose against Kabila; they were backed by Rwanda and Uganda due to Kabila's efforts to free himself of dependency on external support; in the ensuing conflict, Kabila received assistance from Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; **1999** In July, the main combatants signed the Lusaka peace accord to end the conflict; **July** MONUC was established to support Lusaka; **2000** Continuing violence hampered the full deployment of MONUC.

### NO PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE

President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Laurent Kabila abandoned an emergency summit in Lusaka scheduled for 15 August at the last minute. A 19 August *Economist* report stated that the armed opposition group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its ally, the Rwandan government, recently offered to establish a disengagement zone and pull back thousands of their troops from frontline positions. However, the proposal was conditional on the UN dispatching enough troops to fill the vacuum.

The report added that the Congolese had been regularly obstructing UN observers, vetoing missions to sensitive areas and hampering the arrival of peacekeepers. Former Botswanan President Ketumile Masire had been appointed as facilitator in DRC, to attempt to create a dialogue between government and opposition forces towards convening a national conference on the political future of the country. However, Kabila had repeatedly demanded his removal.

## SG'S MONUC REPORT (S/2000/888)

The 21 September 2000 report covered developments in the area of operation of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) since 12 June 2000.

### Political Developments

A summit of the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lusaka on 14 August failed to make any progress on advancing the Lusaka peace process, primarily because the DRC government refused to allow the deployment of MONUC troops to government-controlled territory and to accept as the neutral facilitator.

### Mission of the Special Envoy to the Region

General Abdulsalami Abubakar was appointed Special Envoy to the region. Kabila told the Special Envoy that the obstacles to Lusaka were the fault of "aggressors" and urged that the uninvited foreign forces be asked by the international community to leave without delay.

On 23 August, the DRC government announced it would authorise the deployment of UN battalions to Mbandaka, Kananga, Kindu and Kisangani. However, other essential measures were not authorised, while contradictory messages came from other government departments; Kabila subsequently demanded the renegotiation of Lusaka.

### Military Developments

The parties continued to conduct significant military operations and there were also signs of intensive military preparations. On 22 June Uganda began withdrawing five Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) battalions from DRC and undertook to withdraw the remaining troops in accordance with the provisions of Lusaka. On 8 August, Rwanda announced the return of 1,000 troops from DRC as well as a proposal for Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) troops to disengage from certain positions on the front line.

### Status of Deployment of the Mission

As at 15 September, 258 liaison officers and military observers had been deployed. Military liaison officers were deployed at the HQs of rebel movements and the four regional joint military commissions, as well as Kinshasa. Military observer teams were stationed in six other locations. Twenty-four liaison officers were stationed in neighbouring capitals. Technical surveys were undertaken, where possible, to assess various sites' suitability for the stationing of UN battalions.

MONUC set up elements of a logistics base in Kinshasa to provide support for the Mission headquarters and teams located in western provinces, while an interim logistics base was also established in Goma.

### Practical Measures to Initiate Phase II Deployment

The UN developed a list of practical measures necessary to initiate phase II deployment, including, *inter alia*: full freedom of movement of MONUC, joint air safety measures at airports, provision of and access to facilities at airports, presence of MONUC air operations officers at air terminals for MONUC flights, access to river ports and facilities, granting of communication licences and frequencies and resolution of the issues of the currency exchange rate and the imposition of indirect taxes.

### Humanitarian Aspects

The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that the number of displaced persons (IDPs) had risen from 4 million in June to 8 million in mid-September. UNHCR reported that the number of DRC refugees in the Republic of Congo reached 85,000, and as many as 20,000 Congolese refugees had fled to the Central African Republic. Humanitarian assistance could not reach a significant proportion of refugees because of the fighting or other difficulties. The number of persons estimated to be in critical need of food in DRC remained 16 million (around 33% of the population). The health situation also continued to decline.

### Human Rights

The human rights situation continued to cause grave concern. The situation in the rebel-held areas deteriorated significantly: it appeared that belligerents were pursuing a deliberate strategy to terrorise the civilian population. The situation in eastern provinces was particularly bad and frequently developed along ethnic lines. There were also many cases of abuse in government-controlled areas.

### Child Protection

Although Kabila signed a decree banning the recruitment of children under the age of 18 into the armed forces and the deployment of child soldiers to combat zones, reports from MONUC observers indicated that the belligerent parties continued to recruit children.

### MONUC Contributions as at 15 September 2000

[*Military Observers (MO); Staff Officers (SO) Total (T)*]

Algeria 12 (MO); 1 (SO); 13 (T); Bangladesh 9 (MO); 7 (SO); 16 (T); Benin 5 (MO); 3 (SO); 8 (T); Belgium 1 (MO); 1 (T); Bolivia 2 (MO); 2 (T); Burkina Faso 2 (MO); 2 (T); Canada 2 (MO); 2 (T); Czech Republic 3 (MO); 1 (SO); 4 (T); Denmark 1 (MO); 1 (SO); 2 (T); Egypt 12 (MO); 12 (T); France 1 (MO); 2 (SO); 3 (T); Ghana 8 (MO); 8 (T); India 8 (MO); 3 (SO); 11 (T); Jordan 2 (MO); (SO); 2 (T); Kenya 5 (MO); (SO); 5 (T); Libya 4 (MO); (SO); 4 (T); Malaysia 2 (MO); 7 (SO); 9 (T); Mali 3 (MO); 3 (T); Morocco 4 (MO); 4

(T); Nepal 9 (MO); 9 (T); Niger 2 (MO); 1 (SO); 3 (T); Nigeria 6 (MO); 6 (T); Pakistan 14 (MO); 13 (SO); 27 (T); Peru 3 (MO); 3 (T); Poland 1 (MO); 1 (T); Romania 11 (MO); 1 (SO); 12 (T); Russia 5 (MO); (SO); 5 (T); Senegal 13 (MO); 17 (SO); 30 (T); Sweden 1 (MO); 1 (T); Switzerland 1 (MO); 1 (T); Tunisia 6 (MO); 6 (T); Ukraine 4 (MO); 4 (T); UK 4 (MO); 4 (T); Tanzania 6 (MO); 1 (SO); 7 (T); Uruguay 11 (MO); 8 (SO); 19 (T); Zambia 9 (MO); 9 (T); Total 179 (MO); 79 (SO); 258 (T).

## EU URGES CEASEFIRE

A 25 September *Panafrican News Agency* report revealed that the European Union (EU) had warned that proposals to suspend implementation of the DRC ceasefire agreement could induce a resumption of hostilities in the country and jeopardise the proposed UN peacekeeping operation there. It added that the ceasefire was essential to the advancement of the Lusaka peace agreement, which remained the only consensual basis for a negotiated solution to the DRC conflict.

## ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

### BACKGROUND

**1970s-80s** Regular challenges to Mengistu's Communist Dergue government; **1989** Combined forces from Tigre and Eritrea won military victories in Ethiopia's northern Tigre province; **1991** Mengistu fled Addis Ababa and Meles Zenawi assumed power; **1993** Eritrea achieved independence; **1998** Continuing disagreements over border demarcation led to conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Badme region; an externally arranged cease-fire was agreed to facilitate peace negotiations, but was mainly used by both sides to regroup for further fighting; **1999** Fighting again broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia and also extended into Somalia; **2000** Military victory for Ethiopia led to a ceasefire in June; **September** UNMEE was authorised to support the peace process.

### SG'S UNMEE REPORT (S/2000/785)

Kofi Annan's 9 August 2000 report reflected the findings of a reconnaissance mission dispatched to the region to discuss with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the parties the modalities of possible UN assistance for the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Algiers on 18 June 2000, including the deployment of a UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

### Political Developments

Proximity talks in Washington, D.C., on 3, 5 and 6 July 2000 included discussion on modalities for the delimitation and demarcation of their mutual border, although no formal statement was reached.

## Humanitarian Developments

### Eritrea

By June 2000 there were reportedly over 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Eritrea and some 94,000 Eritrean refugees in the Sudan. On 4 July, UNHCR and the governments of the Sudan and Eritrea signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary repatriation of Eritrean refugees. Many potential returnees had had their homes and assets destroyed. Only 39.2% of the humanitarian appeal fund was pledged by 1 July 2000. There was concern that relief food stocks would run out by September 2000.

### Ethiopia

Severe drought in Ethiopia caused significant migrations, increased malnutrition, large livestock losses, a higher incidence of diseases and an increase in the overall vulnerability of the rural population. The government estimated that over 10 million people needed emergency assistance as of early July 2000. Landmines and unexploded ordnance were a serious impediment to resettlement activities.

## UNMEE

### Proposed Mandate

Liaison officers were consulting at the parties' military headquarters and OAU. The deployment of the military observers, administrative support and other civilian personnel authorised would begin shortly.

In accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and on the basis of the findings of a multidisciplinary reconnaissance mission dispatched to the area, the UNMEE mandate would be to:

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Assist in ensuring the observance of agreed security commitments;
- (c) Monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998;
- (d) Monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;
- (e) Simultaneously, monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that were to remain 25 km from Ethiopian positions;
- (f) Monitor the temporary security zone;
- (g) Chair the Military Coordination Commission, to be established in accordance with the Agreement;
- (h) Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it;
- (i) Coordinate UNMEE's activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian activities in those areas.

### Structure and Concept of Operations

UNMEE would comprise political, military, public information, mine action and administrative

components. The special representative would have overall authority for the activities of the mission and of the UN system in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it and would have observer status at proximity to achieve a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict.

### Political Component

The political component would assist in liaison with the parties; address arising political issues; maintain liaison with OAU; keep abreast of political developments; report to UNHQ; and assist in the coordination of activities and information sharing with UN country teams.

### Military Component

UNMEE's main military tasks would be:

- to monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement;
- to confirm the redeployment of Ethiopian troops;
- to confirm that Eritrean troops remained at a distance of 25 km from the Ethiopian forces;
- and to supervise the temporary security zone.

The joint OAU/UN Military Coordination Commission would address parties' military concerns relating to UNMEE.

UNMEE required 4,200 personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions and necessary support units.

Military observer groups would provide continuous liaison to the parties' military HQs. Battalions would primarily maintain static checkpoints and would provide security for members of the MCC. UNMEE would require engineering assets, primarily tasked for mine clearance. Poor infrastructure meant that UNMEE would also require significant air assets. UNMEE HQ would include a training cell to provide induction and ongoing training to military and civil personnel of the mission.

### Mine Action Component

Primary responsibility for demining rested with the parties, but the extent of the problem was beyond their capacities. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was preparing a mine action assistance programme to provide and coordinate mine action.

### Public Information Component

In order to disseminate objective information on UNMEE's, UNMEE would undertake public information activities through: media relations, radio broadcast, television broadcast, publications and media monitoring.

### Deployment of the mission

The mission would be deployed in three phases:

- (a) *Phase one.* Liaison officers to parties' capitals;
- (b) *Phase two.* Up to 100 military observers and support staff, in order to: establish and maintain

liaison with the parties in the field; visit the parties' military HQs; prepare for the establishment of the MCC; and assist in planning for UNMEE. The special representative and force commander would be appointed and the necessary administrative and logistic staff, as well as essential elements of the political and public information components, the mine action coordination centre and the mine action liaison offices, would also be deployed;

- (c) *Phase three.* Deployment of the full peacekeeping operation.

### Coordination with OAU

The OAU was to undertake liaison functions and representation of the MCC. UN/OAU cooperation with OAU would be ensured through:

- (a) UNMEE providing logistic assistance and security for OAU participation in joint activities;
- (b) Close consultation and coordination between UN and OAU through their respective offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara;
- (c) OAU capital and sector liaison officers would be invited to join UNMEE personnel in their operational tasks;
- (d) Consultations would be between the UNMEE head and senior OAU personnel.

### UN OBSERVERS DEPLOYED

A 26 September *UN Integrated Regional Information Network* report stated that UN military observers were in place in eight locations, four each either side of the Ethiopia/Eritrea border; UNMEE declared that this marked the successful launch of the second phase of the mission's operations.

## GUINEA BISSAU

### BACKGROUND

**1956** The PAIGC party was launched, supporting independence for Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands; **1961** PAIGC resorted to violence in response to mounting repression by the Portuguese colonial authorities; **1973** Independence was unilaterally declared; **1980** President Luiz Cabral was overthrown in a coup by Prime Minister Varnardo Vieira, who ruled the country ever since; **1998** In June, a mutiny erupted when Vieira attempted to arrest General Mane for smuggling arms to MFDC in Senegal; encouraged by France, both Guinea and Senegal sent troops in support of Vieira; **November** a settlement allowing foreign troops to be replaced by ECOWAS peacekeepers fell through; **1999** In March, less than 600 unarmed ECOWAS peacekeepers were finally deployed to uphold the agreement; **June** UNOGBIS was established to support the peacebuilding process.

## SG'S UNOGBIS REPORT (S S/2000/632)

On 28 June 2000, the Secretary-General reported on the work of the UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS) since 24 March.

### Political Developments

The Guinea-Bissau government concentrated on consolidating the authority of the newly established democratic institutions in the face of continued interference from the military establishment. Some progress was made on the withdrawal of the military from the political process, particularly the establishment of the National Assembly of a Commission of Good Offices to bridge differences between the government and the military establishment, as well as the appointment of a new Attorney-General and a civilian as Minister of Defence.

Religious and ethnic tensions erupted in northern parts of Guinea-Bissau between the Fula and Felupe communities and in the East between the Fula and Mandingo communities.

### Military and Security Aspects

On 29 April, newly elected President Wade of Senegal visited Guinea-Bissau as a confidence-building measure and, in response to insecurity in Senegal's Casamance region along their common border, the two leaders agreed to de-escalate tensions and discussed cooperative strategies for securing the border.

There was a distinct rise in armed criminality and banditry. Landmines continued to be a critical problem, and various measures were being introduced by the government in partnership with relevant UN agencies, national institutions and NGOs.

### Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation

The human rights situation remained worrying. By mid-June, only 13 detainees of the original number of nearly 400 people were still detained. UNOGBIS facilitated the training of some 50 judges and was also facilitating the establishment of a radio and television project.

There was a significant reduction in the need for life-sustaining humanitarian assistance in Guinea-Bissau and on 7 April the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) closed its Bissau office. OCHA's training programme to strengthen the government's capacity to manage national emergencies was assumed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but OCHA continued to support demobilisation, weapons collection and demining programmes. The repatriation from Guinea of the remaining 900 refugees began on 15 June.

### Social and Economic Aspects

Endemic poverty remained the single most debilitating social and economic problem. The government

decided to develop programmes in good governance and poverty eradication and to revise the national long-term perspective study.

## NIGERIA

### BACKGROUND

**1993** The military seized power in Nigeria, appointing Sani Abacha as president; **1998** Abacha died on 8 June and was succeeded by General Abdulsalam Abubakar; **1999** In February, presidential elections returned General Olusegu Obasanjo to power with large majority; **2000** Calls for Sharia law to be instated in some northern states induced sporadic outbreaks of violence.

### SHARIA SPREADS IN NORTH NIGERIA

In June, the governor of Kano announced the implementation of *sharia* law in the state from late November - the first day of Ramadan - and an 8 July *Economist* report stated that most other northern states were expected to do the same. Some 1,000 people had been killed during Christian-Muslim riots in the northern city of Kaduna in the spring in response to the imposition of *sharia* law.

Nigeria's estimated 120 million-strong population was divided almost equally between the largely Muslim north and the mixed, but primarily Christian south and it was feared that the introduction of *sharia* law could split the country and lead to violence. Commitments by northern governors in the spring to postpone the introduction of *sharia* appeared to be wavering.

The *Economist* speculated that the upsurge of Islamism represented an attempt by supporters of the late Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha, to establish a new power base; or that these people might be trying to establish conditions which would enable a military seizure of power. The populist exploitation of Islam at least appeared to be a means for Nigeria's northern oligarchy to undermine the authority of President Olusegun Obasanjo in response for his marginalisation of northerners who had enjoyed the patronage of Abacha. Obasanjo's continuing popularity was being undermined by Nigeria's stagnant economy and badly operated state-run utilities.

## SIERRA LEONE

### BACKGROUND

**1991** The RUF attempted to overthrow the government; **1992** A new government assumed power in a coup, but was still opposed by the RUF; **1996** Despite continued hostilities, Ahmed Téjan Kabbah was elected president; the Abidjan Accord was subsequently agreed with the RUF; **1997** Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup by the AFRC; the Conakry Agreement between the parties in the Autumn was never implemented; **1998** Continued unrest induced ECOMOG to intervene to remove the junta with the help of Kamajor militias; Kabbah was restored to power, but violence continued throughout the country; in the summer, UNOMSIL was deployed alongside ECOMOG; **1999** Continuing atrocities, mainly by the RUF, intensified Sierra Leone's humanitarian crisis; the Lomé peace agreement controversially incorporated the RUF into the government; **October** The Security Council approved a 6,000-strong peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) to oversee Lomé; **2000** By May, UNAMSIL had been expanded to 13,000; the RUF reneged on commitments to Lomé and some 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage; British troops were deployed to secure their release, some of whom remained behind to train the army.

### SIERRA LEONE DIAMOND BAN

On 5 July, the Security Council authorised a resolution banning diamond exports from Sierra Leone, to be effective at least until governmental control of diamond mines was reinstated and legally mined stones could be properly certificated. An 8 July *Economist* report was doubtful that the ban could be completely effective. Indeed, a recent UN report stated that many African countries were ignoring the embargo against diamonds sold by UNITA. However, there was hope that the embargo would drive down the price of Sierra Leone diamonds: De Beers, responsible for around 70% of gemstone production, pledged not to buy diamonds from conflict zones, along with other major producers; and the governments of countries that imported rough diamonds for cutting and polishing – notably Belgium, Israel and India – agreed the same.

Much of the Sierra Leonean diamond trade went via Liberia, whose president, Charles Taylor, supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). British attempts to extend the diamond ban to Liberia were opposed by West African governments and the US.

### BRITISH FREE HOSTAGES

During the week beginning 14 August, the British army freed six British troops and sixteen Sierra Leoneans who had been taken hostage on 25 August by the opposition group, the West Side Boyz. One

Briton and over 20 opposition fighters were killed during the rescue operation.

The West Side Boyz leader was captured and the group's headquarters destroyed. A 26 September *Economist* report suggested that keeping Sierra Leone's roads and major towns free of opposition fighters was an essential task for the UN. The RUF, which still controlled many diamond-producing areas in the east, remained the UN's primary threat. At the time of writing, the loyalty of RUF fighters to their new leader, Issa Sesay, remained unclear. Also, a major factor in the conflict was the support that neighbouring countries Liberia and Burkina Faso provided to the RUF in return for diamond concessions.

### SG'S UNAMSIL REPORT (S/2000/832)

#### Mandate and Tasks

The 24 August 2000 report recalled that the Security Council had decided to strengthen the mandate of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including to:

- (a) maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and their major approach routes;
- (b) deter and decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to hostile actions or threat of force;
- (c) deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres;
- (d) assist the efforts of the Sierra Leone government to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country;
- (e) within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians;
- (f) patrol strategic lines of communication, specifically main access routes to the capital;
- (g) assist in the promotion of the political process leading to a renewed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme where possible.

#### Concept of Operations

##### *Current deployment and priorities*

UNAMSIL's most pressing tasks at present were restructuring, strengthening HQ, fully equipping infantry battalions and strengthening deployment at areas close to RUF positions.

##### *Mode of operation: progressive deployment*

Progressive deployment would be accompanied by political activities to seek the compliance of rebel groups with the peace process and to encourage them to join the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. UNAMSIL would be deployed at battalion strength in all but a few relatively secure locations which would conduct

assertive patrols and convoy escorts. This required that all battalions be fully equipped to UN standards.

### **Phases of deployment**

The forward deployment of UNAMSIL would greatly depend on the resources and capabilities made available to it and the speed of deployment would also be dictated by the time of arrival of troops, their level of preparation and the situation on the ground.

#### **First phase**

UNAMSIL would strengthen its presence at key locations in the west and east of the country, which would also enhance the Mission's command and control and support structures through the deployment of the much-needed logistics and communication units.

#### **Second phase**

UNAMSIL would move gradually eastward, depending on analysis of the situation on the ground, which would be undertaken in conjunction with the application of increased political and economic pressure on hostile groups on the ground. The total strength would then reach approximately 20,500 for all ranks. The strength and tasks of the Mission's military observers and civilian police would remain unchanged.

#### **Subsequent phases**

UNAMSIL might be required to deploy to other key areas not currently under government control, including the main diamond-producing areas; however, it would be premature to assess in detail what resources might be required in Sierra Leone at that juncture, with regard to the status of the peace process and the DDR programme, the overall security environment and efforts to enhance regional stability, progress in training and restructuring the Sierra Leonean army, the extension of state authority and the availability of troops contributed by Member States. Further deployment would require additional personnel.

### **Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mission**

UNAMSIL established a working group on policy and planning. Also, cooperation and coordination with UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were strengthened through regular meetings and the establishment of a civilian-military coordination cell. An Ombudsperson was to be deployed to UNAMSIL shortly. UNAMSIL had established a multidisciplinary group to conduct orientation courses for all military personnel and had also prepared code-of-conduct and rules of engagement cards in all the languages used by the contingents.

### **Consultations with Troop-contributing Countries**

A meeting at UN HQ on 23 August was attended by chiefs of defence staff of countries contributing troops to UNAMSIL. Delegations stressed that some of the

proposed tasks required a very strong military peacekeeping presence with the necessary force multipliers, which should operate on the basis of a clearly defined and implementable mandate and realistic timeframes. Most delegations emphasised that their contingents would not take part in a peace-enforcement operation.

The need for UNAMSIL to function as a single integrated UN peacekeeping force was highlighted, whose actions should be based on deterrence and robust rules of engagement.

### **UNAMSIL Contributions as at 22 August 2000**

[*Military Observers (MO); Staff Officers (SO); Troops (Tr); Sector HQ Staff (SHQ); Total (T)*]

Bangladesh 12 (MO); 4 (SO); 776 (Tr); 792 (T); Bolivia 4 (MO); 4 (T); Canada 5 (MO); 5 (T); China 6 (MO); 6 (T); Croatia 10 (MO); 10 (T); Czech Republic 5 (MO); 5 (T); Denmark 2 (MO); 2 (T); Egypt 10 (MO); 10 (T); France 3 (MO); 3 (T); Gambia 26 (MO); 26 (T); Ghana 4 (MO); 5 (SO); 769 (Tr); 778 (T); Guinea 12 (MO); 2 (SO); 775 (Tr); 789 (T); India 14 (MO); 30 (SO); 2,986 (Tr); 43 (SHQ); 3,073 (T); Indonesia 10 (MO); 10 (T); Jordan 5 (MO); 8 (SO); 1,768 (Tr); 49 (SHQ); 1,830 (T); Kenya 11 (MO); 13 (SO); 815 (Tr); 50 (SHQ); 889 (T); Kyrgyzstan 2 (MO); 2 (T); Malaysia 10 (MO); 10 (T); Mali 8 (MO); 8 (T); Nepal 6 (MO); 6 (T); New Zealand 2 (MO); 2 (T); Nigeria 4 (MO); 14 (SO); 3,144 (Tr); 43 (SHQ); 3,205 (T); Norway 5 (MO); 5 (T); Pakistan 10 (MO); 10 (T); Russia 15 (MO); 2 (SO); 110 (Tr); 127 (T); Slovakia 2 (MO); 2 (T); Sweden 3 (MO); 3 (T); Thailand 5 (MO); 5 (T); UK15 (MO); 15 (T); Tanzania 12 (MO); 12 (T); Uruguay 11 (MO); 11 (T); Zambia 11 (MO); 3 (SO); 774 (Tr); 788 (T); **Total** 260 (MO); 81 (SO); 11,917 (Tr); 185 (SHQ); 12,443 (T).

**Civilian Police:** Bangladesh, 4; Gambia, 2; Ghana, 3; India, 1; Jordan, 3; Kenya, 3; Malaysia, 3; Namibia, 1; Nepal, 5; Norway, 2; Senegal, 5; Zimbabwe, 2. Total: 34.

### **JETLEY ACCUSES NIGERIANS**

A 16 September *Economist* article cited the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as a test case for UN peacekeeping: its failure would spell disaster for future operations. The article stated that UNAMSIL operation was not in a strong enough state to exploit problems that had emerged within the RUF since its leader Foday Sonkoh was arrested earlier in the year.

UNAMSIL Commander Major-General Vijay Jetley (India) recently wrote a report accusing Nigerian troops serving with UNAMSIL of being involved in diamond smuggling, making deals with the RUF and not co-operating with the UN command. The resultant controversy came as the Security Council was considering increasing the number of troops in Sierra Leone to 20,500.

The *Economist* criticised calls by the British Conservative Party to withdraw UK troops, engaged in training the Sierra Leone armed forces, following the recent death of a British soldier in the country. It asserted that such a move would suggest that Britain was now as wary of any casualties as the Americans.

The *Economist* predicted an escalation in violence in November, coinciding with the end of the rainy season and an anticipated push by the Sierra Leone army to recapture diamond areas in the east and other opposition-held territory in the north. The article recommended bolstering the UN force in order to hold on to any areas liberated from opposition control, and suggested that Britain could offer to join the force, possibly to lead the whole operation.

### INDIANS PULL OUT OF UNAMSIL

A 21 September *Panfrican News Agency* report stated that the UN had confirmed India's intention to withdraw its 3,000 troops from UNAMSIL. However, the Organisation asserted that it remained confident it would still be able to raise force-strength to 20,500. On the same day, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, announced that Ukraine would send troops to Sierra Leone. However, a Security Council decision to authorise the UNAMSIL expansion was delayed as a result of the problem of raising troops. India denied its decision had been influenced by the scandal surrounding Jetley's accusations against Nigeria.

## SUDAN

### BACKGROUND

**1956** Sudan achieved independence; **1983** Islamic law was introduced, exacerbating divisions between the predominantly Arab North and the Christian South; war resumed between government forces in the north (NIF) and opposition forces in the south (SPLA); **1985** A military coup placed Sadiq al-Mahdi, in power on an Islamist platform; **1989** The army again seized power under General Omar el-Bashir; **March** A consortium of UN and NGOs launched a major relief effort - Operation Lifeline Sudan; **1993** Increasing international isolation forced Khartoum to convert to civilian authority; **1998** In response to suspected Sudanese involvement in terrorist attacks on US embassies in Africa, the US bombed an alleged chemical weapons plant near Khartoum; **1999-2000** Fighting between north and south continued.

### MIXED PROGRESS IN SUDAN

A 19 August *Economist* report stated that the Sudanese government was bombing UN aircraft delivering humanitarian aid, despite the fact that the government approved each UN flight. As a result, the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) suspended all relief

flights. However, flights resumed after a week, on 16 August

The report recalled how, over the previous two years, Sudan had gone a long way towards reversing international political isolation: neighbouring countries Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda sought peace agreements with Khartoum due to their own involvement in other wars; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently lifted Sudan's suspension; and Washington was reopening its Sudanese embassy.

The domestic situation also appeared to be improving. Northern politicians forced into exile by the government were being wooed to return, press freedom and human rights had improved, while the economy had seen 7% growth in 2000 and seemed set continue in view of Sudan's new-found oil wealth.

However, the *Economist* stressed that many political problems remained, while the war continued unabated in the south. The report suggested that the root of the country's problems centred around the clientist nature of its politics, based around three powerful families which aimed to retain power and maintain a unified country. Many commentators described the war as between the Muslim north and the Christian south, although religious and ethnic differences were not the primary cause of the fighting, which was in fact the south against Khartoum.

Meanwhile, the new-found oil reserves were further complicating the situation, as the main deposits lay in opposition-held territory in the south. In response to recent successful military campaigns by the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the government was bombing civilians and displacing thousands from their homes. Sudanese ministers claimed that UN relief flights were in fact delivering weapons to the SPLA, while most UN flights did deliver aid to SPLA supporters, thereby assisting the opposition cause.

### SUDAN/UGANDA ACCORD

A 28 September report in *The Monitor (Kampala)* stated that Uganda and Sudan had pledged to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and to stop doing anything that might undermine the security and stability of the other. These commitments were made following a two-day meeting of foreign affairs ministers from Egypt, Libya, Uganda and Sudan, also attended by a representative of the Carter Centre and observers from UNICEF, UNHCR and the Canadian government.

A delegate at the meeting asserted that this time the peace process would succeed as many parties were involved in the mechanism of implementing the agreed agenda, while several countries, including Canada, Egypt, Libya, and the US, as well as several UN agencies, had pledged to support the peace process. He added that embassies in the Sudan and Uganda could soon be re-opened. The importance of continuing trade

between the two countries was highlighted. Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Uganda, in collaboration with the Carter centre, Canada, UNICEF and UNHCR, were to establish a mechanism to locate and repatriate all abducted children.

## ZIMBABWE

### ZANU-PF RE-ELECTED

Elections in Zimbabwe on 24-26 June returned President Mugabe's leading ZANU-PF party to power with a slim majority, winning 62 out of 120 contested seats; the newly established Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won 57 seats. Some 30 seats in the 150-member parliament were appointed by Mugabe, providing ZANU-PF with a comfortable majority.

European Union (EU) election monitors asserted that there had been serious flaws and irregularities in the electoral process, referring to systematic and widespread voter intimidation in the run-up to the ballot. MDC pledged to appeal against the results of at least 20 constituencies.

However, Mugabe's ability to introduce constitutional change had been compromised, as previously there had been only three members of parliament from outside ZANU-PF. Presidential elections were due for 2002. Mugabe now faced a dire economic situation, as well as the resolution of issues relating to white-owned farms.

### FARM SEIZURES CONTINUE

A 22 July *Economist* report stated that the Zimbabwean government went ahead with plans to confiscate 804 farms. Meanwhile, war veterans continued their unofficial seizures of farms: the previous week had seen over 50 white farmers ordered to leave or be killed. Veterans had so far occupied more than 1,400 farms and the police were ignoring the seizures.

## AMERICAS

## COLOMBIA

### BACKGROUND

**1998** Conservative Pastrana was elected president in place of Liberal Ernesto Samper; **November** Pastrana withdrew the army from a large area in the south of the country to facilitate negotiations; the "demilitarised" area came under the de facto control of the main military opposition force FARC; **1999** FARC suspended peace talks, insisting that the government must crack down on its paramilitaries; FARC then killed three US nationals in March; Washington increased aid to the armed forces, ostensibly for use against drug traffickers, and withdrew official contact with the FARC until the killers were handed over; FARC then launched a massive offensive during the build-up to negotiations with the government in the summer; **2000** The peace process remained stuttering and Colombia's second largest opposition movement continued to try to negotiate its own demilitarised zone.

### US APPROVES MILITARY AID

During the week beginning 3 July, ambassadors from European Union (EU) countries, Canada and Japan met with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda in the organisation's demilitarised zone. The US refused to send a delegate as it would not recognise FARC until it had handed over fighters who had killed three US citizens in 1999.

At the same time, the US Congress approved a \$1.3 billion package of military aid to assist the Colombian government counter the drugs trade within the southern FARC stronghold. The aid formed part of President Andres Pastrana's \$7.5 billion *Plan Colombia*, which further incorporated economic development projects and initiatives to provide alternative crops to coca. European countries were reportedly sceptical about the US military emphasis and the Colombian government's scant efforts to crack down on the military's links with right-wing paramilitaries, who also maintained drug links. The ambassadors' meeting with FARC leaders criticised them for enlisting children, laying landmines and undertaking killings and kidnappings.

A meeting of European countries in Madrid on 7 July saw Spain agree to donate \$100 million to Plan Colombia, while the European Union stated it would review the situation in September.

## **NO PROGRESS WITH ELN**

The week beginning 24 July saw the opening of negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN. However, after two days, the sides were no nearer agreement. ELN were demanding a national convention to be held in their desired demilitarised zone. The government in principle agreed to establish a 4,660 square km<sup>2</sup> zone in three municipalities south of the Bolivar province. Unlike FARC, ELN agreed to allow international human rights observers into the zone.

There was disagreement whether protests from inhabitants of the proposed zone against living under ELN rule were genuine or were in fact manufactured by right-wing paramilitaries. The paramilitaries were open in their aim to drive the ELN out of the area both to prevent ELN regrouping in safety and to exploit gold and coca resources. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño's fighters launched an offensive against the last opposition stronghold in former ELN territory in the San Lucas mountains during the negotiations in Geneva, precipitating their failure, as ELN accused the army of supporting the attacks. Meanwhile, ELN continued to hold many hostages.

## **FEARS OF IMPACT OF US AID**

A 19 August *Economist* report stated that the town of Puerto Asis in the southern Colombian department of Putumayo had both an army and police presence, as well as right-wing paramilitaries operating openly in the town, while the surrounding countryside was controlled by FARC.

Putumayo had become the largest single source of cocaine in Latin America, and restoring state control to the area was the immediate target for the \$1.3 billion American military aid package. President Bill Clinton was to visit Colombia on 30 August.

The majority of the US aid was to help train and equip three new "anti-narcotics" army battalions, based at Tres Esquinas. They would attempt to secure Putumayo, in order to allow police to address drug-processing laboratories in the region and spray plantations with herbicides. It was hoped that the reduction in its drug revenue would encourage FARC to negotiate for peace.

However, there were fears that the programme would in fact exacerbate violence. Although Coca farmers received only a tiny percentage of cocaine's street value, it was still an important source of income for them.

Although a percentage of the US aid was to go towards establishing alternative sources of income for farmers, in Putumayo, poor land and communications made the prospects for such transformation difficult. So, farmers were likely to move to areas where alternatives were more readily available. However, there were fears that such displaced people could swell FARC ranks.

Moreover, coca plantations could quickly be moved, while FARC was likely to use kidnapping and extortion to fill any shortfalls in income. There were also concerns over environmental and human health costs of destroying coca fields using herbicides. It was unclear what level of resistance the three new battalions would encounter when they started to operate, which was not believed to be soon.

FARC accused the American operation of being a thinly disguised intervention by the US. FARC was believed to be reinforcing itself militarily and arming the civilian population in preparation for the new offensive, while paramilitaries also pledged to step up attacks.

## **VENEZUELA BORDER PROBLEMS**

Continuing paramilitary attacks on civilians in the border area near Venezuela created regular flows of Colombian refugees across the border, despite the fact that it was Venezuelan policy to repatriate them. The border area was under FARC and ELN control, and they made frequent incursions into Venezuela to extort, kidnap and smuggle.

For years, Venezuelan governments had promoted stability through tacit agreements with opposition fighters. Although Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez offered to act as an intermediary in peace negotiations, his dislike of the Colombian authorities was well-known and links between Chavez and the Colombian opposition were suspected. There was also speculation that Venezuela was fearful of a large influx of refugees should FARC and ELN lose control of the border area. Chavez criticised Plan Colombia, particularly as this would be likely to contribute to the refugee problem.

## **PEACE TALKS IN JEOPARDY**

A 19 September *Financial Times* report stated that the prospect of peace negotiations between the Colombian government and ELN diminished on 18 September after ELN was blamed for kidnapping around 45 people near the city of Cali, the largest ELN kidnapping since May 1999. In response, the government broke off contacts intended to lead to talks. However, there were reports that around fifteen abductees had been freed. There was also the problem of where to hold negotiations as residents of three towns in northern Colombia which the government had agreed to transform into an ELN demilitarised zone fiercely opposed such a move.

Negotiations with FARC were also under pressure. The government's senior negotiator, Camilo Gomez, was due to meet FARC leaders on 18 September to request the return of an escaped prisoner; FARC had so far refused his release.

## HAITI

### BACKGROUND

**1991** President Bertrand Aristide was overthrown and exiled in a coup headed by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, who appointed Marc Bazin as Prime Minister of the de facto government; **1993** Cedras and Bazin agreed to allow Aristide to return as president and to the deployment of a UN mission (UNMIH) to assist the peace process; however, UNMIH's military contingent was prevented from deploying and violence on the island increased; **1994** A UN multinational force (MNF) was established, prompting the Haitian regime to concede to resign; Aristide returned to Haiti; **1995** Elections returned René Préalval to power; **1997** MIPONUH was deployed with an exclusive police mandate; however, Haiti continued to be affected by unrest; **2000** Disputed elections returned Aristide to power.

### Haitian Elections Criticised

A 12 July *Financial Times* report stated that both the US and the UN had criticised Haiti's intention to go ahead with controversial run-off elections on 11 July. However, Haitian officials countered that they were essential to the process of re-instating democratic government. Haitian opposition parties complained that the ballot was biased in favour of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide's *Lavalas* party, which was on the way to controlling the parliament, while Aristide was widely expected to win presidential elections in November.

Haitian authorities were criticised over vote counting from first round elections in June and the US State Department asserted that the run-off on 11 July was incomplete and inappropriate, as some Senate seats were declared on the basis of the June poll, although there had been no outright winner. Kofi Annan called for the vote count to be investigated.

### ELECTIONS CAUSE PROBLEMS

According to a 22 July *Economist* report, many disputes had erupted in Haiti following reports of ballot-stuffing, ballot-stealing and tampering with results in local and legislative elections on 21 May. The Organisation of American States (OAS) had originally declared the voting a success, but altered its opinion after the electoral council gave all but one Senate seat to candidates of the *Lavalas* party. The head of the electoral council, Léon Manus, fled to the US in June, protesting that he had been forced to present such results following threats from the highest level of the state. He subsequently asserted that a genuine count would have seen most contests go to a run-off vote.

Several electoral officials resigned, alleging intimidation and the OAS boycotted a second round of voting for some non-Senate posts on 9 July. Although

analysts suggested that the *Lavalas* party would have been likely to have won anyway, foreign donors withheld \$500 million of aid, awaiting establishment of a Haitian parliament. Although Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis had claimed that Haiti was already managing without external aid, a recent UN Human Development Report placed the country Haiti 150th out of 174 poor countries.

## ASIA

### ACEH

### KILLINGS CONTINUE IN ACEH

A 22 July *Economist* report stated that killings had continued in Aceh following the 2 June ceasefire between the Indonesian government and opposition Free Aceh Movement (GAM). During the week beginning 17 July, government officials asserted that foreign intervention might be required if the government failed to halt violence in various provinces, particularly between Muslim and Christian communities in the Moluccas. However, violence in Aceh had at least been reduced.

The *Economist* declared that the army and police continued to kill both opposition fighters and civilians in Aceh's commercial capital, Lhokseumawe. The police accused GAM of extortion and forcing young males to fight, as well as using the cease-fire merely as a means to regroup for a future offensive. GAM blamed security forces for truce violations.

There had been an influx of GAM sympathisers back to Aceh since former president Suharto was removed from power two years previously. GAM claimed to have sophisticated new weaponry and to be 26,000-strong. Moreover, student activists campaigning for a referendum on independence were getting more organised.

### CENTRAL ASIA

### FIGHTING IN CENTRAL ASIA

On 11 August, a group of around 100 opposition fighters crossed from Tajikistan into southern Kirgizstan and, according to official figures, subsequent violence saw 24 soldiers and over 50 fighters killed. Previously, an opposition group had crossed from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan, leading to the deaths of 12 government troops and 20 opposition fighters.

In response, a special meeting of heads of state from Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the Chair of the Russian security council, was convened in the Kirgiz capital, Bishkek, on 20 August, at which they pledged to cooperate to crush the terrorists.

Opinions differed as to the opposition fighters' objectives. Kirgiz President Askar Akaev stated that there were over 1,000 waiting to attack his country from Tajikistan, including Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, Pakistanis, Russians and Chechens. They were believed to be financed by international terrorist organisations, including by Osama bin Laden. The Kirgiz alleged that the fighters' aim was to destabilise Central Asia and support drug traffickers transporting drugs from Afghanistan bound for Russia and Europe.

The fighters were believed to be radical Islamists, led by Juma Namangani of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose ambition was to establish an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley, straddling the borders of Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Their strategy was to destabilise Central Asia sufficiently to overthrow the Uzbeki government

Instability in Uzbekistan since 1999 had led to a crackdown on suspected Islamic extremists in the country, often on spurious charges, which antagonised even moderate Muslims in the country. Tajikistan had not allowed other countries to pursue fighters into its territory.

## EAST TIMOR

### BACKGROUND

**1975** Pro-independence FRENTEL group won control of East Timor; **December** Indonesia invaded the island; **1976** East Timor was annexed by Indonesia, although this was never recognised by the UN; **1991** Indonesian troops killed up to 250 civilians at a funeral in Dili; **1998** President Suharto was replaced by Habibie in May, who pledged autonomy for East Timor; **1999** Habibie extended his pledge to independence; **May** Portugal and Indonesia agreed to a UN-sponsored referendum on East Timor's future status, although Indonesia was to be responsible for security; **June** The vote was postponed to the end of August in response to attacks by pro-Indonesian militia in which government security forces were complicit; **August** East Timorese overwhelmingly opted for independence in the referendum, prompting widespread violence; **September** The Security Council authorised an Australian-led peacekeeping force (INTERFET) to help restore stability; **2000** INTERFET was replaced by UN mission (UNTAET) in charge of the transitional administration in East Timor.

### INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS IN E. TIMOR

Between 90,000 and 120,000 refugees remained in camps in West Timor, where continued violence forced UNHCR to announce on 23 August that it was suspending operations there. The UN accused Indonesian security forces of failing to stop the violence.

UNTAET was rushing to get seeds, tools and other agricultural necessities to all districts in time for the planting season in December. Meanwhile, damage to roads made transporting food difficult. UNTAET was also hurrying to prepare for the new school year, starting on 2 October.

Complaints against the UN centred around the fact that UNTAET's large bureaucracy did not affect change quickly enough and that the operation did not consult the East Timorese themselves. In response, UNTAET Head Sergio Vieira de Mello replaced a consultative council with a larger group taken from East Timor's 13 districts and various social groups.

A meeting with local political leaders prompted UNTAET to launch its new transitional cabinet, half the ministers from which were East Timorese; it was hoped that this would facilitate the transition to an elected government. There were further problems relating to political divisions within the East Timorese population. Efforts were being made to forge unity on core political issues.

### SG'S UNTAET REPORT (S/2000/738)

The 26 July 2000 report covered developments in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) since 27 January.

#### Political Transition

The 15-member National Consultative Council (NCC) needed to be expanded, and was replaced by the National Council (NC) on 14 July. The NC was to have 33 members, all Timorese. UNTAET was reorganised to resemble more closely the future government and to facilitate Timorese participation. Eight portfolios were created: internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency services and political affairs.

Various new indigenous political institutions were set up. However, there were instances of intimidation against groups and parties not under the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) umbrella. Thus, UNTAET launched a programme entitled "The future of democracy in East Timor" to promote civic education, constitutional development, the rule of law and political education.

#### Refugees

Over 167,000 refugees returned, primarily from West Timor. However, an estimated 85,000 to 120,000 refugees remained in West Timor, under the influence

of anti-independence militias, leading to severe disruption of the repatriation process.

### **Governance and Public Administration**

There were now 5,275 civil service employees in the East Timor administration. Permanent hiring began in July and the Civil Service Academy was inaugurated on 8 May. UNTAET established the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) - including the treasury - and the Central Payments Office.

*Economy and Infrastructure:* East Timor's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to have shrunk in 1999 by as much as 38%, while unemployment soared and prices rose steeply. Quick impact projects were carried out to provide immediate relief. Business activity expanded moderately. The agriculture sector, upon which 80% of the population relied, saw a fairly strong recovery in the first half of the year. A Land and Property Commission was to be established to address land ownership. Programmes were being introduced to improve the devastated road network and Dili's port. Efforts were made to restore electricity to Dili and the surrounding villages; however, there were still frequent power cuts. Efforts were also being made in relation to water, although no major outbreaks of disease or serious water shortages were reported.

*Education and Health:* Most primary school children and teachers were back in school by the end of April and 200,000 students would attend participate in the coming school year. Some 4,740 teachers were being recruited, however conditions remained very difficult. NGOs were currently the main health service providers as the indigenous health system was in disarray. More long-term measures were being introduced.

*Law and Order:* Although generally stable, there was a notable increase in low-level personal and property crime and police were authorised to carry side arms. The Dili courthouse held its first hearings in May, and the Baucau court opened in late June, to be followed by courts in Oecussi and Suai; judges were appointed to all four. Some 16 East Timorese judges, 8 prosecutors and 8 public defenders had been appointed; ten more judges and four prosecutors were recruited at the end of June and four international judges were also appointed. Two detention facilities were opened, in the Dili and Ermera districts and two more were planned for Baucau and Manatuto.

*Police:* Since January, UNTAET's civilian police grew from 400 to 1,270 officers from the following countries: Argentina (5), Australia (80), Austria (10), Bangladesh (35), Bosnia and Herzegovina (12), Brazil (13), Canada (14), Cape Verde (2), China (15), Egypt (10), the Gambia (26), Ghana (91), Jordan (219), Kenya (14), Mozambique (3), Namibia (9), Nepal (47), New Zealand (12), the Niger (21), Nigeria (51), Norway (1), Pakistan (1), Philippines (105), Portugal (165), the Russian Federation (3), Samoa (25), Senegal

(16), Singapore (40), Slovenia (2), Spain (19), Sri Lanka (30), Thailand (29), Turkey (18), the United Kingdom (14), Ukraine (8), the United States of America (80), Zambia (5) and Zimbabwe (20). Included in the above are two Rapid Response Units of 120 each from Jordan and Portugal.

*Civilian Staffing:* As of 21 July, UNTAET had 2,684 civilian staff, of whom 1,886 were recruited locally and 798 internationally. There remained a shortage of experts in the fields of land and property, customs, statistics, trade and commerce, agriculture, judicial affairs and infrastructure.

### **Security**

The security situation remained generally stable. Insecurity along the border with West Timor diminished following various agreements between UNTAET and the Indonesian authorities, although there remained sporadic incidents. The current strength of UNTAET's military component was 8,032 all ranks, including 198 military observers, from the following countries: Australia (1,542), Bangladesh (572), Bolivia (2), Brazil (81), Canada (3), Chile (33), Denmark (2), Egypt (83), Fiji (188), France (6), Ireland (44), Jordan (720), Kenya (252), Malaysia (32), Mozambique (12), Nepal (168), New Zealand (675), Norway (6), the Republic of Korea (444), Pakistan (804), Peru (23), the Philippines (623), Portugal (759), the Russian Federation (2), Singapore (24), Sweden (2), Thailand (919), Turkey (2), Uruguay (1), the United Kingdom (4) and the United States (4). On 21 July, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit (Thailand) replaced Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos (Philippines) as Force Commander.

There was to be a reduction in the Eastern sector from currently 1,850 to a 500 by the end of January 2001. Military observers were to be reduced to 150.

CNRT decided that East Timor required a national security force, initially based on members of FALINTIL, to guard its borders when UNTAET leaves. An assessment was being undertaken to facilitate this.

### **Humanitarian Affairs**

Over 35,000 metric tons of food were distributed since September 1999, which averted a large-scale emergency. These were subsequently replaced by targeted distributions to vulnerable groups, schools and incentives for work. Conditions in East Timor had improved and the immediate emergency was considered over. Thus, the focus shifted to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

### **MILITIA VIOLENCE IN WEST TIMOR**

Indonesia continued to claim that it would retain responsibility in addressing militia fighters operating in refugee camps in West Timor. There were concerns in Indonesia that further foreign intervention would encourage the break up of the country. However, in

fact, Jakarta had made little response to the violence in West Timor.

On 13 September, Jakarta pledged to send food to the refugees in West Timor; however, WFP pointed out that there was plenty of food in the province, but it tended to go to government workers, members of the armed forces and the police instead of reaching the needy. Militias in West Timor did not want the refugees to return.

### **MILITIA TENSION MOUNTS**

A 25 September *Financial Times* report stated that tension was mounting between militia groups and Indonesian authorities ahead of the 26 September deadline to hand in militia weapons. Indonesian Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri refused to meet militia fighters during a visit to West Timor over the weekend of 23/24 September, prompting militia attacks on police in the town of Atambua. The militias were demanding that hundreds of weapons previously surrendered to the authorities during the first phase of the disarmament process now be returned. The militias were widely perceived as being responsible for the recent killing of three UN workers in West Timor and Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid criticised police for releasing six suspects in the subsequent inquiry.

Ultimately, Indonesian security forces stabilised the situation, but militia leaders asserted that full cooperation was contingent upon negotiations with the government over their future. The Security Council demanded that the militias be disarmed and demobilised, while Washington threatened to withdraw economic assistance to Indonesia unless the militias were controlled.

## **FIJI**

### **HOSTAGES RELEASED**

On 28 June, the military command in Fiji announced its intention to establish an interim administration towards a general election in 2002; the military would retain power during the interim. At the time, Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and 26 other politicians remained in the captivity of coup leader George Speight.

A 1 July *Economist* report stated that support for the army position had strengthened, as there were signs that Fijian chiefs' sympathy for Speight was waning. Fiji's economy was suffering from the effects of the coup, in particular the sugar and tourist industries. There were also negative effects from a ban imposed on imports from Fiji by Australian trades unions.

Then, on 12 and 13 July, Speight released all hostages following a threat by Fijian chiefs to remove his

amnesty unless he remained true to the previous agreement he had made with the army.

### **SPEIGHT AGREES DEAL**

The deal negotiated by Speight was to involve a new constitution reducing the rights of Fiji's Indian population, while Ratu (Chief) Josefa Iloilo – supposedly sympathetic Speight – was appointed president. However, Iloilo subsequently withdrew from swearing in the new interim administration. He declared that he could not appoint a cabinet expressly committed to excluding a particular community that represented 43% of Fiji's population.

The suggested cabinet, which included Laisenia Qarase as Prime Minister, was similar to that previously appointed by the army, in which no member of Speight's group was offered a senior appointment. Qarase and his deputy, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, had previously been rejected by Speight.

However, Qarase was believed to support promotional programmes for indigenous Fijians, transferring state lands to native landowners and nullifying compensation to evicted Indo-Fijian farmers. Meanwhile, there was continued instability around the islands, primarily violence against Indo-Fijians, and there were signs that Speight's supporters would not disband.

### **SPEIGHT ARRESTED**

On 26 July, Speight was arrested by the army, and on 27 July the army stormed Speight's command centre, during which one opposition fighter was killed and 40 were injured. Some 369 arrests were made, including troops from the Meridian Squadron, the principal breakaway force supporting Speight. Military spokesperson Colonel Filipo Tarakinikini declared that the moves had come in response to Speight's failure to comply with the terms of a previously-agreed settlement to release the hostages. The arrests prompted violence by Speight supporters, primarily on the island of Vanua Levu.

### **INTERIM GOVERNMENT SWORN IN**

On 28 July, the new Fijian government, which was to provide an interim administration until further elections were held in three years time, was sworn in, but contained none of Speight's direct supporters. However, only one Fijian Indian was included which, according to a 29 July *Telegraph* report, signified the impending marginalisation of Fijian Indians. Meanwhile, Speight, along with key associates and over 350 supporters, remained detained in military custody on minor charges, although it was suspected he could face more serious charges if his amnesty were revoked.

The Fijian military stated that the country was relatively calm, although there were reports of sporadic outbreaks of violence against Fijian Indian

homes and businesses. Qarase pledged to prioritise the rights of indigenous Fijians as part of a constitution which relinquished political equality for Fijian Indians. Thus, one of Speight's primary demands for political precedence for indigenous Fijians had been upheld.

### SPEIGHT CHARGED WITH TREASON

On 11 August Speight, was charged with treason, which carried the death penalty. According to a 12 August *Guardian* report, Australia, New Zealand, the US and the European Union (EU) had imposed limited aid, diplomatic and sports sanctions against Fiji following Speight's coup. New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark stated that the treason charges were necessary as a means to restore Fiji's international reputation.

A 28 September *BBC Monitoring Service* report stated that the ruling on the validity of the immunity decree for Speight and his coup supporters was to be announced on 2 October. The prosecution in the case were declaring that Speight had failed to meet conditions agreed to in the Muanikau Accord and had reneged his right to immunity, whereas the defence claimed Speight was covered by the immunity decree.

## KASHMIR

### BACKGROUND

**1947** Violence broke out between India and Pakistan over ownership of Kashmir; **1949** A UN observer mission (UNMOGIP) was deployed to monitor a cease-fire line agreed between the parties which divided the province, towards a subsequent referendum to decide its future status; **1965** Renewed fighting between the parties led to the deployment of an additional UN force (UNIPOM); **1966** UNIPOM was withdrawn having successfully supervised the withdrawal of forces from opposing sides of the cease-fire line; **1999** A recent bout of hostilities ended when militia fighters withdrew to the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line; there was speculation that the involvement of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the withdrawal prompted his ousting by the Pakistani military.

### INDIA OUTLINES KASHMIR POLICY

An 8 July *Economist* report suggested that Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's intended policy in Kashmir was to use force to ensure that armed insurrection appeared impossible and so persuade opposition fighters to accept rule by India, in return for additional autonomy and economic aid. However, in the week beginning 26 June, the chief minister of Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, demanded autonomy immediately, which the Indian government rejected.

Vajpayee had recently courted the *Hurriyat* coalition of Kashmiri secessionist parties. Abdullah was

reportedly worried that his National Conference could be wiped out, were *Hurriyat* convinced to participate in elections. He promoted the demand for autonomy to counter opinion that he was a puppet of Delhi.

Vajpayee was hamstrung by hard-liners within his Hindu-nationalist government who opposed even the existing special provisions for Kashmir. Meanwhile, the Hindu-majority *Jammu* and Buddhist-majority *Ladakh* parties in Kashmir demonstrated against the call for autonomy, fearing reaction by officials in the state capital Srinagar as much as Kashmiri Muslims feared officials in Delhi.

### CEASEFIRE IN KASHMIR

On 24 July, one of 12 militant groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, *Hizbul Mujahideen*, announced a three-month unilateral ceasefire, offering negotiations with the Indian government, which Vajpayee cautiously welcomed. *Hizbul Mujahideen* was believed to be one of the largest Kashmiri militant groups and the only principally Kashmiri group – the others being primarily foreign – maintaining political links both to Pakistan and within Kashmir. A 29 July *Economist* report suggested that it was the closest thing to representing the Kashmiri majority.

The main conditions for the ceasefire appeared to be ending human rights violations and violence against *Hizbul Mujahideen* fighters and freedom of political expression for Kashmiris. In response to the offer, *Hizbul Mujahideen* was suspended from the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 15 militant organisations. According to the *Economist*, Pakistan appeared to give tacit approval to the offer.

On 2 August, India stated that it held Pakistan responsible for the deaths of 91 mostly Hindus on 1 August in nine separate incidents at the hands of Islamic militants, according to a 3 August *Telegraph* report. Large crowds of Hindus subsequently gathered in several towns shouting anti-Muslim slogans, prompting the imposition of curfews to prevent sectarian clashes. Vajpayee told the Indian Parliament that the events would not derail proposed peace talks, arranged after the recent ceasefire. The Pakistani government condemned the killings

### CEASEFIRE BREAKS DOWN

The 24 July cease-fire in Kashmir broke down after only two weeks: India ignored demands by *Hizbul Mujahideen* that Pakistan be included in negotiations towards either independence or union with Pakistan, prompting the group to revert to violence on 8 August.

India rejected Pakistani involvement as it perceived Islamabad as being behind the violence in Kashmir and regarded the province as Indian territory and so the trouble as an internal matter.

Violence in Kashmir had seen some 30,000 people killed overall, including over 100 Indians at the beginning of August. Pakistan was believed to have

been behind the recent ceasefire, probably as a means to gain foreign (particularly US) support. Pakistan would not consider any peace process from which it was excluded.

India remained keen to seek alternative partners for negotiations amongst Kashmiri opposition groups. Commentators cited Indian mismanagement of the Kashmiri administration and a poor human rights record in the province as a major factor in fomenting violence. Continuing disagreement between the two countries over Kashmir had taken on a new dimension now that they were both nuclear powers.

## THE MOLUCCAS ISLANDS

### JAKARTA SEEKS ASEAN ASSISTANCE

A 24 July *Financial Times* report stated that, throughout the following week, Indonesia would use a meeting of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) opening that day in Bangkok to seek international assistance in addressing sectarian violence in its eastern Moluccas islands. The move was unexpected as the issue had previously not been brought up at ASEAN as it was considered an internal matter. However, Jakarta was now requesting support both for Indonesia's territorial integrity and for humanitarian and development aid for the islands, primarily from Western states. Disputes between Christian and Muslim communities in the Moluccas over previous months had left thousands dead. Foreign ministers from western countries, including from Australia, the EU, Japan and the US, were to hold bilateral meetings with their ASEAN counterparts later in the week.

## PHILIPPINES

### GOVERNMENT MILITARY VICTORIES

On 9 July, the Philippine army seized Camp Abubakar, Mindanao, the headquarters of the main Muslim secessionist armed opposition group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This was the last of MILF's main bases, and it prompted Defence Minister Orlando Mercado to announce the end of the war. However, MILF leader Hashim Salamat soon demanded a *jihad* against the government.

Three years of peace talks between the two sides had ended with the launch of a government offensive in March. President Joseph Estrada had given MILF to the end of June to renounce secessionist aspirations for the Muslim minority in the south of the mainly Christian Philippines, which MILF rejected. The government campaign had cost hundreds of lives and had displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Following the capture of Camp Abubakar, the

government announced its readiness to resume negotiations as well as financial assistance for Mindanao and smaller southern islands as a means to bolster peace.

However, MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu declared that the group was fighting for a cause not territory, and a 15 July *Economist* report suggested that the group's guerrilla status meant that the loss of its bases would not prevent it from continuing violence. Moreover, the government had little money with which to rehabilitate Mindanao's economy, while a 1996 peace agreement with the other main Philippine Muslim group, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was showing signs of falling apart.

## SOLOMON ISLANDS

### SIAC HAD REQUESTED PEACEKEEPERS

A 3 October *BBC Monitoring Service* report stated that the ousted Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) government had been about to engage armed peacekeepers in Honiara before the 5 June coup. The office of the leader of opposition, ousted Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, affirmed that a final agreement to transform the Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group into an armed peacekeeping force had required only consultation at ministerial level, but was then pre-empted by the coup. The statement revealed that the previous government had requested armed peacekeepers instead of peace monitors, as no peace settlement had so far been agreed. However, only 20 peace monitors were deployed.

## SRI LANKA

### REFORM BILL ABANDONED

During the week beginning 7 August, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga was forced to abandon a constitutional-reform bill aimed at ending the war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The proposed bill would have established a federal system, providing Tamils in the north a high degree of autonomy. However, increased opposition to the bill made it clear that Kumaratunga's party would not be able to garner the required two-thirds majority in Parliament, and so the bill was postponed indefinitely.

LTTE leaders had already rejected the proposal, demanding nothing less than independence. The majority Buddhist Sinhalese population feared that the proposed reforms would mean the state would no longer be obliged to promote Buddhism. Also, the government's slim majority meant it had to rely on opposition defectors to secure a two-thirds vote. Even

had if the bill had been passed, a referendum would still have been required.

A 10 August *Financial Times* report stated that the LTTE had increased attacks against Sri Lankan security forces, killing at least 13 people on 9 August, in response to the government's failure to push through the new legislation.

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## EUROPE

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### CROATIA

A 15 September *Financial Times* report stated that Croatia had moved to try twelve of its citizens on war crimes charges: some for the recent murder of a witness in investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY); but others for crimes committed during the Balkans war in the early 1990s.

The *Financial Times* asserted that such a move represented a sign of genuine change since the demise of former Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman in December 1999 and, as a result, Croatia had been admitted to NATO's *Partnership for Peace* initiative as well as the promise of an association agreement with the European Union in 2001.

### CYPRUS

#### NO AGREEMENT REACHED

Proximity talks between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, in mid-July only produced agreement to meet again. However, Greek-Cypriots were making advances in their ambition to join the European Union (EU) on behalf of all Cypriots and there was speculation that negotiations could be completed by December 2002, enabling Cyprus join by around by around 2005, if the EU parliament agreed to accept a divided island.

Although Denktash still refused to participate in negotiations, the EU's December 1999 decision to accept Turkey's formal candidacy to join softened his insistence that Turkish-Cypriots would not join until Turkey did. Clerides had previously argued that negotiations over EU entry would themselves facilitate a solution to the Cyprus dispute, but in December 1999 the EU also agreed that partition need not prevent the island from joining.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

#### CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN FRY

On 6 July, the federal legislature in Belgrade rushed through constitutional changes which allowed the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, to run for two additional four-year presidential terms; he would previously have had to step down in 2001.

The changes removed Montenegro's notional equality with Serbia in the upper house of the Yugoslav parliament, which retained significant veto powers. The new Yugoslav president, previously chosen by parliament, as well as the upper house, were now to be elected directly. Montenegro had a population of around 600,000 compared to 8 million in Serbia, providing Montenegro with around 7% of the FRY population as a whole. Montenegro had previously been over-represented in the upper house to reflect its position as a republic. From now onwards, its influence would match only its percentage of the population.

A 15 July *Economist* report suggested that Milosevic was effectively sending a message that the only way Montenegro could now leave the federation was to fight, in view of Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic's reformist standpoint. He had previously threatened to hold a referendum on independence. However, Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic more recently asserted that no referendum would take place as long as conflict remained possible. On the other hand, the Montenegrin government refused to participate in federal elections under the revised rules.

Serb critics condemned UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner's determination to press ahead with local elections in Kosovo in October in view of Serb plans to boycott them. The ballot would coincide with elections in Serbia proper, thereby favouring chauvinists in Belgrade.

The European Union (EU) commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten, was reportedly eager to convince EU member states to open their borders to Balkan exports and make commitments to \$2.2 billion in aid between now and 2006 for a post-Milosevic Serbia. The *Economist* acknowledged that the EU had been effective in financing reconstruction in Kosovo. There were also pledges along with other donors of Euro2.4 billion for projects to improve infrastructure in six Balkan states to begin in spring 2000.

#### RUSSIA APPEALS FOR HOSTAGES' RELEASE

A 13 August *Telegraph* report stated that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov appealed to Milosevic to release two British police officers and two Canadians

being held in Belgrade on possible charges of terrorism and espionage.

The prisoners had been arrested as they tried to return from Montenegro to Kosovo, where the Britons were working as UN police trainers and the Canadians ran a construction company. They claimed that they were returning from the Adriatic coast, but the Serb authorities alleged that the presence of detonating wire, fuses and detonator caps found in their car supported their accusations. British and Canadian officials denied that any of the captives were engaged in any espionage or military activity in Montenegro.

### TROUBLE SURROUNDS FRY ELECTIONS

A 22 September *Financial Times* report stated that opinion polls ahead of presidential elections in FRY on 24 September suggested that Slobodan Milosevic faced defeat, despite his attempts to manipulate the result and intimidate the opposition. However, indications were that Milosevic would not surrender power peacefully.

Following the poll, there were reports of fraud and intimidation. Both independent and opposition election monitors cited numerous irregularities, supporting Western fears that Milosevic would rig the ballot to maintain power. Meanwhile, there were reports of the ruling socialist party organising gatherings at sites where the opposition had called for rallies in Belgrade and other major towns, prompting fears of violence.

Contrary to previous expectations that Milosevic would win the election, there was a huge swell of support for opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica. Western states pledged to loosen sanctions against the FRY in the event that Milosevic was ousted.

### MILOSEVIC REMOVED

On 6 October, Milosevic finally conceded to defeat and congratulated president-elect Kostunica on his election victory. However, Milosevic declared that he later planned to resume his political career. According to a 7 October *Guardian* report, following Milosevic's announcement, there were huge celebrations on the streets of Belgrade.

Prior to his announcement, Milosevic had been attempting to deny Kostunica's outright victory and was pressing for run-off elections. Following the poll, there were widespread accusations of vote-rigging against Milosevic and international demands that he recognise the results. However, the escalating outcry by Yugoslavians ultimately convinced Milosevic to relinquish power. Fears that the former president would use his security forces to counter civilian demonstrations proved ultimately unfounded as the Yugoslav security forces ultimately yielded to the weight of public pressure.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### BACKGROUND

**1969** British troops were dispatched to NI following riots in Belfast and Londonderry; **1972** Some 13 people were killed by British soldiers on Bloody Sunday; the NI Stormont parliament was replaced by direct rule from Westminster; **1985** The Anglo-Irish agreement provided Dublin with consultative rights in NI affairs; **1994** The IRA and loyalist paramilitaries announced a cease-fire; **1996** The IRA cease-fire was suspended with bombs in Canary Wharf and Manchester; **1997** The Labour Party assumed power in Westminster with a considerable majority; the IRA renewed its cease-fire and Sinn Fein re-entered negotiations; **1998** The Good Friday Agreement foresaw the devolution of power from London to a new assembly and NI executive; **August** A bomb laid by the republican splinter group the Real IRA killed 28 people in Omagh; **1999** The NI executive was convened; **2000** The executive was resumed after a temporary suspension; IRA arms were sealed in internationally verified bunkers.

### IRA ARMS DUMPS EXAMINED

At the end of June, leading figure in the African National Congress (ANC) Cyril Ramaphosa and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari inspected IRA arms dumps. On 26 June, the two men reported to Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, of Britain and Ireland respectively, that the dumps they had inspected contained a substantial amount of military material which had been safely stored and sealed. They were to re-inspect the sites regularly. Blair declared that the inspections were the beginning of a process which committed the IRA to place arms completely and verifiably beyond use.

### LOYALIST VIOLENCE IN ULSTER

A 21 August *Telegraph* report stated that the UK Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Mandelson, would return from holiday that day with the prospect of alleviating violence between feuding loyalist groups, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Some seven people had been injured during violence over the weekend of 19/20 August.

On 22 August Mandelson ordered the arrest of Johnny Adair, the member of the UFF/Ulster Defence Association (UFF/UDA) recently released from prison as part of the Northern Ireland peace process. Adair, who had considerable support amongst loyalist youths, was the first released prisoner to be re-arrested for breach of good behaviour licences. Mandelson's move was prompted by allegations by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British army that Adair had played a central part in provoking the recent violence.

Allegations that UDA was involved in drug trafficking tarnished the group's image as a responsible protector of the community, and prompted UDA to accuse republicans of intimidating Protestants and to threaten to break its ceasefire.

Mandelson asserted that the recent clashes were the result of gang warfare rather than having a political basis. However, a 26 August *Economist* report, while acknowledging the criminal element to the violence, stated that disagreement about the peace process was also relevant. Adair claimed to support the Good Friday agreement and loyalist ceasefires, but had also publicly supported the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) which was opposed to both.

The political representatives of the UVF, the Progressive Unionist Party, won two seats in the devolved assembly, in which they backed the pro-agreement stance of David Trimble. Meanwhile, loyalist violence continued. The fact that Adair's arrest had not prompted widespread protest was cited by observers as showing that the public were fed up of sectarian violence in the province and supported Mandelson's initiative.

## KOSOVO

### BACKGROUND

**1989** Serb President Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy; **1991** Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo proclaimed independence, but their tactics remained non-violent; **1995** Kosovo was omitted from the Dayton agenda while the EU recognised the FRY, including Kosovo; **1998** Increasing violence induced UNSC Resolution 1199 demanding a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Serb troops; **October**, Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal of Serb troops, a cessation of violence and the deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM); **1999** Following continuing violence, talks at Rambouillet saw the KLA accept a proposed settlement, which Milosevic refused; **March**, NATO began an air campaign against Serb forces; **10 June** UNSC resolution 1244 confirmed the end of the war and established military and civilian missions in Kosovo; however, violence continued between Serb and Albanian communities prompting many Serbs to leave the province.

### KFOR CLOSES MITROVICE LEAD FACTORY

On 14 August, peacekeepers serving with KFOR entered the town of Mitrovica to close down a lead-smelter that was polluting the atmosphere with toxic fumes. A 14 August *Guardian* report stated that the peacekeepers attempted to reassure Serb workers at the factory that their salaries would still be paid while the smelter underwent repairs. The Serb leader in Mitrovica, Oliver Ivanovic, had previously claimed that the lead scare was merely pretext for the

international community to seize the Serb-controlled Zvecan plant as a result of Albanian pressure.

### ESCAPE FROM UN DETENTION CENTRE

A 4 September *Independent* report stated that thirteen Serb prisoners being held on charges of genocide and war crimes had escaped a UN detention centre in Mitrovica. Ivanovic declared that several escapees had reportedly reached Serbia. In response, KFOR launched a broad search operation and Kouchner initiated an inquiry. The detainees had not been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but were being investigated by Kosovo's justice system.

### END TO CLUSTER BOMBS DEMANDED

According to a 6 September *Guardian* article, the Red Cross demanded that NATO stop using cluster bombs after the results of a survey showed that they were causing a disproportionate number of civilian casualties both during and after the Kosovo bombing campaign. Furthermore, the military value of cluster bombs appeared highly questionable in view of their high failure rate: unexploded bomblets were discovered up to 1km from their intended targets, while the failure rate was higher than publicly stated.

The year following the bombing campaign had seen 151 people killed or injured in Kosovo by unexploded bomblets. There were believed to be approximately 30,000 such bomblets around Kosovo; around 4,000 had been confirmed as cleared, excluding disposals undertaken by KFOR. Thus, the Red Cross was demanding that cluster bombs be ranked alongside anti-personnel mines, thereby banning their use under the Ottawa convention.

## SPAIN

### INCREASE IN ETA VIOLENCE

According to a 12 August *Economist* report, on 7 August four ETA Basque separatists were killed in Bilbao when the explosives they were carrying went off in their own car. The lack of public sympathy in the Basque region, in whose interests ETA claimed to work, appeared to reflect the lack of wide support for ETA.

However, the two days following the incident saw a businessman and an army officer killed by ETA, reflecting a recent increase in ETA's terrorist activities since the ceasefire ended in December 2000.

In the Basque region itself, ETA's political wing, *Euskal Herriarrok* (EH) received one vote in six. In the spring of 1999, it had joined in regional government with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). However, the return to violence had placed strains on the alliance. The government was now refusing to talk

with EH after talks in 1999 had produced no results, and because of the return to violence.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### INCREASE IN UK DEFENCE BUDGET

In July, the UK government announced successive increases in the defence budget over the next three years, averaging 0.3% in real terms. Although the increase was small, it was still a reversal from post-Cold War cuts: the defence budget had been reduced by around a third since 1990, and the strength of the armed forces reduced by about the same amount. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was to receive an annual increase of 1.9 % in real terms over the next three years, while the Department for International Development (DFID) was to receive a 6.2% increase over the same period.

A 22 July *Economist* report stated that the defence spending reversal was in part to acknowledge the problem of over-stretch, resulting from increasing peacekeeping commitments in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Gulf. The armed forces' obligations had increased since the 1998 strategic defence review.

The admittedly small increase was likely to make a significant impact on defence diplomacy. For instance, UK military advisers were performing a global role and the *Economist* stated that Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, had commended the programme's effectiveness in advancing bilateral relations. Furthermore, a new conflict prevention fund was announced, worth £128 million by 2003-4, to be jointly managed by the FCO, the Ministry of Defence and DFID.

## MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

### IRAQ

#### BACKGROUND

**1990** Iraq seized Kuwait; a US-led UN task force then liberated Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm; **1991** The cease-fire agreement provided for a UN observer force (UNIKOM) to monitor the Iraq/Kuwait border and a weapons inspection team (UNSCOM) to oversee the dismantling of Iraq's WMD capacity in conjunction with comprehensive sanctions; safe havens were also established in northern and southern Iraq, overseen by UK and US military flights; **1997** Saddam Hussein expelled US members UNSCOM; **1998** Four days of air strikes were eventually undertaken by the UK and US, prompting the expulsion of UNSCOM; **1999**; In December, the Security Council set up a new inspections team (UNMOVIC) and conditions to remove sanctions; however, continuing disagreements meant progress remained stalled, while public outcry mounted over the effects of sanctions on the Iraqi population.

#### UK/US AIR RAIDS CONDEMNED

A 19 August *Economist* report stated that UK/US air patrols and bombing raids over no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq were doing little to protect the Iraqi people from persecution, while their professed precision bombing was, in fact, causing considerable collateral damage.

The report lamented the fact that UN inspectors were no longer in Iraq monitoring Baghdad's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capacity, while sanctions continued to inflict hardship on the Iraqi population.

Indeed, during the week beginning 14 August, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq declared that the UN's precautionary hold on what he described as an "excessive" number of purchasing contracts was seriously hampering the humanitarian programme, while UNICEF stressed that the sanctions regime had caused the deaths of half a million Iraqi children under five.

#### KUWAITI COMPENSATION POSTPONED

A 27 September *Financial Times* report stated that on 26 September, the UN Gulf war reparations body postponed discussion of Kuwait's \$15.9 billion compensation claim for lost oil revenues incurred during the Iraqi occupation in 1990-91. The claim was the largest to be presented yet and was delayed due to power politics within the commission related to

sanctions in Iraq. The commission's membership was the same as the Security Council, although the Permanent Five did not wield veto power. In June 1999, the Kuwaiti claim was delayed twice by Russia, while during the week beginning 18 September 2000, France suggested a reduction in the claim from 30% to 20% of Iraqi oil revenue to be earmarked for reparations. There were reports that France might support the Kuwaiti claim if the US agreed to the suggested reduction in money going to the compensation fund, which received \$400 million-per-month as part off the UN's oil-for-food programme.

### **FRENCH AID FLIGHT TO IRAQ**

On 22 September, an aid flight left Paris bound for Iraq, with the approval of the French government, on what the organisers of the flight described as a humanitarian mission. Paris had notified the Security Council sanctions committee for Iraq, but had not requested authorisation.

According to a 23 September *Telegraph* report, China, France and Russia were claiming that UN sanctions did not apply to commercial flights to Iraq, while the UK and US included them as an economic activity banned under the Iraqi trade embargo.

The *Telegraph* suggested that Baghdad saw the flight as an important step towards the ultimate abandonment of sanctions. US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher criticised France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, for blatantly violating UN sanctions resolutions. French ambassador Jean-David Levitte retorted that Paris had considered that there had been no flight embargo to Iraq for many years.

A closed Security Council session discussed the matter and, according to the *Telegraph*, diplomats had stated that argument over legal interpretations was secondary to the political message involved.

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE**

### **BACKGROUND**

**1985** Israeli forces established a security zone with the South Lebanese Army militia in southern Lebanon against terrorist attacks from the area; **1993** Following years of disputes between Israelis and Palestinians since the establishment of Israel after WWII, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo agreement, providing for a five-year plan to hand control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip back to the Palestinians; **1995** Rabin was assassinated by Jewish extremists; **1996** Binyamin Netanyahu was elected Israeli Prime Minister and obstructed the Oslo process; Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian Council; **1998** Under the Wye agreement, Arafat and Netanyahu appeared to achieve progress over interim issues of the Oslo Accords; however, it began to break down almost immediately; **1999** Ehud Barak was elected Israeli Prime Minister and pledged to advance the peace process with the Palestinians, establish relations with Syria and end violence in southern Lebanon; negotiations between Israel and Syria suffered setbacks, and hostilities continued in Lebanon; **2000** In May, Israeli forces were hastily withdrawn from southern Lebanon.

## **LEBANON**

### **SG'S UNIFIL REPORT (S/2000/718)**

The 20 July 2000 report covered developments in the area of operations of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 17 January to 17 July 2000.

### **Developments in the Area of Operation**

The situation was characterised by attacks by armed elements on the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and their Lebanese auxiliary, the *De Facto* Forces (DFF), and pre-emptive and retaliatory action by both.

### **Israeli Withdrawal**

On 16 May, much sooner than anticipated, IDF/DFF began to vacate its positions in southern Lebanon, amid exchanges of fire. They appeared to have vacated almost all positions in Lebanon by 24 May, and were in the process of withdrawing from positions along the Israel/Lebanon border. On 25 May, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy notified the Secretary-General that Israel had redeployed its forces in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

The UN cartographer worked on the ground to identify a line to be adopted to confirm the Israeli withdrawal.

By 16 June, UNIFIL had finished verifying the Israeli withdrawal behind the line. Notwithstanding their reservations about the withdrawal line, the governments of Israel and Lebanon both confirmed that identifying this line was solely the responsibility of the UN.

The Lebanese government agreed to the deployment of UNIFIL to the vacated areas after Israeli violations had been corrected. It would then also deploy additional troops and internal security forces to the area. Israel committed itself to the removal of all Israeli violations by the end of July. The situation in the area remained generally calm since the end of May.

### **Humanitarian and Economic Issues**

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) worked with the Lebanese authorities on a programme for the development and rehabilitation of the area, particularly rebuilding infrastructure, loans to small enterprises, vocational training, and reactivating the municipalities. Immediate needs included the provision of drinking water to villages previously supplied from Israel, rehabilitating medical services, electricity and sewage systems, housing and road networks. There was also a large landmine problem and UNIFIL established a Regional Mine Action Coordination Cell to conduct mine awareness education activities.

### **UNIFIL Augmentation and Redeployment.**

The first phase of the reinforcement of UNIFIL was under way: its mine-clearance capacity was reinforced in June and an engineer battalion of 600 all ranks from Ukraine was to arrive by the end of July. The units from Finland, Ghana, Ireland and Nepal were reinforced. UNIFIL was awaiting further commitments.

As at 14 July, UNIFIL comprised 5,075 troops, from Fiji (592), Finland (632), France (251), Ghana (783), India (619), Ireland (656), Italy (46), Nepal (712), Poland (630), Sweden (44) and Ukraine (110). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). UNIFIL employed 464 civilian staff, of whom 120 were recruited internationally and 344 locally. Major General Seth Kofi Obeng (Ghana) continued as Force Commander.

### **THE FAILURE OF CAMP DAVID II**

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat met at the US presidential retreat of Camp David on 10 July 2000. This second Camp David conference between the two leaders was brokered by President Bill Clinton and aimed at finalising the Middle East peace agreement, but negotiations collapsed after 15 days. Some progress was made on the borders of a Palestinian state, the return of Palestinian refugees and Jewish settlements. However, the central failure at the summit was the

inability of the parties to come up with a formula to reconcile their competing claims to Jerusalem.

Israel had seized East Jerusalem from Jordan in the 1967 war and annexed it in a move which was not recognised internationally. According to a 26 July *Reuters* article, Palestinians demanded full sovereignty in East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestinian state, while Israelis claimed Jerusalem as their indivisible and eternal capital. UN resolutions called for the return of East Jerusalem and all of the Old City, which is home to 37,000 Palestinians and 3,000 Jews, to Palestinian control and sovereignty.

### **ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS**

Apart from trying to reach a peace deal with the Palestinians, Barak faced political problems at home. Before leaving for Camp David, he lost his majority in parliament when three coalition partners quit his government for fear he would concede too much to the Palestinians. Foreign Minister David Levy resigned on 2 August, joining 13 of the 22 Cabinet members who had already deserted Barak. The Israeli leader, who offered the Palestinians administrative control over some neighbourhoods inside Jerusalem and in suburbs, as well as most of the West Bank, led a minority government at the time of writing and could be forced into new elections when parliament returned in October from summer recess.

Arafat on the other hand received a warmer welcome in Gaza after returning from the summit. A 27 July *Reuters* article stated that for many Palestinians it was preferable not to reach a deal than to give up claims for sovereignty of Jerusalem and to fail to defend the rights of Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian leader had promised to create a sovereign Palestinian state on 13 September whether or not Israel and the Palestinians had forged a final peace by that date. However, a few days before the deadline was reached, the Palestinian leader announced he would postpone this deadline. Israel had warned that it would annex Palestinian areas of the West Bank if the declaration went ahead. The Palestinian Central Council (PCC) postponed an independence declaration at least until 15 November. Israel welcomed the delay, attributing the decision to international pressure on Arafat not to make a unilateral move that would draw Israeli countermeasures and possibly lead to an eruption of violence. The PCC said that it would reconvene by November 15 to consider when to declare the state and that final preparations for statehood should be completed by then. PCC's new target date marked the anniversary of a symbolic declaration of statehood which Arafat made from exile in Algiers in 1988, before he became the Palestinian president.

### **SYRIA'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

Following the collapse of the Camp David summit, US Assistant Secretary of State Edward Walker toured 14 Arab countries in early August. He was told by Syrian

Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa that peace agreements in the area must guarantee Palestinians' rights and ensure complete Israeli withdrawal from all land occupied in 1976, including East Jerusalem. Syrian-Israeli peace talks came to an end in January 2000 with Syria seeking an Israeli pledge to withdraw from the Golan Heights to 1976 pre-war borders. According to a 6 August *Associated Press* article, Israel was interested in retaining some of the land and wanted assurances on what it would get in return for withdrawal before discussing borders. Analysts argued that Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez in June 2000, was not willing to give up his country's role in Lebanon. The relationship between Syria and Lebanon, however, was unlikely to remain the same, with Syria adopting a less heavy handed approach towards Lebanese affairs following Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon earlier in 2000.

#### **LEBANON AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL**

In the second week of August 2000, residents of Southern Lebanon welcomed Lebanese government troops and police. A convoy of 1,000 troops was on its way from Beirut and deployed in bases in the south which, until May, had housed Israeli troops. The Lebanese troops were supported by 400 UN peacekeepers, who completed their own deployment in the formerly occupied area and along the frontier. Kofi Annan appointed Rolf Knutsson to co-ordinate UN activities in the south. UN officials also wanted the Lebanese government to be more co-operative and warned that their mission would otherwise be aborted by the end of 2000. Since the deployment of UNIFIL troops in positions along the frontier, *Hizbullah* fighters had reduced their presence in the area, had abandoned their weapons and were dressing in civilian clothes, but continued to observe the frontier.

Rafik al-Hariri and his candidates won all of Beirut's seats in the 3 September parliamentary elections. Hariri had been prime minister in Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and was remembered for leading the country's rebuilding in the early 1990s after its long civil war. A 4 September *Associated Press* article stated that the first-ever defeat of a Syrian-approved government in Lebanon presented a new scenario of which Damascus must take account. Syria had 35,000 troops deployed in Lebanon and was linked by a friendship and co-operation treaty through which it exercised control over Beirut.

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## **RUSSIA & THE FSU**

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### **CHECHNYA**

#### **CHECHNYA FIGHTING CONTINUES**

According to a 1 July *Economist* report, the senior Russian general in Chechnya announced the end of the war in the country, declaring that most troops could be sent home and mopping-up operations were all that remained to do. He stated that some 20,000 opposition fighters had been killed and their command centres, arms dumps and supply lines destroyed. However, official Russian figures also revealed that some 3,500 Chechen fighters remained, including six main commanders, amongst whose number was Chechen "President", Aslan Maskhadov.

Violence in Chechnya had diminished recently and Chechens were mainly restricted to guerrilla tactics, which accounted for around a dozen Russian deaths per week. However, Russian public opinion remained in favour of the war while western criticism had proved largely toothless.

The *Economist* report was sceptical about Moscow's ability to deliver peace. Chechnya's main spiritual leader Akhmad Kadyrov was appointed by Moscow as head of the country's civil administration in June. However, pro-Moscow Chechens had criticised his previous support for separatist fighters in the 1996 war, while Chechen militants regarded him as the puppet of Russia. The *Economist* speculated that the growing Chechen weariness with the war could convince opposition commanders to negotiate a settlement.

#### **CONTINUING PROBLEMS FOR RUSSIA**

A 29 July *Economist* report stated that Chechen opposition fighters were continuing the war against Russia. Even Russian authorities were acknowledging the loss of dozens of troops every week. During the week beginning 24 July, the Russian commanding general in eastern Chechnya, Alexander Popov, complained that he needed more and better trained soldiers to counter the three main opposition commanders in his operational area. All this contradicted Moscow's previous claims that the war was over and that Russian forces were returning home.

The *Economist* asserted that the deputy head of the pro-Russian administration in Chechnya, Bislan Gantamirov, was dismissed in May due to failure to control his pro-Moscow militia, but was re-appointed in July to run the Chechen police force. However, Gantamirov fell out with Kadyrov, and 200 of his militia fighters raided Kadyrov's offices. The

intervention of the main Russian commander in the region, General Viktor Kazantsev, was needed to subdue to resultant stand-off.

Interviews on Azerbaijani television with Maskhadov and a senior Chechen commander, Shamil Basaev, as well as allegations that Azerbaijan was allowing fighters supporting the Chechen cause to cross through its territory, prompted Moscow to close its border to Azeri trucks, threatening the Azeri economy.

### **UK MPS CRITICISE MOSCOW**

A 2 August report by a cross-party defence committee in the UK House of Commons stated that that Moscow had flouted the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed by 30 countries in 1999 in Istanbul, by deploying 3,600 combat vehicles and artillery pieces on its southern flank, which incorporated Chechnya. However, several states, including Russia and the UK, had so far failed to ratify the treaty. The treaty placed national ceilings on states' military equipment levels as well as territorial ceilings, restricting where such equipment could be deployed.

The report conceded that Russian actions had not been sufficient to violate the treaty in its entirety, but diplomatic attention was, nevertheless, required. It further asserted that Britain should exploit the opportunity of Moscow's desire to renegotiate the treaty to convince Russia to reduce its military resources in Chechnya to more appropriate levels. Moscow was also criticised for periodically refusing weapons inspections.

### **CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM MOSCOW**

A 3 August *Financial Times* report stated that the Russian public was not being allowed to see some of the more disturbing news from the Chechen conflict while the government was delivering contradictory and distorted information on the progress of the war. Having previously asserted that it would not negotiate with Maskhadov, the *FT* claimed that Moscow had recently given signals that it was Maskhadov who wasn't prepared to negotiate. On 2 August, the Russian military declared that a total of 14,000 Chechen opposition troops had been killed during the conflict, which the *FT* stated was more than the overall number of Chechen fighters initially stated by the Kremlin.

### **VIOLENCE IN MOSCOW**

On 8 August, a bomb in Pushkin Square in Moscow killed at least eight people and injured over 90. Russian officials stated that they suspected Chechen involvement: Moscow's Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, suggested that the blast might be linked to fighting in Chechnya. However, Maskhadov had consistently denied involvement in terrorist bombings in Russia, including this most recent incident, while President Vladimir Putin later asserted that it was wrong to

assume a Chechen connection, citing organised crime as a possible alternative.

A 9 August *Financial Times* report stated that Russia had so far produced no public evidence to support claims that Chechen fighters were behind terrorist bombings in Moscow. A 12 August *Economist* report suggested that some Russian policymakers, possibly including Putin himself, were seeking a political solution to the Chechen crisis, but there was little sign of a serious effort in this direction. The position of Kadyrov had been undermined by both Russian generals and Chechen militants.

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## **INTERNATIONAL**

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### **MILLENNIUM SUMMIT DEMANDS PK REFORMS**

On 7 September, the Permanent Five UN Security Council Members (P5), meeting during the UN Millennium Summit, were expected to demand a revision of UN peacekeeping cost calculations in order to place the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in a more stable financial position.

A 7 September *UN Wire* report stated that payment scales for peacekeeping costs were established in 1973 in response to the operation in Sinai, but they have never been revised. A final draft statement by the P5 requested a readjustment of scales in view of changed circumstances.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's address to the summit on 6 September called for a review of UN peacekeeping operations and a new partnership to bring an end to armed conflicts and poverty. Blair suggested the establishment of more robust UN peacekeeping forces that could be deployed quickly into conflict situations. He urged the UN to alter radically its planning, intelligence and analysis, as well as to develop a more substantial professional military staff.

The *UN Wire* reported that the UK government had previously proposed the establishment of a military inspectorate and staff college to train UN peacekeepers.

President Bill Clinton's address, also on 6 December, suggested the need for improved machinery to ensure rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers with adequate training and equipment, the ability to project credible force and missions that were well defined by a well-functioning headquarters.

According to Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, greater resources were required for the UN to prevent and resolve conflicts, asserting that reacting to conflicts not enough. [See *Documentation & Sources for Millennium Declaration*]

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# DOCUMENTATION & SOURCES

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## AFRICAN CONFLICTS

### SC Res. 1318 (S/RES/1318), 7 September

#### FULL TEXT

“The Security Council,

Meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government in the course of the Millennium Summit to discuss the need to ensure an effective role for the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in Africa,

**I** *Pledges* to uphold the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, *reaffirms* its commitment to the principles of sovereign equality, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States, and *underlines* the need for respect for human rights and the rule of law; *Reaffirms* the importance of adhering to the principles of the non-threat or non-use of force in international relations in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and of peaceful settlement of international disputes; *Recalls* its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and *resolves* to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and to ensure the effective functioning of the collective security system established by the Charter;

**II** *Pledges* to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peacebuilding; *Reaffirms its determination* to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world and, in view of the particular needs of Africa, to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and to the specific characteristics of African conflicts;

**III** *Strongly encourages* the development within the United Nations system and more widely of comprehensive and integrated strategies to address the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions; *Affirms* its determination to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping operations by:

- adopting clearly defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates, including in those mandates effective measures for the security and safety of United Nations personnel and, wherever feasible, for the protection of the civilian population,

- taking steps to assist the United Nations to obtain trained and properly equipped personnel for peacekeeping operations,
- strengthening consultations with troop-contributing countries when deciding on such operations;

*Agrees* to support:

- the upgrading of United Nations capacity for planning, establishing, deploying and conducting peacekeeping operations,
- the provision of a more up-to-date and sounder foundation for financing peacekeeping operations;

*Underlines* the importance of enhancing the United Nations capacity for rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations and *urges* Member States to provide sufficient and timely resources;

**IV** *Welcomes* the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 21 August (S/2000/809) [*see Policy Debates and Issues*], and *decides* to consider the recommendations which fall within its area of responsibility expeditiously;

**V** *Stresses* the critical importance of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, and emphasizes that such programmes should normally be integrated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations;

**VI** *Calls for* effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms into areas of conflict; *Decides* to continue to take resolute action in areas where the illegal exploitation and trafficking of high-value commodities contributes to the escalation or continuation of conflict; *Stresses* that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law should be brought to justice; *Emphasizes* its determination to continue to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS in all operations;

**VII** *Calls for* the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the United Nations and regional or subregional organizations or arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, and in particular in respect of peacekeeping operations; *Emphasizes* the importance of continued cooperation and effective coordination between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and African subregional organizations in addressing conflict in Africa, and of enhanced support for the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;

**VIII** *Underlines* that the ultimate responsibility for resolving disputes and conflicts lies with the parties themselves and that peacekeeping operations aimed at helping to implement a peace accord can succeed only to the extent that there is a genuine and lasting commitment to peace by all parties concerned; *Calls*

upon all States to intensify efforts to secure a world free of the scourge of war.”

## HIV/AIDS

### SC Res 1308 (S/RES/1308), 17 July

#### SELECTED EXTRACTS

“The Security Council ...,

1. *Expresses concern* at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel;

2. *Recognizes* the efforts of those Member States which have acknowledged the problem of HIV/AIDS and, where applicable, have developed national programmes, and encourages all interested Member States which have not already done so to consider developing, in cooperation with the international community and UNAIDS, where appropriate, effective long-term strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment of their personnel, as an important part of their preparation for their participation in peacekeeping operations;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take further steps towards the provision of training for peacekeeping personnel on issues related to preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and to continue the further development of pre-deployment orientation and ongoing training for all peacekeeping personnel on these issues;

4. *Encourages* interested Member States to increase international cooperation among their relevant national bodies to assist with the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in international peacekeeping operations;

5. *Encourages*, in this context, UNAIDS to continue to strengthen its cooperation with interested Member States to further develop its country profiles in order to reflect best practices and countries’ policies on HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, counselling and treatment;

6. *Expresses* keen interest in additional discussion among relevant United Nations bodies, Member States, industry and other relevant organizations to make progress, *inter alia*, on the question of access to treatment and care, and on prevention.”

## ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

### SC Res. (S/RES/1320) (2000), 15 September

#### SELECTED EXTRACTS

“The Security Council ...,

Calls on the parties to fulfil all their obligations under international law, including the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;

Authorizes the deployment within [UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia] UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military observers, until 15 March 2001, with a mandate to:

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Assist, as appropriate, in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed by the parties;
- (c) Monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998;
- (d) Monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;
- (e) Simultaneously, monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometres from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy;
- (f) Monitor the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;
- (g) Chair the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;
- (h) Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it;
- (i) Coordinate the Mission’s activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other organizations in those areas ...;

Requests the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to conclude, as necessary, status-of-forces agreements with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusions of such agreements, the model status-of-forces agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

Urges the parties to proceed immediately with demining, in order to ensure safe access of United Nations and associated personnel to the areas being monitored, drawing on United Nations technical assistance as needed ...;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and further to the provisions of paragraph 5 of its resolution 1312 (2000), decides that the measures

imposed by paragraph 6 of its resolution 1298 (2000) shall not apply to the sale and supply of:

- (a) Arms and related matériel for the sole use in Ethiopia or Eritrea of the United Nations, and
- (b) Equipment and related matériel, including technical assistance and training, for use solely for demining within Ethiopia or Eritrea under the auspices of the United Nations Mine Action Service;

Emphasizes that the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities links the termination of the United Nations peacekeeping mission with the completion of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, and requests the Secretary-General to provide regular updates on the status of this issue;

Calls on the parties to continue negotiations and conclude without delay a comprehensive and final peace settlement;

Decides that the Council, in considering the renewal of the mandate of UNMEE, will take into account whether the parties have made adequate progress as called for in paragraph 13 and 14 above ...;

## **UN MILLENNIUM DECLARATION 8 SEPTEMBER 2000**

### *SELECTED EXTRACTS*

*“The General Assembly*

*Adopts the following Declaration:*

... we have identified key objectives to which we assign special significance ...

### **Peace, Security and Disarmament**

We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

We resolve therefore:

- To strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by Member States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.
- To make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In this context, we take note of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and request the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.

- To strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

- To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and call upon all States to consider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

- To take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions.

- To redouble our efforts to implement our commitment to counter the world drug problem.

- To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering.

- To minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.

- To strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

- To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

- To call on all States to consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as the amended mines protocol to the Convention on conventional weapons.

We urge Member States to observe the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, now and in the future, and to support the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal ...”

*8th plenary meeting, 8 September 2000*

## SIERRA LEONE

**SC Res. 1313**, 4 August 2000 (S/RES/1313)

### *SELECTED EXTRACTS*

“The Security Council,

... Expresses its intention ... to strengthen the mandate of UNAMSIL ... with the following priority tasks:

- (a) To maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas, and their major approach routes;
- (b) To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force;
- (c) To deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres and, in coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone to assist, through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence;
- (d) To patrol actively on strategic lines of communication, specifically main access routes to the capital in order to dominate ground, ensure freedom of movement and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- (e) To assist in the promotion of the political process leading, inter alia, to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme where possible;

Considers that, in order to allow the restructuring of the force and provide the additional capability required for the achievement of the priority tasks set out ... above, the military component of UNAMSIL should be reinforced through accelerated troop rotations, as appropriate, and with, inter alia, further aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications and specialist combat and logistic support assets;

Recognizes that the RUF offensive against UNAMSIL since May 2000 revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission's structure, command and control and resources, as referred to in paragraph 54 of the report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 2000, reflecting findings of the United Nations Assessment Mission which visited Sierra Leone from 31 May to 8 June 2000, welcomes the recommendations made and action already taken to address these deficiencies, and requests the Secretary-General to take further urgent

steps to implement these recommendations to improve the performance and capacity of the mission;

Stresses that the successful achievement of the objectives of the mission, including the priority tasks set out ... above, will depend on the provision to UNAMSIL of fully equipped, complete units, with the required capabilities, effective command and control structure and capacity, a single chain of command, adequate resources and the commitment to implement the mandate of the mission in full as authorized by the Security Council ...”.

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## POLICY DEBATES & ISSUES

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### **REPORT OF THE PANES ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS**

*THE FOLLOWING IS THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A REPORT ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS. A FULL COPY OF THE REPORT AND A SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE FOUND ON THE UN WEBSITE: <http://www.un.org/>*

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.

The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building [*see below for members of Panel*], to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also and perhaps even more so on operational and organizational areas of need.

For preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Moreover, the changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.

Each of the recommendations contained in the present report is designed to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology. Key assessments and recommendations are highlighted below, largely in the order in which they appear in the body of the text (the numbers of the relevant paragraphs in the main text are provided in parentheses). In addition, a summary of recommendations is contained in the annex.

### **Experience of the past**

It should have come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not *deploy into* post-conflict situations but tried to *create* them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.

### **Implications for preventive action and peace-building: the need for strategy and support**

The United Nations and its members face a pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms. In this context, the Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report (A/54/2000) and in his remarks before the Security Council's second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000. It also encourages the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisis-preventive action.

Furthermore, the Security Council and the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, conscious that the United Nations will continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace, have each recognized and acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex peace operations. This will require that the United Nations system address what has hitherto been a fundamental deficiency in the way it has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.

Among the changes that the Panel supports are: a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund "quick impact projects" that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.

### **Implications for peacekeeping: the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates**

The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.

In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. Rules of engagement should be

sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.

This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation's authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers.

Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles. However, operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate.

The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation. Security Council mandates, in turn, should reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations.

The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. The Panel is of the view that, once realistic mission requirements have been set and agreed to, the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements.

Member States that do commit formed military units to an operation should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council during mandate formulation; such advice might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Troop contributors should also be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of mission personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of the mandate regarding the use of force.

### **New headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis**

The Panel recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the

informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Without such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events, and the ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created.

The Panel's proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership. It could also propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, helping to transform it into the decision-making body anticipated in the Secretary-General's initial reforms.

The Panel proposes that EISAS be created by consolidating the existing Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with a number of small, scattered policy planning offices, and adding a small team of military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists. EISAS should serve the needs of all members of ECPS.

### **Improved mission guidance and leadership**

The Panel believes it is essential to assemble the leadership of a new mission as early as possible at United Nations Headquarters, to participate in shaping a mission's concept of operations, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance. To that end, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), force commanders, civilian police commissioners, their potential deputies and potential heads of other components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution.

### **Rapid deployment standards and "on-call" expertise**

The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain.

The Panel recommends that the United Nations define "rapid and effective deployment capacity" as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.

The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces,

created by Member States working in partnership, in order to better meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements must not be deployed.

To support such rapid and effective deployment, the Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, be created within UNSAS. Teams drawn from this list and available for duty on seven days' notice would translate broad, strategic-level mission concepts developed at Headquarters into concrete operational and tactical plans in advance of the deployment of troop contingents, and would augment a core element from DPKO to serve as part of a mission start-up team.

Parallel on-call lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions, as needed, and should also be part of UNSAS. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission.

The Panel also calls upon Member States to establish enhanced national "pools" of police officers and related experts, earmarked for deployment to United Nations peace operations, to help meet the high demand for civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations dealing with intra-State conflict. The Panel also urges Member States to consider forming joint regional partnerships and programmes for the purpose of training members of the respective national pools to United Nations civilian police doctrine and standards.

The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment.

Finally, the Panel recommends that the Secretariat radically alter the systems and procedures in place for peacekeeping procurement in order to facilitate rapid deployment. It recommends that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved out of the Department of Management and placed in DPKO. The Panel proposes the creation of a new and distinct body of streamlined field procurement policies and procedures; increased delegation of procurement authority to the field; and greater flexibility for field missions in the management of their budgets. The

Panel also urges that the Secretary-General formulate and submit to the General Assembly, for its approval, a global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and services. In the interim, the Panel recommends that additional "start-up kits" of essential equipment be maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy.

The Panel also recommends that the Secretary-General be given authority, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit up to \$50 million well in advance of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new operation once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established.

### **Enhance Headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations**

The Panel recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organization. DPKO and other offices that plan and support peacekeeping are currently primarily funded by the Support Account, which is renewed each year and funds only temporary posts. That approach to funding and staff seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations, which is obviously an untenable state of affairs.

The total cost of DPKO and related Headquarters support offices for peacekeeping does not exceed \$50 million per annum, or roughly 2 per cent of total peacekeeping costs. Additional resources for those offices are urgently needed to ensure that more than \$2 billion spent on peacekeeping in 2001 are well spent. The Panel therefore recommends that the Secretary-General submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization's requirements in full.

The Panel believes that a methodical management review of DPKO should be conducted but also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, nine civilian police staff to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones, or to allocate just 1.25 per cent of the total costs of peacekeeping to Headquarters administrative and logistics support.

### **Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support**

The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from throughout

the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.

Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), which should be split into two divisions. The Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened and moved into the DPKO Office of Operations. Public information planning and support at Headquarters also needs strengthening, as do elements in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), particularly the electoral unit. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced.

Consideration should be given to allocating a third Assistant Secretary-General to DPKO and designating one of them as "Principal Assistant Secretary-General", functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.

### **Adapting peace operations to the information age**

Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of the above-mentioned objectives, but gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede its effective use. In particular, Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations. A senior official with such responsibility in the peace and security arena should be appointed and located within EISAS, with counterparts in the offices of the SRSG in every United Nations peace operation.

Headquarters and the field missions alike also need a substantive, global, Peace Operations Extranet (POE), through which missions would have access to, among other things, EISAS databases and analyses and lessons learned.

### **Challenges to implementation**

The Panel believes that the above recommendations fall well within the bounds of what can be reasonably demanded of the Organization's Member States. Implementing some of them will require additional resources for the Organization, but we do not mean to suggest that the best way to solve the problems of the United Nations is merely to throw additional resources at them. Indeed, no amount of money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the culture of the Organization.

The Panel calls on the Secretariat to heed the Secretary-General's initiatives to reach out to the institutions of civil society; to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is *the* universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is *their* organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it.

Furthermore, wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. Moreover, qualified people will have no incentive to join it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible.

Member States also acknowledge that they need to reflect on their working culture and methods. It is incumbent upon Security Council members, for example, and the membership at large to breathe life into the words that they produce, as did, for instance, the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis in 1999, an example of effective Council *action* at its best: *res, non verba*.

We — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very *raison d'être*: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace.

While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we have also come to a shared vision of a *United* Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise, and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.

## THE PANEL

### **Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)**

Since 1997, Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Support of the Secretary-General's Preventive and Peacemaking Efforts.

### **Mr. J. Brian Atwood (United States)**

President, Citizens International.

### **Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago)**

Executive Director of the Organization of American States (OAS)/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti, 1993-2000.

### **Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand)**

Head of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1998-1999.

### **Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom)**

Commissioner of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998-1999.

### **General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany)**

Chair of the Military Committee of NATO, 1996 - 1999.

### **Ms. Hisako Shimura (Japan)**

Served for 24 years in the United Nations Secretariat.

### **Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation)**

Former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York.

### **General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe)**

Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 1995-1998.

### **Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland)**

President of the Foundation of Moral Re-Armament, Caux, and of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining.

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# COMMENTARY

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## US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE

*THE FOLLOWING IS A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES SURROUNDING AMERICAN PLANS TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE PROGRAMME, PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER RAMSBOTHAM, HEAD OF THE UN AND CONFLICT UNIT, UNA-UK.*

American plans to build a National Missile Defence (NMD) system to counter missile attacks from so-called rogue states have caused much controversy amongst both its allies and enemies. The project is not only expensive financially, but has proved highly questionable in both technical and diplomatic terms. However, at present, Washington appears determined to carry on with the project no matter the consequences.

America's planned NMD programme is designed to locate and intercept incoming missiles in space. The cost of the proposed system has been estimated at \$50 billion by Congress and it intends initially to deploy 20 interceptor missiles in Alaska by 2005, leading up to as many as 250 missiles by 2010. Three tests of the system made so far have resulted in one success and two failures, the most recent failure occurring in July this year.

### **The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty**

The NMD project compromises various international agreements relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: in particular, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between America and Russia is directly affected by the proposed programme. The ABM agreement is intended to safeguard deterrence between the two signatories by ensuring that both countries remain vulnerable to nuclear strikes from each other. Thus, Moscow and Washington agreed to restrict deployments of anti-ballistic missiles launchers to one hundred each around a single site.

A common argument by American advocates of NMD is that the ABM treaty is out of date, designed within a Cold War context where Russia represented America's greatest nuclear threat. Supporters of NMD assert that America's most significant threat now stems from so-called rogue states, such as North Korea and Iraq, who are attempting to develop nuclear weapons capabilities but are less tied to international conventions and whose behaviour is less predictable than more traditional nuclear enemies. American arguments that the ABM Treaty is an internal matter between Russia and the US ignores the inevitably catastrophic consequences of nuclear engagement between these two for Europe and the rest of the world.

Washington appears to be determined to continue with developing NMD in spite of the financial and political repercussions. To continue with NMD, America would either have to renegotiate the ABM treaty, which Russia has so far been very resistant to, or, as advocated by certain primarily republican hawks, to abandon it entirely. There are strong fears this latter option would further severely compromise other international nuclear weapons agreements.

Not only is Russia very worried about the consequences of NMD, but China and European states are equally nervous, as the programme would complicate their relationship with Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Britain is in a particularly difficult position in view of its much vaunted special relationship with Washington and the fact that America wishes to locate radar installations for the NMD programme on British territory: Fylingdales is intended to be upgraded as an NMD radar site to track incoming missiles; while there are plans that Menwith Hill will be integrated into the system, providing space-based data on missile launches. Both such installations would have contravened the ABM treaty.

In the event that Washington succeeded in convincing Moscow to renegotiate ABM, British security would remain compromised as the two installations would be likely to make the UK a primary target in the event of nuclear strikes against the US. Thus, increased American security would come at the expense of increased British insecurity.

So far, the UK government's response appeared to amount to stating that, since Washington had not yet put in a request about the two potential UK sites, therefore no decision need yet be made.

Critics of NMD, particularly in Europe, further contend that the system will encourage proliferation in nuclear states – including China and Russia - as they strive to maintain a convincing deterrent capable of penetrating the nuclear shield. Thus, UK involvement in the project would further sour UK/European relations. Indeed, there were indications that Washington had been intensely surprised by the strength of European opposition to the NMD proposal. Moreover, opponents of NMD warn that it could never be capable of countering large-scale missile attacks, made all the more likely by the proliferating affect of NMD. However, NMD advocates remind such critics that the system is designed in response to

### **Testing Problems**

The failed July test of NMD appeared to relieve pressure from President Bill Clinton, who would otherwise have had to make a decision on whether to go ahead with the programme before the end of his presidency later this year. However, other analysts have suggested that the failed test in fact weakened US leverage in renegotiating the ABM treaty, thereby strengthening Russian determination to resist concession. In turn, it is feared that this will encourage

more hawkish American politicians more avidly to advocate abandoning the treaty altogether.

On the other hand, Russian problems in even maintaining current nuclear arsenal levels, let alone augmenting them, puts pressure on Moscow to consider renegotiating the ABM treaty in return for reductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals, perhaps signalling some room for manoeuvre for Washington. However, this would not resolve problems for other countries, particularly China.

Meanwhile, the failed test also strengthened the hand of opponents to the system by reinforcing the view that NMD is not only politically damaging, but is also technically impossible. Therefore, far from increasing American security from missile attack, the attempted deployment of NMD could both encourage proliferation and instability, while offering no guarantee of immunity from attack. Even if NMD is technically possible, other countries complain that the impact of nuclear attacks is so widespread and devastating that they would inevitably be affected by the resultant political instability.

### **Postponement**

On 1 September Clinton announced he would postpone preparatory work on a new radar in Alaska for NMD. Testing was to carry on, but Clinton's successor - Al Gore or George Bush – would ultimately have to make the decision whether and how to go ahead. The postponement appeared to generally welcomed within the international community.

However, Clinton had signed the National Missile Defence Act, committing the Administration to deploying national defences as soon as technological advances allowed. Analysts suggested that Clinton's move was influenced by a desire to present Al Gore and the Democrat Party as firm on foreign policy. Republican Defence Secretary, William Cohen, had been the only cabinet member to advocate continuing with NMD as planned following the recent failed test.

## Notes

## Notes