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A DIGEST OF NEWS AND DOCUMENTS ON CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING
CONTENTS
The Conflict Resolution Monitor (CRM) is produced by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. CRM replaces International Peacekeeping News. Many of the features of International Peacekeeping News are retained, but we have broadened the focus in order to cover developments in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Our concern is to provide information and ideas which will be relevant to the international humanitarian community, faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. CRM provides information about peacekeeping deployments and peacekeeping policy debates, and lists conferences, research and publications, and training events. Our Commentary section provides short commentaries from experts and practitioners, and in this issue we are pleased to feature an article by Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Wilkinson (MBE) entitled The Development of British Peace Support Operation's Doctrine. This contributes to issues raised by Kofi Annan in the previous edition of CRM, presenting new thinking in the emerging doctrine of the British armed forces.
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UNDPI MONUA MISSION UPDATE
Function
On 30 June 1997, the Security Council established, by resolution 1118 (1997), the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), operational as of 1 July. Established as a follow on mission to succeed UNAVEM III, MONUA is to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country. The initial mandate of MONUA will extend to 31 October 1997, with the expectation that the mission will be completed by 1 February 1998.
MONUA is mandated to work towards completion of the demobilisation process, incorporation of ex-combatants of the [União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola] (UNITA) into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the Angolan National Police, integration of UNITA personnel in all levels of State administration, elimination of all the impediments to free circulation of people and goods, as well as the disarmament of the civilian population.
With the withdrawal of UN military personnel and the gradual normalisation of State administration over the country, the report states, the mission's civilian police component would continue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, as well as the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police. The unit would monitor the collection of weapons from civilians, supervise their proper storage or destruction and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. After the withdrawal of the main infantry units by August/September, a reduced number of military observers would be retained in Angola to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches.
Background
... In setting up MONUA, the Council called upon the Government of Angola and, in particular, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to cooperate fully with MONUA. It strongly urged the Government of Angola and UNITA to complete the remaining political and military aspects of the peace process.
The Council expressed the hope that issues now delaying the full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol may be resolved through a meeting on Angolan national territory of the President of Angola and the leader of the largest opposition party. It urged the international community to provide assistance to the demobilisation of combatants and their social reintegration and the reconstruction of the national economy in order to consolidate the gains in the peace process.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief Of Mission: Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali)
Force Commander: Major-General Phillip Valerio Sibanda (Zimbabwe)
UNSG'S REPORT, 13 AUGUST (S/1997/640)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Political Aspects
"During the past two and one-half months, the Angolan peace process continued to experience serious difficulties. In view of the deteriorating military situation and the continued delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol ... I addressed letters on 3 July 1997 to the President of Angola, Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, and to the leader of ... UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, expressing my serious concern at the increase in tensions in the north-eastern provinces and at the delay in the extension of State administration throughout the country.
On 4 August 1997, my Special Representative and the representatives of the observer States reviewed the new programme for the normalisation of State administration throughout Angola, which had been submitted by UNITA the previous day, but found the proposals unacceptable.
Since my last report to the Council, no significant progress has been made in the normalisation of State administration throughout Angola owing to the lack of cooperation on the part of UNITA, which until recently was attempting to link the resumption of this process with improvement in the overall military situation. It should be noted that, although the Government had declared its intention to resume the functions of normalisation throughout the country on 25 July 1997, it has so far refrained from taking unilateral measures in this regard.
... The long-awaited transformation of UNITA's radio VORGAN into a non-partisan station has not progressed ... Regrettably, after some reduction in hostile propaganda, there has recently been a noticeable increase in such broadcasts ... Some of the propaganda broadcast over radio VORGAN was aimed at UN staff and other international personnel working in Angola. There have been several instances of physical attacks against MONUA personnel and staff of non-governmental organisations, despite assurances by Mr. Savimbi and repeated public statements by the political organs of UNITA that these actions would cease. Furthermore, restrictions on the movement of MONUA observers in several strategic areas, particularly by UNITA, but in some cases also by the FAA, have prevented the Mission from fully carrying out its verification and observation tasks.
Military Aspects
a) Observance of the cease-fire
The military situation is currently characterised by persistent tensions affecting almost the entire country, but in particular the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Malange. During the reporting period, the mobilisation of troops and military equipment, conscription and an increase in hostile propaganda continued to be registered. Reports were received and verified of several attacks by UNITA on Government positions, including in Lunda Norte province, as well as of attacks by some elements of FAA and the Civil Defence Corps on villages in Huíla province. The most serious of these attacks, which were perpetrated by UNITA in Lunda Norte at Posto de Fronteira Nordeste on 2 July and at Posto de Fronteira Muaquesse on 24 July 1997, were subsequently condemned by the Joint Commission. In the former incident, UNITA forces razed to the ground a village of approximately 150 inhabitants, while the latter attack resulted in the death of several civilians and the burning of houses. Large-scale last-minute changes in the destination of demobilised ex-UNITA troops and the renewed recruitment and deployment of these personnel at strategic locations controlled by UNITA, such as Dambi near Uíge, Cuima and Vinte Cinco in the area of Huambo, and Gungue near Caconda, underline the gravity of the deteriorating situation.
The theft, in July 1997, of 300 kilograms of explosives belonging to a demining brigade at Cazombo in a zone controlled by UNITA, and the landing of over 120 flights between 1 and 30 July at UNITA-controlled airstrips scattered throughout the central and eastern parts of the country, which MONUA was not allowed to verify, are clear indications of extensive military preparations. Planting of new mines in UNITA-controlled areas has also been reported ... Both parties, but especially UNITA, have continued to impose restrictions on MONUA verification activities.
b) Accomplishment of military tasks
With regard to the fulfilment of pressing military tasks, after seven months of delaying tactics, UNITA finally submitted to MONUA, on 21 July 1997, information regarding Mr. Savimbi's security guard and the so-called "mining police", citing the total strength of both forces as 2,963 personnel ... [however] my Special Representative [Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye] and the representatives of the observer States issued a statement, on 22 July, rejecting the information provided by UNITA, on the grounds that it was neither complete nor credible.
... On 10 July 1997, the Government held a ceremony in Luanda to mark the completion of the formation of the FAA ... A total of 10,899 UNITA troops, including generals and other senior officers, have been incorporated into the FAA. This number, however, falls far short of the originally planned figure of 26,300 UNITA personnel who were expected to be incorporated into the national armed forces.
c) Status of the military component of MONUA
... I have decided, upon the recommendation of Mr. Beye and the MONUA Force Commander, to further adjust the drawdown of the Mission's military units. As a result, although the Brazilian infantry, engineering and medical units are expected to be repatriated in mid-August 1997, it is envisaged that MONUA will retain some 2,650 military personnel until the end of October. As currently planned, this downsizing, including that of the Mission's rapid reaction force, would resume at the end of October and would be completed in November 1997. The Brazilian medical units would be replaced by a military medical hospital provided by Portugal.
... In the meantime, given the scope of its mandated tasks, MONUA has had, once again, to redeploy several military contingents within the Mission area. If the demobilisation process does not proceed expeditiously, the military contingent of MONUA will not be capable of coping with the complex tasks still entrusted to it; this could jeopardise the implementation of the overall mandate of the Mission as well as the security and safety of UN personnel and property. The current strength of the Mission's military units is already barely sufficient to perform these absolutely essential functions, and would not be adequate in the event of further deterioration of the security situation in Angola.
Police Aspects
... The selection and integration of UNITA elements into the police has been concluded. A total of 524 UNITA personnel were selected for integration and 437 of them have been incorporated. In addition, of the 212 ex-UNITA officers selected to serve as government bodyguards to UNITA leaders, 178 have been actually incorporated into the police. UNITA also recently submitted a list of 22 senior officers for induction, all of whom have already arrived in Luanda.
Human Rights Aspects: Relief and Rehabilitation
Persistent tensions have resulted in increased insecurity in many parts of the country and have affected the activities of UN humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations. The present security situation has already caused a shift in the focus from reconstruction and development to emergency assistance operations. Armed clashes have resulted in the displacement of more than 10,000 people in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, and joint UN/non-governmental organisation assessment missions have been conducted in order to respond to their needs. ... Owing to the prevalent conditions on the ground, staff of the UN and international non-governmental organisations have been unable to gain access to thousands of refugees who are reportedly stranded in several UNITA-controlled areas; despite numerous requests, UN agencies have not been granted necessary clearance.
Demobilisation
... Demobilisation activities have been proceeding at a markedly slower pace than originally envisaged owing to the strained political and military atmosphere. The hostile attitude of local UNITA commanders and some officers of the Angolan National Police towards demobilisation activities persists. As at 10 August 1997, a total of 21,175 UNITA soldiers have been demobilised within the framework of the rapid demobilisation plan. It should be recalled that 2,124 UNITA and 330 FAA under-age troops were demobilised before the beginning of the plan, which brings the total demobilised soldiers in Angola to 23,629. The first phase of demobilisation was successfully concluded in mid-June, with the closure of five selection and demobilisation centres and one military war disabled centre. The second phase of demobilisation was also completed by mid-July, with the closure of three other selection and demobilisation centres and two military war disabled centres. Even though demobilisation activities have now been completed in the Catala selection and demobilisation centre and are ongoing in the Chitembo centre, there are still five selection and demobilisation centres where demobilisation has yet to commence.
... The financial status of the demobilisation process remains a matter of great concern. Out of total requirements of $ 56.6 million, only $16.4 million has been received so far. In addition, only $5.5 million of the $26 million requested by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for demobilisation activities has been received, undermining this crucial effort.
Demining
There have been worrisome reports from international demining non-governmental organisations and the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE) indicating a trend towards the resumption of mine laying in some parts of the country. ... During the reporting period, UNITA imposed additional restrictions on survey and other demining activities by international non-governmental organisations and INAROE.
Socio-Economic Aspects
The economic situation in the country remained very critical, reflecting the overall slowdown in economic activities.
Observations
... it is my intention, with the concurrence of the Security Council, to further postpone the withdrawal of the UN military units from Angola and to retain in the country up to 2,650 military personnel until the end of October 1997. In taking this step, I have considered the prevailing precarious situation in Angola, the incomplete nature of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the need to give the parties an additional chance to complete the peace process, as well as the need to ensure the security of UN and other international personnel in Angola. I have also taken into account the expressed wish of the Government of Angola to maintain in the country a sizeable UN presence until the demobilisation process is over".
Contributions, as at 10 August 1997:
Bangladesh: 10 (MO), 22 (CP), 93 (Tr), 125 (T); Brazil: 19 (MO), 14 (CP), 3 (SO), 45 (Tr), 81(T); Bulgaria: 10 (MO), 21 (CP), 31 (T); Congo: 4 (MO), 4 (T); Egypt 10 (MO), 19 (CP), 1 (SO), 30 (T); France: 7 (MO), 10 (SO), 17 (T); Guinea Bissau: 3 (MO), 4 (CP), 7 (T); Hungary: 10 (MO), 8 (CP), 18 (T); India: 21(MO),11 (CP), 36 (SO), 407 (Tr), 475 (T); Jordan: 17 (MO), 21 (CP), 1 (SO), 39 (T); Kenya: 10 (MO), 10 (T); Malaysia 19 (MO), 20 (CP), 39 (T); Mali: 9 (MO), 15 (CP), 24 (T); Namibia: 196 (Tr), 196 (T); Netherlands: 2 (SO), 2 (T); New Zealand: 3 (MO), 4 (SO), 7 (T); Nigeria: 16 (MO), 21 (CP), 37 (T); Norway 3 (MO), 3 (T); Pakistan 3 (MO), 13 (SO), 16 (T); Poland: 5 (MO), 5 (T); Portugal: 5 (MO), 38 (CP), 2 (SO), 313 (Tr), 358 (T); Romania: 1(SO), 150 (Tr), 151 (T); Russian Federation: 3 (MO), 2 (SO), 130 (Tr), 135 (T); Senegal: 10 (MO), 10 (T); Slovakia: 5 (MO), 5 (T); Sweden: 3 (MO), 20 (CP), 23 (T); Ukraine 5 (MO), 1 (SO), 1 (Tr), 7 (T); United Republic of Tanzania: 3 (CP), 3 (T); Uruguay: 3 (MO), 15 (CP), 5 (SO), 23 (T); Zambia: 8 (MO), 15 (CP), 6 (SO), 498 (Tr), 527 (T); Zimbabwe: 16 (MO), 22 (CP), 26 (SO), 675 (Tr), 739 (T); Total (T): 3,147, comprising: 237 Military Observers (MO), 274 Civilian Police (CP), 113 Staff Officers (SO), 2,508 Troops (Tr).
UNITA PREPARES FOR WAR
Former UNITA officer, Major Miguel Florentino Sawimbu, on 31 August, stated that UNITA recruited a considerable number of foreign mercenaries in order to restart the civil war in Angola. He asserted that foreign military advisers, based at Katodi near the Congolese border, also possessed a large quantity of arms, and that UNITA combat units were concentrated in Andulo, Central Angola and Mussende.
Similarly, the Luanda Antena Commercial (LAC) radio station, on 3 September, accused Moroccan mercenaries of training UNITA fighters at the organisation's headquarters in Bailundo. Former UNITA Secretary-General, General Eugenio Manuvakola, a signatory of the November 1994 Lusaka peace accord, recently abandoned Bailundo. He denounced UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's preparations for resuming violence, and the authoritarian methods of the government. Manuvakola left on the same day that sanctions were imposed against UNITA by the Security Council for failing to comply with the Lusaka accords [see Documentation and Sources on Angola]. The embargo restricts travel by UNITA members, as well as flights in or out of UNITA-controlled regions, and is scheduled to be enforced on 30 September. Should UNITA still not fully comply with the accords, further measures, such as trade and financial restrictions, will be considered by the Security Council. Diamonds mined from UNITA-held territory in north-eastern Angola are the organisation's principal source of income. The resolution demands that UNITA close its offices around the world, provide the UN with information about the whereabouts of any as yet unidentified opposition fighters, and convert its Vorgan radio station into an unbiased broadcasting facility. At least 30,000 former UNITA troops deserted from UN camps earlier in September.
The Security Council's measures are the culmination of a series of warnings against UNITA, which has been fighting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government since Angola achieved independence in 1975. Savimbi rejected the outcome of the country's first multi-party elections in 1992, after which violence resumed until the 1994 peace accords.
ANGOLA ATTRACTS WORLD GAZE
An ANN report stated that Angola was increasingly attracting international attention, with the US leading efforts to assist the Angolan government achieve peace. The report said that Washington saw peace as the principal factor in encouraging foreign investment in Angola. Senior officials from foreign governments, intent on promoting bilateral cooperation ties, and 39 US businesspeople, eager to invest in Angolan oil, mining, fisheries, and telecommunications, paid unprecedented successive visits to the country during the first two weeks of September.
The US is perceived as the decisive regulator and manager of events in Angola. Therefore, the week-long tour of businesspeople was seen in Luanda as a hopeful sign from Washington at the outcome of the Angola peace process. Political analysts have interpreted the tour as support both for the peace process, and, in particular, the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. This has reportedly annoyed UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who had previously enjoyed American patronism for a number of years.
The ANN report stated that UNITA was interpreting the tour as a means of pressuring it into accelerating implementation and completion of the Lusaka protocol. According to the report, Washington had received information that UNITA was re-opening secret airbases in regions under its military jurisdiction, and was equipping them for impending military action. Consequently, Washington intended to supply the Angolan government with military assistance, including sophisticated air equipment.
US Ambassador to Angola, Donald Steinberg, denied that the US supported actions by any Angolan party which might encourage the resumption of violence. However, US expert in African affairs, Professor Gerard Bender, asserted that a group of American soldiers who had previously proved effective in Bosnia, had met with the Angolan government concerning training the Armed Forces. The report declared that, since UNITA is prepared to resume fighting, Washington would now find it difficult to supply the government with military aid as a means of dissuading Savimbi from his military plans. Bender asserted that supporters of Savimbi in the US Senate no longer enjoyed sufficient influence to prevent President Bill Clinton from adopting a tougher stance against UNITA.
Portugal, Russia, and the US comprise a troika of observers on the Angolan peace process. Portugal stated that, with about two weeks until the sanctions deadline was to expire, UNITA had made no concrete attempts to prevent the embargo being applied. Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Jose Lamego, reaffirmed that his government would close all UNITA offices in Lisbon if it did not comply with the Security Council resolutions.
UNSG'S REPORT, 15 JULY (S/1997/547)
The present report covers the main developments that have occurred since 2 November 1996.
Political Situation
... During the period under review, the political situation in Burundi continued to reflect the deep divisions within and between the country's leading political movements, the polarising influence of militant extremist groups at both ends of the political spectrum, the adverse effects on the security situation of events in former Zaire, Burundi's efforts to end international isolation brought about by the sanctions, and the lack of an agreed mechanism for negotiations acceptable to all the principal actors ... Divisions within the two main political parties, their rivalry and the constraints imposed on their work by the Government, have continued to feed animosities. The Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), [including the] Conseil National de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), seems unable to overcome its internal divisions. The same is true of the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) ... These divisions are exacerbated by the hard-line Parti Pour le Redressement National (PARENA).
The continuing hostility between political parties continues to prevent progress in the national debate advocated by the Government, and to hamper international efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table. Extremists on both sides continue to disrupt reconciliation efforts by threatening and undermining the President. Anti-Buyoya sentiments culminated in mid-March 1997 with the discovery of an assassination plot against the President.
Security Situation
Since November 1996, the security situation has continued to be affected both by political developments inside Burundi and by military and political developments in the subregion. ... With the advance of the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) in eastern Zaire and the consequent elimination of rear bases of armed Hutu rebels close to the Burundi-Zaire border, the security situation in Burundi gradually improved during the first months of 1997, though strong pockets of rebels remained within the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) near Fizi, Kalemie and Moba - enabling them to launch operations against targets in Burundi, including the Government's military strongholds of Bururi and Makamba provinces. Overall, however, the massive movement of Hutu rebels along the western shores of Lake Tanganyika and across the Lake into the United Republic of Tanzania ultimately caused a shift in rebel operations towards the south. The resulting rebel infiltration from the United Republic of Tanzania into the southern provinces of Burundi caused a rift between the two Governments, with accusations that the United Republic of Tanzania was not only harbouring rebels but actively supporting the insurgency. These accusations have been denied by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.
Human Rights
On 14 June 1997, President Buyoya publicly called for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for Burundi, in order to try the instigators and perpetrators of acts of genocide that followed the October 1993 coup. In response to a recent letter addressed to me by the Government of Burundi on the creation of an international tribunal, I replied that given the circumstances prevailing in Burundi I was not in a position to recommend to the Security Council the establishment of such a tribunal at the present time.
Humanitarian Situation
The extensive fighting in the north and south of the country has displaced a significant proportion of the population and made it difficult for humanitarian aid agencies to conduct a consistent and effective relief programme. At the same time, landmines have become an increasingly pervasive source of danger to aid workers and civilians alike.
... As far as refugees are concerned, about 130,000 have returned since 1996. While many of these refugees have returned spontaneously to safe areas in Burundi, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that 150 to 200 are fleeing daily from the Bururi and Makamba provinces to the United Republic of Tanzania out of fear of being caught in the fighting in these provinces.
Mediation Efforts
National and international political mediation efforts have continued throughout the period under review, and although some important positive developments have taken place, a significant breakthrough has yet to be achieved. Mediation efforts have followed three linked but distinct tracks: the ongoing regional mediation effort led by former Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere; the talks between the Government and CNDD under the auspices of the San'Egidio Community in Rome; and the more recent United Nations and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) decision to appoint a Joint UN/OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region.
Former President Nyerere remains the principal international Mediator for the conflict in Burundi, and the focal point for international efforts to achieve a cease-fire and bring about comprehensive political negotiations among the parties ... At a meeting in Lomé, during the course of the Summit Meeting of the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, held on 26 and 27 March 1997, President Buyoya made the case for lifting the sanctions. To all of his interlocutors, he conveyed his strong belief that sanctions not only hurt the more vulnerable segments of the population, but also hindered national reconciliation and strengthened the extremists.
... [T]he Fourth Arusha Regional Summit ... convened on 16 April 1997 to review economic sanctions against Burundi ... attended by President Buyoya, called upon the Government of Burundi and all the parties to the conflict to take steps to urgently create the necessary environment for negotiations and national reconciliation. The Summit also decided to ease some of the sanctions and agreed on the need to ensure the speedy and efficient implementation of the exemptions provided for humanitarian assistance. The participants declared their readiness to suspend all sanctions once there was movement in the negotiations. At a follow-up meeting, on 10 May 1997, in Kampala, no agreement was reached on the list of products to be exempted from the regional sanctions regime. At the end of June, the Government of Burundi expressed its disappointment that sanctions had still not been eased, and its concern that the embargo was exacerbating tensions in the country. On 27 June, the Government of Kenya decided to lift the fuel and travel embargo against Burundi, for humanitarian reasons.
... While discussions on sanctions and their possible relaxation were going on, representatives of the Government and CNDD were engaged, with the blessing of Mwalimu Nyerere, in direct secret talks under the auspices of the San'Egidio Community in Rome. Despite a difficult start and after various problems had been overcome, the two-party talks concentrated on the need to stop the fighting in Burundi and to secure a permanent cease-fire. On 10 March 1997, both parties agreed on the broad agenda that should guide their talks. The agenda included the following items:
(a) The restoration of constitutional and institutional order;
(b) Issues related to the Burundi armed forces and police;
(c) The suspension of hostilities;
(d) The administration of justice, including the creation of an international criminal tribunal to try acts of genocide and political crimes;
(e) The identification and involvement of other parties in the negotiation process;
(f) A permanent cease-fire;
(g) Guarantees for the respect and the implementation of the agreement.
The public announcement on 13 May of the agreement and confirmation of the secret talks between the Government and CNDD drew harsh criticism from many sectors of Burundi society, across the political spectrum. Those not represented in Rome felt excluded from the discussions, which they felt should have taken place in a wider, multi-party environment. Trade unions, student organisations and some political groups condemned the talks out of fear that concessions made to the Hutu opposition, particularly CNDD, might compromise their own political viability".
BURUNDIAN TALKS BREAKDOWN
Burundi's military ruler, Pierre Buyoya, withdrew from peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, on 25 August, causing them to be postponed. The negotiations were intended to end four years of conflict in Burundi, in which nearly 200,000 people have been killed. FRODEBU leader, Jean Minani, stated that he had no confidence in Buyoya. FRODEBU successfully contested elections in 1993, before the murder of Burundi's first Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, induced internal conflict in October of the same year.
Buyoya withdrew from the negotiations at the last minute, accusing Tanzanian mediator and former president, Julius Nyerere, of bias against his regime. Delegates from CNDD, the principal Hutu organisation with fighters active within Burundi, supported Nyerere's decision to postpone the talks, stating that negotiations could not proceed without representation from the Tutsi-dominated army. CNDD spokesperson, Jerome Ndiho, complained about the lack of consistency from Buyoya's regime, which, two years ago, had pressed for Nyerere to be mediator.
Bujumbura has accused Dar es Salaam of sheltering Hutu extremists in refugee camps near the border between Tanzania and Burundi. The two countries have been adopting increasingly hostile stances towards each other. Former Foreign Minister, Jakaya Kikwete, warned that Tanzania would react if Burundi attempted to attack the refugee camps. There were reports in August that Tanzanians had been killed by Burundian soldiers near the north-western border with Burundi, prompting protestations from the Tanzanian government.
UNSC MULLS PK FORCE FOR CONGO
UN Security Council President, Peter Osvald (Sweden), announced that there had been general agreement amongst Council members to deploy a peacekeeping force to the Republic of Congo, where 30,000 people have been killed and 20,000 others displaced from their homes during more than a month of violence. Osvald declared that members were willing to act quickly in response to proposals made by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. A PANA report stated that a number of African and Asian countries, including Botswana, Senegal and Bangladesh, were willing to contribute troops to the mission, and the government of Congolese President, Pascal Lissouba, has offered $1 million. The fighting was brought on by a violent clash between troops loyal to Lissouba, and private militias supporting former military ruler, Denis Sassou Nguesso, on 5 June.
UN Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Mohammed Sahnoun, asserted that the presence of a multinational peacekeeping force in the area would help to stabilise the situation. Sahnoun declared that the force, likely to be 1,000-strong, was required to monitor a cease-fire, protect the airport in Brazzaville, and prevent arms and additional troops from entering the country. He added that the deployment of the force would help to ease tension across the whole region, particularly concerning the adjacent Democratic Republic of Congo, which has threatened to react if artillery shells fired from Brazzaville continued to hit Kinshasa.
UNSG'S REPORT, 13 AUGUST (S/1997/643)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Political Aspects: Elections Successfully Held
"The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1116 (1997) of 27 June 1997, in which the Council extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 30 September 1997, in the expectation that it would terminate on that date.
The Liberian peace process came to a successful conclusion during the reporting period with the holding of presidential and legislative elections on 19 July 1997, as scheduled, and the installation of the new Government on 2 August 1997. The electoral process and the installation of a democratically elected Government constituted the last item on the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement (S/1995/742, annex) under the peace plan for Liberia of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
... the entire electoral process was organised and conducted by the Liberian Independent Elections Commission in an impartial and transparent manner, with the assistance of UNOMIL, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the European Union (EU) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems ... States members of ECOWAS, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), donor countries and the Liberian Council of State provided generous financial, material and technical assistance.
The Joint Electoral Coordination Mechanism of ECOWAS and the UN, which was established during the reporting period, greatly assisted in the harmonisation of electoral preparations.
... A total of 13 political parties fielded candidates for the presidential and legislative elections. The parties started their electoral campaigning on 16 June 1997, as scheduled under the electoral calendar. The campaign was conducted without major incidents of violence or intimidation, and the Liberian people were able freely to associate themselves with political parties of their choice. The Independent Elections Commission, having investigated the few incidents reported to it, determined that there was no evidence to suggest organised or widespread acts of violence or intimidation.
The final result of the election was announced on 24 July, giving the National Patriotic Party (NPP) 75.3 per cent, the Unity Party (UP) 9.5 per cent and the All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP) 4 per cent of the national vote. The Alliance and United People's Party (UPP) each received approximately 2.5 per cent, while the remaining eight parties received less than 2 per cent of the vote each. Voter turnout for the election was approximately 85 per cent of registered voters.
Mr. Charles Ghankay Taylor was elected President, and his National Patriotic Party won 21 of the 26 Senate seats, and 49 of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives. UP leads the opposition with three and seven seats in each chamber respectively. ALCOP entered, and subsequently withdrew, a formal complaint about irregularities in the conduct of elections in three counties and the allocation of seats, the modalities of which had previously been agreed upon by all the political parties and which were provided for in the electoral law. To date, ALCOP and UPP have not filled their seats in the legislature and continue to dispute the method of allocation of seats.
On 2 August 1997, Mr. Taylor was inaugurated as President of Liberia, and Mr. Enoch Dogolea as Vice-President.
... UNOMIL has now begun withdrawing its personnel from Liberia. The bridging activities designed as an interim measure to absorb demobilised combatants have been transferred from the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office to the relevant agencies and are now being dovetailed into the reintegration programme.
... On 3 August, my Special Envoy and my Special Representative for Liberia were received by President Taylor ... [who] requested the assistance of the UN in mobilising international support for the reconstruction of his country. He expressed his desire for a continued UN presence following the termination of the UNOMIL mandate on 30 September.
Military Aspects
Relative peace and stability have continued to prevail throughout Liberia since the issuance of my previous report, dated 19 June 1997 (S/1997/478). The electoral campaigns of the political parties and the polling process were conducted in a secure environment guaranteed by ECOMOG.
... The situation in Sierra Leone remains a potential threat to Liberia's stability. Outbreaks of heavy fighting on 6 and 10 July 1997 in south-eastern Sierra Leone, just across the border from the Liberian town of Bo Waterside, caused an influx of a large number of refugees into Liberia. The refugees included about 200 Kamajor militiamen, who were disarmed by ECOMOG. The fighting also resulted in casualties among Liberian civilians, who were evacuated by UNOMIL to hospitals in Monrovia. During the fighting, the UNOMIL field station at Bo was relocated to Sinje.
There has been no increase in the cumulative total of arms and ammunition recovered and verified by UNOMIL from the totals mentioned in my previous report. However, ECOMOG has reported that its cordon-and-search operations have led to the recovery of approximately 3,750 additional assorted weapons and 152,500 pieces of ammunition since the end of the official disarmament exercise in February. UNOMIL is currently discussing with the new Government and ECOMOG the issue of the custody of the weapons collected during the official disarmament exercise. UNOMIL has now closed its field stations and has begun to repatriate the military observers. As at 15 August, 59 of the 93 military observers had been repatriated
Human Rights
During the period under review, UNOMIL conducted a series of assessment missions to monitor the human rights situation in the countryside. No major human rights violations committed by Liberians were confirmed during these missions.
Humanitarian Aspects
Emergency needs in Liberia are likely to continue to be great for the remainder of the year. At the same time, UN agencies, non-governmental organisations and major donors are reorienting their activities better to address longer-term rehabilitation requirements in agriculture, education, health and infrastructure.
... The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has updated its operational plan for the repatriation and reintegration of Liberian refugees. The expected increase in stability following the elections is likely to prompt greater numbers of refugees to return, and UNHCR will continue to facilitate voluntary repatriation.
There are an estimated 130,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia. UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) provide care and maintenance for an estimated 30,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Montserrado County (Monrovia) and about 10,000 in Grand Cape Mount County. As a result of the situation in Sierra Leone, UNHCR has now halted all assistance to voluntary repatriation to that country.
... Despite several initial problems emanating from a lack of funds or delays in providing funds, together with coordination difficulties, the bridging programme has played a crucial role in the peace process of Liberia by employing approximately 15,000 ex-fighters ... This has kept them away from activities that could have undermined security during the electoral process. Bridging projects have also assisted in the restoration of essential services, such as schools, clinics, agriculture and public works, to many localities and in the rehabilitation of several rural roads and bridges.
Economic and Social Aspects
Since the end of the disarmament exercise in February 1997, UN agencies have been major partners in the consolidation of peace and preparations for the return to normality in Liberia. Their activities are now focusing on two main areas: the resettlement and reintegration of the population, and the preparation of a rehabilitation and reconstruction plan.
The UN, through its Secretariat and specialised agencies and programmes, including UNDP, the Department for Development Support and Management Services, the International Labour Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN, is working closely with ministries of the Liberian Government on a number of projects designed to restore government functions and create jobs. Furthermore, given their paramount importance in the recovery of the country, the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare and Education are being provided with additional resources to complete an assessment of the rehabilitation needs for their respective sectors.
Financial Aspects
In its resolution 51/3 C of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $20,447,100 gross to be assessed at a monthly rate of $1,703,925 gross ($1,576,525 net) for the maintenance of UNOMIL for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998, subject to the extension of the mandate of UNOMIL by the Security Council. Based on Security Council resolution 1116 (1997), assessments on Member States have been made until 30 September 1997. Upon the expiration of the mandate of UNOMIL, the resource requirements for its liquidation and administrative closing will be presented to the Assembly.
As at 30 June 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to some $16.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at 30 June 1997 was $1,673 million.
Since my previous report, the Government of Japan has made a further contribution of $509,000 to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia, earmarked for election-related activities. The Government of Switzerland has also donated 50,000 Swiss francs for civic education activities.
Observations and Conclusions
In keeping with Security Council resolution 1116 (1997), the mandate of UNOMIL will expire on 30 September. The withdrawal of UNOMIL personnel is already underway and should be substantially completed by that date, leaving a small team to complete the usual liquidation and closing process. Pending further consultations with the Government of Liberia, it would be my intention to recommend the establishment of a peace-building support office to succeed UNOMIL after 30 September.
Chief Military Observer: Major-General Sikander Shami (Pakistan).
Composition of the military component of UNOMIL, as at 15 August 1997:
Bangladesh 2 (MO); 4 (O); China 3 (MO); Czech Republic 3 (MO); Egypt 4 (MO); India 3 (MO); Kenya 5 (MO); Nepal 1 (MO); Pakistan 9 (MO). Total: 34 - 30 Military Observers (MO); 4 Others (O).
UNOMIL FACTS AND FIGURES, 30 JUNE
Financing: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account.
Estimated expenditures, as at 31 December 1996, from inception of mission through 30 June 1997: $81,488,600 net.
Budget estimate from 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998: $19.7 million.
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General And Heads of Mission:
Tuliameni Kalomoh (Namibia) - April 1997 to date; Anthony B. Nyakyi (United Republic of Tanzania) - December 1994 to April 1997; Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers (Jamaica) - November 1992 to November 1994.
Chief Military Observers: Major-General Sikander Shami (Pakistan) - December 1996 to date; Colonel David Magomere (Kenya) [Acting] - June to December 1996; Major-General Mahmoud Talha (Egypt) - December 1995 to June 1996; Major-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya) - October 1993 to May 1995.
ELECTIONS MAY BRING STABILITY
A WP report stated that the 19 July Liberian presidential elections provided the population with its first credible government in 12 years. However, it warned that many analysts believe the country could easily revert to violence. The forces of new President, Charles Taylor, were among the most brutal of the factions that have fought for control of the country since 1990. A diplomat asserted that, while Taylor has pledged to include rival leaders in his government, democracy and power-sharing were contrary to his nature. Another diplomat declared that the same people who elected Taylor could be protesting in the streets in a few months time.
However, the report stressed that events have moved a long way since violence engulfed Monrovia in the spring of 1996. It added that the success in Liberia could provide indicators for efforts to create an indigenous African peacekeeping capability, including those being promoted by Washington. ECOMOG's attempts at peacemaking in Liberia were unsuccessful for over six years, involving more than a dozen failed cease-fires and peace agreements. The report stated that ECOMOG now had to construct a neutral army and police force, both to maintain order and to win public confidence. ECOMOG Commander, Major-General Victor Malu (Nigeria), stated recently that he would prohibit Taylor or other warlords from unduly influencing the restructuring of the security forces. The Abuja Accords require the peacekeeping force to stay in Liberia for an additional six months. Diplomats have claimed that this is too short a time to build an army.
Malu claimed to be confident that Taylor would agree to extend the mission. However, Nigerian Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, whose country has provided the majority of troops and money for ECOMOG, was noncommittal about the likelihood of an extension. Other diplomats were worried Taylor wished to strengthen his electoral mandate with some kind of armed force under his own control.
A diplomat stated that Taylor, through winning 75 percent of the presidential vote, maintained substantial legislative majorities to alter the constitution. The report affirmed that the consolidation of peace faced additional hazards. Observers agreed that a considerable number of arms remained cached throughout Liberia, despite ECOMOG's disarmament drive in January, which recovered many of the population's weapons.
Brian O'Neill, a representative of the European Commission, a principal donor of aid to Liberia, asserted that the violence in Monrovia in the spring of 1996 nearly destroyed the international role in the country, adding that his aid mission debated withdrawal. He stated that ECOMOG had been confined to their base, while militia fighters had wrecked the offices and stolen the vehicles of the UN, as well as the majority of aid organisations in the capital. The WP report stated that West Africa's leaders then finally took a firm stance with the warlords and, led by Nigeria's military ruler, General Sani Abacha, forced the factions to accept a peace process with a tight schedule, promising sanctions against those who jeopardised it.
Nigeria, which leads ECOMOG, dispatched Malu to galvanise the force, which had previously been accused of partiality, corruption and irresolution. The report said that African and Western governments worked together in a way which might provide a model for future combined crisis response in Africa: each West African nation funded its own troops, while European governments offset the costs for some states with increased economic aid. It added that African armies often lack heavy trucks, communications equipment and maintenance capacities, which were, consequently, supplied by Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, the US, and other nations. Commander of the Niger peacekeeping contingent, Major Boubakar Balla, declared that it was the first time Anglophone and Francophone troops have worked together in Africa.
ECOMOG EXTENSION AGREED
ECOWAS, on 30 August, removed all sanctions against Liberia, and called on the international community to follow suit. Liberian President, Charles Taylor, was formally admitted to the twentieth ECOWAS summit, which ended, also on 30 August, in Abuja, Nigeria. A communiqué issued at the end of the meeting urged Liberians, other ECOWAS member states, and the international community in general, to support Liberia's post-war requirements. ECOWAS leaders, at the request of the Liberian government, agreed to extend the ECOMOG mandate for a period to be mutually agreed.
The ECOWAS Executive Secretary has now been given the task of negotiating appropriate protocols with the Liberian government to allow continued ECOMOG military and security assistance. However, the communiqué asserted that this operation would be financed by the Liberian government. Defence analysts in Abuja estimated that the relevant training would take at least a year. The communiqué stated that the restoration of peace to Liberia had demonstrated West Africa's solidarity and ability to solve regional difficulties through mutual trust, tolerance, self-sacrifice and firm leadership.
SIERRA LEONE VIOLENCE THREATENS LIBERIA
Secretary of State for East Sierra Leone, Captain Eddie Kanneh, on 9 September, declared that seventeen people were killed during violence over the weekend of 6 and 7 September. The fighting took place between forces loyal to the ruling military regime and opposition militia, near the town of Zimmi, on Sierra Leone's eastern border.
Kanneh asserted that casualties comprised twelve members of the Kamajor militia, and five from an ethnically allied Liberian armed faction. However, he did not comment on whether any troops of the ruling regime were killed. Kanneh believed some of the dead belonged to the purportedly defunct Mandingo wing of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO-K).
During the previous month, regular instances of violence took place around Zimmi, which is approximately 16 km from one of the few road bridges between Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Kamajors control the Sierra Leonean side of the Mano River Bridge, while Nigerian troops serving with ECOMOG control the Liberian side. Kanneh accused ECOMOG of providing the Kamajors with arms, ammunition and training. He warned that the ruling military regime would not allow Sierra Leone to become a base to create instability for the new Liberian government.
Liberian President, Charles Taylor, has also accused ULIMO-K of assisting the Kamajors. He stated recently that the fragile democracy in Liberia was being threatened by the crisis in Sierra Leone. Since Sierra Leonean President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was ousted on 25 May, ECOMOG has made attempts to reverse the coup. Nigerian troops killed 50 civilians in Freetown, on 4 September, when they fired on ships which were attempting to break the embargo imposed on Sierral Leone, but hit a dockside marketplace instead.
ECOWAS DISCUSSES SIERRA LEONE
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, comprising foreign ministers from Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, met on 25 August in Abuja, Nigeria. Delegates stated that the committee was reviewing the political situation in Sierra Leone, where junior army officers have refused to return to power elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, whom they had ousted on 25 May. A delegate asserted that the ministers were likely to recommend tough action against the military government to the ECOWAS heads of state summit on 28 August.
Talks broke down in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, in July, between the committee and representatives of the military regime, led by Major Johnny Koromah, which insisted on maintaining power through 2001. ECOWAS Chair and Nigerian head of state, General Sani Abacha, then announced that economic sanctions against Sierra Leone would be tightened, banning contacts by air, land or sea.
Recent reports suggest some states are ignoring the embargo and providing food and fuel to Sierra Leone. Consequently, the report stated that increasing pressure was being applied to ECOWAS to employ force to restore Kabbah to power. Kabbah is, at present in exile in Guinea, but was expected to attend the Abuja summit. However, analysts have warned against unpredictable violence that could follow the use of force, and also against the costly and protracted experience ECOMOG in Liberia, which took seven years to achieve elections, at considerable cost to troop-contributing countries.
Therefore, Abacha has held consultations with colleagues from Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Togo, on what to do about Sierra Leone. Following the coup, some ECOMOG troops were deployed to Sierra Leone. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting has been reported between the peacekeepers and the Sierra Leonean army.
UNDPI MINURSO MISSION UPDATE
Baker Pleased With Talks
UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, James Baker III, said he was surprised by the "excellent" tone and spirit of the first round of direct talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, which concluded in Lisbon on 24 June.
Baker said that the talks had been private and he could not go into the details of the substantive issues. The Secretary-General's Personal Envoy said that the parties had presented their positions. Meanwhile he had submitted some "bridging proposals" which had been considered by both of the parties and the observer countries.
Baker added that the talks had adjourned while these bridging proposals received final consideration from both sides who had indicated that they would be back with answers "as soon as they possibly could".
Members of the Security Council, on 20 July, expressed their full support for the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, Mr. James Baker III, in their search for a solution to the Western Sahara problem. In a statement to the press, Council President Ambassador Peter Osvald of Sweden said that Security Council members commended the parties for their constructive steps so far and called upon them to continue to cooperate fully with the efforts of the Secretary-General.
In a related development, Mr. Baker ... told the press that some progress had been made in negotiations with the POLISARIO Front and the Government of Morocco concerning Western Sahara. He noted, however, that there was still quite a way to go. "I'm not yet in a position to answer the Secretary-General's question: Can the settlement plan be implemented either with or without adjustments. It's still too early to tell that", Mr. Baker said.
On the other hand, he said, there were some things taking place that had not happened before in "this long, simmering and intractable dispute". He said there had been "direct face-to-face talks between the parties under UN auspices; we have a compromise agreement with respect to the questions regarding identification of voters that had held up the process; we've got a compromise agreement regarding some issues on refugees that had been a problem; we've reached agreement regarding the issue of confinement of Moroccan forces during a referendum period and the parties have agreed that they want to meet again on the 29 and 30 of August. So we will have at least one more session".
MINURSO FACTS AND FIGURES, 30 JUNE
Location: Western Sahara; Headquarters: Laayoune; Duration: 29 April 1991 to date.
Strength on 30 June 1997: 200 military observers and 27 military support personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff.
Original authorisation: Approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel.
Fatalities: 7 total (1 military observer, 3 other military personnel, 1 civilian police, 2 international UN staff).
Financing: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account; Estimated expenditures from inception to 30 June 1997, as at 31 January 1997: $256,317,200 (gross); Budget estimate (gross) from 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998: $29,107,800.
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Heads Of Mission: Erik Jensen (Malaysia) [Acting]: August 1995 to date; Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan): March 1992 to August 1995; Johannes Manz (Switzerland): January 1990 to March 1992; Hector Gros Espiell (Uruguay): October 1988 to January 1990.
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General: James A. Baker III (United States): March 1997 to date.
Force Commanders: Major-General José Eduardo Garcia Léandro (Portugal): March 1996 to date; Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium): October 1992 to March 1996; Brigadier-General Luis Block Urban (Peru) [Acting]: April to September 1992; Major-General Armand Roy (Canada): June 1991 to April 1992.
Police Commissioners: Lieutenant-Colonel Jan H. Kleven (Norway) [Acting]: July 1996 to May 1997; Brigadier-General Walter Fallmann (Austria): January to July 1996 Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Walmann (Norway) [Acting]: August 1995 to January 1996; Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe (Germany): March 1995 to August 1995; Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany): June 1993 to March 1995.
AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE BEGINS TRAINING
A joint press conference was held, on 29 July, by President Bill Clinton's Special Coordinator for the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Ambassador Marshall Fletcher McCallie, and Colonel David E. McCracken, Commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group (3rd Group) which is in charge of the ACRI training programme currently in progress in Senegal and Uganda. McCallie stated that, on 21 July, 120 US peacekeeping trainers had started a peacekeeping training partnership in Senegal and Uganda as part of the ACRI. McCallie asserted that the ACRI was a training initiative which was intended to cooperate with African countries to create effective and rapidly deployable peacekeeping units, to be used in either humanitarian or standard peacekeeping operations. He declared that the US intended to emphasise training with a common peacekeeping doctrine, based on international standards. It also planned to supply common communications equipment, which would allow trained African military units to work together. He added that, in conjunction with France and the UK, the US hoped to develop a common peacekeeping training initiative, which would lead to opportunities for joint training and joint exercises, based on principles of building long-term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness and transparency. McCallie declared that all three countries would collaborate closely with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN.
McCracken's forces are taking direct part in the training exercises. He stated that the 60-day programme was already underway in Senegal and Uganda, and would subsequently move on to Malawi, Ethiopia and Mali. He said that the programme would be carried out at the lowest cost, with the highest leverage, in order to develop existing capacity. He announced that minimum equipment would be supplied by the US, and that each country would receive approximately $1 million in equipment, and maximum training. The training would cost under $2 million per battalion, which comprise 600-800 people.
McCracken is responsible for American interests in 40 African states, and all battalions which come within his area of jurisdiction would be trained by the 3rd Group. He added that the 5th Special Forces, using the same training book, would train African states that fall within the jurisdiction of the US Central Special Forces Group, which includes Egypt, the Horn of Africa, and Kenya.
McCracken stated that other sectors of the American Military Command, including the 18th Airborne Corps, Psychological Operations and the civil affairs officers of the Army Special Operations, would help with the training program. He added that, after the end of the training, if their country's leaders authorised participation in a peacekeeping operation, there would be an initial capability to be called up within 30 days. Other US provisions to the African troops would be: backpacks, canteens, mine detectors, uniforms, and water purification instruments.
Other military personnel involved in the programme have stated that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) has sanctioned the ACRI, and that the initiative is adaptable to all African countries. They expect that approximately eight battalions would be trained, and have already been allotted $15 million for 1997. Although some $20 million has been requested for 1998, they may receive only $15 million again. McCallie asserted that the reason Nigeria had been excluded from the initial phase of the programme was because the provision of military assistance to states ruled by military governments that have displaced civilian governments was prohibited under current US law. However, he did express the intention that the US would be willing to work with Nigeria when it has a democratically-elected civilian government.
McCallie outlined four possibilities for control and command of the peacekeeping units:
1) A UN operation authorised by the Security Council, financed by the UN assessments;
2) A multinational force operation, hopefully authorised by the Security Council, but not financed through UN assessments;
3) A subregional organisation which might decide to carry out peacekeeping in its subregion, and so would finance the operation;
4) An OAU peacekeeping operation.
McCallie acknowledged a significant difference between the ACRI and the Africa Crisis Response Force, proposed by former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, during his visit to Africa in October 1996. He stated that the proposal forwarded by Christopher involved a rapid response force to be deployed as soon as an outbreak of violence occurred. However, likely European partners decided that the proposal could not take place within a six month time frame, and, also, that the creation of such a force would be potentially dangerous. McCallie said that the US was, thus, urged to create a capacity, rather than a force. He emphasised that the advantage of such an approach was that it allowed for the exclusion of politically inappropriate states in a particular operation, such as direct neighbours of the targeted country.
McCallie stressed that all counties involved in the training would retain the sovereign right whether to contribute troops in response to a regional or OAU request. He asserted that the troops would be trained for peacekeeping, rather than peace-making operations. He added that African military leaders and the UN DPKO had advised that peacekeeping training was initially appropriate, since peace-making operations involve the use of sophisticated equipment which is likely to change the balance of forces in a sub-region. Additionally, such equipment was also inclined to change the balance of a military structure within a state.
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ALBANIA NEEDS MORE ASSISTANCE
A WP report stated that violence-torn Albania had initially been abandoned by European countries and international organisations alike. Italy was then forced to intervene as an obvious destination for fleeing Albanians, and as the country most liable to suffer the overspill of Albanian instability.
Therefore, a force was dispatched, comprising a few thousand troops from a small number of countries, with a mandate based round the delivery of humanitarian relief, and with an early withdrawal date. The report asserted that the withdrawal date had recently passed, and that all Italian peacekeepers had, subsequently, left.
The WP report affirmed that the force's mandate prevented the Italians from suppressing and disarming the armed gangs that frequent a large part of Albania. Hundreds of thousands of military arms were allowed to end up in private hands by former Prime Minister, Sali Berisha, forcing the government of newly elected Fatos Nano to rely on a 100-strong rapid intervention force. However, the Italians were able to sufficiently reinforce Albania to conduct adequately free and fair national elections, which removed Berisha. Nano, the last Communist prime minister, had promised to repay Albanians for widespread post-Communist corruption, but then declared that the country could not afford to so.
The WP report stressed that international agencies should be present in Albania. It stated that some Albanians wished to exchange with Washington local military privileges in return for US military aid. It added that NATO has a strategic interest in stabilising ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia.
UNDPI UNMIBH MISSION UPDATE
Bildt Replaced
The Security Council, on 12 June, agreed to the designation of Carlos Westendorp, Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN, as High Representative for the Bosnian peace agreement, in succession of Carl Bildt.
Indicted War Criminals Confronted
The commander of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina officially informed the UN that the force had detained an indicted war criminal Milan Kovacevic, at a hospital in Prijedor
In a separate action in the vicinity of Prijedor, indicted war criminal Simo Drljaca, a former police chief in Prijedor, was killed when SFOR soldiers returned fire in self-defence, a UN Spokesperson declared. "Both Drljaca and Kovacevic are indicted by the Hague Tribunal for complicity and genocide against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the municipality of Prijedor during the period 29 April 1992 and 31 December 1992", he added.
The UN International War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced Bosnian Serb, Dusko Tadic, to 20 years in prison for his role in a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against Muslim civilians during the early stages of the conflict in Bosnia. In its sentencing, the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recalled that Tadic's crimes consisted of killings, beatings and forced transfer, as well as participation in the attack on the town of Kazarac in north-western Bosnia.
The Spokesperson for the Tribunal, Christian Chartier, described the sentencing as a very significant development with wide ramifications. He stated that the Tribunal had made it very clear that its was not only "up and running" but also "up to the job" it had been given in adjudicating the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. He also stressed that the sentencing was very significant for the international justice set up by the UN: "We have made it clear that international criminal investigations were possible, international criminal prosecutions are possible, international proceedings before international impartial judges are possible. This is a very strong message: the cycles of impunity must be broken down".
Security Council Condemns Attacks
Members of the Security Council have responded to recent attacks against international personnel in Republika Sprska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Council President Ambassador Peter Osvald of Sweden stated that members of the Council "condemned in the strongest terms possible" the attacks against the personnel of SFOR, the International Police Task Force (UNIPTF) and the OSCE.
UNMIBH Seeks Information on Fate of Palic
The UN Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) has urged authorities in Republika Srpska to provide information on the fate of Colonel Avdo Palic, the Commander of Bosnian Army, who was seized by armed Bosnian Serb Army soldiers from the UN compound in Zepa. The Mission paid tribute to Palic, who stayed and helped evacuate Zepa's civilians when the area was besieged by the Bosnian Serb Army, forcing the men of Zepa to flee for their lives.
ICTY Begins Brcko Exhumation
The ICTY said in a statement, on 28 July, that a forensic team from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has commenced its 1997 exhumation programme at a site in Brcko, northern Bosnia. The forensic team, which consists of 25 members, has been present at the site for four weeks carrying out preliminary tasks. The exhumation is related to the indictment issued on 21 July 1995 against Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic in connection with the confinement and systematic killings of hundreds of Muslim and Croat men from Brcko at the Luka camp. "It is believed that the exhumation of this site will provide corroborative evidence of the crimes alleged in the indictment. This exhumation and the subsequent post mortem examinations will enable the OTP to establish manner and cause of death of the victims interred", the statement said.
UNMIBH Criticises Intimidation By Croats
UNMIBH has expressed its dismay at the campaign of intimidation during which Bosnian Croats forced the evacuation of five hundred Bosniaks. The Mission said that authorities in the region had failed to prevent the latest campaign of intimidation. UNMIBH stated that it made numerous appeals to the authorities in the region to allow the return of refugees. The Mission reported that Bosnian Croats staged demonstrations over the weekend in the area of Jajce, in the Muslim Croat Federation. The local Croats were protesting the return of Bosniaks to Jajce and forced through intimidation the evacuation of around 500 Bosniaks, most of whom had recently returned to their former homes in Jajce. According to the Mission, the UNIPTF have begun an investigation to look into the role of the local police in the events.
UNMIBH Welcomes Princess of Wales
UNMIBH has welcomed the efforts of Diana, Princess of Wales, to focus world attention on the continuing plague of landmines. The Princess of Wales was in Bosnia and Herzegovina to highlight the plight of victims of landmines.
The UN Mission said in a statement on Friday that it fully supported the call by the Princess of Wales for a complete ban on the production, sale and use of landmines and also commended her interest in the plight of landmine victims across the globe.
It also noted that the UN had trained, equipped and deployed over 100 deminers throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. It said the UN 1997 appeal for essential resources for demining in Bosnia was $23 million, however only $7 million had been pledged.
UNIPTF Finds Unauthorised Weapons
Following reports of human rights violations in the Banja Luka police station in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UNIPTF initiated an investigation which uncovered a number of unauthorised weapons, according to a spokesperson in Sarajevo. The evidence which prompted the investigation suggested that attempts had been made to intimidate Republika Srpska constitutional court judges, including through physical threats.
Among the unauthorised weapons discovered were a machine pistol, two other pistols, a number of magazines of ammunition and a plastic bag containing nine rifle grenades. The spokesperson expressed concern about the discovery, noting that previous investigations had not turned up unauthorised weapons. He stressed that the investigation would be completed shortly and all evidence would be thoroughly examined.
Further Inspections of Banja Luka Police Stations
The UNIPTF will continue inspecting five police stations in Banja Luka which have been the subject of confiscations of large quantities of weapons. A spokesperson in Sarajevo said that among the weapons confiscated from the police stations were "a rocket launcher, a large quantity of ammunition, a number of AK-47s, and also some equipment that would be more fitting of a James Bond film than in a police station, such as 12 booby-trap pens and C-4 plastic explosives".
The spokesperson said that a UNIPTF task force left for Banja Luka on 21 August to begin the process of restructuring the police stations to bring them in line with applicable standards. The spokesperson also stated that Croatia had announced that Pero Skopljak was arrested on a warrant issued by the ICTY. The case would be processed through the Croatian legal system and the suspect would then be sent to The Hague. The spokseperson recalled that Skopljak had been charged with grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions and violations of the law or customs of war.
Federation Police Force Restructured
The formal inauguration of the Posavina Cantonal Police Force, scheduled to take place today in Orasje, brings to five the total number of police cantons in the Bosnian Federation which have been formally inaugurated. A UN spokesperson stated: "This takes us to the half-way point in the restructuring of the Federation's police force". He expressed confidence that the remaining cantons would be restructured in the coming weeks. In Banja Luka, 30 Republika Srpska officers, on 24 August, completed a two-day introductory training programme given by the UNIPTF.
Also in Banja Luka, UN officers are continuing their investigations into allegations of serious human rights abuses committed by the police. The spokesperson said the UN is maintaining a round-the-clock presence in five police facilities in the city.
Violent Mob in Brcko Attacks UNIPTF
UN spokesperson, Liam McDowall, announced that the UNIPTF was, on the morning of 28 August, subjected to "a totally unprovoked and violent assault by a mob". He asserted that several windows were smashed and more than 15 UN vehicles were damaged. He added that the UN "have received reports that UNIPTF officers were slightly injured by crowds who attempted to pull them from their vehicles".
The attacks reportedly occurred following the blaring of sirens across the town and radio incitements for people to defend facilities from the international community. "I want to make it emphatically clear that the UN International Police Task Force was not, and is not, in any way involved in attempts to take over any police facilities", said the spokesperson.
Warning that the incitement and recourse to violence was extremely dangerous because it heightened tension in an already charged situation, McDowall declared: "It is especially serious that violence has been directed against unarmed international police monitors who have done nothing more than stick to their mandate under the Dayton Peace Agreement that the parties requested".
Croats Prevent Return of Bosniacs
The UNHCR today expressed concern about the possible disruption by Croats of the scheduled return of 21 Bosniac families to their homes in Stolac. A mob of Croats, on 1 September, prevented a busload of Bosniacs from Mostar from entering Stolac, according to UNHCR. The mob also reportedly caused problems for some 40 Bosniac construction workers trying to rebuild houses for returning Bosniac families. The workers were escorted from the city by soldiers from SFOR. According to UNHCR, when the workers tried to re-enter the city, on 2 September, their bus was stoned, two windows were broken and two workers were injured. The incident forced workers to abandon their tasks and return to Mostar.
Stolac was one of four cities designated under the Dayton Peace Accord for pilot projects under which minority groups would be allowed to return, demonstrating the commitment of both parties in the Federation for minority returns.
UMIBH FACTS AND FIGURES, 31 JULY
Headquarters: Sarajevo; Duration: 22 December 1995 to date; Fatalities: 5. Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account. Estimated expenditures, from inception of mission through 30 June 1997, as at 31 December 1996: $81,488,600 net.
Budget estimate from 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998: $165.6 million (Revised cost estimates which will modify this figure are being prepared for submission to the General Assembly in order to reflect recent decisions of the Security Council).
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Heads of Mission: Kai Eide (Germany) - January 1997 to date; Iqbal Riza (Pakistan) -February 1996 to January 1997.
UNIPTF Police Commissioners: Manfred Seitner (Denmark) -March 1997 to date; Peter FitzGerald (Ireland) - February 1996 to March 1997.
UNSG'S REPORT, 8 SEPTEMBER (S/1997/694)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Activities of the Mission
International Police Task Force
"Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1103 (1997) of 31 March 1997 and 1107 (1997) of 16 May 1997, the authorised strength of the International Police Task Force is 2,027. As at 4 September, the Task Force had a strength of 2,015 monitors from 38 different countries.
... There has been further progress in the restructuring of the Federation police during the current reporting period. The formal inauguration of the Gorade cantonal police, on 15 July, provided momentum to continuing efforts to restructure the cantonal police in the ethnically mixed Neretva and Central Bosnia cantons. In protracted negotiations that have continued beyond the signing of the 6 June agreement to integrate the Neretva canton police, Bosniac and Croat officials agreed to restructure the six Mostar city police administrations and its multi-ethnic central district first, and then to do the same in the canton's six rural municipalities. Many politically inspired delays in implementing this agreement have required the constant attention of my Special Representative and senior Task Force officials, as well as the intervention of the Office of the High Representative and officials of Member States. Similar delays in the restructuring of the police were also experienced in the ethnically mixed Central Bosnia canton. However, the formal inauguration of the newly integrated police force took place on 22 August, and the process of implementing the restructuring has begun. The restructuring of the Federation police in the remaining cantons is expected to be formally completed by the end of September. However, continuous efforts at training will be needed to ensure that formal integration leads to the development of a genuine modern police force.
The International Police Task Force conducted further training courses for local police to facilitate their transition to police forces that operate according to internationally accepted democratic policing standards.
... Efforts have continued to reach an agreement on police restructuring with the authorities of the Republika Srpska. However, two developments have made this task even more difficult than in the past. On 28 June, President Biljana Plavi, who is based in Banja Luka, suspended the Minister of the Interior, giving among other reasons his failure to cooperate with the International Police Task Force in the restructuring of the Republika Srpska police. That action, which was rejected by the Prime Minister and other officials based in Pale, has led to a serious constitutional crisis in the Republika Srpska, which has made it difficult for UNMIBH to find a legitimate and competent interlocutor on police matters.
Against this background, on 7 August, my Special Representative came to an agreement with the SFOR Commander on the status of the paramilitary forces known as "special police" or "police anti-terrorist brigade". SFOR confirmed that, under the terms of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement, such forces would be treated as military units, subject to SFOR control. It issued Instructions to the Parties specifying the controls to which forces would be subjected. In that connection, the UNIPTF established a target date of 31 August for completing negotiations with the Republika Srpska authorities on police restructuring, and indicated that members of the special police forces could be included in the regular police through the restructuring process. Regrettably, owing mainly to the political crisis within the Republika Srpska leadership, the target date was not met. In addition, the Task Force and SFOR agreed that, with effect from 31 August 1997, any police force that was still operating in a canton of the Federation where restructuring was complete, and that had not been certified by the UNIPTF, was illegal and would be dealt with by SFOR.
The checkpoint policy has led to tangible results. In May, an average of 300 checkpoints were permitted each day and during the first two weeks of implementation of the checkpoint policy, the International Police Task Force identified 13 illegal checkpoints in the Federation and 23 in the Republika Srpska. By contrast, currently only about 15 checkpoints a day are approved and, during the first two weeks of August, only 8 illegal checkpoints were identified in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. This reduction in checkpoints has substantially improved freedom of movement, although problems remain with travel between the two entities.
Human Rights Office
In order to fulfil its responsibility to carry out investigations of human rights violations by local police forces, UNMIBH has set up a Human Rights Office and recruited a Chief of Human Rights for the Mission. The Office is responsible for coordinating all human rights activities of the Mission, including maintaining liaison with the other human rights organisations operating in the mission area. The Human Rights Office led the investigation on the expulsion of Bosniacs from Jajce and related conduct by the local police.
Composition of the International Police Task Force, as at 4 September 1997:
Argentina 49; Austria 39; Bangladesh 31; Bulgaria 47; Canada 15; Chile 31; Denmark 38; Egypt 34; Estonia 9; Finland 20; France 114; Germany 166; Ghana 86; Greece 4; Hungary 46; India 146; Indonesia 18; Ireland 35; Italy 23; Jordan 175; Malaysia 38; Nepal 43; Netherlands 77; Nigeria 16; Norway 10; Pakistan 99; Poland 41; Portugal 59; Russian Federation 36; Senegal 32; Spain 56; Sweden 50; Switzerland 5; Tunisia 3; Turkey 27; Ukraine 41; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 30; United States of America 226.
ELECTIONS GIVE REFUGEES HOPE
Some 89 percent of the electorate registered to vote in their pre-war hometowns in the Bosnian local elections, over the weekend of 13 and 14 September. These included hundreds of thousands of refugees expelled before the Bosnian war had ended, late in 1995. An AP report interpreted this as suggesting that the local elections were likely to alter the ethnic map determined during the war. For example, if most Muslims, previously driven out by Serbs, elected a Muslim city council in a given town, they would then be able to return home.
The report stated that returning refugees were hoping that S-FOR would protect them against pressure from those who had driven them out originally. UNHCR Spokesperson, Kris Janowski, suggested that the large registration of potential returnees provided a good opportunity, but the elections still presented the most significant challenge since the Dayton peace agreement. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - which organised the elections - has declared that it will only certify them as free and fair if local councils are formed according to the wishes of the electorate. Sanctions could be imposed against communities that continue to maintain separatist tendencies.
The AP report affirmed that there would still be a great desire to obstruct progress in a number of areas - particularly those with a high concentration of refugees afraid of losing the small amount of security they have found with other members of their own ethnic group. It pointed out that, for example, only one Muslim, who is married to a Serb, is believed to live in Foca, where Serbs have blown up the town's 16th-century mosque. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the newly elected council could work if it contains any Muslim members, let alone a Muslim majority. OSCE officials have stated that it is still too early to reveal how council members travelling into hostile areas will be protected. Members of parliament currently travel to Pale for legislative sessions without escort.
The report asserted that Bosnians and a large number of international officials believe S-FOR's presence in Bosnia is essential to facilitate the return refugees. British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, on 15 September, warned that, should NATO withdraw its troops from Bosnia as scheduled in June 1998, there was a risk of undoing the work achieved so far. However, he added that British and other troops could only stay on in conjunction with the Americans.
Voter turnout in the elections was high, estimated by the OSCE at 70 percent, and minimal violent incidents were reported. Unofficial results have suggested that nationalist Croat, Muslim, and Serb parties were losing their stranglehold on politics in some towns, although the final results were not expected until 13 September. Head of the OSCE election observers, Javier Ruperez, described the ballot as far from perfect, listing problems including late opening of polling stations, insufficient ballots in some regions, and attempts by some local officials to hamper voting by minority groups. He asserted that the success of the ballot now relied on all parties respecting and implementing its results.
Military Component
"During the reporting period, some elements of the military component were redeployed ... The number of observation posts along the western border of the mission area has increased. Currently, the Nordic Battalion mans eight posts on a 24-hour basis along the northern and western border and three temporary posts, also on a 24-hour basis, in the area of Lake Ohrid. The increase by three observation posts has effectively enlarged the area of responsibility of the Nordic Battalion, whose patrol line is now over-extended. The United States Battalion mans eight observation posts and patrols along a considerably smaller area of responsibility. Since the Nordic Battalion assumed responsibility for the three new observation posts, the United States Battalion has taken over the tasks of guarding the Headquarters and providing the main quick reaction force.
In addition to the community and border patrols conducted by the Force's civilian police and military observers, UNPREDEP military units also conduct patrols in the border areas. In the past three months, they conducted over 220 patrols per week and observed an average of some 153 patrols each week by the armed forces of Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the host country. Observed illegal smuggling incidents decreased substantially during the period from early spring 1997.
... The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the host country informed the Force Commander that, while they would continue to permit UNPREDEP to patrol on the basis of visible and key features of the terrain ... they retained their sovereign right to patrol their respective territories up to the old administrative border. Neither side has expressed any concern as to a danger of armed clashes occurring between their patrols in the border areas.
Along the western border, UN soldiers have been exposed to frequent cross-border shooting from Albania, either by armed groups of illegal border-crossers or by other individuals. On a few occasions, UNPREDEP observation towers were deliberately shot at, resulting in one soldier being slightly injured. Active community patrolling by military observers has contributed to the easing of some tensions in the border area, and the initiation of regular meetings between the mayor of Debar in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and his counterparts in several Albanian communities across the border has been particularly useful as a confidence-building measure. The situation along the border is gradually returning to normal.
Civilian Component
The civilian component of UNPREDEP continues to play an important role in the implementation of the good offices mandate of my Special Representative. It maintains an active dialogue with the authorities and other political forces in the country in order to facilitate the mutual exchange of views and to encourage political and inter-ethnic communication and interaction. The political and humanitarian branch of the civilian component also maintains liaison with various segments of the public and the authorities in order to assess domestic and external developments that might threaten the country's stability.
In the past two years, with the support of several Governments and international organisations, and with the use of extrabudgetary resources, UNPREDEP has successfully advanced the good offices component of the operation. A number of major developmental projects on social integration and national capacity- and institution-building have been initiated and have led to a substantial inflow of international experience to the host country. These projects have played a significant role in promoting mutual confidence and good will across society.
... The civilian police component of the mission represents an important asset to the operation. Conducting some 14 patrols a day, its monitoring of the border areas has provided a unique tool for liaison with the judicial and police authorities and with the population of the host country, including, in particular, the ethnic minorities.
... The small public information component of the mission has developed and implemented an active information programme to raise local and international awareness about the work of the first UN preventive deployment operation.
Operational Coherence, Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness
An integrated approach by all the components of UNPREDEP to the tasks at hand has enhanced the mission's operational coherence and efficiency. Efforts continue to streamline mandate delivery and effect greater savings. A combination of professional skills in the Force has contributed considerably to high levels of coordination and proficiency.
Recent Developments
During the past three months, inter-ethnic relations within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia suffered a setback as a result of a controversy over the public display of flags of national minorities. On 4 June 1997, the Constitutional Court of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia decided that Albanian national flags should not be displayed in front of the town halls of Gostivar and Tetovo. The mayors of the two towns defied the ruling and gave no indication of their readiness to remove the flags when, on 8 July, the National Assembly adopted a new compromise law on the use of flags by the ethnic nationalities. On 9 July, the Government launched a massive law-enforcement operation in Gostivar to remove Albanian and Turkish flags hoisted in front of the municipal building. The municipality of Tetovo was also partly affected by a similar action. During clashes with the police, three demonstrators died in Gostivar and many were wounded in what appeared to be an excessive use of force by government special police forces. In the wake of the Gostivar events, a number of demonstrators were called by the police for "informative talks", a practice restricted by the new law on criminal procedures. Some of the demonstrators complained of brutal methods of interrogation. Amidst severe criticism of the police action by its ethnic Albanian coalition partner, the Government established a ministerial commission to investigate the events and recently presented its findings in a report to the National Assembly. The consideration of the report has been postponed until after the summer recess.
Observations
... Taking into account the new developments, it seems advisable to pursue the implementation of the Council's decision to start, as at 1 October 1997, a two-month phased reduction of the military component of UNPREDEP by 300 all ranks, bearing in mind the conditions prevailing over that time in the region.
Special Representative: Mr. Henryk J. Sokalski (Poland); Force Commander: Brigadier-General Bent Sohnemann (Denmark). Composition and Strength of the Military and Civilian Police Elements of UNPREDEP, as at 7 August 1997:
Argentina 1 (MO); Bangladesh 2 (MO); Belgium 1 (MO); Brazil 2 (MO); Canada 1 (MO); Czech Republic 1 (MO); Denmark 38 (O), 9 (MH), 1 (MO); Egypt 1 (MO); Finland 350 (O), 13 (MH), 1 (MO), 6 (CP); Ghana 1 (MO); Indonesia 50 (O), 1 (MH), 2 (MO); Ireland 3 (MO); Jordan 2 (MO), 2 (CP); Kenya 2 (MO); Nepal 1 (MO); New Zealand 1 (MO); Nigeria 1 (MO), 4 (CP); Norway 38 (O), 5 (MH), 2 (MO); Pakistan 2 (MO); Poland 2 (MO); Portugal 1 (MO); Russian Federation 2 (MO), 2 (CP); Sweden 32 (O), 9 (MH), 1 (MO); Switzerland 1 (MO), 4 (CP); Turkey (MO), 4 (CP); Ukraine 1 (MO), 2 (CP); United States of America 487 (O), 11 (MH); Total 995 Operational (O); 48 Military Headquarters (MH); 36 Military Observers (MO); 24 Civilian Police (CP).
UNSG'S REPORT, 1 JULY 1997 (S/1997/506)
Situation in the UNMOP Area of Responsibility
In May 1997, the Yugoslav authorities confirmed for the first time that three positions that the UN Mission of Observers (UNMOP) had observed in the northern portion of the demilitarised zone were manned by troops of the Yugoslav Army. In the same month, Croatian authorities and media alleged that those Yugoslav positions were located on the Croatian side of the border. Owing to the long-standing restriction imposed by the Yugoslav authorities on the movements of UN military observers in that area, UNMOP has been unable to ascertain the strength and armament of the Yugoslav Army troops at these positions.
Progress Towards Adoption of the Practical Options
In my report of 14 April 1997, I stated that the parties had made no progress towards adopting the practical options that are part of the procedures proposed by UNMOP in May 1996 to reduce tension and improve safety and security in the area (see S/1997/311, para. 4). Subsequently, on 25 April 1997, the Security Council, in a presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/23), reiterated its call upon both parties to adopt the practical options with a view to their early implementation, to remove landmines from areas patrolled by the UN military observers and to stop their interference with the freedom of movement of the observers and with the implementation of their mandate. During discussions with the parties in the region on 8 May 1997, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Bernard Miyet, conveyed to them the urgency of the need to address these concerns by adopting the practical options. Notwithstanding these encouragements, the parties have failed to make any progress in adopting the practical options. ... As regards the freedom of movement of UN military observers throughout the UNMOP area of responsibility, the situation worsened in early June 1997, when access was denied by Croatia to positions in the north-western part of the demilitarised zone where joint patrols of UN military observers and Croatian officials had been permitted in the past. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, lifted, in May 1997, one of the long-standing minor restrictions on the movement of UN military observers within the demilitarised zone.
Progress Towards a Settlement
... the parties have continued to indicate ... that their bilateral negotiations pursuant to the Agreement on Normalisation of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, signed at Belgrade, on 23 August 1996 (see S/1996/706, annex), have not addressed the Prevlaka dispute directly and that there has been no progress towards a settlement.
Observations
In sum, Croatia regards the dispute as a security issue to be settled by an arrangement that would provide security for each State within existing borders. In the view of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the dispute centres upon territorial possession of the Prevlaka peninsula. Composition and strength of the military element of UNMOP, as at 30 June 1997:
Argentina 1; Bangladesh 1; Belgium 1; Brazil 1; Canada 1; Czech Republic 1; Denmark 1; Egypt 1; Finland 1; Ghana 2; Indonesia 2; Ireland 1; Jordan 1; Kenya 2; Nepal 1; New Zealand 1; Nigeria 1; Norway 1; Pakistan 1; Poland 1; Portugal 1; Russian Federation 1; Sweden 1; Switzerland 1; Ukraine 1; Total 28.
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UNSG'S REPORT, 16 JULY (S/1997/550)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report ... covers developments ... since 20 January 1997 (S/1997/42).
Situation in the Area of Operation
During the past six months, hostilities continued between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and its local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), on the one hand, and armed elements who have proclaimed their resistance against the Israeli occupation on the other. The level of hostilities was higher than in the previous period.
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 154 operations by armed elements against IDF/DFF (6 in the second half of January, 35 in February, 9 in March, 18 in April, 31 in May, 36 in June and 19 in the first half of July). There were also reports of more than 210 operations north of the Litani River. The vast majority of the attacks were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organisation. A few of them were carried out by the Shiite movement Amal. Three attacks were attributed to Palestinian groups, although UNIFIL could not confirm this. In their attacks against IDF/DFF, armed elements used small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, road-side bombs and rockets. Armed elements more frequently employed long-range mortar fire in their attacks against IDF/DFF. During the period under review, armed elements fired more than 1,400 mortar rounds, rockets and anti-tank missiles.
IDF/DFF, in response to attacks or in operations they initiated, employed artillery, mortars, tanks, helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft. On more occasions than in previous periods, IDF/DFF conducted pre-emptive artillery bombardments, usually to cover troop movements and patrols. IDF increased long-range patrols beyond its forward positions. In a new development, IDF/DFF also used road-side bombs outside the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). UNIFIL recorded more than 12,000 artillery, mortar and tank rounds fired by IDF/DFF during the reporting period, an increase from the previous period's count. Air raids by IDF continued at a high level throughout the period. Except for an attack in the Nepalese battalion sector on 9 February, and one in the Ghanaian battalion sector on 1 June, all air raids were carried out north of the Litani River.
Organisational Matters
As of July 1997, UNIFIL comprised 4,488 troops, from Fiji (596), Finland (490), France (247), Ghana (651), Ireland (613), Italy (46), Nepal (597), Norway (616) and Poland (632). The Estonian company deployed for a six-month period as an integral part of the Norwegian battalion completed its tour of duty and left in May 1997. UNIFIL was assisted in the performance of its tasks by 52 military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation. In addition, UNIFIL employed 445 civilian staff, of whom 125 were recruited internationally and 320 locally ... Major-General Stanislaw F. Wozniak continued as Force Commander.
I regret to report the death of a French soldier and two Polish soldiers. On 21 June, six soldiers of the Irish battalion were wounded, one of them badly, by a mine explosion during clearing mines near Bayt Yahun. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 211 members of the Force have died: 76 as a result of firing or bomb explosions, 84 in accidents and 51 from other causes. A total of 331 have been wounded by firing or by mine or bomb explosions.
Financial Aspects
By its resolution 51/233 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL an amount of $124,969,700 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998, based on an average strength of 4,513 troops and a continuation of its existing responsibilities. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent to $10,414,142 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 July 1997.
As of 30 June 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNIFIL amounted to $175,918,593. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2.5 billion".
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UNSG'S REPORT, 18 JULY 1997 (S/1997/558)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Political Aspects
"... In early May 1997, a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, headed by Ambassador Ginned Ilitchev, visited Sukhumi and met with the Abkhaz leaders. In June, the Russian Federation hosted intensive Georgian-Abkhaz consultations in Moscow on a draft document prepared by the Russian facilitators and entitled "Protocol on a Georgian-Abkhaz settlement", which contains basic principles for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
The Abkhaz side proposed that the two sides to the conflict should conclude a treaty providing for renunciation of the use of force. The Georgian side did not see the need for such a treaty, since the commitment of the two parties to solve all existing problems peacefully had already been included in documents signed earlier.
In his address to Parliament on 27 May 1997, the President of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, suggested convening an international conference on Abkhazia, Georgia, under UN auspices. According to the President, the conference could be organised and hosted by the Russian Federation and attended by the parties to the conflict, the UN, OSCE, the Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia and possibly other interested Governments. Representatives of the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation could be given observer status.
... On 23 June, the Russian State Duma adopted a resolution in which, inter alia, it requested the President of the Russian Federation to undertake efforts to secure the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, Georgia, beyond the expiry of its mandate on 31 July 1997.
Humanitarian Situation and Human Rights
The situation of most civilians throughout Abkhazia, Georgia, remains extremely difficult: food supplies are generally scarce, particularly for the aged; the health sector has almost completely collapsed; shelter is inadequate and schools are desperately ill-equipped and lack the most basic supplies. There have, however, been some improvements during the past three months, owing mostly to the efforts of aid agencies and, in part, because of improved weather conditions.
Operations of UNOMIG
The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continues to operate in the restricted weapons zones of the Zugdidi and Gali sectors and in the Kodori Valley.
The number of military observers has been reduced to 116. It will be recalled that following a thorough review of the operational requirements of UNOMIG, it was considered that a total of 106 observers should be sufficient to enable the Mission to carry out the tasks entrusted to it under resolution 937 (1994) of 21 July 1994. The strength of the Mission will continue to be reduced gradually and will reach the recommended level of 106 in November 1997.
The Situation on the Ground
The situation in the Gali restricted weapons zone and, in particular, the security zone, has remained unstable and tense. Acts of violence, including common crime, continued to be a problem during the reporting period. Most of the mine-related incidents, which involved remote-control and pressure-sensitive mines and explosive devices, were directed against the CIS peacekeeping force and the Abkhaz militia and administration ... Stability in the security and restricted weapons zones of the Gali sector continues to be severely affected by the high rate of common crime, such as kidnapping, looting and armed robbery.
... The mine threat continues to be the most serious problem in the Gali security and restricted weapons zones. During the period under review, there were six incidents, which appeared to be targeted against the CIS peacekeeping force, the Abkhaz militia and a Russian citizen. In addition, several explosive devices were found in Sukhumi and in the Gali region and were defused by the force's personnel.
... The force's mandate is scheduled to end on 31 July 1997 ... several Georgian leaders, including President Shevardnadze, have called for the withdrawal of the force after the expiry of its mandate if the decisions taken at the CIS summit meeting of 28 March 1997 are not implemented. Although discussions on that matter have been ongoing, a final decision has yet to be taken. As a result, tension continues to increase.
Financial Aspects
By its resolution 51/236 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $18,580,500 (gross) for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. This authorisation is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.
... Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 31 July 1997 ... the monthly cost of maintaining the Mission until 31 January 1998 would be limited to the appropriation contained in General Assembly resolution 51/236 (equivalent to $1,548,375 per month).
As at 30 June 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIG Special Account amounted to $5.5 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.7 billion.
Composition of UNOMIG, as at 10 July 1997:
Albania 1 (MO); Austria 4 (MO); Bangladesh 10 (MO); Cuba 4 (MO); Czech Republic 4 (MO); Denmark 3 (MO); Egypt 5 (MO); France 5 (MO); Germany 10 (MO); Greece 4 (MO); Hungary 5 (MO); Indonesia 5 (MO); Jordan 7 (MO); Pakistan 7 (MO); Poland 4 (MO); Republic of Korea 4 (MO); Russian Federation 3 (MO); Sweden 5 (MO); Switzerland 5 (MO); Turkey 5 (MO); United Kingdom of Great Britain and (MO); Northern Ireland 8 (MO); United States of America 4 (MO); Uruguay 4 (MO); Total: 116 Military Observers (MO).
UNSG'S REPORT, 29 JULY (S/1997/558/ADD.1)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"[A] high-level meeting took place at Geneva, from 23 to 25 July 1997, under the chairship of my Special Representative for Georgia. The meeting was held with the participation of the two parties to the conflict and was attended by the Russian Federation as facilitator, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the representatives of the States belonging to the group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia. ... the Chair made a statement on the final day, in which he reported that the parties had welcomed the proposals of the Secretary-General to strengthen the involvement of the UN in the peacemaking process aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement. The parties had reaffirmed their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other as expressed in their communiqué of 13 January 1994. The Chair stated that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Georgia, the representatives of OSCE and States members of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia had called upon the Russian Federation and the parties to strive for agreement on continuing the peacekeeping operation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to secure favourable and peaceful conditions for the continuation of negotiations to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The Chair stated that he would reconvene the meeting in September at a date to be announced.
UNSG'S REPORT, 4 SEPTEMBER (S/1997/686)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report ... brings up to date the record of developments in Tajikistan and of UNMOT, as well as the activities of my Special Representative for Tajikistan, since my report of 30 May 1997 (S/1997/415).
Conclusion of General Peace Agreement
On 27 June 1997, President Emomali Rakhmonov, Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and Mr. Gerd Merrem, my Special Representative for Tajikistan, signed in Moscow the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan and the Moscow Declaration. President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri also signed a Protocol of Mutual Understanding ... The text of the agreements was circulated under cover of a letter, dated 1 July 1997, from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation (A/52/219-S/1997/510).
While in Moscow, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Azeddine Laraki, signed the Protocol on Guarantees of the Implementation of the General Agreement, which had been agreed in Tehran on 28 May. The Government of Uzbekistan acceded to the Protocol in New York on 26 August. The Contact Group created by this Protocol convened in Dushanbe on 16 July, and has met several times since then. It comprises the representatives of the guarantor States (Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and includes also the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the head of the OSCE mission in Tajikistan and a representative of OIC. The Secretary-General's Special Representative acts as coordinator of the Contact Group and provides necessary support. In accordance with the Protocol of Mutual Understanding between the President of Tajikistan and the UTO leader, the first meeting of the Commission on National Reconciliation took place ... from 7 to 11 July 1997. The Commission adopted an Act on Mutual Forgiveness, which was signed by President Rakhmonov on 14 July, and prepared a draft Act on Amnesty, which was adopted by the Majlisi Oli (Parliament) on 1 August 1997. This was not only a step forward in the process of national reconciliation but also removed a potential obstacle to the return of the UTO members of the Commission to Tajikistan. Based on the same Protocol, the exchange of 49 captured government soldiers and 48 detained UTO supporters took place on 18 to 20 July 1997. Both Tajik sides confirmed at the highest level their intention to finalise the practical preparations for the Commission to begin its work inside the country as soon as possible. These preparations have focused mainly on the stationing of the 460 UTO fighters in Dushanbe.
Developments in Tajikistan and Activities of the Mission
The situation in Tajikistan continued to be volatile. Several unclaimed acts of violence took place in Dushanbe and other parts of the country. On 6 June, a bomb exploded in Khorog, the administrative capital of Gorno-Badakhshan, killing two UTO members. An officer of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was killed and a warrant officer was wounded in Dushanbe on 17 June. A bomb was detonated on 26 July, near the presidential palace in Dushanbe, injuring several persons.
In the second week of June, tensions mounted in Khatlon province south of Dushanbe when the commander of the Government's Rapid Reaction Brigade, Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, asserted control from his base in Kurgan-Tube over parts of Khatlon province and Hissar, Shakhrinau and Tursunzade. Subsequently, he took control of the Fahrabad pass, 25 kilometres south of Dushanbe. Efforts to find a negotiated solution were not successful, and in the second week of August fighting broke out between the Rapid Reaction Brigade and the Presidential Guard. On 9 August, there was heavy fighting in the northern outskirts of Dushanbe between the Ministry of Interior's Special Forces Brigade and forces of Mr. Yakub Salimov, the Customs chief, for whom Colonel Khudoiberdiev declared his support. The Customs chief's forces retreated towards the Hissar valley and, on 11 August, the Presidential Guard took Tursunzade, Hissar and Shakhrinau. As a result of contacts between Colonel Khudoiberdiev and President Rakhmonov facilitated by the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of CIS, an agreement was reached whereby Colonel Khudoiberdiev was relieved of his post by a presidential decree and both sides were to withdraw their forces. Despite the agreement, troops of the Presidential Guard and the Ministry of Interior continued to press their attack, entering Kurgan-Tube and pushing Colonel Khudoiberdiev towards Kabodion and Shaartuz, near the Uzbek border. As of this writing, Khatlon province is under the control of the Ministry of Interior and the Presidential Guard. In the wake of the fighting, UNMOT received reports of local inhabitants being harassed by these troops. Colonel Khudoiberdiev's whereabouts are unknown.
On 1 August, two sons of Mr. Amanullo Nematzoda, Mufti of Tajikistan, were kidnapped from their home near Dushanbe by armed supporters of the Sodirov brothers. In exchange for the two sons, the group demanded the release of Bakhrom Sodirov, under government custody, or $ 100,000. On 22 August, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan confirmed that it had received an official proposal from the group to exchange the two sons for Bakhrom. His brother Rizvon remains at large. On 27 August, Mr. Nematzoda was himself taken by the same group, reportedly as he attempted to secure the release of his sons. On 1 September, government forces launched an operation against the Sodirov group. The next day, Mr. Nematzoda was released but not his two sons. At the time of reporting, the situation was still ongoing.
The cease-fire between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik Opposition continued to hold until 19 August, when fighting broke out between forces loyal to opposition field commanders in the Kofarnikhon and Teppei Samarkandi areas and Ministry of Interior troops, following the arrest on criminal charges of three members of the opposition group by the local police. The opposition took three policemen hostage, demanding an exchange. The Joint Commission, together with UNMOT, negotiated the release of those held. At the same time, opposition fighters in neighbouring Turkobad took four civilians hostage, demanding the return of a vehicle that had been confiscated by the police. The same Joint Commission/UNMOT team negotiated their release. However, the situation in Turkobad continued to be tense and, on 27 August, five UTO fighters were killed in a clash with the police. Mr. Davlat Usmon, UTO Chief of Staff, together with members of the Joint Commission, went to the area in order to establish the facts and defuse tension. However, on 29 August, intense fighting took place between UTO members and Ministry of Defence troops about 9 kilometres east of Dushanbe. UTO took nine prisoners, of whom five were released the next day.
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Activities
The return of UN personnel in early May permitted the resumption of humanitarian assistance in the country. However, the fighting among government forces in August forced a temporary evacuation of staff from the Khatlon area and a reduction of activities by UN agencies. The current donor alert, which was extended through August 1997, resulted in only half of the requested $ 22 million, mostly against World Food Programme (WFP) food aid requirements.
... The UNHCR resumed voluntary repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan on 17 July. As at 28 August, more than 3,000 persons were repatriated through Nizhniy-Pyanj ... Some 2,000 internally displaced persons were airlifted from Khorog to Dushanbe by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and another 2,600 were returned from Dushanbe to Darvaz district and Sagirdasht with government assistance. UN Functions in the Implementation of the Inter-Tajik Agreements The signing of the General Agreement and the subsequent convening of the Commission on National Reconciliation launched the period of transition, during which the refugees are to return; the UTO fighters are to be demobilised or reintegrated into the governmental structures; the armed forces, police and security apparatus are to be reformed; and the democratic processes in the country are to be improved, leading to elections and the formation of a new Government.
... As far as UNMOT is concerned, the functions it would be required to perform during the transition period can be summarised as follows: ... provide good offices and expert advice; cooperate with the Commission on National Reconciliation and its subcommissions, and with the Central Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum; participate in the work of the Contact Group and serve as its coordinator; monitor the cease-fire; monitor the assembly of UTO fighters and their reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation; provide initial assistance for the reintegration into the governmental power structures or demobilisation of ex-combatants; coordinate UN assistance to Tajikistan during the transition period.
Political Issues
The Commission on National Reconciliation is the main organ through which the Tajik parties intend to implement the General Agreement. Composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Government and UTO, and chaired by the leader of UTO, Mr. Nuri, it is to oversee the implementation of the agreements in all their aspects and, among other things, propose new legislation, provide guidance for the disbandment, disarmament and reintegration of the UTO fighters and work on the reform of the power structures. UNMOT would be required to work closely with the Commission and its subcommissions. This would entail participating in its meetings and activities, providing information and advice and exercising good offices when the need arises.
Military Issues
The assembly of armed UTO units in the agreed areas (in Vanj, Garm, Jirgatal, Komsomolabad, Kofarnikhon, Rushan, Tavildara, Tajikabad districts and the towns of Khorog and Magmurud), their registration and eventual reintegration into the national army/police, or their demobilisation, is to take place in three stages within six months, and the full merger of former UTO units with the governmental power structures is to be completed by 1 July 1998. The establishment of the assembly areas, the registration of the UTO personnel and the guarding of their weapons will be undertaken by the Tajik parties themselves. The UTO personnel will be assembled as organised military units and will be subordinated to the appropriate Tajik chain of command within one month of assembly. The responsibilities envisaged for UNMOT involve good offices, technical advice and monitoring. UNMOT would establish a team at each assembly area to carry out these functions.
... In connection with the transfer of UTO units from Afghanistan, the military subcommission of the Commission on National Reconciliation and UNMOT are to travel to Afghanistan and draw up a register of weapons and ammunition. Subject to the agreement of the Afghan authorities, it is envisaged that this would take place on Afghan territory at the two agreed crossing points, Ishkashim and Nizhniy Pyanj. After entering Tajik territory, the UTO units and their arms and ammunition are to be escorted to the assembly areas by the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of CIS, monitored by UNMOT. UN military observers would be stationed at the crossing points to perform these functions. Additional observers would monitor movement to the assembly areas.
... Maintaining the good order and discipline of the UTO personnel during the period of assembly and until their assignment to a regular army or police unit, or their demobilisation, as the case may be, will be a key element in the implementation of the General Agreement and the maintenance of the cease-fire during the delicate initial period of the transition process. An important factor in this will be that these personnel are adequately supplied with food, fuel and other necessities. Tajikistan is already dependent on outside assistance for meeting its most basic needs, and cannot assure that the requirements for the assembly areas will be met. At the same time, many donors have regulations that exclude assistance to military forces. Therefore, start-up funds would be included in the cost estimates for UNMOT so that it can assist with supplies for the first two to three months. The assessed budget would be reduced to the extent that voluntary contributions are made available.
It will be necessary to continue efforts to maintain a cease-fire in the country. UNMOT would therefore continue to discharge its current functions in this regard, deploy as necessary and carry out patrols and investigations, with a view to defusing tensions and containing conflicts that may arise. UN military observers would be stationed, as required, in locations other than the assembly areas, and observers would also be held in readiness in Dushanbe to go to areas of conflict together with representatives of the Tajik parties. It should be noted that the Joint Commission, established in accordance with the 1994 cease-fire agreement, will continue as a subsidiary organ of the Commission on National Reconciliation.
International Assistance
[A meeting of potential donors will focs on] activities directly related to the implementation of the [inter-Tajik ] agreements, and in particular its critical first stages. This involves relief, assistance and rehabilitation programmes for returning refugees and demobilised fighters, the design and provision of vocational training programmes for demobilised fighters and government soldiers returning to work, and support and technical assistance to the Commission on National Reconciliation and government agencies. Such programmes would aim to consolidate the gains made during the negotiating process as well as to lay the foundations for the rehabilitation, development and democratisation of Tajikistan. Under Mr. Merrem's leadership, UN agencies, bilateral agencies and non-governmental organisations have prepared a draft document addressing the specific support requirements for the peace process. It is hoped that the parties will have made sufficient progress in their preparations for the implementation of the agreements to warrant the convening of potential donors in mid-October.
... I have given my Special Representative authority during the transition period over all UN entities in Tajikistan. To assist him in discharging this responsibility, I intend to appoint the UN Resident Coordinator as his Deputy. At United Nations Headquarters, a Task Force on Tajikistan has been established, in which all relevant departments and agencies are represented, to establish priorities for peace-building and to ensure coordination.
Timetable
The General Agreement does not contain a formal timetable for all the steps to be taken during the transition period. The statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation stipulates that it is a temporary body and is to cease its activity after the convening of the new Parliament and the formation of its leadership structures. It is anticipated that UNMOT would be required to function until that takes place. During the negotiations, the deadline of July 1998 in the protocol on military issues was taken as the target date for the completion of the transition as a whole.
Strengthening of UNMOT
To carry out its expanded tasks, UNMOT would need to be strengthened significantly. In view of the responsibilities of UNMOT for the Commission on National Reconciliation and the Contact Group, the Mission's civil affairs component would need to be increased and additional expertise added in the areas of public law (including human rights), police, electoral affairs and coordination of international assistance for the implementation of the General Agreement. UNMOT should also have an effective public information capacity to assist in keeping the Tajik population, as well as the international community, informed of relevant developments during this critical period.
The military component of UNMOT would be increased from its present authorised strength of 45 to 120 military observers. The observers would be organised in small teams to be deployed at the 10 assembly areas, the two crossing points and certain regional centres, as well as the headquarters in Dushanbe. The number takes into account that the crossing points are to be closed after two months. It is anticipated that the number of military observers could be reduced once the merger of former UTO units with the governmental power structures is under way. The administrative component of UNMOT would be strengthened to support the larger Mission, as would its communications, road and air transport and other facilities, bearing in mind the mountainous terrain and the bad state of repair of the roads, many of which are cut off as a result of damage or will be impassable for several months in winter.
Security
[Security] remains a serious concern ... The area that is currently considered to pose the greatest risk extends from Dushanbe to Komsomolabad, through which runs the Mission's main road and air route for the movement and supply of the teams to be stationed in the Karategin valley and in the Tavildara sector. Several groups, which do not appear to be fully controlled by either the Government or UTO, operate in the area. The two hostage incidents in December 1996 and February 1997, which involved UN personnel, and the ongoing incident involving the Mufti took place in this area, as did the recent clashes between UTO groups and the police.
In my previous report I raised the possibility of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of CIS assuming responsibility for the protection of UN personnel, provided all the parties agree. So far, this condition has not been met. Alternatively, I have studied the possibility of deploying a UN infantry battalion. However, to be effective such a unit would require the agreement and cooperation of the parties; this has not been forthcoming. In the circumstances, I have explored with the parties the possibility that they themselves might jointly provide security for UN personnel with a combined force drawn from the Tajik army and the unit of 460 UTO fighters to be stationed in Dushanbe. This would be at the same time a confidence-building measure and a first step towards the reintegration of UTO fighters into the national army. The parties have not yet responded formally to this proposal.
Contributors of Personnel, as at 4 September 1997:
UNMOT comprises 44 military observers from Austria (5), Bangladesh (7), Bulgaria (6), Denmark (4), Jordan (5), Poland (3), Switzerland (5), Ukraine (3) and Uruguay (6), and 63 civilian personnel, of whom 23 are internationally recruited. In addition to its headquarters in Dushanbe, UNMOT maintained its team site in Khujand and re-established teams in Khorog, Kalaikhum, Garm and Kurgan-Tube. Mr. Merrem continued as my Special Representative and Head of Mission. Brigadier-General Boleslaw Izydorczyk (Poland) continued as Chief Military Observer".
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UNSG'S REPORT, 19 JULY (S/1997/564)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Elections
"... On 9 June, Prime Minister Rosny Smarth announced the resignation of his Government, saying that he had been hamstrung by tensions within the ruling coalition and lamenting, in particular, certain developments surrounding recent elections ... On 6 April, the first round of elections for one third of the Senate and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the election of thousands of members of local assemblies were held without major incident ... Overall, less than 10 per cent of the electorate are believed to have cast ballots, but no firm statistics are available.
... In a letter to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) dated 7 May, the Electoral Observer Mission of the Organisation of American States (OAS-EOM), which is monitoring the process at the request of the Government, cited irregularities and "attempts to manipulate the results" in some jurisdictions.
... the Council did not answer formally the petitions of the candidates who were objecting to the results. This led the OPL to announce that it would not participate in the second round unless the results of the first round were re-examined and corrective measures taken.
Further disquiet has been caused by the CEP decision not to sanction some electoral officials in areas with the most irregularities, but to transfer them to other areas. In response to these transfers, the Open Gate Party (PLB) also withdrew from the race just days before the date set for the second round, citing its lack of confidence in the Council.
Attempts by the international community to help the two sides find common ground have floundered. After the withdrawal of two of three participating parties, the second round was postponed for the second time and it has not been rescheduled. Both the OPL and the PLB continue to ask for a number of remedial measures, including the replacement of CEP.
Meanwhile, the existing CEP is attempting to complete the local assembly elections. Complementary local elections were held on 6 July. According to OAS-EOM, these elections, which were announced just five days in advance, were marred by many of the same problems as those in April. Participation was extremely low and, in some places, there were indications of ballot-stuffing.
Security
With respect to security, the situation since my last report has been characterised by continuing unrest, largely as a result of discontent over the country's economic situation and lack of improvement in living conditions, as well as factionalism within the ruling Lavalas movement. There were many demonstrations, blockades and incidents of violence, some of which were related to the elections. The PLB candidate for the Senate for the West Département was the target of several attacks. ... The international community itself has now come under attack and is being blamed for the country's continuing difficulties. Some popular organisations have publicly opposed what they term a "foreign occupation".
... Incidents related to the political rivalries within the ruling Lavalas movement and to growing frustrations over deteriorating living conditions have posed greater demands on the Haitian National Police (HNP), which by and large has performed well.
... The increased circulation of weapons in Haitian society and new and more sophisticated forms of organised crime are also proving a formidable challenge to the fledgling police force. Increasing illegal traffic, particularly in drugs and vehicles, is a growing concern in need of urgent attention ... Gang warfare, particularly in the dense urban slum of Cité Soleil, has also taxed the ability of HNP ability to respond forcefully within the confines of the rule of law and respect for the rights of suspects. Police officers suffer frequent attacks, often by armed individuals. Disappointed that the justice system is not keeping pace with developments, some of them have on occasion taken matters into their own hands.
Despite an agreement between the Governments of Haiti and the neighbouring Dominican Republic, forced repatriations of undocumented Haitians from the Dominican Republic have continued, though at a much slower pace. Through its offices in Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has been working with the two Governments on the issue.
... In extending the mandate of UNSMIH until 31 May and, subsequently, until 31 July 1997, the Security Council endorsed my recommendation to maintain the Mission's authorised strength of 300 civilian police and 500 troops. As the Council is aware, in addition to that authorised strength, the UNSMIH military element includes 800 personnel from Canada and Pakistan whose activities are financed exclusively by voluntary contributions from Canada and the United States of America. The civilian police element of the mission currently numbers 225 officers from eight countries. ... The UNSMIH military element continues to be deployed exclusively in the city of Port-au-Prince, which it patrols on a 24-hour basis
... Members of the UNSMIH civilian police element are deployed in 10 detachments in the provinces and 5 in Port-au-Prince and they continue to accompany HNP officers in their day-to-day activities ... In light of recent disturbances in the country, UNSMIH has worked intensively to strengthen the HNP crowd-control and rapid-intervention capabilities.
Observations
... I recommend that the Security Council examine carefully the facts given in the present report in order to decide upon the maintenance of a UN support of HNP for a period of four months. Were this to be agreed, the Security Council could establish a new mission to be known as the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), the mandate of which would be to support the Haitian authorities in the further professionalisation of HNP. My Special Representative would continue to coordinate the activities of the UN system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.
If the Security Council approves such a mandate, and bearing in mind that countries contributing the majority of the civilian police element are not prepared to deploy their officers without appropriate military backing, the new Mission should be composed of military and civilian police elements. Mindful of the financial crisis in which the UN currently finds itself, as well as of the unpaid contributions to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)/UNSMIH special accounts, and conscious of the need to reduce the strength of the UN presence in Haiti, I recommend that the UN-assessed strength of the new Mission be substantially reduced - the civilian police element from 300 to 250 officers and the military element from 500 personnel to a military headquarters staff of 50.
In view of the progress achieved so far by UNSMIH, the primary task of the military element would be to support the activities of the United Nations civilian police, and some of its earlier tasks would be gradually discontinued. The 50 headquarters personnel would be supplemented by contingents provided by Canada and Pakistan and funded by voluntary contributions. In that regard, the Governments of Canada and the United States of America have expressed their readiness to continue to make the necessary financial contributions.
During the forthcoming four months, the civilian police element would gradually shift its tasks to the training of three of the HNP specialised units - crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security - which are considered of distinct importance. Once reinforced, these units would considerably improve the force's effectiveness while it pursues its own development. The Mission and UNDP would also continue to prepare a technical assistance programme, which would be financed by the voluntary fund established under resolution 975 (1995). The envisaged programme aims to provide HNP with top-level law enforcement expertise over the next three years.
... Should the Security Council authorise the deployment of UNTMIH, the expiration of the peacekeeping mandate, on 30 November 1997, would not mean the termination of UN involvement in Haiti. Indeed, it will be important for the international community to continue to assist the activities of the Government of Haiti aimed at the strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as to maintain a strong support to the building of a professional police force. A follow-on presence in order to provide advice and active support in the fields of public security and judicial reform, as well as in the monitoring of human rights, will be required for at least the medium term. Special attention would also have to be paid to the country's growing problem in drug trafficking, for which it might be useful to benefit from the expertise of the UN International Drug Control Programme. In this context, I will make further recommendations on the modalities of international assistance after 30 November 1997. The political support of the international community for these UN activities, which constitute peace-building in its best sense, will be essential.
UNTMIH FACTS AND FIGURES, 4 AUGUST
Headquarters: Port au Prince.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission:
Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela); Force Commander: General Robin Gagnon (Canada); Police Commissioner: Colonel Jean-Claude Laparra (France).
Financing: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account.
Estimated Budget: $10.1 million (gross) from 1 August to 30 November 1997.
Contributors of Personnel, as at 10 July 1997:
Algeria: 14 (CP); Benin: 10 (CP); Canada: 422 (O), 34 (MH), 300 (VF), 62 (CP); France: 44 (CP); India: 3 (CP); Mali: 38 (CP); Pakistan: 25 (O), 19 (MH), 500 (VF); Togo: 7 (CP); US: 47 (CP); Total: 447 Operational (O), 53 Military Headquarters (MH), 800 Voluntarily Funded (VF), 225 Civilian Police (CP).
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RES. 1127 (1997), 28 AUGUST (S/RES/1127)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Demands that the Government of Angola and in particular UNITA complete fully and without further delay the remaining aspects of the peace process and refrain from any action which might lead to renewed hostilities;
Demands also that UNITA implement immediately its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, including demilitarisation of all its forces, transformation of its radio station Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility and full cooperation in the process of the normalisation of State administration throughout Angola;
Demands further that UNITA provide immediately to the Joint Commission, as established under the Lusaka Protocol, accurate and complete information with regard to the strength of all armed personnel under its control, including the security detachment of the Leader of UNITA, the so-called "mining police", armed UNITA personnel returning from outside the national boundaries, and any other armed UNITA personnel, not previously reported to the UN, in order for them to be verified, disarmed and demobilised in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol and agreements between the parties in the context of the Joint Commission, and condemns any attempts by UNITA to restore its military capabilities;
Determining that the resulting situation in Angola constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN,Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures:
(a) To prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of all senior officials of UNITA and of adult members of their immediate families, as designated in accordance with paragraph 11 (a) below, except those officials necessary for the full functioning of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the National Assembly, or the Joint Commission, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals;
(b) To suspend or cancel all travel documents, visas or residence permits issued to senior UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families, as designated in accordance with paragraph 11 (a) below, with the exceptions referred to in subparagraph (a) above;
(c) To require the immediate and complete closure of all UNITA offices in their territories;
(d) With a view to prohibiting flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft
(i) to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if it has taken off from or is destined to land at a place in the territory of Angola other than one on a list supplied by the Government of Angola to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), which shall notify Member States;
(ii) to prohibit, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the supply of or making available in any form, any aircraft or aircraft components to the territory of Angola other than through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by the Government of Angola to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), which shall notify Member States;
(iii) to prohibit, by their nationals or from their territories, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing, the certification of airworthiness, the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts, or the provision or renewal of direct insurance with respect to any aircraft registered in Angola other than those on a list to be provided by the Government of Angola to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), which shall notify Member States, or with respect to any aircraft which entered the territory of Angola other than through a point of entry included in the list referred to in subparagraph (d) (i) above;
Further decides that the measures set out in paragraph 4 above shall not apply to cases of medical emergency or to flights of aircraft carrying food, medicine, or supplies for essential humanitarian needs, as approved in advance by the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993);
Urges all States and international and regional organisations to stop travel by their officials and official delegations to the central headquarters of UNITA, except for the purposes of travel to promote the peace process and humanitarian assistance;
Decides also that the provisions of paragraph 4 above shall come into force without any further notice at 00.01 EST on 30 September 1997, unless the Security Council decides, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, that UNITA has taken concrete and irreversible steps to comply with all the obligations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 above;
... Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of additional measures, such as trade and financial restrictions, if UNITA does not fully comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and all relevant Security Council resolutions;
... Requests the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993):
(a) To draw up guidelines expeditiously for the implementation of paragraph 4 of this resolution, including the designation of officials and of adult members of their immediate families whose entry or transit is to be prevented and whose travel documents, visas or residence permits are to be suspended or cancelled in accordance with paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) above;
(b) To give favourable consideration to, and decide upon, requests for the exceptions set out in paragraph 5 above;
(c) To report to the Council by 15 November 1997 regarding the actions taken by States to implement the measures set out in paragraph 4 above;
Requests Member States having information on flights prohibited in paragraph 4 (d) above to provide this information to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) for distribution to Member States;
Requests also Member States to provide to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) information on the measures they have adopted to implement the provisions of paragraph 4 above no later than 1 November 1997".
RES. 1125 (1997), 6 AUGUST, (S/RES/1125) SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Concerned by the grave crisis facing the Central African Republic, Taking note with appreciation of the signing of the Bangui Agreements (S/1997/561, Appendixes III-VI) of 25 January 1997 and the creation of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB),
Concerned by the fact that, in the Central African Republic, former mutineers, members of militias and other persons continue to bear arms in contravention of the Bangui Agreements,
... Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, Welcomes the efforts of the Member States which participate in MISAB and of those Member States which support them;
Approves the continued conduct by Member States participating in MISAB of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective to facilitate the return to peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements in the Central African Republic as stipulated in the mandate of MISAB (S/1997/561, Appendix I), including through the supervision of the surrendering of arms of former mutineers, militias and all other persons unlawfully bearing arms;
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, authorises the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel; Decides that the authorisation referred to ... above will be limited to an initial period of three months from the adoption of this resolution, at which time the Council will assess the situation;
... Stresses that the expenses and logistical support for the force will be borne on a voluntary basis in accordance with article 11 of the mandate of MISAB".
RES. 1120 (1997), 14 JULY, (S/RES/1120)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
... Strongly urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to eliminate promptly the administrative and legal obstacles to the return of refugees and displaced persons, in particular those posed by the Law on Temporary Take Over and Administration of Specified Property; to create the necessary conditions of security, safety, and social and economic opportunity for those returning to their homes in Croatia, including the prompt payment of pensions; and to foster the successful implementation of the Agreement on the Operational Procedures of Return (S/1997/341) treating all returnees equally, regardless of ethnic origin;
Urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to eliminate ambiguities in implementation of the Amnesty Law, and to implement it fairly and objectively in accordance with international standards, in particular by concluding all investigations of crimes covered by the amnesty and undertaking an immediate and comprehensive review with UN and local Serb participation of all charges outstanding against individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law which are not covered by the amnesty in order to end proceedings against all individuals against whom there is insufficient evidence;
Decides to extend the mandate of UNTAES until 15 January 1998, as envisaged in its resolution 1079 (1996) of 15 November 1996 as well as in the Basic Agreement;
Endorses the plan for the gradual devolution of executive responsibility for civil administration in the Region by the Transitional Administrator, as set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 June 1997; Endorses the plan for restructuring UNTAES, as set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 June 1997, and, in particular, the proposal for achieving the drawdown of the UNTAES military component by 15 October 1997;
Stresses that the pace of the gradual devolution of executive responsibility would be commensurate with Croatia's demonstrated ability to reassure the Serb population and successfully complete peaceful reintegration;
... Stresses the importance of demilitarisation of the area, and in that context stresses further the importance of achieving bilateral agreements on demilitarisation and a liberal border regime in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, accompanied by appropriate confidence-building measures as suggested in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 June 1997;
Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia, inter alia, to initiate a country-wide public programme of national reconciliation, to take all necessary steps for the official establishment and legal registration of the Joint Council of Municipalities, and to fulfil all its obligations as specified in the various agreements signed with UNTAES;
Welcomes the renewed mandate of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 26 June 1997 (S/1997/522, annex) providing for a continued and reinforced OSCE presence in the Republic of Croatia, with a particular focus on two-way return of all refugees and displaced persons, protection of their rights, and the protection of persons belonging to national minorities, welcomes also the decision of OSCE for the build-up starting July 1997 of its mission personnel with a view to full deployment by 15 January 1998, and urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to cooperate fully with the OSCE mission to that end".
RES. 1119 (1997), 14 JULY, (S/RES/1119)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Authorises the UN military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995) and paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1028) until 15 January 1998;
Renews its calls upon the parties to abide by their mutual commitments, implement fully the Agreement on Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 23 August 1996, adopt the practical options proposed by the UN military observers for the improvement of safety and security in the area, cease all violations of the demilitarisation regime and military or other activities which may increase tension and cooperate fully with the UN military observers and ensure their safety and freedom of movement, including through the removal of landmines".
RES. 1123 (1997), 30 JULY, (S/RES/1123)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Affirms the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully functioning national police force of adequate size and structure, able to conduct the full spectrum of police functions, to the consolidation of democracy and the revitalisation of Haiti's system of justice;
Decides ... at the request of the President of the Republic of Haiti, to establish the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) with a mandate limited to a single four-month period ending on 30 November 1997 in order to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police, as set out in paragraphs 32 to 39 of the Secretary-General's report of 19 July 1997;
Further decides that UNTMIH be composed of up to 250 civilian police, and 50 military personnel to form the headquarters of a security element; Decides that the security element of UNTMIH, under the authority of the Force Commander, will ensure the safety and freedom of movement of those UN personnel implementing the mandate;
Further decides that UNTMIH will assume responsibility for all elements and assets of UNSMIH remaining in Haiti to deploy as appropriate until they are withdrawn; Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the UN and by Member States pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions in order to carry out the provisions of the mandate as set out in paragraph 2 above;
... Recognises that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constitute the major tasks facing the Haitian Government and people and that significant international assistance is indispensable for sustainable development in Haiti, and stresses the commitment of the international community to a long-term programme of support for Haiti;
Requests all States to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund established in resolution 975 (1995) for the Haitian National Police, in particular for the recruitment and deployment of police advisers to assist the Inspector General, Directorate General and department headquarters of the Haitian National Police".
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LESTER B. PEARSON INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE
The Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre aims to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability. The Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programmes. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is an independent organisation established by the Government of Canada in 1994, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre accomplishes its mandate by providing research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.
For more information on courses run by the Pearson Centre, contact the Registrar at:
Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, Po Box 100 Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Tel: (902) 638-8611 ex. 109, fax: (902) 638-8888;
Email: registrar@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
Internet: http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
PEACEKEEPING CITATION LIST: CENTRE FOR DEFENCE INFORMATION
For information on research in the peacekeeping area, contact Colonel Dan Smith at:
Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700; Fax: (202) 862 0708;
E-Mail: dsmith@cdi.org
Internet Site: http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/
UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping, including demining, mission up-dates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel contributors, rapid deployment facilities, and training is available on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
UN INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, PROGRAMME OF CORRESPONDENCE INSTRUCTION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UNITAR POCI)
UNITAR POCI provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the courses is available on-line at:
http://www.wm.edu/unpeace/index.html
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PART II: MEASURES AND PROPOSALS
Peace, Security and Disarmament
"The end of the Cold War transformed the international context of UN missions and activities. In the area of peace and security, the Organisation now finds itself primarily concerned with intra-state conflicts, often with serious international implications and, in many cases, complex humanitarian emergencies. Recent trends suggest that these types of conflicts will continue to require priority attention by the UN.
The Security Council, after decades of stalemate, is now at the centre of international efforts to maintain international peace and security. There is widespread agreement on some of the concepts to guide action by the UN in the peace and security field: recognition of the role of the Secretary-General in preventive action; the necessity of comprehensive approaches in which the political, human rights, military, humanitarian and developmental assets of the Organisation are deployed to promote peace and human security; a coherent engagement and partnership with regional organisations and other external actors.
The complexity of the peacekeeping mandates of the Security Council and the lack of sufficient resources and political will to implement them undermined UN efforts in a number of conflicts. It is, however, clear that peacekeeping will remain an indispensable instrument of the UN and it is thus crucial to maintain the Organisation's capacity to plan, manage and conduct these operations efficiently and successfully.
The UN does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under present conditions, ad hoc Member States coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict. As in the past, a mandate from the Security Council authorising such a course of action is essential if the enforcement operation is to have broad international support and legitimacy.
In recent years, the Security Council has called, with increasing frequency, for economic sanctions as an enforcement tool under Chapter VII. The universal character of the UN makes it an especially appropriate body to consider and oversee such measures. Consideration needs to be given, however, to making these sanctions more effective in achieving the goal of modifying the behaviour of those targeted, while limiting the collateral damages. There is also a need to address the broader humanitarian and economic effects of sanctions, as well as objective criteria in their application, and for their termination.
At the present time, the vision of the Charter of a workable system of collective security has yet to be fully realised. The Organisation still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. Troops for peacekeeping missions are in some cases not made available by Member States or made available under conditions which constrain effective response. Peacemaking and human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations.
Preventive Action
The prevalence of intra-state warfare and multi-faceted crises in the present period has added new urgency to the need for a better understanding of their root causes. It is recognised that greater emphasis should be placed on timely and adequate preventive action. The UN of the twenty-first century must become increasingly a focus of preventive measures.
The Organisation is already maintaining a global watch to detect potential threats to international peace and security with the objective of supporting the efforts of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to deter conflict. Improving this capacity will require close contact with the Security Council and stronger cooperation with governments, especially those with relevant capabilities, as well as with regional or subregional organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic and other institutions.
Peacekeeping
A critical lesson from past experience is the need to be able to deploy operations quickly so as to establish a credible presence at an early stage and prevent a further intensification of armed conflict. Consultations are currently underway with Member States to explore the optimal means of funding the nucleus of a rapidly deployable mission headquarters - a small, multidisciplinary group which would be the first in the field to set an operation in motion.
Readiness on the part of the Organisation must be coupled with the ready availability of trained and equipped troops. A number of States, within the context of the UN Standby Arrangements, are developing units which could deploy immediately upon a decision of the Security Council. Most encouraging is the decision of a group of Member States to participate in the establishment of a standby high-readiness brigade. The availability of troops continues to depend on whether their respective governments are prepared to commit them on a case-by-case basis. An effective system of global security can only be said to exist if the Council can dispatch rapidly military forces with the requisite predictability and reliability.
Serious financial constraints have often affected the establishment and proper functioning of peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping accounts have furthermore had to be used to cover shortfalls in the UN regular budget. The result is a delay in payments to troop-contributing countries. This is an intolerable situation which cannot be allowed to continue. If the Organisation is to continue its work for international peace and security, and do it well, it needs the continuity provided by a sufficient base of resources from the regular budget, mission budgets and peacekeeping support account.
Considerable difficulties are also at times encountered in negotiating and properly implementing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
Amendments proposed by certain host governments sometimes constitute fundamental departures from the customary practices and principles applicable to UN peacekeeping operations, and negotiating on such a basis delays the conclusion of an acceptable agreement. A timeframe prescribed by the Security Council for the conclusion of the SOFA and an inclusion in the resolution establishing the operation of a provision to the effect that the model SOFA shall apply provisionally, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, would contribute to expediting its conclusion.
Recommendation
That governments possessing the relevant capabilities establish the practice of providing information to the Secretary-General which would strengthen his efforts in preventive action.
That the Security Council and the General Assembly consider measures to enhance the rapid reaction capacity of the UN.
That the Security Council, in establishing a peacekeeping operation, prescribe a timeframe for the conclusion of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and the host government for the operation in question and that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model SOFA (document A/45/594) would apply provisionally.
Cooperation with Regional Organisations
Different regional organisations have been involved in preventive action, peacekeeping and other peace-related activities carried out under a Security Council mandate. Based on Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Organisation has developed a number of complementary efforts with regional organisations and arrangements in carrying out these activities. These have included co-deployment of field operations, such as in Georgia and Liberia, and the designation of a joint UN-OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes. Cooperation with regional organisations will be intensified and regional organisations will increasingly become partners of the UN in all activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security, including conflict-prevention.
Secretariat Reforms
It is now widely accepted that present day conflicts have many dimensions that must be addressed comprehensively and require more integrated and coordinated action. Wide-ranging reforms have already been put in place, and cooperation between DPA, DPKO, DHA and other relevant departments and entities called upon to mount and participate in field operations has been considerably expanded. Lines of authority and reporting from field missions have been clarified and information-sharing and coordination between the Departments and with other entities of the system, particularly on humanitarian matters, has been enhanced. The Executive Committees on Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs will examine ways to strengthen cooperation among the Departments concerned, in particular with regard to information gathering and analysis and to gain the maximum possible benefit from lessons learned in the conduct of field missions.
Within DPKO, civilian-military integration is being tightened and reinforced. While much has already been accomplished in this regard, further progress will be difficult as long as a number of units, in the absence of budgeted posts, are staffed almost entirely by gratis military officers. The existing capacity of DPKO must be consolidated by ensuring civilian-military cooperation in all areas from the planning and preparation of an operation through its implementation, closure, and post-mission analysis. This can only be achieved with a budget that reflects the Department's real personnel requirements.
An integrated approach is particularly important in the field, where lack of cohesion or differences among the UN entities can be exploited by the parties. It is for this reason that the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is so vital. In countries where large multidisciplinary field operations are in place, the Special Representative will ensure that the efforts of the different components of the system are mutually reinforcing. In such circumstances, the Special Representative has authority over the force commanders, civilian police commissioners, resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators.
Action 3: A plan will be developed to phase out the use of gratis personnel in the Secretariat at the earliest possible date.
Action 4: In the field, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will have authority over all UN entities.
Post-conflict Peace-building
In recent years, post-conflict peace-building has assumed new prominence in the work of the UN. The concept of post-conflict peace-building refers to the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions; the monitoring of elections; the promotion of human rights; the provision of reintegration and rehabilitation programmes and the creation of conditions for resumed development. Peace-building does not replace on-going humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crises. Rather it aims to build on them and introduce further activities or re-orientation of existing ones which, in addition to their intrinsic humanitarian or developmental value, are politically relevant because they reduce the risk of resumption of conflict and contribute to creating conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. The multi-dimensional nature of such an enterprise demands effective coordination measures.
As focal point and convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, DPA will work particularly closely with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, DPKO, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, bearing in mind in particular the importance in determining the point at which the emphasis on peace-building role will give way to full-fledged reconstruction and development activities. Task forces will continue to be established to ensure integrated action by the entire UN system, the chairmanship being decided on each occasion on a pragmatic basis. The focal point will support and reinforce the work of these task forces.
Action 5: With immediate effect, the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as the current convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, will be the focal point within the UN for post-conflict peace-building. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, in collaboration with other executive committees as appropriate, will be responsible for the design and implementation of post-conflict peace-building initiatives, including the definition of objectives, criteria and operational guidelines for post-conflict peace-building by the organisations of the UN system".
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Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Wilkinson (MBE)
Directorate General of Development and Doctrine
Ministry of Defence
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson is responsible for the development of Peace Support Operations for the British Armed Forces
The formulation of doctrine to cover the sort of military operations involving British troops on behalf of the United Nations (UN) has been through various stages of development. In the early years after the Second World War, the United Kingdom (UK) was not directly involved in UN military activities, with the exception of Korea. The main roles of British Forces were the occupation of Germany and countering insurgencies in Greece, Palestine and Malaya. Only after the Greek-Turkish crisis in Cyprus during 1963, and the more serious confrontation in 1974, did the UK become actively involved in military peacekeeping (PK) duties on behalf of the UN. It was not until 1988, that the Army produced a publication addressing PK doctrine.
Since that first PK doctrinal publication in 1988, and with the demise of the Cold War, the development of PK doctrine, now expanded to embrace Peace Support Operations (PSO), has been dynamic and seen several iterations. PSO is now the term used to cover PK and peace enforcement (PE). Various terms and definitions have been proposed including "Second Generation Peacekeeping", "Chapter 6 1/2 Operations" and the Army's own "Wider Peacekeeping", to name but a few. All have made valuable contributions to the doctrinal debate. However, operational experience continues to move on and the British Armed Forces (not just the British Army) are currently staffing a new doctrine for "PSO" which reflects the most recent and widest range of operational lessons, and seeks to provide doctrine for the whole range of future PSO, and in particular PE. Other peace related operations, such as conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building, are seen as principally the preserve of the diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, albeit closely supported by military activities, so are not addressed directly in the new doctrine.
The aim of this article is to describe how British PSO doctrine has developed post-Cold War, and to give a brief insight into the new Joint (ie tri-service) Publication.
In 1988, the Army produced Army Field Manual "Peacekeeping Operations". This was a manual designed to provide guidance for the conduct of traditional UN inter-state PK operations. That no manual had been produced until then was perhaps because the Army considered that, with its long and wide experience of counterinsurgency (COIN), and in support of the police in Northern Ireland, these relatively benign PK operations were manageable without specific doctrinal guidance. The frequently expressed view that PK is not a job for soldiers but that only soldiers can do it, is not necessarily an opinion widely held in a full-time professional army! Wit
h the demise of the Cold War, however, the nature of PK operations changed. Operations were increasingly in volatile environments, such as Cambodia, Somalia or Bosnia, and such complex emergencies clearly did require a greater degree of doctrinal guidance than hitherto existed. In 1994, in response to an urgent operational requirement to meet the doctrinal needs for UNPROFOR, the Army's Directorate of Land Warfare produced Army Field Manual "Wider Peacekeeping". This was designed to offer guidance for PK in the conditions as they existed in the Balkans at the time.
UNPROFOR achieved as much as could reasonably be expected within the limitations of resources and political will, and it is generally acknowledged, in 'lessons learnt reports', that "Wider Peacekeeping" provided the doctrinal basis which prevented the operation from turning into a debacle. Any perceived failures of UNPROFOR were due not to military incompetence, or a failure of doctrine, but to a lack of international will and commitment. In the absence of coherent international policy, there was no military alternative but to maintain the military operation with the hope that there would eventually be some political movement. However, military operations are no substitute for political initiatives, and the tactical actions of UNPROFOR could only put off the inevitable day when an operational commander would have to force the issue at the political level. In mid-95, UNPROFOR was eventually confronted by "the fork in the road"; becoming incredible and untenable or switching to enforcement. The choice of the enforcement route kick-started the political process.
With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that UNPROFOR was the wrong force, with the wrong mission for the volatile circumstances which prevailed at the time in Bosnia. From a wider PSO perspective, it is now generally considered that the tasks given to UNPROFOR could only have been accomplished and sustained by a combat capable PE force. With that perspective, it has been necessary to re-examine "Wider Peacekeeping". Wider peacekeeping was defined as "the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile". It is now generally accepted, however, that stretching peacekeeping doctrine into volatile areas may over-stretch the credibility of the PK force to a degree that the operation may eventually become untenable. "Wider Peacekeeping" was a pragmatic response, to an urgent operational need, which worked and sustained UNPROFOR for a number of years. It was always acknowledged that the manual was Bosnia specific, hence it was issued as an "interim" manual only.
Three years since the issue of "Wider Peacekeeping" it is clear that there is sufficient experience and need, both nationally and internationally, to produce a new doctrinal manual for PSO. This manual is not only nationally joint, in acknowledgement of the critical participation of all three services, but is also representative of the ever widening international military consensus that exists for the conduct of these operations. Clearly it makes little sense to produce a purely national doctrine for what are multi-national operations. Neither does it make good sense to produce a military doctrine for complex emergencies which does not acknowledge the wider involvement of civilian diplomatic and aid agencies. Hence the new doctrine has been exposed widely to many other potential actors to elicit their views.
Work on this manual started with a reevaluation of all previous UN PK and PE operations (as then defined), those "small wars" in which we and other nations had been involved in the withdrawal from Empire and our experiences in support to the civil power in Northern Ireland. The fundamental and first question that needed to be answered was what made these new challenges, in what has become known as the "grey area", so different as to merit a new doctrine? The answer to that question and to why neither doctrines for PK nor "war fighting" operations were appropriate lay in an examination of operational conditions and the desired end-state. The key environmental change is that unlike traditional inter-state PK operations where the parties are generally at least politically authorised and coherent actors, in an intra-state, failing or failed state conflict the parties have neither authority or responsibility, and may be ill-disciplined, motivated by power and greed and indistinguishable from the rest of the population. Thus any predictions of the in-theatre levels of consent or other conditions may be so problematic as to be worthless. Quite simply, all may be chaos and uncertainty, and in such conditions the judicious course of action is to deploy with the necessary force levels to achieve the mission irrespective of any opposition: to deploy prepared for PE from the outset but in the hope that the application of force may not prove necessary.
While recognising the danger of concentrating on any one conflict, there are two key lessons of UNPROFOR which seem generic. The first is that "you can not fight wars from white painted vehicles" (quote General Rose). Second, you can not keep the peace unless there is a peace to keep. There is a minimum level of force capability below which enforcement is not feasible, and there is a minimum level of consent below which PK is not feasible. Having thus established the outer limits of PK, in terms of consent and force levels, it is necessary to examine what lies beyond. In the development of "Wider Peacekeeping, " and other military doctrine of that time, there was a general assumption that beyond PK lay PE, and because PE was synonymous with war, war fighting doctrine would suffice. The Gulf War was regarded by some as a PE operation. However that is a simplistic and inadequate view. PSO which are designed to win the peace and to create the conditions in which civilian agencies can address the symptoms and underlying causes of the problem require a degree of military restraint and coordination that justifies a doctrine distinct from war fighting; while acknowledging that the ability to escalate and engage in combat remains a prerequisite for the planning of PE. In the new doctrine, we therefore start by making the distinction between PE and other enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as the Korean or Gulf Wars, which had a designated enemy. Our new PE doctrine is designed specifically to fill the gap or "grey area" between PK and war.
Our considerations inevitably focused on the fundamentals of consent, impartiality and their relationship to the application of force. First, as stated with such clarity in "WPK", PK is dependent on the consent of the parties, and the promotion of cooperation and consent is fundamental for success. That view is still extant. However the view that there is a Rubicon of consent, as described in "Wider Peacekeeping", is now only seen to exist from the perspective of a lightly armed PK force. From a broader PSO perspective, there is no "Rubicon" of consent, certainly not for a combat capable PE force which is able to lower its operational profile to PK, while retaining its ability to escalate as and when required. For such a force, a general loss of consent may be viewed as a tactical reverse, but it should not threaten the existence of the mission. Of course, the conduct of all PSO is designed to create a self-sustaining peace, so the promotion of cooperation and consent is always a long term requirement.
The second most significant consideration concerns impartiality. Essentially should and could a PE force be impartial? "Should" is not difficult as the long term requirement to build consent demands an impartial approach to the conduct of operations. However, even if all PSO force actions were in support of an impartial mandate and conducted impartially, would they be perceived that way, and does it matter if they are not? Impartiality is not neutrality; impartiality requires a set of principles, generally enshrined in law or an impartial mandate, against which the actions of the belligerent parties can be judged and acted upon. Every PSO action, whether conducted impartially or not, will have consequences which inevitably penalise or favour one party more than another, and, as a consequence, PSO force activities will be seen as partial, at some stage in almost every operation, and PSO forces will be accused of partiality.
However, so long as PSO force activities are driven purely by principled impartiality, such accusations can be refuted and the subsequent damage to consent hopefully rebuilt. An analogy can help to explain. The law does not designate an enemy, it simply states those conditions which must be maintained. Just as a criminal may perceive the policeman who "collars" him as being partial, so the PSO force can expect to be accused of being partial by any party that does not comply with the operational mandate and experiences the consequences. The impartial status of the law, however, is not compromised because it penalises the guilty and protects the innocent. It is what directs and motivates the policeman or PSO practitioner that is most significant, not how he is perceived - at least in the short term.
Having restricted PK doctrine to operations where there is a peace to keep, and having identified that PE is different from war and why, we are able to define PE and offer guidance for its conduct. Most significantly in the new doctrine, military activities are described as but one of many lines of operations designed within an overarching mission plan created by the lead agency which will rarely, if ever, be the military. Within that broad context, the doctrinal approach to PE offers military commanders the maximum flexibility in the conduct of operations. It offers a wide range of enforcement and consent promoting techniques and suggests the use of enforcement where there is opposition or non-compliance, and the use of consent promoting techniques to maintain consent where it already exists, or to build consent where it is uncertain. This goes a long way to meeting the challenge of peace operations in the next century, as described by Kofi A. Annan in the last edition of Conflict Resolution Monitor, in which he described the requirement to produce a doctrine based upon an approach using a combination of techniques designed as "inducing consent" and "coercive inducement". The concept is to expand areas of consent, at the expense of areas of opposition, so as to create the greater operation space in which the diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can function. This requires military commanders to have a conceptual understanding of PSO which allows them to balance the short term advantages, which may be gained from the use of force, with the requirements of the other involved civilian agencies, and the long term demands of peace. This can only be achieved by the closest liaison between all involved civilian and military agencies.
In the process of developing our new doctrine for PSO we have monitored, collated and discussed lessons, not just from our own experiences in Bosnia, Rwanda etc, but from a wide range of other international operations. In doing so we have developed an international consensus which we have taken into the FINABEL countries, (France, Italy, Netherlands, Allemagne, Belgium, Luxembourg, and now Greece, Spain and Turkey), NATO and the Nordic nations. This consensus is reflected in the new doctrine. The aim is to have a new manual in print and available later this year. PSO remains a dynamic area and, as stated at the beginning of this article, the doctrine that has been developed is also designed to be dynamic, so that it may stand the test of operational reality in the future.
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Conflict Resolution Monitor: Issue 2, Autumn 1997
Last Update: 02/10/1997
Yuka Hasegawa