This Issue

Ethiopia

Victory But Not Peace in the Horn

A 1 March Washington Post report stated that on 28 February Ethiopia declared military victory over Eritrea, while Eritrea acknowledged the loss of most of the territory it had occupied since summer 1998. However, it remained unclear whether a peace settlement was any closer. Both sides claimed thousands of enemy casualties in the four-day final battle. The Ethiopians took the Badme plain - the largest section of disputed land along the 600-mile border area. Eritrea was left with no grounds to maintain opposition to a settlement proposed up by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). On 27 February, the Eritrean ambassador to the UN announced total acceptance of the plan, already signed by Ethiopia. Eritrea had objected to withdrawing from the territory and to allowing Ethiopia to administer it while experts decided the boundary.

The Eritrean statement was welcomed by the UN Security Council, which called for an immediate cease-fire. Ethiopia had not yet given an official response. The report recalled that Eritrea had been a province of Ethiopia until 1993, when a referendum, resulting from 30 years of war, adopted secession, leaving Ethiopia landlocked. There had been talk of reclaiming Eritrea during the recent fighting.

Washington Post: 1 March 1999

OAU Urges Horn Truce

A 2 March Washington Post report stated that on 1 March the OAU demanded a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, Eritrean officials claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties against Ethiopian ground forces, dismissing Ethiopian victory in the Badme as a short-term gain.

Washington Post: 2 March 1999

Guinea-Bissau

Peace Agreed in Guinea-Bissau

An 18 February Panafrican News Agency report stated that peace negotiations were convened in Lome, Togo, by the incumbent ECOWAS Chair, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, to resolve the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. A 17 February press release suggested that Guinea Bissau President João Bernardo Vieira and opposition leader General Ansumane Mane had  resolved not to return to violence and to cooperate to guarantee peace, which had been absent from Guinea-Bissau since on 7 June 1998. The cessation of hostilities was a prerequisite to establishing a government of national unity agreed in the Abuja accord of 15 December 1998 by the two parties.

According to the PANA report, the press release urged the quick withdrawal of foreign troops, the full deployment of the promised ECOWAS-Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force and the re-opening of the country's air and sea ports to international traffic.

Panafrican News Agency: 18 February 1999

WFP Assists Displaced Guineans

A 24 February Panafrican News Agency report suggested that normality was returning to the capital of Guinea-Bissau, although the scars of the civil war were still visible. Many Bissau residents had fled to Senegal or to the countryside. The World Food Programme (WFP) reported that many people had been displaced during fighting in January and February: 60,000 in Safim, 7,000 in Nhoma, 6,000 in Nhacra, 10,000 in Bafata, 11,000 in Gabu and 30,000 in Prabis and Cumura. The WFP established emergency food programmes in response to the war.

According to the PANA report, the head of the WFP Bissau office, Martin Ohlsen, stated that the programme had assisted 262,000 people since the outbreak of the conflict and the WFP estimated that 36,000 tons of food aid were required over a period of six months. However, Olsen asserted that renewed violence in January prevented these targets being met, delaying the programme. Thus, the situation might have become critical by the end of March.

The PANA report declared that the government of national unity was sworn in on 20 February, although the population did not yet trust the former belligerents' commitment to long-term peace.

Panafrican News Agency: 24 February 1999

Secretary-General's Report on Guinea-Bissau

The 17 March report considered implementation of the Abuja Agreement of 1 November 1998, by which the government and the self-proclaimed military junta in Guinea Bissau agreed:

(a) to reaffirm the 26 August 1998 cease-fire agreement;

(b) to withdraw all foreign troops, accompanied by the deployment of ECOMOG;

(c) that ECOMOG would guarantee security along the border with Senegal, separate the warring parties and guarantee humanitarian access, and open the airport and the seaport;

(d) to establish a government of national unity;

(e) and to hold general and presidential elections not later than the end of March 1999, observed by ECOWAS.

Implementation of the Abuja Agreement

Political Aspects: Installing the Government of National Unity

The Secretary-General asserted that, on 3 December 1998, Francisco Fadul was appointed Prime Minister of the new transitional government of national unity. On 8 January 1999, members of the transitional government were appointed: 5 ministers and three secretaries of state were nominated by President Vieira, while three ministers and four secretaries of state were nominated by the self-proclaimed junta. Installation of the government was delayed by demands by Fadul that foreign troops first be expelled and by the resumption of fighting on 31 January.

Annan stated that a draft cease-fire was signed on 3 February and on 20 February, the government of national unity was formally inaugurated. Effective functioning of the government was hampered by several obstacles, including: inadequate facilities and staff and other resources following the fighting; the disruption of the financial system and the lack of operational funds; and mistrust between the two sides.

Military and Security Aspects: The Deployment of ECOMOG and the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

According to Annan, between 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 an advance ECOMOG contingent of 110 Togolese troops was deployed in Guinea-Bissau and a further contingent of 300 troops was deployed on 4 February. At the time of writing, ECOMOG strength stood at 600 troops from Benin, the Gambia, Niger and Togo. Mali also announced its intention to contribute 125 soldiers. The withdrawal of foreign troops was expected to be completed soon.

The Secretary-General added that ECOMOG's operational capabilities were hampered by its lack of communications equipment. Its border deployment required more troops. However, the President supported additional troops, while the Prime Minister believed them to be unnecessary.

A 17 February agreement between Vieira and Mane prompted the disarmament of the forces of the two ex-belligerents by ECOMOG. ECOMOG had recovered and stored all heavy weapons country-wide and all light weapons in the capital. It also launched a de-mining campaign.

Electoral aspects

Annan revealed that the Abuja election deadline could not be met and must be rescheduled for constitutional reasons, although different parties had differing views over potential dates for this. Both Vieira and Fadul requested UN electoral assistance, specifically to coordinate international community assistance, provide technical assistance and coordinate international poll-day observation.

The Peace-Building Support Office

The Secretary-General announced that, on 3 March 1999, the Security Council approved a UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). A small assessment mission from the Department of Political Affairs then visited Bissau from 8 to 11 March 1999. UNOGBIS' primary objective was to provide the political framework and leadership for coordinating and integrating the activities of the UN system, particularly up to the elections.

Kofi Annan asserted that the situation in Guinea-Bissau remained highly fragile: the economy, basic social services and state institutions all required rebuilding virtually from scratch.

UN Doc: S/1999/294: 17 March 1999

Nigeria

Oil Firms Support Nigerian Military

A 26 February report in the Times suggested that the relationship between multinational oil companies and African military dictatorships would be highlighted as a result both of Nigerian democratisation and of demands in Congress to investigate allegations that US oil company Chevron assisted Nigerian security forces to kill civilians. Congressman Dennis Kucinich suggested to the House International Relations Committee that Nigerian forces used Chevron's helicopters to bomb villages and terrorise protesters against environmental degradation of the Niger delta.

The report stated that such allegations followed a Human Rights Watch report, The Price of Oil, accusing Chevron, Shell, Agip, Elf-Aquitaine and Mobil of damaging the delta's environment, not cleaning up slicks that damaged fishing areas and colluding in murder and illegal detention. Attention was also likely fall on the role of oil companies elsewhere in West Africa.

According to human rights groups and diplomats, the support of French company Elf-Aquitaine for Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who deposed Pascal Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville, was under covert investigation. A French mercenary who worked for Nguesso asserted that such support was known about and approved of in Paris.

The report warned that impending democracy in Nigeria was likely to alter the previous secrecy of the oil companies, since the unpublished Constitution for Nigeria's Fourth Republic was likely to incorporate clauses protecting the rights of communities affected by oil operations. Protesters have kidnapped several oil workers and have seized offshore rigs.

The Times: 26 February 1999

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone Peace Hopes Premature

A 4 January Financial Times report stated that the restoration to power of the Sierra Leonean elected government in March 1998 did not signify the desired end to armed conflict in that country. Over the previous two weeks, opposition fighters with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and troops loyal to the ousted junta had again neared Freetown. ECOMOG, which had returned the government to power, was unable to prevent opposition forces from re-capturing their north-western headquarters in Makeni.

The FT report declared that ECOMOG's main troop-contributor, Nigeria, had deployed an additional 7,000 troops to the area over the previous week as part of plans to bring the force's total strength to 20,000 – incorporating around a quarter of Nigeria's army. Local militia fought alongside ECOMOG, remaining the only indigenous force consistently loyal to President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The report declared that ECOMOG had consequently gained military superiority, but it remained sceptical over the force's ability to effect a long-term military solution.

According to the FT report, recent events coincided with a worsening economic crisis in Nigeria as a result of a forecast 54% drop in revenues for 1999 due to global oil-price decreases. A senior Sierra Leonean official conceded that an elected civilian government in Nigeria following elections in May 1999 would have difficulties justifying ECOMOG's human and financial costs. Sierra Leonean officials have accused the West of not providing adequate support for the demobilisation of government and opposition troops and the reconstruction of a national army.

Financial Times: 4 January 1999

Secretary-General's UNOMSIL Report (1)

The 7 January report covered developments since 16 December 1998.

Security Situation

The Secretary-General condemned deterioration in the military and security situation in Sierra Leone from 18 December 1998. In response, on 23 December 1998, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) withdrew seven military observers from Makeni to Lungi. Three military observers who had been sent to Daru were also withdrawn to Kenema.

Annan declared that opposition leader Sam Bockarie threatened a New Year assault on Freetown unless the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader Corporal Foday Sankoh was released. International personnel began to be relocated and withdrawn as a precautionary measure, including some non-essential UNOMSIL civilian staff, UNOMSIL military observer teams, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs. The UK government evacuated British and other nationals.

The seizure of Makeni on 27 December 1998 prompted UNOMSIL to withdraw most of its personnel from Freetown to Conakry, stated the Secretary-General. A contingent of Malian troops were to reinforce ECOMOG, financed by the Netherlands, while their transportation and that of a Gambian contingent was to be funded by the UK. The UK also announced a further £1 million to the Sierra Leone government and to ECOMOG.

According to Annan, on 6 January, the RUF offensive took control of the centre of Freetown; on the same day, UNOMSIL completed its evacuation from the capital. On 20 December 1998, Liberian President Charles Taylor closed the border with Sierra Leone and deployed Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) troops along it. Taylor had received reports of an impending attack against Liberia in late December, to take place in the context of a planned offensive by ECOMOG and the Sierra Leonean Civil Defence Force (CDF) against opposition forces at Kailahun. Taylor suggested joint ECOMOG/Liberian border patrols.

Human Rights/Humanitarian Situation

Annan declared that opposition attacks involved murdering civilians, destroying homes and abductions. Women and children were deliberately targeted while civilians were summarily executed. UNOMSIL also received accusations against ECOMOG of assault, harassment and unnecessary detention, primarily of young men. CDF troops were further accused of a summary killing on 26 December.

Annan warned that overland access to the interior had been cut off while the capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance was restricted due to international withdrawals. Therefore, available sufficient food stocks could not be distributed outside Freetown, risking a humanitarian crisis of major proportions.

International Initiatives

The Secretary-General endorsed the conclusions of the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone. On 28 December, the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria) had held an extraordinary ministerial-level meeting in Abidjan, and was expanded to include Togo, the current ECOWAS Chair. The Committee's final communiqué asserted that both the ECOMOG Force Commander and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone had accused Liberia of providing military support to opposition forces. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia denied this and demanded an international investigation.

The Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG told the meeting that mercenaries were assisting the opposition. The Liberian government accused the current and former governments of Sierra Leone of using Liberian mercenaries. The Committee (now the Committee of Six on Sierra Leone) appealed to the opposition to: cease fighting; lay down their arms; recognise the government; participate in dialogue; and accept the government's offer of amnesty. It urged the international community to assert that the opposition would never be accorded recognition as the legitimate government and requested the speedy provision of logistical support to ECOMOG.

UNOMSIL Activities

UNOMSIL's future appeared less clear than it did a few weeks previously and the expansion of the civilian staff envisaged in Annan's report of 16 December report  had become untenable. However, UNOMSIL could still: facilitate discussions; help reactivate the demilitarisation programme for former Sierra Leonean fighters; continue to facilitate the reconstitution of a national army and the reform of the national police; and continue monitoring the human rights situation.

Annan recommended extending the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 March 1999. He intended to reduce the number of military observers, retaining a small number in Conakry -  to return to Sierra Leone when conditions permitted - as well as the necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff.

UNOMSIL contributions as at 10 January 1999 [Military Observers (MO); Others^a (O); Total (T)]

China 3 (MO) 3 (T); Egypt 2 (MO) 2 (T); India 6 (MO) 15 (O) 21 (T); Kenya 4 (MO) 4 (T); Kyrgyzstan 1 (MO) 1 (T); New Zealand 2 (MO) 2 (T); Pakistan 5 (MO) 5 (T); Russian Federation 7 (MO) 7 (T); United Kingdom 7 (MO) 7 (T); Zambia 4 (MO) 4 (T); Total 41^b (MO); 15 (O); 56 (T);  (MO).

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.

UN Doc: S/1999/20: 7 January 1999

Nigerian Problems Impact on Sierra Leone

A 12 January Financial Times report suggested that the worsening crisis in Nigeria's oil-producing Niger Delta could impact on Sierra Leone. Local militant activists demanding a greater proportion of oil-profits were able to interrupt a third of the country's oil production. The report suggested that military success by Sierra Leonean opposition forces against ECOMOG might encourage further obstruction by Delta activists unless demands were met. Leaders of the three political parties which fought recent state elections had not revealed any plans in relation to Sierra Leone.

Financial Times: 12 January1999

RUF Supports Cease-fire

According to an Associated Press report, opposition and UN officials in Sierra Leone announced that the RUF was ready to agree a cease-fire. However, UN Special Envoy Francis Okelo could not clarify whether the government or ECOMOG supported the proposal.

On 14 January, Ivory Coast Foreign Minister Essy Amara announced that President Kabbah would release jailed opposition leader Foday Sankoh if his troops ceased hostilities and upheld certain undisclosed conditions. Opposition field commanders rejected a previous cease-fire proposal during the week beginning 4 January. Sankoh has been in prison since being convicted of treason and mass murder in October 1998.

Associated Press: 14 January 1999

Sierra Leone Accuses Aid Groups

According to a 15 January Associated Press report, UN and relief officials stated that ECOMOG accused foreign aid groups of assisting opposition forces and demanded that their communication equipment be seized. In return, officials from two major aid agencies charged ECOMOG with hampering their efforts.

A UN official declared that relief groups had been given until 15 January to give up their communications equipment to ECOMOG, some of which the peacekeepers alleged had fallen into opposition hands. However, an official for a major aid agency warned that this would threaten remaining humanitarian links with the outside world and already inadequate medicine and food distribution efforts. The official further revealed that aid workers would also not be able to arrange safe passage with combatants, making it too dangerous to continue to work.

The AP report asserted that most foreign aid workers had already left the country. On 14 January, the government requested that representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross leave Freetown for security reasons. On 14 January, ECOMOG withdrew troops from Monrovia, where they had been stationed since 1990.

The AP report revealed unconfirmed accounts of Ukranian and African mercenaries assisting opposition fighters in Sierra Leone. The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced a similarly unconfirmed report of the arrest of an Israeli private arms dealer by Sierra Leonean officials on suspicion of assisting opposition forces.

Associated Press: 15 January 1999

UN Criticises ECOMOG

A 19 February Daily Telegraph report stated that, on 18 February, the UN accused over 100 members of ECOMOG of summarily executing civilians and employing excessive force. ECOMOG allegedly executed dozens of civilians believed to have collaborated with opposition forces. According to Olara Otunnu, the UN envoy for child soldiers, two ECOMOG generals had acknowledged the excesses and ordered the detention and interrogation of those accused.

The Daily Telegraph: 19 February 1999

UK Assesses Aid for Sierra Leone

A 20 February Times article reported a meeting in Freetown during the week beginning 15 February between Britain's Joint Rapid Deployment Force, headed by Brigadier David Richards and ECOMOG regarding Sierra Leone. British ministers were to review recommendations for providing military and civilian aid. A Foreign Office spokesperson revealed that one option under discussion was to help to develop a Sierra Leonean army.

The Times: 20 February 1999

Secretary-General's UNOMSIL Report (2)

Military and Security Developments

Rebel Attack on Freetown and its Aftermath

A 4 March report by Kofi Annan declared that the seizure of Freetown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF on 6 January 1999 lasted for four days before the opposition forces were ousted in an ECOMOG counterattack. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people were killed in the fighting, many more civilians were wounded and up to 150,000 were displaced around the capital. Large numbers of public buildings and homes were burned by the opposition.

Annan warned that several thousand opposition troops remained in the Peninsula Mountains surrounding Freetown, despite efforts by ECOMOG and the CDF militia to remove them, and might also have infiltrated the city. Opposition forces were believed to control much of the north of Sierra Leone, although ECOMOG had challenged them around Lunsar, Port Loko and Kambia, and still held Kabala and Bumbuna. In the south, ECOMOG resisted several attacks on Kenema, while the situation in Bo remained calm. Annan said that opposition forces employed some foreign mercenaries, including Europeans and Liberians, and received weapons from outside Sierra Leone.

The Secretary-General cautioned that statements that had been made by candidates in the Nigerian elections cast doubt over ECOMOG's longer-term future. It was unlikely that the Sierra Leonean army could cope alone. On 3 March, after improvements in the security situation, a limited number of UN personnel were allowed to return to the country.

Disarmament and Demobilisation

Annan stated that the government relocated ex-soldiers from the disarmament and demobilisation camp at Lungi to Freetown, most of whom had either joined the opposition, had disappeared or had been killed. The government subsequently announced it had not changed its policy on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. It welcomed the offer by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the UK government to provide food and medical treatment for ex-combatants.

Civilian Police

Annan reported that the death of over 200 police officers and the destruction of police property had significantly impaired the government's efforts to maintain law and order in Freetown and the government's plans to reorganise the police force would require considerable external assistance.

Political Developments

Activities of the Government of Sierra Leone

Annan reported that the government of Sierra Leone continued to negotiate with the opposition:

- on 7 January 1999, President Kabbah met with Sankoh;

- on 16 January, Kabbah reiterated both his readiness to pursue political dialogue and offer amnesty;

- on 7 February 1999, Kabbah again indicated he would allow Sankoh to meet other RUF leaders, provided the RUF accepted state legitimacy, and that the Abidjan Peace Agreement could be used as a framework for dialogue;

- on 28 February, Kabbah announced that Sankoh and RUF members could hold their internal consultations in Lomé or Bamako, although Sankoh should subsequently return to Freetown to appeal his conviction for treason.

Activities of the UN

Annan stated that his Special Representative participated in several diplomatic initiatives to reinforce ECOMOG and open dialogue with the opposition which culminated in a 29 January meeting in Conakry of the Heads of State of Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria who agreed to convene an ECOWAS summit meeting and a visit by representatives of the ECOWAS Committee of Six to New York to brief the Security Council. Annan's Special Representative also met with RUF representatives in Abidjan on 21 February.

Human Rights

The Secretary-General asserted that a UNOMSIL human rights officer claimed that the ultimate responsibility during the recent fighting for the majority of civilian casualties and for the consequent humanitarian predicament in Freetown rested with the opposition forces. There were an estimated 3,000 and 5,000 casualties of the fighting, at least 2,000 of whom were civilians killed while being used by the opposition as human shields in combat. Many deaths appeared to have been arbitrary and to have been committed by child soldiers or opposition fighters under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Many hundreds of civilians were reported to have been treated for amputation injuries. There were further reports of widespread rape. Annan declared that, by mid-February, child care agencies stated that 2,000 children were unaccounted for in Freetown since 6 January. Opposition forces also deliberately destroyed civilian property. There were also eyewitnesses accounts of summary executions of alleged opposition fighters and rebel sympathisers by ECOMOG troops.

UNOMSIL facilitated the temporary establishment of a Human Rights Committee for Sierra Leone in Conakry, comprising the Sierra Leonean National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the National Forum for Human Rights, UN agencies, humanitarian organisations and UNOMSIL.

Humanitarian Situation

The Secretary-General reported a drastic decline in the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone. The number of refugees increased to an estimated 450,000, as well as an estimated 700,000 internally displaced people. The number of known vulnerable displaced people in the capital was estimated at 200,000, of whom 60,000 had sought refuge in the national stadium. Civilian suffering was being exacerbated by escalating malnutrition levels. Meanwhile, the humanitarian community's ability to supply relief continued to be hampered by the continuing hostilities. Nevertheless, the international humanitarian community has continued operations where accessibility allowed, particularly in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Moyamba.

Financial Aspects

As at 15 February 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to UNOMSIL amounted to $12.5 million. As at the same date, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,666.6 million.

Observations And Recommendations

Annan announced that, since human rights violations appeared to lie at the heart of the Sierra Leonean conflict, he intended to deploy an extra human rights officer to UNOMSIL to expand the mission's reporting and deepen its coverage of human rights abuses and to maintain its technical cooperation with indigenous organisations.

He added that favourable negotiations between the government and the opposition would mean UNOMSIL could continue to render further assistance to the peace process and so he recommended extending the UNOMSIL mandate for three months, until 13 June 1999. He intended to re-establish UNOMSIL in Freetown whenever possible. Initially, he would increase the number of military observers from 8 to 14 and would redeploy the necessary personnel to support the relocation to Freetown.

Contributions to UNOMSIL, as at 1 March 1999:

[Military observers (MO); Others^a (O); Total (T)]: India 2 (MO) 2 (O) 4 (T); Kenya 1 (MO) 1 (T); Kyrgyzstan 1 (MO) 1 (T); Pakistan 1 (MO) 1 (T); Russian Federation 1 (MO) 1 (T); United Kingdom 1 (MO) 1 (T); Total 7^b (MO); 2 (O); 9 (T).

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.

UN Doc: S/1999/237: 4 March 1999

Africa General

Internal Failure Causes African Conflicts

A 25 February Financial Times report urged the international community to withdraw from African conflicts. There had been a recent trend amongst African countries away from recognition of the inviolability of colonial borders and non-interference in other states' internal affairs. The report acknowledged the artificiality of these borders which separated ethnic groups and ancient kingdoms, but stressed that questioning them would encourage a host of conflicts on the continent.

The report asserted that conflicts were actually the result of a lack of governmental control and state failure. Of the 15 current active African conflicts, only that between Ethiopia and Eritrea were border disputes. The problem was not boundaries but state failure.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo had had no effective government for 30 years. Mobutu Sese Seko's government eventually lost the ability to maintain control of security, provide services, or pay civil servants and soldiers. Mobutu was superseded in 1997 by a weak military movement from weaker political roots. Its leader, Laurent Kabila, was incompetent. Subsequently, a weak opposition movement had seized over one-third of the country in only a few months.

The elected Sierra Leonean government was ineffective and was being maintained by Nigerian troops and international support. A brutal opposition movement was supported by diamonds and Liberian military assistance.

The report stated that the devastating humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflicts were the same irrespective of their  causes. However, causes affect solutions. Therefore, the international community's view that conflicts resulting from state failure can be handled like any other was dangerous. Inter-state border conflicts and civil wars between strong states and strong opposition movements were relatively simple, representing the continuation of politics and diplomacy by forcible means, providing a useful role for mediators.

However, conflicts in collapsed states were more diffuse, involving ill-defined actors and goals, leaving unpalatable options for the international community. The present course of negotiations and low-key, ill-defined and short-term intervention was not only ineffective but also potentially counter-productive. Mediation between parties with no ambitions except their own power prolong conflict, while negotiated cease-fires provide antagonists time to regroup, rearm and re-start fighting. For instance, ten years of internationally-sponsored negotiations and settlements had merely induced further fighting in Angola. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance had fuelled conflict in Somalia and was probably doing the same in Sudan.

The report suggested a second option of imposing order from outside through military intervention, rather than persuading states to abide by the rules of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, there were too many conflicts for this. Successful imposition of peace would still necessitate a long-term international presence to rebuild a new system.

According to the report, there was a third option involved attempting to limit the supply of arms to all belligerents. Consequently, one side might prevail enough to reconstruct a state. Alternatively, the antagonists would reach stalemate requiring mutual accommodation in good faith. Thus, intervention could be restricted to the most extreme scenarios like the Rwandan crisis in 1994. Here, preventing genocide superseded consideration of the long-term outcome of intervention.

The report suggested that the international community needed to accept the limitations of its capabilities as the old order broke down, which had never been particularly effective; it had never worked without outside intervention. It proposed that the only long-term sustainable order for the continent was one established and maintained by Africans themselves.

Financial Times: 25 February 1999

Use of Mercenaries Increasing

A 26 February Times report stated that African conflicts were increasingly attracting mercenaries, such as Russian pilots in the Horn of Africa and Ukranian mafiosi in Sierra Leone. Mercenaries stemmed from legitimate contracts, as well as unemployed soldiers from past state systems. They often used cheap former Soviet bloc weapons and provided military skills lacking in African conflicts which frequently involved armed victimisation rather than combat.

The report asserted that mercenaries proliferated in weak states with weak armies. The end of protracted conflicts often supplied mercenary personnel, such as mujahiddin in Bosnia and Chechnya after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, or Serbs in support of former President Mobutu in Zaire after the Dayton accords. Ideological defeats encouraged recruitment, such as apartheid-era South Africans alienated from the new order or the massive reductions in the former Soviet Union's armed forces.

The report warned that mercenaries were difficult to control. For instance, the South African Regulation of Military Assistance Act merely forced the most successful private military company underground. The international convention on mercenaries did not have sufficient signatories to be enacted. Mercenaries moved from conflict to conflict: South African supporters of Mobutu were currently contracted to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

The report asserted that governments saw mercenaries as a deniable foreign policy tool. The MPRI, based in Virginia, maintained close links with Washington. It trained Croatian and Bosnian troops on Washington's behalf and was established in part as a legitimate outlet for former Special Forces troops who it was feared might join the narcotraficantes. The report recalled that Washington even subcontracted its contribution to the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. Weak African states, with politicised and badly trained armed forces, were often incapable of defeating opposition fighters or forcing them to the negotiating table.

The Times: 26 February 1999

Back to top of page

Back to Spring 1999 contents

Back to UN & Conflict Monitor index

Index to Issues

[Index] [About Monitor]