This Issue
The UN and NATO: Partners or Competitors?
On 1 March, the United Nations Association (UNA) and the UN All Party Parliamentary Group organised a symposium considering future UN/NATO relations ahead of NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in April 1999.
Introduction
At their inception the UN and NATO were entirely different organisations based on opposing premises and with differing objectives.
The UN was established in 1945 on the ruins of the failed League of Nations in the aftermath of two horrific world wars. The aim was to provide a forum for resolution of international disputes through either political or if necessary military means. The UN was intended as a democratic global peace and security organisation, without whose authority no member state could act against another member state militarily (except in self defence).
In contrast, NATO was established as an exclusively military alliance. Within the context of the East/West confrontation after World War II, fears for European democracy increased and the need for a military alliance linking the US with Europe seemed clear. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4th 1949, its defining characteristic being Article V, which stated that an armed attack on any member of the Alliance would be viewed as an attack on all. NATO activity was limited to within the geographical perimeters of its member states, operating within the principles of the UN Charter. The Alliance avowed to act only under the authority of the UN Security Council, except when one of its member states was threatened.
Throughout the Cold War the two organisations maintained no contact. However, with the end of the Cold War their roles became increasingly ill-defined and, perhaps more importantly, seemed to be dangerously overlapping, as events in Bosnia have demonstrated. NATO has at times acted under very doubtful UN authorisation, leading to fears over the possibility of NATO bypassing the UN altogether. The role of the NATO summit in April 1999 in redefining the Alliance's future function invites debate and discussion.
The following is a summary of the symposium.
PART 1: Introductions and Disccussions
A) Can the UN and NATO Happily Co-Exist?
Sir David Hannay (Former Ambassador to the UN)
During the Cold War era there had been no UN/NATO overlap or even contact. NATO had gained no experience of peacekeeping, while it had addressed threats to international security exclusively within the context of the East/West confrontation. Competing vetoes had proscribed Security Council (SC) resolutions for UN/NATO cooperation.
NATO initially avoided post-Cold War involvement in any major conflicts, although until 1992 all such conflicts had occurred outside its operational area. The UN was wary of involvement in the conflict in Bosnia, exemplified by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requesting that other organisations take the lead.
NATO became increasingly involved in Bosnia during 1993 as it was contracted to up-hold no-fly zones over the country. A NATO ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs in response to incidents in Sarajevo in 1994 brought about a lasting cease-fire. However, NATO deterrence was less successful in relation to atrocities in Bihac, Gorazde and Srebrenica. Tension arose between NATO air commandos and UN peacekeeping forces on the ground. In August 1995, NATO air strikes and the build up of UN ground troops convinced the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Dayton agreement.
Judging the success of IFOR and SFOR has been complex. However, the operations have been remarkable, involving input from non-NATO states, including Russia. More importantly, the end of the Bosnian war was seen as being a result of an unprecedented NATO/UN cooperation.
A UN political framework existed for action in Kosovo based around the concept of autonomy. UN requirements were violated by Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Subsequent military threats by NATO forced agreement to a settlement by the warring parties with an OSCE verifying force. The threat of a Russian veto had prevented the SC from endorsing NATO's actions. The best possible outcome would be the threat of NATO force bringing about a political agreement.
The above examples of UN/NATO cooperation demonstrated that the two institutions had developed a good working relationship, particularly at senior level. Since 1992 NATO has evolved significantly, incorporating peacekeeping, deterrence and humanitarian assistance capabilities, bringing it into the UN field. Both institutions maintained differing areas of expertise: NATO's superior military capacity against UN supremacy in terms of legality and legitimacy. NATO has always sought to work within the framework of UN resolutions. It has never strayed outside Europe and has avoided involvement in the former Soviet Union, such as in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The question now was whether NATO could, under any circumstances, act without specific UN authority. Currently, the use of the veto was increasingly obstructing UN action. NATO activities in Kosovo took place within the framework of UN Chapter V11 resolutions and, while the conflict was an internal matter for the Federa Republic of Yugoslavis (FRY), it nevertheless threatened international peace and security, justifying action. Observers should not confuse rhetoric by individuals within NATO with action by the Alliance proper.
Questions
Lord Kennet highlighted US ambitions to expand NATO into Asia as part of a plan for a global military pact, demonstrated by recent attempts to sidestep UN authority. What would prevent other regional organisations from undertaking such unilateral action?
Sir David Hannay responded that regional and subregional organisations were being encouraged to act where the UN could or would not. Regional organisations incorporated self-stabilising elements and strengthening them had to take place within the norms of international law. These organisations should have some autonomy: for the UN to control all regional organisations would be far too complex.
Kjeld Åkjaer (Formerly on World Federation of UNAs Executive Committee) urged the reinforcement of the OSCE in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; although European security required Russian input, there were no plans to bring in Russia as an equal partner in NATO.
Binty Nielson (UNA Denmark) emphasised the dilemma between requirements and demands for humanitarian action and the need for consensus within the SC.
Sir David Hannay pointed out that the US was also keen to reinforce the OSCE: it had insisted the OSCE oversee the Bosnian elections. However, the cumbersome OSCE decision-making machinery hampered its ability to take decisive action. The international community was justified in responding to breaches of international law by Slobodan Milosevic. The legality of the bombing of Serbia in 1995 was doubtful, but should be regarded within the context of Srebenica; action was the only form of pressure the Serbian government seemed to respond to. NATO airstrikes had proved effective against Bosnian Serbs in 1995, who had previously appeared impervious to external pressure. Although there was no specific SC authorisation for force against Belgrade, there were Chapter VII resolutions requiring a political settlement in Kosovo.
B) The UN and NATO's Structural Relationship: The Bosnian Experience
Martin Smith (lecturer at Sandhurst)
Initial impetus for the post-Cold War UN-NATO détente emanated from the UN: in particular, Boutros Boutros-Ghali favoured the regionalisation of security, exemplified in An Agenda for Peace. In March 1992 he personally contacted the then NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner. The subsequent evolution of the relationship has been incremental and ad hoc.
Three major lines of communication existed between the institutions, which did not always run smoothly. First was the institutional link between Boutros-Ghali and Woerner, who was the first Westerner to suggest NATO might operate out of area. Kofi Annan, at the time Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, was also supportive of UN/NATO links. Second, SC resolutions were, after 1993, supported by North Atlantic Council (NAC) declarations. Third, between 1993 and 1995, an operational connection opened up between Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
Sources of tension also existed on three primary levels: the political and diplomatic; the strategic; and the operational. On the political/diplomatic level, the press often referred to NATO as a subcontractor of the UN, which was unpopular at NATO HQ. Furthermore, in 1994, the then NATO Secretary-General, Willy Claes, suggested that the Alliance would act with UN approval if possible, but without it if necessary.
On the strategic level, the two institutions were pursuing incompatible goals. UNPROFOR Commander General Sir Michael Rose stressed the distinction between peacekeeping and warfighting. However, particularly American NATO hawks could have dragged NATO and UNPROFOR into war. Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali attempted to establish a veto over NATO coercive air power. Negative NATO reaction to this was so strong that it has been suggested it led directly to US opposition to Boutros-Ghali's re-election as UN Secretary-General.
On the Operational level, discrepancies arose over the question of NATO/UN 'dual key' control of NATO coercive air power: AFSOUTH Commander Admiral Smith asserted 'never again', while General Rose called it 'a key element of future UN-NATO relations'.
Questions
Tasos Kokkinides (British American Security Studies Council [BASIC]) enquired as to the extent of intelligence sharing between the two organisations during Bosnia.
Martin Smith recalled that the UN did not collect its own intelligence, while in Bosnia NATO refused to share intelligence with UNPROFOR. In Kosovo, intelligence sharing between NATO and the OSCE had been much better.
Malcolm Harper (UNA-UK) asked whether dual key tensions extended to the diplomatic/political level.
Sir David Hannay replied that tension appeared to arise in Bosnia where Europeans had provided ground troops, while the US supplied air power. However, with hindsight, it was questionable whether the presence of US ground troops would have affected air threats.
Ken Aldred (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College) reminded delegates of US/European tensions within the UN and NATO.
PART 2: General Discussion
Chair: Roger Casale, MP for Wimbledon
Uri Belobrov (Political Consul from the Russian Embassy in London) was nervous of NATO intentions for global projection. Moscow had offered proposals to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the UN and the OSCE, over which the West was dragging its feet. US failure to pay its UN dues had hampered Russian proposals to revitalise the Military Staffs Committee, while its proposals to strengthen the OSCE Security Charter had been ignored.
Colonel Philip Wilkinson (Directorate-General of Development and Doctrine, MoD) stated that since most conflicts were intra-state, attention should focus on appropriate responses, suitable agents and linking those activities. More response options existed than traditional peacekeeping or war and UN capacity to operate in the "grey zone" (i.e. Chapter 6 ½ operations) should be enhanced. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had been revitalised, although its action had not been required at the political level.
Tasos Kokkinides complained that NATO's concentration on hardware could be re-directed to enhance its conflict prevention capacity.
Sir David Hannay pointed out that conflict prevention in Kosovo had, in fact, failed. Because the Russians and Europe stayed for so long in the conflict prevention phase, this allowed the position of ethnic Albanian moderates (e.g. Ibrahim Rugova) to be overtaken by the KLA. There had been no lack of attention by international organisations, but Milosevic had prevented OSCE monitors entering Kosovo in the early 1990s.
Malcolm Harper recognised that public pressure to intervene could compromise NATO's position in the face of UN inaction. He suggested a saving clause allowing forcible regional action in specific circumstances until the UN or OSCE responded. The increasing role of private security companies might put further pressure on the SC to consider such options.
Ken Aldred pointed out that relative to all other imperfect international organisations, NATO had evolved well in the post-Cold War world. However, US domination remained a problem. Earlier military action against Milosevic may have proved effective. While the UN remained unable to implement its decisions, NATO retained the only credible military threat.
Martin Smith stated that NATO was the only effective regional organisation. The West perceived Russian proposals for OSCE reform as a means to control NATO. Training and advice for indigenous (particularly African) governments in peacekeeping techniques was important to bolster their capabilities.
Part 3: Panel Discussion
Chair: Roger Casale
Panel: Kjeld Åkjaer, Tasos Kokkinides, Colonel Philip Wilkinson, Ian Wood and Mike Sherratt
Kjeld Åkjaer urged reviewing and strengthening the UN/OSCE and NATO.
Tasos Kokkinides stated that the US believed a precedent for NATO legitimacy outside the UN had now been set: Dayton architect Richard Holbrooke claimed that the recent threats against Belgrade had expanded NATO responsibility while a clearly defined agenda for intervention existed in response to genocide. The US was seeking to use NATO as a means of global emergence with minimum constraints.
Colonel Philip Wilkinson described NATO as a warfighting alliance with a weak humanitarian structure while the UN was strong in political and humanitarian terms but had a weak military structure. Therefore collaboration would make both institutions more effective. More debate about the potential cooperation between the two organisations must be encouraged.
Ian Wood (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UN Department) rejected debates suggesting mutual exclusivity for NATO or the UN. Regional organisations might enjoy some local advantages, but the UN would always retain a crucial global role. The UK was the first permanent SC member to sign a memorandum of understanding as to peacekeeping standby arrangements. NATO was a consensus organisation, while Britain was a member of the SC and the North Atlantic Council. NATO required other organisations for non-military activities and there was already much cross-referencing between the organisations. NATO liaison officers were also being considered.
Mike Sherratt (NATO Desk, MoD) outlined the UK position that a legal basis was required for NATO military action, but it was impractical to define this precisely (i.e. a specific SC mandate) in advance. Particularly, lessons of civil military cooperation had been learnt from previous missions, but awareness of mission creep was important.
Questions
Clare Spencer (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College) stated that synergy between the UN and NATO related to international political relations. The strongest players should set the example: Operation Desert Fox occurred outside both the UN and NATO, while the situation in southern Lebanon and Turkish incursions into northern Iraq were ignored.
Lord Kennet highlighted the threat of NATO withdrawal from UN jurisdiction. The last meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly had removed the requirement to seek UN or OSCE approval for NATO action.
Colonel Philip Wilkinson asserted that political decision-makers perceived prevention, traditional peacekeeping and war as the only responses to armed conflict. However, more options existed than diplomacy and aerial bombardment. The military in conjunction with humanitarian workers could work to address both the symptoms and the root causes of conflict. Intermediate military responses were more politically acceptable and less legally dangerous than those suggested above.
Ian Wood stressed that military activity must be consistent with international law, but SC resolutions were not the only source of authorisation. For example, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, with the consent of the parties to a conflict, or in response to overwhelming humanitarian necessity.
Kjeld Åkjaer urged dialogue between the UN, OSCE and NATO in relation to cooperation over intervention. More effort, including by the UK, needed to be put into a rapid reaction force.
Tasos Kokkinides pointed out that neither China nor Russia had used their SC vetoes recently. However, it was pointed out that some issues (such as recent bombing threats against Belgrade) were deliberately withheld from the SC's agenda in anticipation of being vetoed.
Jim Addington (Renew UN) advocated better transparency in both SC and NATO dealings to promote greater UN/NATO coordination.
Uri Belobrov stated that NATO must move a long way to achieve greater UN/OSCE/NATO cooperation. Moscow was not against enforcement actions and the UN had not exhausted this capability. More care should be taken in targeting recipients of enforcement action. Belgrade tended to be blamed by the West for all problems in the former Yugoslavia, but Western isolation of Serbia through the UN and the OSCE was not helpful.
Summary
Mike Sherratt urged flexibility over the roles of the UN, OSCE and NATO to ensure effective responses to crises.
Ian Wood suggested more transparency in NATO and highlighted NATO cooperative mechanisms such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. NATO should do more to promote its intentions. There should be caution over division of labour between organisations. While it was advantageous to play to the various strengths of each organisation, flexibility should not be jeopardised.
Colonel Philip Wilkinson pointed out the different levels of readiness between conscripted armies and full-time forces, like Britain's. The UK had provided a 'shopping-list' of available resources from which the UN could draw when required. US military planners tended to seek an individual enemy within a conflict, while the UK tried to remain more impartial relative to an operation's mandate.
Tasos Kokkinides pointed out that OSCE principles had been undermined by the Russian government such as Russian actions in Chechnya which compromised the OSCE code of conduct.
Kjeld Åkjaer stated that while the military aspects of the Bosnian settlement had been upheld successfully, NATO had largely ignored bringing together different ethnic groups.
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