This Issue

Bosnia

Karadzic Still in Pale

A 3 December report in the Guardian stated that former Bosnain Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was still in hiding near the former informal capital of the Republika Srpska (RS), Pale. Pale was dotted with posters of Karadzic warning SFOR troops in English not to touch him. The posters defied the 1995 Dayton peace accords which banned any political role for Karadzic. Karadzic was being isolated by former political allies wary of losing their positions through the de facto Western protectorate, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was in control of Bosnia.

The new RS President, Nikola Poplasen, pointedly described Karadzic as a symbol of Serb resistance from a particular period, while Karadzic's former deputy and Poplasen's predecessor, Biljana Plavsic, claimed to have no contact with him. However, Plavsic maintained her nationalist stance against a multi-ethnic Serb entity within Bosnia.

According to the report, an OHR official believed Karadzic still to be politically influential and that his arrest was essential for reconciliation. However, Western officials were divided as to Karadzic's whereabouts. An SFOR officer asserted that he was too well protected to be arrested. An OHR official predicted that British troops with SFOR were most likely to capture him, as the US was too concerned about sustaining casualties. However, other Western officials were worried about the political repercussions of arresting Karadzic. His level of political support might ultimately threaten the Dayton peace process and would also have serious consequences in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The Guardian
3 December 1998

Reward Offered for Karadzic and Mladic

A 4 December Guardian report stated that the US offered a reward of up to $5 million for the capture of Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The rewards formed part of Washington's new hard-line policy against the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, and his policy of harbouring suspects indicted by the International Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). According to the report, $5 million was also being offered for the arrest of the leader of the former Serb Krajina region of Croatia, Milan Martic. It declared that US state department officials met recently to determine a list of most wanted suspects from over two dozen still at large.

The report stated that the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) arrested the most senior Bosnian Serb military leader to date, General Radislav Krstic, commander of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army. Krstic was being charged with crimes committed after the fall of the UN safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995 when thousands of Bosnian Muslims were killed. The report declared that Krstic was uniquely being charged with personal involvement in the massacre as well as responsibility for the actions of people under his authority.
The Guardian
3 December 1998

Croatia

Secretary-General's Final Report on the UN Police Support Group

The report assessed the situation in the Danube region of Croatia ("the region") since 23 September 1998. Kofi Annan stated that the mandate of the Police Support Group had been fully completed and came to an end on 15 October 1998. The transition to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 15 October was seamless and 118 OSCE police monitors were deployed in all local police stations previously staffed by the Police Support Group.

Security Situation

The Secretary-General reported that the overall security situation in the region was satisfactory, but there continued to be a worrying trend of ethnically motivated incidents. Police performance had improved since the deployment of the Police Support Group. The Croatian government took steps to continue this, including governmental respect for the commitments related to the local police and the maintenance of proportional Serb representation in the police force. Further steps might include increasing the level of professional police training and greater support for the judicial system to overcome the substantial case backlog and improve the transparency of its operations.

Refugee Returns

Annan stated that refugee returns to Croatia had continued only slowly. While the return programme contained the majority of necessary elements to facilitate nationwide returns, it was yet to be implemented fully. Several outstanding issues needed to be addressed. The Secretary-General suggested the government harmonise legislation with the provisions of the programme to enable its non-discriminatory implementation. Steps needed to be taken to ensure that all housing commissions functioned effectively. Reconstruction funding should be equally accessible to all, while rights to socially owned apartments should be restored.

Annan stated that the termination of the Police Support Group was expected to be completed by 15 December 1998. The conclusion of the Police Support Group's mandate marked the positive outcome of employing civilian police personnel to secure the consolidation of peace following the withdrawal of a much larger operation. The Secretary-General declared that the Police Support Group had helped to prevent the return of instability to the region. It represented a cost-effective instrument to help maintain conditions conducive to an orderly hand-over to the OSCE pending the eventual transfer of full responsibilities to the national authorities.
UN Doc: S/1998/1004
27 October 1998

Cyprus

Cyprus to Deploy Russian Missiles

A 28 November Associated Press report stated that Foreign Minister Yiannakis Cassoulides asserted that Cyprus would continue with the deployment of Russian anti-aircraft missiles despite Turkish threats and Greek disapproval. At a recent summit in Athens, Greece and Cyrpus failed to agree on the destination of the S-300 missiles, expected to be delivered early next year. The Greek government was nervous of being dragged into hostilities with Turkey, which has threatened to use military force to prevent the deployment. Any Turkish military action would automatically involve Greece through its combined defence agreement with Cyprus. The report asserted that at the summit, Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides refused a proposal by Greek President Costas Simitis that the missiles be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Both Washington and the European Union have criticised the Cypriot stance.

The AP report recalled that Cyprus has been divided into a Greek Cypriot controlled south and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the northern third of the island in 1974. The breakaway northern Turkish Cypriot has only been recognised by Ankara which maintains 35,000 troops there.
 Associated Press
28 November 1998

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Milosevic Proud of His Role

A 13 December Washington Post article included excerpts of a recent interview with the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic. In response to accusations that he represented the problem in the Balkans, Milosevic replied that he was proud of his role as the protector of the interests of FRY and its people. He countered suggestions that the US was trying to oust him by stating that many powers had attempted that. He added that it was not a question of personal positions but of political approaches to problems in FRY and Kosovo.

The WP stated that the US had made lifting sanctions against FRY contingent upon democratisation. Milosevic replied that although the Dayton Accord ending the Bosnian war contained clear agreements to lift all sanctions, Washington had subsequently and unfairly created an "outer wall" of sanctions. He criticised the US for believing that all issues could be solved militarily.

Milosevic asserted that the people of FRY had been left with no alternative but to preserve their country in response to the threat of NATO airstrikes in October 1998. He added that the FRY authorities could not accept Kosovar secession and that any threats relating to the province were risky because of the sensitive position of Kosovo for all Serbs.

The WP asked whether the people of Kosovo would be granted the level of autonomy they had enjoyed prior to 1989. Milosevic replied that this would be inappropriate because Kosovars had then abused that power to terrorise the rest of the population. He denied that the 10% Serb population in Kosovo (compared to 90% Albanian) controlled everything in the province, claiming that many Albanians were in the administration. Milosevic asserted that the province would always remain a part of Serbia and that the region incorporated many different national communities, including Albanians, Montenegrins, Serbs and others, all of whom had to be equal.

The FRY President asserted that the US plan for Kosovo presently favoured Albanians and therefore had to be developed. He denied that there had ever been a plan for a Greater Serbia, declaring that he had supported preserving Yugoslavia because all Serbs were living together in separate republics but in one country.

Milosevic recalled that the implosion of Albania a year before the Kosovo crisis had induced the virtual destruction of the Albanian army and the reduction of the country to chaos. Subsequently, Albania was a destabilising factor for the whole region. He claimed that all terrorist factions world-wide enjoyed an Albanian base. An Albanian narco-mafia was also funding foreign journalists and politicians.

The FRY President maintained that journalists could work in FRY unrestricted. When reminded that journalists were fined whenever they said anything, Milosevic replied that that was the law of Serbia, adding that people who published lies must pay the penalty.

The WP asked whether Milosevic had been involved in the recent capture of Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic by US troops serving with the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Milosevic refuted any involvement in his capture, describing him as an officially active general in the Republika Srpska army. Milosevic asserted that the secret indictment of Krstic did not facilitate normalisation of the situation in Bosnia.

The WP questioned the benefit of Milosevic's alleged shielding of four to seven Bosnian Serbs since relinquishing them was one of the conditions for lifting US sanctions. Milosevic accused the UN tribunal of partiality, blaming Serbs for all that happened in Bosnia, which formed part of the distortion of events in the former Yugoslavia. The WP enquired about indicted Bosnian Serbs Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic replied that Mladic was not in FRY and that the 1,200,000 Serbs living in Republika Srpska had fought a civil war against Bosnian Muslims or Croats. He confirmed that he had assisted the Bosnian Serb war effort, explaining that there had been Serbs who were starving. He agreed that the Bosnians had not been as strong as the Serbs at the beginning of the war but added that Serbs had not attempted to seize their territory.

In response to the question why had he turned the conflict into thousands of deaths, Milosevic asserted that the Serbs had favoured a peaceful solution from the beginning of crisis. He stressed that Mladic was not a FRY citizen and that he did not have the power to turn him or Karadzic over to the UN tribunal. The WP said that in the US, Milosevic had been accused of some of the worst crimes of the century. Milosevic believed the problem to be one primarily of bad PR. He denied the existence of ethnic cleansing and that senior Serb leaders had ordered it to occur. In response to the question whether he had made mistakes, he replied that nobody could be immune to mistakes but that he had a clear conscience. He warned that attempts by SFOR to rescue international monitors in Kosovo would be considered acts of aggression warranting military retaliation. Milosevic confirmed that he was president of Yugoslavia until 2001 and that he could only run for a single term. He denied having any plans change the constitution to allow him to serve for two terms.
Washington Post
13 December 1998

Kosovo

Secretary-General's Kosovo Report (1)

The report covered the period from 4 September 1998. It was based on information from the Chairman-in-Office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Contact Group, individual member states, Kofi Annan's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, and the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission.

Security Situation

The Secretary-General asserted that it was clear beyond reasonable doubt that most atrocities in Kosovo were perpetrated by FRY security forces. However, Kosovar Albanian paramilitary had also committed atrocities. Everyone responsible for killing and mistreating civilians and destroying property needed to be brought to justice requiring a thorough international investigation of all reported cases of atrocities and violations of human rights.

Kofi Annan recalled that FRY authorities held the inherent right and duty to maintain public order and security and to respond to violent acts of provocation in Kosovo. However, this did not justify the systematic terror that had been inflicted on civilians. Security forces needed to give equal protection to all citizens, while terrorist action, including the taking of hostages by Kosovar Albanian elements, needed to cease.

Humanitarian Situation

The Secretary-General re-emphasised the risks of a humanitarian disaster from the impending winter. He highlighted the increasingly limited asylum opportunities outside Kosovo and urged that conditions be created to allow for the return of internally displaced persons. This required a radical shift of policy and behaviour and the introduction of confidence-building measures – including withdrawing police units, declaring an amnesty and releasing prisoners. Contrary to FRY claims, the withdrawal of police units so far appeared limited and the fear that had led civilians to flee was still present. The first priority for all internally displaced people was the restoration of security. Annan declared that the FRY government needed to restrain police excesses and instruct them to respect international human rights conventions. Also required was improving access to prisoners and securing the release of, or accounting for, hostages taken by Kosovar Albanians.

Annan urged dialogue towards early agreements to restore returnee confidence. Such settlements might also envisage broader steps including institutional reforms, to address long-term needs. Any international community involvement in implementing such agreements required a proper assessment of needs that would fully consider humanitarian as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements. The Secretary-General suggested initiating preliminary consultations before agreements were settled. He offered UN assistance for such consultations and stressed the importance of strengthening and improving the international presence. In the immediate term, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission should be expanded to its full strength and the presence of human rights observers enhanced. He also urged close coordination of international efforts in the political, humanitarian and other fields.

Reliance largely on information from non-UN sources prevented Annan from providing an independent assessment of compliance, as required by the Security Council in paragraph 15 of resolution 1199 (1998) (apart from on the humanitarian situation). He recalled that resolution 1199 regarded the deterioration in the situation in Kosovo as a threat to peace and security in the region. The humanitarian crisis resulted from a fundamentally political problem, which required a comprehensive political solution through a negotiated settlement. He stressed that if the international community lost sight of this, it risked treating only the symptoms of the problem and not its causes.

Annex

OSCE Report on Kosovo: Information on the Situation in Kosovo and Measures Taken by the OSCE

General situation

The report stated that the period in question had witnessed a decrease in military operations after the Serb offensive against armed Kosovo Albanians launched by in August. However, house-to-house searches still took place and mine accidents had increased. The first week of September saw continued fighting around Djakovica. During September, FRY forces continued to attack villages to remove all traces of resistance, house burnings continued in the area south of Prizren while military operations began in the area of Orahovac.

According to the report, in late August, after losing territory during the recent Serbian offensive, the leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, Adem Demaci, announced the adoption of classic guerrilla warfare tactics against Yugoslav targets. In early September, the US Ambassador to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Christopher Hill, revealed that an outline agreement had been reached between the Kosovo Albanians and Belgrade on the region's future. The agreement incorporated a three-year stabilisation and normalisation period to enable the re-establishment of democratic institutions.

However, the report pronounced that confusion remained as to who the Kosovo Albanians making the agreement represented and warned of increasing evidence of splits among Albanian armed factions. There had previously been little success in persuading the Albanian Democratic Movement (LDS) to enter the negotiations. The KLA's political representative, Demaci, perceived any temporary agreement as capitulation and so promised to continue violence. However, the fact that some returnees had given up their weapons to Serb forces was interpreted as indicating that sections of the Albanian population were prepared to accept whatever interim political agreement was reached. The problem of who represented Kosovo Albanians was likely continue and the prospects of a cease-fire between KLA and the Serbian authorities remained remote.

Monitoring Activities in Kosovo

The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission continued its activities despite the increasing opposition of Serb security forces and KLA. The mission comprised several tens of people representing EU states, the US, the Russian Federation and Canada.

The Situation of the Civilian Population

The report asserted that fighting forced over 200,000 people to flee their homes, which was compounded by large-scale destruction of houses, food shortages and the risk of epidemic. UNHCR declared that as many as 50,000 people were living in the open in Kosovo while many others were living in desperate conditions as entire villages had been destroyed, livestock slaughtered and fields burned.

The return process for displaced people was hampered by the level of destruction and the presence of Serb security forces in some villages. There were several cases of large-scale detentions where men of fighting age suspected of guerrilla activity were taken to places of detention for interrogation.

Analysis of Spillover Potential

UNHCR reported on 1 September a total of 14,000 refugees in Albania. The report stated that a relative decrease in incoming refugees during the summer in the Tropoja and Has districts of Albania was caused by: tightening of the border by FRY forces; the creation of a cordon sanitaire along the border west of Djakovica; heavier controls by the FRY authorities on mountain routes; and the laying of mines. By the end of August around 100-120 refugees a day were attempting to enter Albania through Montenegro. The number of refugees entering Albania increased steadily during the first two weeks of September, indicating an opening of safe corridors through the border.

The report warned the absorption capacities of the local Albanian population were exhausted. The Albanian government was criticised by the respective parliamentary commissions for failing to take measures to accommodate the refugees from Kosovo, particularly with winter approaching.

According to the report, there were over 45,000 refugees in Montenegro (640,000 inhabitants) in addition to 30,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. There were many clashes between KLA units and the Yugoslav army in the border areas and numerous attempts at illegal border crossings by armed Albanians.

Measures taken by the OSCE

The report stated that on 18 August 1998, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media expressed his concerns over lack of access for foreign journalists to the FRY Foreign Minister. On 3 September 1998, Hill warned the OSCE Permanent Council that the search for political solutions in Kosovo should not be conditioned by continuing fighting and that diplomatic action could not wait for a cease-fire. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Permanent Council she foresaw a special OSCE role in a possible negotiated settlement, particularly with regard to elections. On 10 September the OSCE Permanent Council approved supplementary budgets for the continued enhancement of the OSCE presence in Albania and the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje.
UN Doc: S/1998/912
3 October 1998

KLA Soften Demands

A 30 November report in the Guardian asserted that Kosovo opposition forces had softened their political stance. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) spokesperson Adem Demaci announced that the group was ready to temporarily renounce demands for immediate independence, although he stressed that this remained its ultimate goal. He acknowledged that a final settlement would have to be reached progressively. Senior Western mediator, US Ambassador to Macedonia Chris Hill, also postponed the issue of independence until a later stage in

negotiations. However, Demaci remained sceptical whether negotiations would consequently be accelerated due to the launch of a parallel peace process by Belgrade.
Financial Times
30 November 1998

Nato Presses Russia on Kosovo

A 10 December Financial Times report stated that, at a 9 December meeting of the NATO/Russian Permanent Joint Council, NATO urged Russia to impose additional diplomatic pressure on the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, over the future of Kosovo. The report asserted that NATO foreign ministers called on their Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, to exploit established links. He should use these to urge that Belgrade accept US mediator Chris Hill's latest version of the peace settlement with Albanian separatists in the province. NATO officials described as encouraging Russian interest in taking part in the NATO aerial reconnaissance operation over Kosovo to verify the October cease-fire agreements. These agreements had provided for an OSCE ground observation force.

The report stated that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently denounced both Serb threats of a renewed offensive and secessionist rhetoric by Kosovo Albanians. It added that the 9 December meeting was more congenial than its predecessor, countering predictions that Russian/Western political relations would deteriorate in the wake of Russia's financial crisis. The atmosphere at the meeting was improved by clear indications that NATO did not intend to embark on a new wave of enlargement in 1999.

The report stated that Albright further announced an intended visit to Moscow in January 1999 to initiate a round of US/Russian START 2 nuclear arms negotiations, contingent upon Moscow ratifying the present START 2 agreement in December 1998. It asserted that although NATO and Moscow shared common ambitions to grant Kosovo comprehensive autonomy within FRY, recent months had witnessed tactical disagreements, in particular over NATO'S decision to pressure Milosevic into concessions through threat of air strikes. Albright stressed that the increasing presence of unarmed OSCE observers in Kosovo had not eliminated this threat. However, Ivanov asserted that NATO's immediate pretext for such threats – humanitarian assistance for refugees due to a prolonged conflict – had been removed. He reiterated that NATO had required UN Security Council approval for the threats. However, the report interpreted as a further sign of warming relations the fact that he did not interrupt NATO ministers' explanations that: the alliance had only overlooked the UN because Moscow had vetoed Security Council action; and that Kosovo would not set an automatic precedent for future NATO action.
Financial Times
10 December 1998

West Must Act Quickly in Kosovo

A 19 December Financial Times report cited UK Liberial Democrat Leader Paddy Ashdown as suggesting that violence could break out again in Kosovo over the following few months unless the West quickly revived the political process. Ashdown had returned from a five-day visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He warned of evidence that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was re-arming with high-tech weaponry and that Albanian exiles throughout Europe were investing large amounts of money in the KLA. He stated that Serbs complained that KLA forces were returning to areas vacated under the terms of the recent cease-fire agreement. Ashdown also urged expeditious full deployment of the 2,500 observers to verify the situation on the ground.
Financial Times
19 December 1998

Secretary-General's Kosovo Report (2)

Kofi Annan welcomed accords reached between President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, and the US Special Envoy, Chris Hill, on 13 October 1998; on 15 October between the FRY and NATO; and on 16 October between the FRY and the OSCE establishing the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). He asserted that the complexity and the range of duties in Kosovo necessitated coordinated and concerted efforts by all organisations on the ground. Therefore, all UN agencies in the region would establish lines of communication with the KVM. He further offered UN services to provide assistance to the KVM through the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi and the UN Staff College in Turin.

Annan commended Hill's efforts, supported by European Union (EU) Envoy Wolfgang Petrisch (Austria), in promoting a political dialogue between the FRY authorities and the representatives of the Albanian community in Kosovo. He welcomed reports of FRY security forces withdrawing to agreed levels. However, he was concerned by reports of the return of Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units to positions recently vacated by government forces and especially by their continued attacks against government forces and civilians. He therefore re-emphasised the expeditious deployment of the KVM with a 24-hour presence to return stability and confidence to the region and to allow continuous monitoring of events on the ground. The Secretary-General condemned non-cooperation by the FRY Government with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Annan reported the beginning of mass returns of internally displaced persons to their homes. However, he stated that the situation on the ground demonstrated that their requirements needed to be addressed still further at the international, regional and local levels. Therefore, the UNHCR's coordinating role as the primary agency for humanitarian activities in Kosovo should be preserved and reflected in a formal agreement with OSCE. Such a role would be further enhanced by the wider involvement of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in facilitation of coordination efforts and longer-term reconstruction and post-conflict development plans in the region. Additional attention also needed to be paid to refugees' humanitarian requirements in Montenegro and Serbia.

According to Annan, the extension of guarantees to civilian returnees by the FRY authorities so as to avoid the unconditional interrogation of male internally displaced persons would facilitate thee return of internally displaced people. Issuing appropriate amnesty legislation would also be essential. Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units needed to cease all armed actions, abductions and other violent activities.

The Secretary-General stressed that returnees' continuing security fears emphasised the need to actively monitor and train local police forces, particularly in human rights. Otherwise, the return process would be undermined by a lack of confidence in the local police's ability or inclination to protect returnees. He added that, if requested and deemed appropriate, the UN Civilian Police Unit would be prepared to assist in this area.

Annan stated that the setting up of a UN human rights sub-office in Kosovo would enable the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to carry out its expanded monitoring and promotional tasks in close cooperation with the KVM, UNHCR and other international and national bodies. Early, effective and coordinated action in response to human rights abuses would be crucial in enhancing returnees' confidence. The Secretary-General stressed the necessity to set up a capability to begin an inclusive and coordinated  mine action plan, incorporating mine awareness, education, information, mine-marking and mine clearance. The UN Mine Action Centre would consider modalities for providing such assistance. Annan warned that short term concerns in Kosovo must not eclipse medium-term rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements. The World Bank, the UN Development Programme and bilateral donors should play a leading role in this process, in particular in relation to post-conflict projects.

The Secretary-General recalled that the Security Council had endorsed that the KVM accept responsibility for reporting to the Council. He suggested that this subsume political reporting on the situation in Kosovo. The Secretariat's ability to do this had been hampered by an insufficient independent ground presence.

Annan decided against recommending a UN political presence in Kosovo to avoid parallel reporting channels that could induce confusion and overlapping in the field, as well as unnecessary costs. This necessitated developing clear channels of communication between the UN and OSCE. Short-term missions could be dispatched to Kosovo to assess specific aspects at the Council's request. If future circumstances required an expanded UN presence on the ground, the Security Council could then revert to this issue. Annan suggested that the OSCE report through him to the Security Council regarding the implementation of resolution 1203, while he would continue to report on the humanitarian and human rights situation.

Annex I

OSCE Report on Kosovo: Information on the situation in Kosovo and measures taken by the OSCE

The report covered events in the region during September and October 1998

General Situation

The reviewed period was characterised by relative calm, with sporadic violence throughout Kosovo and specific offensives launched by FRY security forces in several locations. There was continued burning and looting of houses, destruction of property and bombing of villages, in particular in the Djakovica and Prizren areas. September saw the first FRY operations launched not only in central Kosovo and along its border with Albania, but also north of Pristina in the so-called Shala region.

Monitoring Activities

The report asserted that the beginning of October witnessed the partial withdrawal of particular FRY units. Security forces were more discrete, but still maintained a noticeable presence. Observers believed such presence to be necessary given the probability that KLA might exploit the depleted security arrangements in the region.

Civilian Situation

The UNHCR questioned what returnees would come home to. Displaced persons and refugees still outnumbered returnees while internally displaced Kosovars were finding it increasingly difficult to enter Montenegro from Serbia.

Spillover Potential

The report declared that OSCE missions in Tirana, Skopje and Sarajevo were told to follow closely the spillover potential of the Kosovo conflict. Albanian authorities were finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the worsening refugee situation there. This acquired broader political dimensions due to difficulties restricting refugees to the north-east, where law and order remained fragile and relied largely on family ties. The erratic security situation and deteriorating weather conditions forced most international agencies to abandon the region.

The report continued that in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the situation remained calm at the northern border during the first half of October. Neither was there substantive change in the pattern of activity on the western border with Albania. Periodic incidents of attempted illegal entry by armed small Albanian groups continued occasionally. UNHCR report 3,000 Kosovar refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The OSCE stated that potential spillover risks in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia appeared to have been separating public opinion along ethnic lines. The ethnic population was afraid of repercussions of military action and the implicit endorsement of such activity by many ethnic Albanians. The leader of the main Serb political party, the Democratic Party of Serbs, cautioned that attacks on Serbia would be perceived as attacks on Serbs generally.

During the second week of October, an estimated 7,800 Kosovar refugees settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily in the Sarajevo area. The peak inflow rate (approximately 800 per week) declined rapidly since mid-September. Most were Muslim ethnic Albanians, with only a few of Serbs reported.

Measures Taken by the OSCE

The report stated that FRY Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zivadin Jovanovi, and the OSCE Chair-in-Office, Bronislav Geremek (Poland), signed an agreement on 16 October 1998 establishing the KVM. The KVM's main objective was to verify compliance by all Kosovar parties with Security Council resolution 1199 and to report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council, the Security Council and other relevant bodies. It was also to oversee free and fair elections.

The KVM was to comprise up to 2,000 unarmed verifiers. It would establish a permanent presence at as many locations throughout the province as it thought necessary to carry out its responsibilities. The present Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission would be absorbed by the new mission.

On 16 October, Geremek met in Pristina with the leader of the Albanian community in Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova highlighted weak points in the recent agreement and voiced disappointment that no representatives of the Albanian community took part in the negotiations.

However, Rugova nevertheless maintained that the Albanian community would cooperate with the KVM. He believed an enlarged international presence in Kosovo would facilitate negotiations towards a political solution to the crisis, recognising Albanian community institutions, including local police, and deciding over Kosovo's future.

The report stated that the agreements on the KVM and on the NATO-Kosovo air verification regime signed on 15 October would help to create a political framework to guarantee compliance with Security Council resolution 1199. Geremek would then immediately begin KVM deployment on the ground. A 13-member OSCE technical advance mission began negotiations on 17 October with the FRY authorities. The mission arrived in Pristina on 18 October to assess conditions for deployment.

The report stated that Geremek appointed William Graham Walker as KVM Head as of 17 October 1998. Walker was previously Transitional Administrator for the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), in Croatia.

Annex II: Letter from the NATO Secretary-General to Kofi Annan, 27 October 1998

Javier Solana asserted that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 27 October decided to maintain the activation order for the limited air response. Execution would be contingent upon an additional Security Council decision and assessments that the FRY was not in substantial compliance with Security Council resolution 1199 (1998). The Council also decided to continue current air activities as part of the phased air campaign.

Solana stated that NATO reached this decision after assessing the FRY's level of compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1199 (1998). NATO aerial surveillance and the KVM confirmed that substantial numbers of FRY and Serb security forces withdrew towards pre-March levels. Conditions were being established for returns of refugees and displaced persons while NATO military authorities were developing planning for an emergency extraction capability for OSCE verifiers. NATO military authorities also began talks with some Partnership for Peace countries over participation in the NATO air surveillance mission.
S/1998/1068
12 November 1998

Prevlaka Peninsula

Secretary-General's UNMOP Report

The report considered the progress made by the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) towards a settlement which would peacefully resolve their differences on the disputed issue of the Prevlaka peninsula and on the possible adaptation of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). The UNMOP mandate was due to expire on 15 January 1999.

Dialogue

The Secretary-General stated that a meeting of experts from both countries took place on 15 and 16 September 1998 in Zagreb to address mainly procedural issues. No information had been received about the second round of negotiations, which were to begin in Belgrade on 9 October. Preliminary information suggested that the parties needed to agree on several outstanding issues before real progress could be achieved.

However, Annan warned that it would be premature to believe the parties were close to a final agreement. He asserted that UNMOP's presence on the ground and its continued liaison work with the parties had played a crucial role in creating conditions conducive to the opening of negotiations.

The Secretary-General said that the situation in the UNMOP operational area remained stable. However, violations of the demilitarisation regime persisted, including restrictions on the movement of UN military observers and deployment of FRY military elements in the demilitarised zone.

UNMOP Activities

Kofi Annan asserted that movement restrictions prevented UNMOP from ascertaining the strength and armament of Yugoslav Army troops in the north-western part UNMOP's operational area. The troops presence has been the most significant long-standing violation of the demilitarised zone. Croatia also continued to deny unrestricted access to its positions in both the northern part of the demilitarised zone and to several positions in the southern part. Local Croatian authorities continued to contend that the northern part of the zone did not form part of the UNMOP area of responsibility.

Composition and strength of the military elements of UNMOP as at 2 October 1998:

Argentina 1; Bangladesh 1; Belgium 1; Brazil 1; Canada 1; Czech Republic 1; Denmark 1; Egypt 1; Finland 1; Ghana 2; Indonesia 2; Ireland 1; Jordan 1; Kenya 1; Nepal 1; New Zealand 2; Nigeria 1; Norway 1; Pakistan 1; Poland 1; Portugal 1; Russian Federation 1; Sweden 1; Switzerland 1; Ukraine 1; Total 28.
UN Doc: S/1998/939
12 October 1998

European Security

Europe Wary of US NATO Plan

A 28 November International Herald Tribune report asserted that the 50^th Anniversary NATO summit meeting in Washington in April 1999 was in danger of being taken over by disagreements between the US and Europe. The report suggested that a US proposal for the summit would define NATO's strategic concept beyond the commitment to mutual self-defence that formed the foundation of the 1949 Washington treaty establishing the alliance. NATO diplomats stated that the Clinton Administration wanted to broaden NATO outlook beyond defending a specific territory, to incorporate diverse interests including countering biological and chemical weapons, nuclear proliferation or terrorism. However, a senior official warned that such a programme raised concerns that the US was seeking to globalise NATO. A European official further suggested that Washington might be exaggerating threats like terrorism to promote its NATO vision.

The report stated that France, Germany and Russia were particularly wary of the US position. France has traditionally promoted developing European defence capabilities. The new German Coalition has a general anti-militarist outlook, while Russia was naturally concerned. Particular worries centred around US resolve  that, under exceptional circumstances, the alliance could act without a specific UN Security Council mandate. US officials declared that such a stipulation would avoid placing NATO at the mercy of a Chinese of Russian veto. A NATO diplomat cited the Kosovo crisis earlier in 1998 as an example of when this was useful. US officials have described NATO's decision to authorise action against Belgrade without a specific UN mandate [see UN & Conflict Monitor Issue 1, p.24] as creating an important precedent. On the other hand, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has argued that the proposed NATO stance would threaten international law and would encourage competing regional security blocs.

The report warned of another US proposal for a NATO Defence Capability Initiative which suggested that the organisation should be able to extend its military power over long distances and to effectively engage, sustain for long periods and maintain that power even in the face of biological, chemical or electronic attack. The Bosnia operation persuaded European governments to acknowledge these objectives. However, European Union (EU) agreements had so restricted their budgets that they could not afford the necessary changes. The IHT report revealed that a UK government-led initiative was seeking to streamline the EU defence industry. While Europe spent two-thirds as much as the US on defence, the yield was one-third of the US level due to duplications.

According to the report, broad European consensus existed that divisible but not divided European defence units should be developed within NATO. However, tensions remained over Europe's defence identity in the new NATO doctrine. While most NATO members agreed on pursuing balanced nuclear disarmament, they also regarded nuclear deterrence, including first strike capability, as central to security.
International Herald Tribune
28-29 November 1998

British/French Defence Summit

A 5 December Financial Times report stated that on 4 December, at the close of the 21st Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, both countries committed themselves to strengthening European foreign policymaking. According to the report, such cooperation contradicted decades of disagreement over defence between the two countries. The statement suggested a European Union (EU) framework for military initiatives either inside or outside the NATO alliance. British Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed that a common European defence policy would not threaten existing UK commitments to NATO or military ties to the US. French President Jacques Chirac emphasised that Britain and France were the only two European powers with a strong diplomatic and military capacity.

The report declared that the agreement represented UK willingness to develop a formal defence policy outside the context of the US-led NATO alliance. Meanwhile, Paris abandoned enduring reservations over British insistence on the primary role of the US and NATO in European defence. It added that, while the accord was only in its nascent stages, it enabled Blair to negotiate a key role in an area where the EU had yet to define a common policy.

The UK policy shift further reinforced links with continental Europe as the UK risked being sidelined by the January 1 launch of the single European currency, in which Britain was not participating. According to the report, Paris has for a long time been pushing for the Western European Union (WEU) to be strengthened as a European defence entity. On the other hand, the UK has been sceptical that a reinforced WEU would only duplicate existing NATO structures and weaken the US security umbrella for Europe.
Financial Times
5 December 1998

NATO Nuclear Dependence Criticised

According to a 9 December Financial Times report, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at an 8 December NATO meeting challenged the alliance to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons, including its adherence to first use capability. However, the three nuclear weapon states, France, the UK and the US, saw no reason to change a strategy that had worked for 50 years. The report stated that British and French ministers tempered their rebuttal by highlighting recent reductions in their atomic arsenals. Fischer welcomed the closing communiqué's endorsement of disarmament efforts.

The report said that Fischer conceded that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of leaders like Iraqi President Saddam Hussein represented the greatest threat to NATO. However, he argued that the best way to tackle such threats was to create a climate of disarmament. He asserted that the major nuclear powers should accelerate disarmament programmes to become weapons of last resort.

However, the report said that Fischer received scant support from other NATO ministers, including from Canada which has traditionally criticised NATO nuclear reliance. The meeting's final communiqué expressed the intention to expand efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction through superior intelligence sharing and civil emergency planning.

The report stressed that few Allies were pushing geographic, legal or functional limits to broadening NATO's future defence concept. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine warned against too broad an interpretation of new common interests, emphasising commitments to act under the authority of the UN Security Council.
Financial Times
9 December 1998

NATO's Future

An 8 December leader in the Financial Times declared that US aspirations to expand NATO's conceptual  horizons resulted from two primary factors. First, President Bill Clinton sought a fresh initiative to present at the 50^th anniversary NATO summit in Washington in April 1999. Second, Washington has felt increasingly vulnerable to the global threat of nuclear, chemical and biological attacks from rogue states or terrorists. The report suggested that perceptions of European disregard of such threats would jeopardise US support for NATO. However, Washington should be wary of overextending NATO's political and military resources.

The report stated that since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attempted simultaneously to maintain three separate positions. First, it has tried to continue its traditional capability for collective defence of its members' territory. While trying to improve capacity to project force outside its operational area. Several European states had experienced problems transporting their troops - equipped for static defence - even into neighbouring Bosnia. The report warned that the US was urging these states to copy Britain, France and itself by developing more flexible forces.

Second, the report asserted that European aspirations of an expanded defence role needed to be reconciled with maintaining transatlantic ties, although NATO had already developed means to detach separable but not separate NATO forces for possible Europe-only operations. Efforts to this end had increased following the recent Franco-British agreement to press for a genuine European Union (EU) defence policy role.

The report stated that the final problem was to develop means towards eastward NATO enlargement without jeopardising relations with Russia. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would be Allies by the time of the Washington summit, but NATO was unlikely to invite new members. However, the alliance was still committed to further enlargement. The report suggested that NATO could indeed take useful passive measures against global proliferation, including coordinating intelligence and civil emergency planning. However, the Alliance did not have the resources to become a global police force.
Financial Times
8 December 1998

Canada Urges Reduced NATO Nuclear Role

An 11 December Washington Post article stated that after two years of study and a divisive internal debate, Canada's Foreign Affairs Committee released a report accusing the US and other nuclear powers of maintaining Cold War defence reasoning long after it had ended.

The report recommended that NATO renounce its first use nuclear policy and advocate separating nuclear warheads from missiles and bombs to further reduce the possibility of use.

According to the WP article, the report added political weight to attempts by Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to persuade Washington and the major powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. However, Axworthy faced opposition from Canadian government Defence Minister Art Eggleton and other cabinet colleagues who were disinclined to challenge major allies on the issue.

The government report accused the US of double standards over nuclear non-proliferation, stated the WP articl. Washington urged countries such as India and Pakistan to renounce nuclear capabilities while maintaining its own. The report further cited material from defence planners that tactical nuclear weapons no longer served any military purpose.

The WP article in turn accused Canada of failing to develop a domestic nuclear capability while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of NATO membership and the American nuclear umbrella. US officials have pointed out that NATO has reduced its nuclear warheads by 80% since 1991, with further reductions still possible. However, they have cautioned that public calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons by Canada, Germany and a number of smaller NATO members was jeopardising NATO cohesion.
Washington Post
11 December 1998

Back to top

Back to Winter 1998/99 contents

Back to UN & Conflict Monitor index

Index to Issues

[Index] [About Monitor]