This is the first issue of Conflict Resolution Monitor (CRM), from the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. CRM replaces International Peacekeeping News. Many of the features of International Peacekeeping News are retained, but we have broadened the focus in order to cover developments in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Our concern is to provide information and ideas which will be relevant to the international humanitarian community, faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. CRM will continue to provide information about peacekeeping deployments and peacekeeping policy debates, and will list conferences, research and publications, and training events. Our Commentary section continues to provide short commentaries from experts and practitioners, and in this first issue we are pleased to feature an article by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan which points to the need for a concept and practice of peacekeeping which enables it to engage with and apply conflict resolution strategies which are themselves concerned to nurture sustainable peace processes. CRM introduces a new section on Conflict Resolution Organisations, listing those organisations based in the UK which are engaged in research, education, training, policy development and/or field based applications of conflict resolution processes.
CRM will be published quarterly and the information on the organisations will be updated in each issue. The section on UK-based organisations also contains a guide to internet links which provide a comprehensive survey of conflict analysis, conflict data and conflict resolution work world-wide.
CRM is an electronic publication available at the world wide web homepage of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (Note: back issues of International Peacekeeping News are available on this homepage).
Project Directors: Dr Tom Woodhouse and Dr Oliver Ramsbotham , Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford; BD 7 1DP; Tel/Fax: ++ (0)1274 384197
Editor: Alexander Ramsbotham
Internet Editor: Yuka Hasegawa
We are grateful to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Nations Department), the Samuel Rubin Foundation, and the Westcroft Trust for financial support for the project. We also wish to thank the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Section and the UN Department of Public Information.
UNDPI UNAVEM Mission Update
In its resolution 1075, of 11 October 1996, the Security Council emphasised that continuing delays and unfilled promises, in particular on the part of UNITA, in implementing the successive timetables for the completion of key military and political issues to do with the Lusaka Protocol would no longer be acceptable. The signing of the Protocol, on 20 November 1994, marked a new stage in the Angolan peace process. The Protocol consisted of a number of documents, each relating to a particular issue on the agenda of the peace talks, covering legal, military, police and political issues, as well as the role for the UN. After UNITA submitted a list of tasks which it had to fulfil by 15 November 1996 (later extended to 20 November), UNAVEM III prepared a comprehensive implementation timetable, encompassing all pending military, police and political tasks to be completed by both parties. In his report to the Council, of 19 November 1996, the Secretary-General stated that the agreement on a consolidated timetable for the completion of the pressing tasks had brought the most urgent issues into focus. Some progress had been made, but the implementation of the timetable was still lagging behind. In the meantime, in light of the envisaged date for the completion of the mandate, plans for the start of the orderly and phased drawdown of UNAVEM III were finalised. Those plans included the withdrawal, by the end of December 1996, of four UN infantry and support units, with a total strength of between 600 to 700 personnel. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission is Mr.Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali), and the Force Commander is Major-General Phillip Valerio Sibanda (Zimbabwe)
Countries contributing personnel to UNAVEM were, as of 31 March 1997: Bangladesh (21 CP, 214 T, 19 MO); Brazil (10 CP, 946 T, 20 MO); Bulgaria (15 CP, 0 T, 10 MO); Congo (0 CP, 0 T, 4 MO); Egypt (15 CP, 1 T, 10 MO); France (0 CP, 11 T, 8 MO); Guinea Bissau (4 CP, 0 T, 18 MO); Hungary (7 CP, 0 T, 10 MO), India (11 CP, 949 T, 20 MO); Jordan (22 CP, 2 T, 20 MO); Kenya (0 CP, 0 T, 19 MO); Malaysia (20 CP; 3 T, 20 MO); Mali (15 CP, 0 T, 10 MO); Namibia (0 CP, 207 T, 0 MO); Netherlands (10 CP, 8 T, 16 MO); New Zealand (0 CP, 7 T, 5 MO); Nigeria (21 CP, 0 T, 20 MO); Norway (0 CP, 0 T, 5 MO); Pakistan (0 CP, 16 T, 10 MO); Poland (0 CP, 0 T, 7 MO); Portugal (28 CP, 316 T, 10 MO); Romania (0 CP, 792 T, 0 MO); Russian Fed. (0 CP, 158 T, 11 MO); Senegal (0 CP, 0 T, 10 MO); Slovak Rep. (0 CP, 0 T, 5 MO); Sweden (10 CP, 2 T, 20 MO); Tanzania (3 CP, 0 T, 0 MO); Ukraine (0 CP, 11 T, 5 MO); Uruguay (13 CP; 53 T, 7 MO); Zambia (16 CP, 527 T, 18 MO); Zimbabwe (22 CP, 719 T, 19 MO). Total Strength: 5,560, comprising 262 Civilian Police (CP), 4,942 Troops (T), and 356 Military Observers (MO).
Angola Nearing War
An Africa News On-Line report stated that the final act in Angola's cold war was currently underway as UNITA and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) confronted each other across the disputed diamond-mining region of the Lundas. The report asserted that the FAA operation, intended to regain control of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border and to bring UNITA to negotiations, has developed into a state of near-war. An unconfirmed report from Luanda asserted that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos had authorised the offensive to recapture diamond fields controlled by UNITA, and to contain militias entering from the former Zaire. The FAA had been deployed to the region four weeks previously to prevent Hutu militias and refugees crossing the border. Reports suggested that members of erstwhile Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko's presidential guard were also entering Angola to join UNITA. Cafunfo, the FAA base in the Cuango valley, was reinforced in a covert operation and used to attack the UNITA diamond mining base Luzamba. However, UNITA repelled the attacks. The report stated that, despite UNAVEM's efforts, elite UNITA military units had not gone into cantonment as part of the UN-supervised demobilisation process, and as many as a third of the 67,000 quartered troops have since deserted. An un-named source asserted that large quantities of UNITA arms were entering the country. UNITA controls 80% of Angola's diamond areas, which it captured in 1992 to finance the conflict that broke out against government forces after it had rejected the results of UN-monitored elections. UNITA received an average of $500-million per annum through its control of the Cuango Valley. UNAVEM confirmed recently that a group of military observers from the Portugal, Russia and the US had found the Kassai border region tense, reporting artillery fire and civilians fleeing the fighting. The UNAVEM mandate prohibits it from military intervention. The Africa News On-Line report warned that the conflict would be fought through to the end unless the issues between UNITA and the government were negotiated successfully.
End of Zaire Threatens Angola
A Jane's report stated that the Government of National Unity (GURN) in Angola was being threatened by operations to contain the incursion of armed Hutu militia and refugees into UNITA-controlled regions along the country's border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The report said that UNITA and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had previously conducted what amounted to a proxy war in the Congo. The report stated that UNITA had provided former Zaire President Mobuto Sese Seko's logistical support, at the behest of previous US governments, and had also dispatched troops to assist him. This had enabled UNITA to continue the internal conflict in Angola. When it became apparent that UNITA was still negotiating arms deals through Zaire, the MPLA supported Laurent Kabila's Zairean opposition alliance with fuel supplies and Katangese militia in an attempt to end the long-term destabilisation. UNITA has continued to deny it supported Mobuto, but Angolan Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations, George Chikoty, declared that UNITA soldiers were captured fighting alongside Hutu Interahamwe opposition. The report stated that UNITA supply lines and bases in DRC had been closed down, while its diamond smuggling routes through that country were also in danger. UNITA was negotiating deals with multinational diamond company Endiama to secure share-holdings or profit shares with the foreign mining companies whose concessions it occupied. UNITA would surrender the Lundas region to government control, in return. The party was also authorised to establish a diamond mining and buying company, as well as three mining concessions, prior to the installation of the GURN.
UNITA protested that the GURN military operation was aimed at undermining its position in the diamond areas of the Lundas, and threatened to cease the return of areas, describing the operation as a serious setback to the peace process. The government replied that the intention of the operation was to stop armed Interahamwe opposition fighters from crossing into UNITA-held territory. The army has recaptured the towns of Buia, Canzar, Cambulo and Muinda along the Kassia River. Following reports of casualties, UNAVEM III [UN Angola Verification Mission III] planned to dispatch monitors to the areas. The situation has again demonstrated the weaknesses in the UN operation in Angola. Under UN supervision, UNITA was supposed to have quartered 70,000 of its troops and surrendered much of its war material, while UNAVEM should also have monitored the handover of occupied areas to government control. However, the UN has neither been able to obtain full access to UNITA areas, nor to identify the presence of armed UNITA units in the mining areas and over the Zairean border. It has also failed to discover the whereabouts of the 22,000 troops who deserted from the quartering areas. Instead, after 18 months of delay, the GURN, incorporating UNITA, was sworn in on 11 April, in the hope that the outstanding issues could subsequently be resolved by the parties, who remain virtually on a war footing, according to the report. The personal intervention of Secretary-General Kofi Annan in April brought about the eventual agreement of UNITA to take part in the government. Annan had warned UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi that UNAVEM would withdraw if UNITA ministers and deputies failed to join the government, facilitating an MPLA attack against UNITA. UNITA complied, but Savimbi, who has accepted the official position of leader of the opposition, and many senior UNITA generals remained in UNITA's headquarters in Bailundo. The Jane's report stated that a UNITA withdrawal from the peace process would leave it in a very weakened position, since its lack of rear bases in DRC would mean it could only move diamonds and supplies through Zambia and its old South African Defence Force (SADF) allies in South Africa. Both countries' governments would attempt to prevent this support. Effective military assistance from the Hutu Interahamwe opposition fighters was also being ruled out by the army. The reported asserted that, if Savimbi was to renege on his commitments to political settlement, UNITA would become a small but destructive opposition army. The government's anti-Hutu operation would almost certainly stop short of provoking such a conflict.
UNDPI UNOMIL Mission Update
Report of the Secretary-General, 24 March 1997
In a report to the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) be extended for a period of three months until the end of June 1997. The Secretary-General said that the progress made since last January was generally encouraging. He said the outcome of the disarmament and demobilisation exercise could be considered to be in substantial compliance with the Abuja Agreement. The Secretary-General pointed out that the main focus of UNOMIL must now be the forthcoming elections. In that context, he made recommendations on the role to be played by UNOMIL in the poll. Other recommendations include the strengthening of the UNOMIL electoral unit; recruiting of 200 additional personnel from among existing UNOMIL and UN staff members, as well as from member states and regional organisations, to observe the polling and the counting of votes; and that UNOMIL be authorised to make appropriate arrangements for the production and broadcast of daily radio programmes in order to ensure that Liberian voters receive neutral factual information about the electoral process.
UN Department of Public Information Daily Highlights, Thursday, 3 April 1997
The Elections Commission in Liberia was formally inducted on 2 April, and all the previously nominated seven members of the Commission were sworn in by the chair of the Council State. The international technical advisors to the Commission, composed of three representatives of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN were also inducted. The role of the Elections Commission was to ensure that elections were conducted on 30 May as had been planned, and it was expected that the electoral law would have been promulgated over the following ten days to two weeks. To assist the electoral process, the UN increased the number of electoral officers and was in the process of dispatching a larger number of electoral monitors. At the time, there were ninety-two UN military observers deployed throughout Liberia.
UNOMIL Press Release, 25 April 1997
In preparation for the upcoming elections, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) has deployed 30 international electoral observers to 16 electoral observation bases scattered in all of Liberia's 13 counties. The observers were to work in close coordination with the 75 UN Military Observers already on the ground to follow the conduct of voter registration; observe the activities of all political parties; receive and channel complaints to the Independent Elections Commission for adjudication; determine population density and logistical difficulties surrounding conduct of elections at each centre; and prepare for the deployment of some 200 short-term international electoral observers who would arrive in Liberia for the actual elections.
The international electoral observers were, at the time, deployed in the following sites: Voinjama and Zorzor in Lofa County; Kakata in Margibi County; Harper in Maryland County; Gbarnga in Bong County; Greenville in Sinoe County; Buchanan in Grand Bassa County; Tubmanburg in Bomi County; Tapeta and Saniquellie in Nimba County; Monrovia in Montserrado County; Bo-Waterside in Grand Cape Mount County; Cestos City in River Cess County; Barclayville in Grand Kru County; and Zwedru and Kanweakhen in Grand Gedeh County. Deployment to Vahoun in Lofa County was to take place within the following ten days.
UNOMIL Press Release, 29 April 1997
Namibian Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh arrived on 28 April to take up his post as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Liberia. He succeeded Ambassador Anthony Nyakyi of Tanzania, who had served as SRSG since 11 December 1994. Ambassador Kalomoh is the third SRSG appointed to serve in Liberia. Prior to his appointment, Ambassador Kalomoh served as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Namibia, and as Namibia's Ambassador to the United States of America, and High Commissioner to Canada.
Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, 30 April 1997
Spokesperson Fred Eckhard stated that Liberia was now entering a transition period, from civil conflict to a civil and democratic society, where citizens would have the opportunity to rebuild their lives. To make that transition a success, a vast amount of resources were needed to help restore basic social and economic services for the population. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) had issued a five-page background document, produced by its office in Liberia, on UNDP efforts towards sustainable human development in that country. The UNDP, he added, was coordinating the UN System Inter-Agency Community Reintegration and Peacebuilding Programme, which focused on medium-term reintegration, rehabilitation and governance activities.
Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 9 May 1997
Associate Spokesperson Mr. Juan-Carlos Brandt announced that, while there were still reports of harassment of relief workers in Liberia, the security situation in that country had vastly improved. The UN now enjoyed greater access to the countryside than it had at any time during the seven-year crisis, and humanitarian organisations were active in all 13 counties. The improved security situation had led to the return of both internally displaced persons and refugees, although in limited numbers. The commencement of the rainy season was now seriously impeding access to many areas of the country. Between November 1996 and February 1997, 21,000 fighters were successfully demobilised by the office of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Liberia.
The UN, together with Liberian partners, had carried out some 200 projects, including civil reconstruction and vocational training projects, to facilitate the initial re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life, the spokesperson said. So far, some 10,000 ex-combatants and 10,000 civilians had been absorbed by those activities. The rate of implementation was expected to increase. Brandt added that re-integration activities were of critical importance to the upcoming electoral process in Liberia.
Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 22 May 1997
Spokesperson Mr Fred Eckhard stated that elections in Liberia, initially scheduled for 30 May, were postponed to 19 July, by a decision taken at the summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Committee of Nine. Mr Eckhard asserted that the new government would be inaugurated on 2 August. He added that, if run-off elections were necessary, they would be held on 2 August, and the new government would be inaugurated on 16 August.
Countries contributing personnel to UNOMIL were, as of 31 March 1997: Bangladesh (7 T, 7 MO); China (0 T, 7 MO), Czech Republic (0 T, 5 MO); Egypt (0 T, 14 MO); India (0 T, 14 MO); Kenya (0 T 13 MO); Malaysia (0 T, 3 MO); Nepal (0 T, 6 MO) Pakistan (0 T, 13 MO); Uruguay (0 T, 2 MO). Total Strength: 91 military personnel, comprising 7 troops (T) and 84 military observers (MO).
Last Troops Join ECOMOG
Military sources in Monrovia stated that, during the week of 12 - 19 May, the last remaining reinforcements of west African troops joined the seven-year old ECOMOG [ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group] peacekeeping mission, increasing its strength to nearly 13,000. The revised Abuja peace accord, reached in August 1996 to end the internal conflict that began in December 1989, envisaged increasing ECOMOG's strength from 8,500 to 18,000. ECOMOG's Nigerian Force Commander Major-General Victor Malu declared in January that he would require at least 12,500 personnel to carry out the ECOMOG mandate, which now primarily involves providing security for forthcoming elections. The peacekeeping force consists of troops from ten members of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS]. An AFP report asserted that ECOMOG has been dominated by Nigerian troops since it was deployed to Liberia in 1990. The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone have also contributed contingents. ECOMOG reached its greatest strength 1994 with 20,000 troops, and the report said that Nigeria has made frequent appeals for reinforcements. Malu has repeated such requests since becoming force commander in 1996, highlighting the need for reinforcements during the elections. Francophile countries in the sub-region have recently dispatched military units to join ECOMOG: Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Liberia's neighbour Ivory Coast - from where leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NFPL) leader Charles Taylor launched the incursion that is believed to have started the war in 1989 - has for a long time resisted contributing troops to ECOMOG, in case they were called on to fight factions from similar ethnic groups to their own. However, it recently dispatched a military medical team to Liberia. The ECOMOG force declared the successful disarmament and dissolution of Liberian factions earlier in 1997. It intends to train the new Liberian army and security forces following the elections, six months after which it is scheduled to withdraw.
Abacha Suggests Permanent PK Force
Nigerian leader Sani Abacha proposed that ECOMOG form the core of a permanent, regional security force. Abacha told west African leaders that the predominantly Nigerian ECOMOG troops had opened up new fields of cooperation, and had laid a foundation for what could develop into a permanent framework for increased security cooperation within the sub-region. He asserted that 11,000 peacekeepers serving with ECOMOG were deployed in 42 sites in all 13 of Liberia's counties. Nigeria not only contributes the largest national contingent to ECOMOG, but is also its most significant financial supporter.
Elections on Schedule
ECOMOG Commander Major-General Victor Malu declared that, despite the coup in Sierra Leone over the weekend of 24-25 May, the Liberian elections set for July 1997 would go ahead as planned. The Nigerian army also has troops deployed in Sierra Leone as part of a defence agreement between the two countries. Malu stated that he had received information that the Nigerian contingent in Sierra Leone had not recorded any casualties during the coup. He asserted that the situation in Sierra Leone was worrying, but would not comment further. Malu announced that ECOMOG troops had been deployed to the majority of the principal border posts with neighbouring countries to increase the sense of security of refugees returning to Liberia. He said that peacekeepers had also been dispatched to all thirteen of the county capitals to encourage internally displaced citizens to go back to their homes in the countryside, adding that 2,001 Liberian refugees have returned to the country through 11 border towns during May alone. Malu announced that 11,000 ECOMOG troops were now patrolling regularly in 50 towns and villages, where they had previously not been deployed, to enable them to enforce security in the countryside, making the whole of Liberia safe and conducive for election campaigns and other political activities. He expressed disappointment that only two of the 16 Liberian parties had established offices outside the capital Monrovia. Malu asserted that ECOMOG was well positioned to ensure that the ballot was not only free and fair but also not fraudulent, since not even all the factions combined could challenge ECOMOG. He explained that the peacekeeping force had disarmed over 30,000 fighters and recovered over 32,000 weapons, as well as three million rounds of ammunition. He did concede, however, that, although ECOMOG has received logistical support from France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, after seven years of civil war, Liberia remained difficult terrain. He reported that ECOMOG's operations were supported by 300 generators donated by Western countries, while Nigeria supplied their fuel. He declared that the ECOMOG-supervised restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia after the elections would reflect all ethnic groups - unlike the domination of the armed forces during the pre-war period by the Krahn, the ethnic group of assassinated president Samuel Doe.
Diplomats Question Nigerian Role in Sierra Leone
Diplomats in Lagos complained that that Nigerian troops did not have the mandate to fight under the banner of ECOMOG to return Sierra Leone's democratically elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power in Freetown. Nigerian President Sani Abacha announced that the operation was completely an ECOMOG affair. Nigerian defence spokesperson, Colonel Godwin Ugbo, stated the operation intended to restore peace to Sierra Leone and to west Africa in general. He added that additional troops could be deployed there if required. Under a bilateral defence agreement, 1,200 Nigerian ECOMOG troops joined 1,000 Nigerian soldiers already in Sierra Leone. An AFP report asserted that Nigeria was, thus, controlling an operation whose potential ulterior motives, as well as chances of success, have raised serious doubts among diplomats. Abacha is Chair of the West African Economic Community ECOWAS, which controls ECOMOG. Kabbah announced, on 2 June, that he had requested the Nigerian intervention, and that he was optimistic of a swift resolution. However Ghana, which is the second largest troop-contributor to ECOMOG, has stressed its opposition to military action in Sierra Leone. Information Minister, Kofi Quakyi, asserted, on 2 June, that Ghanaian troops would only be dispatched there as part of an overall political settlement. A diplomat in Accra stated that Nigeria was believed to be keen to pursue a military option through embarrassment that the coup had occurred in the presence of Nigerian troops. Diplomats also questioned whether Nigeria had the logistical means to carry out the operation, since failure would have serious consequences for Abacha's regime. Medical sources in Freetown stated that fighting on 2 June left at least 65 dead. The report asserted that if Nigeria decided to continue with the intervention, it would need to send in reinforcements immediately, potentially endangering the Liberian peace process.
UN Exhibits Weak Africa Policy
An AP report stated that the spectacle of President Sani Abacha's Nigerian military regime being called upon to oust the military regime in Sierra Leone in the name of democracy was the result of the latest trend at the UN toward subcontracting peacekeeping duties to regional organisations. The report asserted that this philosophy became popular after the disastrous UN peacekeeping experiences in Bosnia and Somalia, which produced casualties but only mixed results. The Security Council authorised NATO to take over the UN operation in Bosnia as part of the new strategy, and gave Italy the go-ahead to lead a European multinational force to restore order in Albania. The report suggested that Africa presented special problems. Only Nigeria and South Africa have the capability, in terms of military strength and prestige, to reverse the coup in Sierra Leone. However, South Africa is still experiencing problems as a result of the international ostracism it experienced stemming from its years of apartheid. And Nigeria's military government has a poor human rights record and is not renowned for its democratic aspirations. It has maintained a military presence in Sierra Leone since 1990, partly to support the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation in Liberia. The Clinton Administration, in 1996, started to promote the idea of a standby force of African troops [the African Crisis Response Force], which wealthy countries would finance and train to respond quickly to crises across the continent. However, the AP report suggested that, until such a force is created, only Nigeria among the west African states boasted both the military strength as well as the political will to use it. Only Angola, which just beginning to recover from years of civil war, has an army of comparable size to Nigeria's 77,000-strong armed force. Nigeria has often taken part in peacekeeping operations, partly to promote itself as a major player in Africa. Nigerian peacekeepers served in Bosnia, Croatia and along the Iraq-Kuwait border, while its 6,000 soldiers form the nucleus of ECOMOG. However, Abacha has allegedly been involved in corruption and human rights abuses since he took power Nigeria in 1993. He had originally pledged to have installed a civilian government by the end of 1996, but subsequently decided to hang on to power until presidential elections in 1998 on the basis of ensuring a smooth transition to democracy. The putsch in Sierra Leone placed Nigeria in the middle of a fight in which it had not intended to get involved. Nigerian peacekeepers stationed in the country were attacked, and they responded in kind. Nevertheless, the report suggested that the US and other states on the Security Council - who have been wary of military intervention in Africa since UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] - may well have been relieved by Nigeria's willingness to act in Sierra Leone.
First African PK exercise
The first international peacekeeping exercise in Africa, involving 1,570 troops from eight Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, has taken place in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. The exercise, code-named Blue Hungwe, paved the way for an African regional peacekeeping force, and signalled the beginning of a new era in the military operations of SADC member states. The exercise lasted 17 days and cost $1 million, and was jointly funded by the Zimbabwean and British governments, with the hosts contributing over 75% of that amount. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is the head of SADC's Defence and Security Organ, which is currently developing standing operation procedures for the management of disasters. Zimbabwe is also mandated to coordinate peacekeeping training in the sub-region. Exercise director and force commander, Zimbabwean Major-General, Mike Nyambuya, stated that the exercise had created a cohesive military force capable of undertaking UN peacekeeping operations. The troops underwent pre-deployment training, peace support operations, parades and demonstrations, and a fictional country called "Mycosa" (Mythical Country of Southern Africa), had been invented to facilitate the training operation. The Mashavas and the Dimas - two opposition groups who were fighting for the control of Mycosa - had agreed to a cease-fire, and the SADC forces were required to ensure peace prevailed between them. Nyambuya asserted that the aim of the exercise was to demonstrate what is expected of peacekeepers during missions to troubled countries. SADC Battalion commander Lieutenant- Colonel Lazarus Ncube hoped that participants in the exercise would be able to train their compatriots in peacekeeping duties. South Africa supplied a motorised infantry company, a field engineer troop, medical detachment and staff officers, totalling 308, while the South African Air Force provided two Oryx helicopters, air and ground crew and was in charge of the air force command of the whole exercise. The People's Defence Force of Tanzania provided 34 personnel, including an infantry platoon and staff officers, while the Mozambique Armed Forces contributed a rifle company, staff and liaison officers and observers totalling 130. The Defence Forces of Namibia and the Royal Swazi Armed Forces provided a rifle platoon of 38 troops and 32 staff officers. The Lesotho Armed Forces provided a rifle platoon and staff officers, numbering 33. A total of 133 personnel were contributed by the Malawi Army, comprising a rifle company, headquarters personnel and staff officers. Zimbabwe itself supplied an infantry battalion, administration and exercise staff, communications, medical and logistic support, armoured cars, air support, liaison officers and military observers, totalling 731. A staff of 59 personnel, four helicopters and two Casa aeroplanes were also supplied by the Air Force of Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe Republic Police contributed 27 officers as the civilian police. Denmark, France and the US contributed military observers. NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP, Oxfam and Friends Services Committee also took part. The British Military Advice Training Team was heavily involved in the initial planning stage and coordination of the exercise, and contributed 16 officers. Angola, Botswana and Zambia, the three remaining SADC member countries, did not contribute troops, but did provide seven military and civilian police observers.
West Pledges PK Help for Africa
A Xinhua report stated that France, the UK and the US have promised to assist African states in developing their peacekeeping and conflict resolution capacities. OAU spokesperson Ibrahim Dagash announced that the three western countries had adopted a common position recently to facilitate the establishment of effective African mechanisms for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. He stated that African states were willing to accept the assistance and, once the funds were made available, had the capabilities to provide military personnel to constitute a continental peacekeeping force. However, Dagash asserted that there must be no strings attached to the assistance African countries received from other countries. He declared that the OAU's Council of Ministers would make the final decision on the offer when it had received clarification of some aspects of the proposed assistance, in particular to do with the logistics of peacekeeping operations. Dagash affirmed that the establishment of a peacekeeping force for Africa should be complementary to the efforts of the UN Security Council.
UEMOA Backs African PK Force
The leaders of eight west African countries, attending a summit of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) in Lome on 23 June, condemned the April coup in Sierra Leone and demanded the immediate return of the constitutional order. They also agreed to participate in a multinational peackeeping force for Congo under the aegis of the UN and the Organisation of African Unity. UEMOA comprises the member states Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The leaders expressed serious concern over the fratricidal violence taking place in Brazzaville, resulting in numerous casualties, and urged the parties to the violence to continue observing the cease-fire in place and to concentrate on dialogue to resolve the crisis in the Congo. The summit recognised the worrying conditions that were prevalent in certain states of the sub-region and the continent. The leaders at the summit condemned the renewed clashes in the Central African Republic, especially an attack on the inter-African force entitled MISAB, and requested that the warring parties respect the Bangui peace accords. They also mentioned the encouraging progress that had been made in Liberia, and urged the international community to provide the funding that had been pledged for crucial elections scheduled for 19 July. The summit emphasised the close ties between peace, security and development, and it reiterated the urgent need to establish an African peacekeeping force.
OAU Summit
An APS report stated that elected African governments continued to suffer military threats against them, even though nearly one month previously an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit warned that the day of the coup d'etat was over in Africa. The OAU summit closed in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 4 June, threatening military intervention against the military junta that had taken power in Sierra Leone. However, the people who carried out the putsch in there remained in power, while violent armed conflicts were imminent elsewhere on the continent. At the close of the summit, new OAU Chair, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, declared that the African leaders had unanimously and unreservedly condemned the events in Sierra Leone as a setback for democracy in Africa. They had simultaneously welcomed the new Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and demanded that Africa and the international community come to that country's assistance. The summit had been attended by the new Congolese leader, Laurent Kabila, who ousted former Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko. OAU leaders attending the summit gave West African countries a mandate to take the necessary action to restore the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone, and the OAU spokesperson asserted that this included the use of military force. After the summit, Mugabe stressed that democratic systems were increasing in Africa, and that the OAU would take a tough stance against illegitimate governments. OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim affirmed that the OAU would take whatever measures were necessary to restore legality in Sierra Leone, adding that the details would be worked out in accordance with the development of the situation itself. On 2 June, a Nigerian battleship fired on the capital Freetown and Nigerian soldiers fought with Sierra Leonean forces, while on 4 June, the military regime released 300 Nigerian troops it had captured the day before. Mugabe declared that the summit also discussed adopting a common position on banning anti-personnel landmines, and establishing an African Court of Human and People's Rights.
However, some African leaders accused the OAU of applying double standards in its treatment of small and powerful member states. Burundian military ruler Pierre Buyoya complained that his country suffered sanctions immediately after it assumed power during a bloodless coup on 25 July 1996, while military regimes in some larger, more affluent African states were not punished. This was believed to be a reference to the regime of General Sani Abacha in Nigeria, which was highlighted at the summit for its role in taking the lead in military action to reverse the coup in Sierra Leone. Burundi was placed under economic sanctions on 31 July 1996 - after Buyoya had removed civilian leader, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, from power - in an attempt to force the Tutsi army in Burundi to negotiate with extremist Hutu opposition fighters who have been waging an insurrection over the past three years. On 3 June, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and OAU spokesperson Ibrahim Dagash implicitly supported the use of force to reverse the coup in Sierra Leone. On 4 June, Buyoya conceded that military coups were unacceptable, but justified his actions in 1996 as not really a military coup, but rather an operation to rescue people who were experiencing difficulties as a result of a total collapse of authority.
The Sierra Leonean military junta complained that Nigerian President Sani Abacha, who has been leading military action against it, lacked the moral authority to preach democracy, since Moosood Abiola, the assumed winner of the presidential elections in Nigeria several years ago, was still in jail. Annan also warned, during the summit, that human rights had to take precedence in Africa if lasting peace was to be achieved on the continent. He urged that everything had to be done to maintain democracy and respect human rights while a new era of long-term stability was dawning. He stated that, over the last 50 years, Africa had experienced a series of momentous changes, starting with decolonisation and struggle against apartheid, followed by a wave of internal conflicts, autocratic military rule and economic stagnation. Annan, during a subsequent meeting with Kabila, applauded Kabila's commitment to the holding of elections in the DRC, but emphasised that the respect of rights needed to take effect there. Kabila's government has claimed that accusations of violations of the human rights of Rwandan refugees in the east of the Congolese republic were a campaign of intimidation orchestrated within the UN Security Council. Annan described as demeaning the view from some quarters that human rights concerns were a luxury enjoyed by rich industrialised countries, which Africa was not ready for. He added that long-term peace in Africa depended on democracy and sustainable development, and proposed a new doctrine for politics on the continent, declaring that in situations where democracy had been usurped, African heads of state must make every effort to restore it to its rightful owners: the people. However, on June 5, a fresh crisis developed when violence broke out in Brazzaville between armed opposition militia supporters of erstwhile President Denis Sassou Ngueso and the government forces of President Pascal Lissouba, Attempts over the preceding three weeks to end the fighting there have failed.
UNDPI Update on Albania
The Security Council, , on 28 March, at its 3,758th meeting, reiterated its deep concern over the deteriorating situation in Albania, underlined the need for all concerned to refrain from hostilities and acts of violence, and reiterated its call to the parties involved to continue the political dialogue. The Security Council stressed the importance of regional stability, and in this context fully supported the diplomatic efforts of the international community to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, in particular those of the OSCE and of the European Union. It affirmed the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Albania, determining that the present situation of crisis in that country constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. The Security Council thus condemned all acts of violence and called for their immediate end. It welcomed the offer made by certain member states to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.
The Security Council welcomed further the offer by a member state contained in its letter (S/1997/258) to take the lead in organising and commanding this temporary multinational protection force, and took note of all the objectives contained in that letter. It authorised the member states participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objectives and, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, further authorised these member states to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said multinational protection force. It further called upon all those concerned in Albania to cooperate with the multinational protection force and international humanitarian agencies for the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council decided that the operation would be limited to a period of three months from the adoption of the present resolution, at which time it would assess the situation. It decided that the cost of implementing this temporary operation would be borne by the participating member states. It encouraged those member states to cooperate closely with the government of Albania, the UN, the OSCE, the European Union and all international organisations involved in rendering humanitarian assistance in Albania. The Security Council requested the member states participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General, to the Council, the first such report to be made no later than 14 days after the adoption of this resolution, inter alia specifying the parameters and modalities of the operation on the basis of consultations between those member states and the government of Albania.
UNDPI UNMOP Mission Update
In a Presidential Statement of 24 April 1997 (S/PRST/1997/23), the Security Council expressed its disappointment at the general lack of improvement in the situation in Prevlaka, the operational area of the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP).
The Council was concerned by the assessment of the Secretary-General that several developments have led to an increase in tension in the area. It was particularly concerned by the reported continuing violations of the demilitarisation regime, including movements of heavy weapons and of Croatian special police, and the entry by a navy missile boat of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the demilitarised zone. The Council called upon the parties to refrain from provocative actions of all kinds, to cease violations of the demilitarised zone and to cooperate fully with the UN military observers.
The Security Council also noted the lack of any progress towards adopting practical options proposed to the parties by the UN military observers in May 1996 to improve the safety and security of the area. The Council reiterated its call upon both parties to remove landmines from areas patrolled by the military observers, and to stop their interference with the freedom of movement of the military observers and with the implementation of the observers' mandate. It further called upon Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to resolve the disputed issue of Prevlaka through bilateral negotiations pursuant to the Agreement on Normalisation of Relations, signed by them in Belgrade on 23 August 1996.
In a report to the Security Council dated 14 April 1997 (S/1997/311), the Secretary-General observed increasing tensions in the area as a result of several developments. In particular, concern mounted in the wake of a substantial increase, beginning in mid-December 1996, in the number of Croatian special police personnel in the UN designated zones, which UNMOP estimated to have doubled. On two occasions, Croatian heavy weapons were observed inside the demilitarised zone. In February 1997, a three-day exercise by the Yugoslav navy outside the UNMOP area prompted a strong reaction by Croatia, which partly restricted the movement of UN military observers on coastal roads inside the demilitarised zone. In March, the UN-controlled zone was violated by a Yugoslav navy missile boat. Croatian police boats also occasionally entered the zone.
The Secretary-General observed that, since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1093 (1997), the parties had made no progress towards adopting the practical options proposed by UNMOP to improve the safety and security in the area. Long-standing violations of the demilitarisation regime persisted. Both parties continued to restrict the freedom of movement of UNMOP in the northern part of the demilitarised zone. Access elsewhere was denied randomly and even, at several Croatian positions, constantly. Minefields laid on both sides of the international border still constituted a hazard to UN military observers.
The Secretary-General stated that the UNMOP Chief Military Observer had offered specific suggestions to the parties on the lifting of restrictions on the military observers' freedom of movement and on the removal of landmines. However, the Chief Military Observer found no willingness among the parties to take unilateral steps to improve respect for the demilitarisation regime in Prevlaka, such as removing minefields and easing the movement of UN military observers. They insisted that such steps could only be undertaken in the context of reciprocal arrangements. The experience of UNMOP has shown that the parties' requirement of guaranteed reciprocity makes meaningful progress on the issue extremely difficult, if not impossible.
UNDPI UNPREDEP Mission Update
The Security Council, at its 3,764th meeting on 9 April 1997, having considered the letter of 3 April 1997, and the recommendation contained therein, from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/276), adopted resolution 1105 (S/RES/1105 1997) on the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the resolution, the Security Council decided to suspend the reduction of the military component of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) referred to in its resolution 1082 (1996) until the end of the current mandate on 31 May 1997. It welcomed the redeployment of UNPREDEP already achieved in the light of the situation in Albania, and encouraged the Secretary-General to continue further redeployment of UNPREDEP, taking into consideration the situation in the region, consistent with the mandate of UNPREDEP. The Security Council further requested the Secretary-General to submit by 15 May 1997 his report with recommendations on a subsequent international presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as referred to in its resolution 1082 (1996).
By adopting resolution 1110 (1997) of 28 May 1997, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNPREDEP for six months through 30 November 1997 and to start, as of 1 October 1997, taking into account the conditions prevailing at that time, a two-month phased reduction of the military component by 300 all ranks.
Countries contributing personnel to UNPREDEP were, as of 31 March 1997: Argentina (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Bangladesh (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Belgium (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Brazil (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Canada (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Czech Rep (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Denmark (0 CP, 45 T, 1 MO); Egypt (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Finland (5 CP, 355 T, 1 MO); Ghana (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Indonesia (0 CP, 51 T, 2 MO); Ireland (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Jordan (2 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Kenya (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Nepal (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); New Zealand (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Nigeria (4 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Norway (0 CP, 49 T, 2 MO); Pakistan (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Poland (0 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Portugal (0 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Russian Fed. (1 CP, 0 T, 2 MO); Sweden (0 CP, 41 T, 1 MO); Switzerland (6 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); Turkey (4 CP, 0 T, 0 MO); Ukraine (4 CP, 0 T, 1 MO); USA (0 CP, 498 T, 0 MO). Total Strength: 1,100 personnel, comprising 26 Civilian Police (CP), 1039 Troops (T), 35 Military Observers (MO).
UNDPI UNTAES Mission Update
On 11 March 1997, UNTAES Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein proclaimed the holding of elections for municipal and city councils in the UNTAES mandate region on 13 April 1997, to be organised by the Joint Implementation Committee on Elections (JIC) and conducted by the Local Electoral Commissions (LECs) appointed by the JIC on elections. These elections were to be held in accordance with the Basic Agreement of 12 November 1995. On 20 March, Serbian President Milan Milosevic told the political leadership in the region to cooperate fully with UNTAES, accept the 13 April date for elections, and urged the population to take their documents and vote. The Transitional Administrator reported on 24 March 1997 continuing progress on many issues, with election preparations taking centre stage. Meanwhile, UNTAES continued to review the voters' list data as compiled by the Croatian Government, the latest of which was for 20 March 1997. It included over 118,000 people registered to vote, of which just over 50,000 (or 43 per cent) were residents of the region. The remaining 68,000 (or 57 per cent) would be voting at polling places outside the region. In a Presidential Statement of 6 March 1997, the Security Council emphasised that the holding and certification of elections upon a decision by the Transitional Administrator within the envisaged time-frame would be only possible if the Croatian authorities fulfilled their obligation to complete issuing citizenship and identity documents for all eligible voters. The Council underlined the need for full cooperation by the local Serbs. It stressed that the restoration of the multi-ethnic character of Eastern Slavonia was important to international efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region of the former Yugoslavia as a whole.
Elections Held Successfully
The successful holding of municipal and local elections in the region, conducted by UNTAES on 13-14 April 1997 were conducted simultaneously with elections throughout Croatia. They marked the first time since the conflict began that the local population had legitimate representation in the Croatian constitutional and legal system, and cleared the path for the two-way return of all displaced persons.
The high voter turnout in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium of over 72,000 votes cast was beyond expectations. Due to technical difficulties, voting inside the region was extended to 14 April and until 15 April in one polling station. No security incidents or evidence of notable fraud were recorded. The Transitional Administrator certified the elections on 22 April, and the results were accepted by all major parties. The newly formed Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) won an absolute majority in 11 of the 28 municipalities. In the symbolically important city of Vukovar, SDSS and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) each won 12 out of 26 seats. Discussions have commenced between them on a coalition city administration. The elections opened the way for rapid progress on practical aspects of reintegration. On 24 April, the Croatian Government adopted the recommendations of a Joint Working Group of UNTAES, UNHCR and Croatia on the return of displaced persons which provide for equal treatment and equal rights for all affected.
A Declaration of the European Union (EU), dated 30 April 1997, stated that the local elections certainly formed a firm basis for the peaceful reintegration of the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into Croatia. However, the EU pointed out that strict respect for human rights and for the rights of minorities remained an essential prerequisite for the ultimate success of the reintegration process.
Residents currently living in the region voted at 193 polling stations, including 30 polling locations for absentee voting for the authorities outside the region. Over 56,000 displaced persons elsewhere in Croatia cast absentee ballots in 75 polling locations with 645 polling stations. Fewer than 1,000 voted in absentia for authorities to be elected in their former places of residence. The JIC on Elections appointed an Electoral Appeals Commission composed of Serb and Croat jurists and chaired by an UNTAES-appointed international judge. A Media Experts Commission (MEC) was appointed with a similar composition to monitor equitable access of all registered parties and candidates to the media.
Within the UNTAES region, over 150 UNTAES observers were deployed to all polling stations as static monitors. In addition, 30 OSCE observer teams, observers from the Council of Europe and diplomats visited numerous polling stations during the elections. No intimidation, violence or electoral improprieties were observed before, during or after the elections.
The Secretary-General, on 21 April 1997, expressed appreciation as to the positive assessment of the elections by UNTAES Administrator Jacques Klein. The Secretary-General said that "the next most significant challenge in the implementation of the UNTAES mandate will be the establishment of the conditions necessary for the return home of all displaced persons and refugees. It is up to the Security Council, to which I will present my recommendations shortly, to decide on the modalities of the future UN presence in the region.
In a statement of 22 April, the UNTAES Administrator emphasised "that the successful holding of free, open and fair elections in the region was a historic milestone in the peaceful reintegration of the region, the success of the UNTAES mandate and in creating conditions for reconciliation and return. It should be recalled that 18 months ago, the region was an area of military hostility with 17,000 soldiers and numerous heavy weapons deployed in expectation of war. There was a real possibility of renewed hostilities with unforeseeable consequences. Instead, UNTAES had succeeded in bringing stability and progress in peaceful reintegration of the region. The mission succeeded in demilitarising the region, opening-up economic and human contacts, obtaining comprehensive political, cultural and employment guarantees for residents in the region, attracting $70 million in international assistance and processing the return of displaced persons.
Today, more than 90 per cent of the residents who were present at the time of signing the Basic Agreement, remain in the region. More than 112,000 have Croatian documents. Fields are being planted, children are going to school, and the mood of the region has begun to look for the future and not the past. There is hope and there is determination to work for a better future.
Ten political parties and 1,000 individual candidates contested elections in 25 municipalities and three towns. A new Serb political party, the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) was formed and registered in accordance with Croatian law. Voting took place in 193 polling stations in the regions and at 75 external locations. There were 126,533 valid votes of which 70,292 were votes cast in the region. By their vote, the people of the region discarded the leadership of the past and gave their new leadership legitimacy at the ballot box.
Looking ahead after the elections, the next step is reconciliation and return. The key aspects are economic reconstruction and revitalisation; the provision of orderly and secure housing arrangements; strong and wise political guidance and leadership; and continuing international support for bilateral efforts between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNTAES is looking forward to working with the new Joint Council of Municipalities which, for the first time in six years, will give Serbs a legal voice within the Croatian political system and will genuinely represent the concerns of the people. UNTAES continues to make extraordinary progress in its mandate and in forming the bridge for normalisation between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
On 1 May 1997, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman announced the creation of a State Commission for the Establishment of the Constitutional-Legal Order of the Republic of Croatia in the areas of Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Sirmium counties, which are currently under the administration of UNTAES. Mr. Jure Radic, Minister for Development and Reconstruction, was named Head of the Commission. The State Commission will cooperate with UNTAES to coordinate and oversee the work of all government bodies - county, city and municipal - as it relates to peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into Croatia.
The Agreement of the Working Group on the Operational Procedures of Return, which detailed a programme of return of Croatian citizens to their homes throughout Croatia, was signed by Croatia on 27 April 1997, and transmitted to the Security Council the following day. The mechanisms provide equal access and equal treatment for all Croatian citizens regardless of ethnicity, assigning to all of them the identical legal status of "returnee". Under the Agreement, Croatia will, with the cooperation of the international community, organise an agency for mediation in selling or exchanging property for legal owners who no longer wish to inhabit their property. The "Land Bank" concept is to be developed by the Working Group. Croatia, UNTAES and UNHCR will seek international funding for the implementation of the return mechanisms.
UNTAES Force Commander is Major-General Willy Hanset (Belgium). Brigadier-General Purwadi (Indonesia) is the Chief Military Observer, and Brigadier Walter Fallmann (Austria) is UNTAES Police Commissioner.
Countries contributing personnel to UNTAES were, as of 28 February 1997: Argentina (30 CP, 74 T, 2 MO), Austria (3 P), Bangladesh (41 CP, 6 MO), Belgium (835 T, 4 MO), Brazil (6 MO), Czech Republic (37 T, 4 MO), Denmark (8 CP), Egypt (9 CP, 4 MO), Fiji (46 CP), Finland (11 CP, 4 MO), Ghana (6 MO), Indonesia (31 CP, 75 T, 5 MO), Ireland (15 CP, 3 MO), Jordan (23 CP, 879 T, 6 MO), Kenya (24 CP, 6 MO), Lithuania (9 CP) , Nepal (19 CP, 3 MO), Netherlands (6 T), New Zealand (1 T, 4 MO), Nigeria (5 CP, 3 MO), Norway (35 CP, 6 MO), Pakistan (990 T, 5 MO), Poland (4 CP, 53 T, 5 MO), Russian Federation (3 CP, 872 T, 6 MO), Slovak Republic (580 T), Sweden (10 CP, 5 MO), Switzerland (3 MO), Tunisia (23 CP), Ukraine (12 CP, 352 T, 4 MO), United Kingdom (1 T) and the United States (46 CP, 6 T). Total strength 5,268, comprising 407 Civilian Police (CP), 4,761 Troops (T) and 100 Military Observers (MO).
UNDPI UNIFIL Mission Update
UNIFIL's contribution to stability in the region, and the protection it is able to provide to the local population, remain important. The force has recently been streamlined in order to achieve savings without affecting its operational effectiveness. The current mandate was most recently extended to 31 July 1997 by Security Council resolution 1095 (1997) of 28 January. The Force Commander is Major-General Stanislaw Franciszek Wozniak (Poland)
Countries contributing personnel to UNIFIL were, as of 31 March 1997: Estonia (0 CP, 136 T, 0 MO); Fiji (0 CP, 582 T, 0 MO); Finland (0 CP; 491 T, 10 MO); France (0 CP, 247 T, 0 MO); Ghana (0 CP, 646 T, 0 MO); Ireland (0 CP, 618 T, 0 MO); Italy (0 CP, 45 T, 0 MO); Nepal (0 CP, 597 T, 5 MO); Norway (0 CP, 484 T, 0 MO); Poland (0 CP, 627 T, 0 MO) - CP = Civilian Police, T = Troops, and MO = Military Observers.
UNDPI UNMOT Mission Update
The UNMOT mandate was extended to 15 March 1997 by the Security Council under the terms of its resolution 1089 (1996). In that same resolution, the Security Council expressed concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in Tajikistan, and stressed the urgent need for the government and the leadership of the opposition to adhere sincerely to the commitments they had made to resolve the conflict and to achieve national reconciliation exclusively through peaceful, political means on the basis of mutual concessions and compromises. The Security Council most recently extended the UNMOT mandate through 15 June 1997 by adopting resolution 1099 (1997) on 14 March 1997. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the UNMOT Head of Mission is Mr. Gerd Merrem (Germany). The Chief Military Observer is Brigadier-General Boleslaw Izyrdorczyk (Poland).
Countries contributing personnel to UNMOT were, as of 31 March 1997 (all Military Observers): Austria (3); Bangladesh (2); Bulgaria (2); Denmark (3); Jordan (3); Poland (3); Switzerland (5); Uruguay (3); Total Strength: 24 Military Observers, supported by international and local civilian staff
UNDPI MINUGUA Mission Update
In December 1996, the Guatemalan Government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) reached an agreement on the details of a cease-fire, on constitutional and electoral reforms, and the reintegration of the URNG into Guatemala's political life, which was followed by a final peace accord, the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, signed on 29 December 1996. Pending action by the General Assembly, the Security Council decided on 20 January 1997 to authorise that a group of 155 military observers and requisite medical personnel be attached to MINUGUA for a three month period, to become operational on 3 March 1997, in order to verify the cease-fire. While retaining its current acronym, MINUGUA, the Mission's name was changed from the Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala to the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala as from 1 April in order to reflect its new mandate. On 27 March 1997, the General Assembly authorised the renewal of the MINUGUA mandate, with expanded responsibilities, for a further period of one year until 31 March 1998, to verify all of the agreements covered by the peace accord. In his report to the General Assembly (A/51/828), the Secretary-General stated that the entry into force of the peace agreements required the creation of five separate verification areas, each of which would be headed by a Chief who would report to the Chief of Mission. The areas would be organised as follows: human rights; indigenous affairs; social, economic and agrarian; strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society; and resettlement and integration.
Through a statement read out by its President, Park Soo Gil (Republic of Korea), the Security Council commended both parties for progress made in implementing the peace accords to date, particularly for the establishment of the Follow-Up Commission which would oversee implementation of the agreements, and for steps taken towards establishment of the Historical Clarification Commission. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General is Jean Arnault (France), and the Chief Military Observer is Brigadier-General Jose B. Rodriguez.
Countries contributing personnel to MINUGUA were, as of 31 March: Argentina (6 CP, 5 MO); Australia (1 MO); Austria (3 MO); Brazil (11 CP, 18 MO); Canada (2 CP, 15 MO); Colombia 3 CP); Ecuador (3 MO); Germany (5 MO); Italy (10 CP); Norway 2 MO); Russian Fed. (3 MO); Singapore (5 MO); Spain (16 CP, 42 MO); Sweden (2 CP, 2 MO); Ukraine (8 MO); Uruguay (20 MO); USA (5 MO); Venezuela (8 MO); Total Strength 195, comprising 50 Civilian Police (CP) and 145 Military Observers (MO).
The Security Council, at its 3,757th meeting, on 27 March 1997
... "Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until 30 June 1997;
... Expresses its concern at the delay in the installation of the new independent Elections Commission and the reconstituted Supreme Court, and the implications of this delay for the electoral process, and urges that they be installed immediately;
Urges the international community to provide financial, logistical, and other assistance to the electoral process in Liberia, including through the Trust Fund for Liberia, and to provide additional support for ECOMOG to enable it to sustain a secure environment for the elections;
Stresses the importance of close contacts and enhanced coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG at all levels and, in particular, the importance of ECOMOG to continue to provide effective security for international personnel during the election process;
... Also stresses the importance of assisting with the prompt repatriation of refugees who are willing to return to Liberia in time to participate in the registration and voting process".
report of the Secretary-General, 14 April 1997 (S/1997/304)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"... following the arrival in Luanda of 63 out of 70 elected deputies of the União para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and of all 11 of its designated officials, the Government and UNITA agreed that the UNITA deputies would take their seats in the National Assembly on 9 April, and that the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation would be installed on 11 April.
An extraordinary session of the Joint Commission was held on 31 March to confirm those arrangements. Consensus was also reached at that meeting on the draft text of the document on the special status of Mr. Jonas Savimbi as president of the largest opposition party.
... On 8 April, the National Assembly enacted into law the text on the special status of Mr. Savimbi. ... That legislation, which can be amended or suspended only with the consent of the president of UNITA, defines his rights, duties and immunities. As scheduled, on the following day, 67 out of 70 UNITA members were sworn in ... The remaining three deputies were unable to arrive in Luanda in time, owing either to illness or to difficulties with transportation. Subsequently, the National Assembly elected from among UNITA deputies a second vice-president and a second secretary of the Assembly.
...On 11 April, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was inaugurated ... As expected, Prime Minister Fernando França Van Dunem and most ministers in the previous Government were reappointed, together with four ministers and seven vice ministers from UNITA.
At the session of the Joint Commission held on 31 March, particular concern was expressed at the slow pace of the incorporation of selected UNITA soldiers into the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) and into the Angolan National Police. Neither process has advanced substantially since my last report to the Security Council (S/1997/248). The Joint Commission decided to dispatch four special groups composed of representatives of the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM to visit quartering areas/selection and demobilisation centres to assess the situation and to identify steps which have to be taken in order to accelerate the incorporation of UNITA soldiers into FAA and the national police and the demobilisation of excess personnel. Those recommendations, which include the need to improve coordination and logistic support to the above processes as well as the need to issue specific instructions for UNITA commanders in the quartering areas, will be considered by the Joint Commission shortly.
As of 10 April, of 18,558 UNITA troops selected, 7,949 had in fact been incorporated into FAA. While the quartering of UNITA police has now been formally concluded, only slightly more than 500 of them, out of a total of 5,040, have been selected for service in the national police. It appears that the stringent educational, age and fitness criteria which have been applied so far have excluded many potential candidates from possible selection. In the meantime, the beginning of the rapid demobilisation programme ... has been postponed several times, creating additional hardship for UNITA soldiers and their families, and imposing further financial difficulties on the UN.
The large number of deserters and absentees from the selection and demobilisation centres remains a source of serious concern ... UNITA has declared that their four remaining [command] centres have now been dismantled, and this is being verified by UNAVEM III. The UN is also continuing to encourage the parties to dismantle a total of 135 illegal checkpoints, 77 of which belong to UNITA. In addition, UNAVEM is still awaiting from UNITA complete information concerning the strength and weaponry of the security detachment of the UNITA president.
UNAVEM III is proceeding with the gradual withdrawal of its formed military units. The next repatriation, of approximately 220 military personnel, is scheduled for 20 April. As a result, the strength of UNAVEM's military units will have been reduced by approximately 30 per cent. As previously indicated, this phased drawdown will continue, while taking into account the situation on the ground. However, under present plans, it is still my intention to complete the process by the end of August 1997.
... During the reporting period, humanitarian activities throughout the country continued to focus on the completion of the demobilisation process, acceleration of the social reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependants, as well as on the reconstruction of basic services in order to absorb large population influxes. However, a number of security incidents have hindered humanitarian activities in the central and southern regions of the country, while difficulties continue to be experienced with the free circulation of people in the areas controlled by UNITA in the northern and eastern parts of Angola. In the meantime, some 2,000 new internally displaced persons from UNITA areas recently arrived in the vicinity of the city of Malange.
As of 12 April 1997, a total of 2,124 under-age UNITA military personnel have been demobilised from eight selection and demobilisation centres. Following the disbursement by the Government of the funds for a special subsidy, a new schedule was approved for the rapid demobilisation of excess UNITA personnel in the central and southern regions.
... the General Assembly has provided resources for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of $22,996,400 gross ($22,496,800 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of the Mission by the Security Council.
... As at 9 April 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $93.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations was $1,659.0 million.
... In the meantime, since the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation has now been inaugurated, I recommend that the Security Council approve the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III until 30 June 1997, on the understanding that the operation would gradually proceed with the transition towards an observer mission, as described in section VII of my report of 7 February 1997 to the Security Council (S/1997/115). The required transitional arrangements would be financed from within the resources already allocated for the Mission by the General Assembly ...
Should the Security Council agree to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, as suggested above, I would further recommend that the observer mission, to be known as the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNOMA), be formally established on 1 July 1997.
... The main activities of the Observer Mission, in addition to the completion of the remaining military tasks, would focus on political, police and human rights aspects, as well as on humanitarian and public information programmes aimed at supporting and consolidating the national reconciliation process, with a view to creating conditions conducive to political stability, economic and social recovery and sustainable development".
Resolution 1106 (1997) (S/RES/1106)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
The Security Council, at its 3,769th meeting on 16 April 1997:
"... Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until 30 June 1997 to assist in the implementation of these remaining tasks, with the understanding that UNAVEM III will begin, as appropriate, to proceed with the transition towards an observer mission as described in section VII of the report of the Secretary-General of 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115) using resources already provided or allocated to the mission for the period ending 30 June 1997;
Requests the Secretary-General to complete the withdrawal of UNAVEM III military units as scheduled, taking into account progress in the remaining relevant aspects of the peace process;
Expresses its intention to consider the establishment of a follow-on United Nations presence, bearing in mind the reports of the Secretary-General of 7 February 1997 and 14 April 1997, which would succeed UNAVEM III".
Resolution 1118 (1997) (S/RES/1118)
Selected Extracts
The Security Council, at its 3,795th meeting, on 30 June 1997:
"... Decides to establish, as of 1 July, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) with the objectives, mandate, and organisational structure recommended by the Secretary-General ... in his report of 5 June 1997;
Also decides, with the expectation of full completion of the mission by 1 February 1998, that the initial mandate of MONUA will extend until 31 October 1997, and requests the Secretary-General to report on the situation by 15 August 1997;
Further decides that MONUA will assume responsibility for all components and assets of UNAVEM III remaining in Angola, including formed military units, to deploy as appropriate until they are withdrawn;
Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take into account the situation on the ground and progress in completing the remaining relevant aspects of the peace process in implementing the scheduled withdrawal of UN military units".
Report of the Secretary-General, 14 April 1997 (S/1997/311)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"With an authorised strength of 28 military observers, UNMOP [the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka] continues to monitor the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula and of neighbouring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by carrying out vehicle and foot patrols on both sides of the border.
... While the situation in the UNMOP area of responsibility has been generally stable, tension increased as a result of several developments. In particular, concern mounted in the wake of a substantial increase, beginning in mid-December 1996, in the number of Croatian special police personnel in the UN designated zones. UNMOP estimates that the increase amounts to a doubling of the strength of the special police in those areas
... Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1093 (1997), the parties have made no progress towards adopting the practical options that are part of the procedures proposed by UNMOP in May 1996 to reduce tension and improve safety and security in the area ... both parties continue to restrict the freedom of movement of UNMOP in the northern part of the demilitarised zone and that access elsewhere is denied randomly and even, at several Croatian positions, constantly. Minefields laid beside routes patrolled by UN military observers on both sides of the international border in the demilitarised zone still constitute a hazard to UN military observers.
... The Chief Military Observer has found no willingness among the parties to take unilateral steps to improve respect for the demilitarisation regime in Prevlaka and its neighbouring areas. Although neither party refuses to consider removing minefields or lifting restrictions on the movement of UN military observers, both insist that such steps can be undertaken only in the context of a reciprocal arrangement. The experience of UNMOP has shown that the parties' requirement of guaranteed reciprocity makes meaningful progress on the issue extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The parties raised various concerns related to the work of UNMOP ... In this situation, UNMOP will continue to carry out its mandate, within the existing practical constraints. It will also continue its efforts to enhance security and safety in its area of responsibility and to contribute to confidence-building between the parties".
Report of the Secretary-General, 12 May 1997 (S/1997/365)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Since my predecessor's last report to the Security Council on 19 November 1996 (S/1996/961), the composition, strength and mandate of UNPREDEP have remained unchanged. The mission continues to be headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Henryk Sokalski (Poland). The Force's military component consists of two mechanised infantry battalions: a Nordic composite battalion and a United States Army task force, each with a strength of 500 personnel. The two battalions are supported by a 50-man engineering platoon from Indonesia. UNPREDEP also has 35 military observers and 26 civilian police monitors drawn from 27 countries. The military component of the mission is headed by the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Bo Wranker (Sweden).
... In addition to the community and border patrols carried out by the civilian police and the military observers, UNPREDEP military personnel conducted more than 190 patrols a week during the reporting period. On average, UNPREDEP observes approximately 90 patrols per week by the armed forces of Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the host country. However, during the month of March 1997, the number of those patrols increased to more than 160 per week. Furthermore, UNPREDEP reports that military units of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and those of the host country now actively patrol their territory up to the old administrative border of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is the view of UNPREDEP that those patrols are closely linked to the process of demarcating the border between the two countries. The new pattern of patrolling has increased the frequency of encounters with UNPREDEP patrols operating in those areas.
... Under Security Council resolution 1082 (1996), the strength of the UNPREDEP military component was to have been reduced to 750 personnel by 30 April 1997. The reduced component would have continued to comprise a Nordic composite battalion and a United States Army task force, each with a strength of 350 personnel. The number of observation posts would have been reduced from 21 to 12. Formed infantry units would have remained on the northern border, while the western border would have been monitored by military observers. Support to the two battalions would have continued to be provided by the Indonesian engineering platoon.
... the escalation of the crisis in neighbouring Albania earlier this year prompted the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to write to me on 7 March 1997 ... to request an urgent suspension of the proposed reduction of the strength of the military component ... The Council ... decided in its resolution 1105 (1997) of 9 April 1997 to suspend the reduction until the end of the current mandate on 31 May.
... Since my predecessor last reported to the Security Council, there have been few positive developments in the region. In most of the countries neighbouring the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, public unrest and tension have been evident. Social unrest has occurred in Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. State institutions have collapsed and social structures have disintegrated in Albania. The situation in Kosovo remains tense and has been a source of continued concern to the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which remains apprehensive that developments in that region might directly affect the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, difficulties have been encountered in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement.
... Domestically, developments have been uneven. On the one hand, the latest local elections, in which all political parties participated, have strengthened the pluralistic composition of the political scene and the exercise of grass-roots democracy ... At the same time, however, a number of worrisome developments have been observed during the reporting period. The passage of the law on instruction in the languages of the ethnic communities sparked daily protests, followed by a hunger strike, by ethnic Macedonian students.
In a letter addressed to me on 1 April 1997 (S/1997/267), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated that it was his country's view that the current situation in the region, combined with previously unresolved problems, had underscored the need to extend the existing mandate of UNPREDEP for an additional six months. He further stated that the events in Albania had contributed to the continued vulnerable security situation in the region and could have a spillover effect on neighbouring countries. In the light of the increasing number of cases of various armed gangs trespassing into the territory of the Republic, the Minister expressed the view that the presence of an objective foreign entity such as UNPREDEP would be of great importance in verifying or clarifying problems that could arise from such incursions. Additional arguments put forward for extending the mandate of UNPREDEP included, inter alia, the fragile and complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political unrest in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the elections in that country, the situation in Kosovo, the continued lack of defensive capacity of the army of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the pending demarcation of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
In meetings with UN officials, all levels of the host country's Government have stressed that the monitoring and reporting mandates of UNPREDEP have provided an essential tool for an objective assessment by the international community of the situation in the region. It is the Government's position that the presence of UNPREDEP on the borders of the Republic not only has prevented a radicalisation of the crisis in neighbouring areas, notably in Kosovo, but also has effectively stopped active hostilities from spilling over into the country. UNPREDEP confirms that the recent uncontrolled looting of installations on the Albanian side of the border with the Republic did not spread to communities or border posts in the immediate border area. UNPREDEP also confirms that the refocusing of its activities along the western border and its reinforced and highly visible community patrols in minority villages along the border during the height of the Albanian crisis had a calming effect on the population in those areas. It is the mission's view that its rapid and flexible response increased the confidence of the local population in the ability of the Republic to withstand the potential threat to its stability.
... recent developments in Albania have demonstrated that stability in the Balkan region remains extremely fragile. Uncertainty still prevails in that country, in part because of the lack of a constructive dialogue among the parties. There have been doubts about the possibility of holding free and fair elections in June. In the absence of a legitimate, elected and representative Government and of progress in re-establishing collapsed public institutions, efforts to revive the shattered economy of Albania will be severely undermined. So too will the relative stability established by the multinational protection force. In addition, the lack of a perceptible and early change in the situation in Albania could lead to another explosion of internal violence, which may have a negative impact on neighbouring countries. In this regard, the large number of weapons circulating in the region, some of which have already been interdicted in the border areas by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, pose a risk to stability in the region that cannot be neglected. Yet another potentially destabilising factor in the coming months will be the outcome of the elections scheduled to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in September of this year.
In the light of the strong views conveyed to me by the Government of the host country for a continued UNPREDEP presence, the continuation of the conditions that led to the suspension of the drawdown of the military component and the challenges to be faced in the region in the near future, I am of the view that it would be imprudent to recommend that the UNPREDEP mission be terminated. I believe it would be equally imprudent to recommend any immediate changes in the mandate or size of the Force at this time. I therefore recommend that the mandate of UNPREDEP be renewed for an additional six months until 30 November 1997. I further recommend that the present strength of the Force be maintained for a period of four months, up to 30 September 1997, with a view to starting as of 1 October 1997, taking into account the conditions prevailing at that time, a two-month phased reduction of the military component to the 750 troop level foreseen by the Council in resolution 1082 (1996)".
Resolution 1110 (1997) (S/RES/1110)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
The Security Council, at its 3,783rd meeting, on 28 May 1997:
"Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP until 30 November 1997, and to start as of 1 October 1997, taking into account the conditions prevailing at that time, a two-month phased reduction of the military component by 300, all ranks;
... Welcomes the redeployment of UNPREDEP already achieved in the light of the situation in Albania, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue further redeployment of UNPREDEP taking into consideration the situation in the region, consistent with the mandate of UNPREDEP".
Resolution 1107 (1997), (S/RES/1107)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
The Security Council, at its 3776th meeting on 16 May 1997:
"Decides to authorise an increase in the strength of UNMIBH [the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina] by 120 police personnel, in the light of the recommendation of the Secretary-General concerning the tasks of the [UN International Police Task Force] UN-IPTF as set out in the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4 and 5 December 1996 (S/1996/1012) and agreed by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to enable the UN-IPTF to carry out its mandate set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement and resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996;
Urges Member States to provide qualified police monitors and other forms of assistance and support to the UN-IPTF and in support of the Peace Agreement".
Resolution 1114 (1997), (S/RES/1114)
Selected Extracts
The Security Council, at its 3,791st meeting on 19 June:
"Stressing the importance of regional stability and, in this context, fully supporting the diplomatic efforts of the international community, particularly the OSCE and the European Union, to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and assist in the electoral process in Albania, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities,
Taking note of the need over a short period of time ... for a limited increase in the contingent originally planned, for the purpose of protecting the OSCE mission, especially in view of the planned elections;
... Welcomes the readiness of the countries contributing to the multinational protection force to maintain their military contingents in Albania for a limited time as part of the multinational protection force in the framework of the mandate provided by resolution 1101 (1997);
Further welcomes the intention of the countries contributing to the multinational protection force to continue, within the framework of the mandate provided by resolution 1101 (1997), to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance
... Authorises the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve [its] objectives and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, further authorises these Member States to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the multinational protection force;
... Decides that the operation will be limited to a period of forty-five days from 28 June 1997, at which time the Council will assess the situation
... Decides that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States".
Report of the Secretary-General, 5 May 1997 (S/1997/358)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"... The present report covers developments since my interim report of 27 February 1997 (S/1997/166)
... Following consultations with me and preliminary discussions with the representatives of the two parties and the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, in New York on 2 April, my Personal Envoy [Mr. James A. Baker III] undertook an exploratory mission to the region from 23 to 28 April.
... During the reporting period, the military component of MINURSO [UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara], led by Major-General Jorge Barroso de Moura (Portugal), continued to monitor and verify the cease-fire through daily ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance. Its strength currently stands at 228.
... Cooperation with both the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Frente POLISARIO has been generally good. No violations of the cease-fire were reported during the period under review. However, there were instances where RMA failed to comply with certain technical requirements of the cease-fire rules, particularly with regard to the timely submission of requests for carrying out activities that are monitored by MINURSO. As RMA and the Frente POLISARIO continued to conduct live-fire exercises in almost all regions, the Force Commander requested both sides to refrain from undertaking such exercises with heavy weapons during May and June 1997, in order to avoid any potential rise in tension towards the end of the Mission's current mandate.
... In my interim report of 27 February (S/1997/166), I indicated that, in order to reduce costs further, it was my intention not to replace the personnel of the civilian police component of MINURSO at the end of their assignments, or earlier if agreed by their Governments. Consequently, the Acting Police Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan H. Kleven (Norway), and three officers will be leaving at the end of their tour of duty on 31 May. The remaining five officers are expected to leave as soon as the necessary consultations with the Governments concerned have been completed.
... During my Personal Envoy's consultations in the Tindouf area, the Frente POLISARIO presented him with a list of 85 prisoners of war whom it proposed to release. This list was communicated to the Government of Morocco and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
... Currently, an amount of $2,658,500 gross has been made available for the maintenance of the Mission for the month of June 1997 under the terms of General Assembly resolution 51/2 of 17 October 1996, subject to the extension of the mandate. My proposed budget for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 (A/51/763/Add.1) has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at the second part of its resumed fifty-first session. It is estimated that the monthly cost of maintaining MINURSO at its current strength will amount to $2,425,650 gross beginning 1 July 1997. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission, as recommended in paragraph 22 below, the cost of maintaining MINURSO would be within the monthly rate indicated above.
As at 30 April 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 November 1996 amounted to $40.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations, as at 30 April 1997, was $1,644.5 million".
Report of the Secretary-General, 16 May 1997 (S/1997/372)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"During the period under review, the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained without serious incident and the Force's area of operation remained calm.
... As of May 1997, UNDOF comprised 1,053 troops from Austria, Canada, Japan and Poland (465, 188, 45 and 355 troops respectively), as well as four UN military observers detailed from the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). In addition, UNDOF was assisted by the 73 UNTSO military observers of the Observer Group Golan (OGG). Major-General Johannes C. Kosters (Netherlands) continued as Force Commander. By its resolution 50/20 B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNDOF an amount of $32,254,900 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent to $2,687,908 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the current mandate of UNDOF.
The budget proposed for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 (A/51/405/Add.2) is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. Subject to the Assembly's decision, the cost of maintaining UNDOF at its authorised strength for that period would be $32,368,000 gross, which is equivalent to $2,697,333 gross per month.
Unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNDOF as at 30 April 1997 amounted to $48.2 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 April 1997 amounted to $1.64 billion".
Conferences, Research And Training
Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre: Roundtable on "Journalism in Crises", 6th-10th October, 1997
With the growth of satellite communications, wars and humanitarian disasters have become regular fodder for the media, and there has been a rapid internationalisation in conflict reporting. Journalists are often at the scene at the same time as the first emergency aid workers, usually before multinational forces arrive, whether they have been dispatched by the UN or regional organisations. Most of the journalists will leave before the troops go home and long before the aid workers depart.
The Roundtable, Journalism in Crises, will examine a number of issues that have arisen from these changes both in the nature of regional conflict and the ways they are covered by the media. There will be a loose thematic for the Roundtable, starting from the point where countries are heading towards conflict, through the conflict and its humanitarian consequences to the stage where the post-conflict redevelopment is underway.
The focus of this Roundtable is journalism at the sharp end. By necessity, this means the views of others in conflict zones; local people, aid workers and foreign troops will also be incorporated in the discussions. One of the aspects that will be touched on is how these diverse groups and organisations, with their very different concerns, interact with each other.
There are no easy answers to such questions as: the media's obligations, if any, when covering conflict and humanitarian disasters; or the increasingly relevant issue of how to assess when a story is becoming too dangerous to cover. The primary goal of this Roundtable is to bring together veteran journalists and others who have worked in these difficult places to explore the issues, exchange ideas and, where applicable, try to come up with solutions.
A second goal is to turn the issues and ideas that are generated into the foundation for the development of a course by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre on the media in peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian crises. Such a course would be offered to participants from around the world. There will be opportunities during the Roundtable for discussion on possible course content.
In conjunction with the Roundtable, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is also funding a research project on issues relating to Journalism in Crises.
For further information, please contact Jean-Yves LeFort, Assistant to the Director of Programmes
Tel: ++ (902) 638-8611 ext.135
Fax: ++ (902) 638-3310
Email: jylefort@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
Peacekeeping Citation List: Centre for DEFENCE Information
For information on research in the peacekeeping area, please contact Colonel Dan Smith:
Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700
Fax: ++ (202) 862-0708
Email: dsmith@cdi.org
Website: http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPDKO)
Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping including demining, mission up-dates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel-contributors, rapid deployment, fatalities, and training is availavle on-lene at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
UN Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI)
UNTAR POCI provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the curse is availavle on -line at: http://www.wm.edu/unpeace/index.html
UN Annual Briefing to Member States on Standby ARRANGEMENTS, 29 May 1997
Full Text
Definitions and Background
"As a lead into the core subject of the Standby Arrangements System, let me first define three terms. These terms we all use time after time but each of us gives them our own meaning, therefore to create a better understanding please accept the following as the working definitions of Rapid Deployment, the UN Standby Arrangements and the UN Standby Force.
... the UN has very limited assets of its own to run UN field operations. Therefore, Member States are the main providers of the resources required to the UN operations. However, if Member States are not able to provide all the assets, these are then supplemented with the limited UN owned resources and with the contracted support bought in from international market. Thus, within the UN Secretariat, the term "rapid deployment" means the rapid deployment of all resources needed and used to sustain UN operations whereas the Standby Arrangements System is a system which deals exclusively with resources provided by the governments, both military and civilian in order to facilitate, among others, the rapid deployment of all the resources needed in the peacekeeping operation.
... the speed of deployment is contingent on the following three main factors: short response time of resources being made available, including political approval and the conclusion of the necessary administrative procedures; rapid availability of the necessary air/sea strategic lift; and finally availability of resources to provide logistic sustainment of the force in the mission area. Relationship between these factors and the result can be presented as a simple mathematical formula as shown, rapid deployment is a function of response time, strategic lift and logistic sustainment. This formula proves that should one of these three factors be zero, then the ability to deploy rapidly is likewise zero.
In order to meet the demands symbolised in this formula, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested in 1992 that troops and resources should be made available by Governments to the UN peace operations at short notice, when necessary. This is what is known as the standby forces concept. An idea which, as governments are no doubt aware, was initially described by the Secretary-General, in para. 51 of his "Agenda for Peace." These Standby Forces were not to be used for peace-enforcement actions but simply for chapter VI type operations.
However, after consultation with Member States in 1993 and 1994, the idea of the Standby Forces was limited to what it is now called, - "the Standby Arrangements System" since a basic prerequisite for the UN Standby Forces could not be met. This prerequisite is defined as an unconditional political commitment of earmarked resources by Member States into the UN Standby Forces pool; whereas the Standby Arrangements System is based on conditional pledges by Member States to contribute specific resources with agreed response time into the system.
As the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in November 1995, the purpose of a standby arrangement is to have a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at a given condition of readiness for movement from the home country if it agrees to contribute to a peacekeeping operation. Such an understanding facilitates the Organisation's efforts in mission force planning and force building, and also contributes to its rapid deployment. Similarly, it places the participating Government in a better position to plan and budget for a possible contribution to a peacekeeping operation, to train and prepare its personnel and, if necessary, to arrange for the acquisition of the necessary equipment required to perform peacekeeping duties.
The Standby Arrangements System is based on the established principle that a member state retains the right to say "No" to the Secretary General's request for participation in a specific UN peacekeeping operation. Hence, it cannot be assumed that all resources included in the system will be made available when so requested.
The effectiveness and optimisation of the Standby Arrangements System is linked to detailed information on resources specified in each of the standby arrangements. By maintaining a comprehensive database, the UN Secretariat is in a better position to determine the resources available to meet peacekeeping mission requirements. It also enables departmental planners to tailor realistic tasks for resources provided by the governments according to their capabilities, as well as identifying what services and materials should be procured or contracted if deficiencies exist. So, in other words, we know that we cannot assign the tasks of a mechanised infantry battalion to country A if under SBA it has said that it will offer a light infantry battalion. The database also provides generic information which enables logistic planners to know in advance what transportation provisions are required in terms of force units movement into the mission area.
The Standby Arrangements also greatly facilitate the budget planning process. The intent is to have the Standby Arrangements linked to the budget planning process by identified personnel, equipment and services to be provided by troop-contributing countries under the new procedures for the control and reimbursement of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), as authorised by the General Assembly. By having this information entered into the Peacekeeping Database, budgeting for the participation of a troop-contributing country is facilitated by simply transferring the Standby Arrangement of the selected troop-contributing country into the budgeting module of the database, identifying the financial resources required and creating at the same time the related annexes of the Contribution Agreement. This must however be a slick process if it is not to hamper the rapid deployment.
In addition, it is important to stress that the Standby Arrangements are not only confined to resources directly required in the mission area, but also cover air and sea strategic lift resources offered by governments and needed in rapid deployment of all resources into the peacekeeping operation area.
To assist Member States and Secretariat planners, standard standby components have been devised and are listed in Tables of Organisation and Equipment that have been made available to Member States. The tables provide guidelines on tasks, organisational structure, size and equipment, including the number of vehicles, of the types of units typically deployed in today's peacekeeping operations.
Having summarised the benefits of the Standby Arrangements System, it is extremely encouraging to see the progress that has been made. In three years since the system was implemented, sixty-five Member States have now confirmed their willingness to participate in the Standby Arrangements System ... Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Ghana, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia and Singapore have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN, formalising the details of their contribution to the Standby Arrangements System. Two additional MoUs are currently being staffed and are expected to be finalised shortly. [SEE BELOW FOR MORE RECENT DETAILS OF STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS]
In terms of personnel resources that could be made available to the UN, current standby arrangements add up to more than 83,000 personnel; while primarily composed of military, these resources include some 880 civilian police and 240 civilian specialists and experts ranging from surgeons to procurement personnel.
... Standby Arrangements information registered in [the UN] database proved most helpful in the planning for and subsequent deployment to peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Angola, former Yugoslavia (UNTAES) and Guatemala. The data was used extensively by departmental desk and planning officers and contributed to the reduced deployment times.
... The response time ... is the time that elapses between the moment a formal request is sent by the Secretary General, and the time when the resources are ready to be picked up for deployment at specified points of embarkation.
... As mentioned before, the response time depends not only on the high readiness of the units but also on prompt domestic political decision making process and administrative preparations. The current distribution of resources in the SBA pool reflects some of the national impediments or time delays as determined by each Member State's particular requirement for administrative governmental decision or some form of parliamentary approval. In addition, there are considerable differences in response time from various categories of standby units e.g: standing professional armies, conscript forces and/or call up mechanisms (reservists); the latter category requiring a longer lead time to prepare. Furthermore, the new COE procedures require the contribution agreements to be signed before the actual deployment of the resources to the mission area. Such legal requirement may delay the process of rapid deployment. Thus, in the light of this mandatory requirement for future peacekeeping operations, the Member States who have already pledged to the SBA system may wish to exchange data required by Annex A and B to the model of the Contribution Agreement within the framework of the Standby Arrangements System. This data will be modified and corrected during the contribution agreement finalisation process when a Member State eventually confirms its readiness to participate in specific operation.
Consequently, the Mission Planning Service reviewed the volumetrics form in order to meet this need as well as taking into account the demands of other users of the Peacekeeping Data Base ... The new form which is called the "Planning Data Sheet" consolidates information required and is fourfold. It requires information on: generic description of unit capabilities, generic movement data, logistic sustainment and self-sufficiency and a list of major equipment ... In addition, the implementation of a new "Planning Data Sheet" will result in a reduction of annexes to the Memorandum of Understanding into a two-page annex covering the generic description of resources and their response times. In other words, the "Planning Data Sheet" asks for only the generic details of unit capabilities, its equipment and so on - more details will only be needed as we plan an actual deployment.
The preceding facts illustrate how, with the assistance of Member States, this system is being formed into an operational tool, to enhance the planning process and to facilitate rapid deployment of the mission force. The way ahead, as we perceive it, would be to focus on the following issues related to the enhancement of the Standby Arrangements System.
First, to continue our effort in increasing the number of Member States taking part in this initiative, and by that enable a wider participation and support for it.
Second, to obtain a more balanced ratio between operational and support units, by encouraging member states having support assets to include them in their pledges. Furthermore, to promote the idea of having national civilian support organisation, such as NOREPS, with rapid deployable capabilities to be included into national contributions to the Standby Arrangements.
Third, to continue our effort in moving resources from the fourth group into either first or second group of the SBA pool by sharing information and providing advice to member states interested in shortening the response time of their contributions.
The UN will continue to invite all Member States to participate in the system, regardless of the type, size and response times of the resources, since another principle of the Standby Arrangements System is that no contribution is too small and no contribution is too big. This will contribute to the enhancement of the system to be used for the planning of any type of peacekeeping operation, and also to enhance our ability to obtain a balanced geographical distribution of the participants in future peacekeeping operations.
In closing, we believe it is fair to repeat again that it is an expression of the will of the Member States and their enthusiasm that have permitted the Standby Arrangements System to achieve the progress that it has in this endeavour. Continued support in this joint effort is crucial to enable the strengthening of the Standby Arrangements System and permit it to achieve its intended goal of reacting more quickly and more efficiently to future peacekeeping requirements".
June Monthly Status Report for UN Standby Arrangements
INFORMATION ACCURATE AS OF 2 JUNE 1997
"Thus far 66 countries have officially expressed their willingness to participate in Standby Arrangements. The latest addition being China: Argentina *; Australia **; Austria ***; Bangladesh **; Belarus *; Belgium **; Bolivia ***; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; ** Canada; ** Chad *; China; Czech Rep.**; Denmark ***; Egypt; Estonia; Finland *; France **; Georgia; Germany *; Ghana ***; Greece; Guatemala **; Hungary *; India *; Indonesia; Ireland *; Italy ***; Jordan ***; Kazakstan; Kenya *; Kyrgyz Rep.; Malaysia ***; Myanmar *; Nepal **; Netherlands **; New Zealand **; Nigeria; Norway *; Pakistan **; Poland **; Portugal **; Rep. of Korea *; Rep. of Moldova; Romania; Russian Fed.; * Senegal; * Singapore ***; Slovak Rep. *; Slovenia; Spain *; Sri Lanka *; Sudan; Sweden *; Syria **; Tanzania; Tunisia; Turkey *; Ukraine *; U.K. **; U.S.A. *; Uruguay **; Uzbekistan; Zambia; Zimbabwe *
(*) denotes Member States who have provided lists of capabilities = 47; (**) denotes Member States who have provided volumetrics = 25; (***) denotes Member States who have signed an MOU with the UN = 8
From volumetrics provided thus far (**) and estimates based on UN Tables of Organisations and Equipment (TO&Es) for those countries which have identified capabilities only (*), stand-by personnel resources which could be made available to the UN are as follows:
Infantry: 50,191; HQ Support: 3,124; Communications: 4,055; Engineers: 7,596; Logistics: 10,150; Air Services: 2,750; Health Services: 4,800; Individuals: 4,405 (Military Observers, Civilian police, staff officers, etc) Estimated Total: 87,071
Some support functions are not in sufficient numbers to allow for optimum system efficiency. Therefore, the current emphasis is in seeking contributions in the following areas: HQ Support Communications Engineers Air Services Civilian Police Logistics.
I. From Past to Future: The Challenges Ahead
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. The first is to analyse the nature of conflicts which are likely to challenge the Organisation in the early 21st century; second, to define (by necessity in broad terms) the types of response which are most promising in such cases; third, to outline how the United Nations in recent years has greatly enhanced its capacity to implement such responses; and fourth, to suggest further innovations which will be required if the Organisation is to be successful at the turn of the century. In an effort to see the forest, not the trees, the paper takes the long view. It does not dwell on today's immediate ate worries: the political cum financial crisis or the challenges of current operations.
The conventional wisdom, arising primarily from the difficulties encountered by two operations (in Bosnia and Somalia), is that the Organisation should do less peacekeeping, either by not getting involved at all in certain conflicts or by working only at their margins. Aside from the overriding fact that inaction in the face of massive violence is morally indefensible, non-involvement is an illusory option. The illusion is due to domestic political imperatives in an age of media-driven popular awareness, as well as to international political realities. Doing nothing to respond to violent upheaval invites those affected, whether neighbouring countries strained by an influx of refugees or external players with interests in the country (including, at times, rival external states with competing interests), to take matters into their own hands, whether through interdiction of refugees, support of proxies or direct intervention.
With regard to domestic politics, Member States are sometimes unable to resist popular pressure to "do something." It is a credit to the world's peoples that a declared policy of inaction in the face of genocide is not always politically viable. The problem is that the "CNN factor" tends to mobilise popular pressure at the peak of the problem - which is to say at the very moment when effective intervention is most costly, most dangerous, and least likely to succeed.
In short, in our present world and into the foreseeable future, there is no such thing as international non-involvement in violent conflicts. There is, rather, a choice between legitimate involvement and other more ominous forms of intervention. Absent a concerted effort to strengthen the United Nations as the centre for harmonising interests and implementing the wishes of all the Members, it will be only a matter of time before a great power comes to the Council seeking official blessing for its intervention, is denied this blessing, and takes unilateral action. This will be countered through arms transfers and other assistance by those who refused to legitimate the intervention in the first place. Some - but fortunately not all - of these elements are already apparent in parts of the world today. It does not take much imagination to envision a case in which all of these elements would be present. This would mark a return, not to the Cold War - there is no need to be unnecessarily apocalyptic - but nevertheless to an old and unpleasant, albeit familiar, way of the world.
What faces us, thus, is a need to recognise competing national interests and to explore ways to transcend them or at least to reconcile them through acceptable institutional mechanisms. This in turn will require an effective and sustainable system of collective security (one element of which would be peacekeeping) at the disposal of the Security Council. To think in terms of a system means to stop thinking of each individual case as if it existed in isolation, and to begin to think of an over-all framework which would pre-empt the need for so many new operations. An effective system of collective security would rest on three essential elements: consistent and timely response, resources, and sustained commitment. Whether or not such a system is put into place, the Council will continue to mandate challenging, new operations. It is useful to focus on what these future UN operations will look like.
II. Types of Operations
There is no doubt that some of the UN's future operations will fall into two categories in which the Organisation has had considerable success:
1. The UN will continue to be tasked with classic UN peacekeeping operations, in which the parties share an interest in a limited settlement consisting of, for example, a cease-fire and separation of forces. With the consent and cooperation of the parties, the peacekeepers monitor the implementation of the settlement. Examples would include the operations on the Golan Heights and in Cyprus. The UN will also occasionally be assigned preventive deployment operations, similar to the above except that they are deployed before conflict breaks out, as with the current operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
2. The Organisation will be tasked with multi-disciplinary operations to comprehensive settlements arrived at in good faith on the basis of a lengthy political process (e.g. in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique). In spite of the fact that we have had tremendous successes here, it is generally recognised, within the Secretariat at least, that that the machinery creaked and was stretched to the limit. A number of needed improvements have since been made, as described below; others are under way. The Secretariat is now equipped with most of the functional units which are required to plan and manage such operations. The challenge for the future will be to integrate these disparate parts into a more cohesive whole (and to resist pressures to dismantle some of them each time there is a lull in operations).
3. To face squarely a third type of UN operation which will be required in the future, it is first necessary to free ourselves from a certain amount of organisational and bureaucratic inertia. There is a temptation to rest on the machinery laurels of past successes, restricting the Organisation to tried-and-true UN peacekeeping, and becoming involved only where the doctrine and methods of that well-honed instrument fit the circumstances. The problem with such an approach, of course, is that in a much changed world, the pre-requisites of traditional peacekeeping will not exist in the great majority of cases. If the UN has no other method at its disposal, it will become largely irrelevant. The UN, like a successful corporation, must periodically adapt its product line to changing demands. In the foreseeable future, the demands of peace and security will be to meet the threats posed by conflicts which are on one level internal but which have serious international implications. Have the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda been without such implications? Obviously not. Have they been amenable to traditional peacekeeping? Obviously not. Should the UN prepare itself constructively to address such conflicts in the future or abdicate its responsibilities in the name of "sticking to what the Organisation does best?" Even if the Organisation should prepare to abdicate - which it should not - it will not have the luxury of doing so, for the reasons described in the first part of this paper. In the absence of any realistic alternatives, a UN operation will occasionally be the least bad option available to the Council for dealing with such conflicts, and soldiers under UN operational authority will be thrust into the violence to do what they can. Since this is foreseeable, there is a need to strengthen the Organisation's capacity to handle such operations. Otherwise, if the Organisation is neither doctrinally prepared, nor staffed nor structured for the tasks, the least bad option on paper could easily degenerate into a fiasco on the ground.
To stand still while the world moves forward is to slide helplessly backward. The United Nations must face challenges which do not fit into a neat peacekeeping package: the volatile, so-called "grey area" operations. As discussed below, this will require, first, the development of a serious capacity for the lawful gathering and analysis of intelligence, so that we understand the crisis in which we are about to intervene and are able to anticipate how it is likely to develop. On the basis of that understanding of the situation on the ground and the turns it could take, UN operations will require, second, appropriate capabilities upon deployment: the right force structure to be able to carry out the mandate and to protect the operation. If the Organisation fails to do this, as was the case in both Bosnia and Somalia, credibility will be eroded even further, and it will become increasingly difficult to find troop contributors.
"INDUCING" CONSENT
What approaches seem most promising for future UN operations in volatile international conflicts? In any given case, blue helmeted soldiers are likely to encounter many persons who welcome the UN presence and many others who are highly resistant. In such operations, some of which will be mandated to assist societies bordering on anarchy, the old dictum of "consent of the parties" will be neither right or wrong; it will be, quite simply, irrelevant. Only if conceived in a new light can the concept of consent be useful to future operations. That new concept. which is outlined in this section, may hold one of the keys to the success of future operations.
Much of the literature on peacekeeping treats the consent of the parties as if it were an independent variable. It is not, for the simple reason that the decision of parties to a conflict to grant consent is never taken in a vacuum. It is, rather, a function of the alternatives. If consent carries with it certain rewards, and the failure to consent carries certain costs, this obviously affects the decision as to whether or not consent will be granted.
Through most of UN history, peacekeeping operations were established in cases in which external powers had considerable influence and interests. Indeed, a driving force behind peacekeeping in the Cold War was the superpowers' initial interest in bringing an end to proxy wars before the superpowers were dragged into a direct confrontation, with all the dangers that that implied. Hence, the superpowers, which were in a position to greatly increase or drastically reduce military and economic assistance, were able to induce their respective clients to consent to a peacekeeping operation and to cooperate with it.
When consent was thus secured, patrons rewarded their clients for cooperation. Foreign aid bills increased. In addition, the peacekeeping operation, once deployed, could itself build on the consent, winning the confidence of the parties, providing a climate in which reasonably normal life, including economic activity, could resume. Hence, the peacekeeping operation helped to deliver a reward, namely stability. It did not dispense punishments, at least not directly. Rather, when coercion was required, it reported to the Council, so that those with influence could (usually behind the scenes) apply the appropriate pressure.
The situation today is different. Conflicts occur in places that the superpowers no longer care very much about. They do not have in such places large military or economic assistance programmes that can be manipulated to reward or punish the recipients. To complicate matters, there is often a severe weakening or even breakdown of authority in these situations, with the result that ostensible political and military leaders exercise very little control over their supposed subordinates around the country.
In such situations how are consent and cooperation to be achieved? The behind-the-scenes support of the great powers, while still necessary, is not enough. It is up to the operation in the mission area to gain the consent and cooperation directly with the people they encounter whether peasant, civil servant, warlord, or political leader. To do this, they must be able in the mission area to provide some mix of costs and rewards. At present, it is difficult for a UN operation to do either.
Inducement operations are conceived for this purpose. They are intended to restore civil society where it has broken down by two methods: ( I ) the use of positive incentives (rewards) to induce, in the first instance, consent and cooperation with the peace operation and, beyond that, reconciliation; and (2) the threat of coercion to gain the consent and cooperation, however grudging, of those who are unresponsive to positive incentives.
COERCIVE INDUCEMENT
Let us deal first with the coercive aspect, the purpose of which is to intimidate recalcitrants into cooperating. (This was successfully accomplished, for example, in the case of UNITAF in Somalia, the Multinational Force in Haiti and, on a more limited scale, Operation Turquoise in Rwanda). If Consent is thereby granted, then an inducement operation ensues. Such an operation takes into account that hostile consent was granted only in the face of intimidating force, and that a credible force is required if consent is to be maintained. Simultaneously, however, it operates on the basis of freely-given consent on the part of much of the population, and regards this as a valuable asset to be protected and nurtured. Thus the behaviour of soldiers in an inducement operation must be distinctly different from what it would be either in a war-fighting or a peacekeeping operation. The purpose of an inducement operation is to build, not to destroy, even while intimidating into acquiescence those who would prevent reconciliation and the peacebuilding processes that are inherent in the restoration of civil society.
What happens if the international community gives an ultimatum, displays its coercive capacity, and one or more parties still refuse to grant consent? Given the lasting damage to credibility which results from making an ultimatum and then failing to follow through, bluffs should be avoided at all costs. It follows that inducement operations should be deployed with the mandate and the capacity to conduct, if necessary, offensive operations against recalcitrants. Otherwise, the intimidation factor on which their success depends will be glaringly absent, and they will be doomed from the beginning. The trouble-makers will continue to persecute their victims, who will blame the UN for failing to bring justice. Few imaginable outcomes could be more damaging to credibility than failures of this kind.
It should be remembered that "credible coercive capacity" is a relative term, depending on circumstances, timing and the nature of the adversary. General Romeo Dallaire, who was the UN Force Commander in Rwanda at the time of the crisis there, has made the compelling argument that, if he had had a cohesive, mobile, brigade-size force within three weeks of the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, he could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, albeit with some UN casualties. Rapid and decisive action, he argues, could have prevented a loosely organised and militarily unsophisticated group from wreaking havoc on elements of the local population. The key in that case would have been to establish such a presence before the situation got completely out of hand.
THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE INDUCEMENT
The reliance on coercion alone, however, is insufficient for three reasons. First, given that leverage is the product of carrots and sticks, it is obviously preferable, when possible, to influence parties' behaviour with the former rather than the latter. Second, the intimidation factor will erode over time. Third, the most difficult operations are those in which the members of the Security Council find it necessary to provide a mandate which sounds robust, even though they cannot agree among themselves as to which party should be the target of decisive military force. In such circumstances there are severe constraints on the use of coercion, due to the fact that the political direction and support for it is ambiguous or faint. Fourth, carrots and sticks as tools of influence are not entirely interchangeable. Some things can be achieved only by providing positive rewards rather than punishment. For example, while intimidation can in some (but certainly not all) circumstances clamp a lid on violence, at least for a while, it is not useful in promoting lasting reconciliation. Put simply, the underlying problems which led to violence cannot themselves be intimidated out of existence. Justice and a lasting solution require not only stopping the violence but, crucially, taking the next step. (This was an obvious shortcoming in the UNITAF approach).
In the context of armed conflict, a third party's (e.g. UN) threat to punish factions if they fail to cooperate with their "enemy" will most likely have an effect opposite the one intended. The faction thus threatened, naturally suspicious in view of the violence in which it is engaged, will feel "ganged up on" and will be less likely to cooperate with the third party and with its adversary except, perhaps as a tactical and short-term measure to alleviate the pressure. This does not promote reconciliation and indeed can actually hinder it. The offer of positive incentives, in contrast, is non-threatening and is not as likely to evince the same visceral, negative response. The steps thus taken towards reconciliation are taken willingly, which is a far better foundation on which to build lasting peace.
POSITIVE INDUCEMENT
The provision of rewards in the mission area can be divided into two broad categories. The first is what some military establishments have called "civic action." Its purpose is limited, namely to gain the good will and consequent cooperation of the population. The second, which might be termed "peace incentives," is more ambitious. It is intended as leverage to further the reconciliation process. It provides incentives - a structure of rewards - for erstwhile antagonists to cooperate with each other on some endeavour, usually a limited one at first, which has the potential for expansion if all goes well.
Providing rewards in the mission area could include any variety of activities, tailored to the particular situation. These quite often seem mundane, including development assistance of various types, local infrastructure and water projects, the provision of access to small business loans, making available (or, better yet, training people to provide) basic medical care and veterinary services. To employ them effectively as tools of conflict resolution requires understanding peoples' problems in their complexity and being able to respond at several levels simultaneously and with a certain amount of flexibility. In UN operations, as currently constituted, there is neither structure, staff nor budget for this type of activity. Hence, UN operations, which have been weak on the coercive side due in part to ambiguous mandates and the paltry means with which they have been deployed, have been similarly weak in their ability to offer rewards. This was not a grave problem in an earlier era, when great powers could provide the sticks and carrots in support of the peacekeeping operation. It is more of a problem in conflicts where the great powers themselves have few interests and thus few ties with the parties through which to exercise leverage effectively.
Civic action and peace incentives are different from humanitarian assistance, though the two may sometimes appear the same and have some of the same results. The difference lies in their purpose. The primary purpose of humanitarian assistance is to provide succour to those in need. While civic action and peace incentives also help those in need, their primary purpose is to forward political objectives to gain people's support for a UN operation and to provide leverage in favour of reconciliation. While humanitarian assistance is unconditional, peace incentives are to some extent conditional. Their continuation depends, more or less explicitly, on a certain amount of cooperation towards the objective of political reconciliation.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that experience to date has not been promising in regard to effective cooperation between humanitarian providers, on the one hand, and peacemakers and peacekeepers, on the other. They are in the field for related but distinctly different reasons. Understandably in this context, the political and security components, without a civic action budget and no realistic alternatives to win popular support or provide incentives for reconciliation, are anxious to use the humanitarian agencies for these purposes. Just as understandably, the humanitarian agencies wish not to be used in this way, but instead "to remain independent," i.e. to protect their capacity to pursue humanitarian goals, assisting the affected population, regardless of whether or not warlords can be induced to cooperate with each other or the peace operation.
Civic action, in short, is neither charity nor luxury but, in the types of conflicts we have been discussing, an essential requirement for operational effectiveness that requires a line item of its own in the peace operation's budget. Peace incentives, similarly, are rewards cum leverage rather than assistance for its own sake.
Operations such as those discussed above will require the Organisation to have a more sophisticated capacity for peacekeeping than it has had in the past. The Secretariat has been strengthened in recent years to handle the increasing complexity of peacekeeping. Progress in this regard will be described in the next section, as will additional improvements that have not yet been made but will prove indispensable.
III. Implications for Secretariat Capacity
RECENT IMPROVEMENTS AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS
A number of steps have been taken to enhance the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to plan, manage and direct the numerous and complex field operations established by the Security Council and the General Assembly. It has been an enormous task to keep up with peacekeeping's rapid evolution, illustrated by the fact that, at the end of 1991, there were some 11,500 United Nations peacekeepers in the field, a figure which rose to 80,000 in early 1994. At this writing in February 1996, there are approximately 30,000, a figure which will inevitably ebb and flow in keeping with the unpredictable and dynamic nature of violent conflicts and the world's response to them.
To meet the immediate challenges which have been presented by these dramatic changes over the last few years, in the absence of sufficient posts being established in the Secretariat, many of the new activities in DPKO have been carried out by officers made available on a short-term basis by Member States at no cost to the Organisation. The Secretariat greatly appreciates this assistance which has been essential for the Organisation to be able to fulfil its responsibilities.
The practice, however, is only an interim solution. If the UN is to develop an experienced staff which can provide continuity and institutional memory, core posts are required.
... In order to enable timely communications between these operations and New York Headquarters, a Situation Centre, operating around the clock, was established in April 1993. Still largely staffed by military officers loaned by Member States, its role is to improve and augment communications with UN operations around the world. It also assists other departments in discharging their responsibilities in the field. This includes the Departments of Humanitarian and Political Affairs, as well as the Office of the Security Coordinator, which is in the Department of Administration and Management and is responsible for policies and programmes to ensure the safety and security of non-military UN staff world-wide.
In late 1993, the nucleus of a Policy and Analysis Unit was established. The Unit acts as a think tank, providing in-depth research and analysis of policy questions within the Department's sphere of responsibility. It also gathers and assesses relevant studies and reports undertaken by intergovernmental, regional, national, governmental, or non-governmental organisations, maintaining liaison with counterparts from Member Governments and with scholars and independent policy analysts in research institutions and foundations.
As the Security Council in recent years has mandated operations in highly volatile settings where military expertise is essential, this aspect of the Department has been greatly enhanced. In 1991 there was a Military Advisor at the rank of Major-General, who was assisted by an Additional 3 officers. That was the sum total of military personnel at New York Headquarters. Today, the Military Adviser's Office consists of 4 and provides guidance to an additional 157 military officers working Department-wide.
With regard to the Department's over-all structure, two offices, each headed by an Assistant Secretary-General have been created: an Office of Operations and an Office of Planning and Support. The Office of Operations is divided into three regional divisions, each staffed with one or more political and military desk officers for each operation. This Office is responsible for the day-to-day executive direction of peacekeeping operations and other field missions. This requires maintaining contact with the parties to the conflict, with the members of the Security Council, with countries contributing personnel to an operation, and with other States having an interest in the conflict.
It is essential for the Office of Operations to provide the field with timely guidance on policy questions. To discharge this function effectively, its staff liaise closely with the Departments of Political and Humanitarian Affairs to ensure that communications with the field are coordinated, consistent and coherent. In this regard, there have been a number of innovations. First, the Secretary-General established in 1993 a High- Level Task Force on UN Operations, comprised of the Under-Secretaries-General of the relevant departments. Its purpose goes well beyond coordination and includes the formulation of integrated analysis and policy advice for the Secretary-General. The task force has a regularly scheduled weekly meeting and convenes more frequently in a crisis. Similarly at the working level, inter-departmental working groups have been established for particular operations. Finally, the three Departments have developed a framework for cooperation to ensure that information and early warning signals are shared in a timely manner, and that options for action are identified when appropriate.
The Office of Planning and Support is responsible for all technical matters, including staffing, finance, logistics and procurement, related to the planning and support of peacekeeping operations and other field missions. In addition to defining, developing and coordinating the development of plans for peacekeeping operations and other field missions, the Office of Planning and Support is also responsible for civilian police, demining and training activities.
An important part of this Office is the Mission Planning Service, established in mid-1993. It works with the close cooperation of other units of the Department, of specialists from other relevant departments of the Secretariat as well as the specialised agencies and non-governmental organisations, to design carefully integrated (civilian and military) plans for complex, multidimensional operations. Staff from the Mission Planning Service participate in technical missions sent in advance of an operation's establishment. The Service's first major task was to prepare a detailed plan for UNAVEM III, which helped the UN to deploy without delay once a political settlement had been reached and financing had been authorised. This exercise was also carried out successfully in preparing for the deployment of an expanded operation in Haiti earlier this year. This advance preparation represents a qualitative change in the Organisation's ability to respond quickly to assist parties to conflict to implement negotiated agreements. The concept is being further developed in concrete ways as the Department is now in the process of establishing, within the Mission Planning Service, an 8-10 person nucleus of a force headquarters. Once this team is in place it will be involved in planning an operation. It will then be dispatched to the field to provide initial staffing in the operational headquarters and to ensure that implementation begins in a timely manner and according to plan.
A closely related function of the Mission Planning Service is the establishment and management of a system of national stand-by forces and other capabilities which interested Member States maintain at an agreed state of readiness as a possible contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. As the name implies, they remain on standby in their home country. The decision as to whether or not these will be deployed in any given UN operation remains with their government.
The system of Standby Arrangements is still young (the concept having been developed in 1993.) However, important aspects of it are now in place, and it is being enhanced continuously as more States become involved. To date, 47 Member States have confirmed their willingness to participate in the Standby Arrangements System. Of these, 30 have already provided detailed lists of specific capabilities they would like to be included in the Stand-by Arrangements database. These capabilities add up to the equivalent of five fully equipped brigades of 4,000-5,000 persons, and all additional five brigades for which equipment, support services and support units would have to be found.
To be able to make optimal use of the Standby Arrangements, the Mission planning Service must have more than a list of capabilities. For planning purposes, what is required is detailed information such as the units' organisational structure, response times, air and sea lift volumetrics, as well as indications regarding equipment availability and requirements. This data enables the facilitation of rapid lift and deployment of these elements into a peacekeeping area. At this writing, eleven Member States have provided the requisite volumetric information and technical data that make this system work, and discussions are under way with a number of others. [SEE "POLICY DEBATES AND ISSUES" SECTION (THIS ISSUE) FOR MORE RECENT INFORMATION ON STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS]
A very recent innovation has been the establishment in DPKO of a Lessons-Learned Unit, to provide a greater capacity for in-depth study and analysis of experience, the conclusions of which can be applied to ongoing as well as future operations. A key element in this process is to elicit the insights of persons directly involved in operations, across the spectrum of components. Towards this end, the Unit in 1995 conducted lessons-learned seminars on the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The seminars brought together key personnel from UNOSOM, non-governmental organisations active in the mission area, and personnel who had been involved in the management and support of the operation at UN Headquarters in New York. In view of the usefulness of these pilot seminars, similar meetings will be organised on other major operations. The Lessons-Learned Unit will also coordinate the preparation and analysis of after-action reports and relevant research.
Within its limited resources, the Department works to promote standardised peacekeeping training among the many and diverse troop contributing countries. For these tasks, a small Training Unit was established in DPKO in 1992. In addition to serving as a clearing house of information on peacekeeping training activities, this unit has developed training materials and issued them to all Member States to assist them in preparing military personnel and civilian police, in accordance with agreed common standards, skills, practices and procedures, to participate in peacekeeping operations. Some of the key elements include a UN Military Observers course and handbook, a UN Civilian Police course and handbook, a Junior Ranks handbook, a Command and Staff College training module and a Peacekeeping training manual.
The Training Unit has recently established Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs), made up of experienced peacekeepers provided by Member States on an as-needed basis, to assist interested countries and regional institutions to develop training programmes to train national and regional trainers. These teams are also available to train headquarters staff of UN peacekeeping operations. To date, such exercises have been held for the headquarters staff of the UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti and Angola. These have been positive experiments assisting in the early integration of political, military, humanitarian and administrative personnel into a cohesive team.
In addition, with significant in-kind support from a number of Members, the Training Unit has recently initiated regional peacekeeping training workshops. Two were conducted in 1995 (for the Nordic countries and Latin America). On the basis of these successful pilot programmes, and taking into account the lessons learned from them, two additional workshops have been conducted in Africa and Asia in 1996.
The role of civilian police components has become increasingly important in many operations. In order to have the expertise to provide effective headquarters management of these activities, a Civilian Police Unit was established in the Department in 1993. In addition to advising the Department and field missions on operational police matters, the Unit is developing guidelines for the employment, conditions of service, training and administration of civilian police in peacekeeping operations.
Mine clearance has become an operational and humanitarian problem in many countries in which there are UN peacekeeping operations, which often carry out demining activities both as an operational necessity and as part of their over-all mission. The Demining Unit, since its establishment in 1992, has enabled the Department to provide more effective headquarters management of these activities. It advises on mine-clearing activities and develops integrated plans for demining programmes. Mines are now acknowledged as a major world problem, and the UN sets up and funds more mine clearance than any other world agency. The Demining Unit is a crucial part of this effort.
With a view to consolidating in one department the responsibility for the direction and support of operations, the division handling field administration and logistics (formerly known as the Field Operations Division) has been moved from the Department of Administration and Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The integration of this Divisions renamed as the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), into the Department's Office of Planning and Support strengthens the capacity of the UN to plan and manage field operations, and has ameliorated problems arising from dual channels of communication between headquarters and the field.
Another significant improvement in the area of logistical support has been the establishment of an equipment depot at Brindisi, Italy. The Organisation has been able to develop at Brindisi, with assets coming out of recently closed operations, start-up kits containing basic equipment and supplies to initiate and sustain the non-military components of a peacekeeping operation until its own systems are operative. To give an example of what this means in practical terms, let us look at the continent of Africa. Start-up kits and other equipment pre-positioned at Brindisi can be moved to virtually any African port capable of handling ocean-going ships in less than three weeks. This has been very valuable in the establishment of UNAVEM III in Angola.
In sum, as the number, size and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations have increased, demands on the Department have gone up dramatically. The Department has managed a structured, prudent, and gradual expansion in order to meet these demands in a concerted and coherent manner. It began by establishing a sound skeletal structure to which, bit by bit, flesh has been added.
While the Department was being strengthened, so were the channels of communication among members of the Security Council, troop contributing countries, and the Secretariat. These improvements were essential. Decisions on mandates and overall policy regarding peacekeeping operations are in the competence of the Security Council, while implementation of those decisions is the purview of the Secretary-General and the chief of mission. Without prejudice to the authority of any of these officials, there is a practical necessity to engage the troop contributors in dialogue in order to establish clear understandings about the mandate, strategy and methods of the mission. The Secretariat, therefore, now holds regular meetings with the troop contributors for each operation (in addition to the long-standing and natural practice of being fully accessible for informal, bilateral discussions with individual governments). These meetings are not limited to briefings about recent events but are an opportunity for substantive discussion of operational questions. More recently, at the political as opposed to operational level, the practice has emerged of the President of the Security Council and a representative of the Secretary-General co-chairing meetings with troop contributors at key points in the life of a peacekeeping operation. These developments have been welcomed by all concerned.
In terms of further strengthening the UN's peacekeeping instrument for the twenty-first century, what additional capacities will be required for success? First, the military expertise of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations must be strengthened and placed on a firmer footing. This involves, first and foremost, developing a general staff in the Military Adviser's Office of DPKO. This permanent core of military expertise could be relatively lean (but not skeletal) and could be supplemented by loaned officers when faced with a need for surge capacity. The work of the general staff must be thoroughly integrated with that of the Secretariat's political, humanitarian, and relevant administrative personnel. It must have a greater capacity, first, to conduct feasibility studies of achievable options for the Secretary-General to present to the Security Council for its consideration; second, to translate mandates into achievable concepts of operations; third, to provide timely guidance and support to the field on military matters; and fourth, to enable the Secretary-General to give timely and meaningful feedback to the Council. Fulfilling these tasks responsibly will require a professional capacity for the lawful gathering, analysis, and reporting of intelligence. This will be essential to an adequate appreciation of what the Operation will encounter in murky, complex situations. While much of the information already exists in the public domain and in the greater UN system, intelligence sharing by Member States during the planning and implementation stages is essential, as is a properly stated, analytical unit at Headquarters. Information without analysis is not useful. Properly analysed, however, information is a vital tool for the planning and management of operations.
On the basis of a realistic understanding of the situation on the ground and the turns it could take, UN operations will require appropriate capabilities upon deployment: the right force structure to be able to carry out the mandate and to protect the operation. Ready access to cohesive, mobile, well-trained forces will also be crucial. The UN Stand-by Arrangements System which is now being developed is a step in the right direction and could be enhanced by some of the "rapid deployment" initiatives which are now being explored by the Members. Such systems, of course, are only as strong as the political will of the Members to make them work.
Finally, the Secretariat must have the capacity to manage the non-coercive aspects of inducement, which is a complex undertaking and which will require closer integration of different functional units of the Organisation. The use of limited incentives to promote conflict resolution can only be effective if the nature and complexity of the conflict is understood. Is it a deeply-rooted societal conflict? Does it make sense to try to rebuild the failed state, or to restore civil society under different institutions? Who are the parties, what are their interests, values, fears, strengths and weaknesses? Most importantly, what do they want and need in order to move politics from the battlefield to legitimate institutions, and how can the international community best support them in that endeavour. Only on the basis of this type of information can one enunciate a coherent strategy, realistic objectives and plan of action.
For decades if not centuries, these kinds of questions have been routinely posed by persons involved in negotiations of inter-state conflicts, but in intra-state violence the answers are sometimes harder to determine. The ability to do so requires not only traditional politico-military and economic skills. It also requires expertise in intra-societal politics and an ability to draw in country specialists with a detailed knowledge of local structures, values, needs and interests. Again a serious intelligence capacity will be required. It is as essential for the formulation and implementation of a successful political strategy as it is for the safety and effectiveness of the military component.
Conclusion
Conflict is as old as nature, and man's inhumanity to man surely predates recorded history. In the current era, unless and until a government or group of governments can be identified that is prepared to take on the role of global police, UN peace operations will in many cases be the only instrument available. This has been demonstrated repeatedly over the last few years, during which the UN, responding both to political and moral imperatives, has become increasingly involved in intra-state conflicts. The Organisation must face this reality by adapting and learning to do things differently, and by strengthening its machinery so as better to serve the world. None of this can be accomplished without both vision and investment.
In this partial lull which has resulted from the closure or scaling down of a few operations, we have a unique opportunity. We should take advantage of this relatively quiet period for UN peacekeeping, which will be ephemeral at best, to build on the Organisational achievements of the last few years. The greatest danger is that we will do the opposite, dismantling what has been accomplished in the name of short-term savings. This would be penny wise and pound foolish. One need not follow world affairs very closely to understand that new and challenging operations could be on the horizon.
In the conflicts plaguing the world today and into the foreseeable future, standard requirements for success will include a reliable capacity for the lawful gathering and analysis of intelligence; credible risk and threat analysis prior to deployment, and a capacity to plan on the basis of appropriate force structures which are capable of achieving the mandate and of self-protection. The Organisation must have reliable access to such forces adequately equipped for their task and trained to certain common standards. They must be fielded with rules of engagement which are realistic in the context of the specific mandate and mission area. They must operate within an effective command and control structure in which troop contributing countries place a high degree of confidence. (On this latter point, the strengthening of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, together with recent innovations to enhance opportunities for consultation among troop contributing countries, Security Council members, and the Secretariat, provide an important foundation on which to build). UN operations must be able to utilise the appropriate mix of coercion and reward - sticks and carrots - for managing and resolving conflicts. Finally, and crucially, they must be properly prepared to carry out the most challenging tasks in a manner which may sometimes be tough but must always be fair, upholding the Organisation's legitimacy and credibility, its indispensable assets.
NOTES
1. This term was coined by Don Daniels and Bradd Hays, whose ideas, to be published shortly in the journal International Peacekeeping, have contributed to part of the discussion below. Their emphasis is primarily on the coercive dimension of inducement.
Conflict Resolution Monitor: Issue 1, Summer 1997
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Last Update: 12/06/1997
Yuka Hasegawa