This Issue
Secretary-General's MONUA Report (1)
The report covered developments since 7 September 1998 (S/1998/838). The Secretary-General remained concerned about the apparent unravelling of the peace process in Angola, for which the international community held UNITA primarily responsible. He asserted that the peace process could only be rescued by the unconditional implementation of all major elements of the Lusaka Protocol, in particular complete demilitarisation and the extension of state administration throughout the entire country.
Peace Initiative
Annan reiterated that the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions were the most viable means to restore normalcy to the country. He stressed the importance of keeping the door to dialogue open. His Special Representative was to maintain contacts with all parties. On the basis of the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 1195 (1998), he requested his Special Representative, Issa Diallo, to deliver the message of the international community to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and to ascertain his intentions concerning the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
MONUA Mandate
The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend MONUA for up to six weeks to give his Special Representative an extra opportunity to revive the peace process.
Annan recalled that the Security Council originally mandated MONUA to help the Angolan parties to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, enhance confidence building and create an environment conducive to long-term stability. In the event that the pattern of UNITA non-compliance with its obligations continued after this extension, dialogue between the parties remained elusive, his Special Representative could not maintain meaningful contacts and MONUA remained obstructed in its verification activities, he might be forced propose the course of action outlined below.
The UN would proceed with the immediate readjustment of its presence in Angola from the beginning of December. Its deployment would be concentrated mostly around six regional headquarters, Luanda and the logistical base in Lobito. The reconfiguration would be carried out gradually to protect UN personnel and property and would be completed by the end of January 1999.
Recommendations
Annan recommended that urgent measures be taken to enable the humanitarian operations to carry out their tasks. He stated that security clearances with all parties concerned and urgent additional
funding were the fundamental requirements to avoid further aggravation of the emergency situation at the time. He intended to begin consultations aimed at defining modalities for increasing the flow of humanitarian assistance
commensurate with the needs on the ground over the following few weeks.
UN Doc: S/1998/931
8 October 1998
4,000 UNITA Troops Demobilise
A 21 November Panafrican News Agency report suggested that around 4,000 Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) troops had deserted and surrendered their weapons to the Angolan authorities. Former UNITA secretary-general, General Euginio Manuvakola, split from UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in September to lead a rival faction. Manuvakola intended to ally with the government to ensure full implementation of the Lusaka peace protocol.
Local Government Minister Fernando Faustino Muteka urged the international community to treat Savimbi as a war criminal. He asserted that both the Angolan government and the breakaway faction felt that
the UN had failed to disarm Savimbi. He added that they had appealed to Southern African Development Community states and other African countries to disarm him.
Panafrican News Agency
21 November 1998
Savimbi Defies Peace Efforts
A 23 November editorial in the Times of Zambia accused UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi of being unconcerned that the 20-year war in Angolan had killed and injured thousands of people and had caused widespread displacement. Statistics from relief organisations stated that 30% of people in some parts of the country have been disabled by landmines. The editorial recalled that Angola has never fully exploited its rich oil reserves and mineral resources to benefit its population. Savimbi has defied peace efforts with impunity, even following losing an election.
The report recalled that the 1994 the Lusaka protocol incorporated UNITA members in parliament and suggested disarming UNITA fighters. However, many observers at the time were suspicious when a junior
UNITA representative was sent to sign the agreement.
The Times of Zambia
November 23, 1998
Savimbi Still Being Armed
A 23 November Post of Zambia report declared that the head of UNITA's splinter group, General Euginio Manuvakola, accused leader Jonas Savimbi of continuing to receive arms from the international community. Manuvakola suggested that the arms were manufactured in Eastern Europe and were traversing African countries such as Rwanda. He announced an agreement to impeach Savimbi.
Local Government Minister Fernando Faustino Muteka further warned that Namibian and Zimbabwean troops would challenge Savimbi once they had defeated opposition fighters in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. He accused the UNITA leadership of exclusively serving the interests its most senior members. Muteka further pledged to cooperate with the new UNITA camp.
The Post of Zambia
23 November 1998
MONUA Peacekeepers Evacuated
A 7 December Associated Press report stated that the UN evacuated fourteen peacekeepers serving with the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) who had been trapped by fighting between the Angolan army and UNITA. The peacekeepers comprised a Swede, a Brazilian, a Senegalese and 11 Indians. Spokesperson Hamadoun Toure stated that they were withdrawn from the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo which were reportedly under attack by government forces.
The report asserted that the government accused UNITA of using the peacekeepers as human shields to counter attacks. It added that the UN Security Council on 4 December declared that UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi would be held personally accountable for the monitors' safety.
Associated Press
7 December 1998
Secretary-General's MONUA Report (2)
The report covered developments since 8 October 1998. The Secretary-General stated that no progress had been made in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and that the overall political, military and security situation in Angola had further deteriorated. Dialogue between the government and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi had ceased. Combined mechanisms, including the Joint Commission, were inoperative and preparations for military confrontation continued. Consequently, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was unable to carry out most of its mandated duties and there were few prospects for reactivating the peace process.
International Involvement
Kofi Annan remained convinced that there could be no military solution to the conflict. A political settlement on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol represented the only means to achieve peace. He reiterated that UNITA must take concrete steps to implement immediately all of its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol.
The Secretary-General criticised the National Assembly's recent abrogation of Savimbi's special status since rejecting all dialogue with Savimbi was unlikely to forward national reconciliation.
On 20 November, a government official had reportedly declared that, unless MONUA and the Troika of observer states to the peace process (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the US) participated in a Joint Commission meeting along with the recently established UNITA Renovation Committee, the government would resolve the outstanding issues of the Protocol with the Renovation Committee alone. The Secretary-General recalled that the Lusaka Protocol explicitly included UN assistance in its implementation, since when the world body had facilitated the establishment and maintenance of space for peace and political reconciliation.
Annan remained convinced that international engagement would help to dissuade the parties from a return to war. He therefore proposed that the MONUA mandate be extended for up to three months. However, were the security situation to become untenable, he would immediately submit further recommendations, including, if necessary, the withdrawal of MONUA.
MONUA contributions as at 17 November 1998
[Military Observers (MO); Civilian Police Obervers (CPO); Staff Officers (SO); Troops (Tr); Total (T)]
Argentina 15 CPO; 15 T; Bangladesh 3 MO; 20 CPO; 1 SO; 24 T; Brazil 4 MO; 11 CPO; 2 SO;
17 T; Bulgaria 3 MO; 17 CPO; 20 T; Congo 2 MO; 2 T; Egypt 3 MO; 15 CPO; 18 T; France 3 MO; 3 T; Gambia MO; 4 CPO; 4 T; Ghana 3 MO; 6 CPO; 9 T; Guinea-Bissau 2 MO; 4 CPO; 6 T; Hungary 3 MO; 8 CPO; 11 T; India 5 MO; 11 CPO; 8 SO;
135 Tr; 159 T; Jordan 3 MO; 19 CPO; 22 T; Kenya 3 MO; 6 CPO; 9 T; Malaysia 4 MO; 20 CPO; 24 T; Mali 3 MO; 20 CPO; 23 T; Namibia 2 SO; 134 Tr; 136 T; New Zealand 3 MO; 3 T; Nigeria 4 MO; 15 CPO; 19 T; Norway 3 MO; 3 T; Pakistan
3 MO; 1b SO; 4 T; Poland 4 MO; 4 T; Portugal 4 MO; 40 CPO; 4 SO; 42 Tr; 90 T; Romania 4 SO; 138 Tr; 142 T; Russian Federation 3 MO; 3 SO; 100 Tr; 106 T; Senegal 4 MO; 4 T; Slovakia 3 MO; 3 T; Spain 14 CPO; 14 T; Sweden 3 MO; 14 CPO; 17 T; United Republic of Tanzania 3 CPO; 3 T; Ukraine 3 MO; 1 SO; 4 T; Uruguay 3 MO; 31 CPO; 2 SO; 36 T; Zambia 3 MO; 22 CPO; 8 SO; 33 T; Zimbabwe 3 MO; 22 CPO; 4 SO; 29 T; Total 90 MO; 339 CPO 40 SO; 547 Tr; 1,016 T;
a Including military police.
b A military specialist in the demining school.
UN Doc: S/1998/110
23 November 1998
UN Sanctions Ignored
A 14 December Financial Times article cited a report by Global Witness accusing companies and governments of failing to properly implement UN sanctions in Angola. The report alleged that diamonds from UNITA were reaching the market via the diamond company De Beers and several governments, in particular Belgium. The report denied claims that smuggling and problems identifying the diamonds' origins impeded the enforcement of sanctions. These were merely excuses to avoid implementing unwelcome reforms in the diamond industry.
The FT report stated that UNITA relied heavily on diamond profits, having lost most of its Cold War allies. Approximately two-thirds of the total $600m-$800m Angolan diamond output for 1997 emanated from UNITA-held areas. However, the FT report put recent reductions in output down both to the UNITA's withdrawal from some mining areas late in 1997 and because easily accessible surface deposits were becoming diminished and could be exploited only with considerable investments, rendered unlikely due to persistent insecurity.
According to the FT article, UNITA used intermediaries to avoid sanctions proscribing diamond imports from Angola without government certification. These came from within Angola and from neighbouring
countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
Financial Times
14 December
Burundi Atrocities Condemned
A 19 November Associated Press article cited an Amnesty International report accusing Burundi's Tutsi-controlled military of killing hundreds of innocent civilians and Hutu
opposition forces of murdering dozens more. The Amnesty report declared that the majority of the killings took place in highly insecure areas, making verification difficult.
The article recalled that Hutu opposition forces have been fighting to overthrow the regime of Tutsi President Pierre Buyoya who seized power in a 1996 coup. Over 200,000
people have been killed since violence broke out in 1993 following the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchoir Ndadaye (Hutu).
Associated Press
19 November 1998
Congo CEASE-FIRE Agreed in Principle
A 30 November Financial Times report stated that a cease-fire was agreed in principle by the main states backing the regime of Congolese President Laurent Kabila and Congolese opposition forces. The accord resulted from diplomatic activity on the sidelines of the 20th Franco-African summit in Paris, attended by 50 African leaders and Kofi Annan.
The report warned that doubt remained over the integrity of Congolese opposition fighters who held considerable territory in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) bordering Uganda and Rwanda. A delegation from the Movement for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was in Paris for the summit but was not accorded official status. An opposition representative denied the validity of the accord without prior opposition agreement with Kabila.
However, the report questioned the level of opposition autonomy from its Rwandese and Ugandan backers. Presidents Pasteur Bizimungu and Yoweri Museveni, of Rwanda and Uganda respectively, expressed willingness in Paris to support the cease-fire. Before the September regional summit at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, both had been reluctant even to admit involvement with the Congolese opposition. In contrast, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe have overtly supported Kabila with troops and military equipment. Annan helped broker contacts between Kabila and Museveni, who had previously assisted Kabila to overthrow former President Mobutu Sese Seko.
The report suggested that the cease-fire would be initialed in the Zambian capital Lusaka in early December. It would then be signed at a special session of the Organisation of African Unity in Ougadougou, Burkina Faso on 17-18 December. The agreement focused on the withdrawal of external forces and the dispatch of a UN-funded African peacekeeping force to guarantee international borders between DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. The force would further monitor the movement of Rwandan Hutu opposition groups based in DRC.
The FT report stated that consolidation of the accord would represent an achievement for French diplomacy. Less than a year previously, Paris was seen to have lost regional
influence, with Mobutu's overthrow and Kabila's arrival assisted by US-backed allies. Kabila subsequently threatened to withdraw DRC from the association of francophone states and accused Paris of neo-colonialist ambitions.
The Financial Times
30 November 1998
Congo Cease-fire Tenuous
A 30 November Associated Press report stated that, despite recent cease-fire negotiations in Paris between leaders of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the DRC [see article above], Congolese opposition forces promised to use the break in fighting to regroup for a fresh offensive. Rwandan and Congolese opposition commanders only agreed to stop fighting, not to withdraw troops. On 30 November, DRC President Laurent Kabila described the cease-fire as one option toward the cessation of hostilities, stressing that no agreement had yet been signed.
The report declared that on 29 November Rwandan government minister Patrick Mazimhaka declared continued Rwandan support for the Congolese opposition, while
opposition leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba asserted ceasing hostilities to be contingent upon opposition participation. However, it was unclear whether the opposition would be
invited to initial the cease-fire. The opposition comprises a coalition of minority Tutsi, disenchanted members of the Congolese army and opposition politicians who resorted to
violence on 2 August. Kabila announced that the cease-fire had to be linked to the withdrawal of foreign troops, accusing Rwanda and Uganda of engineering the conflict.
However, the report estimated that 60,000 opposition were responsible for most of the fighting in eastern DRC.
Associated Press
30 November 1998
Perry Urges Ecowas to Address Crisis
A 15 November Panafrican News Agency report asserted that former Liberian President Ruth Perry urged the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to make efforts to prevent the country from sliding back into violence. Perry was referring to continuing confrontation between President Charles Taylor and his former rival, Roosevelt Johnson. Taylor succeeded Perry in 1997 and has accused Johnson and others of plotting to overthrow his government. Johnson remained in exile having escaped an arrest attempt by Taylor's security forces in Monrovia two months previously which caused many casualties.
Perry advised the former warlords to present their problems to ECOWAS or even the UN Security Council. She requested the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to take charge of restructuring the Liberian army under the terms of the Liberian peace agreement. She welcomed ECOWAS' assertions during the last OAU summit that the peace agreement be complied with.
The report said that Taylor had reneged on the agreement, arguing that Liberia's status as a sovereign nation with an elected government provided it with exclusive rights to organise its army. However, factional leaders have accused Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of using his forces against them and of killing his political opponents. The report claimed that Liberia has consequently been denied genuine peace one-and-a-half years after the supposed end of the war.
Perry argued that reconstruction efforts needed to address issues of conflict prevention among children and conflict resolution and anger management among adults..
Panafrican News Agency.
15 November 1998
Secretary-General's UNOMSIL Report
The report described developments since 12 August 1998. Kofi Annan declared that at the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL completed the first phase of the deployment of its military component, comprising 40 military observers, the Chief Military Observer and a 15-strong medical team. As well as monitoring military developments, the observers also monitored international humanitarian law promoting humanitarian assistance through the investigation of incidents. They further provided both security advice to humanitarian personnel and liaison between them and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and local authorities. Annan revealed that, as of 28 September, agreement had been reached with Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar that ECOMOG forces assume responsibility for the security of UN personnel in the country.
Opposition Activity
The Secretary-General stated that the build-up of armed opposition forces was most significant in the north of Sierra Leone and also brought the area of opposition activity closer to the centre of the country. Kofi Annan condemned the summary executions, torture, mutilations, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried out by former junta elements. He was particularly outraged by acts of terror against children as young as six, including the amputation of limbs.
The concentration of opposition forces in the north-west might represent preparations for a major offensive against Makeni or Port Loko, said Annan. This would sever ECOMOG's main supply route between Guinea, Freetown and Makeni and provide opposition forces with a foothold close to Freetown. On 1 October 1998 the CDF, with ECOMOG support, launched an offensive to capture an opposition stronghold in Kailahun district, causing a reduction in the intensity of opposition activities in the north.
Annan stated that human rights abuses committed by opposition forces had induced the humanitarian emergency in Sierra Leone and protracted the widespread dislocation of local populations. UN humanitarian personnel and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provided considerable aid to victims of attacks and displacement. However, Annan stressed that more needed to be done urgently, especially the provision of medical and surgical capacity, specific services for amputees and psychosocial treatment.
ECOMOG Activity
The Secretary-General declared that ECOMOG remained essential to the government of Sierra Leone's capability to restore peace and security throughout the country. He further welcomed efforts to deploy additional troops from ECOWAS countries for an offensive into the east and to seize the military initiative from opposition forces. The governments of Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali and the Niger pledged to contribute some of the additional 6,000 ECOMOG troops to join the 10,000 to 12,000 already there. Those countries stated that the deployment could take place if the international community was prepared to bear their transport costs. Annan asserted that, should the CDF/ECOMOG offensive lead to large-scale opposition surrenders and their subsequent participation in the disarmament and demobilisation programme, it might then be necessary to deploy UN observers very rapidly.
An estimated total of 33,000 ex-combatants, primarily from the CDF, were intended to take part in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, scheduled to be completed in three phases by June 2001. The Secretary-General stated that the first phase covered the demobilisation of former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and RUF personnel who had been captured and disarmed by ECOMOG and later encamped at Lungi. Their screening and registration began on 2 September. UNOMSIL deployed extra observers to the Lungi team site to assist in several aspects of the registration. This was necessary to ascertain the identity and eligibility of the ex-combatants since UNOMSIL had not been present during the initial disarmament by ECOMOG.
The end of the exercise on 25 September saw 2,145 people screened and registered. Demobilisation was scheduled to be completed in December 1998. However, Annan complained of the lateness of the programme due to the continued war effort. He was concerned over the hostile public attitude towards former RSLMF personnel, which could potentially derail the reintegration process. Ostracised former soldiers might then form a destabilising factor. Thus, a sensitisation campaign under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture was being implemented to increase public acceptance. Annan asserted that reintegration also depended on benefits being extended to returnee communities to avoid perceptions of preferential treatment for former soldiers.
Government Activity
Annan commended the government's focus on strengthening democratic control over the reconstituted armed forces. He also complimented the thoroughness of the reform and restructuring of the police force. He thanked the governments of Germany and the UK for their support in this.
Sierra-Leone's long-term stability also depended on the implementation of the government's disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, reported the Secretary-General. He commended the UK for its role in providing equipment and logistical support for the screening and registration exercise.
Annan welcomed the government's efforts to ensure that the procedural aspects of the civilian group trials conformed with international human rights standards, but was concerned that those sentenced to death in the recently concluded court martial had no right of legal appeal under Sierra Leonean law. He urged the government to at least consider a stay of execution pending review of the proceedings before relevant international monitoring bodies.
Annan suggested that the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia exercise restraint, pursue dialogue and implement confidence-building measures, agreed in July 1998. Should both parties agree, the Secretary-General proposed the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border, subsequently accompanied by UN military observers, to help stabilise the situation and restore mutual confidence.
UNOMSIL contributions as at 1 September 1998
[Military Observers (MO), Others (O), Total (T)] China 3 MO, 3 T; Egypt 2 MO, 2 T; India 6 MO, 15 O, 21 T; Kenya 4 MO, 4 T; Kyrgyzstan 1 MO, 1 T; New Zealand 2 MO, 2 T; Pakistan 5 MO, 5 T; Russian Federation 7 MO, 7 T; UK 7 MO, 7 T; Zambia 4 MO, 4 T; Total 41b MO, 15 O, 56 T.
a Medical team.
b Including Chief Military Observer.
UN Doc: S/1998/960
16 October 1998
Deteriorating Humanitarian Crisis in Sierra Leone
A 29 October report by Refugees International stated that, according to UN estimates, the continuing conflict in the north and east interior of Sierra Leone had created over 250,000 refugees in Guinea and Liberia and an additional 250,000 internally displaced people. Extreme insecurity had also prevented international relief agencies from accessing much of the interior of the country.
The report stated that June had witnessed ECOMOG losing ground to opposition forces, while September saw further security deterioration. Opposition forces attacked twenty villages in the north of Sierra Leone. The attacks involved a mutilation campaign as well as new types of atrocity including burning houses with people inside, decapitation, sexual assaults, forced conscription of both men and women and confirmed reports of babies being burned alive.
The report cautioned that displaced people did not feel safe to return to their homes but faced severe food and money shortages if they could not harvest their crops in time. Surveys by several NGOs already revealed widespread malnutrition and the report warned that the situation was likely to be deteriorate where NGOs lacked access. The forthcoming dry season could witness increased violence. The fighting had already extended to Guinea and threatened to spread throughout the region. The report warned of a growing public perception that ECOMOG could not effectively defend villages or counter opposition forces.
Kofi Annan asserted that ECOMOG required significant additional logistical support to contain opposition activity and restore order to eastern and northern parts of the country.
The report suggested that government forces mainly comprised traditional hunters loosely organised into the Civil Defence Force (CDF).
Refugees International
29 October 1998
Secretary-General's MINURSO Report
The report covered developments since 11 September 1998. The Secretary-General stated that neither party made any specific proposal to reconcile their viewpoints over the disputed tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52. Consequently, his Special Representative, Charles Dunbar, continued to seek ways of breaking the deadlock. On 23 September, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, informed Dunbar of his government's intention to facilitate the return of Saharan refugees. The Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (POLISARIO) also reiterated the importance of the referendum process.
Settlement Plan
Annan's Special Envoy was to begin an appeals process as the most effective means of advancing the Settlement Plan. He dispatched a mission comprising Dunbar, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet and the Chair of the Identification Commission, Robin Kinloch, to travel to Rabat and Tindouf from 17-24 October to propose a set of measures intended to overcome current obstacles. The mission submitted protocols on the identification of applicants from the relevant tribal groupings wishing to present themselves individually and on the appeals process, a memorandum on UNHCR activities and an outline of the next stages of the Settlement Plan. A protocol on refugee repatriation was to be submitted to the two parties and to the Algerian and Mauritanian authorities.
The parties' agreement to the above protocols would need to be secured by mid-November 1998, in order that UNHCR could prepare to receive refugees and that identification of individual applicants from the disputed tribal groupings could begin on 1 December 1998, the date scheduled for publication of the provisional list of voters. In accordance with the Settlement Plan, the appeals process for applicants from tribes other than the disputed groupings could conclude in March 1999 and identification of applicants from the disputed groupings in April. If the referendum was to take place in December 1999 it was important to undertake full deployment by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), effective 1 January 1999.
Arbitration
Annan stated that the deadlock in the Settlement Plan was primarily due to the inability of the Moroccan Government and POLISARIO to reach a compromise on the disputed tribal groupings. He therefore offered personal arbitration in keeping with the provisions of the Settlement Plan, including paragraph 20 of the Secretary-General's report of 19 April 1991 (S/22464), which stipulated that: "The Commission's mandate to update the 1974 census will include (a) removing from the lists the names of persons who have since died and (b) considering applications from persons who claim the right to participate in the referendum on the grounds that they are Western Saharans and were omitted from the 1974 census."
To avoid excluding eligible voters, Annan asked the Identification Commission to consider requests from those tribal groupings who wished to present themselves individually, having regard to the five eligibility criteria accepted by the parties. The parties would have strictly to adhere to the conditions of the review, as provided for in the Houston agreements and specifically in annex I to his report of 24 September 1997 (S/1197/742), which stipulated that: "The parties agree that they will not directly or indirectly sponsor or present for identification anyone" from these tribal groupings, although the parties would not have to actively prevent individuals from such tribal groupings from presenting themselves.
Identification
The Secretary-General stated that the supplementary identification operation would prolong the Identification Commission's work programme. Therefore, he suggested launching the phase of the appeals process simultaneously so as not to postpone the referendum too long. It was therefore necessary to publish by 1 December 1998 the provisional list of voters resulting from the work of the Identification Commission on tribes other than those disputed, so as to begin on that date the appeals process concerning tribes already identified. Since the implementation of such a programme made it essential to strengthen the Identification Commission, Annan proposed that the number of the Commission's members be gradually increased from 18 to 25 and that the necessary support personnel also be increased, so as to keep to the proposed timetable.
The Secretary-General asserted that the referendum was also conditional upon the safe return of eligible refugees and their immediate families. Therefore, the Moroccan government, POLISARIO and the Algerian and Mauritanian governments needed to provide the UN with relevant facilities and guarantees. The Secretary-General included a revised timetable for implementation of the above issues. He added that the various texts which he had submitted to the Moroccan Government, POLISARIO and the Algerian and Mauritanian governments needed to be accepted within a few days, including the outstanding draft status-of-forces agreements and the protocols on the identification of applicants from the disputed tribal groupings
Financial Aspects
MINURSO's proposed budget for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 amounted to $65.1 million gross. The General Assembly, by its resolution 52/228 B of 26 June 1998, provided an initial bridging appropriation of $21.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $5.4 million gross, for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998. Also on 26 June 1998, the Assembly appropriated $22.8 million to maintain the force from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. As at 23 October 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO for the period since inception of the Mission to 21 September 1998 amounted to $55 million.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General was Charles Dunbar (US); Personal Representative of the Secretary-General was James A. Baker III (US); Chairman of the Identification Commission was Robin Kinloch (UK); Chief Military Observer was Major-General Brnd SLubenik (Astria); Police Commissioner was Chief Superintendent Peter Miller (Canada).
MINURSO contributions, as at 22 October 1998
[Military Observers (MO); Staff Officers (SO); Troops (Tr); Civilian Police Observers (CPO); Total (T)]
Argentina 1 MO, 1 T; Austria 5 MO, 5* T; Bangladesh 6 MO, 6 T; Canada 8 CPO, 8 T; China 16 MO, 16 T; Egypt 19 MO, 2 CPO, 21 T; El Salvador 2 MO, 2 T; France 25 MO, 25 T; Ghana 6 MO, 7 Tr, 10 CPO, 23 T; Greece 1 MO, 1 T; Guinea 3 MO, 3 T; Honduras 12 MO, 12 T; Ireland 8 MO, 8 T; India 10 CPO, 10 T; Italy 5 MO, 5 T; Kenya 8 MO, 8 T; Malaysia 13 MO, 10 CPO, 23 T; Nigeria 5 MO, 10 CPO, 15 T; Norway 2 CPO, 2 T; Pakistan 5 MO, 6 O, 150 Tr, 9 CPO, 170 T; Poland 3 MO, 3 T; Portugal 4 MO, 10 CPO, 14 T; Republic of Korea 20 Tr, 20 T; Russian Federation 25 MO, 25 T; Sweden 1 O, 10 CPO, 11 T; Uruguay 13 MO, 13 T; USA 15 MO, 15 T; Venezuela 3 MO, 3 T; Total 203 MO, 7 O, 177 Tr, 81 CPO, 468 T.
*In addition to the Force Commander.
UN Doc: S/1998/997
26 October 1998
Executive Outcomes Closes
An 11 December Financial Times report declared that the South African mercenary company, Executive Outcomes (EO), would close on 11 January 1999. EO's operations have included providing military support for the Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments against opposition forces.
The FT report stated that EO has marketed itself as a legitimate organisation supplying professional military advisory services. Mercenary groups in South Africa were facing the threat of having their assets confiscated as part of the new Military and Foreign Assistance Act. EO claimed submissions it made during the drafting of this legislation had made it the only legally authorised security company in South Africa.
According to the report, EO explained that it was closing because security advances by African governments had removed its raison d'être. However, the large number of
African countries involved in foreign military expeditions, domestic wars or civil conflicts made this claim implausible. Wars such as that in the Democratic Republic of Congo
created ample opportunities for mercenary work. The report suggested that there was widespread suspicion that EO personnel would find employment with other security
companies. However, EO Director Nico Palm denied connections with other mercenary groups. The EO website cited as successful operations: countering white-collar crime for
a major product supplier; training South African special forces in counter-espionage techniques; securing and defending oil installations in Angola; releasing hostages; retraining an African army; and preventing a coup d'état.
Financial Times
11 December
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