This Issue
Kosovo
NATO Reputation at Stake in Kosovo
Former international peace envoy to Bosnia, Carl Bildt, in a 12 January article in the Financial Times, warned that the impending conflict in Kosovo threatened to become NATO's first failure to deter war in a generation. He asserted that the settlement resulting from international diplomatic efforts in October 1998 was always intended as a temporary measure to buy time for political negotiations to create an interim arrangement on Kosovan autonomy by early November. However, neither party to the conflict had since shown any genuine interest in reaching a settlement.
Bildt stated that Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces had retaken large parts of the province, having been driven out by a Serb offensive in summer 1998. There had been an increase in armed incidents; civilians were being armed; civil instability threatened in areas where Serbs and Albanians still lived close together; and insecurity was likely to reach the cities.
Bildt warned that external pressure presented the only means to advance negotiation, but there were limits to what outside forces could do. He described the deterrent presence of 1,500 unarmed verifiers, NATO air power and a European extraction force for the verifiers in Macedonia as useful but insufficient. Military pressure needed to be exerted on all belligerents, since NATO air power had little impact on Kosovo's ethnic Albanian separatists.
Bildt recalled that the Albanian government had previously requested NATO forces along its Kosovan frontier to deter Serbian cross-border attacks on KLA bases. Clashes were likely to continue to intensify, making it difficult to demand reductions in the Serb military presence in Kosovo or to exert pressure on the KLA, which had been reinforcing in northern Albania. Closure of the Albanian/Yugoslav border by NATO and a reinforced UN/NATO presence in Macedonia would provide the international community with more leverage over belligerents.
Bildt pointed out that NATO governments had been reluctant to consider ground troops. However, an international peacekeeping force would be required to oversee an interim political agreement while a larger intervention force would be needed in the event of further escalation. He suggested that NATO had the greatest interest in the peace process. While it had been possible to blame the European Union and then the UN in the early stages of Bosnian conflict, NATO had assumed responsibility for Kosovo. Meanwhile, Europe, Russia and the US should consider long-term problems that affect the Balkans. Bildt complained that towards the end of the last century, instability in the Balkans was a constant threat to Europe. Failure to deter war in the Balkans and to provide the region with a more stable political structure would represent a continued absence of peace in Europe.
Financial Times: 12 January
Milosevic Rebuffs NATO Commanders
A 20 January Washington Post report asserted that, during a visit to Belgrade, NATO Supreme Commander US Army General Wesley Clark and German General Klaus Naumann failed to convince Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to meet promises made as part of the October 1998 settlement over Kosovo, despite the threat of renewed NATO airstrikes.
Milosevic further declined to reverse his decision to expel the head of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), William Walker (US), after he accused Serb police of illegally killing 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak on 15 January. On 18 January, Walker was given 48 hours to leave the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although Milosevic extended the deadline by 24 hours on 19 January. FRY authorities maintained that the Albanian victims were separatist guerrillas.
On 18 January, the UN Security Council demanded immediate investigation into the massacre and the reversal Walker's expulsion order. The report added that nearby opposition positions had been attacked by Serb special police units and army tanks for the third day. According to UN aid workers, several thousand Kosovans had been forced to flee their homes. The report suggested that the violence represented the final end of an unofficial truce in Kosovo. European members of the OSCE stated that Walker's departure would endanger KVM operations.
The report declared that Milosevic also refused to allow Chief Prosecutor of the UN Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Louise Arbour, to investigate Racak incident. She was turned back at Kosovan/Macedonian border on 18 January. On the same day, Serb police removed from a Racak mosque around 40 bodies from the alleged massacre site. Officials in Pristina stated that forensic experts from Yugoslavia and Belarus had established that, contrary to Walker's assertions, the victims had not been executed at close range. Belgrade did agree to allow Finnish forensic investigators proposed by the OSCE to examine the bodies.
Washington Post: 20 January 1999
Allies Wary of Bombing Belgrade
A 23 January Washington Post report declared that, according to US and European officials, European allies were wary of airstrikes against Yugoslavia without US participation in a multinational ground force in Kosovo. The report stated that NATO troops could facilitate the implementation of a cease-fire, guarantee security for verifiers and pressurise Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and Kosovar opposition forces to agree a broader settlement for Kosovan autonomy. According to the report, both Pentagon Joint Staff and Defence Secretary William Cohen were opposed to US ground troops, believing such a mission would inevitably develop into a long-term commitment, as in Bosnia. However, others claimed Bosnia to be a success model and warned that unchecked, Milosevic's behaviour could eventually threaten the unity of the Alliance.
The report announced that NATO had decided Belgrade must comply with an expanded cease-fire, including compliance with his October agreement, acceptance of additional restrictions to the movement of military and police forces, cooperation with UN investigation of recent massacres, and enhanced security for the OSCE verifiers. US and European officials were also investigating modalities for deploying a NATO ground presence to enforce such measures. Pentagon planners asserted that such a force would require many thousands of troops to allow for worst-case-scenarios, although others in the government believed the force might require only upwards of several thousand.
According to the report, US officials revealed another US option relying on airstrikes alone to induce Milosevic's compliance. The airstrikes' intended targets would include air defence, communications networks, troop barracks and other military instalments around Belgrade, Kosovo and Montenegro. However, such tactics could merely prove to make Milosevic yet more popular domestically for his defiances, as had been the case with Iraq.
The report cited a final option proposed by US officials to dispatch a large multinational force to Kosovo after the launch of airstrikes, but before agreement of a cease-fire. Thus, a settlement would be imposed by force while political leaders negotiated a more enduring solution. However, estimates of a 30,000 troop-requirement have made this option unpopular. Penatgon spokesperson Kenneth Bacon warned that whereas in Bosnia, years of war had exhausted all factions, Kosovan parties were preparing for a wider war. Vice President of the International Crisis Group George Biddle warned of continued incidents with Milosevic if this situation were not dealt with and that NATO could not hope to project its interest in the other areas if it could not handle trouble in its own sphere. Senator John Warner, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned that instability in Kosovo could spread to Bosnia and counteract the slow progress there.
Washington Post: 23 January 1999
Secretary-General's Kosovo Report
The 30 January report covered the period from 24 December 1998 to 30 January 1999. Kofi Annan condemned the atrocities committed in Racak on 15 January and urged the FRY authorities to investigate them urgently with international experts. The massacre reflected the pattern of disproportionate use of force by the FRY in retaliation for provocations by Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries. The perpetrators needed to be brought to justice in order to deter additional violence. Appearances of impunity would hamper negotiation and so there needed to be unconditional respect for International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The Secretary-General asserted that violence in the region had severely impeded the humanitarian operation, as the deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was beginning to help to establish and consolidate conditions for return of internally displaced people. Fear of hostilities and continued violence against civilians represented the main obstacle to returnees and to the sustainability of previous returnees. Annan warned of the development of all-out civil war in Kosovo and its possible repercussions for the entire region.
Annex: Report of the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, 22 January 1999
Solana stated that the North Atlantic Council (NAC), following its meeting on 17 January: called on the FRY to cooperate fully with the ICTY and to bring those responsible for the Racak massacre to justice; supported the KVM; and demanded that President Slobodan Milosevic comply fully with his commitments to NATO and OSCE, based on Security Council resolution 1199 (1998).
On 19 January, at the NAC's request, the Chair of the Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, visited Milosevic to underline the Alliance's concerns and urge him to honour his obligations. The NAC was accordingly considering how to assist the international community achieve a political solution to the crisis.
Solana said that, on 20 January, the NAC agreed he would report to the UN on compliance by the parties to the conflict, enclosed below. The report covered major trends and incidents over the preceding month. Neither party respected the cease-fire, while a number of cases of kidnappings and attacks by Kosovar armed elements had occurred. However, the actions of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the Special Police (MUP) were entirely disproportionate.
NATO Compliance Report for Kosovo, 13 December 1998-19 January 1999
A) UN Security Council resolution 1199 (1998) [MUP - Special Police; UCK - Kosovo Liberation Army; VJ - Yugoslav Army]
1) Resolution tenet: FRY and Kosovo Albanians must cease hostilities and maintain cease-fire. Related activity: 13-19 December: VJ kills 31 Kosovo Albanians crossing border at Podujevo. UCK kills 8 Serb civilians, 1 MUP officer. UCK kidnap and kill Deputy Mayor of Kosovo Polje. 20-26 December: 2 UCK killed in UCK attack on MUP patrol; UCK kill MUP officer in Podujevo, local security official in in Kosovska Mitrovica. VJ forces attack villages around Podujevo. 27 December-2 January: 15 Kosovo Albanian civilians killed by VJ shelling around Podujevo. UCK kill Serb judge in Podujevo. 3-9 January: UCK kill 3 MUP officers. UCK temporarily detain 8 VJ soldiers. VJ/MUP shell villages around Podujevo and attack UCK positions. 10-16 January: VJ/MUP believed (including by KVM) to be responsible for 45 civilian deaths in Racak.
2) Resolution tenet: FRY to take steps to improve humanitarian situation. Related activity: The FRY government, on 17 December, announced (as yet unimplemented) plans to build humanitarian centres and improve housing. FRY operations around Podujevo, Suva Reka displaced over 7,000 people.
3) Resolution tenet: The FRY must cease action by security forces against the civilian population and withdraw security units used for civilian repression. Related activity: Between 3-9 January the MUP was accused by civilians of attacking Djakavica, Sipitula and Belince.
4) Resolution tenet: The FRY must enable effective international monitoring. Related activity: Throughout the reporting period, VJ and MUP forces have denied access, in selected areas, to Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission and OSCE personnel.
5) Resolution tenet: The FRY must facilitate with UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) safe returns. Related activity: There was no overt example of FRY cooperation. Recent violence around Stimlje produced an estimated 6,000 internally displaced people.
6) Resolution tenet: FRY must cooperate with the ICTY. Related activity: On 10 December Serb police blocked the Finnish forensics team from conducting the first exhumations of Kosovo massacre victims as part of a dispute over Serb access to a UCK-controlled area. On 19 January, the FRY government denied access to the ICTY Chief, Louise Arbour, to evaluate the alleged massacre of 45 civilians in Racak. FRY authorities had moved the bodies from a mosque in Racak to Pristina and had begun their own autopsies.
7) Resolution tenet: The FRY must bring to justice members of the security forces involved in the mistreating of civilians and destroying of property. Related activity : There was no sign of cooperation.
8) Resolution tenet: The Kosovo Albanian leadership must condemn all terrorist activity. Related activity : There was no public declaration from the political or the military leadership.
B) i) Modalities for Kosovo FRY security force reductions and operations agreed to by NATO and the FRY on 25 October 1998
1) Modality: FRY Special Police units deployed to Kosovo after February 1998 to be withdrawn. Combined police/Special Police strength in Kosovo must be reduced to their February 1998 duty level. Actions by the FRY: There was evidence that Serbian Special Police detachments continued to operate within Kosovo, but none that externally based detachments were being withdrawn.
2) Modality: Heavy weapons must be withdrawn from Kosovo or returned to the VJ. Actions by the FRY: MUP was still employing heavy weaponry.
3) Modality: All VJ units and extra equipment introduced to Kosovo after February 1998 must be withdrawn. Actions by the FRY: VJ forces may have been reinforced with external personnel.
4) Modality: Except augments for border guards, all VJ in Kosovo must return to garrison. Actions by the FRY: This requirement had been violated since mid-December.
5) Modality: The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission/OSCE must receive detailed weekly reports from VJ and MUP. Actions by the FRY: Reporting was inaccurate and misleading; VJ and MUP units did not account for equipment and personnel numbers and activities.
B) ii) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission verification modalities
6) Modality: All checkpoints must be dismantled. Actions by the FRY: MUP maintained and added to unauthorised checkpoints.
C) UN Security Council resolution 1203 (1998)
Resolution tenet: The FRY must cooperate fully with the KVM and Kosovo Air Verification Mission (KAVM). Related activity: On 18 January, the FRY government ordered the Head of the KVM, Ambassador William Walker, to leave the FRY within 48 hours.
Resolution tenet: The FRY and Kosovo Albanians must respect freedom of movement of KVM. Related activity: Both parties obstructed some access; the FRY had not yet allowed KVM personnel access to border operations nor to some MUP facilities.
Resolution tenet: The FRY must ensure security for all diplomatic, KVM, international and NGO personnel. Related activity: The MUP attack on Racak on 17 January endangered KVM personnel in the vicinity.
Resolution tenet: The FRY and Kosovo Albanians must ensure personnel were not threatened or interefered with. Related activity: Two KVM personnel wounded on 15 January by UCK small arms fire. UCK claimed it was accidental.
UN Doc: S/1999/99: 30 January 1999
No Deal from Kosovo Talks
A 24 February Financial times report stated that Kosovo peace negotiations ended on 23 February with no signatures on a settlement. However, international mediators claimed to have achieved consensus over a political deal between Serbian and ethnic Albanian negotiators. Both sides were summoned to fresh negotiations in mid-March. Foreign ministers from the Contact Group for Kosovo claimed substantial progress but they conceded signatory failure.
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine asserted that they would not allow the process they had begun to disintegrate. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claimed to have broken the stalemate in Kosovo.
The report warned that the second round of negotiations would need to address the issue of a NATO-led force in Kosovo as well as finalise discrepancies in the agreement. The consensus claimed by mediators comprised separate letters to the Contact Group from both sides. The Albanian letter claimed to accept the draft plan subject to consultations in Kosovo and expert technical review, including pledges that the KLA would demilitarise. However, acceptance was contingent upon rapid deployment of a NATO force and on a referendum. The Contact Group refused to promise a referendum if it were opposed by the Serbs.
The Serbs supported autonomy for Kosovo if it did not result in independence or a third republic of federal Yugoslavia. They had previously refused to consider foreign troops on Yugoslav soil, but conceded a willingness to discuss an international presence. Albright had previously declared a military component as an essential element of any agreement, and had threatened air strikes. However, her stance softened as she described the threat of force as a tool, not an end in itself.
Financial Times: 24 February 1999
Kosovo Peace Talks Deadlocked
A February 23 report in the Financial Times stated that NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark had been called in to help break the deadlock in the Kosovo peace talks being held at Rambouillet. Serbian refusal to agree to a NATO-led peacekeeping force (totalling around 28,000), which the Albanians and NATO regarded as essential to underpin the political settlement, held up the peace talks. The FT report suggested that if agreement was reached on the political aspects of a three year interim deal for broad autonomy for Kosovo, the deadline could have been extended to negotiate details of the NATO force provided Belgrade gave a firm indication that it was ready to accept a foreign military presence. Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Prime Minister, had stated that Russia was ready to contribute to a peace keeping force provided Serbia agreed to its presence.
Financial Times: 23 February 1999
No Agreement at Rambouillet
A 24 February article in the Financial Times stated that hardliners within the KLA had scuttled the US strategy to isolate Serbia at the Rambouillet peace talks which ended on 23 February. However this also exposed serious divisions within the opposition movement. Adem Demaci, the KLA's political representative, prevented KLA negotiators from signing the accord. The FT report noted that diplomats said that the US plan to get KLA support and thereafter force Belgrade into an agreement through the threat of air strikes was no longer viable, at least until the 15 March when the peace conference was scheduled to continue.
Financial Times: 24 February 1999
NATO Builds Up in Macedonia
A 25 February Financial Times report stated that British Challenger tanks and Warrior armoured vehicles were arriving at Thessaloniki, Greece, as part of a build-up of NATO forces around Kosovo. NATO was continuing intense preparations for deployment of a 30,000-strong force (KFOR) to uphold a settlement, despite the suspension of negotiations [see above]. The UK pledged up to 8,000 troops, France and Germany 5,000 each, the US 4,000 and Italy 2,000, while Belgium and Canada also made commitments to the force.
The report asserted that NATO was hoping Russia would contribute troops to KFOR, although there had not yet been a formal response from Moscow. The first parts of the force were gathering in Macedonia in preparation for an initial 10,000-strong deployment as an enabling force under the tactical command of Lieutenant-General Sir Mike Jackson (UK), head of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Some 2,225 British troops were being deployed to Macedonia, while 2,000 US marines were ready to deploy from the USS Nassau of the Amphibious Ready Group in the Adriatic. Pentagon spokesperson Ken Bacon denied any pre- positioning in Macedonia, but said they were exercising and preparing and would represent a presence in the region.
The 2,300-strong extraction force already in Macedonia, primarily comprising French and British troops, would be partly included in KFOR. However, the extraction force was less heavily armed than KFOR was intended to be. According to NATO officials, KFOR would oversee compliance with the military aspects of the settlement, including specific levels for Serbian and ethnic Albanian forces. The FT report stated that the draft peace settlement foresaw the Yugoslav army reducing its presence in Kosovo from 11,000 to a border force of 1,500 plus 1,000 more within the region to service the border troops. Special police units would be reduced from 14,000 to 2,000 and would be confined strictly to genuine policing tasks. The KLA would be demobilised and demilitarised. Progress at Rambouillet had not ruled out NATO airstrikes against Serb military targets for which a force of more than 400 aircraft had been assembled, mostly at bases in Italy and on ships in the Adriatic.
Robin Cook, UK Foreign Secretary, declared that Belgrade already knew the conditions restricting its military behaviour and urged the Serbs not to violate these. NATO officials reaffirmed the continued presence of the October 1998 activation order authorising airstrikes.
Financial Times: 25 February 1999
Kosovo Parties return to Rambouillet
A 17 March Financial Times report said that international mediators at the second round of the Rambouillet peace talks had rejected Serbia's bid to make major political changes to the draft peace accord for Kosovo. French Foreign Minister and Co-Chair of the Paris peace talks, Hubert Vedrine, accused the Serbs of reneging on aspects of the political agreement they had accepted at the first round of talks. In addition, the Serbs were still refusing civil and especially military guarantees on the ground, whilst agreeing to the political settlement only on the condition that their amendments were adopted. The FT report noted that Serbian state television claimed that one of the main objections was to the removal of jurisdiction of Serbian courts over Kosovo. Belgrade diplomats apparently claimed that Slobodan Milosevic wanted to drag out the talks to sow divisions among the US and its European allies. The Albanians, however, had agreed on Monday 15 March to sign up to the overall peace deal.
Financial Times: 17 March 1999
NATO Orders Airstrikes on Belgrade
A 24 March Financial Times report stated that on 23 March, NATO had ordered air attacks against Yugoslavia after the failure of diplomatic efforts to persuade Slobodan Milosevic to accept a peace deal for Kosovo. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated that attacks would be aimed at disrupting Serb forces' attacks on ethnic Albanians and at weakening their ability to cause further catastrophe. Solana said that NATO had acted because Yugoslavia had refused the international community's demands.
The FT report stated that NATO was likely to follow a strike-and-pause strategy to allow the alliance to respond quickly to any peace overture or concession from Milosevic. NATO's plans
Financial Times: 24 March 1999
NATO Bombardment Begins
A 25 March Guardian report announced that diplomatic efforts to end the Kosovo crisis ended dramatically on the evening of 24 March, when NATO launched aerial attacks named Allied Force against Belgrade, Montenegro and Pristina. The offensive represented NATO's first ever attack on a sovereign state and Europe's largest single military action since 1945.
Washington confirmed that bat-wing stealth bombers had been used for the first time ever in combat; Britain supplied Harrier GR7 aircraft and cruise missiles from nuclear submarine HMS Splendid. Western leaders including Tony Blair and Bill Clinton were quick to underline the moral imperative for action and stress that the responsibility lay with President Slobodan Milosevic.
However, President Boris Yeltsin requested convening an immediate session of the Security Council and a suspension of cooperation with NATO. Furthermore, NATO member state Austria proscribed NATO planes using its airspace due to the lack of UN mandate for the action, while both Finland and Ireland asserted that they did not support the airstrikes. Kofi Annan also stressed that the Security Council needed to be involved in any decision to use force.
The Guardian: 25 March 1999
Macedonia
Secretary-General's UNPREDEP Report
The 12 February report covered developments since 14 July 1998. The Secretary-General said that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1186 (1998), UNPREDEP undertook the new assignment of monitoring illegal arms flows and other activities restricted under resolution 1160 (1998). It used mobile reaction teams, responding to sighted smuggling activities by moving quickly to carry out more proximate observation, thereby providing more accurate information, although it could not interdict and inspect cross-border traffic. UNPREDEP had not detected any direct evidence of arms smuggling across frontiers with Albania or the FRY.
UNPREDEP Activities
Annan asserted that UNPREDEP was involved in a wide range of programmes related to good governance and the rule of law, strengthening of national capacity and infrastructure, institution-building and human resources development in the governmental and civil sectors.
Annan reported that the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's (YRM) bilateral relations with some of its neighbours had strengthened: with Albania following the recent parliamentary elections there and with Greece following the increase in trade and collaborative ventures. However, relations with the FRY were strained following the deployment of the NATO Extraction Force in YRM. Parliamentary elections in October and November 1998 resulted in a change of government representing a coalition of three parties. The elections were monitored by international observers from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and international NGOs and were described as well conducted.
Security Situation
Kofi Annan declared that stability in the YRM continued to depend to a large extent on developments particularly in Kosovo, although he was satisfied that, at the time of writing, the YRM had not been adversely affected, aided by the presence of UNPREDEP. UNPREDEP continued to implement its good offices mandate by carrying out an active dialogue with the authorities and all other major political forces; encouraging inter-party dialogue and a superior understanding among the different sections of society towards reducing inter-ethnic tensions; and advancing the application of international standards of human rights.
On 29 January, the YRM Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested an extension of the UNPREDEP mandate for an additional six months, with its existing composition and structure. He was particularly concerned over spillover of the Kosovo conflict, increasing tension along the Albanian-Yugoslav border, the continued precarious situation in Albania which had obstructed the YRM government's efforts to prevent arms trafficking to Kosovo, and the lack of progress in the defining the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
Composition and strength of UNPREDEP, as at February 1999
UNPREDEP's military component comprised two mechanised infantry battalions a Nordic composite battalion and a US Army task force, containing 650 and 350 personnel respectively, supported by a 50-strong Indonesian heavy engineering platoon. There were 35 military observers and 26 civilian police monitors. The civilian component's authorised strength, including the local staff, was 203.
[Contingent Strength (CS); Military Observers (MO); Civilian Police (CP)]; Argentina1 (MO); Bangladesh 2 (MO); Belgium 1 (MO); Brazil 2 (MO); Canada 1 (MO); Czech Republic 1 (MO); Denmark 87 (CS), 1 (MO); Egypt 1 (MO); Finland 199 (CS), 1 (MO), 6 (CP); Ghana 1 (MO); Indonesia 51 (CS), 2 (MO); Ireland 2 (MO); Jordan 1 (MO), 26 (CP); Kenya 2 (MO); Nepal 1 (MO); New Zealand 1 (MO); Nigeria 1 (MO), 46 (CP); Norway 152 (CS), 2 (MO); Pakistan 2 (MO); Poland 2 (MO); Portugal 1 (MO); Russian Federation 3 (MO), 26 (CP); Sweden 198 (CS), 1 (MO); Switzerland 1 (MO), 46 (CP); Turkey 46 (CP); Ukraine 1 (MO), 46 (CP); US 362 (CS); Total 1,049 (CS); 35 (MO); 266 (CP).
UN Doc: S/1999/161: 12 February 1999
China Vetoes UNPREDEP Extension
A 26 February Financial Times report stated that on 25 February China vetoed the extension of the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in the Security Council. Russia had abstained from the vote. Kofi Annan had recommended extending the 1,100-strong force, including 360 Americans and over 600 Scandinavians, since it helped build confidence and defuse tension in the region. Chinese motivation resulted from Macedonia's January decision to establish diplomatic ties and accept over $1bn in aid from Taiwan. The US State Department complained that it was a particularly sensitive moment in the Balkans in view of ongoing negotiations over Kosovo.
UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, asserted that the veto should not to be used for reasons extraneous to the situation on the ground. The FT report asserted that the use of the veto was a rare event for the post-Cold War UN, particularly for China, and warned that America and interested European countries might consider options outside the UN framework. It recalled that in 1997 China had withdrawn its veto of a proposal to dispatch UN troops to Guatemala when that country withdrew support for Taiwan's claim to a UN seat.
Financial Times: 26 February 1999
Prevlaka Peninsula
Secretary-General's UNMOP Report
The report covered developments since 12 October 1998. The Secretary-General applauded the constructive atmosphere in which discussions between the two sides were continuing, but asserted that it was too early to conclude that a final agreement between the parties was close at hand. The area of operations of the UN Observer Mission in Prevlaka (UNMOP) remained stable. There had been fewer serious incidents and cooperation between the parties and UNMOP had improved. Kofi Annan recommend a further six-month extension of the UNMOP mandate until 15 July 1999.
In order to keep the Security Council regularly informed of progress, the Secretary-General suggested the Council request the parties to report to him their assessment of the status of the negotiations on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. He added that he would be prepared, on request, to arrange for a UN observer to attend such talks.
Kofi Annan asserted that, if there was no substantial progress over the following six months, the Security Council might consider alternative mechanisms, such as international mediation or arbitration. Annan said he could then suggest modalities for adaptations to UNMOP's concept of operations and the existing security regime. He noted that the UNMOP-monitored security regime came under the Agreement on Normalisation of Relations agreed by the parties and endorsed by the Security Council.
Budget
For administrative and budgetary purposes, UNMOP is treated as part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the costs of maintaining it from 1 July 1998-30 June 1999 were included in the Secretary-General's report on the financing of UNMIBH for that period (A/52/786). Costs relating directly to UNMOP would amount to less than $2,000,000.
Composition and strength of the military elements of UNMOP, as at 4 January 1999:
Argentina 1; Bangladesh 1; Belgium 1; Brazil 1; Canada 1; Czech Republic 1; Denmark 1; Egypt 1; Finland 1; Ghana 2; Indonesia 2; Ireland 1; Jordan 1; Kenya 1; Nepal 1; New Zealand 2; Nigeria 1; Norway 1; Pakistan 1; Poland 1; Portugal 1; Russian Federation 1; Sweden 1; Switzerland 1; Ukraine 1; Total 28.
UN Doc: S/1999/16: 6 January 1999
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