This Issue
Public Security and Post-Settlement Peacebuilding
Laina K. Reynolds, post-graduate student at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and Internet Editor of the UN and Conflict Monitor.
This article explores the challenges of post-settlement peacebuilding, focusing in particular on the role of public security and civilian policing.
Deficit Areas in Post-Settlement Societies
Deficit areas are divided into four principle categories: political-constitutional; military-security; economic-social; and psycho-social.
Military-security
During a protracted internal conflict, the military sector usually expands in size and influence, creating paramilitary units and taking over internal security or police structures. Local leaders can exploit the prevailing lack of law and order and their control of the instruments of violence to gain power and economic advantage, giving them a vested interest in resisting re-integrative peace processes. This pattern is clearly visible among the Bosnian Serbs.
The military-security tasks for peacebuilders include the monitoring of a cease-fire, the separation of forces, the collection of heavy and light weapons, and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of soldiers. There have been problems with all of these areas, exemplified by Jonas Savimbi's troops in Angola rearming themselves under the noses of the UN forces and the discovery of a large FMLN weapons cache after the disarmament process in El Salvador.
In the longer term, reforming the security sector is a vital part of constructing an institutional framework for the protection of human rights. One of the most important challenges is the creation and support of professional, accountable police forces, which will be explored more fully below. The army and other elements of the security sector also require extensive reform in order to bring them firmly under civilian control and improve their accountability and transparency.
Political-constitutional
The peace agreement will normally define the substance of political reforms, depending on the particularities of the conflict and the negotiations. However, all of the peacebuilding missions have included electoral assistance, ranging from registration and voter education programmes to monitoring the conduct of political parties and even conducting the election. The time frame for these reforms is generally one to two years. The UN's high level of success in administering the bureaucratic elements of elections is somewhat offset by the growing realisation within the international community that elections are not the endpoint of the political reform process, but just the beginning. In the polarised politics of post-settlement countries, democracy can have divisive effects, highlighting societal divisions and intensifying confrontation.
Economic/Social Reconstruction
Post-settlement governments often face significant economic-developmental challenges. The international community only usually supports market-oriented reforms, including structural adjustment programmes, with stringent requirements for privatisation and control of public spending. In the short term, these policies can widen the gap between the rich and poor in a society, heightening social tensions and increasing the risk of a return to conflict.
The resumption of normal economic activity is complicated by the lasting effects of the war and by the very presence of the peacebuilding mission. Ineffectively demobilised soldiers may turn to crime, while the return and resettlement of refugees implies resolution of issues around the availability of land, housing and jobs. The huge inflow of funds that accompanies a peacebuilding mission can distort the local economy, destroying indigenous markets and creating an unsustainable culture of dependency.
Psycho-social healing
The healing of the psychological wounds of violence and the reconciliation of antagonistic communities is the most long-term activity in the post-settlement peace process. Reconciliation encompasses many different activities undertaken in the aftermath of a violent conflict. It can mean acquiescence (willing or otherwise) to a given situation, the harmonisation of divergent versions of history, and the restoration of friendly relations. The first sense implies that a majority of the population accepts the goal of eventual reintegration of the society as envisioned in the peace accords. The second is the work of Truth Commissions and other public accountability fora, the third is a long-term process that may take generations.
Problems with the UN model
By and large, UN post-settlement peacebuilding has been unable to fulfil the high expectations placed on it. Each of the operations has been beset by ongoing problems such that the resulting peace can be thought of as self-sustaining in only a very few countries. For example, in Angola the multi-million dollar UNAVEM III was completely unable to prevent a return to civil war in early 1999. There has also been speculation that, in some cases, peacebuilding actually undermines the peace process it was supposed to support. These and other problems have motivated a re-evaluation of the theories and practices that inform the UN intervention model.
One of the most important and yet misunderstood aspects of peace processes is the establishment of personal and public security. However, there is little understanding of exactly how security is created and consolidated following a conflict. The security provided by military peacekeepers is unsustainable in the long term, since eventually UN troops must be withdrawn. This means that, in the long-term, security is best served by the establishment (or re-establishment) of professional local police forces. This has been part of the mandate of many peacebuilding missions, but analyses of these programmes tends to concentrate more on improving the deployment, training and operation of international police monitors. Much more detailed research is needed into how to improve states' capacity to maintain law and order while respecting human rights.
The Reconstruction of Civilian Policing
Civilian police monitors (CIVPOL in UN parlance) were first deployed as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. UN CIVPOL mandates during the Cold War were largely limited to monitoring and supervision of cease-fires. The UN operation in El Salvador, which began in 1992, was the first to envision a complete replacement of the old police with a professional, democratic and civilian force. Since then, police monitoring, reform or reconstruction has become a prominent part of nearly every post-settlement operation. International assistance has been used to train, equip, monitor and even temporarily replace local police forces. In 1997 over 3,000 police officers from 53 countries were engaged in UN operations in 8 countries (1). Despite this growth of international assistance to internal security reforms, there are very few internationally accepted standards for law enforcement practice. Some of the important documents include UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979), the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force (1990) and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1984).
The police reform process has been an important issue in post-settlement contexts as diverse as El Salvador, South Africa and Northern Ireland. It presents three primary challenges: addressing the grievances arising from the role of police in the conflict; dealing adequately with the rise in criminal violence that commonly follows the establishment of a cease-fire; and constructing a future role for the police that fulfils the needs of everyone in the country. In the tense and uncertain atmosphere following a peace accord, the creation of an effective, professional and accountable police force can be a significant factor in securing people's trust in the peace process and the government. Philip Heymann writes,
"A weak system that does not deal with corruption or extortion of the sorts that are rampant in Moscow, that cannot deal with the wealthy and powerful (as was true until recently in Colombia and in Italy), and that cannot prevent systematic violence or intimidation by its own security forces (as has been true at one time or another within the last decade of South Africa, Israel, Spain, and Northern Ireland) is an open announcement that there is inequality in fundamental political rights and a public invitation to disloyalty toward the democratic institutions of each of these countries."(2)
Even so, it is important not to overestimate the potential of a police reform programme in isolation from other systemic reforms. The creation of a democratic police force cannot, by itself, create a democratic system of governance in a country. However, the lack of effective and accountable policing can certainly undermine even the most stable government.
In addition, most analysts agree that it is essential to treat the criminal justice system as a whole in a reform programme, co-ordinating police reform with reforms in the judicial and penal systems. Even if police are successful in apprehending criminals, the existence of a corrupt or ineffectual judiciary and substandard prisons will undermine their efforts. For example, in Haiti the frustration of officers at the release of criminals once they had been handed over to the courts has resulted in some incidents of summary punishment or execution.
A Framework for Transformation
The police reform process can be conceptualised in a similar way to the peacebuilding framework discussed above. One dimension of the framework is temporal, with short-term and long-term elements. The second dimension is functional, with five areas that require detailed attention and planning.
- structure, which includes the overall doctrine and the functions of the police;
- accountability, which includes the internal and external mechanisms for addressing police misconduct;
- composition, or who is allowed to join the police;
- training, both technical and professional;
- resources, from international donors and from within the country.
These areas do not break down so neatly in real life, of course, and there is a high degree of interdependence and overlap between them. Sustained attention to each of these areas does not guarantee the successful establishment of a professional democratic police force, but it does provide a framework for the planning of the process.
The short-term or 'transition' phase of peacebuilding is dominated by the military-led peacekeeping mission. The peacekeeping troops can establish basic area security, but it is often a makeshift combination of hastily trained recruits and members of the old security forces or militias that are responsible for public security. The long-term police reform agenda, or 'consolidation' phase, extends from the second year to whenever the new internal security and criminal justice systems are firmly institutionalised and self-sustaining, which could take as much as ten years or as little as five. There is evidence that the time frame commonly used by the UN in planning peacebuilding missions of two to three years is inadequate for the deep nature of the reforms envisioned."
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Index to Issues
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Long term |
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Structure |
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Accountability |
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Composition |
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Training |
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Structure
Structural reform of the police is about creating a legal and institutional framework for the operation of a professional, accountable police force. The structure and functions of the police are often decided by negotiators as part of the overall peace settlement, so many of the specifics of a restructuring programme will vary from situation to situation. Broadly speaking, however, the restructuring agenda includes three areas that must be addressed by different means in both the short and long-term phases of the reform process: separating the military and police functions; giving police sole responsibility for internal security; and subordinating public security to civilian control.
The process of separating the police and military begins with identifying and disbanding semi-official paramilitaries, militias and other armed groups. Some of the members may be considered combatants and can go through normal demobilisation channels. Failure to accurately distinguish who has served in paramilitary units early in the peace process can jeopardise later attempts to control the composition of the police force.
As early as possible, national and local police leaders who have a strong commitment to the establishment of a democratic, accountable police force must be appointed. Without reformist leaders, the process of restructuring can run into obstructions and delays. A lack of co-operative leadership was a major problem in El Salvador, where the appointment of a former military officer as sub-director of the new National Civilian
Police resulted in delays, violations of the peace accords and human rights abuses. Similar problems emerged in Haiti and in Bosnia. In the longer-term phase of peacebuilding, each of the major themes mentioned above needs to be deepened and institutionalised.
The process of separating the military from internal security functions can be lengthy and complex, particularly in places such as El Salvador and Haiti where there is a long tradition of military involvement in policing. However, it is an important requirement for the establishment of a stable peace. The unstable post-settlement security environment can encourage the use of the military to restore order, jeopardising the structural reforms. Resistance from former élites and problems such as resource shortages further invite reversion to old, familiar structures. For these reasons, international and local reformers must monitor the development of the police to ensure that reforms are maintained in the long term.
Accountability
The importance and difficulty of developing police accountability warrants separate consideration. In El Salvador, South Africa, Guatemala, Northern Ireland and other locations the security forces themselves have been one of the main sources of insecurity for citizens, who had no redress against abuse, torture and murder. Insofar as public trust and co-operation are essential for a police force to function, a new police force must make a clear break with the past and institute transparent, tough mechanisms for the investigation and punishment of officers who abuse their authority. Towards that end there must be independent disciplinary mechanisms to receive and investigate complaints, maintain the personal safety of informants, and discipline officers or turn their cases over to the criminal courts for prosecution. Real accountability also requires the existence of an effective judicial system that can prosecute the most severe abuses.
It is important to set up the offices and structures for internal discipline concurrently with the deployment of new officers. If these positions are left unfilled until later, as they were in El Salvador and Haiti, new police officers run the risk of adopting the same culture of impunity that infected the previous regime. The internal oversight office must be capable of investigating complaints about police behaviour and have sufficient independence and resources to ensure it has the capacity to act against senior police officials as well as beat officers.
Accountability also requires an effective public complaints procedure, including a human rights ombudsperson or similar office to investigate complaints and ensure confidentiality or protection. International monitors can provide such services impartially until a sufficient level of trust has built up between the authorities and the population to enable autonomous operation. Effective accountability mechanisms will facilitate public faith in the new security force. Inevitable cases of excessive use of force or corruption must be dealt with by penalising the offending officer. The internal disciplinary office should strive to publicly and firmly punish proven cases of misconduct, ultimately through prosecution in a criminal court if necessary.
Composition
An early challenge for post-settlement police forces is deciding who will be eligible to join, because of the active role that internal security institutions may have played in the conflict. The population may be quite sensitive to their former oppressors being given responsibility for public security, as they were in Haiti. Furthermore, two major risks accompany the incorporation of army officers into the new police force. The first is that the presence of known human rights abusers on the force will destroy the community's trust in the new force. The second is that the example of abusive commanding officers will taint the performance of those he or she commands.
The problem of composition is particularly salient in regard to interim arrangements before the new force can be deployed. Military peacekeepers are often unwilling to take on the responsibility of public security, but the old security providers may be discredited and unable to maintain order. The rise in crime following a peace settlement means that there is an immediate need for competent policing, but it takes time to train new police recruits, and even more time for the newly deployed officers to acquire the experience to be truly effective. In these circumstances, it has sometimes been necessary to accept a larger role for the military or the old police in the interim period than is desirable in the longer term. This dilemma can be balanced by providing international monitors to accompany the interim security forces and ensure respect for human rights.
Identification and disqualification of the worst human rights abusers from the former police regime is also a problem. The process of vetting will not necessarily be easy. For instance, in El Salvador, authorities delayed or withheld lists of security officers from international authorities. In Bosnia they dealt with this problem by publishing lists of applicants for police jobs in the local papers for the review and approval of the local community (3).
Other standards and procedures for entry may include educational requirements, interviews, exams and other ways of determining candidates' suitability. It is important that the standards be applied equally on an individual basis and that they are fair and consistent. In El Salvador, irregularities in the vetting procedure and the admittance of some former military personnel in contravention of the accords was damaging to public trust in the impartiality of the new civilian police (4). The composition of the civilian police force can play an important role in its effectiveness and legitimacy among the population. As the institution develops, it should try to incorporate previously underrepresented groups, such as ethnic minorities and women (5).
Training
There are two sets of training needs for a post-settlement civilian police force. The easier of the two is training in basic, practical policing skills. The more difficult, and arguably more important training amounts to inculcating a new culture of democratic policing. The training programme will generally include courses in international human rights laws and standards as they apply to policing, the use of firearms, crowd control, investigative techniques and other basic policing skills. The exact content will vary according on the specific requirements of each country's justice system and on the laws of the country. For example, in Bosnia members of the restructured police forces were required to take a one-week 'human dignity' course followed by a three-week 'transition' course in policing skills. (6)
The immediate need for police personnel to establish and maintain public security will create pressure for quick deployment of new officers, but inexperienced newly trained officers may not be effective at controlling crime. The mentoring of new officers by UN CIVPOL monitors has been an effective adjunct, in some cases, to formal academy-based training. International police in this role can provide on-the-job training as well as monitoring the performance of their mentees. If this method is used, care should be taken that CIVPOL officers, who come from diverse policing cultures themselves, have the necessary training or qualifications to give appropriate and consistent instruction to trainees.
At the outset of a post-settlement training programme, most of the police trainers will probably come from outside of the country. In the long-term, the international community will need to focus on building the host country's capacity to train their own police by training the trainers. The range of the curriculum will also need to be expanded so police academies can support leadership training and deploy specialised units for combating narcotics, organised crime and other problems.
Resources
A continuing problem in the construction of civilian police forces has been the provision of adequate resources. In most of the recent peacebuilding missions, the police force has been faced with an immediate requirement for the basic tools of the job: radios, handcuffs, uniforms and so on. Simple administrative material is also often needed. In Bosnia one international police monitor greatly assisted the station he was posted at by introducing a standardised incident report form. (7) International donors can provide some of this equipment and some can also be recycled from newly demobilised military units.
Police are hugely expensive to train, equip and support, and post-conflict governments rarely have the resources to devote to this undertaking. International donors are required to fill the resource gap, providing funding for infrastructure, such as training facilities, as well as the personnel for developing training curricula, etc. A lack of funding can cause important tasks to be delayed, perhaps damaging the long-term viability of the process. However, in the long term, international aid for the police will inevitably taper off. This means that the government will need to find sources from within its budgets to adequately resource the continued operation of the police force.
Conclusion
These five areas constitute the core issues of a post-settlement police reform process. The composition, structure, accountability, training and resources of the new force have been important, to different degrees, in a variety of police reform processes in many different countries. The framework does not constitute a set of recommendations, or a recipe for the foolproof production of a democratic police force, but does flag up important points in each of the areas as well as potential problems. For the international community, which is increasingly promoting sweeping reform of the police as an important component of post-settlement peacebuilding, this framework highlights the complexity of the reconstruction process. It is clear that security is an absolute requirement for the success of post-settlement reconstruction. If citizens do not feel safe, they will not begin the process of rebuilding their lives and their societies.
Notes
(1) Robert M. Perito (1997), "Managing U.S. Participation in International Police Operations," in National Institute of Justice, Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping—A workshop series: A Role for Democratic Policing (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 6 October 1997), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/intdocs.htm, p. 9.
(2) Philip B. Heymann (1995), "Principles Of Democratic Policing," in National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Policing in Emerging Democracies: Workshop Papers and Highlights (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 14-15 December 1995), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/int97.htm
(3) Human Rights Watch (1998), Bosnia and Hercegovina: Beyond Restraint: Politics and the Policing Agenda of the United Nations International Police Task Force, 10(5), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/bosnia/
(4) William Stanley (1993), Risking Failure: The Problems and Promises of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America and Hemisphere Initiatives), p. 7.
(5) Charles Call (1997), "Police Reform, Human Rights and Democratization in Post-conflict Settings: Lessons from El Salvador," paper from USAID Conference, After the War is Over, What Comes Next? Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Reintegration in Post-conflict Societies, (30-31 October 1997).
(6) Report Of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Mission In Bosnia And Herzegovina (16 September 1998), UN DOC S/1998/862, para. 8.
(7) Perito (1997), p. 10.
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