This Issue
A 19 December report in the Independent presented a profile of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It pointed out that Annan was the fist Secretary-General to have risen through UN ranks. He invested a lot in the settlement of the Gulf crisis, starting with his diplomatic intervention in Baghdad in February. His visit was risky not only in terms of his personal safety, but also diplomatically, since neither Washington nor London were enthusiastic about the trip.
The Independent report recalled that two weeks previously, Annan had similarly stuck his neck out by visiting Tripoli to speak to Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi on the surrender for trial at the Hague of two Libyan suspects from the Lockerbie bombing.
The report recalled that Annan's appointment two years previously came amidst US determination to prevent Boutros Boutros-Ghali taking up a second term. Boutros-Ghali had often been outspoken, noticeably his criticism of western capitals' concentration on what he described as the "rich man's" war in Bosnia at the expense of others in poorer regions such as Africa. The then US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, had pressed for Annan's appointment due to his anticipated low profile and primarily managerial approach. The report suggested that Annan's 30 year UN career appeared to support Washington's perception that he would affect the broad reforms it desired.
According to the report, the Secretary-General's first high profile accomplishment occurred when he persuaded Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to allow the repatriation of 500,000 foreign workers trapped in Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion. He then became Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. During his tenure the UN suffered the problematic missions in Bosnia and Somalia followed by the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
The report revealed that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had received information of the impending Rwandan disaster before it took place and that the UN was subsequently blamed for events. At the time, Annan did not voice his belief that responsibility lay with the governments who had failed to provide the necessary personnel.
The Independent report pointed out that the Secretary-General has undertaken widespread UN reform and has demonstrated broader diplomatic skills than expected. This induced respect from France, which
had initially been against his appointment. Anna also experienced strained relations with Washington. He believed that the US did not demonstrate sufficient flexibility during the Gulf crisis. Nor has he convinced Washington to
pay its almost $1bn UN dues. The report stated that Annan was disappointed that the US/UK offensive by-passed the UN's role in the conflict.
The Independent
19 December 1998
Seccurity Council Resolution 1209
Selected Extracts
"The Security Council,
… Expresses its grave concern at the destabilising effect of illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa and at their excessive accumulation and circulation, which threaten national, regional and international security and have serious consequences for development and for the humanitarian situation in the continent;
Encourages African states to enact legislation on the domestic possession and use of arms, including the establishment of national legal and judicial mechanisms for the effective implementation of such laws, and to implement effective import, export and re-export controls, and encourages also the international community, in consultation with African states, to assist in these efforts;
Stresses the importance of all member states, and in particular states involved in manufacturing or marketing of weapons, restricting arms transfers which could provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in Africa, such as through voluntary moratoria;
Encourages African states to participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, encourages also the establishment of appropriate regional or sub-regional registers of conventional arms on the basis of agreement reached by African states concerned, and encourages further member states to explore other appropriate ways to enhance transparency of arms transfers to and in Africa;
Urges member states with relevant expertise to cooperate with African states to strengthen their capacity to combat illicit arms flows, including through the tracking and interdiction of illicit arms transfers;
Welcomes the declaration on the moratorium adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, adopted in Abuja on 30 October 1998, and urges other sub-regional organisations in Africa to consider taking similar measures;
Encourages African States to examine the efforts undertaken in other regions such as by the Organisation of American States and the European Union in preventing and combating illicit arms flows, and to consider adopting similar measures as appropriate;
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to accord high priority to the United Nations' role in promoting better understanding of the direct and indirect consequences of illicit arms flows, and stresses the importance of bringing the negative impact of illicit arms flows to and in Africa to the widest possible public attention;
Encourages the Secretary-General to explore means of identifying international arms dealers acting in contravention of national legislation or embargoes established by the United Nations on arms transfers to and in Africa;
Encourages the Secretary-General to promote cooperation among member states, the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organisations and other relevant organisations to collect, review and share information on combating illicit arms flows, especially regarding small arms, and to make available, as appropriate, information about the nature and general scope of the international illicit arms trade with and in Africa;
Reiterates the obligation of all member states to carry out decisions of the Council on arms embargoes, and, in this context, notes the broader implications of the findings and experience of the International Commission of Inquiry established by its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995 and reactivated in accordance with its resolution 1161 (1998) of 9 April 1998, and requests the Secretary-General to consider the possible application of such a measure to other conflict zones in Africa with specific emphasis on the sources of such arms and, if appropriate, make recommendations to the Council;
Encourages the Secretary-General, in consultation with member states, to explore means for collection, sharing and dissemination of information, including technical information, on illicit small arms flows and their destabilising effects, in order to improve the international community's ability to prevent the exacerbation of armed conflicts and humanitarian crisis, as well as means for the rapid exchange of data on possible violations of arms embargoes;
Requests the Secretary-General to consider practical ways to work with African states in implementing national, regional or sub-regional programmes for voluntary weapons collection, disposal and destruction, including the possibility of the establishment of a fund to support such programmes;
Recognises the important contribution of programmes for voluntary weapons collection, disposal and destruction in specific post-conflict situations in Africa, and expresses its intention to consider including, as appropriate, means to facilitate the successful conduct of such programmes in the mandates of future peacekeeping operations it authorises in Africa on the basis of recommendations by the Secretary-General;
Calls upon regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa to strengthen efforts to establish mechanisms and regional networks among relevant authorities of their members states for
information sharing to combat the illicit circulation of and trafficking in small arms".
UN Doc: S/RES/1209
19 November 1998
Security Council Resolution 1208
Selected Extracts
"The Security Council,
…Underlines the particular relevance of the provisions contained in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 10 September 1969;
… Calls upon African states further to develop institutions and procedures to implement the provisions of international law relating to the status and treatment of refugees and the provisions of the OAU Convention, especially those relating to the location of refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin and the separation of refugees from other persons who do not qualify for international protection afforded refugees or otherwise do not require international protection, and in this regard urges African states to seek international assistance, as appropriate;
Recognises the primary responsibility of the UNHCR, with the assistance of other relevant international bodies and organisations, to support African states in their actions directed towards the full respect and implementation of the provisions of international law relating to the status and treatment of refugees, and requests the UNHCR, as needed, to keep in close touch with the Secretary-General, the OAU, sub-regional organisations and the states concerned in this regard;
Notes that a range of measures by the international community are needed to share the burden borne by African states hosting refugees and to support their efforts to ensure the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, including in the areas of law enforcement, disarmament of armed elements, curtailment of the flow of arms in refugee camps and settlements … and demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants;
Notes also that the range of measures referred to … above could include training, logistical and technical advice and assistance, financial support, the enhancement of national law enforcement mechanisms, the provision or supervision of security guards and the deployment in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of international police and military forces;
Requests the Secretary-General to respond, as appropriate, to requests from African states, the OAU and sub-regional organisations for advice and technical assistance in the implementation of international refugee, human rights and humanitarian law relevant to the present resolution, including through appropriate training programmes and seminars;
Urges the UNHCR, other relevant United Nations bodies and organisations, member states, the OAU and sub-regional organisations to initiate coordinated programmes to provide advice, training and technical or other assistance, as appropriate, to African states which host refugee populations … and encourages relevant non-governmental organisations to participate in such coordinated programmes when appropriate;
Encourages the Secretary-General and member states involved in efforts to enhance Africa's peacekeeping capacity to continue to ensure that training gives due emphasis to international refugees, human rights and humanitarian law and in particular to the security of refugees and the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements;
Expresses its support for the inclusion in the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements of military and police units and personnel trained for humanitarian operations, as well as related equipment, which relevant United Nations bodies and organisations could draw on in providing advice, supervision, training and technical or other assistance related to the maintenance of the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, in coordination as appropriate with the African states hosting refugees;
Requests the Secretary-General to consider the establishment of a new category within the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa to support, as needed, and in addition to existing sources of funding, the provision of advice, supervision, training and technical or other assistance related to the maintenance of the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements;
… Requests all member states, relevant international bodies and organisations and all regional and sub-regional organisations to consider, as appropriate, the application of the
measures contained in this resolution to regions other than Africa".
UN Doc: S/RES/1208/1998
19 November 1998
Security Council Resolution 1212
Selected Extracts
"The Security Council,
Decides … to extend the present mandate, including the concept of operation of [the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti] MIPONUH until 30 November 1999 in order to continue to assist the government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police … including mentoring Haitian national police field performance and strengthening the capability of the central directorate of the police force to manage aid provided to it from bilateral and multilateral sources;
Affirms that future international assistance to the Haitian National Police should be considered through United Nations specialised agencies and programmes, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, and through other international and regional organisations and by member states;
… Underlines the importance of full coordination among multilateral and bilateral contributors in order to assure the effective allocation of international assistance provided to the Haitian National Police and requests the representative of the Secretary-General to work closely with member states to ensure that bilateral and multilateral efforts are complementary;
… Emphasises that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constitute the major tasks facing the Haitian government and people and that significant international assistance is indispensable for sustainable development in Haiti, stresses the commitment of the international community to a long-term programme of support for Haiti and invites United Nations bodies and agencies, especially the Economic and Social Council, to contribute to the designing of such a programme;
… Expresses its intention not to extend MIPONUH beyond 30 November 1999 and requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations on a viable transition to other forms of
international assistance … taking into account the need to preserve the progress made in the reform of the Haitian National Police and to strengthen further United Nations support for the
consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights and the maintenance of law and order in Haiti".
UN Doc: S/RES/1212
15 November 1998
Security Council Resolution 1210
Selected Extracts
The Security Council,
… Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by the government of Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,
… Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Decides that the provisions of resolution 986 (1995), except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12, shall remain in force for a new period of 180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard Time, on 26 November 1998;
Further decides that paragraph 2 of resolution 1153 (1998) shall remain in force and shall apply to the 180-day period referred to … above;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days after [the beginning of the 180-day period] … and again prior to the end of the 180-day period, on the basis of observations of United Nations personnel in Iraq, and of consultations with the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs including … any observations which he may have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and petroleum products;
… Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council if Iraq is unable to export [sufficient] petroleum and petroleum products … and, following consultations with relevant United Nations agencies and the Iraqi authorities, make recommendations for the expenditure of the sum expected to be available;
Decides that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of resolution 1175 (1998) shall remain in force and shall apply to the new 180-day period referred to in paragraph 1 above".
UN Doc: S/RES/1210/1998
24 November 1998
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Security Council Resolution 1207
Selected Extracts
"The Security Council,
… Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Reiterates its decision that all states shall cooperate fully with the [International Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia] and its organs in accordance with resolution 827 (1993) and the Statute of the Tribunal, including the obligation of states to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute, to execute arrest warrants transmitted to them by the Tribunal, and to comply with its requests for information and investigations;
… affirms that a state may not invoke provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to perform binding obligations under international law;
Condemns the failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal against the three individuals referred to in the letter of 8
September 1998, and demands the immediate and unconditional execution of those arrest warrants, including the transfer to the custody of the Tribunal of those individuals".
UN Doc: S/RES/1207
17 Nov
ember 1998
Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre
The Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programmes. It is an independent organisation established by the Government of Canada in 1994, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre accomplishes its mandate by providing research, education and training courses.
Information on courses run by the Pearson Centre is available from the Registrar at:
Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100 Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Tel: (902) 6388611 ex. 109; Fax: (902) 6388888;
Email: registrar@ppc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
Internet: http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
Peacekeeping Citation List: Centre for Defence Information
For information on research in the peacekeeping area, contact Colonel Dan Smith at:
Tel: ++ (202) 862 0700; Fax: (202) 862 0708;
Email: dsmith@cdi.org;
Internet: http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite/
UN Department Of Peacekeeping Operations
Comprehensive information on UN peacekeeping, including demining, mission updates, field employment, lessons learned, medical support, personnel contributors, rapid deployment facilities, and training is available on-line at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
UNITAR POCI
The UN Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI) provides a series of training courses for peacekeepers. Information on the courses is available on-line at:
http://www.wm.edu/unpeacek/index.html
University of Colorado
The University of Colorado provides a website containing information and useful internet links in the field of peace and conflict research. It can be accessed at:
http://csf.colorado.edu/peace/
Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa
The following contains extracts from the UN's new database (incomplete at time of writing) on peacekeeping training initiative's in Africa which is available in full at the homepage of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (see Conferences and Research).
Why the database?
Quote from the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 16 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/28):
"The Security Council welcomes the readiness of the United Nations to act as a clearing house for information on available training initiatives. It particularly welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations database on training. With the aim of strengthening Africa's peacekeeping capacity, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to pursue these plans, and to include in the database information about African needs in this field, possible regional and extra-regional contributions to assist in achieving this goal, and available expertise on training. It encourages member states and regional and sub-regional organisations to contribute information to the database.
[The] database … is intended as a key tool to facilitate the overall exchange of information on peacekeeping training and initiatives, and to assist in the coordination of future peacekeeping training objectives and activities in Africa.
Concrete steps such as this one, designed to support the enhancement of African capacity for peacekeeping, primarily originate in the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report of 1 November 1995 (A/50/711-S/1995/911) and the Presidential Statement of 25 September 1997 (S/PRST/1997/46). More recently, Security Council Resolution 1170 (1998) of 28 May 1998 welcomes this initiative in particular consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa (A/52/871 - S/1998/318).
Development and Data collection
… DPKO continues to solicit and collect information on both the training needs and requirements of African countries as well as the resources of donor nations and organisations willing to play a role. The input and feedback of member states is critical to ensuring that this becomes a highly useful and effective mechanism for sharing information.
United Nations' On-going Efforts Towards Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Capacity In Africa
DPKO Strategy Toward Improving African Peacekeeping Training Capacity
The development of the strategy to improve the training capacity of African nations was proposed during the African Peacekeeping Training Strategy Session held on 26 May 1998 at UN HQ. It is based on three time frames;
- the short term (3 to 6 months) - activities which establish the baseline capacities and share this information;
- the medium term (6 to 18 months) - activities which integrate ongoing training and developmental initiatives;
- the long term (18 to 36 months) - capacities that sustain operational deployment and mission management.
Short Term
The short term goals include: the collection of all the baseline training data from member states, inclusion of related material from other sources and the distribution of this material to all nations. This is an iterative process, with each repetition improving the quality and quantity of material; the adoption of the database as a tool to share information; the establishment of physical links between the OAU and the UN to ease transmission of information; the generation of support for UN and other training initiatives. On the UN side this includes support for the training analysis, the resultant courses proposed and the correspondence training; the establishment of a working group which includes African nations and active or potential resource providers. The target is to meet within the three months / possible location - in Africa / hosted by OAU/ African member state(s); the continuation of current training initiatives and programmes.
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Medium Term
The medium term goals include: the execution of the training from the short term; the conduct of integration training to develop staff capability at the mission management level (mission management training, sustainment training to refine ongoing initiatives and the continued development of the national training base); the determination and adaptation of doctrine to African uses; the conduct of regional training exercises (Command Post Level) by African nations ; the development of national training institutions.
Long Term
The long term goals include: the continued development of Regional training institutions; the integration of training and standby arrangements; the formulation of an African major training exercise programme, which incorporates all preliminary training, preparation of logistics support, staff development and mission management training; the development of operational mission management capacities.
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Commentary
An International System For the Prevention of Armed Conflicts
Mariano Aguirre
Mariano Aguirre is the Director of the Centro de Investigación para la Paz (CIP) in Madrid. He has co-directed a study on the western Mediterranean region for the Conflict Prevention Network of the European Commission. He is also on the governing board of EuroISIS, which provides a briefing service to parliamentarians on issues of defence and security.
This article previously appeared in the Spanish journal Foreign Affairs.
The impact of wars on fragile states has led the principal foreign protagonists involved - states, multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGO´s) - to debate prevention and its possible political application. Internal wars which take place on the periphery of the world system will continue, carrying serious regional and global effects. Therefore, prevention of conflicts is a necessity, especially within the framework of the Foreign Policy and Common Security of the European Union.
A series of wars over the last decade have produced complex emergencies which have led to various combinations of genocide, famine, destruction of infrastructure, enforced displacement of populations and regional destabilisations. These conflicts have broken out within states which are generally fragile and which lack state institutions almost in their entirety. The difference between the civil population and military forces is unclear, and state and non-state protogonists wage war with no regard for humanitarian law. From Somalia to the former Congo, via the Balkans, Chechnya, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Sri Lanka, the phenomenon of armed conflicts in fragile states will be one of the twenty first century's crucial problems.(1)
Foreign reaction varies according to the protagonists involved and their standing in the international system. The powerful states with global interests have wavered between empowering the United Nations with managing these conflicts or directly tackling them themselves either unilaterally or joining with other states with common interests. For strong states, especially the five members of the UN Security Council, granting power upwards to the UN's Secretary-General or the Organisation for European Cooperation and Security (OECS) goes against the traditional and pragmatic concept of the nation state and, from their perspective, would imperil their capacity to act in defence of their interests.
Over the current decade multilateral organisations have fought for political space (delegated by powerful states), economic support and even for the military power of coercion. The proposal by both the former and the current Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan respectively, to avail of a peace force which can act for prevention has not been adopted by states because it would grant the Secretary-General power over them and enable him to act coercively.(2)
For their part, NGO's have the prestige, social support and the political and economic backing which states and institutions such as the EU have invested in them to manage the most dramatic consequences of humanitarian crises. But in the current decade, NGO's face complex emergencies which in some cases are beyond them while on the ground provide proof of the states' unwillingness to defend their causes.
The three groups referred to have debated - together with academics, institutions studying peace and security, and journalists - the responses to complex emergencies, paying particular attention to interventionism and so-called "humanitarian interference".(3) Some key questions have been the who, the when and the how of intervention; whether the use of force to guarantee humanitarian aid is useful or produces destabilisation; and the differences between humanitarian intervention or imposition of peace. The answer is that there is no single answer. Every crisis requires special treatment.
The problem of wars within states and their humanitarian impact, in reality, lies in the battle between the concept of the singular interest of the nation-state promulgated by the pragmatic school and the cooperative ideal which maximises the common good, furthered in the last decade by institutionalists and through regulations. This tension between two concepts - the pragmatic and the institutionalist /regulations - will define the international system in the next century.
Conflict prevention, in part, implies a compromise between the two concepts and all the protagonists, given that some want to do more, and others less, and the majority demand different responses (including the victims). But all agree that peace operations conducted since the late eighties up to now have been found wanting: they either failed, they were not able to halt the conflict, they left the situation little better than before or they did not take place as in the crisis of the Great Lakes in October 1997. States do not wish to fund peace operations in the long term nor risk their armed forces, and multilateral organisations and NGO's criticise states and believe that mechanisms for avoiding crises do exist.
As well as criticism aimed at states and by connection at the UN over humanitarian operations, there is further criticism of humanitarian action and cooperation with development from within and beyond NGO's themselves.(4) These organisations - private and multilateral, such as the United Nations' High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) - often see themselves caught between reluctant states who cannot take on tasks that they are allotted and state and non-state forces which steal their food, medicines and fuel for their causes or take them as hostages.(5)
The first institutional initiative in favour of prevention came in 1995: the European Parliament accepted a proposal by the President of the Commission for Development, Michel Rocard, to form a group for the analysis of conflicts. In 1996 the European Commission created the Conflict Prevention Network and at the Amsterdam summit in 1997 the Council of Europe decided to form planning and early warning groups within the framework of Foreign Policy and Common Security.(6) In addition, the Committee for Development Aid of the OECD drew up an important document which contained an analysis of prevention, development and post-war reconstruction. And the Humanitarian Affairs Department of the UN created the Humanitarian Early Warning System. Similarly, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention was created, grouping European institutes and NGO's. An example of the importance of the question is provided by the fact that in the current renegotations between the EU and the 71 member states of the Lomé Convention on commerce and aid the theme of conflict prevention has been introduced.
What is conflict prevention?
The first step is to define current armed conflicts: these are violent situations in around 30 countries where more than a thousand victims die a year and in which one or more protagonists battle over political power or land. One of these protagonists is the state which participates by means of its security forces. There are usually several non-state armed protagonists and connections with violent groups such as drug traffickers, paramilitary organisations and mercenaries. These conflicts usually have a strong regional impact which manifests itself in refugees, illegal arms sales and environmental destruction.(9)
Modern wars have their origins in diverse internal causes. As they take place in countries on the periphery of the global system there is a strong link between the economic policies which are directed at them and their internal reality. Rapid modernisation, for example, linked with integration into the global market can increase inequalities and social tensions. Therefore decisions taken in central countries or international financial institutions on prices of raw materials, arms sales or credit policies affect these countries owing to their dependency and weakness. This weakness can be a trump card in prevention.
Discussions take place between politicians, diplomats, NGO's and the armed forces about how to define the prevention of these conflicts. For some, prevention is about the application of long-term policies to tackle the problems which cause armed conflicts (for example, poverty). For others, it is about gaining respect for democratic standards and human rights through the strengthening of institutions. A third group attempts to take measures which are diplomatic, political, economic, commercial and eventually military in order to avoid a crisis turning into violence.
The definition varies according to the position of whoever proposes it, both in order to put it into practice and with the aim, paradoxically, of not carrying it out. Therefore, government civil servants may prefer the diplomacy of rapid response in order to avoid having to tackle the roots or commercial relationships, because this would affect their country's interests. But an NGO involved in development understands that prevention means getting to the roots.
Conflict prevention aims to stop tensions escalating to violence by means of short, medium and long-term measures. Theoretically, the more effective the preventive action the less tensions there will be and the greater the distancing of violence. No single measure excludes the others. Nicolaïdis presents a reference framework for prevention which comprises coercive diplomacy (e.g. arms embargo); institutional incentives (e.g. aid in exchange for peace); co-operative management (e.g. easing mediation); and systematic transformations (e.g.constructing a legal system).(10) The wider the perspective the more dynamic the response will be. That is, given an imminent conflict in a country, a state or the EU can, at the same time, send a research or mediation commission, demand that human rights are not violated, and initiate a study on the structural problems of that country.
Just as there is no mechanical relationship between factors which generate conflicts, nor can there be a mathematical summation of action which will halt violent escalation. Conflicts are in the hands of people and the results are always unpredictable. Furthermore, prevention should be carried out cautiously (in order to avoid producing the opposite effect) but without trusting in its results.
Lund says that prevention should signify immediate diplomatic or military interventions so as to bring about an immediate halt to violence and towards political and socio-economic structural changes which improve people's standard of living .
Therefore prevention includes:
1) action, policies or institutions which are used in order to avoid a significant and constant escalation to violence of internal or international disputes at times or places which are particularly vulnerable ("vertical escalation");
2) the promotion of activities which bring about non-violent reconciliation of the interests in dispute;
3) this reconciliation includes helping to prevent the conflict from starting up again once attention is turned to avoiding other conflicts ("horizontal escalation").(11)
Operational and Structural Operations
The American Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts studied the question for three years and has come up with an important final study.(12) Its definition is based on avoiding violence, vertical and horizontal escalation and avoiding violence from breaking out in conflicts which have ended. The strategies for prevention are set down in three principles:
a) act rapidly at the earliest signs of the problem (this implies possessing prior analysis of ethnic, linguistic and socio-economic, national and religious roots.);(13)
b) act from the outside using political, economic, social and military measures to relieve the pressure which has sparked the violence;
c) activate policies which resolve the underlying problems which lie at the roots of the violence.
The Commission groups the strategies for prevention under operational prevention and structural prevention. In the former, an external protagonist (state, multilateral organisations, a prestigious personality) sets in motion a political-military and humanitarian strategy aimed at halting the escalation of violence and restoring the internal politics of the state affected.
Operational prevention includes having the capacity to anticipate and analyse potential conflicts (early warning), acting on opportunities which arise unexpectedly, putting the problem in the hands of the UN Security Council and the relevant regional organisation and encouraging preventive diplomacy, both public and secret. It also involves utilising economic measures such as sanctions, the exchange of specific measures for commercial profits, and making aid and investment conditional.(14)
The degree of force employed has to be in proportion with the goals to be achieved and should be utilised within the framework of the UN Charter. It is curious that force will not be used as a last resort but that governments who commit genocide should realise that certain behaviour is unacceptable to the international community. Force can be applied also for preventive deployment (such as in Macedonia since 1992) or to prevent the outbreak of violence.
Structural prevention includes the application of international law and mechanisms for resolving disputes as well as strategies for satisfying the economic, social, political, cultural and humanitarian needs of those affected by conflicts and post-war reconstruction. The Carnegie Commission believes whatever the type of society is, the pillars of peace are security, social welfare and justice.(15)
With regard to security, the Commission includes non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the control of conventional ones, with attention to small arms which are most often used in today's wars. Another dimension is the security within a state which comes from having laws, a legitimate police force and impartial judicial and penal systems.
Welfare implies access to basic personal needs: drinking water, health service, education, home and equal employment opportunities. To reach these goals a redefinition of the concept of development is required with aid and foreign investment which favour sustainable development, as well as a revaluation of the role of the state which must be openly and efficiently run. In addition the OECD puts emphasis on long-term development and sees a single continuous process in conflict prevention, humanitarian emergency operations, institutionalisation and reconciliation in peace processes.(16)
The State: Stabilising Tool
An interesting aspect in prevention is the role of the state. As the economy has become globalised, the state has lost weight, particularly in those countries which are peripheral and fragile institutionally. Neo-liberalism promotes a global market with little state participation. Bodies such as the World Bank, the NGO's and aid and co-operation agencies share a distrust of dictatorial and corrupt states. Some trust in private enterprise and others in civilian society.
However, there is today a revaluation of the role which the state should undertake in development. This is important because all prevention policy should be strategically orientated to a reconstruction of the state and society affected. Without the state there can be no process of institutional and social post-war reconstruction and the cycle of conflict will start again. The European Commissioner for relations with the countries of the Lomé Agreement, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, believes that EU preventive policies should be orientated to "the Africans taking control of the situation" but that the principal problem with Africa is the fragile state, corruption, repression, inefficient management and the control of resources by an elite.(17)
A recent White Paper of the British Department for International Development proposes "a coherent global system" for conflict prevention which goes from preventive diplomacy to balanced economic development, the promotion of human rights and social cohesion as well as donors, development agencies and strong governments which are open to public scrutiny and honest.(18)
Priority Areas
Early attempts at conflict prevention were directed at those areas which most interest the EU and the USA. For the EU's Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) the priorities are in sub-Saharan Africa, eastern Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR and the Mediterranean zone. The Centre for Preventive Action (of the Council of Foreign Relations, in New York) is interested in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa.
The structural instability in the area of the Great Lakes, with around 800,000 deaths during the current decade has been the spark which has drawn attention to Africa. From 1955 to 1995 armed conflicts have affected 53 countries in the African continent.
There are 23 million refugees and 66 ethnic minorities under threat. Solely between 1994 and 1995 it is calculated that around one million died in Africa.(19)
Various pieces of research point out that the most important causes of conflicts in Africa are the violation of basic freedoms and of human rights, the lack of democratic systems, and the lack of economic development.(20) The relationship is not automatic: very poor societies exist where there is no armed conflict yet there is criminal violence. At the same time, co-operation in development can help to prevent conflicts or help to worsen them as the processes of rapid modernisation generate tensions among both those affected and those unaffected by socio-economic changes. Development creates subjective expectations which modernisation does not satisfy and this can generate aggressiveness and violence.(21)
The obstacles
Reports such as those of the Carnegie Commission, the Aspen Institute (22) and the OECD are programmes for social construction of the state in countries in potential conflict, and a working agenda for the international system. All the studies propose either the full or partial setting up of a system - i.e., a collection of rules, implicit or explicit norms and procedures - for the exercise of internal conflict prevention. Despite the good news that the question is receiving support from several quarters, this raises many difficulties of which the principal ones are:
a) the pre-eminence of the national interests of global and regional powers over common interests. Multilateralism is losing ground and the idea of regional hegemonic leaders is returning. Powers such as the USA and France have interests in some African states, for example, and compete with the collaboration of local governors in order to gain access to natural resources and regional prestige. Local powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, intervene for their own ends;
b) the general trend in the global economy is low-risk investment with high gains in the short term. Structural prevention implies investment which carries a risk with a possible indirect gain in the long term. Analysis is needed which investigates if it is more profitable to prevent than manage crises and collaborate in reconstruction;
c) immediate prevention can be capitalised on politically by those governments or institutions which propose it (if it proves efficient). But public opinion and the media comprehend better a war or a breakdown in negotiations than the process which avoids it. The media bear a responsibility in giving sufficient airing to the preventive and diplomatic processes (such as the OECD and Felipe Gonzalez in Kosovo and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland);
Conflict prevention is a concept to be developed. It is receives its nourishment from Human Rights, International Law, economic development, the theories of the state and democracy, and the verification that modern armed conflicts carry consequences to be avoided because, in the end, very often prevention can be simpler, cheaper and less brutal than cure.
Notes
(1) See José M.Tortosa, "Orígenes y contextos de los nuevos conflictos bélicos" (the origins and contexts of new armed conflicts) and Mariano Aguirre, "Los factores de la guerra moderna" (the factors of the modern war) in Centro Pignatelli (Ed.), Los conflictos armados. Génesis, víctimas and terapias, (Armed conflicts. Genesis, victims and therapy) Peace Research Seminar/ Aragon Regional Government, Zaragoza, 1997.
(2) Kofi A. Annan, Transition and Renovation. Annual report on the work of the Organisation 1997, United Nations, New York, 1997, p.57.
(3) See in Adam Roberts' extensive bibliography "Humanitarian Action in War", Adelphi Paper, Nº 305, IISS/Oxford University Press, December 1996.
(4) See Alex de Waal, "Democratising the Aid Encounter in Africa", International Affairs, vol.73, Nº 4, pp.623-639 and David Sogge (ed.), Compassion and Calculation. The Business of Private Foreign Aid, Pluto Press/ Transnational Institute, London, 1996 (Spanish translation in Icaria, Barcelona, 1998).
(5) John Pomfret, "Charities get caught up as tools of war", The Guardian Weekly,
5 October 1997, p.17.
(6) See Peter Cross (Ed.) Contributing to Preventive Action. Conflict Preventive Action Yearbook 1997/1998, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Brussels, 1998.
(7) DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development and Co-operation, OECD, Paris, 1997.
(8) Resolution on the Commission's Green Paper in Relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st Century, European Parliament, Brussels, 1997.
(9) Michael E. Brown, "Introduction" in M.E. Brown, The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p.1; and Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (Eds.), New Wars, Pinter, London, 1997.
(10) Kalypso Nicolaïdes, "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework", in Robert Y. Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance, Brookings Institution Press and the World Peace Foundation, Washington D.C., 1996. p.56.
(11) Michael Lund, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall", in Cross (ed.) Contributing to Preventing Action, p.21.
(12) Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Washington D.C., 1997. Presided by David A. Hamburg (distinguished scientist and member of the US Presidential Assessors Committee on Science and Technology) and the ex-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The Commission comprised, among others, of the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Gareth Evans, the British diplomat, David Owen, the former Under-Secretary of the UN, Sir Brian Urquhart, and John Steinbuner, analyst for the Brookings Institution.
(13) Michel Rocard, "Pistes pour une meilleure prévention", Le Courier, Nº 168, March-April, 1998, p.69.
(14) A manual containing definitions and the array of institutions involved in this field in SIPRI-UNESCO, Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention. Handbook, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
(15) Preventing Deadly Conflicts, p. XXVIII.
(16) OECD, DAC Guidelines, p.10.
(17) Joao de Deus Pinheiro "La réponse de l'Europe aux conflits de l'Afrique", Le Courier, Nº 168, March-April 1998, p.66.
(18) Secretary of State for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century. White Paper on International Development, London, 1997, p.68+
(19) Luc Reychler, "Conflicts in Africa: the Issues of Control and Prevention", in Conflicts in Africa. An analysis of Crises and Crisis Prevention Measures, European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security/Médecins sans Frontiers/King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, 1997, p. 19-22.
(20) Possibilities of African-European Cooperation in Prevention of Conflicts and Humanitarian Disaters in Africa. A study commissioned by the European Commission DGIA, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague, 1996, p.5.
(21) Essays on the violent effects of development in Espen Barth Eide and Carsten Ronnfeldt, "Development Aid as Conflict Prevention? Reflections on the Possible Use of Development Aid in Comprehensive Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Efforts", in CPN Yearbook, p 150-151.; Henk W. Houweling, "Destabilising Consequences of Sequential Development", in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, Paul Sciarone (Eds.), Between Development and Destruction. An enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states, Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 143-172.
(22) Conflict Prevention: strategies to sustain peace in the post-Cold War world, The Aspen Institute, Washington D.C., 1997. Praiseworthy study containing essays by George Soros, Richard Goldstone and Alvaro de Soto, among others.
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