Correspondence concerning the Conflict Resolution Monitor should be directed to:
Alexander Ramsbotham
The Centre for Conflict Resolution
Department of Peace Studies
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The Conflict Resolution Monitor (CRM) is produced by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. CRM has replaced International Peacekeeping News. Many of the features of International Peacekeeping News have been retained, but the focus has been broadened to cover developments in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Our concern is to provide information and ideas which will be relevant to the international humanitarian community, faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. CRM provides information about peacekeeping deployments and peacekeeping policy debates, and lists conferences, research and publications, and training events. Our Commentary section provides short commentaries from experts and practitioners. In this issue, we feature a piece by Mike Pugh which provides some critical reflections on, and assessments of emerging doctrines of peace support operations and their role in the resolution of post-cold war conflicts. In particular, Mike Pugh's conclusion points to an important question mark in relation to emerging doctrine: i.e. there is a danger that insularity from civilian and conflict resolution functions in peace support operations will limit their effectiveness. We take the matter up further in the next issue of CRM
CRM includes a list of UK-based Conflict Resolution Organisations engaged in research, education, training, policy development and/or field-based applications of conflict resolution processes. CRM is published quarterly and the information on the organisations is updated in each issue. The section on UK-based organisations also contains a guide to internet links which provide a comprehensive survey of conflict analysis, conflict data and conflict resolution work world-wide. CRM is an electronic publication available at the world wide web homepage of the Centre for Conflict Resolution: http//www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/crchome.html. (Note: back issues of International Peacekeeping News are also available on this homepage).
UNDPI MONUA MISSION UPDATE
Beye Meets Savimbi
A UN Department of Public Information Press Briefing stated that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, met with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, on 9 September, in Andulo. Beye explained to Savimbi the concerns of the international community and the aims of Security Council resolution 1127, which identified restrictive measures to be undertaken unless UNITA complied with the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. Savimbi expressed frustration at the decision of the international community to impose sanctions, but also expressed UNITA's continued commitment to the Lusaka Protocol. So far, 40 localities in Angola had been placed under State administration. However, some major centres - including those in the diamond-mining areas in the Lundas - remained to be incorporated.
DPI PRESS BRIEFING
10 SEPTEMBER 1997
Punitive Measures Against UNITA Postponed
By its resolution 1130 (1997), unanimously adopted on 29 September, the Security Council postponed the beginning of punitive measures specified in resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August, until 30 October 1997.
In his report to the Security Council, dated 24 September 1997, the Secretary-General said that, since the adoption of resolution 1127 (1997), the military situation in Angola had remained relatively calm and stable. However, the demilitarisation of UNITA forces was not yet complete. At the same time, the Secretary-General recognised that progress had been made towards the establishment of a non-partisan FM broadcast facility to replace Radio Vorgan [see SG's report below]. However, the Secretary-General said that the final steps in the Angolan peace process were long overdue and expeditious actions were required.
After the Council adopted resolution 1130 (1997) on 26 September, its President, Ambassador Bill Richardson of the United States, told reporters that Council members expected that before 20 October, UNITA would cooperate with the extension of State administration in Cuango, Negage, Mavinga, Andulo and Bailundo. Also on 26 September, a UN spokesperson said a ceremony had been held in Negage to hand it over to the Government.
DPI DAILY HIGHLIGHTS
29 SEPTEMBER 1997
Security Council Condemns Attacks Against Deminers
The President of the Security Council, Ambassador Juan Somavia of Chile, on 28 October, said that Council members believed that demining is absolutely central in Angola. He made those comments in the wake of the killing on 23 October, of two international deminers, a German and a Zimbabwean, from the Xongoroi team site in the Benguella province. The team of deminers, from a German non-governmental organisation called Santa Barbara, was ambushed by about 20 unidentified people, who also killed two Angolan national police and a local government official. A civilian police observer with MONUA, from India, was injured.
The President of the Security Council said that this incident was being investigated. There was another armed attack, on 27 October, on the Santa Barbara team near Xongoroi, but there were no casualties or injuries.
DPI DAILY HIGHLIGHTS
28 OCTOBER 1997
Sanctions Against UNITA to Take Effect in October
By unanimously adopting resolution 1135 (1997) on 25 October, the Security Council demanded that UNITA comply immediately and without any conditions with the obligations set out in resolution 1127 (1997), including full cooperation in the normalisation of State administration throughout Angola, including in Andulo and Bailundo.
In resolution 1127 (1997), the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for enforcement, decided, among other things, that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of all senior officials of UNITA and of adult members of their immediate families. The Council, however, made exceptions for officials functioning in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the National Assembly, or the Joint Commission. The Council also called on States to suspend or cancel all travel documents, visas or residence permits issued to senior UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families, and to immediately and completely close all UNITA offices in their territories.
Furthermore, the Council said States should prohibit flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft.
The Security Council endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to postpone the withdrawal of United Nations military formed units until the end of November. The Council also extended the mandate of MONUA until 30 January 1998, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report and recommendations no later than 13 January 1998.
DPI DAILY HIGHLIGHTS
29 OCTOBER 1997
Countries Contributing Personnel to MONUA, as at 15 October 1997:
Bangladesh 10(MO); 22(CPO) 3(SO) 90(Tr) 125(T); Brazil 19(MO) 21(CPO) 1(SO) 41(Tr); Bulgaria 9(MO) 20(CPO) 29(T); Congo, Republic of the 3(MO) 3(T); Egypt 10(MO) 19(CPO) 1(SO) 30 (T); France 3(MO) 3(T); Guinea-Bissau 3(MO) 4(CPO) 7(T); Hungary 10(MO) 8(CPO) 18(T); India 20(MO) 17(CPO) 33(SOb) 390(Tr) 460(T); Jordan 17(MO) 20(CPO) 1(SO) 38(T); Kenya 10(MO) 10(T); Malaysia 19(MO) 20(CPO) 39(T); Mali 9(MO) 20(CPO) 29(T); Namibia 194(Tr) 194(T); New Zealand 3(MO) 1(SOb) 4(T); Nigeria 16(MO) 20(CPO) 36(T); Norway 3(MO) 3(T); Pakistan 3(MO) 7(SOb) 13(T); Poland 5(MO) 5(T); Portugal 4(MO) 38(CPO) 6(SO) 359(T) 414(T); Romania 1(SO) 150(T) 151(T); Russian Federation 3(MO) 1(SO) 129(Tr) 134(T); Senegal 10(MO) 10(T); Slovakia 5(MO) 5(T); Sweden 3(MO) 21(CPO) 24(T); United Republic of Tanzania 3(CPO) 3(T); Ukraine 5(MO) 3(CPO) 2(SO) 10(T); Uruguay 3(MO) 25(CPO) 4(SOb) 32(T); Zambia 8(MO) 15(CPO) 6(SO) 497(Tr) 526(T); Zimbabwe 13(MO) 22(CPO) 25(SO) 662(Tr) 722(T); Total 226 Military Police (MO), 318 Civilian Police Observers (CPO), 92 Staff Officers (SO), 2,471 Troops (Tr), 3,117 Total (T). (a Including military police; b Including military specialists in the demining school and in quartering area administration).
UNSG'S REPORT, 4 DECEMBER 1997, (S/1997/959)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report covers developments since my most recent report, dated 17 October 1997 (S/1997/807) ... [the UNITA Political Committee ], on 4 November, issued a communiqué claiming that the imposition of sanctions was unjust and stating that, as a result of the sanctions, UNITA would face "enormous difficulties" in fulfilling its remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol. However, the head of the UNITA delegation reaffirmed his movement's intention to maintain its commitment to continue to cooperate with the peace process.
... On 17 November 1997, another extensive discussion took place in Andulo between Mr. Savimbi and my Special Representative, who was accompanied by the representatives of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America). During the talks, the UNITA leadership presented to the United Nations a list of concerns and accused the Government of seeking to destroy UNITA's political structures in the countryside, thus creating a new impasse in the peace process. Mr. Beye and the representatives of the observer States once again impressed on UNITA the urgent need to resume the implementation of the remaining tasks, including the full demilitarisation of UNITA and the rapid extension of State administration throughout Angola, and promised to verify all UNITA allegations. At the same time, they called upon UNITA to desist from restricting the freedom of movement of MONUA personnel, which has become a serious impediment to the execution of the mandate entrusted to the United Nations.
Implementation of UNITA Obligations
Military and police aspects
Despite persistent tensions ... which are the result of continuing acts of banditry, and troop movements by both parties, the military and security situation in the country remained relatively calm. While tensions were prevailing throughout Angola before the coming into force of the new sanctions on 29 October 1997, there was still a measure of cooperation between the parties. However, three weeks after the imposition of sanctions, UNITA severed almost all contacts with the Government and MONUA, except at the level of the Joint Commission.
... After a three-week suspension, on 21 November 1997, UNITA resumed the registration and the demobilisation of its "residual" troops. In the last few weeks, it has presented to the United Nations additional armed personnel, including 145 senior officers registered in Bailundo in November and December. This brings the number of the "registered" residual troops to the level of 6,899 out of the total of 7,759 remaining armed personnel officially declared by UNITA. So far, UNITA has not provided the United Nations with a more credible figure of its "residual" forces. In the meantime, UNITA informed MONUA of the existence of 56 communication sets in different parts of the country, which it said were being used to coordinate activities related to the extension of State administration and the registration and demobilisation of its remaining troops. MONUA has so far verified 43 communication sets, while the remaining equipment is yet to be verified, owing mainly to lack of cooperation on the part of UNITA. With regard to demobilisation, all 15 UNITA quartering areas have now been closed, bringing the total number of the formally demobilised UNITA personnel to 40,059, including 5,647 war-disabled soldiers. However, the demobilisation of UNITA military war-disabled has continued at several centres.
Extension of State Administration
Following the issuance by its Political Commission of a statement on 4 November 1997, the UNITA leadership announced that the extension of State administration would be suspended pending an additional "assessment" of the status of the peace process and a resolution of the problems which had arisen between the Government and UNITA authorities in some areas of the country. On 5 November, the Joint Commission expressed serious concern over this announcement, which had been made despite the earlier promises of the UNITA representative in Luanda to the contrary. After further delay, on 21 November, UNITA presented to the Government its new proposals on the normalisation of State administration. Following the Government's approval of these proposals, the Provincial Intersectoral Operational Groups, composed of the representatives of the two parties and the United Nations, held meetings in most of the provinces to work out the modalities for the implementation of the agreed programme. On 22 November 1997, the extension of State administration resumed throughout the country and is progressing, albeit at a very slow pace. As of 4 December, central administration had been extended to 200 localities, out of a total of 344 areas which have to be normalised.
In the meantime, the consolidation of State administration in localities where central authority has been established has become an increasingly difficult exercise, owing to the growing tensions between the Angolan National Police and UNITA sympathisers. UNITA accuses the Government of attempting to occupy these areas by force and claims that the conduct of the Government security operations against banditry is actually aimed at dismantling UNITA's party structures. For its part, the Government accuses UNITA of obstructing the work of the newly installed local authorities, and of trying to run a parallel administration. The cases which MONUA has been able to verify tend to confirm some of the accusations made by both parties. In order to allay some of the above concerns, the Government has decided to suspend the special security operations conducted by FAA in the southern regions of the country. In the middle of November 1997, it submitted to the Joint Commission a new programme for the disarmament of the civilian population, to be implemented in three stages, starting with a public awareness campaign.
On 24 November 1997, Mr. Savimbi sent me a letter expressing strong concern about the Government's actions against UNITA members. I have instructed my Special Representative to investigate the allegations contained in the letter, some of which have been confirmed by MONUA. In other instances, however, the alleged actions appear to have been perpetrated by bandits. On 2 December, MONUA reported the existence of a huge bunker containing several hundred bodies unearthed by a FAA unit in Central Angola. In the meantime, MONUA confirmed that some UNITA party members had been arrested and mistreated by Civil Defence elements in Piqui (Uige Province).
Transformation of the UNITA Station Radio Vorgan into a Non-Partisan Broadcasting Facility
Following its submission of the necessary application for the establishment of an FM network to replace its shortwave radio station, UNITA was allocated a frequency for the new facility in Luanda. On 13 October 1997, it requested additional frequencies for its planned FM radio stations in other Angolan cities. Also in October, UNITA sent to Luanda the management team of the future non-partisan radio station, "Radio Despertar", to discuss administrative and technical procedures with the authorities. However, the Government recently indicated that UNITA must provide additional information before Radio Despertar could be authorised to become operational. A reply is still being awaited. Regrettably, since the coming into force of the new sanctions against UNITA, the dissemination of hostile propaganda, especially over Radio Vorgan, has resumed.
Withdrawal of MONUA Military Personnel
In my previous report dated 17 October 1997 (S/1997/807), I recommended a slight postponement of the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Angola. This recommendation was supported by the Security Council. The drawdown resumed on 3 December. The strength of United Nations military personnel now stands at 2,495, including 192 military observers, 78 military staff officers, 1,668 troops and 557 military support personnel. With the completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, which was the main task to be performed by United Nations formed units, I believe that the Mission can now proceed with the gradual downsizing between the second half of this month and the first week of February 1998. According to present plans, which have been coordinated with the troop-contributing countries, approximately 700 military personnel from Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Portuguese logistic unit as well as a number of military observers and staff officers will be repatriated by the end of December. This will leave MONUA with approximately 1,750 military personnel of various categories, including the rapid reaction force to be deployed in six regions of Angola. The month of December would, therefore, serve as an interim period during which the deployment of the United Nations forces in Angola would undergo major changes, so that MONUA can achieve the planned quick reaction configuration by the first week of January 1998.
The repatriation of the military component of the Mission will resume in the middle of January ... However, in view of the complexity of the security situation in Angola, I will continue to review the requirements of the Mission and, if need be, adjust the drawdown in January/February 1998.
Humanitarian Aspects
During the reporting period, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, together with its partner programmes and agencies, continued to carry out the demobilisation process, including registration, issuance of identification cards, transportation of demobilised ex-combatants to their places of choice and the provision of reintegration kits.
As of 4 December 1997, a total of 40,059 UNITA personnel had been demobilised, out of the total of 78,887 troops registered in the selection and demobilisation centres and the military war disabled centres. In addition, 6,889 UNITA "residual" personnel had been registered in situ, of whom 424 had been demobilised. On 10 November 1997, demobilisation operations were suspended in Cuando Cubango Province after two United Nations staff members were attacked and injured there by UNITA elements. However, despite the disruptions and delays, demobilisation has been completed in the last three selection and demobilisation centres (Andulo, Lumege and Licua).
The Technical Working Group on Demobilisation and Reintegration of the Joint Commission has finalised procedures for the demobilisation of the special categories of UNITA personnel consisting of the UNITA elements incorporated into the National Police, as well as into the programmes of the National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance (INAROE) and the National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers (IRSEM). However, the overall demobilisation programme continues to experience serious delays, which affect the pace of the peace process. There are also serious concerns over a new increase in incidents involving UNITA attacks on humanitarian workers ... which has been vigorously condemned by MONUA. Although, at his 17 November meeting with Mr. Beye and the representatives of the three observer States, Mr. Savimbi promised to punish the perpetrators, MONUA still awaits information from UNITA on the identity of the assailants and the disciplinary action taken against them.
Regrettably, the donors' response to the 1997 Humanitarian Appeal for Angola is still inadequate. MONUA and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit have repeatedly expressed serious concern over the lack of funds necessary to complete the vital demobilisation programme. In order to complete it as presently planned, it will also be necessary to continue funding the activities of the Coordination Unit's Demobilisation and Reintegration Office through the assessed budget until the end of March 1998".
BUYOYA ACCUSES NYERERE OF BIAS
An ANO report stated that Burundi's military ruler, Pierre Buyoya, has requested that the Arusha talks on Burundi be moved to Uganda, and has accused the current mediator, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, and the Tanzanian government of bias in favour of opposition forces. Former presidents Sylvestre Ntibantuganya and Jean Baptiste Bagaza have declared both Tanzania and Nyerere to be unbiased and credible. On 8 December, the Burundi government suspended FRODEBU, the principal opposition party, for six months. The Burundi Interior Ministry claimed FRODEBU had re-elected Jean Minani to party leader while still in exile in Dar-es-Salaam, while the law requires that political parties be resident in Burundi.
The ANO report described the suspension as a trumped-up excuse to remove FRODEBU, since the party congress by which Minani was re-elected actually took place in Bujumbura. Former FRODEBU leader, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated a few months after becoming Burundi's first Hutu president in 1993, as the previous ruling elite could not accept its loss of power. The report stated that Ndadaye's successor, Ntibantuganya, was not allowed to function properly as president, and eventually Buyoya assumed authority. The report asserted that the FRODEBU MPs who had dominated parliament became increasingly politically marginalised, and the coup that had started with Ndadaye's assassination has reached fruition with the suspension of FRODEBU. The report pointed out that, ironically, cooperation with FRODEBU represented the ruling elite's best chances of survival, since a military response to armed opposition groups could only ultimately destroy both the ruling elite, itself, and Burundi. It continued that Minani and FRODEBU have been marginalised by exiled armed opposition groups in Dar-es-Salaam because they maintain ideals of a democratic solution to Burundi's problems. The National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) fighters seek to overthrow the regime in Burundi, and the regime's increased intransigence encourages opposition supporters to switch allegiance from FRODEBU to CNDD. The report declared that moving the Arusha talks to Uganda, and removing Nyerere as mediator would be a fatal mistake. It described Buyoya's demands as a ruse to avoid compromise and the possibility of a political solution in Burundi.
AFRICA NEWS ONLINE
10 DECEMBER 1997
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
REFUGEE REPATRIATION CONDEMNED
Amnesty International (AI), on 21 November, criticised attempts by the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi - and also, reportedly, Rwanda - to force thousands of Burundi and Rwandese refugees from the DRC back to their own countries, where they were at risk of grave human rights abuses. AI has been investigating reports that 38 of 63 Burundi refugees who were arrested in Uvira, DRC, have disappeared, and of unauthorised executions of unarmed civilians by Burundi soldiers during the DRC operation.
The AI report stated that, since 9 November, as many as 2,000 Burundi and Rwandese refugees have been forced to return to Burundi from South-Kivu, while 700 Rwandese refugees have been forcibly repatriated in what resembled a coordinated military operation by Burundi, DRC and Rwandan troops. AI urged the DRC government to recognise its obligations, under international and customary law, to ensure the safety of refugees within its borders, while authorities in Burundi and Rwanda should also guarantee the protection of returnees. There have been unconfirmed reports of similar repatriations occurring in other parts of the DRC, including Fizi territory in South Kivu province, and thousands more Burundi and Rwandese refugees in DRC face imminent enforced repatriation.
In November, Burundi soldiers, reportedly with the assistance of local Congolese authorities and members of the security forces, as well as Rwandese soldiers, systematically sought out refugees in at least seven villages and towns in DRC. Many of the Burundi refugees have lived in eastern DRC for a number of years - some since 1972 - and have become part of the local Congolese population. However, Burundi soldiers employed local authorities to identify the refugees. Captured refugees were not allowed to collect their belongings from their homes, and many became separated from their families. Those who attempted to resist capture were beaten or, in some cases, threatened with execution. There were reports that the refugees were accused of being members either of a DRC armed group, called Mayi Mayi, or of the former Rwandese interahamwe militia.
The AI report asserted that refugees in the African Great Lakes region have continuously faced forcible repatriation, either to their country of origin, or to other countries in which their safety could not be ensured. The countries involved have systematically bi-passed internationally binding standards of refugee protection; also, in some cases, international agencies, such as UNHCR, have succumbed to pressure by host governments to compromise the above principles. Burundi refugees risk serious human rights abuses in their home countries, including deliberate and arbitrary murder by governmental forces or armed opposition groups. Widespread insecurity continues in many parts of the country, including Cibitoke province, which often leaves the region inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. Thus, it is extremely difficult for independent observers to monitor returnees' safety. A large proportion of the hundreds of Burundi refugees forcibly expelled from the DRC in late 1996 and 1997 have, subsequently, been extrajudicially executed following their return home.
Many enforced Rwandese returnees from the DRC and other countries have also suffered serious abuse in the past, including murders and disappearances. There are reported to have been over 6,000 people killed in Rwanda during 1997 - most of whom were unarmed civilians. The fact that many deaths go unreported mean that the real figure may be substantially higher, while the victims include many returnees from the DRC. The report asserted that deaths were attributable to both the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) and opposition fighters thought to be allied to the erstwhile army of Rwanda.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
19 NOVEMBER 1997
UNSG'S REPORT, 24 SEPTEMBER 1997, (S/1997/742)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report covers developments since ... 9 May 1997.
Mission of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General
Following his exploratory visit to the Mission area, my Personal Envoy, Mr. James A. Baker III, informed me that neither party had indicated any willingness to pursue any political solution other than implementation of the settlement plan. He advised that discussions with the two parties on the implementation of the plan would be necessary, but that the only way realistically to assess its implementability would be by arranging direct talks between them, under United Nations auspices. I decided therefore to invite the Government of Morocco and the [Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Sagua el-Hamra y del Ro de Oro (POLISARIO)] as well as the two neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, to send high-level representatives to meet with my Personal Envoy in London, for separate consultations on that issue on 10 and 11 June.
... In London, my Personal Envoy ... explained that direct talks between the two parties would be necessary, in order to address the obstacles in the implementation of the plan.
... Under the ground rules set forth and agreed to in London, the first official direct contact between Morocco and POLISARIO under United Nations auspices was held at Lisbon on 23 June, in a good, cooperative atmosphere. The discussions started with the primary issue that had deadlocked the implementation of the settlement plan, namely the identification of prospective Saharan voters in the referendum.
... a second round of direct talks between the parties [was] held in London on 19 and 20 July ... During those talks, agreement was reached on issues related to the identification of prospective voters and on preparations for the return of refugees. In addition, the parties confirmed their support for the provisions of the settlement plan concerning the reduction and confinement of Moroccan forces during the transitional period.
... My Personal Envoy opened the third round of direct talks between the parties in Lisbon on 29 August ... During the Lisbon talks, agreement was reached on issues related to the confinement of Moroccan and POLISARIO forces and to the release of prisoners of war and Saharan political prisoners and detainees.
... The fourth round of direct talks between [the Moroccan government and POLISARIO was held at Houston, Texas, from 14 to 16 September ... Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO reached agreement on the code of conduct for the referendum campaign and on a declaration of the parties relating to the authority of the United Nations during the transitional period. In addition, they agreed to a set of practical measures for the resumption of the identification process.
Military and Civilian Police Aspects
On 18 July 1997, Major-General Jorge Barroso de Moura (Portugal) completed his assigned tour of duty as the Force Commander of MINURSO [UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara]. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Mohd Isa bin Said (Malaysia), served as Acting Force Commander until the arrival of Major-General Bernd S. Lubenik (Austria), who took up his functions on 28 August. As at 24 September, the strength of the military component stood at 224. [T]he last three civilian police officers left on 2 June.
Financial and Administrative Aspects
As at 24 September 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 September 1997 amounted to $46.2 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 24 September 1997 was $1,849 million.
Observations and Recommendations
When I appointed Mr. James A. Baker III as my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, I asked him to undertake a fresh assessment of the situation, whose purpose would be threefold: to assess, in consultation with the parties, the implementability of the settlement plan in its present form; to examine whether there were any adjustments, acceptable to the parties, which would significantly improve the chances of implementing it in the near future; and, if not, to recommend other possible ways of resolving the conflict.
[The resultant] achievements create the conditions to proceed towards the full implementation of the settlement plan, starting with the resumption of the identification process. I believe that MINURSO should be provided with the resources to do so on an urgent basis, in order to build on the current momentum.
I therefore recommend that MINURSO proceed with the implementation of the plan, starting with the completion of the identification process. The identification of all remaining prospective Saharan voters could be completed at the earliest feasible opportunity, provided that both parties cooperate totally with the Commission in carrying out its tasks in accordance with the measures agreed.
The identification operation would be conducted in successive phases. Identification would begin at four centres. It is estimated that 32 identification staff and 36 civilian police officers would be required to operate these centres. The operation would then be rapidly expanded to a maximum of nine centres operating concurrently, with an estimated additional staff of 40 identification and 45 civilian police officers. By the end of the process, the list of persons judged eligible to vote would be published, and the transition period could begin shortly thereafter, upon completion of other steps required by D-day in accordance with the settlement plan. On the basis of the original timetable for the transitional period, the referendum of self-determination in Western Sahara would thus be held within a year. The identification operation should be resumed as soon as possible. ... In order to initiate this preparatory work and also to enable concerned members of the Security Council to consult with their authorities on the proposed expansion of MINURSO, I recommend that the mandate of the Mission be extended for three weeks, until 20 October 1997. I further recommend that the mandate of MINURSO be extended thereafter for a period of six months, until 20 April 1998, in order for the Mission to proceed with the identification tasks described in the three preceding paragraphs.
Should these recommendations meet the approval of the Security Council, it would be my intention to dispatch a technical team to the Mission area during the first half of October 1997, to reassess the resources requirements for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength.".
ADDENDUM TO THE UNSG'S REPORT, 25 SEPTEMBER 1997 (S/1997/742/ADD.1)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"the full cost of completing the identification process ... is projected at some $20.8 million. This provides for the preparation and emplacement of identification staff and civilian police and equipment, the operation of up to nine identification centres and for the expansion of MINURSO to implement the identification process by 298 civilian personnel, including 72 identification staff, and 81 civilian police.
... Cost estimates for the completion of the identification process (thousands of US dollars): Civilian personnel costs - 12,380; Premises/accommodation - 1,040; Transport operations - 1,200; Air operations - 1,100 Communications - 2,160 Other equipment - 820; Supplies and services 170; Air and surface freight - 20; Staff assessment - 1,880; Total - 20,770.
Composition of the military component of MINURSO, as at 24 September 1997: Argentina 1 (MO); Austria 5 (MO); Bangladesh 6 (MO); China 16 (MO); Egypt 19 (MO); El Salvador 2 (MO); France 25 (MO); Ghana 6 (MO) 7 (SU); Guinea 3 (MO); Honduras 12 (MO); Ireland 8 (MO); Italy 5 (MO); Kenya 8 (MO); Malaysia 13 (MO); Nigeria 3 (MO); Pakistan 5 (MO); Poland 3 (MO); Portugal 4 (MO); Republic of Korea 20 (SU); Russian Federation 22 (MO); Uruguay 13 (MO); United States of America 15 (MO); Venezuela 3 (MO) 3 (T); Total: 197 Military Observers (MO), 27 Support Units (SU), 224 Total (T)".
UNDPI MINURSO MISSION UPDATES
MINURSO Mandate Extended
The Security Council, on 20 October, decided to extend the MINURSO mandate until 20 April 1998. Unanimously adopting resolution 1133 (1997), the Council endorsed the recommendation of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who reported that MINURSO should proceed with the implementation of a stalled United Nations plan to resolve the dispute between Morocco and POLISARIO over the territory. The Council also endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation that the strength of MINURSO be expanded. Under the terms of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to begin the identification of eligible voters in accordance with the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached between the parties with the aim of finishing the process by 31 May 1998. He was also requested to submit a detailed report on the plan, timetable and cost of holding the referendum. Through its President, Ambassador Juan Somavia of Chile, the Council requested the Secretary-General to name a Special Representative as soon as possible and called on all parties to cooperate with the Special Representative throughout the implementation of the Settlement Plan.
In an interview with UN Radio, Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi of Morocco said that his Government was happy that a breakthrough in the impasse had finally been reached due to the skills of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, James Baker III. The POLISARIO's Representative, Ahmed Boukhari, told UN Radio that there were three elements that had led to the breakthrough: the arrival on the scene of a new Secretary-General, who reached back into the Western Sahara file; the skills of Mr. Baker; and the holding, for the first time, of direct talks between the parties. Mr. Boukhari added that the implementation of the agreements would depend on the political will of both parties and the credibility of the Identification Commission.
DPI DAILY HIGHLIGHTS
20 OCTOBER 1997
AFRICAN COUNTRIES MORE PREPARED TO INTERVENE
A WP report suggested that African governments have recently demonstrated a new prepardeness to intervene in neighbouring states. Uganda supported Rwandan Tutsis during their 1990-94 civil war, in which the Hutu-dominated government in Kigali was overthrown, while Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda - and, according to Western diplomatic sources, Ethiopia and Eritrea - assisted President Laurent Kabila's struggle for power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the spring of 1997. The report asserted that Angola, during the week beginning 14 October, also dispatched troops, tanks and warplanes to the Brazzaville Congo Republic, to help overthrow President Pascal Lissouba. Both the US and European governments, and the international institutions they dominate, including the UN Security Council, have become largely marginalised, as African heads of state have decided on initiatives - including military actions - intended to forward their national interests. A Western diplomat in Kinshasa declared that African countries now possessed the military capacity and political will to intervene themselves.
The report suggested that several African governments wanted to attack across their borders to strike at opposition bases in neighbouring countries. For instance, Angola intervened in the Congo Republic on the premiss that the government there had been supporting the Angolan opposition movement, UNITA. A Western diplomat agreed that Luanda's motives in assisting the overthrow of neighbouring governments was not to try to establish itself as the dominant regional power, since it has always had a very specific motive of strategic defence against UNITA. UNITA has, so far, failed to implement a 1994 peace agreement with the Angolan government. The report asserted that Angola has a greater capacity to intervene than most African states. The 90,000-strong Angolan army is one of Africa's largest, and its military transport planes provide it with a modern airlift capability unrivalled in the rest of Africa.
However, diplomats in the region have pointed out that Angolan involvement outside its own borders has enjoyed only limited success. Angola acted against former Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko partly because he had provided UNITA's principal supply line; his senior aides provided aeroplanes to deliver weapons and supplies to UNITA-controlled territories, as well as to buy the diamonds mined by UNITA to finance its operations. Following the fall of Mobutu in the spring of 1997, UNITA transferred its arsenals principally to the Congo Republic, necessitating the second Angolan intervention, which enabled opposition leader, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, to seize control in Brazzaville. However, Sassou-Nguesso represents only a small tribe, and it is uncertain how he could establish a coalition capable of government. Both Lissouba and a third militia leader, Bernard Kolelas, have pledged to maintain continue fighting.
The report added that central Africa has been affected over recent decades by the losers of internal conflicts. Army units, militia groups and individual soldiers remain scattered in camps, the countryside, or mixed with refugees or local residents, with their only means of survival as mercenaries or bandits. For instance, Rwandan Hutu fighters and former members of Mobutu's defeated army have reportedly fought for money on both sides in the Congo Republic's four-month-old war. Analysts stated that 7,000 other such fighters might have fled to UNITA-held territory in northern Angola.
WASHINGTON POST
OCTOBER 21 1997
US-AFRICAN PK INITIATIVE CONTINUES
An AP report stated that the US-supported African peacekeeping initiative, entitled the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), has been receiving renewed enthusiasm from US officials, with units already trained in three countries, and training planned in three more. The Clinton administration's special coordinator for the ACRI, Marshall McCallie, asserted that the initiative provided well-trained, African troops which could be quickly called upon by political authorities to carry out peacekeeping duties in the event of a crisis. The report declared that it was the intention of the year-old programme that American Special Forces could teach peacekeeping skills to military units from participating African countries, with both the United States and its European allies providing logistical support. A Pan-African peacekeeping force of ten to twelve battalions could be then be rapidly formed from the African units, to prevent future outbreaks of fighting such as the massacre in Rwanda in 1994.
The report declared that another advantage of the ACRI, in view of the depth of Western, public opposition to military involvement in Africa, is that peacekeeping in Africa would not involve American and European ground troops. After the end of the Cold War, even France, with its long history of African military involvement, has been substantially reducing its African military presence.
The ACRI corresponds with similar British and French programmes already being promoted, for which Paris has earmarked $35 million to train and equip an African peacekeeping force. These initiatives recently received a major boost when a meeting of all the relevant nations' ambassadors was convened in New York, to start coordinating various approaches to enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. McCallie said that Russia, Brazil and several West European nations had all expressed an interest in the project. The report stated that, despite encouragement from the Organisation of African Unity, previous attempts to establish a Pan-African peacekeeping capability had failed due to Cold War rivalries and insufficient finances. It added that the Rwandan massacres had generated sustained interest in the project.
The original announcement of the $15 million initiative by former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in October 1996, was not universally well-received. Steven Metz, a researcher at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, pointed out that African leaders have witnessed American programmes disintegrate through lack of sustained interest, and that Washington's European allies were also unimpressed by the announcement. He added that the French had been particularly critical of what they perceived to be an expansion of US interest into their traditional sphere of sub-Saharan Africa. However, the initiative has, nevertheless, become the mainstay of Washington's African security policy. In 1997, separate, two-month exercises were conducted by sixty-strong teams from the 3rd Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, with battalions from Malawi, Uganda and Senegal. Similar exercises have been planned for Mali and Ghana early in 1998, and an exercise is already in the planning stages for Ethiopia.
The AP report asserted that the initiative was part of renewed American interest in Africa, which was largely ignored by both Congress and the White House during President Bill Clinton's first term in office. However, First Lady, Hillary Clinton, paid a highly public visit to the continent in March 1997, and Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, begins a seven-nation tour in December. The government agency that provides investment insurance to American overseas businesses also declared the launch of the initial instalment of a $650 million programme to facilitate private investments in sub-Saharan Africa. While African trade only accounts for approximately 6% of US imports and export trade, it increased in 1997 by 18.2%, making it the fastest-growing American trade area. McCallie announced that, in order for Africa to develop economically, African governments would need to provide secure environments which supported investment, adding that these could not be externally imposed.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
DECEMBER 6, 1997
UNDPI UNTMIH MISSION UPDATE
Facts and Figures, as at 15 October 1997
Location: Haiti; Headquarters: Port-au-Prince; Duration: August 1997 to date.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela); Force Commander: General Robin Gagnon (Canada); Police Commissioner: Colonel Jean-Claude Laparra (France). Authorised Strength: 250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel (A number of additional military personnel, provided on the basis of voluntary funding, are also attached to UNTMIH's military component). Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account; Estimated budget: $10.1 million (gross) from 1 August to 30 November 1997.
Composition and strength of the military and civilian police elements of UNTMIH, as at 15 October 1997: Argentina 5 (CP); Benin 10 (CP); Canada 31 (AHQ) 600 (VF) 58 (CP); France 47 (CP); India 6 (CP); Mali 47 (CP); Niger 5 (CP); Pakistan 19 (AHQ) 525 (VF); Senegal 10 (CP); Togo 7 (CP); Tunisia 4 (CP); United States of America 43 (CP); Total 50 Military Police - UN Assessed HQ (AHQ), 1,125 Military Police - Voluntarily Funded (VF), 242 Civilian Police (CP).
UNSG'S REPORT, 31 OCTOBER 1997 (S/1997/832)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"So far, President [René] Préval's efforts to promote dialogue among the main political parties involved in the electoral dispute have not yielded concrete results. Far from getting closer through mutual concessions, the positions of the main Lavalas factions seem to have hardened in the last two months. The Organisation Politique Lavalas and Lafanmi Lavalas have not met and no agreement has been reached on the three main contentious issues under consideration: elections, economic reforms and the appointment of a new prime minister. The "new direction for the economy" proposed by some involved in recent negotiations has not drawn wide support, nor have adequate steps been taken to reach out to those representing other political views.
The continuing crisis, which has seriously impeded the functioning of the Government, has eroded public confidence in the capacity of the authorities to solve the problems facing the country.
Deployment and Operations of UNTMIH
During the reporting period, the civilian police element - in addition to monitoring the performance of the Haitian National Police and accompanying agents in their day-to-day duties - has been providing technical assistance to several specialised units of the National Police, in particular in matters relating to crowd control, the rapid reaction force and investigations. It has also been providing assistance to the Directorate-General, the Inspector-General and National Police staff at each departmental headquarters. The aim of such assistance is to professionalise the force operationally, as well as through its institutional development. Operational support is provided by accompanying Haitian agents in their daily policing duties, providing material assistance and ongoing training. As the Haitian National Police has developed steadily in skills and self-confidence, the Mission's civilian police element has been serving increasingly as a back-up in especially difficult circumstances.
In the present phase of the Mission, training of the Haitian National Police at all levels continues to receive the highest priority. Training centres are being established in each of the nine départements, each with a group of specialists in six areas: crowd control; criminal investigation; collection and analysis of information and operations; traffic; personnel management; and management of resources.
The Mission and [UN Development Programme] UNDP have continued to prepare for a technical assistance programme designed to provide the Haitian National Police with top-level law enforcement expertise over the next three years. The programme is financed by contributions to the voluntary fund established under Security Council resolution 975 (1995), which now total over $2.5 million.
System of Justice
The "audit" conducted in July 1997 highlighted the widening gap between the increasing consolidation and professionalisation of the Haitian National Police and the lack of any such development in the justice sector ... While the diagnostic study conducted in January recorded progress in collaboration among the institutions responsible for the administration of justice, that progress has all but halted in the last six months. MICIVIH [International Civilian Mission in Haiti] has continued to promote dialogue at the local level, but few steps have been taken to institutionalise the links between justice sector professionals and the police. The matter is left largely to the goodwill of the individuals concerned and in some places cooperation was even found to have deteriorated.
In August, MICIVIH released a comprehensive report on the Haitian penal system, which it found to have improved since the creation of the prison authority, the Administration Pénitentiaire Nationale. Considerable progress has been made in the treatment of prisoners and in health and sanitary conditions. Some prisons have been renovated and the first phase of the rehabilitation of the national penitentiary is now complete. However, as noted above, prison overcrowding remains a serious concern, as does the lack of adequately trained prison guards. A project to promote prison reform funded jointly by France, the United States of America and UNDP, is now completing its second phase. Six Haitian educators have been trained in Canada and Haiti to prepare prison guards to meet the demands of a growing prison population ... Further delays in judicial reform would jeopardise what has been achieved with the Haitian National Police as well as the development of the country. While MICIVIH and several donors, in particular Canada, France and the United States of America, are working in the justice sector, reform efforts lack strong leadership and clear direction..
Development Activities
Haiti's economy remains in the doldrums. Average per capita income has been stagnant in the past 12 months. The impulses expected from increased government expenditures and public investments financed by international cooperation have not materialised. The 1996/97 budget was presented late and delayed further by Parliament, which approved it seven months into the fiscal year, leading to expenditures below those envisaged. The new fiscal year began on 1 October, once again without a budget finalised and approved in Parliament, which is likely to result in the same deleterious effects as in 1996 ... By way of building a blueprint for the country's development, UNDP has sponsored the "Haiti 2012" initiative in collaboration with two Haitian non-governmental organisations. Two seminars have been held and the third and final gathering, scheduled for November, will draw some 250 Haitian participants who will define some 30 economic, social, and institutional objectives. What emerges from the process should serve as a blueprint for national and international development efforts.
Observations
Haiti has not had a fully functioning Government for more than four months. Efforts are currently under way to find a solution to this political crisis. It is hoped that they will soon lead to a compromise between the two main factions of the ruling Lavalas movement on the pending electoral and economic issues. As local elections have now been completed, many fear that the establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council whose legitimacy, if not legality, would be questioned by most political parties would deal a serious blow to the democratic process in Haiti and open another period of instability.
Clearly, the Permanent Electoral Council must be acceptable to all political forces if subsequent elections, including the November 1998 legislative and local elections, are to be credible and result in the creation of unchallenged democratic institutions.
The current political stalemate is having negative repercussions on economic activity. However, despite growing popular discontent, fuelled in particular by a steady rise in the prices of basic commodities, it is generally felt that the situation remains relatively stable. Given the absence of a military threat against the authorities, it is intended that the military element of UNTMIH will end its mission and leave the country at the end of the current mandate.
In this context of political uncertainty, international assistance beyond November should focus on strengthening the existing institutions, including the Haitian National Police and the justice system, restoring the people's trust in future electoral processes and supporting economic and social development.
The Haitian authorities believe that the joint [Organisation of American States] OAS/United Nations International Civilian Mission has made a useful contribution to the consolidation of democratic institutions and the establishment of a democratic culture in the country and that it should be extended with its current institution-building and human rights mandate. In this connection, consideration should be given by the United Nations General Assembly, in consultation with OAS, to the possibility of increasing the number of MICIVIH technical advisers, particularly in the area of judicial reform.
... The Organisation of American States and the United Nations should ... be prepared to provide electoral assistance to the Haitian authorities, at their request, and if the necessary conditions for democratic elections are fulfilled. Given the crucial importance of the November 1998 elections, it is hoped that a consensus will soon be reached on an electoral council, which would be established in time to implement a number of technical measures that would ensure the fairness of the process, including setting up a strong national and international observation mechanism.
Finally, assistance to the development of Haiti should continue, despite the current political difficulties, the uncertainties surrounding the economic programme of the Government and the frustrations born from the low absorptive capacity of the country. Efforts to achieve a consensus among the key forces in the country on a long-term strategy for sustainable development, such as the "Haiti 2012" initiative, should also be actively pursued.
... it is my considered opinion that in the political and economic climate prevailing in Haiti, the National Police will need international assistance if it is to continue to pursue its own institutional development while meeting the country's increasing security needs.
In the light of President Préval's request of 29 October for continued United Nations assistance to the Haitian National Police, I have already approached the Governments of several Member States to establish whether they might be willing, under appropriate security arrangements, to place the necessary personnel at the disposal of the United Nations, should the Security Council decide to establish in Haiti a follow-on mission whose main task would be to support the Haitian National Police and further contribute to its professionalisation".
CONTINUED POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
A WP report stated Haiti still faced many problems that have brought into question the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation, which withdrew from the island on 1 December. International forces, led by a 20,000-strong US contingent, were deployed in September 1994 in order to remove the military dictatorship on the island and reinstate Haiti's first freely elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Restricted by political infighting, the Haitian government has not had a prime minister for months, leaving it dysfunctional, and hampering the crucial economic recovery programme. Although peaceful elections have taken place, the last major ballot, which occurred in April, has been accused of irregularities. The report stated that parliament would not approve a new prime minister until the election dispute has been resolved.
Haiti, consequently, lost $120 million in foreign aid in 1997. It is estimated that 70 percent of Haiti's 7 million population is either unemployed or underemployed. Large sections of road, many of which were constructed by the American military, are disintegrating, while the majority of Haitians are without electricity, telephones or clean water. The cost of living is also high, principally since the country relies heavily on imported goods, possessing few means of domestic production.
The WP report warned that the most alarming situation was the re-emergence of political violence after three years of stability, particularly from former members of the paramilitary groups that had terrorised Haiti during the regimes of Francois Duvalier, and his son and successor, Jean-Claude Duvalier. It was feared that the newly formed and inexperienced Haitian National Police (HNP) might not be able to cope with the renewed fighting. Several erstwhile members of the Duvaliers' Ton-Tons Macoutes have stated that they have been waiting for the remaining 1,170 UN troops to withdraw, so that they can resume fighting and challenge the government of President Rene Preval - Aristide's successor - as well as Aristide himself, and the parliament.
Police authorities believe they have discovered a link between a grenade attack in Port-au-Prince in November, in which one woman was killed, with a plan to assassinate Preval, Aristide and senior government officials. A politician, a police officer, two former soldiers and five others have subsequently been arrested. The WP report said that some observers were afraid the HNP was liable to become a vehicle for forwarding political agendas. Leon Jeune, who stood against Preval in the 1995 elections, is a suspect in the alleged assassination plot. However, he maintains his innocence, with the support of many Haitians, and, according to officials, was beaten by police during his arrest.
The report stated that the 5,300-member HNP has more respect for human rights than previous security forces, but continues to be affected by corruption, abuse of power and other offences. During the three weeks preceeding this article, over 20 officers, two judges, a prosecutor, a local council member, and a deputy mayor were arrested on charges of drug-trafficking. Secretary of State for Public Security, Robert Manuel, has declared that several anti-democratic groups have been attempting to destabilise Haiti's struggling democracy - including international drug traffickers using Haiti to smuggle cocaine into America.
The Haitian judicial system remains largely corrupt and dysfunctional, and Head of the UN Mission in Haiti, Enrique ter Horst, recently acknowledged that Haiti would continue to require both financial and technical international assistance for a long time. Foreign Minister, Fritz Longchamp, has stressed that the UN mission has facilitated the transition of a country under martial rule, to one with a civilian police force. The UN presence in Haiti did not end with the 1 December withdrawal, since the Security Council has agreed to the establishment of a new civilian police mission, including up to 300 personnel, to continue the HNP's training for another year. The WP report stated that around 500 non-combatant American troops remain in Haiti, ostensibly to construct roads, bridges and wells, although some Republicans in Washington have been demanding their withdrawal. There are fears that crime will spread, principally in Port-au-Prince, without the visible deterrent provided by the UN troops. President Bill Clinton has considerable political interest in Haitian reconstruction, after highlighting it as a foreign policy success of his administration.
WASHINGTON POST
1 DECEMBER 1997
UNSG'S REPORT, 10 DECEMBER 1997 (S/1997/966)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report ... summarises the activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from the time of my last report of 8 September 1997 (S/1997/694) to 1 December 1997. UNMIBH continues to be led by my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Kai Eide (Norway). He is assisted by Mr. Manfred Seitner (Denmark), who serves as the Commissioner of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF).
Activities of the Mission:
International Police Task Force
The authorised strength of IPTF remains at 2,027, as provided for by the Security Council in its resolutions 1103 (1997) of 31 March 1997, relating to the implementation of the Brko Arbitration Award, and 1107 (1997) of 16 May 1997, relating to the additional tasks assigned by the London Conference of the Peace Implementation Council of 4 and 5 December 1996. On 1 December, IPTF had a strength of 2,004 monitors from 40 different countries. Following a review of the Task Force's management structure, it was decided to eliminate one administrative layer and to consolidate the district offices into the seven regional offices. Accordingly, all 64 IPTF stations now report directly to one of the regional offices. As a result, fewer IPTF officers are employed at headquarters and more on the ground across the country.
The Mission suffered a tragic setback on 17 September when a helicopter under contract to the United Nations crashed while on mission in central Bosnia. Among the 12 passengers who lost their lives in that accident was the Deputy IPTF Commissioner responsible for the police restructuring. Despite this loss, IPTF has continued to make progress in police restructuring. Following the constitutional split in the Republika Srpska between the President, based in Banja Luka, and the Government, based in Pale, my Special Representative and the IPTF Commissioner reached an agreement, on 24 September, when President Biljana Plavi (in Banja Luka) and Prime Minister Klikovi (in Pale) both accepted the UNMIBH principles of police restructuring in the Republika Srpska, according to which the police in the Republika Srpska are being reduced and restructured to operate in accordance with internationally recognised standards and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Progress has also been made in implementing the agreement between my Special Representative and the Commander of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) on the Republika Srpska's "special police" ... The paramilitary forces subject to controls imposed by SFOR ... are being disbanded. IPTF and SFOR have formed a working group with representatives of the Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior to coordinate the transition of suitable officers from the special police to the regular civilian police. By 17 November, all 104 officers of the special police in Doboj had been given application forms for re-certification and had completed an initial one-day course as a preliminary step towards restructuring. Remaining units of the "special police" will be re-certified as a distinct element in the restructuring process of police in other municipalities of the Republika Srpska. New departments are being established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to take responsibility for counter-terrorism, border control, organised crime prevention, VIP protection and crowd control.
Police restructuring in the Federation has maintained its rate of progress. Seven of the Federation's 10 cantons have now largely completed the process of restructuring. In all municipalities of the ethnically mixed Neretva and Central Bosnia Cantons, Bosniac and Croat police officers are patrolling together. There is still a need, however, to fill the posts allocated to Serbs and "others". It has also not yet proved possible to solve a small number of remaining problems, such as uniform insignias, mainly because of Croat intransigence. Negotiations concerning the division of authority in the remaining three cantons between the cantonal ministers of the interior (of the majority group) and their deputies (from the minority) are advancing ... In conjunction with training, IPTF now assists the local police in rehabilitating and developing proper police academies.
Improved cooperation between IPTF and the local police in both entities has facilitated implementation of the checkpoint policy. By August, the number of checkpoints approved had already dropped from over 300 per day to 15. Now, an average of only 10 checkpoints are permitted each day in both entities. Since the policy was introduced in May 1997, SFOR has cooperated in removing 34 of the 119 illegal checkpoints that have been removed. The reduction in checkpoints has helped to improve freedom of movement within and between entities. That reduction, however, can only be one element of a broader strategy to promote freedom of movement. A major step forward will be the adoption and implementation of a common licence plate by 31 December 1997, as mandated by the Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, held at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997.
Since August, IPTF has embarked, in cooperation with SFOR, on an assertive programme of weapons inspections in local police stations to ensure that local police maintain only the equipment they need to police their areas ... IPTF cooperated closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and SFOR in the implementation of the municipal elections held on 13 and 14 September and the elections for the Republika Srpska Assembly on 22 and 23 November. The endorsement of authorities in the Federation and the Republika Srpska for the election security plan was secured in advance of voting. On election day, IPTF and SFOR monitored the movement of voters across the inter-entity boundary line and within the Federation. The local police generally maintained public order without difficulty. After the results of the municipal elections were announced, IPTF worked with OSCE and local authorities to develop security plans for inaugural sessions of the municipal assemblies. However, as at 1 December, only 15 of 136 municipal administrations had fulfilled the conditions to be recommended for final certification by OSCE, and 9 municipalities had not yet met at all.
Related Activities
To implement its mandate, IPTF relies on the other divisions of UNMIBH for support and cooperation. In this connection, Civil Affairs officers have continued to provide advice and support to IPTF in the field, as well as political services to the Mission as a whole.
... The structure and working procedures of the UNMIBH Human Rights Office were finalised in October. The Office consists of 120 IPTF monitors and 10 civilian staff, deployed in the seven regional units, with at least one human rights monitor per IPTF station. A small headquarters team ensures overall coordination. The Office works closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the two coordinate their activities with those of other agencies with a human rights mandate, primarily through the Human Rights Coordination Centre at the Office of the High Representative.
The main function of the Human Rights Office is to carry out IPTF investigations into human rights violations by law enforcement agencies. Following the major investigation into the Croat police response to acts of intimidation against Bosniac returnees to the Jajce municipality in August 1997, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Police of Jajce were removed from their positions and disciplinary proceedings against them and eight other officers are in progress.
The UNMIBH Legal Office has cooperated with the Council of Europe and other international bodies to reform the Criminal Code and the Law on Criminal Procedure of the Federation. The work has focused mainly on criminal procedures affecting police activity, but has also touched on procedures in criminal courts.
In order to promote the broadcast of United Nations radio programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UNMIBH Office of Press and Information has cooperated with Bosnian student organisations to facilitate the establishment of an independent radio station in Sarajevo with financial assistance from the European Union, OSCE and a number of national Governments. The Office is also cooperating with local non-governmental organisations in Banja Luka to establish an independent radio station there. ... The Trust Fund Unit has been active in helping restore specialised medical services in Sarajevo. It is currently seeking to expand the terms of reference of the quick impact fund to allow the funding of projects that address gaps in the social infrastructure in Sarajevo.
Mine Action Centre
The Mine Action Centre now has 120 trained deminers in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar, as well as 40 in Biha, where they operate under the terms of a contract between UNMIBH and a non-governmental organisation, Handicap International. Currently there are about 750 trained civilian deminers in Bosnia and Herzegovina working on programmes funded by the European Commission, Norwegian People's Aid, the Mine Action Centre and the World Bank. The Mine Action Centre itself has completed 23 emergency demining tasks. The total area surveyed and cleared and reported to the Mine Action Centre in 1997 by all organisations participating in demining programmes up to 30 November was about 5 square kilometres.
... On 15 October 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding on the United Nations Mine-Action Plan was signed by the United Nations and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Agreed Principles for Demining after 1 January 1998 were signed by the Council of Ministers on 30 October. Detailed discussions between the Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining, the entity Governments and the Board of Donors, co-chaired by UNMIBH and the Office of the High Representative, are now under way in order to reach agreement on the administrative arrangements for the Bosnia and Herzegovina mine action centre and the entity mine action centres, thus completing the establishment of demining structures in the country by 31 December, as foreseen in the conclusions of the London Conference in December 1996. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed, for signature by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a project document under which it will provide technical and financial assistance to the Government for the implementation of the Mine-Action Plan in 1998.
Activities of the United Nations System:
World Food Programme
The World Food Programme (WFP) has completed its re-categorisation process of beneficiaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of beneficiaries currently receiving WFP-channelled food aid is 586,518 and will remain constant throughout the winter months. Between the spring of 1998 and the last quarter of 1998, there will be a further gradual reduction in the number of beneficiaries. The focus of WFP support to small-scale, short-term rehabilitation activities has intensified in the transition away from direct relief aid.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has continued its efforts to implement Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement. It is estimated that, since the beginning of the year, some 150,000 refugees and displaced people have returned to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 100,000 of them from countries of asylum.
International Labour Organisation
The activities of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) have focused on three initiatives: opening of a training centre for adults in the Unsko-Sanski Canton, concentrating on training the most vulnerable unemployed labourers in construction trades; implementation of activities for training unskilled and semi-skilled unemployed workers of the Gorade Canton in electrical trades; and inauguration of a business development centre in the Brko area, which aims to promote the development of micro-enterprises.
Observations
... Police restructuring has to be accompanied by reform of the judicial system in general and the present mandate of IPTF includes the monitoring, observation and inspection not only of law enforcement activities and facilities, but also of associated judicial organisations, structures and proceedings. UNMIBH, the Council of Europe and the Office of the High Representative have been cooperating in efforts to reform the criminal procedure of the Federation. However, a wider range of activities related to the reform of the judicial system in both entities has not yet been possible owing to a lack of resources and qualified personnel. I have suggested to the High Representative and the members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council that UNMIBH work with the Council of Europe, OSCE and other organisations to expand its operations to ensure that international efforts to reform the judicial and penal systems advance in tandem with efforts aimed at the local police forces. It is clear that reforming the police, the judicial system and the prisons must be addressed in an integrated way if a law and order environment that is fair and non-discriminatory is to be created.
Another area that deserves increased attention is the loss of revenue to the State through economic crimes that, furthermore, benefit mainly forces opposed to the peace process. Investigations by the European Commission have highlighted the extent of financial crime, smuggling and other illicit operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The links between such activities and the political, police and judicial structures in the three communities have been documented and are at present the subject of public debate in the country. As part of a wider effort to bring about greater professionalism and transparency to public service, IPTF intends to work with ministries in both entities to improve their capacity to identify, and deal with, financial crime, which corrupts public institutions. UNMIBH is ready to begin training entity police forces in the detection of financial crime, smuggling and corruption, and to assist in setting up special anti-corruption units. The close IPTF monitoring of police activities will also extend to this area of law enforcement.
... In order to carry out the tasks related to judicial reform and economic crime suggested above, UNMIBH will require an increase in human and financial resources. A number of experts in financial crime, smuggling and corruption will be required to form two training teams to work with the entities. Additionally, experts in criminal justice reform, as well as experts in the development of modern judiciary and penal systems will be required. UNMIBH will look into ways of adapting the present structure of IPTF to focus its work in these areas in an adequate manner, as was done in the human rights sector".
Composition of the International Police Task Force, as at 1 December 1997*
Argentina 43; Austria 39; Bangladesh 31; Bulgaria 33; Canada 30; Chile 31; Denmark 39; Egypt 34; Estonia 9; Finland 23; France 137; Germany 166; Ghana 86; Greece 13; Hungary 36; India 143; Indonesia 18; Iceland 3; Ireland 35; Italy 23; Jordan 156; Malaysia 46; Nepal 43; Netherlands 55; Nigeria 19; Norway 24; Pakistan 95; Poland 40; Portugal 60; Russian Federation 36; Senegal 32; Spain 54; Sweden 50; Switzerland 4; Thailand 3; Tunisia 3; Turkey 27; Ukraine 36; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 60; United States of America 189; Total 2,004.
* The number of civilian police monitors may vary owing to rotations.
DEBATE OVER US TROOPS IN BOSNIA
A 7 December WP Report asserted that President Bill Clinton was soon likely to request that Congress retain US troops in Bosnia beyond the withdrawal deadline he had set in 1996. Officials have emphasised that Clinton has made only one firm decision concerning Bosnia: that he will not set a new withdrawal date. The report stated that exit dates were a new feature of early attempts by the White House to restrict Clinton's doctrine on employing force abroad. Establishing a definite withdrawal deadline for US troops was intended to allow Washington both to pressure local factions to resolve their problems quickly, and to rally public and congressional support for the initial deployments.
The WP report declared that the above policy had facilitated the deployment of US troops in Bosnia and Haiti, and that Republicans were again likely to criticise Clinton for breaking promises in the forthcoming congressional debate over exit dates for US forces in Bosnia. However, in requesting an extension for American troops, Clinton is likely to voice his own disillusionment with the exit date doctrine, which was designed by Tony Lake, national security adviser during Clinton's first term of office. Lake believed that indefinite American troop commitments in conflicts in developing countries created lengthy and corrupting dependencies. However, the report criticised the strict withdrawal policy of the 20,000-strong US force dispatched to Haiti three years previously, for leaving the country with no functioning government, and re-emerging refugee and security problems.
The report asserted that, to avoid similar problems in Bosnia, Congress should support the Clinton initiative to maintain a sufficiently large force beyond June 1998, to supervise the objectives of Dayton agreement. Clinton's Special Envoy in Bosnia, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, has outlined the civilian and military tasks that need to be accomplished in order to pronounce Dayton a success. A large proportion of the heavy lifting on refugee resettlement and civic reconstruction requires police protection, and Gelbard wants a Bosnian gendarmerie to be equipped and trained by European countries with effective national paramilitary units - such as France, Italy, and Spain - that can progressively assume control of internal security requirements. However, the report stated that this initiative would still require the presence, for several years, of a considerable international force, led by the US and its NATO allies. It added that the Pentagon and the White House were considering three options. First, to reduce the 8,000-strong US contingent presently in Bosnia to around 6,000, leaving a sufficient number to carry out the mission termination agenda. Second - which the military service chiefs at the Pentagon fear Congress will favour - that US forces will be downsized to around 3,000, while the mission itself remains large and nebulous. Third, a costly American rescue operation stationed close to, but outside Bosnia.
WASHINGTON POST
DECEMBER 7, 1997
BOSNIAN PEACE FAILS IN PRACTICE
A WP report stated that establishing peace in Bosnia has consumed significant amounts of Western capital, and has occupied tens of thousands of its diplomats, troops and aid workers. However, there have been serious concerns over whether mission's principal objective - creating a multiethnic state - remains viable. NATO officials have started discussions over the future-role and nature of a NATO-led force in Bosnia.
The report asserted that foreign and local sources agree that few of the positive developments achieved by SFOR - the scattered but accelerating refugee returns to minority areas, and the ethnic integration of a small number of local police forces and town councils - would be likely to survive the withdrawal of the 31,000 SFOR personnel. Western officials have failed to significantly alter the war's legacy of ethnic partition, and some foreign officials privately admit that the West's real goal in Bosnia has been stability, and not reintegration. It is within this context that senior officials in the Clinton administration and Europe are calling for an extension to the SFOR mandate beyond its expiry-date at the end of June, 1998. European leaders have declared that a continued European presence is contingent on the US remaining.
The WP report stated that the Dayton accords had paradoxically incorporated both a unified Bosnia, comprising the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS), while allowing significant autonomy for each half, with only a small central government. The report declared that Dayton implicitly recognised that reintegration was unrealistic, and that the resulting tension at the centre of Dayton, between an ethnically integrated and an ethnically partitioned Bosnia, has caused the West severe problems ever since.
While the West has been reluctant to employ force, many of Bosnia's problems cannot be solved by such means. Bosnian societal tensions have been exacerbated by incendiary media and nationalist politicians, leaving the population with few means of identification other than by ethnicity. The three principal nationalist political parties, which had initially led their people into war, have each retained power by pledging to uphold the interests of their respective ethnic supporters. The report criticised the West for failing to adequately promote moderate opposition politicians, or establish a working civil society. Diplomats have admitted that there has been a considerable difference between effort and achievement in Bosnia: in two years, $2 billion has been spent by international civilian agencies, and many billions more by NATO and its military partners. However, the West has not managed to significantly reduce inter-ethnic partition. The divisions are as deep within the Federation as they are between the Federation and Serbian authorities. Muslim and Croat armies are joined only at the highest levels, but remain separate in the barracks, while other institutions are similarly divided. Some towns in central Bosnia, inhabited by equal numbers of Muslims and Croats, are still segregated as they had been during the war. Positive NATO initiatives since summer 1997 have weakened the position of extremists in RS by depriving them of police and broadcasting capabilities, as well as the veneer of impunity, but the Serb-, Muslim- and Croat-controlled parts of Bosnia still do not look like agreeing on a common flag, currency, passport, or refugee-return policy.
More than $7 million in international funds has been spent or pledged since spring 1997 on a new UN programme, entitled Open Cities, to allow minorities to return to their homes. However, although reconstruction is in progress, only a couple of hundred refugees returned to their homes during 1997 under the programme. Overall in 1997, only 20,000 Bosnians returned to areas controlled by other ethnic groups - twice as many as 1996, but still only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons who remain in Croatia, Germany, Yugoslavia and within Bosnia itself. A diplomat stated that it was only the heavy US presence that prevented local Serbs evicting Muslims who had returned to the Brcko area, a strategically important strip of land linking the eastern and western sections of RS.
The report stated that Western officials were now considering partitioning Bosnia's ethnic communities, an idea promoted by Henry Kissinger, and well received by many Bosnians and others. Even those opposed to the idea agree that it may require closer attention, if extremist ethnic political parties retain power following elections in Autumn 1998. However, officials have cautioned that partitioning Bosnia would probably require relocating tens of thousands of people, necessitating the long-term involvement of an international force to maintain stability.
The report said that the West has been credited with generating a new sense of momentum in Bosnia since the summer: SFOR has been more positive against Bosnian Serb hard-liners, while ten Bosnian Croat war crimes suspects handed themselves in to the International War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, SFOR has refused to hunt most Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects, including Radovan Karadzic, former president of the Serb Republic. Many observers have stated that the West has been limited by the level of electoral support extremists still command. Bosnian Serb hard-liners in Pale do everything in their power to hamper attempts to integrate police officers and judges within their territory, dissuade Serbs from returning to their prewar homes outside Serb-controlled territory, and prevent members of other ethnic groups returning to their homes in RS. Also, the Croat mayor of Mostar, Ivan Prskalo, has refused to adopt any measures to facilitate the return of Muslims to their homes within his jurisdiction. He has stated that he will only consider accommodating Muslims when he has seen a nation-wide initiative resettling displaced Croats and Serbs. The Bosnian Muslim leadership has been no more amenable. For instance, the Muslim-dominated government in Sarajevo has effectively prevented the majority of Serbs, who accounted for 30% of the city's prewar population, from returning to their former homes.
WASHINGTON POST
7 DECEMBER 1997
FRENCH REFUSE TO TESTIFY AT ICTY
A WP report stated that, during the week beginning 8 December, French Defence Minister, Alain Richard, asserted that French officers who had served with the multinational peacekeeping force during the Bosnian war (UNPROFOR) would not be permitted to testify before the International Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Richard described the tribunal as a judicial spectacle. The report said that French officers have already submitted extensive written depositions to the tribunal.
Chief ICTY Prosecutor, Canadian Judge Louise Arbour, responded by accusing French peacekeeping forces in Bosnia of failing to pursue indicted war criminals forcefully. Bosnia has been militarily divided into American-, British-, and French-controlled sectors, and Arbour declared that suspected war criminals felt absolutely secure in the French zone. She added that the only arrest that has occurred in Bosnia took place in the British sector, while the overwhelming majority of indicted suspects, including the most important ones, were residing in the French sector.
Arbour complained that Richard's description of the tribunal as a spectacle demonstrated contempt for witnesses describing the atrocities they had suffered. She stated that Belgian and British generals had testified in war crimes proceedings, while Canadian, German, US, and other countries had offered the tribunal financial support. The French position has also disrupted a Western consensus on prosecuting Bosnian war crimes. French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, has subsequently criticised Arbours allegations over the French sector of Bosnia.
French officers often held command responsibilities in UNPROFOR, and, so, are valuable witnesses in war crimes cases. However, the WP report stated that Paris did not wish expose French officers to potentially adversarial questioning at the ICTY that might implicate military personnel in war crimes. Some 70 French soldiers died and about 700 were wounded during service with the UN force.
The WP report stated that France must also be concerned over potential cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda. The French role in the UN operation in Rwanda has received criticism, and there are fears within the defence establishment that testimonies might be used against the entire French military hierarchy. The attitude of the Defence Ministry is believed to be in response to financial cutbacks and the end of conscription - which have already adversely affected the military establishment - and the preferences of President Jacques Chirac - who shares power with Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.
WASHINGTON POST
16 DECEMBER 1997
UNSG'S REPORT, 8 DECEMBER 1997 (S/1997/962)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments since 6 June 1997.
Activities of the Force:
Maintenance of the Cease-fire and the Military Status Quo
During the period under review, the level of tension along the cease-fire lines remained higher than the norm, but lower than during the same period in 1996. Although both sides generally respected the cease-fire and the military status quo, there were nonetheless frequent incidents and an increased number of restrictions of UNFICYP movement. Moreover, throughout the reporting period, both sides were not forthcoming when UNFICYP protested these violations of the military status quo. Both sides continued to dispute the delineation of their respective cease-fire lines as well as the authority of UNFICYP in a number of areas of the United Nations buffer zone. Moreover, in most instances of protests by UNFICYP to moves forward, the violating side challenged the delineation of the buffer zone in the area concerned ... During the reporting period, there was a slight rise in the number of serious shooting incidents in or near the buffer zone ... Both sides undertook major military construction works extending eastward from Nicosia, including anti-tank ditches and other defensive fortifications. In the Pedieos River area, to the west of the Old City of Nicosia, both sides carried out "tit for tat" construction by building a network of bunkers with connecting trenches. This military construction continued despite strong protests by UNFICYP.
On 26 September 1997, the leaders of the two communities met jointly with Mr. Gustave Feissel, my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus, at the latter's residence in the buffer zone, to explore the possibility of agreeing on matters related to security. Mr. Feissel underlined that while a comprehensive settlement of the security issues would be part of an overall agreement, some modest first steps would be most helpful, not least at a time when acrimonious exchanges both on the island and between Greece and Turkey were undermining the overall atmosphere ... The two leaders agreed that Mr. Feissel would follow the meeting with separate discussions with each of them in the hope of preparing the ground for an agreed joint statement. Mr. Feissel is pursuing this with the two leaders.
Both sides continued to upgrade their military and mechanised forces. It is estimated that there are over 30,000 Turkish forces and some 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops on the island. Their equipment was modernised with the further replacement of M48A5T1 tanks by M48A5T2 tanks. In addition, the Turkish forces introduced 12 large-calibre, self-propelled M-110 artillery pieces on the island.
... The National Guard's strength is approximately 14,500. The plan announced by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to purchase the S-300 air defence system continued to draw a strong reaction from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side. On several occasions, UNFICYP drew the attention of both sides to resolution 1117 (1997), in which the Security Council reiterated grave concern at the continuing levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they were being expanded, upgraded and modernised. No progress was made towards the implementation of that provision of the resolution.
UNFICYP continued its efforts to have the package of proposals for the reduction of tension along the cease-fire lines accepted in accordance with Security Council resolution 1117 (1997) and previous resolutions. In late June 1997, to facilitate an agreement, UNFICYP presented a revised package of unmanning proposals to both sides that took into account the preoccupations that had been expressed by each side. The revised proposals focused upon Nicosia and Dherenia as the areas of close proximity most prone to generate tension. Those proposals, based on detailed on-site reviews with both sides, included a new approach of "lateral unmanning". The lateral unmanning approach would achieve the objective of increasing the distance between positions of the opposing forces by the unmanning of guard posts alternating diagonally between the two cease-fire lines. The proposal for the prohibition of loaded weapons along the cease-fire lines and the proposed code of conduct were amalgamated since both proposals aim at raising the threshold before firearms are used. Despite a further 21 meetings with the military authorities on both sides, no agreement has yet been reached. UNFICYP informed both sides that I would advise the Security Council of the respective positions adopted by each side up to this time.
The Latest Position of Each Side is as Follows:
(a) The National Guard has taken the position that the reduction of tension along the cease-fire lines would best be achieved by the implementation of the prohibition of loaded weapons and the code of conduct. The National Guard does not wish to unman in areas such as Nicosia where, in their view, the security of Greek Cypriot civilians might be affected;
(b) On 23 October 1997 the Turkish forces declared their willingness to accept the UNFICYP revised package presented to both sides in June 1997, provided that the National Guard did likewise.
UNFICYP will continue its efforts to reach an agreement on the proposed package of proposals.
Organisational Matters
As of December 1997, UNFICYP comprised 1,230 troops and 35 civilian police. This represents an increase of 57 troops since the last report following the expansion of the Force to its full authorised strength in response to the experiences of 1996. The military personnel are from Argentina (416), Austria (257), Canada (2), Finland (1), Hungary (105), Ireland (30), Slovenia (10), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (409). Slovenia became a new troop contributor during the period under review. The civilian police are provided by Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, UNFICYP currently has a civilian component of 44 international and 291 locally recruited staff.
Mr. Diego Cordovez remained my Special Adviser on Cyprus. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Major-General Evergisto A. De Vergara continued as Force Commander.
Financial Aspects
In its resolution 51/235 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $48,000,800 gross for maintaining UNFICYP for the 12-month period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. This amount includes the pledged voluntary contribution from the Government of Cyprus of one third of the cost of the Force, and the annual amount of $6.5 million contributed by the Government of Greece.
Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months ... the costs of maintaining the Force would be approximately $24 million. Of that amount, approximately $14.5 million would be assessed on Member States.
As at 31 October 1997, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account amounted to $15.4 million, which represents some 14.8 per cent of the assessment for the Mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1.6 billion".
UNDPI UNTAES MISSION UPDATES
Walker Appointed Transitional Administrator
Effective 1 August 1997, William Walker (US) was appointed by the Secretary-General as the new Transitional Administrator of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), taking over from his predecessor, Jacques Klein.
UNDPI
1 AUGUST 1997
Agreement on Reintegration of the Judiciary
On 30 September 1997, the Agreement on the Reintegration of the Judiciary was signed by the UNTAES Transitional Administrator and Croatian Justice Minister, Separovic. Under the Agreement, UNTAES and the Government of Croatia confirmed that the Ministry of Justice would announce a vacancy competition for the Croatian judicial bodies in the region which would be proportionally filled by Serb representatives. The Transitional Administrator reported, on 22 September 1997, that residents of the region continued to turn in military weapons on a voluntary basis, including a cumulative total since the end of the weapons buy back programme of 204 rifles, 11 anti-tank rockets, 238 grenades, and 55,000 rounds of ammunition.
UNDPI
30 SEPTEMBER 1997
Report of the UNSG, 2 October 1997
In a report to the Security Council, dated 2 October 1997, (S/1997/767), the Secretary-General noted that, over the past 20 months, the Government of Croatia has achieved many of the goals established in the Basic Agreement and in its letter of 13 January 1997. Most technical reintegration issues have been successfully addressed. However, as at 25 September, substantial goals still remained to be accomplished before the end of UNTAES' mandate. It was of particular concern that in recent weeks Croatia has sought to repudiate unambiguous commitments made in key documents and to ignore the results of the elections of 13 and 14 April 1997 by using the 1991 census as the basis for determining Croat/Serb proportional representation in local institutions. This contradicts the clear terms of the Basic Agreement that all persons who have left the region or who have come to the region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the region.
The Secretary-General noted that five months after local elections, the power sharing agreement between Croat and Serb political parties was not working well. There continued to be a demonstrable lack of commitment by Croatian officials to work towards the establishment of effective local government administration. Municipalities throughout the region lacked adequate financial resources. Only the tax and customs authorities operated on a full-time basis. As regards civil affairs, most of the region's residents have received Croatian documents. As at 25 September, approximately 146,000 citizenship documents, 130,000 Croatian identity cards and 126,000 passports have been issued. However, over 1,300 residents have been denied naturalisation on the basis that they failed to meet the provisions of the Croatian law on citizenship.
The Secretary-General reported some progress on returns. Since April 1997, over 5,200 Serbs have returned to their homes throughout Croatia. Of that number, 965 returned using the weekly convoys organised since July by UNTAES, UNHCR and the Croatian Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR). Two-hundred made private arrangements for return. Over 4,100 returned spontaneously and without official confirmation from the Government of Croatia. They have now been granted retroactive confirmation. In the same period, only 320 Croats have returned to the region with official confirmation of ODPR. An additional 1,500 Croats have returned spontaneously, mainly to reconstructed villages in the south of the region. There are over 750 vacant and habitable homes to which Croats could return immediately. Two-way returns have been held up by the slow action of ODPR, the uncertain security and economic situation in areas of potential return and legal impediments to getting back property.
Current UNTAES military activities focus on creating the conditions to facilitate the reintegration and reconciliation process while supporting the safe return of displaced persons and refugees. UNTAES military engineers and the mine action centre have demined more than 150 kilometres of railroad, 75 kilometres of high-power lines and 10 villages.
The Secretary-General observed that it was of fundamental concern that there had been no attempt by the Government of Croatia to lead and support a national programme of reconciliation and confidence-building. The political leadership had yet to prepare the population, at a minimum, to coexist peacefully and to begin to rebuild functioning multi-ethnic communities in the region. The need for such a programme is evident to avoid ethnic harassment as displaced persons were returning home. Also, the performance of some of the local Serb leadership has been passive and lacklustre. They have shown little vigour or initiative in encouraging the population to take advantage of Croatian programmes and have slowed the progress in some areas.
Deficiencies in Croatian cooperation and performance over the past two months have delayed the decision by the Transitional Administrator that conditions have been achieved for the transfer of authority to Croatia. The first phase of the exit strategy has not been completed and authority cannot be handed over at the present time. It was the Administrator's view that transfer of authority over the region to Croatia at the present time would jeopardise the achievements made, but that Croatia could meet its obligations and commitments if it applied itself with sufficient diligence in the remaining time. In view of the stable military situation, the second phase repatriation of the military contingent of UNTAES could start on 15 October and be completed by 15 November. However, because conditions have not yet been achieved to enable to full integration of the Transitional Police Force (TPF) into the Croatian police force, the present civilian police strength of 400 would be required at least until 15 January 1998. It was also essential that the number of United Nations military observers remained unchanged at 100.
UNDPI
2 OCTOBER 1997
Croatia Likely to Comply With Obligations
In a Presidential Statement of 20 October 1997 (S/PRST/1997/48), the Security Council noted with approval positive actions taken by Croatia, including recent agreements on education, progress in the reintegration of the judiciary, the law on convalidation, moves toward recognition of pensioner service, assistance to local governments and municipalities and provision to UNTAES of documentation on 25 war crimes cases. The Council was also encouraged by the increased cooperation with the International Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The Security Council continued to note with concern that there were still outstanding areas of contention and non-compliance which required further urgent action from the Government of Croatia. The Council reiterated its call to Croatia to curb media attacks on ethnic groups. It underlined the importance of the removal of all legal and administrative barriers to the accelerated voluntary two-way return of displaced persons, as well as to the return of refugees. The Council called upon the Government of Croatia to give immediate effect to decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding the Law on the Temporary Takeover and Administration of Specified Property, and to take further action to promote the return of owners to their homes, including access to reconstruction assistance.
The Council approved the intention to retain UNCIVPOL and UNMOs at current levels to the end of the UNTAES mandate, and noted the need to address concerns relating to the continuation of police monitoring functions. Finally, the Security Council shared the assessment of the Secretary-General that there was sufficient time for Croatia to comply fully with its obligations and commitments before 15 January 1998 and urged Croatia to redouble itsefforts in the remaining time.
UNDPI
30 OCTOBER 1997
UNDPI UNMOP MISSION UPDATES
Improved Relations with Croatian Authorities
On 31 October 1997, the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Force Commander reported to UN Headquarters a marked improvement in relations during October with the local Croatian authorities. Following an UNMOP meeting with the Dubrovnik police chief on 13 October, UN military observers gained access to several positions in the demilitarised zone for the first time. UNMOP also obtained a joint patrol to positions in the north for the first time since March 1997. However, the mission was informed that this "exceptional" access would not be repeated. An unprecedented event for the mission was the visit to Prevlaka, on 27 October, by the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Mr. Ivan Penic.
DPI DAILY HIGHLIGHTS
31 OCTOBER
UNSG'S REPORT, 30 DECEMBER 1997 (S/1997/1019)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) consists of 28 United Nations military observers ... headed by a Chief Military Observer, Colonel Harold Mwakio Tangai (Kenya). The current mandate of the mission expires on 15 January 1998.
Situation in the UNMOP Area of Responsibility
Since the submission of my report of 1 July 1997 (S/1997/506), the situation in the UNMOP area of responsibility has remained stable. Occasional violations of the demilitarisation regime, consisting of several sightings of Croatian Army and Yugoslav personnel and one sighting of a Croatian heavy weapon, were fewer in number and of lesser significance than similar violations reported in the past.
Progress Towards Adoption of the Practical Options
During discussions with the Croatian and Yugoslav authorities in October 1997, the Chief Military Observer again appealed to the parties to improve their compliance with the demilitarisation regime. In particular, he urged the parties to remove landmines from areas patrolled by the United Nations military observers and to cease their interference with the observers' freedom of movement.
... Following negotiations between UNMOP and Croatian officials, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Croatia ordered the clearing of a minefield along a road inside the United Nations controlled zone. During November and December, a total of 67 mines were cleared. Upon the completion of this project, the Croatian authorities closed three positions of the Special Police inside the United Nations controlled zone. These actions represent the first substantial progress towards implementation of the practical options since June 1996. Subsequently, the Yugoslav Army conducted a mine-searching operation along a road inside the United Nations controlled zone and confirmed that the road was free of mines. As a result of these actions by the parties, United Nations military observers are now able to patrol all roads inside the United Nations controlled zone without risk to their safety.
Efforts by the Chief Military Observer to establish procedures for regular access to positions throughout the UNMOP area of responsibility have not so far been successful. The Yugoslav authorities have, however, lifted the partial restriction on the access of United Nations military observers to Border Police positions and also on their use of a road in the demilitarised zone.
Progress Towards a Settlement
Since my previous report, the parties have continued to indicate in their contacts with United Nations officials that their bilateral negotiations pursuant to the Agreement on Normalisation of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, signed at Belgrade on 23 August 1996 ... have not yet addressed the Prevlaka dispute directly, and that there has been no progress towards a settlement. Public statements by senior government officials in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have confirmed those indications.
Observations
Since my previous report, the parties have continued to indicate in their contacts with UNMOP that they retain their divergent interpretations of the Prevlaka dispute ... For Croatia, it is a security issue, whereas the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regards it as a territorial issue ... substantive negotiations have not started and, in discussions with UNMOP, Croatian and Yugoslav officials have held out no prospect of an end to the long-term violations in the United Nations controlled zone
... UNMOP plays an essential role in maintaining conditions conducive to negotiations, and recent developments at other parts of the border between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia give me grounds for hope that the two countries can solve the disputed issue of Prevlaka through mutual negotiations".
Composition and Strength of the Military Elements of UNMOP, as at 19 December 1997:
Argentina 1 (MO); Bangladesh 1 (MO); Belgium 1 (MO); Brazil 1 (MO); Canada 1 (MO); Czech Republic 1 (MO); Denmark 1 (MO); Egypt 1 (MO); Finland 1 (MO); Ghana 2 (MO); Indonesia 2 (MO); Ireland 1 (MO); Jordan 1 (MO); Kenya 2 (MO); Nepal 1 (MO); New Zealand 1 (MO); Nigeria 1 (MO); Norway 1 (MO); Pakistan 1 (MO); Poland 1 (MO); Portugal 1 (MO); Russian Federation 1 (MO); Sweden 1 (MO); Switzerland 1 (MO); Ukraine 1 (MO); Total 28 Military Observers (MO).
UNDPI UNMOT MISSION UPDATE
Location: Republic of Tajikistan; Duration: December 1994 to present; Headquarters: Dushanbe; Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Mr. Gerd Merrem (Germany); Chief Military Observer: Brigadier-General Boleslaw Izydorczyk (Poland)
Recent Developments
In November, the Secretary-General reported that substantive progress towards addressing the security concerns had been made, leading him to recommend that the Security Council expand UNMOT's mandate as proposed in his September report [see CRM, Issue 2]. The Council, by its resolution 1138 (1997) of 14 November, expanded the mandate of UNMOT and extended it until 15 May 1998. The Council also increased the size of the Mission in accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations. The Security Council expanded the mandate of UNMOT to enhance the Mission's ability to assist in the implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, which was signed on 27 June 1997. UNMOT is to provide good offices and expert advice; cooperate with the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) and its subcommissions, and with the Central Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum; participate in the work of the Contact Group of guarantor States and organisations and serve as its coordinator; investigate reports of cease-fire violations and report on them to the United Nations and the CNR; monitor the assembly of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters and their reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation; assist in the reintegration into governmental power structures or demobilisation of ex-combatants; coordinate UN assistance to Tajikistan during the transition period; and maintain close contacts with the parties, as well as cooperative liaison with the CIS Peacekeeping Forces, the Russian border forces and the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan.
Strength, as of 31 October 1997: 44 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff
Contributors of Military Personnel, as of 31 October 1997: Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Denmark, Jordan, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uruguay.
UN EMPLOYEE KILLED IN TAJIKISTAN
A UN spokepserson announced that, on 18 November, a Frenchwoman, Karine Mane, who was working with the UNHCR, and five of her abductors, were killed in a grenade explosion at her apartment in Dushanbe. Local authorities stated that forces loyal to the government had surrounded the apartment, which Mane had shared with a male friend who was subsequently freed. The authorities believed that separatist warlord, Rezvon Sadirov, had ordered the abduction, hoping that an exchange could be made for his brother, Bakhrom Sadirov, who awaits trial on kidnapping charges. The Tass and Interfax news agencies reported that there had been a grenade explosion during a rescue operation by the government, although it was unclear whether security forces or the kidnappers had been responsible.
WASHINGTON POST
1 DECEMBER 1997
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SC RES. 1136 (1997), 6 NOVEMBER (S/RES/1136)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Expressing appreciation for the neutral and impartial way in which the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB) has carried out its mandate, in close cooperation with the Central African authorities, and noting with satisfaction that MISAB has contributed to stabilising the situation in the Central African Republic, in particular through the supervision of the surrendering of arms;
Noting that the States participating in MISAB and the Central African Republic have decided to extend its mandate in order to complete its mission;
... Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region; Welcomes the efforts made by the Member States which participate in MISAB and of those Member States which provide support to them, and their readiness to maintain these efforts;
Welcomes the support provided by the United Nations Development Programme to the International Committee for the follow-up of the Bangui Agreements and encourages it to continue this support;
Approves the continued conduct by Member States participating in MISAB of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective; Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorises the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel;
Decides that the authorisation referred to ... above will be limited to a period of three months from the adoption of this resolution;
Recalls that the expenses and logistical support for MISAB will be borne on a voluntary basis in accordance with article 11 of the mandate of MISAB, requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to establish a Trust Fund for the Central African Republic which would assist in supporting the troops of States participating in MISAB and in providing logistical support to them, and encourages Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund;
... Urges all States, international organisations and financial institutions to assist in post-conflict development in the Central African Republic".
SC RES. 1141 (1997), 28 NOVEMBER (S/RES/1141)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Affirms the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully functioning national police of adequate size and structure, able to conduct the full spectrum of police functions, to the consolidation of democracy and the revitalisation of Haiti's system of justice and encourages Haiti to pursue its plans in these respects;
Decides ... to establish, until 30 November 1998, a United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), composed of up to 300 civilian police, with a mandate limited to a single one-year period ending on 30 November 1998, in order to continue to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian national police in accordance with the arrangements, including monitoring Haitian national police field performance;
... Affirms also that further international assistance to the Haitian national police, should it be needed, should be provided through United Nations specialised agencies and programmes, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, and through international and regional organisations and by interested Member States;
... Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the United Nations and by Member States pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions in order to carry out the provisions of the mandate;
... Recognises that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constitute the major tasks facing the Haitian Government and people and that significant international assistance is indispensable for sustainable development in Haiti, and stresses the commitment of the international community to a long-term programme of support for Haiti;
Requests all States to make voluntary contributions ... for the Haitian national police, in particular for the recruitment and deployment by the United Nations Development Programme of police advisers to assist the inspector general, directorate general, and department headquarters of the Haitian national police".
MACEDONIA
SC RES. 1142 (1997), 4 DECEMBER (S/RES/1142)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Welcoming the phased reduction and restructuring of [UN Preventive Deployment Force] UNPREDEP troop strength which has taken place pursuant to its resolution 1110 (1997);
... Taking note of the Secretary-General's observations that there have been a number of positive developments in the overall situation in the area, in particular the stabilisation of the situation in Albania, but that peace and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region;
Bearing in mind the intention of Member States and interested organisations to consider actively the instituting of possible alternatives to UNPREDEP,
Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for the final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal of the military component immediately thereafter;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 June 1998, on the modalities of the termination of UNPREDEP, including practical steps for the complete withdrawal of the military component immediately after 31 August 1998, and to submit recommendations on the type of international presence that would be most appropriate for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after 31 August 1998".
SC RES. 1144 (1997), 19 DECEMBER (S/RES/1144)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which includes the IPTF [International Police Task Force], for an additional period terminating on 21 June 1998, which will be renewed for a further period unless there are significant changes to the security arrangements as currently provided by the multinational stabilisation force (SFOR);
... Reaffirms that the successful implementation of the tasks of the IPTF rests on the quality, experience and professional skill of its personnel, and urges Member States, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure the provision of such qualified personnel;
Urges also Member States to provide training, equipment and related assistance for local police forces in coordination with the IPTF, recognising that resources are critical to the success of the police reform efforts of the IPTF;
Calls upon all concerned to ensure the closest possible coordination among the Office of the High Representative, the multinational stabilisation force, UNMIBH and the relevant civilian organisations and agencies in order to ensure the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and the priority objectives of the civilian consolidation plans, as well as the security of the IPTF".
SC RES. 1145 (1997), 19 DECEMBER (S/RES/1145)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
... Noting the termination of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) on 15 January 1998 ... and express[ing] its continued full support for UNTAES as it completes its mandate;
... Underlines that it is the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian police and judicial authorities who bear full responsibility for the security and safeguarding of the civil rights of all residents of the Republic of Croatia, regardless of ethnicity;
Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia to implement fully and promptly all of its obligations and commitments, including those reached with UNTAES, with regard to the Region;
Stresses the need for the Government of the Republic of Croatia to pursue the economic revitalisation of the Region and notes, in this respect, the importance of past and future involvement by the international community; Notes with approval the recent improved performance of the Government of the Republic of Croatia towards fulfilling its obligations, including the adoption of a comprehensive programme of national reconciliation, and encourages continued progress in this regard;
... Decides to establish, with effect from 16 January 1998, a support group of 180 civilian police monitors, for a single period of up to nine months as recommended by the Secretary-General, to continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons, in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the report of the Secretary-General and in response to the request by the Government of the Republic of Croatia;
Decides also that the support group will assume responsibility for those UNTAES personnel and United Nations-owned assets needed for its use in fulfilment of its mandate".
CONFERENCES, RESEARCH AND TRAINING
LESTER B. PEARSON INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE
The Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre aims to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability. The Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programmes. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is an independent organisation established by the Government of Canada in 1994, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre accomplishes its mandate by providing research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.
Live, Move and Work: Technology and Engineering in Modern Peacekeeping, 2-13 February 1998
This course aims to provide participants with knowledge about the scope and value of engineering and technology in modern peacekeeping. By making prospective peacekeepers more aware of the engineering problems and the technological options, the course will enhance their ability to choose and use these tools and make them safer and more effective in their work. The course is designed for all members of the of the Peacekeeping Partnership, whether technically experienced or not, and seeks, especially, to provide practical guidance to middle and senior managers in the field and at national/international headquarters. The course design reflects the fact that quality of life and effectiveness are issues of great interest and importance in every mission.
The course deals with a wide range of issues in peacekeeping engineering and technology: the philosophical, cultural, military, political, legal and economic aspects. It describes the complete life cycle for technical and other equipment used in the field: planning, procurement, deployment, operation, maintenance and replacement/evolution. Practical criteria for choosing appropriate technologies and engineering projects will be presented. The wide scope of the course reflects the fact that, while the right technology and engineering, even in small amounts, can be crucial elements of a mission's success, the unsuitable or inappropriate can at least slow the progress and at worst reverse it.
The course costs $2,200 (Cdn). This fee includes tuition, study materials, accommodation and meals at the Cornwallis Park campus, and ground transportation between the campus and Halifax or Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. The Legal Framework of Modern Peacekeeping, 23 March - 3 April, 1998
The aim of this course is to provide intermediate and senior members of the peacekeeping disciplines with an in-depth understanding of the legal framework of modern peacekeeping. Participants will include representatives from all elements of the New Peacekeeping Partnership. Ideally, approximately half will come from Canada, with the remainder coming from several other nations of the peacekeeping community. A course participant profile has been developed to provide a representative balance from humanitarian agencies, civil police, the military, election monitoring agencies, the media, departments of foreign affairs and academia.
The course has been developed along several themes or "series." The Partners Profile Series provides overviews of the legal aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Partners profiled on this course include humanitarian and human rights agencies, the military, civil police, war crimes investigators and the United Nations. The Problem Solving series outlines the application and effect of humanitarian law and human rights norms on international intervention operations. Participants working in syndicate will subsequently apply these theories on several case studies as well as in a major exercise involving issues of genocide, refugees, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the treatment of victims of international armed conflicts. The Overview Series places the subject of international law within the context of other major issues relating to modern peacekeeping.
The cost of this course is $2,200 (Cdn). This fee includes tuition, study materials, accommodation and meals at the Cornwallis Park campus, and ground transportation between the campus and Halifax or Yarmouth, Nova Scotia.
Information on courses run by the Pearson Centre is available from the Registrar at: Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100 Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada. Tel: (902) 638-8611 ex. 109, fax: (902) 638-8888; Email: registrar@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca Internet: http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
PEACEKEEPING CITATION LIST: CENTRE FOR DEFENCE INFORMATION
For information on research in the peacekeeping area, contact Colonel Dan Smith at: Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700; Fax: (202) 862 0708; E-Mail: dsmith@cdi.org; Internet Site: http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/
UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping, including demining, mission up-dates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel contributors, rapid deployment facilities, and training is available on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
UNITAR POCI
The UN Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI) provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the courses is available on-line at: http://www.wm.edu/unpeacek/index.html
The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has undertaken studies of four multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).
Mandates and Means
The United Nations should be actively involved in the negotiations of peace accords, cease-fire agreements or other accords that define its role in a conflict situation. Before the Organisation takes on a peacekeeping task, the parties must demonstrate a commitment to implementing the accords. The mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable and provide for the necessary means for implementation. The mandate of an ongoing operation should be adjusted to take account of changing circumstances and conditions in the mission area. The Secretariat and Member States should provide the Security Council with all relevant information in order for the Council to take an informed decision when framing or readjusting a mandate ... In seeking an in-depth assessment of potential crisis situations before formulating a mandate, the Security Council may consider expanding its sources of information to include informed views of military experts, academics, concerned media representatives, non-governmental organisations and agency staff ... The Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States, collectively and individually, should provide a peacekeeping operation with adequate means and resources to implement the mandate. If a mandate is changed or adjusted, the mission must be provided with the necessary resources to implement the modified objectives ... Mandates should be conceptualised flexibly and could include elements of peace-building and emergency reconstruction of war-torn economies. The means to do this must be provided, such as a trust fund, assessed contributions, a mixed peacekeeping force with strong security elements as well as a substantial engineering capacity, communications experts etc.
Planning
Planning for an operation should begin with the collection of all information about the country and region of deployment. In addition to traditional sources of information, brainstorming sessions should be conducted with all elements of the United Nations system that may have some relevant knowledge about the situation. Elements to be consulted as a general rule are the military, political, humanitarian, specialised agencies, information, human rights and legal affairs. The experience of non-governmental and local bodies of the situation on the ground is invaluable to the planning process and consultations with these parties should also be held. Other sources of information include Governments, regional organisations, academic institutions and human rights monitoring groups. The survey/reconnaissance technical mission should include representatives of all substantive components of the proposed mission. The team should propose an operational concept; the team's report will form the basis of the plan for the mission. The report should include strategic options and courses of action. When the mission's mandate has been approved by the Security Council, the mandate should be translated into an operational plan with detailed and specific activities for each component. This will also assist in the determination of budgets, logistical requirements, and other administrative back up required for the mission ... Whenever possible an advance team should be sent to prepare the ground for the deployment of the operation. This includes situations in which the United Nations is taking over operations from a multinational or regional force ... Planning is a dynamic process and contingency plans should be developed ... Planning for liquidation of a mission should be done well in advance and in coordination with all departments and agencies of the United Nations system to ensure a smooth departure.
Coordination
There must be clearly defined common goals and objectives which provide all the components of a peacekeeping operation ... with a coherent framework for their activities ... Realising the importance of coordination, the Secretary-General has constituted a task force consisting of the under-secretaries-general of substantive departments dealing with peacekeeping to provide policy guidance at the highest level ... The SRSG is the recognised institutional head of the United Nations family in a mission area and under the SRSG should be a unified, cohesive structure. All substantive decisions in the field with political ramifications should be taken in the name of the SRSG. The SRSG must be an experienced political negotiator as well as an effective manager of a complex operation. Frequent changes in the top leadership of an operation, including component heads, detract from the objective of developing a coherent and integrated structure for the operation. All members of the United Nations family in the mission area should have mutual knowledge of each other's organisational mandates, objectives and operating procedures. Respect for each other's organisational cultures can contribute to improving coordination. Guidelines to improve civilian-military coordination within a mission could be developed. These should include information on the role, function and organisation of coordination mechanisms, such as a joint civilian-military coordination or operations centre to be set up both at mission headquarters and in the regions of the mission area. The guidelines should describe the range of military support services and assets (e.g. transportation, engineering, logistics, security) that can be used for humanitarian purposes. Mechanisms to resolve day-to-day management issues as well as urgent problems requiring the attention of top management should also be described ... Coordination of activities with the non-governmental community, to whatever extent possible, is essential, keeping in mind their independence of the United Nations system ... All UN entities in a mission area must be headquartered close to each other for effective coordination. An inter-agency agreement defining the responsibilities of each entity in the implementation of the peace agreements could be considered. Innovations to improve coordination have had some success and could be considered for other missions: the appointment of a deputy SRSG, at the Assistant Secretary-General level, to act as a general manager responsible for day-to-day administration and coordination allowing for an integrated military-humanitarian-development approach ... There should be a clear chain of command between a peacekeeping mission and Headquarters. Ideally, all individual units and departments should work through the SRSG, as he/she is the head of the mission ... An interdepartmental framework of cooperation has been established for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs to improve coordination among those departments. This framework should be strengthened.
Intelligence and Information Analysis
Given the necessary political resolve, the key to a successful early-warning system would be effective targeting of warnings to relevant political bodies and individuals ... A well-managed intelligence and information analysis programme can greatly assist a peacekeeping operation. This should be taken into account in future operations, despite the Organisation's traditional reluctance in this area. A detailed intelligence management plan should be completed in advance of deployment. Such a plan should cover in as much detail as possible the mission area, the collection efforts, analysis and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, operational security and the acquisition/maintenance of intelligence products, including maps. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely sharing of intelligence information, both among contingents in the field and between mission headquarters and New York. A combined civilian-military information analysis cell may be established in the Office of the SRSG for political and military analysis. Ensuring security of information gathered and protecting the confidentiality of sources is essential. Missions must develop standard operating procedures for these.
Military
Detailed standard operating procedures for all functions of the military component should be developed. These are a valuable tool for the planning process, as well as operational and administrative/logistics activities. Units should arrive in the mission area well balanced in composition and capable of accomplishing their envisaged tasks. In providing troops for peacekeeping operations, Member States with known capabilities in specific areas of expertise should contribute troops for those purposes. Emphasis should be put on capability rather than numbers. Troop contingents that arrive late and not fully equipped detract from the overall effectiveness of the mission. Troop-contributing countries must ensure that their contingents are properly equipped to perform assigned tasks and are deployed to the mission area as expeditiously as possible. To avoid problems arising from mismatching troops and equipment, all contingents must arrive with their own equipment. When this is not possible, troops should be given some time to train with the new and unfamiliar equipment, prior to deployment. There is a need for flexibility in allowing overlap of incoming and outgoing contingents, even if it results in exceeding the mandated troop strength for a limited time, as long as the Security Council and budgetary authorities are kept fully informed. Good and reliable communications are essential for operational efficiency. Adequate communications equipment and facilities must be provided for in the initial mission plan and the necessary budgetary requests made. Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if a peacekeeping operation is to succeed. Individual contingents must respond consistently to the direction of the Force Commander and not to national imperatives and agendas. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently detailed to eliminate doubt as to individual and unit behaviour under various contingencies, and should include guidance concerning mutual support by personnel and units of the force as a whole. Unilateral withdrawal of national contingents after they have been deployed in an operation should be discouraged as such actions jeopardise the safety of the remaining force. Any withdrawal must be carried out in consultation with the Secretary-General and must be implemented in the field under the authority of the Force Commander. When deciding on the use of commercial service contractors in support of military elements, the United Nations must recognise that such contractors are not capable of providing for their own security, and place an added burden on the military. This should be factored into the planning of troop requirements.
Security
The head of the mission is normally the designated official responsible for the security of all mission personnel. This official should assign to a senior officer with the appropriate training the task of assisting with security measures. A security plan should be prepared immediately upon the start-up of the mission, using guidelines contained in the Field Security Handbook published by the United Nations Security Coordinator. This plan should detail the actions to be taken to ensure the security of United Nations staff members and property in any emergency ... There should be only one integrated and comprehensive security plan which includes both the peacekeeping mission and the United Nations agencies working in the mission area. There should not be two parallel security plans for the same mission area, or separate security plans for the military and civilian components of the mission. All personnel should receive a security briefing immediately upon arrival in the mission area and a security training programme should be in effect ... Missions should ensure that adequate rations, drinking water, medical supplies and fuel reserves are on hand to meet emergency requirements. Communication systems should be adequate to allow for uninterrupted communication in the event of an emergency. As a standard procedure, heads of missions should be briefed by the United Nations Security Coordinator at Headquarters in New York, prior to deployment in the field. The security of personnel and mission assets, being a fundamental concern, should not be compromised for budgetary reasons.
Training of Local Police and Human Rights Monitoring
The training of local police should be envisaged as part of long-term peace-building activities of the mission and within the context of the development of security, human rights and public administration systems. The development of these systems should, as appropriate, be set in motion along with the peacekeeping operation. The Centre for Human Rights, the Crime Prevention Division and relevant specialised agencies should, therefore, be included in the consultative process when defining the role of CIVPOL. The training programme for the local police, if part of the mandate, should be formulated in close cooperation with the local authorities leaving it to them to select trainees, ensure their upkeep and to provide the infrastructure for training as well as supplies and equipment. If the local authorities are unable to provide the latter, the international donor community could assist. A comprehensive appeal for equipment and supplies must be planned and prepared well in advance so that the equipment is available when needed. The CIVPOL must work closely with both the military and civilian components, particularly the human rights monitors. The idea is to marry the practical experience of the police observers with the legal and human rights expertise of the human rights monitors. Coordination of activities should start from the conceptual and planning stages through to implementation and follow-up. CIVPOL observers should be trained in human rights monitoring, and be aware of other internationally approved norms and guidelines on crime prevention and criminal justice, including relevant principles of international humanitarian law. The CIVPOL observers must be able to communicate with the local population. The hiring of interpreters must be budgeted for in advance. Guidelines should be developed for such often-mandated CIVPOL activities as training of national police forces, including the investigation of human rights abuses.
Logistics
Operational and logistics plans should be fully integrated and developed together. As soon as a concept of operations is formulated, a logistics concept should be developed, followed by a comprehensive operational plan and a logistics plan to support it. Mission specific guidelines to troop-contributing countries should clearly include all stores and equipment required to be brought by each contingent and the period for which contingents are required to be self-sufficient. The mission logistics infrastructure should be set up at the earliest to ensure smooth induction of troops and personnel and the early establishment of all components of the mission. This requires early budgetary allocation; selection, recruitment and positioning of essential logistics staff; finalisation of service and supply contracts; and early procurement action. Standard operating procedures to minimise delays should be adopted. Efforts should be made to improve material management and inventory control through the establishment of an electronic inventory which could provide easily accessible information on available equipment and stores. Mission start-up kits containing critical operational material could be readied and warehoused centrally to offset procurement delays during the initial deployment phase. Vehicles and stores at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, should be in a serviceable condition before being dispatched to missions. Adequate resources should be provided to the Base for this. In view of the fact that military logistics units are not readily provided by troop-contributing countries, it may be necessary to provide logistics support through commercial contractors. Another option may be to use military logistics units during the initial deployment phase and, thereafter, civilian contractors. The Organisation must strengthen its ability to administer such contracts efficiently. The status-of-mission agreement must be finalised at the earliest and should provide for certain facilities for contractors providing services to the United Nations, including the prompt issuance of visas; freedom of movement; and the right to import, for the use of the United Nations, supplies, equipment and material, free of tax or duties. Standard operating procedures are a valuable tool in the execution of administrative/logistics activities and should be prepared in advance whenever possible. Mission liquidation planning should start once the deployment phase has ended. A detailed plan should be prepared to ensure a smooth exit. Based on the liquidation guidelines, detailed instructions for the disposal of assets should be included in the liquidation plan.
Finance and Budget
Early approval of the budget for a peacekeeping operation is an important factor in minimising delays in deployment as most contractual and procurement actions can only be initiated only after budgetary approval. Therefore, preparation of a budget should begin simultaneously with the operational plan for the proposed mission. Requirements for each planned activity of the mission should be provided for in the budget. Budgets for peacekeeping operations should be as comprehensive as possible, with all substantive components providing input, especially when a peacekeeping mandate is being renewed or modified. To minimise lead time, procurement procedures should be streamlined and simplified. A list of approved vendors, arranged by commodity, should be maintained to facilitate procurement of goods and services. Field staff that have the authority to make procurement requests should be made aware of each step of the procurement process. Consideration should be given to further delegation of financial authority to the field. There should be greater decentralisation of spending authority, with regional offices of the mission being allowed to maintain petty cash accounts. The new, simplified procedures for reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment should be implemented.
Personnel and Training
A reliable system of civilian stand-by personnel in key categories, such as administration and finance, political, public information and legal, can be developed. The setting up of "start-up" teams and the early identification of staff for senior, core posts would shorten recruitment time. Qualified and experienced staff from within the United Nations system should be released to serve with peacekeeping operations, especially in the areas of procurement, finance and personnel. The United Nations must consider giving incentives to both mission appointees and Headquarters staff wishing to serve in the field in order to attract a better calibre of staff for peacekeeping operations. It is essential to select and appoint international staff who have both the necessary professional skills and knowledge of United Nations procedures to key positions at the outset to lay a strong foundation for the efficient functioning of the mission. Training courses in critical fields should be held periodically at Headquarters to develop a pool of staff that could be deployed to the field at short notice. In recruiting staff, due weight should be given to such factors as political and negotiating skills, ability to work in an international environment, ability to cooperate with other components of a mission, sensitivity to foreign cultures and traditions, and the ability to drive on less than perfect road conditions. In keeping with the Organisation's policy on achieving gender equality, the recruitment of women at all levels should be encouraged. Quick turnover of staff in key positions is detrimental to efficiency and continuity. A training cell must be established in all missions, and briefings and orientation should be provided not only to military observers and CIVPOL, but to all civilian staff as well. The training should include some practical exercises to improve interaction and cooperation among the various components of the mission. Orientations should include information on the history, culture and traditions of the host country, the nature of the conflict, the mandate of the mission, the role and functions of the different mission components as well as agencies that are operating in the area, and on the standards of behaviour expected of United Nations staff in the conflict area. A systematic debriefing of mission personnel should be established so that the Organisation benefits from their experience.
Medical and Health
Each peacekeeping operation must contain a medical element and this must be included in the initial plan for the operation. The composition of the medical element should be tailored to suit the mission's environment and requirements ... Pre-deployment medical briefing of staff, including medical staff, is essential ... To improve coordination between headquarters medical branch and the field medical units, which are attached to different national contingents, standard operating procedures and treatment protocols should be developed for all medical units of the mission. Reporting procedures should also be developed to share experiences on disease incidence and treatment success. Medical evacuation procedures should be clearly defined and emergency evacuation authority should be delegated to the Force Medical Officer. Stress is often a consequence of working in a difficult and conflict-ridden environment and stress management for staff must be regarded as a priority for peacekeeping operations.
Demining
... Planning for demining should commence at the outset and the demining plan should be woven into the operational plan for the mission. In operations where demining is envisaged, a representative from the Demining Unit should be included in the reconnaissance/survey missions and in the planning team constituted to develop the operational plan. Demining has two aspects: the immediate operational demining necessary for the conduct of the peacekeeping operation and the long-term humanitarian demining to rid the country of land-mines laid over a period of time. The Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) is responsible for the former, while the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) for the latter; however, close cooperation between the demining units of both Departments is necessary to ensure that plans for operational and humanitarian demining complement each other. Adequate funds for operational demining should be included in the budget of the peacekeeping operation so that it is not dependent on voluntary contributions. In order to build indigenous capacity for long-term demining, it may be necessary to conduct demining and mine-awareness training. In such cases, adequate budgetary, staffing and administrative provisions must be planned well in advance ... While civilian contractors to conduct demining are preferred by national military contingents, these contractors should be on the ground and operational before troops arrive in-theatre and are ready for deployment. If this is not possible, then demining should be conducted by military units for the initial months of deployment. A political initiative to ensure that new mines are not laid must be conducted in tandem with demining, otherwise the effort is for naught and these costs of demining, in financial terms and lives lost, will continue to rise.
Humanitarian Relief in a Peacekeeping Environment
Humanitarian indicators can serve as an important barometer of political trends and must be given appropriate attention at the political level. Greater cooperation in pooling and accessing information within the humanitarian community, between the humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping operation and with Member States may help to provide a more complete picture of the humanitarian situation, especially during pivotal moments of complex emergencies. A critical analysis of the nature of the conflict will contribute to conceptualising comprehensive humanitarian action. Effective targeting and channelling of humanitarian aid depends on accurate political analysis of the conflict and, thus, the context within which the aid is delivered. This would dispel any misperception that aid is not reaching those most in need. A systematic needs assessment by a lead agency should be conducted to avoid disproportionate distribution of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian assistance to refugee camps should also be provided with the ultimate objective being repatriation. A consolidated relief strategy should be developed for humanitarian emergencies, backed up by specific operational plans, including guidelines for actions to be taken by the United Nations system, other international organisations and non-governmental organisations. The implementation of these plans should be monitored regularly, evaluated periodically and revised as conditions in a country change. The physical infrastructure has to be improved and maintained along with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Donors and financial institutions must be encouraged to contribute to such rehabilitation even in countries where there is no government. Aid for internally displaced persons must be part of contingency planning and responsibility for such persons must be clearly assigned within the humanitarian community working in a country.
Public Information
A successful information campaign requires a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of the mission. It should be a part of the overall operational plan of the mission, should be monitored from Headquarters to ensure political coherence, and should be coordinated through the SRSG, so that there is a consistent public information voice and message from the United Nations as a whole. Public information specialists must be part of the mission from its inception. Good media relations is a long-term proposition and should not be viewed as a one-time activity. Press relations and trust have to be developed over a period of time. When something goes wrong, it is generally best to acknowledge that, explain why it happened and what is being done to avoid the problem in the future. If journalists are to represent the United Nations perspective they have to feel sympathetic to the problems that peace-keepers face. They are more likely to do this if they trust the UN spokesman as a reliable and honest source. Good media relations in the field include providing journalists with basic information about the United Nations, its structure, aims and objectives in a mission area, nature and constraints of the mandate, as well as the political, social and other conditions in the host country. The briefing materials prepared for mission staff and national contingents could be shared with journalists to good effect. Journalists safety concerns may also affect their coverage of events in a mission area. To the extent possible, they should be provided with some measure of security. However, it is not advisable to house journalists inside a United Nations compound. Journalists tend to concentrate on dramatic events, such as military actions, ignoring soft news stories on other positive United Nations activities because they are not dramatic enough. It is up to the field operation's information section to make such stories easily accessible to the media. There are four target audiences for United Nations public information efforts in the field: the international audience; the parties; the local population and the local media; and the mission personnel themselves. Effective international media coverage depends on the optimal use of television, while local populations in many countries can be best reached through radio. Information strategy should therefore be designed with the potential of each medium in mind from the very outset and resourced accordingly. Effective communication and interaction with the local population is essential for the mission to achieve its objectives. The mission must be able to explain its mandate to the local population, to articulate what is expected of persons living in the mission area, and to counter false expectations of the United Nations role. Mission personnel also need to be continuously informed about the goals and activities of the mission; changes in its mandate if any; changes in the political or security situation in the country; and all other relevant developments. Mechanisms such as briefing sessions for staff, periodic newsletters, including relevant developments at the United Nations Headquarters, and a staff hotline are some ways to keep mission personnel aware and informed. The diplomatic community in a country is another important target group for information activities. Diplomatic representatives can exercise political influence on the parties involved in a conflict; they also serve as important sources of information for the media. The diplomatic community, therefore, should be kept abreast of developments in the mission area and the assistance of diplomats should be solicited in helping the SRSG carry out diplomatic functions. Pre-packaged public information material on the United Nations, the mission and its mandate can be prepared in advance of the mission's deployment and can be sent with the advance party so that some information activities can be started before the public information component is fully functional. The designated spokesman for the mission must be among the first to arrive in the mission area and must have strong journalism or public relations credentials. Under the guidance of the SRSG, the spokesman must be the voice of the mission and the information officers of all other United Nations entities in the mission area should work in coordination with the spokesman. To ensure the integrity and quality of its information products, the mission must be supplied with all necessary equipment and staff to allow it to produce its media programmes free from dependence on Government facilities. United Nations information must be kept strictly independent from the information activities of all the other actors present in the area, including the parties, as well as representatives of governments that may have their own agendas to pursue.
Relations with Local Population
... Lack of local support not only hinders the operation in the implementation of its mandate and the conduct of daily activities, but can also pose a physical danger to the mission's personnel. The local population should perceive the mission and its staff as being impartial. When the parties to a conflict attempt to use the mission or some of its staff to their own advantage, as they often do, the mission and its information component must be able to maintain and project its image of impartiality and neutrality. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour. The United Nations must also demonstrate a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities. It must not be perceived as being "above the law". Designating an ombudsman, or a focal point, to consider the grievances of the local population against the mission or its staff could be considered. Respect for the cultural traditions and social mores of the local population is an important part of maintaining good relations with the local population. Briefings on history, culture, and other aspects of life of the host country should be conducted for all staff. Efforts at peace-building ... can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grass-roots support for the operation. In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the operation is best advised to work through existing local authorities and community elders and its peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict management, provided these do not contradict accepted international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in areas of recent and ongoing conflict, the operation must exercise great caution in identifying local community leaders, since it is often unclear as to who actually represents the community. Due to strife, population displacements and other extenuating circumstances, traditional societal patterns and roles may have become blurred or have submerged under new, often militaristic, hierarchies. As peacekeeping missions become more multi-faceted, peace-building is becoming an integral part of their activities. Emphasis should be placed on support of processes and institutions that reinforce reconciliation between warring parties and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, so that once the mission pulls out it does not leave behind a vacuum, but a foundation of peace and development that the country can build on. The United Nations must gear the composition of its peacekeeping forces to the new and changing role they are expected to play. The force could consist of mainly fighting troops when the imperative is maintenance of peace and security. This can be changed gradually, when the emphasis of the mission has changed to peace support and peace-building, to include more engineering or other units that could assist in the reconstruction of the country. Discretionary funds for peace-building should be made available to the SRSG to enhance the SRSG's leverage with the local authorities and the humanitarian community. The mission could use these funds for quick-impact projects and infrastructure repairs, among other things. An integral part of United Nations peacekeeping should be the promotion of "indirect peace-building", i.e., the resurrection of a web of non-governmental civic, professional, business and other associations. During the liquidation of an operation, consideration should be given to what resources could be left behind in the country to assist in post-conflict peace-building.
Demobilisation
Demobilisation in a peacekeeping environment is the down-sizing or complete disbanding of armed forces of parties to a conflict. Generally, demobilisation is accompanied by the disarmament, retraining and integration into civilian society of some of the former combatants, and others into a restructured national army, police or other paramilitary force. In the context of peacekeeping, demobilisation can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement. The peace agreement should also establish the institutional framework for the demobilisation exercise, including the schedule for down-sizing of forces and the establishment of the restructured national army. Demobilisation must be specifically included as an element in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration form a continuum. Demobilisation is only possible when there is some level of disarmament. Similarly, the success of demobilisation efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former combatants and their integration into civilian life or the restructured army. Planning for demobilisation and reintegration must be done in tandem. This requires the combined and coordinated efforts of several players: the parties to the conflict, the local governmental authorities, the UN specialised agencies, donors, non-governmental groups and the humanitarian community, as well as the peacekeeping operation. The efforts of all should be properly coordinated and should form part of an integrated approach. The demobilisation plan should include operating procedures for standard activities to be performed during the entire process, such as weapons classification, storage and destruction; registration and identification of ex-combatants; and site selection and basic requirements for assembly areas; among others. The plan should also define the incentive package to be provided to former combatants to encourage demobilisation. This could include staggered cash payments, food aid, clothing, household utensils, and implements and tools that would help former combatants become as self-reliant as possible. There should be an information strategy to accompany the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. The strategy should include general information about the entire process as well as specific information, such as locations of assembly areas; who is responsible for what element of the process; what a former combatant can expect at an assembly area; what are the options following demobilisation. To guard against a backlash caused by unrealistic expectations of what the United Nations is going to provide, the public information campaign should present a clear and realistic picture of what the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process entails and the role, limits and constraints of the United Nations in it. The responsibilities of other actors ... must also be clearly spelt out to the public. Designated assembly points for the combatants are useful at the early stage of demobilisation. At these assembly points, weapons can be collected and registered. The security of assembly areas must be ensured and infrastructure and amenities to house former combatants for a determinate period must be in place. In some situations, it may be necessary to have some infrastructure in place to support families of former combatants. An effort must be made to discourage the assembly areas from becoming satellite towns or permanent settlements dependent on UN support and supplies for their survival. Transparency of the arms collection process is vital. Weapons storage areas should be situated at some distance from the assembly areas. It is preferable that the storage sites are guarded by UN peace-keepers. The turning in of poor quality or obsolete weapons could be indicative of a lack of a genuine commitment to the disarmament process by the parties to the conflict. Final disposal of weapons and ordinance should also be planned in advance, in consultation with the parties. Some weapons are likely to be needed by the new, restructured army; others could be destroyed. The destruction of weapons and munitions must be accompanied by an effort to inform the local population of the reasons for those actions. The registration and documentation of ex-combatants should be performed at the assembly areas. The registration process should be able to indicate the preferences and future plan of each ex-combatant, his or her skills and level of education, as well as other information required for reintegration. Following a preliminary health examination, reorientation for civilian life and counselling can also begin at this stage. Reintegration projects located within existing communities have the advantage of an easier transition to civilian life and also of sharing much of the burden of retraining and socialisation of ex-combatants with the community and the local authorities. The local communities would also benefit from these projects. The impartiality of the monitors of the process must be beyond question. This is necessary to ensure that disarmament is and demobilisation are evenly matched on both sides. This perceived impartiality is also essential if the United Nations is to monitor cease-fire violations or to mediate disputes. The disarmament-demobilisation-reintegration process requires a commitment in terms of political will and considerable resources on the part of the international community and the parties to the conflict. This commitment is a prerequisite for the success of demobilisation and reintegration efforts.
The emerging doctrines of peace support operations in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and in NATO, represent a common shift towards a military spectrum approach, in which peacekeeping and peace enforcement are part of a range of military options. Hitherto, Wider Peacekeeping, the US FM 100-23, the December 1995 NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations and the UN's own pronouncements, had not proposed using the same forces for sliding from peacekeeping to enforcement and back again. In spite of the confusingly varied nomenclature used by different states for peace support operations, they had commonly articulated a distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.1 However, France, the largest and most active European peacekeeper by 1992 and a leading supporter of strengthening the UN and European security orders, was developing a less conservative approach. The French General Staff noted a requirement to act under a Chapter VII mandate in a "no consent, no aggressor" context, in order to restore peace (restauration de la paix). This would be non-offensive interpositional peacekeeping in an internal conflict but, and on this point France was exceptional at the time, with a mandate to switch to overwhelming force if necessary against all-comers who disturbed the peace. It differed from peace enforcement, which is also action under Chapter VII, in that peace enforcement, according to the French view, crossed the boundary into war.[2 ]The defining peace restoration mission for France was Operation Turquoise in Rwanda in mid-1994 which established a protection zone in the south-west of the country. Of course, in this instance the potential challengers did not possess powerful or sophisticated military equipment on the same level as, say, the Bosnian Serb forces in former Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, the UK had the distinct advantage of a more widely-understood language and a field manual that received public exposure and was eventually published as Wider Peacekeeping by the Stationery Office in London. It is also clear that the UK took a lead in devel oping a revisionist approach to its own Wider Peacekeeping doctrine. The UK's first draft of AFM PSO indicates a major doctrinal shift to a spectrum discourse, rather than representing an up-dating or consolidation of the former doctrine.
It also meshes with advances in the militarisation of peacekeeping in three respects. First, the 1990s have seen a more military, professional approach to peacekeeping management by the UN, as evidenced by various reforms in the DPKO: establishing a round-the-clock Situation Centre, increasing the staff from 6 in 1989 to about 450 in 1996, establishing an equipment maintenance and assembly store in Brindisi and so forth. Second, the concept of the UN subcontracting to proficient coalitions of the willing and able has been established for peace enforcement operations. Third, whereas there was no real doctrine of peacekeeping beyond the Hammarskjöld principles during the cold war, there were more insistent calls for a military doctrine of peacekeeping in the early 1990s. The requirement for a post-cold war doctrine had been answered by the British Army's Wider Peacekeeping manual. Since then, the revision of British Army doctrine recognises that the principles of war can be adapted to peace support operations and that enforcement is "set to increase" as the most appropriate response in complex emergencies where the situation in volatile[3].
This is not to say that cold war peacekeeping was entirely devoid of military professionalism. The British Army in Cyprus, for example, was highly professional in its approach. But peacekeeping was hardly treated seriously in the UK until the production of the Army Field Manual: Peace Keeping Operations in 1988, and the subject was not taught at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst until 1994. There can be little doubt that, since the end of the cold war, far more attention has been paid within the UK, the UN and among contributing states to the need for high levels of military professionalism and competence for peace support operations.
Above all, the new doctrine reflects a decision to deliberately incorporate the possibilities of vertical creep in operations in a controlled way and not assume that peacekeepers are appropriate in volatile situations. Indeed the reliance by blue helmet forces on consent can lead opponents to see this as a weakness from which to take advantage, thereby underlining a cringe posture on the part of the peacekeepers.[4]
Correspondingly, horizontal creep may have to be dealt with by emphasising the distance between military and non-military tasks. One should not overstate the case here. The military priority is bound to prevail in the military mind. But the more peacekeeping is seen as being a military rather than diplomatic function the less room there may be for horizontal activities. A reciprocal relationship between the two kinds of overspill probably involves an element of mutual exclusion to the extent that the incorporation of escalation creep may preclude the incorporation of horizontal creep. Not surprisingly, therefore, advocates of escalation potential have also been vociferous against task creep.[5] Indeed, Wider Peacekeeping suggested that transiting to peace enforcement:
would, for instance, require substantial force restructuring and redeployment, the evacuation of unarmed monitors and civilian workers and the probable termination of humanitarian operations.[6]
The logic of military preferences results in stones being cast in one pool rather than another, and the rationality of the choice for military establishments can hardly be denied. They are choosing to deal with vertical mission creep by trying to eliminate its inadvertence and making it intentional. This institutionalises it as part of a military spectrum, and it clearly has a combat-oriented ontology which challenges the diplomatic basis of old peacekeeping and even wider peacekeeping.[7 ]This is not the same as a continuum, or seamless transition from one kind of operation to another. Rather, the spectrum is segmented. Although a likely consequence of loss of credibility in a peacekeeping force is withdrawal, a transition from one segment to another is certainly envisaged: "A PK [peacekeeping] force can make the transition to PE [peace enforcement] provided that the necessary preparations [restructuring, evacuation of civilians and termination of humanitarian activities] have previously been made".[8]
Hammarsjköld principles, The Nordic Tactical Manual, Wider Peacekeeping and FM 100-23 made austere distinctions between peacekeeping and enforcement and emphasised the break between relatively inoffensive and relatively combative configurations. In December 1995 NATO doctrine also stated that:
Peace enforcement is fundamentally different from peacekeeping and requires a conscious political decision and a clear UN Mandate. It is normally not possible for the same PSF [Peace Support Force] to move from one operation to the other unless this possibility was foreseen and planned for; there are fundamental differences in the required organisation, training, attitudes, and equipment between peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces.[9]
By contrast, the emerging peace support operations doctrine allows planning for moving from one type of operation to another in a controlled way with escalation dominance. In essence, the problem of mission creep is solved by controlling it. New distinctions are made between peace enforcement and war. Unlike warfare, peace enforcement operates within strict limits such as impartiality in the targets of enforcement, minimum use of force consistent with the task and the preclusion of "war winning" objectives.[10] Nevertheless peace support operations can become part of proper soldiering rather than a distraction or a black art. Hammarskjöld 's rubric that "Peacekeeping is not soldiers' work but only soldiers can do it", is translated into "peace support is soldier's work and only soldier's can do it".
The adoption of an approach based on continuity rather than disjunction in military behaviour perhaps offers a more consistent and comfortable framework for military establishments, or at least for certain military cultures, than does the old discontinuity in military behaviour that peacekeeping always presented. As the new British doctrine comments in regard to training:
The conduct of PK [peacekeeping] may limit the use of force to self-defence purposes, however, there may be the requirement, in the conduct of any operation, to escalate to enforcement and war fighting.[11]
The doctrine shift is designed to offer a better fit between requirements, intentions and performance. Important military questions arise from new peace support doctrine - whether transitions are to be stepped or smooth; if, when and how helmets are to be changed from blue to green; whether it is more logical to provide a third force for third options. In theory, switching between roles, from the modestly-armed and transparent peacekeeper to the camouflaged combat soldier may not be a mission impossible. In carefully controlled domestic environments and schedules, soldiers can switch from warfighting roles to disaster relief for the civil power and back again. Needless to say, intrastate conflicts are not carefully controlled environments. However, the impact on military effectiveness is not the point at issue in this paper, but the non-military implications of the new doctrine.
Non-military Implications of the Doctrine Shift
Among the important considerations that will impinge on peace support operations, five can be readily identified.
Constitutional issues
The legal basis for moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations, and the closely-related issue of subcontracting, raises serious constitutional points. The use of Chapter VII for enforcement activities by UNIKOM, UNISOM II and, eventually, by UNPROFOR was perfectly legitimate (coming close to the original purpose of article 43). Consensual peacekeeping, despite lack of express provision in the UN Charter, also has a firm legal basis. In effect, UN authorisation is not even required for states or groups of states to conduct it. However, delegated enforcement action does require Security Council authorisation (under article 53). The legal status of operations that transit from peacekeeping to enforcement is therefore uncertain. There is no provision for an operation that commences as a consent-based presence, without the need of UN authorisation, and then, in accordance with new doctrine, develops into a grey-area of enforcement whilst maintaining a peacekeeping label outside article 53. What has tended to happen is that the Security Council has given its imprimatur to a regional 'peacekeeping operation' after it has commenced (as in Chad and Liberia), but then turned a blind eye to its subsequent evolution as an enforcement operation.
Such looseness is dangerous. It allows "considerable coercive freedom for regional defence and security organisations, which are, as practice has shown, subject to even greater domination and abuse" than UN operations.[12] Further, as David Gibbs points out, it is possible that such franchised operations could constitute "a new means for established powers to project their influence or, stated more plainly, a new type of imperialism".[13] Consequently, the value of having the participation of the Permanent Five Security Council members in Chapter VI consensual Peacekeeping is open to question. A study by INCORE (Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, University of Ulster) already suggests that the P5 might be excluded on the grounds that they are perceived to be overtly following national interests.[14]One solution is the subsidisation by the wealthier states of regional institutions and states for peacekeeping, thereby also avoiding the human and economic costs of involvement in conflicts deemed of peripheral interest to the wealthy - much as the United Kingdom and France are subsidising African peacekeeping competence. In the short term, however, this is likely to increase dependency on western equipment expertise and logistic support.[15]
On the other hand, for the UN to assume control over enforcement or "grey area" operations is not necessarily desirable. If constitutional controls over peace enforcement are desirable, "to help prevent charges of western domination [...] as well as curbing excessive uses of force"[16] the exercise of control might, in turn, endanger the UN's credibility and neutrality. It could undermine the UN Secretary-General's authority as an impartial negotiator. In sum, without secure constitutional foundations for "grey area" operations. intervention by the most powerful states, either controlled or uncontrolled, could undermine the UN's legitimating function.
Political Acceptability
The political acceptability of a military spectrum in which vertical mission creep is deliberately embraced may not be acceptable to troop providers taking risks and for those being policed or protected whose future cooperation may be jeopardised. The shift in doctrine eclipses the former consensus around traditional guidelines. It is quite possible that the new doctrine will be universally-accepted to produce a new doctrinal consensus. However, the consensus may not be so robust and long-lasting as the previous Hammarskjöld consensus for two reasons.
First, change in the environment of peacekeeping has been so rapid that doctrine has difficulty keeping up with practice. It is a central paradox of doctrinal development that the demand for consistent guidance is greater at a time when the pace of change has made it more difficult to discern dominant trends and more problematic to devise new, lasting principles. As in general warfare, the military establishments always seem to be reacting to and preparing for the previous crisis.
The experience of Somalia engendered great caution about mixing traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. The Rwanda crisis suggested the need for robust restauration de la paix by well-armed, though relatively small, and rapidly-deployed forces. The UNPROFOR mission in former Yugoslavia initially appeared to confirm the need for separation of peacekeeping and combat functions, because the Security Council had disastrously fudged the two concepts, and the IFOR mission subsequently encouraged a military spectrum approach. The Great Lakes crisis (Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda) in the latter part of 1996 testified to the great muddle that seemed to prevail. For it was not at all clear what an external force would do in that region, how it would be configured and what its rules of engagement would be.
Second, Hammarskjöld's principles were relatively uncontroversial because they were based on limited, consent-based inter-state peacekeeping. The character of new peace support operations is riskier, and this may discourage states from subscribing, though qualms may be suppressed if escalation is anticipated rather than inadvertent.[17 ]So far, among the Nordic states, Denmark has subscribed to NATO peace support operations doctrine (and its tank company in UNPROFOR shelled and killed Bosnian Serbs when returning harassing fire). Sweden and Finland were also involved in IFOR, though the former is guided by a doctrine similar to wider peacekeeping called "extended multifunctional peacekeeping", and the latter has constitutional inhibitions on involvement in enforcement.[18] However, if casualties are suffered as a consequence of association with a military spectrum approach, and another incident occurs of the kind that affected the second Multinational Force in Beirut in 1982, then the attitude of these and other states may change.
Exclusion on Military Grounds
The new doctrine portends a growing gap between military efficiency and political representation. It entails a high level of military proficiency on the part of contributing forces. In peace support operations that could entail enforcement, military protection of the force is paramount. Consequently, there is no room for incompetent and fainthearted military components in a force. High levels of professionalism and capability are required. Advocates of peacekeeping reform have correctly anticipated pressures for standardisation in training and harmonisation of operating procedures. The United States appears to be taking a leading position on training, and there are recommendations that criteria, to which some Third World states are unlikely to conform, should determine the suitability of contributions to peacekeeping by other states.[19] It would also be logical to create an international inspectorate to reject troops from countries that do not meet rigorous combat requirements.
However, these criteria will have consequences in terms of representation and political legitimacy, because selected multinational forces are likely to be drawn from a limited number of capable states. It may be essential, then, to spend as much effort in improving the competence of unrepresented states as in refining the peace support doctrine of hegemonic states.
Division of Labour
The new doctrine for peace support operations subscribes to a "division of labour" approach. This is designed to exploit the comparative advantage of types of specialisation. At the same time, several studies suggest that because complex situations require complex answers, a holistic approach to peacekeeping and external involvement has to be adopted. Both the Canadian and Dutch studies into improving rapid response acknowledged that peacekeeping was less a purely military vocation than in the past.20 The INCORE study places considerable emphasis on a holistic approach to military training, going beyond military skills and in effect incorporating multifunctional task creep.[21]
The two approaches, the holistic and the division of labour, are not necessarily incompatible. But the militarisation of peacekeeping could well make it increasingly difficult to mesh with civilian aspects of operations, especially in the military guardianship of civilian humanitarian activities.[22] The military will not wish to be hampered by civilian tasks; the humanitarian agencies do not want to be tarred with the military brush. A divorce between military and civilian components, to the detriment of the latter in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement has been a consequence of the division of labour approach.[23]
British Army doctrine emphasises the need for coordination of effort through a campaign plan developed by a Head of Mission, normally the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative.[24] But managing the plan, and particularly the relationship between military-civilian components, is likely to be increasingly demanding if divisions of labour leads to specialist autonomies and greater prospect of the use of force. One particular European government's defence ministry has adopted the military spectrum approach for peace support measures whilst another of its ministries (meshing the management of negotiations, sanctions and conflict prevention with humanitarian relief) is heading in the opposite direction.[25] Consequently, when the two impinge upon one another their working relationships have to converge from goals and methods that may be drifting further apart.
Given that the multiplicity of actors in complex emergencies are likely to resist coordination and attempt to maintain their independence, the best that can be hoped for is probably the facilitation of cooperation to concert military civilian efforts and avoid duplication. A logical consequence of increased division of labour in external intervention would be to create a body of professional coordinators/facilitators - though they might function by uniting all the other actors in distrust of this new layer of international bureaucracy![26]
Simultaneously, powerful market imperatives to exploit comparative advantage are pushing military establishments with volunteer forces towards internal, marketised divisions of labour. Economic imperatives are increasing the civilianisation of support functions. In the United States, for example, where the culture of market testing and contractorisation has gone furthest, the out-sourcing of base installation and management has been partly justified on the grounds that it is a waste of talent for soldiers to be digging latrines, especially in conflict situations. Manpower cost savings in the order of 25 per cent can be made. Increased militarisation of field operations will necessitate a rigid division of labour that may become problematic in conflict. Will soldiers be obliged to protect and rescue private company personnel? What will be the status of these personnel under international law? What control will commanders have over them? Will they be subject to military discipline? These and a great many other related questions, and the military consequences of the market in peace support operations, need to be given thorough consideration.[27]
The Challenge of Divergent Perceptions
As Hugo Slim has indicated, the military and civilian cultures in external interventions possess certain similarities and exhibit a "peculiar mimicry", but they also have crucial differences.[28] Civilians working in complex emergencies are not themselves homogenous, of course, but they share features that distinguish them from the military: often a profound unease about military ethics and culture, a gender balance not seen in the military, and a greater degree of accountability to their host communities. The new military doctrine may widen the distance between military and civilian because of its emphasis on the division of labour approach.
Furthermore, although both military and non-military commentators share the perception that conflict environments are grey and messy, locating peace support operations on a spectrum of force could, even unintentionally, encourage the notion that there can be military fixes of deep-rooted political problems, a notion that may be exacerbated by the pressure for quick exit strategies. It is worth emphasising that concerns about grey area operations cannot be dismissed as a case of "academics" wishing the world were a less messy place. On the contrary, an appreciation that situations are messy and volatile, leads to a concern that interventions do not create more mess in the long term.
Humanitarian workers and political negotiators have to deal with the situations after the military have gone. This is one of the reasons why, in general, UN officials have recoiled from the view that peacekeeping can be extended in an escalatory fashion, even if it seems to limit flexibility both before commitment and in the field. For example, Marrack Goulding, former Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations and subsequently for Political Affairs, argued for strict conditions for the use of force by the UN, conditions perhaps unlikely to be fulfilled, though not as part of a military spectrum and not necessarily undertaken by peacekeepers.[29] The new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, however, may be more favourable to extending the use of coercion into what he calls inducement. This departure from the principle of host consent, would be limited to situations where peacekeepers might take coercive action, used impartially, in response to breaches of undertakings that factions have made.[30]
Conclusion
The formulation of principles and doctrine for peacekeeping has, of course, lagged behind developments in practice. Indeed third party operations occurred in Europe as a crisis management instrument after the First World War (in the Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite, for example), long before the term "peacekeeping" was coined, and without any apparent need to define criteria. During the cold war, the basic principles were effectively institutionalised by experience in a relatively settled international system. But during the cold war the restricted use of peacekeeping and the restricted range of states participating in the mainly uncontested interventions, meant that the principles, though paradoxically unmilitary in character, could be relatively uncontroversial and readily subscribed to by participants. For some forty years there was little political debate about the general function of peacekeepers and the principles they should follow, though the Congo crisis was a significant exception.
Since 1989, the demand for new doctrine has followed the rapidly changing demands for new peacekeeping. The British Army provided a model for post-cold war doctrine in Wider Peacekeeping that was "wide" in its acceptance, perhaps because it was based on the old discourse that peacekeeping was not soldiers' work, but an extension of diplomacy in fragile peace. Whether the doctrine of peace support operations can be sustained militarily and politically will depend on its relevance to future crises, for military doctrine has always trailed behind experience. Just as generals are condemned to fight the next war according to what they should have done in the previous conflict, the same will be true of peace support operations. The difficulty will be lessened if doctrine draws on cumulative experience rather than simply reacting to the lessons of the most recent intervention.
Now, more than in consensual operations, the new peace support operations carry great burdens of expectation to uphold normative humanitarian principles and a multinational cooperative spirit. But it has to be remembered that peace support operations reflect failures in world politics. They attempt to deal with the manifestations of problems rather than the problems themselves. That the new circumstances of international peacekeeping require new doctrine is a convincing, legitimate and powerful thesis. However, as doctrine writers themselves no doubt appreciate, guidelines are not a panacea and we need to be aware of the non-military implications of escaping from the snake by climbing the ladder. Disassociation from the old discourse, insularity from civilian and conflict resolution functions and increased emphasis on combat capability can serve to protect military establishments from the horrors of missions impossible. But it is unlikely to overcome the political deficiencies of mission cringe. As Shashi Tharoor has remarked, it is essential to do the right thing as well as do the thing right.31
Notes
1 F. Lentfer, Doktrin for fredsstøttende operationer, Købenahvn: Forsvarsakademiet, 1996, from which information was kindly supplied in English by Knud Erik Jørgensen.
2 Angela Kane, "Other Selected States: Motivations and Factors in National Choices", in Donald C.F Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp.125-7; Daniel and Hayes, Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Force", in Michael Pugh (ed.), The UN peace and Force, London: Cass, p.10.
3 First Draft, Army Field Manual: Peace Support Operations, n.d., [hereafter AFM PSO], ch.2., p.7; ch.4, pp.7-9.
4 Ibid., ch.1, p.2.
5 Comments made at World Disaster Conference, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Overseas Development Institute, London, 29 May 1997.
6 Wider Peacekeeping, Chapter 2, p.13.
7 Counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and "small war" are thereby considered appropriate experience. AMF PSO, ch. 1, p.1.
8 Ibid., ch.3, p.4.
9 Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, Bi-MNC Directive, NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11 December 1995, para. 1-4. This echoes the UN Secretary-General's view in "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", UN Doc. S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, paras 35-36.
10 AFM PSO, ch.3, p.1.
11 Ibid., ch.7, p.12.
12 Nigel D. White, "The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues", in Michael Pugh (ed.), The UN peace and Force, London: Cass, p. 63; Supplement to Agenda, n.7 above, para.88.
13 David Gibbs, "Hegemony in the UN", unpublished paper, p.39. This issue is explored at greater length in: Laura Neack, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", Journal of Peace Research, Vol.32, No.2, 1995; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996.
14A survey of attitudes of Irish and Nordic peacekeepers by INCORE indicates that the perceptions of British, US and French peacekeepers are not always flattering. Some responses suggested that the French were too "trigger-happy" and that the British behaved as if they were in Northern Ireland. "The Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers", Final Report, INCORE, University of Ulster, Derry, 1996, pp.112-13, 162.
15 France, the UK and the Western European Union, have been prepared to assist African states and institutions, and the United States provided $25 million to the OAU's Conflict Resolution Division. Roy May and Gerry Cleaver, "African Peacekeeping: Still Dependent?", International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No.2, 1997 forthcoming.
16 White, (n.12 above), p.62.
17 Italy threatened to withdraw its contingent from Somalia in July 1993 after the offensive against the Aideed clan in Mogadishu, but had a brigade in IFOR
18 Bo Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint", in Donald C. F Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 112-13; and Flemming Lentfer, Doktrin for fredsstøttende operationer, Københaven:
Forsvarsakamiet, trans. and with information kindly supplied by Knud Erik Jørgensen, Århus University, from Sweden's Participation in Peace Support Operations", Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1995.
19 Bennis (n.13 above), pp. 106-8; Thomas S. Szayna, Preston Niblack and William O'Malley. "Assessing Armed Forces' Deficiencies for Peace Operations", International Peacekeeping, Vol.3, No.3, 1996, pp. 77-91.
20 Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capabilities for the United Nations, Ottawa, 1995, p. 66; "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade, A Preliminary Study", annex to letter from Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN Secretary-General, 7 April 1995. UN doc. A/49/886.
21 INCORE, see n.14 above, p. 162.
22 Micheal Pugh, "Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping", Global Security, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1996, pp. 205-224.
23 See, Annika S. Hansen, "PoIitical Legitimacy, Confidence-Building and the Dayton Peace Agreement". International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No.2, forthcoming summer 1997.
24 AFM PSO, ch.2, p.5.
25 Unattributable source in discussion with John Carlame, November 1996, Plymouth Peacebuilding Project, International Studies Research Centre, University of Plymouth.
26 For a discussion of this issue, see Michael Pugh and S. Alex Cunliffe, "The Lead Agency Concept in Humanitarian Assistance: the Case of the UNHCR", Security Dialogue, Vol.28, No.1. 1997, pp.17-30.
27 See, Rhys Dogan and Michael Pugh, "From Military to Market Imperatives: Peacekeeping and the New Public Policy", paper presented at the BISA Conference. University of Durham, 17-18 December 1996.
28 Hugo Slim, "The Stretcher and the Drum", in Jeremy Ginifer (ed.), Beyond the Emergency, London: Cass, 1997.
29 Marrack Goulding, "The Use of Force by the United Nations", International Peacekeeping, Vol.3, No.1. pp. 1-15.
30 Kofi Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century", in Michael Doyle and Olara Otunnu (eds), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century, New York: International Peace Academy, 1997 (forthcoming).
31 Shahsi Tharoor, "Foreword", in Donald C. F Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, ix.
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