This Issue
Iraq
Bombings Offer Baghdad Diplomatic Opportunities
A 31 December Financial Times report stated that recent US-led air raids [see UN & Conflict Monitor Issue 2] had only just ceased when Baghdad began to challenge the northern and southern exclusion zones barring its air force and troops. Baghdad opened fire on US and British aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone, provoking retaliation. An earlier incident had induced the Americans to attack an air-defence battery, killing four Iraqi soldiers.
The report asserted that, in response, Washington might decide to remove Iraqi ground-to-air capabilities that had survived Desert Fox. However, Iraq wished to demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the outside world its continued appetite for defiance and its capability to attack US aircraft. Additional US strikes also portrayed Washington as continuing aggressive behaviour against Baghdad.
The report suggested that Iraq also appeared to believe increasing tensions could help transform perceived political gains from Desert Fox into diplomatic advantages. While the air strikes depleted military infrastructure, they did not induce insurrection nor weaken the regime's hold on power. However, they did emphasise divisions within the Security Council: after the strikes, China, France and Russia demanded the lifting of the oil embargo. There were also demonstrations against the strikes throughout the Arab world. But, the report revealed the postponement of an Arab League foreign ministerial summit concerning Iraq from 30 December to the end of January. Baghdad had been trying to stress that the no-fly zones were not authorised by the UN and were being enforced exclusively by the UK and US.
The report asserted that UNSCOM inspectors could only return to Iraq if the embargo were lifted and their operations were restricted to monitoring previously inspected facilities. However, diplomats in Iraq declared that Russia - Iraq's strongest patron - was not pushing the Iraqi position hard enough at the Security Council. The report suggested that Baghdad might be hoping that the no-fly zones issue would provide leverage for its supporters within the Security Council.
Financial Times: 31 December 1998
US Warplanes Confront Iraqi Jets
According to a 6 January Financial Times report, US officials stated that missiles launched by US F-14 navy jets and land-based F-15 air force strike planes appeared to have missed targeted Iraqi jets, although one crashed seemingly because it ran out of fuel. Baghdad denied it had lost any planes. This represented the first aerial confrontation between the two states since December 1992.
Washington asserted that the no-fly zones over northern and southern regions of Iraq, protecting Kurdish and Shia populations respectively, have been authorised by UN resolutions. However, Baghdad believed them to be illegal violations of Iraqi sovereignty.
The report asserted that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein released a speech on satellite television to coincide with the launch of US aircraft from bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Saddam demanded that Arabs revolt against their leaders who collaborated with Western powers, particularly the US. The report continued that Saddam has habitually portrayed himself as a pan-Arab leader and successor to the late Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Financial Times: 6 January 1999
UN Denies UNSCOM Spied for America
A 7 January Financial Times report stated that the spokesperson for Kofi Annan, Fred Eckhardt, denied there was any evidence that UNSCOM had assisted US intelligence. Baghdad for a long time cited suspicions of spying as justification for obstructing UNSCOM. UNSCOM Head Richard Butler has asserted that over 40 countries, including the US, offered assistance following Iraqi obstruction of inspections and that such assistance was used exclusively for legitimate purposes.
The report declared that Eckhardt also rejected allegations that Annan wanted to remove Butler, emphasising that UNSCOM was a subsidiary of the Security Council and so Butler did not work for the Secretary-General.
However, Annan did discuss with Butler possible US intelligence assistance, following news of the allegations. The FT report asserted that the UN secretariat rejected Baghdad's demand to replace 14 British and American humanitarian employees on the grounds of their own safety, following air strikes in December. According to diplomats, the expulsions appeared to be directed in particular at the de-mining teams on Iraq's Iranian and Turkish borders.
Financial Times: 7 January 1999
Russian Plan to End Iraqi Oil Embargo
A 15 January Washington Post report revealed a Russian proposal to end the UN oil embargo against Iraq and set up a new, less intrusive weapons inspection system. France and the US offered proposals earlier in the week beginning 11 January to attempt to re-establish Security Council consensus over disarming Iraqi military forces. The report suggested that proposals offered to the Security Council so far had primarily served to highlight divisions within it. Beijing, Moscow and Paris supported a flexible approach. The Russian proposal broadly mirrored the French.
According to the report, Mosow suggested replacing UNSCOM with an "assessment team" of experts drawn from many countries to establish with Iraqi authorities rules for a new inspection system. The embargo could then be lifted and UNSCOM's intrusive, on-the-ground inspections replaced with longer-term monitoring through aerial surveillance, television cameras and sensors.
However, the report stated that, on 14 January, Washington attempted to maintain the embargo by suggesting lifting the cap on the oil-for-food scheme. Acting US Ambassador to the UN Peter Burleigh asserted that Washington did not believe Baghdad to be fully disarmed and wanted UNSCOM to resume inspections. Over the previous month, Russia called repeatedly for the removal of UNSCOM Head Richard Butler (Australia). Moscow proposed its suggested assessment mission should also comprise experts in disarmament from such organisations as the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was responsible for disarming Iraqi nuclear weapons programmes, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which could replace UNSCOM's chemical and biological weapons responsibilities. When the transition to monitoring took place, the work would be carried out by a monitoring centre within the framework of the UN Secretariat rather than the Security Council. Diplomats believed the proposal to be inspired by a desire to limit US influence over UNSCOM.
Washington Post: 16 January 1999
Vedrine on Iraq
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine outlined his thoughts on the situation in Iraq in an 18 January 1999 article in the Financial Times. Vedrine asserted that Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and the UK-US airstrikes had made resumption of the international community's previous programme in the country impossible, for three reasons. First, the airstrikes had further weakened Baghdad's military potential and created a fresh situation which made additional investigations into the Iraqi weapons programmes of the 1980's virtually impossible. Second, under such circumstances, Iraqi authorities would never be likely to cooperate. Third, progress on disarmament could never be reached by an unchanged UNSCOM.
Therefore, Vedrine suggested new forms of international regulation under Security Council authority, which needed to be restored. He outlined three French ideas which had been submitted to the Security Council: prevention, humanisation and monitoring. Primarily, Baghdad must be prevented from creating new developments of weapons of mass destruction from remaining stocks that had eluded inspections or from fresh programmes. This would be achieved by an independent control commission under the Security Council, with expanded access and investigative rights allowing efficient, surprise inspections. It would also have increased personnel and financial resources and an autonomous operational budget. The arms import embargo under resolution 687 would remain in place. He recommended the implementation of a prior authorisation regime for dual-use items authorised under resolution 1051, while restrictions would be lifted on all other imports. Vedrine declared that this system would satisfy the security concerns of Iraq's neighbours.The oil export embargo could then be lifted
However, such relaxation was conditional on stopping Iraqi authorities from diverting oil export revenues for illegal rearmament purposes. Therefore, economic and financial monitoring procedures would complement the first two measures. Buyers and Iraq would inform the UN Secretariat of any oil contract, while controls in the field would ensure economic and financial transparency. This was intended to guarantee Baghdad upheld its international financial obligations, including compensating for war damages and paying for ongoing monitoring and verification. It would also prevent Iraq from diverting oil revenues to fund weapons programmes while enabling it to meet the requirements of its people and of its development. The Security Council could implement new sanctions in the event of non-compliance.
Financial Times: 18 January 1999
Arab League Does Not Support Iraq
A 25 January Financial Times report stated that, on 24 January, Iraqi delegates walked out of a ministerial meeting of the Arab League which demanded Iraq stop threatening its neighbours - which the FT article assumed referred to Kuwait - and comply with UN resolutions. It further required that Baghdad formally recognise Kuwait before any sanctions were lifted.
The FT report asserted that Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara described airstrikes against Iraq in December 1998 as both illegal and ineffectual. However, Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained determined not to allow Iraq to divide Arab opinion. The report said that all Arab states criticised the airstrikes, but none overtly supported President Saddam Hussein.
Financial Times: 25 January 1999
Review of Iraqi Disarmament Begins
A 24 February Financial Times report declared that the delayed review of the UN disarmament programme in Iraq began on 23 February. A 20-strong panel was to recommend to the Security Council by 15 April modalities to reinvigorate or replace the programme.
Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who Chairs the panel, excluded former UNSCOM chief Richard Butler but not his American deputy Charles Duelfer. Baghdad insisted all its weapons of mass destruction had been accounted for and several months previously sought a comprehensive review. However, it still had reservations about the compromise panel being promoted by Security Council members Argentina, Brazil and Canada. The proposed panel would comprise a mix of technical and political representatives. The FT report predicted that it would be divided along partisan lines, with China, France and Russia resisting UK and US proposals.
Financial Times: 24 February 1999
US Airstrikes Near Baghdad
A 25 February Financial Times report stated that on 24 February Iraq claimed attacks by US warplanes near Baghdad had left one person dead and several others wounded. The alleged attacks represented the first time sites near the capital had been targeted since December 1998. The Pentagon was unable to confirm whether the outskirts of Baghdad had been hit, but asserted that Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites in Al Iskandaryah had been attacked. The FT report said that incidents in the southern and northern no-fly zones were occurring almost daily.
Financial Times: 25 February 1999
Iraqi Oil Receipts Inadequate
A 26 February Financial Times report stated that, according to the head of the UN's Oil for Food Programme in Iraq, Benon Sevan, the programme could not raise enough money from permitted foreign oil sales to carry out its humanitarian duties. Dropping oil prices combined with Baghdad's reduced pumping capability prevented achieving the permissible $5.2bn per six months. Current plans to import spare parts and equipment would not significantly increase the volume of oil exports until March 2000, Sevan asserted. Revenues would earn $2.9bn by 25 May - the end of the present six month period - of which only $1.8bn would be used for humanitarian supplies and spare parts. However, $2.7bn was required exclusively to implement the UN's humanitarian programme during that period. The report said that UNICEF estimated that over 5,000 Iraqi children under the age of five die from malnutrition or related diseases every month. Distribution delays formed part of the problem, which Baghdad has pledged to amend, although the report described the lack of funds from oil exports as more serious.
Financial Times: 26 February 1999
Lebanon
Secretary-General's UNIFIL Report
The 19 January report covered the period from 16 July 1998 to 15 January 1999, during which time Kofi Annan stated that violence continued at an increased pace between, on one side, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF) and, on the other, elements of armed resistance to Israeli occupation. Some 386 operations against IDF/DFF were recorded by UNIFIL, the highest number in a long time, as well as reports of 280 operations north of the Litani River. Most of these operations were conducted by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organisation.
The Secretary-General reported that IDF continued pre-emptive artillery bombardments but reduced long-range patrols forward of its positions. IDF carried out a further seven air raids in the UNIFIL area of operation, and another 58 air raids against targets north of the Litani River. UNIFIL used its network of checkpoints and observation posts, continuous patrolling and continuous contacts with the parties to try to stop hostile activities within its area of operation. It was further deployed to protect villages and farmers. However, two civilians were killed and eight injured. Some ten civilians were killed and fourteen injured outside the UNIFIL area of operation.
Annan asserted that UNIFIL at times encountered hostile reactions from both sides as well as minor breaches of an agreed safety zone around UNIFIL positions.
Annan regretted that there had been no new developments from his recent contacts with the parties regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). An 8 January letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the UN requested that the Security Council extend the UNIFIL mandate for six months until 31 July 1999, which Annan endorsed.
The Secretary-General stressed that unpaid assessments to UNIFIL amounted to $112.9 million, which represented money owed to troop-contributing states. The total outstanding peacekeeping contributions amounted to $1,593.2 million.
Annan announced that, at the end of November 1998, an Indian battalion deployed to the east sector, replacing the Norwegian unit, which left UNIFIL following over 20 years service. As of December 1998, UNIFIL comprised 4,483 troops from Fiji (588), Finland (492), France (247), Ghana (646), India (617), Ireland (611), Italy (46), Nepal (604) and Poland (632). UNIFIL was assisted by 51 military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and it employed 486 civilian staff, of whom 142 were recruited internationally and 344 locally. Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote was the Force Commander. Since its establishment, 222 UNIFIL members lost their lives: 76 through firings or bomb explosions, 92 in accidents and 54 from other causes. Some 334 had been wounded by firing, or by mine or bomb explosions.
UN Doc: S/1999/61: 19 January 1999
Western Sahara
Secretary-General's MINURSO Report
The 28 January report covered developments since 11 December 1998.
Negotiations
Kofi Annan noted the government of Morocco's decision to engage in detailed discussions with his Special Representative, Charles F. Dunbar, and the Chair of the Identification Commission, Robin Kinloch, over voter identification and appeals protocols, which formed part of the package of measures presented by the UN in October 1998 and formally accepted by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (POLISARIO). The government of Morocco requested extensive clarifications of these documents, which were promptly submitted by the UN. The government of Morocco requested a few days to study the clarifications and Annan expected it would then be able to present the specific alterations to the texts of the voter identification and appeals protocols to Dunbar.
Refugees
The Secretary-General welcomed the government of Morocco's decision to formalise UNHCR's status in Western Sahara and urged that preparations for the return of the refugees eligible to vote and their immediate families begin expeditiously. Although POLISARIO declared that all measures in the package should come into effect simultaneously, Annan suggested the pre-registration operation in the Tindouf camps be allowed to resume.
The Secretary-General described the refugee repatriation protocol as an essential guide to the work of the parties in bringing the refugees back to the territory and he urged the government of Morocco to immediately open discussions with UNHCR on the draft protocol. The government of Morocco had decided to sign the status-of-forces agreement regarding MINURSO which would both allow the orderly deployment of the resources required to implement the Settlement Plan and facilitate the day-to-day conduct of MINURSO's operations.
Annan recommended that the MINURSO mandate be extended until 28 February 1999. However, he warned that should prospects for re-implementing the package of measures still be elusive by his next report, he would ask his Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, to reassess the situation and the viability of the mandate of MINURSO. As at 27 January 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to MINURSO amounted to $65.1 million.
MINURSO contributions, as at 26 January 1999
[Military Observers (MO); Staff Officers (SO); Troops (Tr); Civilian Police Observers (CPO); Total (T)]: Argentina1 (MO), 1 (T); Austria5 (MO), 5* (T); Bangladesh 6 (MO), 6 (T); Canada 2 (CPO), 2 (T); China 16 (MO), 16 (T); Egypt 18 (MO), 1 (CPO), 19 (T); El Salvador 2 (MO), 2 (T); France 25 (MO), 25 (T); Ghana 6 (MO), 7 (Tr), 1 (CPO), 14 (T); Greece; 0 (T); Guinea 3 (MO), 3 (T); Honduras12 (MO), 12 (T); Ireland 8 (MO), 8 (T); India 10 (CPO), 10 (T); Italy 5 (MO), 5 (T); Kenya 8 (MO), 8 (T); Malaysia 13 (MO), 13 (T); Nigeria 3 (MO), 3 (T); Norway 2 (CPO), 2 (T); Pakistan **5 (MO), 6 (SO), 60 (Tr), 9 (CPO), 80 (T); Poland 3 (MO), 3 (T); Portugal 2 (MO), 1 (CPO), 3 (T); Republic of Korea 20 (Tr), 20 (T); Russian Federation 25 (MO), 25 (T); Sweden 0 (T); Uruguay 13 (MO), 13 (T); US 15 (MO), 15 (T); Venezuela 3 (MO), 3 (T); Total 197 (MO), 6 (SO), 87 (Tr), 26 (CPO), 316 (T);
* In addition to the Force Commander.
** All of the Pakistani engineering support unit were to be repatriated by 2 February 1999.
UN Doc: S/1999/88 28 January 1999
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