ANGOLA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
GENERAL
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ANGOLA
Secretary-General Sets Course for UN Revitalisation, January 1998
Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham
Correspondence concerning the Conflict Resolution Monitor should be directed to:
The Conflict Resolution Monitor (CRM) is produced by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. Our concern is to provide information and ideas which will be relevant to the international humanitarian community, faced with the challenges of peacemaking in a wide variety of contexts. CRM provides information about peacekeeping deployments and peacekeeping policy debates, and lists conferences, research and publications, and training events. Our Commentary section provides short commentaries from experts and practitioners, and in this issue, two contributions develop our earlier examination of evolving peacekeeping doctrine and its relationship to the theory and practice of Conflict Resolution. The first, by Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham, presents an outline summary of the objectives of a three year research project, funded by the UK Department for International Development, into Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs). These situations, and the conflicts and human misery associated with them, present the greatest challenges to the international community in its efforts to respond humanely and effectively. The second piece, by Alexander Ramsbotham, considers the uses of regional initiatives in Africa, the continent where the most severe CPE-type conflicts have erupted.
CRM is linked to a list of UK-based Conflict Resolution Organisations engaged in research, education, training, policy development and/or field-based applications of conflict resolution processes. CRM is published quarterly and the information on the organisations is updated in each issue. The section on UK-based organisations also contains a guide to internet links which provide a comprehensive survey of conflict analysis, conflict data and conflict resolution work world-wide.
Project Directors: Dr. Tom Woodhouse t.woodhouse@bradford.ac.uk,
Editor/ Internet Editor: Alexander Ramsbotham a.ramsbotham@bradford.ac.uk
We are grateful to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Nations Department), the Samuel Rubin Foundation, the British Council, and the Westcroft Trust for financial support for the project. We also wish to thank the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Section, and the UN Department of Public Information.
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Despite the extensive efforts undertaken by the Angolan parties themselves towards the consolidation of peace in their country and the continued assistance provided by the international community, certain important tasks remain to be completed in order to conclude the peace process in Angola. While significant progress has no doubt been achieved towards this goal, and the Government and UNITA continue to express their willingness to fulfil their remaining obligations, persistent delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol continue to be a source of serious concern.
There is an urgent need for both parties, but in particular UNITA, to display a greater sense of urgency in carrying out the Lusaka agreements and the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is obvious that additional effort should be made to complete without procrastination the key aspects of the peace process: full normalisation of State administration throughout the country, including the areas of Andulo and Bailundo; demobilisation of UNITA troops; and transformation of the UNITA radio into a non-partisan facility. In addition, UNITA has to take decisive steps towards its transformation into a purely political party, declare that it has no more armed personnel or weapons under its control and move its leadership to Luanda. Equally, the international community is expecting that the Government will foster a climate of confidence so that the peace process can continue in an atmosphere of trust and security.
... Having the above developments in mind, I recommend that the mandate of MONUA be extended for three months, until 30 April 1998."[See Documentation and Sources for Security Council Resolution]
Angolan radio reported, on 28 January, that at least one police officer was killed and another reported missing following a violent clash between police and former UNITA fighters at Kamakupa in central Angola. The report stated that a police patrol had intercepted former UNITA soldiers in the process of laying mines on a road near Kamakupa. The incident came only a day after the UN Security Council voted to extend the MONUA mandate for three months.
ALL AFRICA PRESS SERVICE
On 6 March 1998, the Security Council Committee, established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, met to continue discussions initiated pursuant to the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1127 (1998) and 1135 (1998) concerning sanctions against UNITA. Committee Chair, Njuguna M. Mahugu (Kenya), expressed concern over delays in the peace process since Angolan parties adopted a new timetable on implementation of tasks in January, principally because of failure by UNITA to fulfil its obligations. The Chair called on the parties, and UNITA in particular, to remain committed to the Lusaka peace process and to give MONUA their full cooperation.
A 20 February press release included 80 names of senior UNITA officials, under the category of adult family members, against whom travel restrictions were to be applied, including UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. Mahugu asserted that such 'smart sanctions' were intended to avoid harming innocent Angolans. The Committee was also considering additional measures that could be applied against UNITA.
Mahugu added that the Committee had considered a proposal to visit Angola and neighbouring countries in order to facilitate revitalising the peace process, and to demonstrate to Angolan parties the existence of the Sanctions Committee.
UNDPI
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Reconfiguration of MONUA Components Before 30 April 1998
"In its resolution 1149 (1998) [See Documentation and Sources], the Security Council requested me to make recommendations regarding the configuration of MONUA before 30 April 1998, when the current mandate of the Mission will expire. In view of the delays in the implementation of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and the short period of time remaining until the expiration of the mandate of MONUA, no major changes in the strength and operations of MONUA appear desirable at this time. Nevertheless, it is my intention, subject to conditions on the ground, to resume the gradual downsizing of the military component of the Mission by the end of April. At the same time, the Demobilisation and Reintegration Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, which was to be funded through the assessed budget until the end of March, will now operate until the end of April, as a result of a recent compromise between the Government and UNITA regarding the special demobilisation arrangements for the remaining registered troops.
Proposed United Nations Mandate and Concept of Operations, After 30 April 1998
... despite some progress made in the implementation of the Lusaka agreements, the current political climate in Angola is still characterised by mistrust between the Government and UNITA, and by a sense of insecurity in the Angolan population. While much has been achieved to bring relative stability to the country over the past three years, the peace process continues to demand concerted international efforts to ensure a lasting peace and the reconstruction of the country. Under these circumstances, it would be advisable to maintain a significant United Nations involvement in the peace process in order to promote confidence-building measures, national reconciliation and socio-economic development. To this end, support from the United Nations would be based on close coordination between the good offices of MONUA and the assistance provided by the United Nations system. At the same time, where appropriate, MONUA would begin gradually to transfer some of its responsibilities to United Nations programmes, funds and agencies.
It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, the United Nations is expected to determine whether requisite conditions for the holding of the second round of the presidential elections have been met, and to provide appropriate support for the verification and monitoring of the electoral process. While in November 1996, the Angolan National Assembly decided to hold the next legislative elections within two to four years, it is not yet clear when exactly the second round of presidential elections will be conducted. At the same time, during his meeting on 2 March 1998 with my Deputy Special Representative, President [Eduardo] dos Santos expressed the view that MONUA should continue to be reduced gradually to a structure sufficient for the verification of the next elections and that it should be phased out thereafter. These views have been taken into account in the proposed mandate and concept of operations outlined below.
Political, Human Rights and Public Awareness Aspects
Subject to approval by the Security Council, it is envisaged that MONUA will continue, with the necessary adjustments, to carry out its activities on the basis of the mandate and organisational structure contained in my reports of 7 February (S/1997/115) and 5 June 1997 (S/1997/438) to the Security Council, and approved by the Council in its resolutions 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997 and 1149 (1998).
Accordingly, my Special Representative would continue to provide good offices to the Government and UNITA and to chair the Joint Commission. In addition, political affairs and human rights officers would be deployed to the countryside to mediate disputes and promote national reconciliation and respect for human rights. The MONUA information and public awareness programme would continue to provide an important support function by disseminating impartial information about the peace process, human rights and good governance. The political and human rights components and the Public Information Unit would, for the time being, maintain their current strength and composition.
Civilian Police Component
In the light of the progress made in the normalisation of State administration and the deployment of ANP personnel into newly normalised areas, a substantial revision of the deployment of civilian police is needed. In this context, it is envisaged that the total number of United Nations civilian police locations would be increased from 46 to 51 and additional team sites in Malange, Uigé, Cuanza Sul and Moxico provinces would be opened. The establishment of these new team sites would help monitor the areas where normalisation of State administration has recently taken place and which have a strategic significance for the parties. The revised deployment plan would also allow United Nations civilian police observers to have access to most of the municipalities of the country. In line with the proposal contained in my report of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the Security Council may wish to consider the deployment of up to 83 additional civilian police observers. The current authorised strength of the civilian police component stands at 345 officers. This would also enable MONUA to strengthen selected team sites in order to increase the number of daily patrols and to ensure the timeliness and effectiveness of United Nations verification and investigation. However, the modus operandi of the civilian police component would be kept under constant review, in order to determine whether these tasks can be performed on the basis of a more limited increase in the number of personnel. At the same time, the composition of the component, which should play a pivotal role in the consolidation of peace in the country, would be enhanced with an increase in the number of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking officers.
Military Component
Depending on the situation on the ground and the progress made in the implementation of residual military tasks, the gradual reduction of the military component of the Mission would resume by the end of April 1998. The withdrawal of all formed units would be completed by July 1998, with the exception of one infantry company, the helicopter unit and the signals and medical support units. However, if significant progress is achieved in the implementation process before that time, the military task force could be repatriated earlier.
It is widely recognised that the current 90 military observers should be retained at least through September/October 1998, to allow for the completion of residual tasks, such as the monitoring of the discovery of arms caches and the verification of cease-fire violations.
Administrative Component
Since my last report to the Security Council of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the administrative component of the Mission has continued to carry out simultaneously several key tasks, including logistical support to the withdrawal of formed military units and the closure, reconfiguration and upgrading of a number of military and civilian police team sites. These challenging activities, in addition to the regular maintenance of the Mission, have continued to strain considerably the capabilities of the administrative component. Some additional material and human resources are required to proceed with the liquidation process of UNAVEM III, which is still behind schedule owing to the need to address other pressing logistical tasks.
Observations
The failure to comply with the 9 January 1998 timetable for the implementation of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol and the ensuing tensions between the Government and UNITA on the ground resulted, once again, in an impasse, which was largely due to the persistent delays and last-minute conditions that have become a constant feature of UNITA tactics.
However, it is hoped that the major advance achieved on 6 March 1998, with the adoption of an adjusted timetable, will reinvigorate the peace process.
... It is obvious that the completion of the peace process is contingent upon the full and unconditional demilitarisation of UNITA ... It is indispensable that UNITA carry it out on time and in full. Unregistered armed elements continue to be reported in some of the provinces, which does not enhance mutual trust or improve the prospects of national reconciliation. Equally, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should show restraint and give priority to peaceful actions that contribute to the successful conclusion of the peace process. It is in this spirit that I also appeal for the earliest resumption of the disarmament of the civilian population throughout the country.
... In the meantime, the presence of the United Nations in Angola is still needed. As regards MONUA, it would be my intention, subject to security conditions on the ground and to the concurrence of the Security Council, to proceed with its reconfiguration along the lines described in ... the present report.".
MONUA Contributions, as at 6 March 1998
Bangladesh 3 (MO) 22 (CPO) 3 (SO) 26 (T); Brazil 4 (MO) 19 (CPO) 23 (T); Bulgaria 4 (MO) 19 (CPO) 23 (T); Congo 3 (MO) 3 (T); Egypt 3 (MO) 19 (CPO) 22 (T); France 3 (MO) 3 (T); Guinea-Bissau 3 (MO) 4 (CPO) 7 (T); Hungary 4 (MO) 7 (CPO) 11 (T); India 5 (MO) 22 (CPO) 15 (SO) 169 (Tr) 191 (T); Jordan 5 (MO) 26 (CPO) 31 (Tr); Kenya 3 (MO) 3 (SO) 6 (T); Malaysia 4 (MO) 24 (CPO) 28 (T); Mali 3 (MO) 19 (CPO) 1 (SO) 23 (T); Namibia 150 (Tr) 150 (T); New Zealand 3 (MO) 3 (T); Nigeria 6 (MO) 32 (CPO) 38 (T); Norway 3 (MO) 3 (T); Pakistan 3 (MO) 1 (SOb) 4 (T); Poland 4 (MO) 4 (T); Portugal 4 (MO) 35 (CPO) 6 (SO) 180 (Tr) 225 (T); Romania 4 (SO) 146 (Tr) 150 (T); Russian Federation 3 (MO) 130 (Tr) 133 (T); Senegal 4 (MO) 4 (T); Slovakia 5 (MO) 5 (T); Sweden 3 (MO) 21 (CPO) 24 (T); Ukraine 3 (MO) 5 (CPO) 1 (SO) 9 (T); United Republic of; Tanzania 3 (CPO) 3 (T); Uruguay 3 (MO) 25 (CPO) 28 (T); Zambia 3 (MO) 24 (CPO) 3 (SO) 150 (Tr) 180 (T); Zimbabwe 4 (MO) 22 (CPO) 12 (SO) 38 (T); Total 98 Military Observers (MO) 348 Civilian Police Observers (CPO) 49 Staff Officers (SO) 905 Troops (Tr) 1,400 Total (T).
a Including military police.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
EASTERN SLAVONIA
KOSOVO
RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SIERRA LEONE
IRAQ
WESTERN SAHARA
KOSOVO
PREVLAKA PENINSULA
GEORGIA
US Under-Secretary of Defence Policy on the Dayton Agreement and the NATO Bosnia Mission, 12 MARCH 1998
African Regional Responses to Security Crises: Alexander Ramsbotham
Alexander Ramsbotham
The Centre for Conflict Resolution
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
BD7 1DP
UK
Tel/fax: ++44 (0)1274 384 197
A.Ramsmotham@bradford.ac.uk
and Dr. Oliver Ramsbotham o.ramsbotham@bradford.ac.uk
AFRICA
UNSG'S REPORT, 12 JAN. (S/1998/17)
VIOLENCE IN ANGOLA AS MONUA MANDATE EXTENDED
9 FEBRUARY 1998BRIEFING BY SC COMMITTEE CHAIR
4 MARCH, 1998UNSG'S REPORT, 13 MARCH (S/1998/236)
b A military specialist in the demining school.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
A PANA report stated that the international committee monitoring the implementation of the peace accords for the Central African Republic has demanded an improvement in the material conditions for African peacekeepers there. The committee was established to supervise the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB); Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo have contributed peacekeepers to MISAB. The committee, in its monthly report to the UN, pointed out that conditions for troops serving with MISAB were inferior to those enjoyed by other peacekeeping forces around the world. MISAB was deployed following the signing of the Bangui agreements on 25 January 1997, to promote stability in the country through disarmament of combatants and actions to bring about national reconciliation.
The monitoring committee, chaired by former Malian president, General Amadou Touré, welcomed the establishment of a UN trust fund for the Central African Republic, stressing that expeditious contribution to the fund was vital to the maintenance of security in the country. The mission is currently supported by the United Nations Development Programme. The committee noted that an amnesty law relating to offences carried out during the third army uprising, and a government of national unity, had both been established. The report added that the disarmament process was underway, including extensive recovery of heavy weapons; however, recovery of light arms had been less successful. Disagreement among the parties has hampered implementation of provisions relating to the reduction and dissolution of selected security forces. However, the committee stated that measures had been taken to promote progress in these areas, including guidelines to ensure a national, republic and multi-ethnic basis for army restructuring, and seminars to promote national reconciliation in various regions of the country. The report also appealed for aid to counter economic problems which have prevented the government from meeting obligations such as payment of foreign debts, wages and salaries, as well as to sustaining peace efforts in the country.
PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
9 JANUARY 1998
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Since the signing of the Bangui Agreements in January 1997, peace and security have been gradually restored to Bangui. While due credit has to be given to the people and Government of the Central African Republic for implementing several main provisions of the Bangui Agreements, this positive development is also largely due to the active mediating role played by African countries, in particular by members of the International Monitoring Committee and to the commendable role of the MISAB force, with the logistical and other support of France and UNDP.
The progress achieved so far in improving the overall situation of the country is undeniable, but it is far from irreversible. For national reconciliation to take root, and in order to restore lasting peace and stability in the country, it is essential that the outstanding provisions of the Bangui Agreements be implemented expeditiously. It is also essential that substantial reforms be undertaken to revitalise the country's economy and to improve the living conditions of the population. Regrettably, both elements have been elusive despite the efforts of the International Monitoring Committee and the encouragement of the international community. Bold and far-reaching measures have therefore to be taken without further delay to redress the current situation in the Central African Republic.
In his 1998 new year message to the nation, President [Ange-Felixe] Patassé stated that he believed that 1998 would be marked by national reconciliation, strengthening of democracy and economic revival. He indicated that the Government would put a revised electoral code before the Parliament and then announce the dates for municipal and parliamentary elections. He underlined that one of the main priorities for the coming year was to re-establish contact with the Bretton Woods institutions, with a view to reaching agreement on a structural adjustment programme.
... This determination was confirmed in the letter that the President addressed to me on 8 January 1998 [which] contains significant undertakings regarding the full implementation of the Bangui Agreements and important political and economic reforms.
... In his letter, President Patassé also stated his belief that it would be essential for the United Nations to ensure that a credible peacekeeping force was maintained in the Central African Republic. That position is strongly supported by the International Monitoring Committee and the States of the region. In view of the ineffectiveness of the national security forces in the Central African Republic, MISAB has become an indispensable force for the maintenance of security and stability in Bangui and in the country in general. The withdrawal of MISAB, which is almost fully dependent on the logistical and financial support of France and relies on the availability of French operational back-up, would result in a situation that could destabilise the fragile peace process in the country, with serious consequences for the humanitarian situation and international peace and stability in the subregion.
Fully aware of the above, the Member States participating in MISAB are willing to continue to assist the Central African Republic in consolidating the peace. However, they would not have the capacity to do so alone, as France is preparing to withdraw all its troops, currently totalling more than 1,400, and, consequently, its logistical support for MISAB, by mid-April 1998. The continuation of active international assistance to the Central African Republic would therefore be vital after the expiration of the MISAB mandate on 6 February. Such a presence would be important as a major preventive measure aimed at allowing stability to take root in the Central African Republic and thus avoiding any further upheaval in an already fragile subregion.
Since MISAB would not be able to maintain its presence in Bangui without adequate financial and logistical support, the only viable option for the maintenance of stability in the Central African Republic appears to be the establishment and deployment of another peacekeeping operation authorised by the international community".
Annex
Mandate and Concept of Operations of the Proposed United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
SELECTED EXTRACTS
Introduction
"Substantive and active involvement of the international community continues to be required to achieve sustainable peace and a stable social environment in [Central African Republic]. Should the Security Council so decide, such an international presence would be established in the form of a multi-functional peacekeeping operation to be known as the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic/Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine (MINURCA). The operation would have the following main goals:
(a) To assist the people of the Central African Republic to consolidate the process of national reconciliation on the basis of the full implementation of the Bangui Agreements and subsequent undertakings by promoting vital reforms through programmes supported by the international community;
(b) To assist in sustaining a secure and stable environment in the capital of the Central African Republic, which is essential for general stability in the country; to support the establishment of the necessary conditions for the holding of free and fair legislative elections to be held in August/September 1998; and to observe and verify the conduct of the elections if these conditions are met.
The mandate of the Mission would be of a limited duration and, subject to the decision of the Security Council, would end 90 days after the announcement of the election results. However, the actual drawdown of MINURCA would begin no later than 60 days from the date of such an announcement. In carrying out its mandate, the Mission would cooperate closely with regional initiatives, in particular the International Mediation Committee and the International Monitoring Committee, as well as with the Organisation of African Unity.
Mandate
The main elements of the mandate of MINURCA would be:
(a) Political
(i) To assist in the implementation of major reforms pursuant to the Bangui Agreements and the decisions of the National Reconciliation Conference by promoting national reconciliation and providing good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties in the country;
(ii) To provide coordination, political guidance and support to all United Nations activities in the country;
(iii) To cooperate with other international partners, including the Bretton Woods institutions, with the objective of supporting activities aimed at establishing the foundations for lasting peace, national reconstruction and development;
(iv) To provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in the areas of good governance and promotion of human rights;
(b) Military
(i) To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city, thus assisting the Central African authorities in maintaining a secure environment throughout the country;
(ii) To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui;
(iii) To supervise and control the storage of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise;
(iv) To assist in the establishment of an environment conducive to the holding of free and fair legislative elections;
(v) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the safety and security of United Nations property;
(c) Police
(i) To assist in the training of trainers and other capacity-building efforts of the national police and gendarmerie, to provide advice for the restructuring of security forces and to coordinate international technical assistance;
(ii) To monitor the neutrality of the security forces before and during the elections;
(d) Electoral
(i) To provide advice to the national electoral bodies and coordinate international technical assistance for the conduct of the legislative elections;
(ii) To monitor the preparations for the elections and determine whether the requirements for holding free and fair elections are fulfilled;
(iii) To observe the elections and verify the results of the elections, provided those requirements are fulfilled.
Concept of Operations
Political Aspects
To pursue the political goals outlined above, the Mission would be headed by a Special Representative with an office comprised of the necessary political, legal, public information and human rights staff operating in Bangui. My Special Representative would assist in the implementation of the reforms necessary to achieve national reconciliation and stability in the country. The Special Representative would have overall authority over all United Nations activities in the Central African Republic in support of the Mission's mandate. In order to ensure optimal coordination, the United Nations Resident Coordinator/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative would concurrently serve as Director of the Office of the Special Representative.
Because of a lack of reliable infrastructure in the country, the Mission would include a small public information component. In close coordination with UNDP, two international staff would prepare information on United Nations activities and major developments in the country for dissemination through the local media. In close collaboration with donors and non-governmental organisations, the Mission would launch a United Nations radio programme to promote national reconciliation and the goals of the Mission, including the dissemination of information on the electoral process. Two human rights experts would be attached to the Mission in order to provide, as requested by the Government, advice to the national authorities and organisations on human rights issues and to identify technical assistance needs for capacity-building in this important area. The experts would, through my Special Representative, coordinate with and seek guidance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
A special coordination and implementation mechanism could be established, to be co-chaired by my Special Representative and the Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee, in which the Government, representatives of the opposition and major donors would participate. The United Nations, with the assistance of UNDP and other donors, would provide a small technical secretariat for such a mechanism.
Military Aspects
The task of maintaining a secure environment in Bangui and its immediate vicinity requires the deployment of an international military force with sufficient capability not only to carry out the Mission's mandate, but also to provide credible protection to United Nations personnel and property, should the situation deteriorate. In addition, the force and the whole Mission would have to rely on the readiness of a major military power to provide "over-the-horizon" deterrence and assistance in case of emergency evacuation or other major threats.
To assist in maintaining security in Bangui, a city with a population of between 500,000 and 600,000, a United Nations force consisting of six mechanised infantry companies, each approximately 120 to 150 personnel strong, would be required. The infantry would establish and maintain over 30 stationary and mobile patrols/checkpoints on a 24-hour basis in various parts of the city. They would also provide security to key installations in Bangui and guard collection/storage areas for heavy weapons, all of which should be placed under United Nations control. The force would be able to provide some security and logistical support for the demobilisation programme coordinated by UNDP. If need be, it would assist in investigating violations of the Bangui Agreements in the military area.
At the same time, a reinforced infantry company would be needed to guard the M'Poko airbase, which would be vital for the Mission as the main entry, exit and resupply point, as well as Mission headquarters and other key United Nations facilities. In addition, in order to be able to provide a swift and flexible response to any serious threat and to compensate for the withdrawal of the French combat units from the Central African Republic, a special reinforced squadron of light armoured vehicles, supported by a heavy mortar platoon, would be required to respond to possible aggressive action from areas around the city.
A military logistic unit of up to 150 personnel should be attached to the force to support the military and other components of the Mission in the absence of the necessary facilities in the Central African Republic. Such a unit would be capable of providing maintenance of military equipment and transportation of basic supplies. It is envisaged that substantial parts of MINURCA logistical support would be routed through the closest seaport, Douala, Cameroon, which would necessitate a well-balanced mix of surface and air transport.
With the poor road infrastructure and acute shortage of transportation, and in order to ensure a long-range medical evacuation capacity, it would be desirable to assign to the Mission two fixed-wing aircraft, which would preferably be civilian-contracted. At the same time, for urgent evacuation over short distances, resupply and reconnaissance around the capital, three medium-lift utility helicopters operated by a military unit not exceeding 50 personnel would be needed.
To establish reliable radio and telephone communications links between the force headquarters and its military units, a small military signals unit may be required. However, a civilian communications network would be necessary to provide links on the ground and to liaise with United Nations Headquarters. In view of the limited medical infrastructure in the Central African Republic, a military medical unit would be deployed to provide medical support to United Nations civilian and military personnel. Such a unit would provide level 2 medical assistance, while level 3 emergencies would be referred to other medical facilities elsewhere in the region.
At the same time, a force headquarters totalling up to 75 personnel, which would also contribute to the integrated operations and logistics systems of MINURCA, would have to provide command, control and liaison functions.
In view of the considerations and challenging tasks presented above, it is estimated that the minimum strength of the force necessary to perform the military mandate of the Mission would be approximately 1,400 personnel all ranks. However, I will continue to review the requirements of the force in light of developments in the security situation, particularly any requirement to deploy outside Bangui and the need to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
Police Aspects
Both the national gendarmerie and the national police suffer from an acute lack of equipment and professional training. To design and conduct training-of-trainers programmes for the police and, to some extent, for the national gendarmerie, the Mission would rely on the services of up to 24 civilian police experts/observers. Such a small civilian police unit would also monitor the implementation of the restructuring plans for the Central African security forces and assist in mobilising and coordinating international technical assistance. Finally, United Nations police observers would monitor the neutrality of the national police and gendarmerie in Bangui and several key areas of the country before and during the legislative elections. United Nations staff would monitor the electoral campaign by attending public meetings and demonstrations, liaising with the local police authorities, investigating allegations of human rights abuses and conducting other relevant activities.
Electoral Aspects
An Electoral Unit of three electoral officers would be included in the Mission to assist, in collaboration with UNDP, the Central African authorities with planning and technical support for the legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998. In due course, electoral observers drawn primarily from United Nations programmes and agencies in the Central African Republic and in the region, as well as other international personnel, would be recruited to establish a presence in the interior of the country. The Unit would also be in charge of coordinating the possible presence of other international electoral observers. The United Nations would also work to mobilise and coordinate the international assistance necessary for the successful conduct of the elections. Such assistance would supplement the considerable efforts that will have to be made by the Central African authorities to overcome significant logistical and financial constraints.
Administrative Aspects
The complex nature of the proposed Mission would require the establishment of a reliable civilian logistical back-up in Bangui, and later, during the legislative elections, in some other areas of the country. It is anticipated that the Government of the Central African Republic will provide a substantial contribution to the operation of MINURCA by making facilities and accommodation available free of charge, as well as providing to the United Nations, at the lowest possible cost, other services and essential supplies. The above requirements would be reflected in a status-of-forces agreement to be concluded between the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations. At the same time, the effectiveness of the Mission would undoubtedly depend on the willingness of France to provide logistical support in the country and to maintain a presence in the region, as well as on its readiness to transfer to the United Nations some of the major assets currently available to the French military contingent in the Central African Republic.
A United Nations trust fund would be established to enable Member States to make voluntary contributions towards the activities of MINURCA.
Transitional Arrangements
The security environment prevailing in Bangui and throughout the country strongly mitigates against any gap in the stabilisation process. The only realistic approach in this regard is to rely on the military contingents already stationed in Bangui as part of the MISAB force. I have already initiated contacts with the current MISAB contributors and France, all of which have expressed their readiness, in principle, to participate in the proposed United Nations operation. The additional elements, which would perform various support functions, would have to be provided by new troop contributors, and I have approached a number of Member States in this regard.
Under the current very tight schedule, the establishment of the new United Nations operation will be an extremely challenging task. Therefore, to allow for a smooth transition to MINURCA, an additional extension of the mandate of MISAB would be necessary until 15 April 1998 [see Documentation and Sources for Security Council Resolution]. If carefully planned and adequately supported, such a transition could be executed within a period of four to six weeks from the adoption of an enabling resolution by the Security Council. In order to carry out the transition in the most timely and efficient manner, it would be my intention, as soon as possible after the adoption of a Council resolution, to dispatch to Bangui a transition team, including an advance headquarters, of up to 45 military planners and logisticians. This process would also be greatly facilitated if France, which is currently providing critical support to MISAB, would be ready to transfer to the new United Nations operation essential equipment and facilities, as well as to provide other services to MINURCA. During the transition period, the troops currently serving under MISAB would continue to depend on full logistical back-up provided by France. However, to ensure the timely transfer of authority and overall responsibility to the United Nations, I would seek expeditiously an initial budgetary and procurement authorisation from the appropriate United Nations bodies.
The formal establishment of the new Mission would be accompanied by a transfer of authority of MISAB forces, totalling some 800 personnel, to United Nations command, which would be conducted on 15 April 1998, concurrent with the phased rotation of fresh troops into the mission area. As described above, additional units to provide operational and support services currently performed by the French troops (who are scheduled to depart the Central African Republic by 15 April), should be deployed to Bangui not later than by mid-April 1998".
A PANA report stated that Presidents Omar Bongo of Gabon, Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali, and Idriss Deby of Chad would sign a peace accord in Bangui to bring to an end the political and security crisis in the Central African Republic. The leaders were selected at the November 1997 Franco-African summit to pursue reconciliation between President Ange-Felix Patassé's government in Central African Republic, and some of his army. There was a rebellion by sections of the army in 1996 and 1997 over non-payment of salaries, and troops from France and other African countries were called upon to intervene.
The signing of the accord in Bangui marked the end of the national reconciliation conference initiated on 26 February, and President Bongo is the Chair of the international mediation committee on the Central African crisis.
PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
5 MARCH 1998
A Ghana Focus report stated that the mandate of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) had expired on 2 February, and that peacekeepers from Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, and Mali had withdrawn. Some troops from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone remain in Liberia to facilitate the establishment of the new Armed Forces of Liberia. ECOMOG was deployed to try to stabilise the internal conflict in Liberia in 1990, following the attempt by the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, to overthrow late President Samuel Doe. The report said that, although Liberia has been returned to constitutional rule, the withdrawal of ECOMOG was creating problems in the country. It added that a group of traditional leaders have asserted that Liberians rely on ECOMOG peacekeepers to objectively ensure their safety, and have requested a halt to the force's demobilisation. The Ghana News Agency has also reported low morale among the 500 Ghanaian troops still serving with ECOMOG, who had expected to be returning home.
GHANA NEWS AGENCY
24 FEBRUARY 1998
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Although the junta claims that it remains committed to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, the situation in Sierra Leone remains deeply preoccupying and requires the urgent attention of the international community. In particular, it is important to develop and finalise the necessary deployment, disarmament and demobilisation plans if the Conakry Agreement is to be implemented and the constitutional order restored in accordance with the timetable envisaged in the Agreement. It would therefore be premature at this stage to present to the Security Council a full concept of operations or an estimate of force size and structure in respect of a possible United Nations military presence in Sierra Leone.
My Special Envoy stands ready to assist in efforts to overcome the obstacles blocking the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. In this context, I welcome the proposed convening in New York of the Ministerial Meeting of the Committee of Five, which could give a much-needed impetus to the process of dialogue as well as to the full and timely implementation of the Conakry Agreement.
I also intend to re-establish the United Nations liaison office in Sierra Leone, initially staffed with a political officer, a military adviser and a humanitarian officer under the direction of my Special Envoy and supported by the necessary staff, including a security officer. In due course, the liaison office could be expanded to comprise human rights and information officers. The staff of the office would maintain contacts with the members of the junta and civil society in Sierra Leone. The Special Envoy and his staff would also facilitate talks with the junta and with ECOWAS and ECOMOG on various aspects of the implementation of the Agreement ... At the same time, I invite the Security Council to consider the deployment of a small military liaison cell of up to 10, with the necessary support staff, to assess and report on the military situation within Sierra Leone and coordinate with ECOMOG and with other United Nations agencies in the areas of ECOMOG deployment, in the capital and, conditions permitting, in other areas of the country. I will seek the necessary security guarantees from all parties. In my view, the presence of the military liaison cell, which would operate under the authority of my Special Envoy, would also signal the commitment of the Council and the international community to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and would serve as an important confidence-building measure. I recommend that the costs related to the military liaison cell be met through peacekeeping assessments, and I intend to present this recommendation to the General Assembly in due course.
My Special Envoy and his staff will also maintain the contacts they have established both with the ECOMOG High Command and the junta, with a view to assisting in the finalisation of a comprehensive concept of operations for deployment throughout Sierra Leone, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean combatants into civilian life. United Nations planning would be completed on the basis of such a concept as well as the operational data acquired during the visit of the technical survey team.
The United Nations will work with the international community to try to generate the logistical, technical and financial support that will be required for ECOWAS to pursue its efforts to carry out the Conakry Agreement. I call upon Member States to stand ready to offer generous assistance in this regard.
I note that the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, on 19 December 1997, called upon all countries and, in particular, on ECOWAS member States, to adhere strictly to the sanctions. Reports of persistent violations of the Security Council arms embargo are of great concern, as such violations could seriously impede the peace process.
... I am concerned at the plight of civilians affected by the strict enforcement of sanctions on Sierra Leone and by the conduct of hostilities within the country, including in the area around Bo".
A WP report described how Nigeria intervened in Sierra Leone nine months after the Sierra Leonean army had forcibly removed the elected government; within twelve days, Nigerian troops had captured Freetown and ousted the junta. However, the report predicted that, as is often the case in such external interventions, things were likely to be more difficult in rural areas. The junta forces launched counter-offensives against two provincial capitals during the week starting 16 February, demonstrating that they have not disbanded. Again on 16 February, the commander of Nigeria's forces in Sierra Leone asserted that more troops were required to expand operations beyond the Freetown peninsula. The report stated that the Nigerian intervention to return elected President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, was likely to occupy thousands of Nigerian troops for months or years. It added that Nigeria's motives were principally to maintain its dominant regional position: it has a population of 100 million, and boasts some of the world's largest oil reserves. However, its regional influence has been diminished by: domestic instability - for 28 of its 38 years of independence, it has been ruled by military governments; international criticism of the government's poor human rights record; and delays in transferring power to elected civilians.
After the end of the Cold War, Nigeria was one of the first African countries to take on a continental, interventionist role. Until then, African security had been dominated by the US and USSR, and its former European colonial powers.
The report described how the Sierra Leonean population of almost 5 million people has, for many years, witnessed fighting between many armed factions, and a 1997 UN survey rated it the least developed country in the world, with life expectancy averaging 34, and a 30 per cent literacy rate. Although, militarily, Nigeria is considerably more powerful than the junta, it could face a difficult guerrilla war, as evidenced by the recent counter-offensives. The junta's forces comprise troops of the Sierra Leone army and fighters with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an opposition group based in the east that has fought against successive Sierra Leonean governments for six years, before allying itself with the junta in 1997. The report stated that the junta's forces also face opposition from tens of thousands of militia from villages in the south and east - traditional hunters called kamajors - who were armed by the Kabbah government. The report declared that, in order to achieve peace, the various armed factions needed to be demilitarised and then found alternative sources of income.
Nigerian officials have justified intervention by reiterating the 1997 statement of Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, that it was Nigeria's duty to maintain stability in its sub-region, and that Liberian stability is impossible without peace in Sierra Leone. The report stated that West African analysts believe Nigeria might ultimately be seeking economic benefits, through gaining influence over President Kabbah to secure profitable oil sales or a role in Sierra Leone's diamond trade. The report further claimed that Nigeria might hope that its intervention in Sierra Leone would distract international attention from domestic affairs. In the early 1990s, Nigeria provided the majority of troops for ECOMOG, and dispatched troops to Sierra Leone under a bilateral agreement to assist the government against RUF fighters. ECOMOG was provided with a UN-backed mandate to enforce an economic embargo against the junta, but not to overthrow it. However, Nigeria has described the recent offensive as insignificant skirmishing provoked by the junta. The report stated that Nigeria's neighbours - including Ghana, Guinea, and Ivory Coast - were worried by the intervention and, despite Nigerian appeals, had not sent troops to Sierra Leone.
WASHINGTON POST
18 FEBRUARY 1998
On 17 February, Sierra Leone's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, James Jonah, stated that the refusal of the international community to recognise the junta in Sierra Leone was a major contributing factor to its being ousted from control during the week beginning 9 February. Jonah thanked the international community for its solidarity with his people. He also thanked Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the firm position he took in Harare, Zimbabwe, at the outset of the crises, when he not only criticised the coup d'état which removed President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah from power, but called on the heads of State of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to not only condemn it, but to do something. All Sierra Leoneans would long remember that stand, Jonah added.
Jonah further expressed gratitude to the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), particularly General Sani Abacha of Nigeria and the Government and people of Nigeria, since the Nigerian government was the only one prepared to use economic and human resources in support of Sierra Leone.
Jonah commended ECOMOG for taking care to ensure that civilian casualties were limited during fighting with the junta over the preceding week.. Those who were familiar with the geography of Sierra Leone would know that the tactics of ECOMOG were not to engage the enemy in built-up areas. Jonah asserted that the Sierra Leonean government had presented evidence to the UN almost eight months previously that the junta had a genocide plan for Sierra Leone. He added that the plan was to be carried out from the hills of Freetown. ECOMOG's initial attack was, therefore, from those hills, catching the junta unprepared and preventing them from executing the genocide plan. He pointed out that the material damage from the fighting was not as great as had been originally thought. The serious damage occurred in the last two days of the fighting and was perpetrated by the retreating forces of the junta as they burnt houses in and around Freetown. There was also evidence that the junta deliberately fired on the Parliament building and, using two gunboats, on civilian targets. It calculated that this would induce outrage in the international community, which would blame ECOMOG, leading the Security Council to intervene and call for a cease-fire.
Jonah stated that he could not understand the "new jurisprudence" that he was hearing around the corridors of the United Nations. Some people were saying that, when the ECOMOG Foreign Ministers came to New York, they had deceived the Council over their intentions. There was no formal meeting of the Security Council, he stressed, noting that the only meeting was requested by the five Foreign Ministers under the Arria formula to find out what the Council was prepared to do. They were told that the Secretary-General had recommended ten liaison military officers for Sierra Leone. If anyone was frustrated, said Mr. Jonah, it should have been those ministers, not those who had spoken of being deceived by them.
He stated that, according to the Charter, non-use of force was not absolute, but was governed by certain provisions. Mention should be made of Article 51 which provided for self-defence and the principle of collective security. When Member States were asked by the Charter to refrain from the use of force, it was in the expectation that the Security Council would come to their aid in time of need. To the contrary, the Security Council was now dithering and hesitating in dealing with African problems.
Jonah criticised the Security Council for ignoring appeals for assistance by Sierra Leoneans over the previous eight months. As a result, they had to look around for those who could come to their assistance, and were grateful that ECOMOG was able to come to their aid.
Jonah stated that it was important to note that loyal Sierra Leonean forces, which defected months ago, had fought alongside ECOMOG. In addition, the civil defence unit had fought the junta throughout and had made several gains, among them taking the Tongo field (the diamond mining areas), pushing back the junta in the South and the South-East and, in the final days, taking the second largest city, Bo, and Kenema. He added that the war in Sierra Leone had been initiated by Liberians in 1991. In the last few days, the stiffest resistance was also put up by the Liberians, and it was now known that large amounts of weapons were supplied to them, in defiance of Security Council sanctions, through Liberia. It was also now widely known that, in the final days of the conflict, some of the junta members were attempting to go to Liberia, perhaps for onward transit and to cause further trouble in the Kalahun District. He urged the international community to pay attention to this because Sierra Leone could not have a neighbour who sought to destabilise another country.
Jonah complimented the speed with which the United Nations humanitarian community had responded to the serious situation in and around Sierra Leone. Under-Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was contacted concerning the danger of the water supply being poisoned, a fact which threatened to cause panic in the country. In response, an expert was found within 24 hours to go there, and they were planning to send supplies in the next few days. He added that his Government still hoped that the Security Council would send an observer or peacekeeping force to work alongside ECOMOG in the coming days, stressing that the difficulties of deploying peacekeeping forces in Africa were well-known. Jonah refused to name those Liberians he believed to be responsible for fomenting violence in Sierra Leone.
Jonah blamed UN inactivity both on a lack of interest and what has been called "the Somalia allergy". He recalled that, as an Under-Secretary-General at the United Nations, he had suffered the frustration of bringing African issues to the Council, then facing its failure to act, as occurred with Burundi and Rwanda. If the Security Council would not help such small and weak States, those States would either go to regional groups, such as ECOWAS, or the "security firms" that were now proliferating. Jonah declared that the permanent members of the Security Council had misused their privileges and abused the veto, which was why the Non-Aligned Movement was so opposed to the use of the veto.
The Permanent Representative stated that the ECOMOG force had a mandate to maintain law and order, and that the duration of their stay was something which President Kabbah would be discussing with the heads of State of ECOWAS, but he personally thought they would be staying for a considerable period. The Sierra Leonean army had been involved with coups for a long time and was not professional. It needed reorganisation, and he hoped the United Nations would help. He stressed that his country was trying to prevent a recurrence of the Foday Sankoh and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) genocide.
Jonah denied any contradiction in Nigerian involvement, considering its domestic record. The OAU gave a mandate to ECOWAS, and it so happened that the Chair of ECOWAS was Nigeria. It was not incongruous that the president of Nigeria was carrying out his obligations as Chair. Second, Sierra Leone had a bilateral agreement with Nigeria. Third, the history of the relationship between both countries was very deep, involving family ties, education and intermarriage. Fourth, there was a strong personal relationship between General Abacha and President Kabbah. Jonah added that Nigerian forces had treated Sierra Leone with tremendous respect and understanding, and he was satisfied with the way ECOMOG had related to Sierra Leone.
UNDPI
18 FEBRUARY 1998
A PANA report stated that a 3 March meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, which reviewed developments in Sierra Leone, announced that, following the reinstatement of deposed President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, it would dispatch a ministerial-level team to Sierra Leone to demonstrate its solidarity and support. The mission was to comprise representatives from Britain, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia and Zimbabwe. The Commonwealth announced that the mission would explore ways in which it could assist Sierra Leone in national reconstruction and peace-building. It declared that assistance to train the police force, as requested by Kabbah, would have to be carried out in association with other international organisations to ensure a secure environment.
The Action Group commended the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for its role in removing the junta from power in Freetown, and endorsed the request by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers for the early deployment of a UN military observer mission in support. The ministers appealed for urgent assistance from the international community to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country. Commonwealth heads of government established the Action Group in 1995 to tackle violations of Commonwealth principles, as outlined in the Harare declaration of 1991. It was reconstituted in October 1997 at the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh, Scotland.
The Action Group consists of foreign ministers from Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia, New Zealand, the UK, and Zimbabwe, and is chaired by Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Stan Mudenge.
PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
3 MARCH 1998
A PANA report stated that the Chair of the five-nation ECOWAS Ministerial Committee, Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi, briefing the Security Council on 4 March, announced that President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah would assume full charge of Sierra Leone on 10 March. Ikimi asserted that Kabbah wanted ECOMOG to provide security throughout the country for the immediate future. Ikimi declared that ECOMOG's future mandate in Sierra Leone depended on the wishes of the Kabbah government, while the duration of the mission depended on how quickly it could re-establish total security. Kabbah's objectives included: disarming all combatants; programmes to reorganise the armed forces and rehabilitate combatants; the establishment of an inclusive government; and downsizing the government's bureaucracy. These aims took full account of political and economic realities and the necessity for national cohesion, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Ikimi pointed out that, although ECOMOG had already taken charge of a number of provincial towns from the junta and RUF troops escaping Freetown, more urban areas required attention. However, he added that logistic support was needed from the international community if ECOMOG was to disarm fighters quickly. Ikimi stated that regional states had offered to contribute troops, including Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Niger, but required financial assistance from the international community. He added that ECOWAS had requested a UN military observer force to work with ECOMOG in the disarmament. Ikimi declared that ECOMOG's forcible removal of the junta was in response to successive attacks by the junta's troops, launched on 5 February, the same day that committee members had arrived in New York to consult the Security Council over terms for the restoration of the Kabbah government. Security Council members praised ECOWAS' actions, and supported a UN military observer mission, but stressed that the decision would have to be based on a review of the security situation in Sierra Leone.
PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
5 MARCH 1998
The following is Kofi Annan's message on the occasion of the return to Sierra Leone of President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, delivered on his behalf by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahima Fall, in Freetown on 10 March:
FULL TEXT
"The return of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to Freetown today, following the removal from power of the illegal military junta, accomplishes a major objective not only of the people of Sierra Leone, but also of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the entire international community.
Shortly after the coup d'état last May, speaking at the annual summit meeting of the OAU in Harare, I said that "Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as fait accompli, coups against elected governments, and the illegal seizure of power by military cliques, who sometimes act for sectional interests, sometimes simply for their own".
Today, with the restoration of the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone, we celebrate a step that strengthens democracy and the rule of law in Africa. And we reiterate the conviction that the will of the people must be the basis of governmental authority.
The diplomacy of ECOWAS and the resolve of the Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) played a crucial role in this turn of events. The OAU and the United Nations Security Council added their voices to the chorus calling for the junta to relinquish power.
Thanks to these efforts, the people of Sierra Leone can now turn their energies to the job of rebuilding their country; of repairing the damage done by months of junta misrule; of restoring the country's civil governance and promoting lasting national reconciliation. I call on the donor community to respond generously to the urgent appeal for humanitarian assistance launched by the United Nations earlier this month.
The United Nations also looks forward to working closely with President Kabbah in helping to broaden his Government's base, reassert its authority and strengthen its capacity throughout the country, in order to create a stable, united and democratic State. The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of all ex-combatants in Sierra Leone will be a major part of this effort, requiring close cooperation among the Government, ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations system.
As a first step in this direction, I have proposed, subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, that a number of United Nations military observers be deployed alongside ECOMOG to monitor the military and security situation in the country, to help draw up the necessary demobilisation plans, and to assist in the process of normalisation within the country. I also plan to strengthen the Office of my Special Envoy, and to establish a Trust Fund for Sierra Leone.
The people of Sierra Leone have been through a period of terrible violence and loss of life and property. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my condolences to all those who have suffered since the coup and to the families of those who lost their lives. As we look to the future, I pledge the full support of the United Nations in helping Sierra Leone to leave behind this unfortunate chapter in the country's history and, from this day forth, to build peace in the fullest sense of the word".
UNDPI
10 MARCH 1998
A GI report stated that the return of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to State House in Freetown was an unprecedented move for an elected head of state in Africa. The report observed that sanctions against the junta caused the Sierra Leonean public to suffer severe economic hardship. It asserted that the 12 February ECOMOG offensive against State House was caused by the refusal of junta leader, Johnny Paul Koromah, to accede to sanctions, political isolation, and even the Conakry Accord - which demanded a peaceful hand-over to Kabbah. Within days, almost all members of the junta had either been killed or had fled. The GI stated that, while this was taking place, it had received reports of a US attempt to form a West African peacekeeping force, although it could not give details.
The report urged Kabbah to immediately address certain practical problems in Sierra Leone, in particular: the continued presence of opposition forces throughout rural areas; the continued incarceration of Revolutionary United Front leader, Foday Sankoh, in Nigeria; and the country's desperate economic situation. It further urged Kabbah to now heed his aides who had, before the coup, advised him to attend to the needs of the army. The report stated that governance in Africa could ill afford to ignore power struggles within the military, especially in countries which have been involved in coups.
GHANAIAN INDEPENDENT
19 MARCH 1998
The USIA reported that, according to a State Department official, President Bill Clinton's forthcoming tour of Africa would support Washington's commitment to work with African and international partners, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the UN to assist Africa's peacekeeping efforts. Clinton was to visit Botswana, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda.
Special Coordinator for the US Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie, has referred to the initiative as the American component of a wider international effort to promote the enhancement of African peacekeeping capability. McCallie denied that the initiative would facilitate US withdrawal from African peacekeeping obligations, asserting that Washington realised that many African peacekeepers would still require logistical assistance, and that America would still provide support to peacekeeping operations in Africa on a case-by-case basis.
The USIA report declared that Clinton's visit would highlight economic security as a crucial element to effective peacekeeping: the Clinton administration's new economic initiative for Africa intends to significantly enhance access to US markets for African exports. McCallie emphasised long-term commitments to development and creating economic opportunities for individuals as a vital aspect of reconciliation and reconstruction in Africa. He pointed out that it was easier to overcome ethnic or religious animosity amongst people who could work together to create a fertile economy, rather than competing with one another over scarce resources. McCallie declared that peacekeeping and conflict management alone were insufficient, and the developed world must work with Africans over issues of creating economic growth and opportunity.
McCallie listed several successful peacekeeping efforts by the international community in Africa. He cited the UN contribution to independence and the successful establishment of a democratic government in Namibia, where, subsequently, several elections have taken place, and the government respects the independence of the judiciary. He also pointed to the Lusaka Protocol, which, with the support of the international community, ultimately halted internal conflict in Angola. He commended the excellent leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali), who simultaneously monitored the terms of the compliance to the agreement, and maintained an atmosphere of honesty amongst the parties to the process.
McCallie stated that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the potential for similar disasters elsewhere in Africa, encouraged the establishment of the ACRI. US Special Forces have since trained peacekeeping battalions in Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda. They were currently working in Mali, were to begin training in Ghana, and planned to start training in Ethiopia later in 1998. McCallie pointed out that many African countries have already provided considerable and valuable peacekeeping duties, from whom the US military could, themselves, learn a lot. He added that Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and the UK have all expressed an interest in participating in a broad international initiative, in coordination with the OAU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He also observed that active programmes already existed between some of these countries and African partners. The USIA report stated that international contributions could range from finance and personnel for military training, to assistance in the fields of transportation and medicine.
McCallie said that several African countries had indicated an interest both in providing a locus for peacekeeping training and contributing troops, and that the majority of African countries had emphasised a central role for the OAU and the UN. He continued that US military trainers were engaged with each African partner for a period of three years. Training started with an initial 70-day programme, after which trainers returned biannually to assist the peacekeeping units in such areas as logistics, train-the-trainer procedures, battalion and brigade staff leadership, and working with civilian humanitarian organisations. The intention was that, over the three years, respective battalions and their leadership would have experienced full exposure to the tasks of peacekeeping. The report commended an original aspect of the initiative: to provide optical examinations and spectacles to troops who needed them.
USIA WASHINGTON FILE
18 MARCH 1998
An FT report described how, following fifteen hours of negotiations in Baghdad, Kofi Annan secured written undertakings from Iraq providing UN inspectors unimpeded access to all sites they suspected of containing chemical or biological weapons. The report asserted that the deal enabled both Iraq and the UN to claim their objectives had been achieved. The eight previously contested presidential sites will be inspected by UNSCOM, accompanied by UN diplomats. Annan announced that there would be no time limits or deadlines on any inspections. Three hours of direct negotiations with President Saddam Hussein had managed to reverse Baghdad's previous insistence on concluding inspections within 60 days.
The report declared that Washington was afraid Saddam would sufficiently moderate demands to negate US justification of air strikes, although not enough to satisfy its security concerns. However, the report asserted that the deal allowed President Bill Clinton to claim that Saddam had been brought under control, while both the US and UK could point to the successful threat of force as a bargaining tool.
Conversely, Saddam successfully maintained his grip on power, and managed to restore his image among the Arab world. He could also claim to have stood up to Washington, which has failed to uphold its pledge of an equitable settlement in the Middle East peace process, through unwillingness to pressure its ally, Israel, to restore occupied Arab territory in exchange for peace.
The November 1997 UNSCOM crisis had enabled Baghdad to return the issue of lifting sanctions against Iraq to the UN's agenda, and the Security Council has recently moved towards increasing the price of oil Iraq is allowed to sell, in exchange exclusively for food and medicine, from $2bn to $5.3bn every six months. The report stated that Saddam could now feel that he was emerging from diplomatic isolation. Apart from Kuwait, all Arab countries, as well as China, France, and Russia among the Security Council's permanent five members, had been against military action in response to the recent crisis.
The report doubted whether Saddam had been forced to sacrifice his other assumed ambition of retaining a residual capability in weapons of mass-destruction. It added that, even if the entire Iraqi weapons arsenal were accounted for, Iraqi scientists still retained the knowledge to recreate them, which cannot be inspected. Furthermore, the West's previous record in supplying Baghdad with dual-use machinery is likely to give Saddam confidence of being able to re-arm in the future.
However, the report warned of the likelihood of other confrontations with Iraq before then, starting with whether UNSCOM head, Richard Butler (Australia), retained his position. Iraq believes him to be promoting US rather than UN policy. The report pointed out that he has a tendency to stray into politics, such as his announcement to the New York Times in January that Baghdad was known to have biological weapons with sufficient capacity to destroy Tel Aviv. This infuriated Arab leaders: Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, coordinator of the Arab response to the crisis, recently told the FT that this statement made the entire Arab population believe that strikes against Iraq would be carried out for the sake of Israel.
Annan's deal has prompted pan-Arab demands that Washington pressurise Tel Aviv to honour its commitments to the Palestinians under the Oslo accords, underwritten by the US. The report stated that this message resulted from a consensus among Arab leaders that containing Iraq had become primarily a political problem: US action will never remove Saddam or destroy his weapons capability, and so US intervention serves only to increase Saddam's standing amongst Arabs.
The report declared that Arab leaders expected the US, with European and Russian support, to inject new energy into the peace process, coupled with a policy of engagement with Iran to attempt to encourage reformist supporters of Mohammed Khatami, elected president in 1997. The European Union, which proved institutionally impotent during the Iraq crisis, recently demonstrated willingness to ignore US isolationist policy towards Tehran by restoring bilateral ministerial contacts. Arab leaders have emphasised the importance of a holistic approach to the Middle East, without which the US will play into the hands of Islamists and their Iranian hardline supporters. The report stated that, despite the recent success of Annan's deal, few in the Middle East believe the UN can supersede US leadership [see Documentation and Sources for text of Annan deal].
FINANCIAL TIMES
24 FEBRUARY 1998
A WP report claimed that the Clinton administration had originally asserted that President Saddam Hussein should have no influence over the composition of inspection teams looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and that the inspectors must be independent and report exclusively to the Security Council. However, the agreement between Kofi Annan and Saddam bi-passed these principles, while the UN has pledged to respect Iraq's national security, sovereignty and dignity. The report declared that the majority of congressional leaders appeared relieved that Annan's mission had averted the possibility of air strikes, which would probably have caused a high number of Iraqi civilian casualties, while, at the administration's own assessment, would have been unlikely to have displaced Saddam, or even eliminated his biological and chemical weapons capability. In other words, the report asserted, with no plausible, united policy leading up to the crisis, the administration was relieved not to have had to carry out its threats.
The report stated that Annan's deal meant that eight of Saddam's presidential sites, which comprise over 1,000 buildings overall, will not be inspected as part of the operation of UNSCOM head, Richard Butler, but by a new bureaucracy led by a commissioner who will report to Annan, or to his political representative. The bureaucracy will form teams comprising technical inspectors as well as diplomats with no comparable expertise. The role of the diplomats is ill-defined, but the report warned that they might jeopardise the element of surprise that has been a crucial factor of the inspectors' job. The report further stated that the agreement could allow Saddam to comply with its terms, while still obstructing legitimate inspection.
The report questioned whether Annan could simultaneously be arbiter and prosecutor: in a closed meeting, he reportedly referred to Butler's inspectors as cowboys; and, in an open press conference, he asserted that the inspectors should not throw their weight around and cause unneccessary tension. The report declared that, ultimately, Annan was not responsible for the shortcomings of the agreement, since he was following the requests of the UN.
WASHINGTON POST
26 FEBRUARY 1998
An FT report stated that Kofi Annan was developing a policy of engagement with Baghdad designed to persuade it to cooperate with UN demands, whereby returning Iraq to the international community could play a crucial role in achieving stability throughout the Middle East. Annan asserted that Iraq's recent attempts to make contact with its neighbours and the wider international community would create political space to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, as well as difficulties between Israel, and Syria and Lebanon. Annan has taken concrete steps to repair relations with Iraq since securing the deal with Baghdad.
During the week beginning 7 March, Annan named former Indian Ambassador to the UN, Prakash Shah, as his Special Representative to Iraq. The report stated that Iraq perceived the oil-for-food deal as a UK/US ruse to avoid lifting the embargo, imposed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Annan acknowledged that Iraqis greatly resented the scheme, and were best placed to manage their own affairs. He has invited Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mohammed al-Sahaf, to New York to discuss the humanitarian initiative with officials from the ministries of trade, oil and health. Annan did not claim that Iraq had had a total change of heart, but asserted that the threat of military strikes had convinced Baghdad of the value of cooperating with UNSCOM. He promoted the dual-track policy of diplomatic and military pressure on the Iraqi regime, which, according to the FT report, appeared to rely on a diminishing threat of force, and the promise of rehabilitation. Annan's aides have stressed that rehabilitation is contingent upon full Iraqi cooperation. The report said that Iraqi compliance would bring on an additional problem: the US policy of maintaining sanctions as long as Saddam retains power has induced fears of a potential split in the Security Council.
FINANCIAL TIMES
7 MARCH 1998
According to an AP report, Kofi Annan stated, on 8 March, that Washington would need to refer to the Security Council prior to mounting any military action against Iraq. Annan asserted that Security Council accord on military action would be much easier to obtain in response to Iraqi abrogation of the agreement on full access for UN weapons inspectors. However, Annan noted that three permanent members of the Security Council, China, France, and Russia, have objected to allowing Washington a free hand to launch military action.
The Clinton administration has insisted that Security Council resolutions adopted at the time of the Gulf War provide the legal requirement for unilateral action in response to Iraqi violations. However, the administration carried out extensive consultations with other UN member states as it prepared attacks against Iraq in February this year.
Annan has also requested that the Security Council consider Moscow's proposal that a Russian be named as second deputy on the UN weapons inspection commission. US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, has indicated that Washington might veto that request. Moscow has been sympathetic to Baghdad's demands that economic sanctions be lifted. The US is reluctant to place a Russian in a senior role in the inspection team since the teams must determine when Iraq has eliminated all its weapons of mass destruction, which is a condition for removing sanctions.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
8 MARCH 1998
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Between 28 August 1994, when the identification process was launched, and December 1995, when it came to a standstill, 77,058 persons had been convoked, of whom 60,112 had been identified by the Commission. Between 3 December 1997 and 10 January 1998, 18,688 persons were convoked, and 13,227 identified. The Commission has now achieved a threefold increase in the weekly rate of identification. Promising progress has thus been made since the resumption of the process.
Nevertheless, the completion of the identification phase by 31 May 1998, will be a daunting and arduous task, involving the convocation of more than 100,000 applicants, and their identification, in less than five months.
... In consultation with my Personal Envoy, and in conformity with the Houston agreements, I have decided to instruct [United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara] MINURSO to proceed as soon as possible with the identification of those unconvoked individuals who presented themselves on the days of convocation of their respective tribal groups.
... Until the number of non-convoked persons presenting themselves is known for certain, it will not be possible to confirm that the identification process can be concluded by the end of May to permit the start of the transitional period on 7 June 1998 as planned. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that, in order to keep the momentum, it is essential that every effort be made to adhere as strictly as possible to the timetable presented in my report of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882). In addition to the continued commitment and cooperation of the parties, this requires, as underlined in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 12 December 1997 (S/1997/974), the provision of the necessary resources in full and on time, including the early deployment of the engineering and other resources to undertake the required operational demining and prepare for the deployment of the military component of the Mission. I appeal, therefore, to the Security Council and the General Assembly to extend all the necessary support in this regard, so that the overall objective of holding the referendum by the end of 1998 may still be maintained".
The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has so far identified 90,537 potential voters in the poll, which will allow them to decide between independence or integration with Morocco. In January alone, 14,000 people were identified - the highest achieved in one month since the process began.
The Secretary-General provided these figures in his latest communication to the Security Council covering MINURSO's activities (S/1998/142). In it, he appealed to the Council to support the continued preparations and provide the necessary resources for the full deployment of MINURSO. At the same time, the Secretary-General stated that there has been a "perceptible increase" in the level of tension between the Government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y del Rio de Oro (POLISARIO). The tension is blamed on a number of factors, including interruptions in the identification process caused by the illness of participating sheikhs on either side. The Secretary-General asserted that there was a marked increase in anti-POLISARIO and sometimes anti-MINURSO coverage in the Moroccan press. Moroccan official public demonstrations have also been held to protest the negative testimony of sheikhs on the POLISARIO side.
The Secretary-General appealed to the parties to cooperate with MINURSO in the identification of persons from non-contested tribes.
UNDPI
19 FEBRUARY 1998
Composition of the Civilian Police Element of MINURSO, as at 15 January:
Seventy-nine civilian police officers, including the Civil Police Commissioner, are assigned to MINURSO, drawn from the following countries: Canada (5), Egypt (2), Ghana (10), India (10), Malaysia (10), Nigeria (10), Norway (2), Pakistan (10), Portugal (10), and Sweden (10). Two civilian police officers are expected to arrive during January, bringing the civilian police component to its total strength of 81 as planned.
Administrative support was mobilised in response to the resumption of identification on 3 December 1997. Although deployment of administrative staff was generally on target, shortages remained in the Identification Commission support staff. However, by the end of December 1997, the total number of civilian staff stood at 266 (194 international and 72 local).
The Secretary-General's budget for MINURSO, which provides for additional requirements of $17,489,100 gross to enable it to proceed with its identification tasks pursuant to Security Council resolution 1133 (1997), has been finalised and is expected to be issued shortly. Pending consideration of this budget by the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has authorised commitments of $9.3 million gross to meet the essential and immediate requirements for the identification process for the period ending 31 March 1998. As funds have not been made available for the deployment of the Engineering Unit, demining activities will not commence in February 1998 as planned in the timetable proposed in the Secretary-General's report of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882), thus affecting the timely deployment of the military component of MINURSO and other elements of the implementation plan.
As at 31 December 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period since inception to 31 December 1997 amounted to $48.9 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 31 December was $1,574.1 million.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Erik Jensen (Malaysia) [Acting] August 1995 to date; Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General: James A. Baker III (United States) March 1997 to date; Force Commander: Major-General Bernd S. Lubenik (Austria) August 1997 to date; Police Commissioner: Chief Superintendent Peter Miller (Canada) November 1997 to date.
Fatalities: Total: 7 (1 military observer, 3 other military personnel, 1 civilian police, 2 international UN staff).
Method of financing - assessments in respect of a Special Account; Estimated expenditures (gross): from inception to 30 June 1997, as at 31 January 1997: $256,317,200; Budget estimate (gross), from 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998, as at January 1997: $29,107,800; Indicated financial implications related to the planned expansion of MINURSO: $129,000,000.
Voluntary Contributions: Algeria (accommodation premises, office space, fuel, food, water for hygiene facilities, transport and laundry facilities); Australia (signals unit and communications equipment until May 1994), Mauritania (office space); Morocco (accommodation premises, office space, fuel, food, water for hygiene facilities, air and land transportation, transport workshop, trucks and personnel); POLISARIO (accommodation premises, office space, food, water for hygiene facilities, technical personnel and other staff); Switzerland (aircraft in support of the medical unit and 30 support personnel until June 1994).
Facts and Figures for United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), as at 31 December 1997
Fatalities: 10; Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account; Estimated expenditures, from inception of mission through 30 June 1997: $81,488,600 net; Budget estimate from 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998: $189.5 million.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Elisabeth Rehn (Finland) - January 1998 to present; UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) Police Commissioner: Manfred Seitner (Denmark) - March 1997 to date.
Current contributors of personnel: Argentina 43 (CP); Austria 39 (CP); Bangladesh 30 (CP); Bulgaria 24 (CP); Canada 30 (CP), 1 (MO); Chile 31 (CP); Denmark 39 (CP); Egypt 33 (CP); Estonia 9 (CP); Finland 21 (CP); France 116 (CP); 1 (T); Germany 164 (CP); Ghana 86 (CP); Greece 13 (CP); Hungary 36 (CP); Iceland 3 (CP); India 143 (CP); Indonesia 18 (CP); Ireland 35 (CP); Italy 23 (CP); Jordan 155 (CP); Malaysia 46 (CP); Nepal 43 (CP); Netherlands 52 (CP); Nigeria 19 (CP); Norway 24 (CP); Pakistan 95 (CP); Poland 40 (CP); Portugal 60 (CP); Russian Federation 36 (CP), 1 (MO); Senegal 32 (CP); Spain 54 (CP); Sweden 45 (CP); Switzerland 4 (CP); Thailand 3 (CP); Tunisia 3 (CP); Turkey 27 (CP); Ukraine 36 (CP); United Kingdom 60 (CP); United States 206 (CP); Total Strength: 1,976 civilian police (CP), and 3 military observers (MO), supported by international and local civilian staff (The number of civilian police monitors may vary owing to rotations).
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"On 16 January 1998, Ms. Elisabeth Rehn (Finland) succeeded Mr. Kai Eide (Norway) as my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 2 March, Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) took over from Mr. Manfred Seitner (Denmark) as Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF).
The authorised strength of IPTF remains at 2,027, deployed in 64 stations in seven regions covering the whole country.
In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first phase of police restructuring is finally nearing completion and the police in eight out of 10 cantons have been inaugurated. The first phase comprises reducing the number of police officers to accepted international standards, selecting and certifying the officers and providing them with preliminary training.
... The problems in cantons 8 and 10 are indicative of the challenges which IPTF has begun to encounter in a systematic review that is being conducted on the implementation of the first phase of police restructuring throughout the Federation - especially in the ethnically mixed cantons 6 (Travnik) and 7 (Mostar). The continued existence of unofficial separate, ethnically based chains of command in these cantons has impeded cooperation between Croat and Bosniac police officers in joint investigations of ethnically motivated crimes, such as house burnings in areas of minority return. In addition, some municipalities in these cantons, which are dominated by one ethnic group, have reverted to a pattern of police patrols by the dominant group only. Both these developments demonstrate the continuing need for close monitoring of the local police even after the first phase of restructuring has been completed.
The second phase of police restructuring will concentrate on monitoring the performance of the newly inaugurated police services, recording failures of police to comply with the new standards, increasing minority representation and building capacity for self-sufficiency in training. Increasing the minority representation will be the central challenge in this phase ... The implementation of this second phase will require intensive support from IPTF, in terms of both advice and training, as well as in constant monitoring of implementation in every municipality.
In the Republika Srpska the election of a Government headed by Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, on 18 January 1998, appears to have resolved the political crisis which began in June 1997. Mr. Dodik has consistently supported the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and has promised to cooperate fully with international organisations charged with helping to implement it. In meetings on police restructuring, the newly appointed Interior Minister, Milovan Stankovic, has expressed his readiness to accelerate training and instruction in the Republika Srpska to allow early certification of all proposed 8,500 police officers.
Brko's multi-ethnic police began operations on 31 December 1997, as scheduled by the Brko Supervisory Order of 13 October 1997. The 230 police officers of all three ethnic groups are headed by a Serb police chief with Bosniac and Croat deputies, and led by an ethnically mixed police command staff ... IPTF needs to monitor each and every joint patrol in order to establish confidence for the minority police officers and for the population.
... IPTF has maintained its rate of progress in training police to operate according to the principles of democratic policing. All 11,500 police officers in the Federation have now completed the two-day "information" course, which explains the Task Force's restructuring process and its aims. In the period under review, 3,098 officers completed the one-week "human dignity" course, which gives them a modern view of the role of the police officer in society (76 per cent of officers have now completed the course). In addition, 1,264 officers completed the three-week "transition" course, which is a condensed version of a police academy course and focuses on basic police skills (18 per cent have now completed the course). In the Republika Srpska, of a total future number of 8,500 police officers, over 6,500 have now completed the information course and 1,898 have completed the human dignity course. The first transition course has just begun.
Efforts continue by IPTF to assist the local police in rehabilitating and developing modern police academies as opposed to the current secondary school style programmes for cadets.
... In support of freedom of movement, IPTF cooperates with the local police in both entities to implement the checkpoint policy, described in earlier reports (see S/1997/468, para. 5). On average, the Task Force now only approves about eight checkpoints per day. Since the introduction of the policy, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) has cooperated in removing 38 out of 151 identified illegal checkpoints.
On 10 January 1998, IPTF launched, in cooperation with SFOR and police in both entities, a two-week security operation ("Operation Corridor") on the transit road through the Republika Srpska between Sarajevo and Gorazde, which had been plagued by security incidents. During the operation, in which IPTF established a full-time presence between Sarajevo and Trnovo, traffic increased from a mere trickle to 390 Republika Srpska and Federation vehicles per day. Another instance in which intensive IPTF monitoring has resulted in improved compliance, has been in the significant reduction of cases where local police officials are charging illegal visa fees and road taxes on cars entering the country from Croatia.
A most significant step in enhancing freedom of movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the introduction of a common licence plate, as mandated by the Peace Implementation Council in its Sintra and Bonn meetings. Entity police will no longer be able to stop a vehicle solely because the licence plate is from the other entity or from a part of the Federation controlled by the other ethnic group.
... In cooperation with SFOR, IPTF has continued its programme of weapons inspections at local police stations, to ensure that local police only maintain the equipment necessary for policing in their areas: one long-barrelled rifle for every 10 officers and one side arm for each officer. A total of 570 weapons inspections were carried out between 1 November 1997 and 28 February 1998. Illegal weapons were found in 127 cases: 57 in the Republika Srpska and 70 in the Federation. Among the weapons confiscated by SFOR were 49 pistols, 645 long-barrelled weapons, 19 grenade and rocket launchers, 51 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, 405 grenades and over 49,149 rounds of ammunition".
Facts and Figures
Information effective as of 25 February 1998
Location: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium (Croatia); Headquarters: Vukovar (Police Hqs), Zagreb (United Nations Liaison Office UNLO); Duration: 16 January 1998 to present.
Function: To continue monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly with respect to the return of displaced persons, for a single nine-month period beginning on 16 January 1998.
Representative of the Secretary-General, Head of Support Group; Head of UN Liaison Office Zagreb (UNLO) Mr. Souren Seraydarian (Syrian Arab Republic); Police Commissioner: Chief Superintendant Halvor Hartz (Norway).
Strength, as of 31 January 1998: 378 police, 18 troops.
Contributors of Military Personnel, as of 31 January 1998: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Tunisia, Ukraine, United States
Background
By unanimously adopting resolution 1145 (1997) on 19 December 1997, the Security Council decided to establish a support group of 180 civilian police monitors to continue monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly with respect to the return of displaced persons, for a single nine-month period beginning on 16 January 1998. The support group was to continue that aspect of the work of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), whose mandate expired on 15 January 1998. By that time, UNTAES had successfully accomplished its key objective under the November 1995 Basic Agreement for the region and the preceding Dayton Accords on the former Yugoslavia of peacefully reintegrating that region into Croatia within the prescribed time frame of two years.
By resolution 1145 (1997), the Council decided that the United Nations Civilian Police Support Group would assume responsibility for those former UNTAES personnel and United Nations-owned assets needed for the fulfilment of its mandate. It encouraged liaison between the support group and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with a view to facilitating a smooth transition of responsibility to that organisation, and welcomed the OSCE's key role in the region. The Security Council reiterated its call to all regional States, including Croatia, to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and called on the Government of Croatia to implement fully and promptly all of its obligations and commitments, including those reached with UNTAES with regard to the region. Welcoming the fact that some progress had been made in the peaceful two-way return of displaced persons and the return of refugees in the region, the Security Council called on the Government of Croatia to remove legal obstacles and other impediments to two-way returns, including through such measures as the resolution of property issues, the establishment of straightforward procedures for returns, the adequate funding of the Joint Council and all relevant activities of municipalities, and the clarification and full implementation of the Amnesty Law.
The adoption of resolution 1145 (1997) followed consideration by the Security Council of the report of the Secretary-General on UNTAES (S/1997/953), dated 4 December 1997, in which the Secretary-General recommended that UNTAES be terminated on 15 January 1998 and be replaced by a support group of 180 civilian police to continue monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons. Until 15 January 1998, the UNTAES Transitional Administrator progressively turned over operational control of all remaining functions of UNTAES in the region to the Croatian Government, while retaining his authority to intervene and overrule.
According to the Secretary-General's plan, this post-UNTAES civilian police support group would be stationed in the main Croatian police headquarters and at the 20 Croatian police stations throughout the Danube region. The group would be headquartered in Vukovar and would operate under the overall responsibility of a small substantive unit based in Zagreb. Along with three mobile patrols, it would maintain 24-hour-a-day coverage of police activities. The support group's operations would be limited to nine months and there would be the option to terminate it sooner should circumstances so permit.
Under the Basic Agreement reached in late 1995, the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the region's local Serb authority, had accepted a plan for the peaceful reintegration of the ethnically mixed Danube region into Croatia. The Basic Agreement envisaged a transitional period of a maximum of two years during which this process could be achieved. The parties requested that an international force, that would become UNTAES, be stationed in the region to maintain peace and security and to assist in the Agreement's implementation during the transitional period. In response, the Council formed UNTAES, with military and civilian components led by a Transitional Administrator. The two-year transitional period ended on 15 January 1998, with the expiration of the UNTAES mandate. In his 4 December 1997 report to the Council, the Secretary-General stated that Croatia had made major efforts to meet its obligations under the Basic Agreement and recently demonstrated more political will to complete reintegration successfully. These efforts, if sustained, gave hope that the termination of UNTAES on 15 January 1998, would not jeopardise the results of two years of intensive international investment and effort in the region. In the final analysis of the Secretary-General, the Croatian authorities were responsible for the successful completion of the peaceful reintegration of the region and the true reconciliation of the people.
In the post-UNTAES period, many international organisations were to support Croatia by comprehensively monitoring the implementation of commitments and providing reassurance to the population of the region. Local Serbs needed reassurance and did not yet trust that central government instructions would be implemented by all local officials. Without continued international engagement, there was a clear risk that the termination of UNTAES might be seen in retrospect as having been premature. For those reasons, the Secretary-General welcomed the deployment throughout Croatia of the long-term mission of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the activities of other international and local non-governmental organisations. The continued presence and support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would also be an essential aspect of the international involvement in the region.
According to the Secretary-General's 4 December 1997 report to the Council, the estimated costs for the civilian police support group for a period of nine months would be approximately $17.6 million. This estimate provided for a strength of 180 civilian police, supported by a civilian establishment of 53 international and 165 local personnel. On 13 January 1998, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Souren Seraydarian (Syrian Arab Republic) his Representative and Head of the support group and the United Nations Liaison Office in Zagreb (S/1998/29).
In his final report on UNTAES and its succeeding support group dated 27 January 1998 (S/1998/59) to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations civilian police component began its drawdown on 16 January 1998 in order to reach the ceiling for the support group of 180 officers as approved in resolution 1145 (1997) by 31 January 1998. A military liquidation force with the tasks of securing draw-down operations and guarding the remaining UNTAES assets and personnel has been operational since 15 October 1997 and, as of 15 January 1998, was being progressively phased out. There have been no security problems associated with this draw-down. To provide security to United Nations assets, the Secretary-General planned to retain a United Nations guard element of 60 military personnel until 1 March 1998 and, from 1 March 1998 until the completion of the liquidation not later than 31 May 1998, a remainder of 30 military personnel. Security of both military and civilian personnel remaining in the Danube region was to be provided by the Croatian Government.
On 10 February 1998, the Head of the Support Group reported that the transition from UNTAES to the civilian police support mission has been seamless and that the new mission was fully operational in accordance with its mandate. The mission closely cooperated with OSCE and maintained close contacts with other UN agencies in Croatia. On 25 February the Support Group's Head stated that the overall security situation in the Danube region was relatively stable, although a worrying trend of increasing harassments and intimidations continued. This created a climate of fear and uncertainty amongst local Serbs and led to an elevated rate of "quiet" departures from the region. According to a UNHCR estimate, presently only 12,900 displaced Serbs were still in the region out of a previous total of about 45,000. The Support Group and OSCE cooperated closely in monitoring the situation in the region. The performance of the Croatian police was generally accepted and its response to complaints speedy and effective.
A WP report warned that a second Bosnian war may be igniting in Kosovo, a Serbian province with a 90 percent ethnic Albanian majority. The current crisis was triggered by the killing of some Serbian police officers by the armed wing of the Albanian nationalist movement, to which the Serbian government responded with indiscriminate force against civilians. Although the US State Department concurs with Belgrade that the Kosovo Liberation Army is a terrorist group, it, nevertheless, criticised the Serbian response as excessive.
Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, has recently sought international approval by assisting the US install a new moderate Bosnian Serb government. Milosevic has been rewarded, amongst other things, with air landing rights and some other forward-looking steps, while the State Department has supported Belgrade's proposal for issue-by-issue negotiation of Serbian-Albanian differences, starting with education. The report asserted that even this scant progress had now been lost.
The report cautioned that Serbia could expect political isolation, and Albanians neglect, if the international community perceived either as responsible for escalating hostilities. Any political alterations must occur through negotiation, while the embargo against Serbia cannot be tightened much further. However, the report asserted that NATO military options should be reviewed: President Bill Clinton has reiterated George Bush's 1992 warning against Serbian aggression - a warning Milosevic would find no advantage in testing.
WASHINGTON POST
8 MARCH 1998
A WP report described how, on 7 March, Serbian forces continued their offensive against ethnic Albanians living in the Kosovo province for a third day. Thousands of refugees were forced to flee the region. Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, was warned by US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, that he will pay the price for the attack against pro-independence opposition fighters, stating that she would lobby allies for a firm and decisive response to try to stop the fighting.
The report asserted that the latest violence involved Serbian police and troops killing scores of Albanians and destroying their homes. The targeted Albanians have been accused by Serbian authorities of taking part in murdering Serbian police officers, and of assisting an extremist group that employs violent tactics against Serbian domination of Kosovo. However, the report pointed out that no juries were being created to hear such charges, while only a few arrests have been made. Serbian Interior Ministry officials have claimed that their activities are legal, involving only regular police, and have insisted that no special forces have been employed. The report declared that several armed men had claimed to be under the command of a Serbian called Frenki Simatovic, who had assisted in the arming and training of nationalist Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia before the war in 1991 and 1992. He had also allegedly helped to initiate an anti-NATO riot in the Bosnian city of Brcko in August 1997.
The report asserted that few Serbians support Western proposals for increased political autonomy for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, claimimg that such moves would not appease the Albanians, and would only hasten the secession of the region from Serbia. Serbian media have carried out propaganda campaigns claiming that many ethnic Albanians are terrorists. Milosevic rescinded Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989, in response to a rise in Serbian nationalism.
Serbian claims that their actions were retaliatory have been contradicted by US intelligence officials who detected preparations by special Serb police units for an offensive in January. The report declared that Donji Prekaz - where the recent offensive took place - and its environs were havens for anti-Serbian sentiment, and some residents may have had associations with the Kosovo Liberation Army.
WASHINGTON POST
8 MARCH 1998
An AP report stated that, on 9 March, the six-nation Contact Group - comprising Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the US - was to hold a meeting in London to discuss events in Kosovo. The report said that consensus over intervention appeared unlikely because of divisions among the delegations. The report believed that the 8 March announcement by the Deputy Chief of the Serbian province of Kosovo, Veljko Odalevic, that their four-day campaign against pro-independence Albanians had ended, may have tempered the attitude of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and other advocates of a hard-line policy. However, the report declared that the Serb peace pledge was ultimately unlikely to convince Albright and like-minded diplomats.
The meeting's Chair, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, declared, on 8 March, that he wished to send a clear message to Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, that Belgrade must stop the acts of repression and begin a political process to allow increased autonomy for Kosovo. Of the six delegations convening for the meeting, Russia is the strongest opponent of decisive action against the Serbs, advocating Milosevic's line in perceiving the dispute over Kosovo as an internal matter.
Albright was worried that events in Kosovo would have a knock-on effect in neighbouring countries, potentially involving NATO members Greece and Turkey, with detrimental repercussions for the alliance. Bonne was concerned over refugees from Kosovo arriving in Germany. The US wanted European countries to withdraw economic and diplomatic support from Belgrade. The report stated that various proposals were being considered to deter internationalisation of the conflict, including extending the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia beyond its 31 August expiry date, and enlarging the Western European Union (WEU) force currently stationed in neighbouring Albania.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
8 MARCH 1988
A WP report stated that, on 10 March, the Contact Group agreed on moves to increase pressure on Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, to end repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Russia acquiesced to two of four measures proposed: an arms embargo and a ban on transfers of equipment that might be used for repression. However, Moscow opposed two additional measures: denial of visas for Yugoslav representatives responsible for repressive action; and a moratorium on government-financed credit for privatisation of Yugoslav companies. French, Italian and Russian opposition prevented the group from freezing overseas assets of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian governments, which is considered the most severe of possible economic sanctions. The contact group was to reconsider the possibility in Washington on 25 March.
The report asserted that agreement was more than Washington had hoped to achieve during Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright's three-day tour of European capitals, which culminated with the meeting in London. However, Albright believed the measures to be merely satisfactory, and US officials have stated that further pressure would probably be required to relieve violence in Kosovo.
The use of military intervention by Western powers was not discussed during the meeting. Albright declared that, although the US was keeping its options open, it believed it was essential to move forward towards a political settlement. She added that she had told the meeting Washington reserved the right to take unilateral action, and had seen enough evidence that ethnic cleansing was again taking place. On 10 March, Albright discussed the crisis with NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, and British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. According to senior NATO diplomats, alliance defence experts were analysing possible measures to contain the conflict and prevent it from spreading into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. On 11 March, they announced that Albania could make a formal request for a military border-monitoring presence at an emergency meeting, called by the Albanians themselves, as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The programme is designed to develop military cooperation with non-NATO countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
NATO officials asserted that Solana hoped the Contact Group avoided mistakes made during the Bosnia crisis, and ensured NATO was informed about all possibilities of urgent military action. This was particularly relevant to stabilising Albania and Macedonia, whose population is 40 per cent ethnic Albanian. About 700 US and Nordic troops serve with the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP). NATO sources expected Albania to request a similar force to monitor Kosovo.
Cook has declared that the situation in Kosovo demands a political solution, requiring Milosevic to begin a political dialogue with moderate Albanians to find a peaceful solution to the escalating violence. He distanced Western powers from the demands for independence of the ethnic Albanian opposition fighters, and stated that, while he recognised Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, he could not condone the violent repression of non-violent expression of political views.
The contact group agreed to dispatch former Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, to the region to attempt to mediate on behalf of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It also requested the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to start to collect information for the potential prosecution of war crimes in Kosovo. It urged Milosevic to pull out special police forces that have been murdering civilians, to give the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies access to the region, and to start dialogue with ethnic Albanian leaders.
WASHINGTON POST
10 MARCH 1998
An FT report asserted that, on 17 March, further sanctions were threatened against Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, including by his traditional ally, Russia, unless he ended the conflict with ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, the report added that Serbian officials had privately stated that the government was preparing for sanctions, and believed it enjoyed broad, domestic public support. Diplomats expected Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, to urge Milosevic to accept an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mediating mission in Kosovo.
Following talks with Primakov, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Zivadin Jovanovic, declared that Serbia would not accept outside interference in what it perceived to be an internal matter. However, diplomats stressed that Belgrade could not expect firm support from Moscow.
The report said that senior US envoy, Robert Gelbard, was expected to increase pressure on Milosevic in Belgrade on 18 March, and that the French and German foreign ministers were expected to do the same on 19 March.
FINANCIAL TIMES
18 MARCH 1998
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Much groundwork has been laid during the reporting period towards achieving substantive progress in the Georgian/Abkhaz peace process: [United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)] efforts in that regard have been further revitalised, in close coordination with the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, and the OSCE; the role of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General has been clarified and agreed upon; and the Concluding Statement adopted at Geneva, on 19 November, now provides an implementation plan.
Political machinery to address the military, political and economic ramifications of the peace process is now in place: the Coordinating Council and three working groups have been established and have already met for the first time at Sukhumi in December 1997. Further meetings are planned in January 1998 for the working groups, in February for the Coordinating Council, which will convene at Tbilisi, and in March/April for the high-level Geneva mechanism. Progress, therefore, now depends more than ever on the determination of the two sides to negotiate in earnest and to work constructively with my Special Representative to achieve substantive results. I also appeal to them to continue to expand their bilateral contacts. Progress in the area of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons is urgently needed in order to give additional credibility to the peace process".
Composition of UNOMIG, as at 15 January 1998:
Albania 1 (MO); Austria 4 (MO); Bangladesh 9 (MO); Czech Republic 4 (MO); Denmark 5 (MO); Egypt 4 (MO); France 5 (MO); Germany 10 (MO); Greece 4 (MO); Hungary 5 (MO); Indonesia 4 (MO); Jordan 6 (MO); Pakistan 5 (MO); Poland 4 (MO); Republic of Korea 4 (MO); Russian Federation 3 (MO); Sweden 5 (MO); Switzerland 5 (MO); Turkey 4 (MO); United Kingdom of Great Britain and (MO); Northern Ireland (MO); United States of America 4 (MO); Uruguay 4 (MO); Total 106 Military Observers (MO), supported by international and local staff.
By its resolution 51/236 of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $18,580,500 (gross), equivalent to $1,548,375 per month for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. The assessment of those amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission. In addition, on 11 December, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions authorised the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in the amount of $1,653,600 to improve the safety of UNOMIG personnel and create conditions for the effective performance of its mandate.
Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 31 January 1998, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 1998, would be limited to the appropriation contained in General Assembly resolution 51/236 and the additional authorisation provided by the Advisory Committee.
As at 31 December 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIG Special Account amounted to $6.4 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.6 billion.
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Since I last reported to the Security Council three months ago, work on the implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan has continued at a slow pace. Regrettably, much energy has been consumed by crisis management, and the momentum created by the adoption of Security Council resolution 1138 (1997), and by the gratifying support for the peace process at the donor conference in Vienna, has not yet been able to be translated into tangible results.
Much of the attention of the parties continued to be taken up by the question of the senior government posts to be allocated to the UTO, an issue that has dogged them for several months. While it is understood that this is a difficult process, requiring a delicate balance to be struck within as well as between the two camps, the time has come for resolving this matter.
For the remainder of this mandate period, I hope that there will be practical work and tangible progress on such matters as the reintegration of the UTO fighters and the revision of the Constitution and adoption of new laws. I would also encourage the [Commission on National Reconciliation] CNR to launch now the broad dialogue among the various political forces, including those not represented in the CNR, as foreseen in the General Agreement. The aim should be to create equal opportunities for all citizens to participate in the political life of the country and to establish the conditions for free and fair elections as soon as possible.
For the United Nations, the safety of its personnel has continued to be a major preoccupation. Security in Tajikistan has been precarious and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The United Nations must, therefore, seek to limit the risks for its personnel to the extent possible, otherwise they will not be able to perform the important functions assigned to the Mission by the General Agreement".
On 18 December 1997, the General Assembly authorised the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations component of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MIPONUH) until 31 December 1998. In a resolution adopted by consensus, the Assembly reaffirmed the international community's commitment to continue technical, economic and financial cooperation with Haiti in support of its economic and social development. The Assembly also reaffirmed the commitment to strengthen institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, respect for human rights, political stability and economic development.
Among the tasks, the mission will provide, at the request of the Haitian Government, technical assistance in the field of institution-building, such as the training of the police and support for judicial reform and the establishment of an impartial judiciary. It will also provide support for the development of a programme to promote and protect human rights, establish a climate of freedom and tolerance favourable to the consolidation of long-term constitutional democracy in Haiti, and contribute to the strengthening of democratic institutions.
The mission will verify full observance by Haiti of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Strongly supporting the leadership of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organisation of American States in Haiti, the General Assembly encouraged further cooperation between the International Civilian Mission and the United Nations and others participating in institution-building, including police training activities.
UNDPI
20 DECEMBER 1997
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The international community is deeply concerned that Haiti is still without a functioning Government after more than eight months. Not only does the political impasse have consequences for the economic and social development of a country in dire need of economic relief, it also jeopardises the consolidation of democracy and seriously compromises international cooperation. I therefore reiterate my appeal to the Haitian authorities and political leaders to negotiate an end to the crisis, including the electoral dispute, which has had negative repercussions for many months, in a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation, with a view to reaching an agreement that will allow their country to start moving again towards democracy.
As I have stated in my previous reports and as President [René] Préval has emphasised, the Haitian National Police continues to make steady progress. Nevertheless, the absence of a functioning judicial system severely hinders its ability to carry out its tasks and to ensure the prosecution of those officers who do not conduct themselves properly. The fact that incidents of human rights violations, corruption and other misconduct continue to be reported, notwithstanding the efforts of the Inspector-General of the Haitian National Police to rid the force of unqualified elements, is cause for concern. While I am aware of the difficulties entailed in revamping the judicial system, I must stress that, without a functioning judiciary, the international community's efforts to help create an effective, politically neutral and professional police force could become increasingly difficult. I therefore strongly urge the Haitian authorities to move forward urgently in the area of judicial reform and call on the international community to provide the necessary assistance in that regard. A respected and effective judicial system is one cornerstone of a functioning democracy".
Composition of the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), as at 12 February 1998
Argentina 139 (SP) 5 (SE); Benin 6 (SE); Canada 23 (SE); France 35 (SE); India 4 (SE); Mali 20 (SE); Niger 5 (SE); Senegal 8 (SE); Togo 7 (SE); Tunisia 3 (SE); United States of America 30 (SE); Subtotal 139 Special Police Unit (SP), 146 Substantive Element (SE); Total 285.
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council ... Stresses the urgent need for the Government of Angola and in particular UNITA to complete in accordance with the timetable approved by the Joint Commission, on 9 January 1998, the implementation of their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol as well as to complete the implementation of their obligations under the "Acordos de Paz" (S/22609, annex), and relevant Security Council resolutions;
Decides to extend the mandate of [UN Observer Mission in Angola] MONUA, including the military task force as outlined in ... the report of the Secretary-General of 12 January 1998, until 30 April 1998;
... Stresses the importance of strengthening the rule of law, including the full protection of all Angolan citizens throughout the national territory;
Requests the Government of Angola, in cooperation with MONUA, to take appropriate steps, including through its integrated National Police and Armed Forces, to ensure an environment of confidence and safety in which the United Nations and humanitarian personnel may carry out their activities".
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council ... Welcomes the efforts made by the Member States participating in [the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements] MISAB and by those States providing support to them, and their readiness to maintain these efforts;
Urges the Government of the Central African Republic to continue to fulfil the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic (S/1998/61, annex) and calls upon the parties in the Central African Republic to complete the implementation of the provisions of the Bangui Agreements and to implement the conclusions of the National Reconciliation Conference (S/1998/219, appendix);
Approves the continued conduct by Member States participating in MISAB of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective as set out in ... resolution 1125 (1997);
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorises the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure security and freedom of movement of their personnel;
Decides that the authorisation referred to ... above will be extended until 27 March 1998;
Recalls that the expenses and logistical support for MISAB will be borne on a voluntary basis in accordance with article 11 of the mandate of MISAB, and encourages Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Central African Republic;
Affirms that it will take a decision by 27 March 1998 on the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 1998".
FULL TEXT
"The Security Council recalls its resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, and the statements of its President of 27 May 1997 (S/PRST/1997/29), 11 July 1997 (S/PRST/1997/36) and 6 August 1997 (S/PRST/1997/42), following the military coup d'état in Sierra Leone on 25 May 1997. It expresses its deep regret at the violence, loss of life and property and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone since the coup. It remains gravely concerned at the continued violence in the country and calls for an urgent end to the fighting.
The Security Council welcomes the fact that the rule of the military junta has been brought to an end, and stresses the imperative need for the immediate restoration of the democratically elected Government of President Tijan Kabbah and a return to constitutional order, in accordance with paragraph 1 of its resolution 1132 (1997).
The Security Council encourages the earliest possible return to Freetown by President Kabbah and looks forward to his re-establishing a functioning and autonomous government in the country.
The Security Council expresses its readiness to terminate the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of its resolution 1132 (1997) as soon as the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of that resolution have been fulfilled.
The Security Council commends the important role that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has continued to play towards the peaceful resolution of this crisis. The Security Council encourages the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) to proceed in its efforts to foster peace and stability in Sierra Leone, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It underlines the need for close cooperation between the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS, and in particular its Committee of Five Foreign Ministers on Sierra Leone, ECOMOG commanders, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and his staff, United Nations agencies and relevant international organisations in their work, and specifically on the development of a plan for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of all combatants in Sierra Leone. In this context, it supports the intention of the Secretary-General, subject to security conditions on the ground, to take rapid steps towards the reopening of the United Nations Liaison Office in Freetown in order to support the activities of his Special Envoy, and in particular to assist national reconciliation and political dialogue.
The Security Council expresses the view that the Conakry Agreement (S/1997/824, Annexes I and II) and the Abidjan Agreement (S/1996/1034) provide important elements for a framework for peace, stability and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. It calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to work towards these objectives through peaceful means and political dialogue. In this regard, it condemns all reprisal killings and related violence in Sierra Leone and calls for an immediate end to such acts.
The Security Council looks forward to detailed proposals by the Secretary-General concerning the role of the United Nations and its future presence in Sierra Leone. It requests the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund to support such activities and calls on all Member States to make early contributions to it.
The Security Council welcomes the interim report of the Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Sierra Leone of 10 February 1998 (S/1998/155), and commends those Member States and international organisations who have provided urgent humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone. It remains deeply concerned about the serious and fragile humanitarian situation in the country, and calls upon all States and international organisations to provide further urgent assistance to Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries affected by the crisis. It calls on ECOMOG and all those concerned to ensure safe and unrestricted access to those in need.
The Security Council expresses its concern about the safety of all humanitarian personnel in Sierra Leone, and condemns the taking of hostages by former members of the deposed junta. It calls for the immediate release of all international personnel and others who have been detained or held hostage. It commends ECOMOG for its efforts to liberate those individuals being held against their will".
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council,
... Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Welcomes the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically elected President on 10 March 1998;
Decides to terminate, with immediate effect, the prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution 1132 (1997);
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to make proposals concerning the role of the United Nations and its future presence in Sierra Leone;
Decides to review the other prohibitions referred to in resolution 1132 (1997) in accordance with paragraph 17 of that resolution and in the light of developments and further discussion with the Government of Sierra Leone".
FULL TEXT
"Further to my briefing of the Security Council [on 26 February] regarding my recent mission to Baghdad, please find attached a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding which I signed with Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq
The Government of Iraq reconfirms its acceptance of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). The Government of Iraq further reiterates its undertaking to cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The United Nations reiterates the commitment of all Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.
The Government of Iraq undertakes to accord to UNSCOM and IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity with the resolutions referred to in paragraph 1. In the performance of its mandate under the Security Council resolutions, UNSCOM undertakes to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity.
The United Nations and the Government of Iraq agree that the following special procedures shall apply to the initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks mandated at the eight Presidential Sites in Iraq as defined in the annex to the present Memorandum:
(a) A Special Group shall be established for this purpose by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and the Director General of IAEA. This Group shall comprise senior diplomats appointed by the Secretary-General and experts drawn from UNSCOM and IAEA. The Group shall be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary-General.
(b) In carrying out its work, the Special Group shall operate under the established procedures of UNSCOM and IAEA, and specific detailed procedures which will be developed given the special nature of the Presidential Sites, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.
(c) The report of the Special Group on its activities and findings shall be submitted by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
The United Nations and the Government of Iraq further agree that all other areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation shall be subject to UNSCOM procedures hitherto established.
Noting the progress achieved by UNSCOM in various disarmament areas, and the need to intensify efforts in order to complete its mandate, the United Nations and the Government of Iraq agree to improve cooperation, and efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of work, so as to enable UNSCOM to report to the Council expeditiously under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). To achieve this goal, the Government of Iraq and UNSCOM will implement the recommendations directed at them as contained in the report of the emergency session of UNSCOM held on 21 November 1997.
The lifting of sanctions is obviously of paramount importance to the people and Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General undertook to bring this matter to the full attention of the members of the Security Council.
Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq of 23 February 1998
The eight Presidential Sites subject to the regime agreed upon in the present Memorandum of Understanding are the following:
The Republican Palace Presidential Site (Baghdad).
Radwaniyah Presidential Site (Baghdad).
Sijood Presidential Site (Baghdad).
Tikrit Presidential Site.
Tharthar Presidential Site.
Jabal Makhul Presidential Site.
Mosul Presidential Site.
Basrah Presidential Site.
The perimeter of the area of each site is recorded in the survey of the "Presidential sites" in Iraq implemented by the United Nations Technical Mission designated by the Secretary-General, as attached to the letter dated 21 February 1998 addressed by the Secretary-General to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq".
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council ... Approves the deployment of the engineering unit required for demining activities and of the additional administrative staff required to support the deployment of military personnel ...;
Expresses its intention to consider positively the request for the remaining additional military and civilian police assets for MINURSO ... as soon as the Secretary-General reports that the identification process has reached a stage which makes the deployment of these assets essential".
FULL TEXT
"1. We the Foreign Ministers of Contact Group countries, together with representatives of the European Commission and the Office of the High Representative, met in London on 9 March to discuss the increasingly tense situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the unacceptable use of force over recent days. The Balkans region has seen too much bloodshed in recent years for the international community to stand aside.
2. We recalled that when we met in New York on 24 September 1997, we voiced deep concern over developments in Kosovo and called on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to join in a peaceful dialogue. We are dismayed that in the period since September, rather than taking steps to reduce tensions or to enter without preconditions into dialogue toward a political solution, the Belgrade authorities have applied repressive measures in Kosovo. We note with particular concern the recent violence in Kosovo resulting in at least 80 fatalities and condemn the use of excessive force by Serbian police against civilians, and against peaceful demonstrators in Pristina on 2 March.
3. Our condemnation of the actions of the Serbian police should not in any way be mistaken for an endorsement of terrorism. Our position on this is clear. We wholly condemn terrorist actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual. Those in the Kosovar Albanian community who speak for the different political constituencies should make it clear that they, too, abhor terrorism. We insist likewise that those outside the FRY who are supplying finance, arms or training for terrorist activity in Kosovo should immediately cease doing so.
4. We condemn the large-scale police actions of the last 10 days that further inflamed an already volatile situation. The violent repression at non-violent expression of political views is completely indefensible. We call upon the authorities in Belgrade to invite independent forensic experts to investigate the very serious allegations of extrajudicial killings. If these accusations are borne out, we expect the FRY authorities to prosecute and punish those responsible.
5. Our commitment to human rights values means that we cannot ignore such disproportionate methods of control. Government authorities have a special responsibility to protect the human and civil rights of all citizens and to ensure that public security forces act judiciously and with restraint.
6. In the light of the deplorable violence in Kosovo, we feel compelled to take steps to demonstrate to the authorities in Belgrade that they cannot defy international standards without facing severe consequences. The Contact Group has decided to take a broad range of action to address the current situation on an urgent basis. The Contact Group welcomes the continuation of consultations in the United Nations Security Council, in view of the implications of the situation in Kosovo for regional security. Against that background the Contact Group:
- requests a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- urges the office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY to begin gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction. The FRY authorities have an obligation to cooperate with the ICTY. Contact Group countries will make available to the ICTY substantiated relevant information in their possession.
- supports the proposal for a new mission by Felipe Gonzalez as the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the FRY that would include a new and specific mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo.
- supports the return of the OSCE long-term missions to Kosovo, the Sandzak and Vojvodina.
- recommends that the Special Session of the OSCE Permanent Council meeting on 11 March arrange for Embassies in Belgrade of OSCE participating states to intensify their visits to Kosovo so as to provide for a continuous presence.
- will continue vigorously to support Sant'Egidio's efforts to secure implementation of the Education Agreement, and identify resources to assist a fair and acceptable arrangement.
- proposes the establishment of an international consortium including non-Government Organisations that would promote civil-society building in Kosovo and the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
- recognising that neighbouring countries of the FRY have legitimate security concerns stemming from violence and unrest in Kosovo, will arrange an urgent meeting of the Contact Group with representatives of governments in the region to discuss the grave consequences of an inter-ethnic conflict and its possible spillover to other parts of the region. We expect them to do all in their power to prevent support for terrorism. The meeting will in particular address:
- the possible dispatch of a short-term OSCE monitoring group to enhance the ability of the Albania mission's Shkodra field office to monitor the FRY (Kosovo) border.
- the possible strengthening or the present OSCE mission in Skopje.
- recommends that consideration be given to adapting the current UNPREDEP mandate, and would support the maintenance of an international military presence on the ground in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia when the current mandate of UNPREDEP expires.
- will monitor the situation in Kosovo by frequent joint visits to Pristina by Contact Group and other representatives.
7. At the same time, it is not enough for the killing to stop; too much damage has already been done to human life and to the FRY'S credibility. Because of the gravity of the situation, we endorse the following measures to be pursued immediately:
a) UN Security Council consideration of a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, including Kosovo;
b) Refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for internal repression, or for terrorism;
c) Denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo;
d) A moratorium on government-financed export credit support for trade and investment, including government financing for privatisations, in Serbia.
The Contact Group notes that the Russian Federation cannot support measures c) and d) above for immediate imposition. But if there is no progress towards the steps called for by the Contact Group, the Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss all the above measures.
We call upon President Milosevic to take rapid and effective steps to stop the violence and engage in a commitment to find a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue. Specifically, he should within 10 days:
- Withdraw the special police units and cease action by the security forces affecting the civilian population.
- Allow access to Kosovo for the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations as well as by representatives of the Contact Group and other Embassies.
- Commit himself publicly to begin a process of dialogue, along the lines in paragraph 10, with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community.
- cooperate in a constructive manner with the Contact Group in the implementation of the actions specified in paragraph 6 above which require action by the FRY government.
If President Milosevic takes these steps, we will immediately reconsider the measures we have now adopted. If he fails to take these steps, and repression continues in Kosovo, the Contact Group will move to further international measures, and specifically to pursue a freeze on the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian governments.
The Contact Group has decided to meet again on 25 March to assess the response of the government of the FRY.
8. Belgrade's own actions have seriously set back the process of normalisation of the FRY's relations with the international community. Unless the FRY takes steps to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its international standing. On the other hand, concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the FRY and prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and full rehabilitation in international institutions.
9. No one should misunderstand our position on the core issue involved. We support neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. As we have set out clearly, the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and be in accordance with OSCE standards, Helsinki principles, and the UN Charter. Such a solution also must take into account the rights of the Kosovo Albanians and all those who live in Kosovo. We support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY which a substantially greater degree of autonomy would bring and recognise that this must include meaningful, self-administration.
10. The way to defeat terrorism in Kosovo is for Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process. The authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community must assume their responsibility to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues. The Contact Group stands ready to facilitate such a dialogue".
USIA
9 MARCH 1998
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council ... authorises [United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka] UNMOP to continue monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula until 15 July 1998. The Council urged the parties to take concrete steps towards a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in good faith and without delay. UNMOP Force Commander reports improved relations with Croatian authorities;
Welcomes steps undertaken by the parties in adopting the practical options proposed by United Nations military observers to reduce tension andimprove safety and security in the area, and calls upon the parties to make further progress in this regard;
... Urges the parties to abide by their mutual commitments and to implement fully the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 23 August 1996;
Expresses its support for the commitment by the parties to a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in accordance with article 4 of the aforementioned Agreement;
Urges the parties to take concrete steps towards a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in good faith and without delay;
... Requests the United Nations military observers and the multinational stabilisation force authorised by the Council in resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996 to cooperate fully with each other".
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"The Security Council notes with satisfaction that much groundwork has now been laid towards achieving substantive progress in the peace process but reiterates its deep concern that, as yet, no significant progress has been made on the key issues in the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia;
... Decides to extend the mandate of [UN Observer Mission in Georgia] UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 31 July 1998 subject to a review by the Council of the mandate of UNOMIG in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate or in the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force;
Encourages further contributions to address the urgent needs of those suffering most from the consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, in particular internally displaced persons, including contributions to the voluntary fund in support of the implementation of the Moscow Agreement and/or for humanitarian aspects including demining, as specified by donors, requests the Secretary-General to consider the means of providing technical and financial assistance aimed at the reconstruction of the economy of Abkhazia, Georgia, following the successful outcome of the political negotiations, and welcomes the planning of a needs assessment mission".
The lecture is presented by Professor I. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organisations and Conflict Resolution, and Director of the Conflict Management Programme, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.
The lecture considers the resurgence of ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era, focusing on potential techniques to resolve such problems. The lecture takes place at 5:00 p.m. on Monday 27 April 1998, at First Union, 123 South Broad Street/5th Floor/Board Room/Phila. The lecture is free for Members, or $15 for Non-Members.
For further information, contact: Tel: ++ (703) 821-7742; E-mail: FPRI@aol.com
The Symposium takes place at Nasby Park, Stockholm, Sweden. For Further information, contact: ++ (703) 893-6800; Fax: ++ (703) 821-7742; E-mail: bsmith@ebrinc.com; Website: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/act/atpr.html
The Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre aims to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability. The Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programmes. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is an independent organisation established by the Government of Canada in 1994, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre accomplishes its mandate by providing research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.
Information on courses run by the Pearson Centre is available from the Registrar at: Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100 Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada. Tel: (902) 638-8611 ex. 109, fax: (902) 638-8888; Email: registrar@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca Internet: http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
For information on research in the peacekeeping area, contact Colonel Dan Smith at: Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700; Fax: (202) 862 0708; E-Mail: dsmith@cdi.org; Internet Site: http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/
Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping, including demining, mission up-dates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel contributors, rapid deployment facilities, and training is available on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
The UN Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI) provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the courses is available on-line at: http://www.wm.edu/unpeacek/index.html
The University of Colorado provides a website containing information and useful internet links in the field of peace and conflict research. It can be accessed at: http://csf.colorado.edu/peace/
SECRETARY-GENERAL SETS COURSE FOR UN REVITALISATION, JANUARY 1998 (DPI/1957)
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"... The 185 Member States of the United Nations have given their strong backing to the drive by the Secretary-General to make the Organisation a more vital and relevant force for the world's people.
The demand and need for such reform began to be articulated nearly a decade ago, when the ending of the cold war fundamentally altered relations among States, regions and political blocs. But very little organisational reform had in fact taken place, a result primarily of suspicion that change would be driven by the powerful at the expense of some of the Organisation's long-standing commitments, particularly to development. No less important was the absence of a vision of such change that could be supported by all Member States.
... While delivering on his promise to cut back on the Organisation's costs and raise efficiency - and putting forward the first-ever negative-growth budget - the Secretary-General has also sought to stem the erosion of the UN's influence in critical areas. Mr. Annan has addressed a full agenda of regional conflicts and taken steps, with the appointment of new key players, to strengthen the Organisation's work in areas such as human rights, humanitarian assistance, sustainable development and the fight against drugs and organised crime.
... While recognising the imperative of mending fences with the United States, he is fully committed to understanding and addressing the concerns and interests of all other States, and is deeply conscious of the independence, neutrality and integrity that are essential to the office of the Secretary-General in its efforts to promote peace, prosperity and justice. He has therefore been able to make effective use of his good offices, pointing the way to potential resolutions of long-standing international disputes.
Furthering world peace
An important part of the reform effort has been to give concrete expression to the centrality of the United Nations in issues of concern to the international community, in particular peace and security. Bitter experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have led to a general reluctance by the Security Council to authorise new peacekeeping operations, despite situations of compelling need. Development of a rapid troop deployment capacity, provided by certain Member States, coupled with a clear strategy for the withdrawal of forces is among the measures Mr. Annan has promoted to raise the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts, and rebuilding confidence in this vital instrument for maintaining peace.
The Secretary-General undertook initiatives in 1997 to revive the peace process in a number of intractable conflicts, including Western Sahara where the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, former United States Secretary of State James Baker, has succeeded in breaking new ground East Timor, Cyprus, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Angola. Secretary-General Annan visited Angola in March and convinced the opposition group, UNITA, to fulfil its commitment to participate in a new government of national unity. In November, the Secretary-General took steps to help defuse the dangerous stalemate with Iraq over weapons inspections, and recommended the renewal of the oil-for-food programme in that country to offset the humanitarian crisis caused by sanctions.
UN peacekeeping operations successfully monitored elections in Liberia and in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, where in January the UN completed the handing over of its administrative responsibilities to the new local authorities. The UN also completed its peacekeeping operation in Haiti, where a small contingent of police advisers remains as part of the international community's assistance to the country's new democratic institutions.
The Secretary-General has placed particular importance on the role of disarmament in the furthering of international peace and security. The General Assembly has welcomed his decision to create a Department of Disarmament Affairs in the UN Secretariat to give renewed focus and drive to this vital issue. Mr. Annan has also emphasised that disarmament efforts should not be limited to weapons of mass destruction, but include conventional weaponry. He strongly supported the drive to ban the use of landmines, despite lack of progress on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. At the signing ceremony for the new Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, in Ottawa in December, Mr. Annan pointed to the important role the "union of governments, civil society and international organisations" had played in this success. The need for these principal actors to work together in common cause is one of the cornerstones of Mr. Annan's strategy to ensure action in support of global issues.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) therefore are even more welcome partners now in the UN's efforts to deal with the many humanitarian crises that affect all regions of the world. An important thrust of the Secretary-General's reforms has been to strengthen the UN's coordination of these efforts. In the past year, UN agencies, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme, working in close concert with NGOs, have provided relief to hundreds of thousands of people in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, the Great Lakes region of Africa and elsewhere".
The following is a statement by the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Walter R. Slocombe, before a hearing of the House Committee on International Relations on "Prospects for Implementation of the Dayton Agreements and the New Nato Mission in Bosnia".
SELECTED EXTRACTS
"In authorising American troops to take part in the SFOR mission, we expected the mission to end in 18 months, in June of 1998. It was the Administration's expectation that by that time Bosnia's economic and political life would be sufficiently rebuilt to continue the work without continuing outside military support. However, it is the view of virtually everyone with experience in Bosnia - military, international civilian, and local leaders of all political and ethnic views - that if NATO left in the middle of this year the process would halt and progress could unravel.
The reasons this effort has taken longer than expected are many. Civilian implementation took longer to be organised effectively and faced greater obstacles than expected. The enmities of war still slow or even block inter-ethnic cooperation. Bosnia has been at peace only half as long as it was at war. It remains poised on a tightrope, moving toward a better future, but not at the point yet of a self-sustaining peace. To get there, the people of Bosnia, after June 1998, will still need a safety net and a helping hand that only the international community, including the United States, can provide - and that help must include a strong security element, provided by a NATO military force, in which the US fully participates.
Our assistance will be two-fold. First, we and our allies must intensify our civilian and economic engagement. As a result of the progress we've achieved in recent months, we know where to focus our efforts. Civilian and voluntary agencies working with Bosnian authorities must help to do the following things: first, deepen and spread economic opportunity while rooting out corruption; second, reform, retrain, and re-equip the police; third, restructure the state-run media to meet international standards of objectivity and access, and establish alternative independent media; fourth, help more refugees return home in a gradual and orderly process based on consent and incentive, not force; and fifth, make indicted war criminals answer for their crimes, both as a matter of justice and because their continued political power is a stumbling block to lasting stability.
The second thing we must do is to continue, with our NATO allies and others, including Russia, to provide an international military presence that will enable these efforts to proceed in an atmosphere of security and confidence. Our progress in Bosnia to date would not have been possible without the secure environment created by the NATO forces. They have not done, "nation-building", themselves, but, by helping assure security in the country and in key localities, they have allowed dozens of civilian agencies and literally hundreds of voluntary agencies to do their job, laying the foundation for a self-sustaining peace, and they have permitted Bosnians of all ethnic groups to work to rebuild their country.
Accordingly, following intensive consultations with the President's national security and military advisors, with our NATO allies, and with leaders from both parties in Congress, we reached the inescapable conclusion that, in order for the progress we've seen in Bosnia to continue, a follow-on military force would be necessary after June 1998. It was equally clear that NATO must continue to lead that force. No other institution could do so effectively. And America, as the leader of NATO, must participate in that force, because the record shows that the US has to join in any such force if it is to be successful.
During recent weeks, our military planners and those of others in the NATO Alliance have agreed to a force that can both deter a return to armed conflict and contribute to a secure environment and provide broad support to civil implementation in order to maintain progress. The final details of force size and structure are still being worked out. But the mission and basic approach are agreed. The force will not engage in police work or nation-building. Rather, it will provide security and backup to those organisations doing so. Our objective is to establish conditions under which civil implementation can continue without the support of a large scale NATO-led military Force.
To carry out this mission, the military authorities at NATO have recommended - and NATO has agreed on - a follow-on force which will combine deterrence plus support for civilian implementation in a manner similar to the current approach of SFOR. The objective of the force is to consolidate the gains achieved to date while sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. The force will allow the peace process to become more self-sustaining, but do so without exceeding SFOR's current level of intensity and involvement. And we expect the new NATO-led multinational force will retain the well-established name SFOR (for "Stabilisation Force").
Key military tasks include:
Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities;
Preventing removal of heavy or air defence weapons from cantonments;
Maintaining the operation of the Joint Military Commissions;
Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement, and continued compliance with the cease fire and Zone of Separation;
Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords and, if required, enforcing compliance;
Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner similar to SFOR's current approach, to a secure environment within which civil implementation can continue.
Key supporting tasks, within means and capabilities and in a manner similar to SFOR's current approach, include:
Supporting the High Representative;
Supporting phased and orderly returns of refugees and displaced persons by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but not forcibly returning refugees or displaced persons or undertaking to guard individual locations;
Supporting OHR and OSCE in the conduct of elections and the installation of elected officials;
Supporting the OHR and International Police Task Force (IPTF) in assisting local police by providing back-up support and a secure operating environment towards the creation of a restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking civil police tasks;
Supporting OHR and OSCE in media reform efforts;
Supporting ICTY and efforts against war criminals;
Supporting the OSCE, on a case-by-case basis, in implementing Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement;
Supporting the Supervisor in the implementation of Brcko arbitration decisions presently in effect; and
Contributing to the continued improvement of freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
While the force will be similar in size and mission to SFOR, there will be three important differences:
1. Reduced size and proportion of US participation.
The US was one-third of IFOR, with about 20,000 troops. We were about one-quarter of SFOR, with about 8,500 troops. Even as the follow-on force will remain similar in size to SFOR, the US contingent will be reduced from a current authorised level of 8,500 to 6,900 under the follow-on force.
We expect to conduct periodic six month reviews with the intent of making further reductions based on progress on the ground.
2. Addition of Specialised Units to reduce risks.
Specialised Units with special training in security functions, drawn from European paramilitary security forces such as Italian Carabinieri, will give the follow-on force an enhanced capability to help promote public security in close cooperation with the office of the High Representative, the UN International Police Task Force, and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These units will not take on civil police tasks and would conform to SFOR ROEs (Rules of Engagement), but their training and experience will make them more effective in public security tasks than regular combat troops.
We expect use of Specialised Units to both improve implementation and lower overall risks.
3. No artificial deadlines, but benchmarks to focus efforts, measure progress, and permit steady reduction in force levels.
Experience has taught that setting deadlines doesn't work and can even be counterproductive. Arbitrary withdrawal targets dishearten those who cooperate and invite hard-liners to wait us out.
So, rather than pick a date, we have developed a comprehensive set of benchmarks for progress toward self-sustaining implementation. They are concrete and achievable in realistic timeframes.
... Some very important things will not change:
First, the force will be fully able to protect itself. Although the follow-on force will be smaller, it will be sufficient, as judged by our military commanders, in numbers and in equipment, to achieve its mission and to protect itself in safety. It will continue NATO's robust ROEs. As has been true throughout, force protection is our highest priority.
Second, the United States will retain command. US officers will command not only the US units, but will continue to command the overall multinational force. While specific arrangements are still under development at SHAPE, command and control of US forces operating in support of the follow-on force mission in Bosnia will follow a command structure very similar to that established for IFOR and SFOR. US forces will operate under the operational control of SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, USA, who is also Commander in Chief, US European Command. The operational control of forces is subsequently exercised by Commander SFOR, currently Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, USA (also Commander in Chief, US Army Forces Europe), and the commander of Multinational Division (North), currently Major General Larry Ellis, USA (Task Force EAGLE and 1st Armoured Division Commander).
Third, our European allies will bear their share of responsibility. Europe and our other partners are already doing a great deal - providing three times as many troops as we are, five times as much economic assistance, nine times as many international police, and receiving 10 times as many refugees. And this is wholly appropriate. While Bosnia is a challenge to American interests and values, the longer-term and fundamental challenge is to make Bosnia a genuine part of Europe, and we expect the Europeans will do more. To this end, we have made clear we expect the relative share of forces provided by non-US countries to increase.
Finally, there is the question of costs. The incremental costs for our participation in the Bosnia operation - including ground, sea, and air elements - has been running about $2 billion a year. That is large in absolute terms, but small relative to our total defence budget - about 1%. These costs will decline as force levels go down and will remain manageable. In particular, the cost of staying in Bosnia will not be allowed to impact either on the readiness of our military for other missions, or on our programmes to increase procurement so we can modernise the equipment our military will need to meet the challenges of the future.
The current year's budget, passed by the Congress last year, funds our Bosnia operation through the end of June 1998. Last week, the Administration submitted an FY98 emergency supplemental funding request, along with an FY99 budget amendment to cover expenses related to Bosnia, Iraq, and natural disasters. These include a request of $487 million related to the planned extension of operations in Bosnia beyond June 1998, and $1.859 billion to continue Bosnia operations through the next fiscal year. The Administration has agreed with the Congressional leadership on a supplemental without offset in the DoD budget. The strong performance of the economy and the success of the bipartisan budget agreement make this possible consistent with sound fiscal policy. The price of staying in Bosnia, therefore, will not come out of the Services' hide - not from readiness nor from procurement.
We also recognise concerns about the impact of the Bosnia operation on the non-financial aspects of readiness. Readiness is a continuing challenge - and our priority commitment. We are committed to maintaining the readiness of US forces to perform the full range of missions required for our national security. Readiness has consistently been the top priority in the Defence budgets submitted to Congress and will remain so.
Just as our troops are carefully trained before they go for the military tasks they fulfil while in Bosnia, our commanders in Europe have implemented measures to assure that, as units rotate out of Bosnia and elsewhere, they promptly get the training needed to bring those combat skills that have not been exercised in Bosnia up to the needed level.
As our military leaders have noted, certain specialised forces - both active and reserve - have been heavily used in Bosnia and elsewhere, and face particular readiness challenges. Secretary Cohen and General Shelton pay particularly close attention to those forces and are developing innovative approaches for managing their employment more effectively. The essential point is that our forces remain ready for major conflicts in the Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere. So far, the impact of the Bosnia operation on morale and retention has been, if any, favourable. The duty is tough, but it is challenging and the troops know they are doing a vitally important job. Overall retention is better for units that are in Bosnia than the force-wide average.
Some say a lasting peace in Bosnia is impossible, and therefore, we should end our efforts now. But we believe that securing the peace in Bosnia is important to US interests and that a fair reading of Bosnia's history, and an assessment of the progress since November 1996, simply refutes the proposition that the Dayton peace agreement cannot work. If, however, we were to pull out before the job is done, Bosnia almost certainly will fall back into violence, chaos, and ultimately a war every bit as bloody as the one that was stopped. That would not only be bad for Bosnia, it would hurt basic American interests. Ultimately, Bosnia's future is in the hands of its own people. But we can help them make it a future of peace. We need to finish the job we began for the sake of that future and in the service of our own interests and values.
Conclusion
In sum, the follow-on force in Bosnia meets the requirements the President laid down in December:
The mission is accomplishable - and crucial to US interests and US leadership;
The force will be able to protect itself;
The U.S. retains command;
The European share of responsibility will be maximised;
The costs will be manageable;
It deserves the support of Congress and American people".
USIA WASHINGTON FILE
13 MARCH 1998
The Commentary in this issue develops our earlier examination of evolving peacekeeping doctrine and its relationship to the theory and practice of Conflict Resolution. In this issue, we feature two contributions. The first, by Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham, presents an outline summary of the objectives of a three year research project (COPE), funded by the UK Department for International Development, into Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs). These situations, and the conflicts and human misery associated with them, present the greatest challenges to the international community, in its efforts to respond humanely and effectively. The second piece, by Alexander Ramsbotham, considers the uses of regional initiatives in Africa, the continent where the most severe CPE-type conflicts have erupted.
LIONEL CLIFFE
PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
ROBIN LUCKHAM
RESEARCH PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
BOTH LIONEL CLIFFE AND ROBIN LUCKHAM ARE INITIATORS OF THE COPE PROJECT
1. The term 'Complex Political Emergencies' itself is not offered as a basic concept to be theorised but simply as a convenient heuristic device to cover a range of differing post-Cold War experiences. Their common dimensions are: great human suffering, together with political conflict which calls the existence and nature of the state into question.
2. One basic lesson of recent interventions is the need to understand the specific complexity of each situation in context before prescription and action. In part, this Paper begins to outline a framework for analysing specific cases.
3. The state has often been subject to a period of decline as well as being under direct challenge through conflict: these processes have each to be understood and their causal links probed, as action needs to be directed at underlying 'causes' and not just symptoms. The state has to be a central focus in CPE analysis for several reasons: the state as a core actor in relief and/or development may have been side-lined or eclipsed, or not be in control of all the state-territory. The reconstituting of the state may have to be part of the reconstruction agenda: though whether the main or prior one is a matter for debate - and future research especially in countries like Somalia.
There is not one single category of 'collapsed state'; analyses to inform practice can be premised on different types of governance situations, in which the cause of state collapse may be less important than its fate: what has become of its structure and capabilities.
Lessons From Previous CPEs and Interventions in Them
4. A review is made of what other analysts consider the major lessons of CPEs and attempts by international actors to respond to them, particularly the 'failures'. One of the most thorough is the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. As well as 'Findings' on Relief Delivery, Post-War Rebuilding and the Media, and some positive findings, it offers others, with specific recommendations to the agencies concerned, on the shortcomings of international actors in: policy coherence, mis-reading of early warning of genocide and insufficient support of efforts to prevent it, inadequacies of contingency plans and preparedness, flaws in human rights mechanisms and in political conditionality of aid, mixed performance in coordination of the multiplicity of agencies and by NGOs.
5. A controversial finding of the Rwanda evaluation is their identification as a flaw in the Arusha peace process signed in 1993 that no provision was made for Hutu extremists being left out of the new dispensation. Insofar as the reaction of that group should have been intercepted and headed off, this is fair comment, but it raises the general point as to how far those who have major responsibility for human suffering and crises should also be part of the solution - an issue raised in different forms in cases like Bosnia, Somalia, and also with its parallel in managing relief: should warlords be used for food distribution, or any other aid?
6. Another Rwanda Finding has comparative significance. The Evaluation felt that there had been insufficient reliance on regional organisations and sub-regional groupings and that no sustainable solution to any country CPE in the Great Lakes could be found in isolation from other countries. One similar exercise for Somalia points to the potential significance of the regional dimension, but noting the lack of any significant input from the African or Arab or Islamic regions or groups during the emergency period, feels they should not be overestimated. Whether the positive evaluation of their actual role in the Great Lakes or the poor record in Somalia is accepted, both arguments point toward increased support for the peace making capacities of new organs in the OAU and African and other sub-regional bodies. Apart from the inevitable spill over of ethnic identities, of refugees, arms trading, border clashes, the regional dimension is a cause of even greater complexity in some regions where it has led to patterns of mutual interference by neighbouring states in each others' insurgencies.
7. Applicability of 'lessons' from one country cannot be assumed to have relevance to other cases, except for the generic problems, such as co-ordination, preparedness, that are involved in any international intervention. What can be put forward is a set of categories that allow identification of those other and future cases which share significant characteristics with any particular country.
An Analytical Framework
8. A framework of typologies is proposed that distinguishes countries in terms of:
The State:
- nature and degree of its prior collapse; its implosion or explosion;
- its 'fate': collapsed; contested duality; replacement.
- impact on state-civil society link, on economy;
- the task of reconstituting the state.
The CPE:
- social and ideological bases for mobilisation for conflict;
- shape, strategies and tactics of war (understood in an interactive way): e.g. guerrilla/counter-insurgency, militias, terror/scorched earth;
- impact on livelihoods, markets and own production, dislocation.
The Intervention
- purpose: protection of relief, protection of human rights, peace-making or keeping, state building, etc.;
- form: UN, powers, regional, etc.
This framework will be used to tease out further 'lessons' and their applicability by a more thorough, comparative analysis of the cases presented at the Workshop. It is also offered as the basis for a methodology for use by policy makers and practitioners.
8. One key 'lesson' was the need for an agreed understanding of a CPE as a basis for co-operation, which in turn raises the issue of where to locate such future research - presumably it should be done or delegated by the UN, otherwise each agency will be better informed but reach their own conclusions.
Agenda For Future Research
9. The proposed field work in the African regions and Sri Lanka will use the above framework to further elaborate the processes at work in the recent past experience and to get more detailed lessons, including those from a local level that might have only a provincial applicability, though they should also offer further evidence of what works and does not work, especially in resolving conflicts and allowing humanitarian work.
10. The state and CPE linkage will figure in this future research agenda mainly in emphasising the role of the state in reconstruction and the task of state reconstitution. especially in these areas clearly in a 'recovery' phase but also in those where the CPE remains - the comments here thus relate to COPE's third theme. Specific questions which can be addressed:
Ethiopia & Eritrea: evaluation of distinctive strategies of state-directed, market-oriented, self-reliant post-war development without NGOs.
Somalia: is reconstruction possible without a state or when it is still contested?
Uganda, Rwanda, Sri Lanka: development where a provincial conflict is merely contained?
Somaliland, Rwanda: rebuilding state capabilities from scratch.
ALEXANDER RAMSBOTHAM
EDITOR: CONFLICT RESOLUTION MONITOR
In the context of an expanding number of internal or civil wars, debates about the modalities of international conflict management and resolution have tended to identify the use of regional arrangements as the most effective response. The idea was prominent, for example, in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace in 1992. Many Africans have, for a long time, promoted the concept of an indigenous response to African security issues. However, more recently, this trend has also been encouraged by international interventionist caution. Post-Cold War confidence in the ability of the UN to effectively address global security issues has been progressively eroded by problematic peace support operations, such as in Bosnia and Somalia. The tendency for the UN to become overstretched by its peacekeeping obligations has been especially acute in Africa, where, as a result, the international community has increasingly embraced a blanket reluctance to authorise and equip new operations.
From inception, the UN envisaged the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for, "resort to regional agencies or arrangements", in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Chapter VIII, meanwhile, identifies a role for, "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action". However, the authors of the Charter did attempt to establish a constitutional basis for the authoritative precedence of the Security Council.
Africa's colonial history has provided a particular, regional slant to conflict on the continent, as a constituent legacy of colonial state formation. Social, economic and political factors have combined to develop a continental proliferation in internal conflicts, often involving sub-state actors, which are liable to threaten the authority, and even existence, of the state. Such conflicts are also likely to have regional repercussions, through incorporating one or more of the following factors: spillover effects, caused by circumstances such as the transfer of refugees and weapons across national borders, and ideological association; domestic politics pursued outside a state's borders; and neighbouring countries exploiting internal conflict situations to alter a government's leadership or policies. The above analysis in no way implies a uniformity to African conflicts, and hence management methodology. However, in relation to prospective African conflicts, it does suggest the relevance of broader, multidimensional peace support operations to supervise the implementation of comprehensive political settlements. These can incorporate peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace-building, and are liable to involve, amongst other things: demilitarisation; electoral and humanitarian support; and national reconstruction and reconciliation.
Thus, an additional problem arises for potential regional security arrangements. Multidimensional operations, by definition, require considerable operational capability, in terms both of material and political resources. The range of tasks involved, and their long-term nature, demands the availability of trained personnel and specialised, functioning equipment for indefinite, though often extended, periods. Furthermore, the nature of internal conflict, particularly where the authority of the state itself is being challenged, implies that the consent of the belligerents - a prerequisite for more traditional forms of peacekeeping - is likely to be neither universal nor enduring. This places increased significance on the perceived legitimacy and authority of the implementing agency.
African regional security mechanisms might enjoy some advantages over the UN in certain areas. For example, it is more likely that a regional, or especially sub-regional, agency will be more committed to an operation in its region, because of the potential regional repercussions of conflict mentioned above. Furthermore, African troops have participated in many UN operations, while African regional and sub-regional organisations have undertaken peace support operations themselves: the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Chad in the 1980s - the Inter-African Force (IAF); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s - the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
However, in many other areas, African regional or sub-regional arrangements are at an inherent disadvantage. Regional mechanisms, in general, experience difficulties to do with neutrality. For instance, many observers have been suspicious of Nigerian motivation for the ECOMOG deployments, for which Nigeria has provided the majority of the finance, personnel and equipment. African regional agencies are also unlikely to possess the necessary resources to carry out such operations. African states are, in general, not wealthy, and do not have access to the relevant matériel or trained personnel, while African institutions do not retain the necessary organisational capacity, experience, nor political clout. During the Cold War era, African collective security responsibilities had primarily been taken care of either within the context of East/West, bipolar confrontation, or by European colonial or former colonial powers. Furthermore, members of African regional bodies, through widespread insecurity over the fragility of their own statehood, had supported the constitutional sanctity of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of another state. Consequently, African regional groups have, historically, been discouraged from intervening in internal conflicts, although the 1990s has witnessed signs of this trend relaxing.
Therefore, some means are required to support African collective security measures. Some African governments have resorted to private security arrangements, most notably the South African-based Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. However, predominantly, current initiatives take two principal forms: cooperation between regional agencies and the UN; and developing indigenous African capabilities. Although, as mentioned above, the UN Charter provided for resort to regional security arrangements under certain circumstances, the text itself remains vague on the mechanics of the relationship. In practice, few provisions exist to facilitate cooperation, which has impaired the ability of the UN to work with regional agencies. For example, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and ECOMOG operated together in Liberia. However, UNOMIL was not deployed until three years into the operation. Consequently, the UN remained subordinate to ECOMOG both operationally and on the ground. This caused problems for the UN in terms of precedent, in that its reputation - and hence legitimacy and authority - was governed by, and so at risk from, the actions of the regional force. Thus, difficulties experienced by ECOMOG were reflected onto the UN by association. ECOMOG and the UN ultimately failed to achieve the full cooperation that had been envisaged at the start of the collaboration, while differing levels of equipment and expertise further hampered coordination, and exacerbated friction between the two. It is also important to remember that multidimensional operations incorporate manifold civilian tasks, and, therefore, involve cooperation with civilian organisations and NGOs.
International initiatives also exist to enhance indigenous capabilities. Many African countries run peacekeeping training courses, while the British and French have offered programmes to train African troops in peacekeeping techniques for a number of years. More recently, the US has launched the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which aims to teach peacekeeping skills to military units from participating African states. This is intended to establish a readily-available resource-base to enable rapid deployment of a pan-African peacekeeping force of ten to twelve battalions, for which the US and European countries would provide logistic support. Representatives of these various initiatives met late in 1997 in New York to attempt to coordinate the programmes. However, it remains to be seen whether UN/regional cooperation can be improved, or how the indigenous and exogenous initiatives to train African peacekeepers will work on the ground.