This Issue

Angola

Secretary-General's MONUA Report (1)

The 17 January report considered the status of the peace process, the future role and mandate of the UN in Angola and the force structure of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).

Peace Process

Kofi Annan stated that the Angolan peace process had effectively collapsed, reducing the country to a state of war. There was heavy fighting in several regions, presenting dire consequences for the country's civilian population. Dialogue between the Angolan government and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, had ceased de facto since June 1998. Joint negotiation mechanisms had been inactive for months while MONUA had been prevented from fulfilling its mediation tasks. Both parties publicly committed themselves either to politically neutralise their opponents or to intensify the military confrontation. They had both ignored numerous Security Council resolutions, regional and bilateral initiatives.

The Role of UNITA

The Secretary-General declared that the root causes of the fighting lay with UNITA, which had refused to comply with fundamental provisions of the Lusaka Protocol demanding that it demilitarise its forces and extend state administration throughout the country. Furthermore, UNITA was politically intolerant and unwilling to engage in mutual accommodation. Nor had there been substantial attempts to develop political support by improving the basic living conditions of the population.

Annan asserted that it had become increasingly apparent that conditions for a meaningful UN peacekeeping role in Angola had ceased to exist due to: the expressed determination of the belligerents to seek a military solution; worsening security conditions; and the inability of MONUA to carry out its mandate. Furthermore, President José Eduardo dos Santos did not support an extension of the MONUA mandate, while an anti-UN media established a negative public atmosphere.

The Secretary-General declared that the shooting down of two UN aircraft had been intended to persuade the UN to curtail its operations. He was appalled by the parties lack of cooperation in the immediate aftermath of the crashes and demanded that a fully fledged investigation be conducted into the incidents to identify those responsible.

The UN's Role

Annan stressed it was impossible for the UN to impose its presence on the Angolan parties, or to carry out an effective role without their cooperation. The UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and MONUA had created ample political space for a peaceful solution and the achievement of national reconciliation. The UN and its programmes and agencies had contributed around $1.5 billion in support of the peace process.

Withdrawal

Annan announced that the MONUA withdrawal and the repatriation of UN personnel would continue. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters should have been pulled back to Luanda by mid-February 1999 and the expiration of the MONUA mandate on 26 February 1999 would prompt the UN's technical liquidation; the majority of MONUA's military, police and civilian personnel would have been repatriated by 20 March 1999. Effective liquidation required the maintenance of adequate human and material resources in Angola, however. This would take an estimated four to six months. The first few months of this period required the presence of a strong security detachment - an infantry company of up to 200 personnel - to protect UN property as well as an adequate air capacity and other support services and administrative personnel.

Continued UN Commitment

However, Annan urged that the UN needed to remain actively involved in the Angolan conflict. The UN was, on request, ready to perform a political role towards a peaceful solution. Annan intended to assign a senior official as his Special Envoy for Angola, based in New York, together with requisite support staff, to cooperate and liaise with the members of the Security Council, with other interested member states, and as far as possible with the Angolan parties. Should the necessary conditions be in place, his Special Envoy could be rapidly relocated to Angola.

Sanctions Against UNITA

The Secretary-General recalled that Security Council resolutions 1202 (1998) and 1213 (1998) had requested recommendations regarding technical and other ways for member states to enhance the implementation of the measures against UNITA contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1221 (1999). He therefore urged governments to provide information of violations to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) on a regular basis. Governments of territories being used for violations should take the necessary preventive measures. He suggested exploring the potential role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in relation to this.

Human Rights Commitment

Annan urged that the work of the UN human rights presence in Angola should continue its activities, on condition of the agreement of the Angolan parties and sufficient security guarantees. These would be aimed at: strengthening administrative judicial arrangements; enhancing national and non-governmental human rights capacity; gathering human rights data; dispersing human rights information; advancing the role of civil society in building peace and development for human rights; and providing relevant technical support.

The Secretary-General warned that the already critical humanitarian situation in Angola could become catastrophic. Humanitarian access to increasing numbers of affected people was being hampered and often prevented by hostilities, landmines and restrictions within UNITA-held areas.

Finance

The General Assembly appropriated a total amount of $130.8 million gross for the maintenance of MONUA between 1 July 1998 and 30 June 1999. Annan anticipated that these resources provided by the General Assembly would meet MONUA's requirements. As at 31 December 1998, unpaid assessments to the UNAVEM/MONUA special account equalled $101.2 million, while outstanding assessments for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,593.9 million.

Contributions to MONUA, as at 18 January 1999

[Military Observers (MO); Civilian Police Observers (CPO); Staff Officers^a (SO); Troops (Tr); Total (T)] Argentina - 15 (CPO); (SO) 15 (Tr); Bangladesh 3 (MO) 20 (CPO) 1 (SO) 24 (T); Brazil 4 (MO) 9 (CPO) 2 (SO) 15 (T); Bulgaria 3 (MO) 13 (CPO) 16 (T); Congo 2 (MO) 2 (T); Egypt 3 (MO) 15 (CPO) 18 (T); France 3 (MO) 3 (T); Gambia 4 (CPO) 4 (T); Ghana 3 (MO) 6 (CPO) 9 (T); Guinea-Bissau 2 (MO) 4 (CPO) 6 (T); Hungary 3 (MO) 8 (CPO) 11 (T); India 5 (MO) 11 (CPO) 8 (SO) 138 (Tr) 162 (T); Jordan 3 (MO) 19 (CPO) 22 (T); Kenya 3 (MO) 6 (CPO) 9 (T); Malaysia 4 (MO) 16 (CPO) 20 (T); Mali 3 (MO) 12 (CPO) 15 (T); Namibia 2 (SO) 134 (Tr) 136 (T); New Zealand 1 (MO) 1 (T); Nigeria 4 (MO) 15 (CPO) 19 (T); Norway 3 (MO) 3 (T); Pakistan 3 (MO) 1^b (SO) 4 (T); Poland 4 (MO) 4 (T); Portugal 2 (MO) 38 (CPO) 4 (SO) 40 (Tr) 84 (T); Romania 4 (SO) 138 (Tr) 142 (T); Russian Federation 3 (MO) 3 (SO) 100 (Tr) 106 (T); Senegal 4 (MO) 4 (T); Slovakia 3 (MO) 3 (T) Spain 14 (CPO) 14 (T); Sweden 3 (MO) 10 (CPO) 13 (T); Ukraine 3 (MO) 1 (SO) 4 (T); United Republic of Tanzania 3 (CPO) 3 (T); Uruguay 3 (MO) 27 (CPO) 2 (SO) 32 (T); Zambia 3 (MO) 22 (CPO) 7 (SO) 32 (T); Zimbabwe 3 (MO) 22 (CPO) 4 (SO) 29 (T); Total 86 (MO); 309 (CPO); 39 (SO); 550 (Tr); 984 (T).

^a Including military police.

^b A military specialist in the demining school.

One UN MO (Russian Federation), two UN Police Observers (Egypt and Zambia), and one peacekeeper each from the Namibian Military Task Force (NAMMTF) and the Ration Support Unit (RASU) have been missing since 26 December 1998 owing to anaircraft accident; and one peacekeeper from NAMMTF has been missing since 2 January 1999 owing to an aircraft accident.

UN Doc: S/1999/49: 17 January 1999

MONUA to Withdraw

A 19 January Financial Times article stated that an 18 January [sic] report by Kofi Annan to the Security Council recommended the withdrawal of MONUA after its mandate expired on 26 February. The report declared that this represented another failure in the UN's poor record of efforts to rescue African states experiencing armed conflict, including Somalia and Sierra Leone.

According to the FT report, officials declared the decision to be inevitable once the government and UNITA reacted indifferently to the shooting down of two UN-chartered aircraft on 26 December and 2 January. A UN investigative team was only provided access to the crash sites in the central highlands during the week beginning 11 January.

Financial Times: 19 January 1999

New Battles Predicted in Angola

A 5 February Financial Times report revealed that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) pledged to recapture the town of Mbanza Congo, following its seizure by UNITA the previous week, prompting fears of renewed fighting in the north of the country. UNITA asserted it would continue its offensive westwards towards Soyo, a land base for offshore oil operations. According to diplomats, the FAA was surprised by the high level of UNITA armaments following its recovery in early December 1998 from an FAA attack on its headquarters. Since then, UNITA has defeated the FAA in various battles in the north.

Professor Gerald Bender of the University of Southern California asserted that government oil production was expanding: over 800,000 barrels per day, producing revenues of around $1.5bn in 1998. Meanwhile, UNITA's diamond resources were diminishing: it was believed to have mined less than half 1998's estimated $600m-700m overall output.

Financial Times: 5 February 1999

Angolan Leaders Preoccupied by Profit

A 3 March Business Day article stated that during the week beginning 1 March, the World Bank President James Wolfensohn told African cabinet ministers that the priority for development on the continent was to combat corruption. The report asserted that although resurgence of violence in Angola was primarily ascribed to UNITA, neither party to the conflict was committed to the reconstruction of Angola.

The article recalled a 17 January UN Secretary-General's report [see above] which lamented the lack of concrete attempts to establish political support by improving Angolans' basic living conditions and that a state of war appeared to suit both the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and UNITA.

A February 1999 report by the State Department claimed that the security factors which hampered Angola's democratic transition commensurately affected transition from a state-led economic system to one centred around market principles: governmental economic policies were designed for war allowing the administration to resist appeals for more transparency in public accounting. The State Department report added that the MPLA failed to liberalise sufficiently import rules or manage its regulatory agencies to enable importing goods and services essential for the economy, since reform would compromise this source of massive personal enrichment.

The Business Day report declared that MPLA was prepared to pay their Washington consultants and military élites handsomely. Tacit approval would then be provided for other security personnel to be paid through extorting the civilian population and committing human rights abuses, mostly with impunity. The continuing existence of Jonas Savimbi provided the MPLA with justification.

The report questioned the MPLA's ability to win popular support without Savimbi's involvement in government. However, civilians in UNITA-held territory lived under a brutal form of economic feudalism: their crops and other goods could be seized by UNITA troops and they could be subjected to forced labour, including military service.

Business Day: 3 March 1999

Secretary-General's MONUA Report (2)

The 24 February report covered developments between 17 January and 23 February.

Political Developments

Kofi Annan expressed concern over the continued heavy fighting in several parts of the Angola.

The Secretary-General acknowledged that on 27 January, the National Assembly of Angola reiterated its view that the mandate of the MONUA should be ended. It also declared Savimbi to be a war criminal and an international terrorist and called for his arrest and prosecution. On 18 February, the Chief State Prosecutor of Angola indicated that Savimbi would be charged with war crimes and that proceedings against him would start soon.

Annan noted that on 29 January, President dos Santos appointed a new cabinet and temporarily assumed the functions of Prime Minister and CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces. Due to the renewed fighting, on 18 February 18, the Angolan government and the UNITA Restoration Committee (UNITA Renovada) agreed that the second round of the Presidential elections would be cancelled. The elections had already been delayed since 1995.

It was noted that on 2 February, the National Assembly suspended the five UNITA deputies who had been arrested during the first half of January for their alleged collusion with Savimbi, thereby lifting their immunity. Annan acknowledged that several UNITA deputies had expressed fear for their lives after MONUA's expected withdrawal from Angola.

Annan stated that on 3 February the Standing Committee of the Political Commission of UNITA expressed disagreement with the assessment of the three Observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the USA) regarding the current situation in Angola. UNITA laid the blame for the crisis on the government and in particular dos Santos who, it claimed, had openly declared war on UNITA.

The Secretary-General understood that on 4 February, Angolan Minister of Defence, Paihama, named seven neighbouring countries which had allegedly supported Savimbi, and warned that Angola reserved the right of retaliation.

UNITA Secretary-General Gato complained to Annan's Special Representative Issa Diallo of attempts to sideline UNITA and that humanitarian assistance was not reaching people in UNITA-controlled areas. Later in the report Annan expressed concern at the problems of access and called for cooperation from both sides to enable humanitarian workers to reach people.

The Military Situation

Annan reported large numbers of civilian casualties in the town of Malange, which was also overwhelmed by the influx of almost 100, 000 displaced persons. UNITA announced on 9 February that it had captured two diamond mines in the northeast and killed 19 foreigners. Annan also noted that there were abundant rumours about the induction of a large number of foreign troops by both sides. There were reports of Congolese troops undergoing training with the FAA.

Security of UN Personnel

Annan regretted the murder on 1 February of  a Namibian peacekeeper serving with MONUA by the Angolan National Police (ANP). The culprits were arrested.

After extensive negotiations, on 25 January a UN investigation team with a UNITA escort reached the crash site of the UN plane which went down on 2 January. Time at the site was restricted due to difficulty of access. From preliminary observations of the team, it seemed that the aircraft was attempting to make an emergency landing when it lost control. It also seemed that the aircraft had been on fire and continued to burn after impact. Flight data recording equipment was missing and there were numerous bullet holes in the tail section of the aircraft. It was unlikely that there were any survivors since very few human remains had been recovered.

Human Rights Aspects

Annan acknowledged that continued fighting in some provinces had further contributed to the dramatic deterioration in the human rights situation, particularly with regard to the civilian population.

The Secretary-General also expressed concern at the increase in the number of abuses committed against members of the Roman Catholic Church in the last year, allegedly by UNITA fighters. Protestant churches had also been abused particularly by government elements. Freedom of expression had come under pressure, with journalists being detained.

Humanitarian Situation

Annan expressed concern that the humanitarian situation in Angola was likely to deteriorate over the coming months. The situation had attained devastating proportions, comparable with the humanitarian catastrophe in Angola during the fighting in 1993 and 1994.

There were now over 550,000 displaced persons in Angola as a result of the conflict. Moreover, UNHCR  reported that 19,000 Angolan refugees had recently arrived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Also higher levels of malnutrition, especially among young children were reported, along with dismal sanitation and health conditions. Outbreaks of TB had been reported in some areas. Overcrowding in the camps had further exacerbated the situation.

Annan announced that the continuing security risk was restricting humanitarian operations to emergency projects were being undertaken. Fighting in the country and the withdrawal of international personnel from the provinces had seriously hampered the UN mine action programme.

Drawdown of MONUA and its Liquidation Phase

Annan noted that the relocation of UN personnel and equipment to Luanda by February 23 had proceeded smoothly. Up to 260 troops would remain during the liquidation phase estimated at six months.

UN Doc: S/1999/202: 24 February 1999

Central African Republic

Secretary-General's MINURCA Report

On 29 January, Kofi Annan reported that he had dispatched Hédi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, as his Personal Envoy to the Central African republic (CAR). He was to address Security Council concerns over the maintenance of  the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) with its existing structure and overall strength until the presidential elections scheduled for late 1999.

The Secretary-General stated that legislative elections on 22 November and 13 December 1998 to decide the 109 seats in the National Assembly returned 54 seats to the ruling party and its allies, the Mouvance Présidentielle, and 55 to the coalition of opposition parties. However, an opposition legislator subsequently announced his support for the Mouvance Présidentielle, which then claimed a majority and the right to the presidency and other senior positions. Opposition parties walked out of the Assembly after it convened on 4 January 1999 and the impasse has persisted. President Ange Félix Patassé has since nominated alternative members of government.

Implementation of the Bangui Agreements

Annan asserted that although the restructuring of the armed forces and the adoption of measures to strengthen the economy were the most important aspects of the Bangui Agreements, they still remained to be accomplished. He suggested that a small team of UN military experts provide managerial and organisational advice to the CAR Ministry of Defence which would complement assistance MINURCA was already providing to CAR's police and gendarmerie

Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Annan stated that the outbreak of heavy fighting in DRC in January prompted an influx of 5,000 refugees into CAR. A defence agreement between President Patassé and DRC President Laurent Kabila enabled 550 Congolese government troops to return to Congolese territory. The CAR opposition stressed that the National Assembly had not ratified the defence agreement. Annan's Personal Envoy made several points to the CAR government:

(a) The impasse over the National Assembly should be resolved consistently with the spirit of the Bangui so to ensure the constructive participation of the opposition and the early adoption of a budget;

(b) Efforts should be made to advance the restructuring of the armed forces, including the restriction of the activity of the Special Force for the Defence of Republican Institutions (FORSDIR) to exclude traditional police and gendarmerie functions;

(c) The government should comply with agreements with the international financial institutions (IFIs), in particular ensuring the payment of salaries, the privatisation of state enterprises and the maintenance of state revenues at a suitable level;

(d) The CAR should not be drawn into the DRC conflict.

In response, Patassé and other interlocutors stated:

(a) Government attempts to reach agreement with the opposition parties on the formation of a government had been rejected, but Patassé remained open to a solution;

(b) Despite the hindrance of financial restrictions, the government was committed to advance the restructuring of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA);

(c) The government would uphold its agreements with IFIs;

(d) The government did not believe its territory was at risk from the DRC opposition.

Annan stated that Patassé made a number of commitments in a letter to him, adherence to which would lead within a short time to the following outcomes:

(a) The participation of the opposition in the National Assembly and in CAR political life in general;

(b) The adoption of a budget in-line with IFI requirements before their visit in February;

(c) The adoption of the draft laws on the restructuring of the armed forces;

(d) The restriction of FORSDIR activities;

(e) The completion of the privatisation of state enterprises.

Annan asserted that the premature withdrawal of international support in any of the key areas could threaten the fragile progress achieved so far in CAR. Therefore, MINURCA should assist the government prepare and establish a secure environment for forthcoming elections and should monitor and verify their conduct. Thus, MINURCA's military should be maintained at its current strength.

UN Doc: S/1999/98: 29 January 1999

Democratic Republic of Congo

British Initiative for Peace in Congo

A 26 February Times report stated that the UK was leading the first major international diplomatic peace initiative in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), likely to involve the European Union (EU) and the UN. Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd visited the nine countries involved in the conflict as a mediation effort. On 25 February, he described the conflict as being of continental and global importance. He added that the UK had a definite role in mobilising international efforts for peace and in providing practical assistance for a cease-fire and settlement. Lloyd met with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, perceived as DRC President Laurent Kabila's closest ally. Lloyd was doubtful of the existence of sufficient political will to end the conflict.

The Times: 26 February

Commitments to Cease-fire in DRC

A 4 March Africa News Online article cited a 26 February 1999 report by Kofi Annan's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara A. Otunnu. The report came in response to commitments by the Chair of the opposition Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba, in a meeting with Otunnu on 22 February, to uphold a limited cease-fire for emergency humanitarian purposes, in particular for vaccinations and feeding malnourished children. Wamba responded positively to several points raised by Otunnu including recruiting and employing child soldiers and protecting civilian populations.

According to the article, Otunnu further expressed his concern over the increasing tendency to target civilians, citing in particular massacres at Makobolo in January 1999 and at Kasika in August 1998. He urged RCD to accept international experts to investigate the incidents, which Wamba accepted

Wamba stated that the RCD had inherited child soldiers from the 1996-1997 DRC war, adding that the RCD would cooperate with UN agencies and NGOs to ensure their demobilisation and reintegration. He accepted in principle Otunnu's request of a minimum age limit of 18, although practical arrangements for this needed to be worked out. Wamba pledged to observe the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Wamba also agreed with Otunnu's concerns over the use of public media for incendiary information.

Africa News Online: 4 March 1999

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