Angola
The Conflict
There were fears that Angola was headed for a humanitarian catastrophe, as, by mid-May this year, one million people had been displaced by the intensifying conflict in the country. The Angolan government's Chief of Staff admitted that the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) was out-performing government forces, although its tactics had changed. Whereas in the past, peasant farmers had generally remained on their property during fighting, over the preceding six months, UNITA had been forcing people from their lands. Some 1 million people (10% of the population) had reportedly been driven into government-controlled cities surrounded by hostile UNITA-controlled countryside, in order to coerce the population into opposing the government (Economist, 29-4-99). UNITA Secretary-General Paulo Lukamba Gato, during the week beginning 17 May, declared that UNITA forces had moved to within 60km of Luanda. Contrastingly, two major offensives by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) against UNITA headquarters since December had failed. The FAA admitted that it was restricted to "active defence" (Financial Times, 25-5-99). Prospects for negotiation between the two sides appeared poor, as the government vowed never again to negotiate with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi.
Economic Aspects
In April, the government admitted that foreign currency reserves were virtually depleted. Then. in mid-May, Angola's council of ministers approved a deal with foreign oil companies which would release more than $800m in special downpayments to the government over the next few months. Towards the end of May, a group of foreign banks loaned the Angolan government $575m, which would help with the country's financial crisis (Financial Times, 25-5-99).
The Role of the UN
Spokesperson for Kofi Annan, Fred Eckhard, announced on 21 June that the Angolan government had agreed in principle to a small follow-on UN mission in Angola during weekend talks in Luanda with Benard Miyet, UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping. Eckhard revealed that the mission under consideration would include political, information and humanitarian components, although there was, as yet, no agreement on military observers or human rights monitors. At the time of writing, the UN had around 50 staff and implementing partners trapped by the fighting in the city of Huambo (Panafrican News Agency, 22-6-99).
Burundi
Negotiations Hit Problems
During the week beginning 24 May, the 18 parties preparing ground for resumed negotiations in Arusha failed to overcome political differences. There appeared to be three distinct groupings, one allied to Burundi President Major Pierre Buyoya, the other two representing Hutu and Tutsi interests respectively. European Union (EU) Special Envoy Aldo Ajello stated that the three groups were, nevertheless, expected to propose both the content and direction of the fifth round of the Arusha peace talks scheduled for July, facilitated by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Buyoya reportedly proposed the establishment of a transitional government to be in place for the following ten years, comprising a head of state supported by a Hutu and Tutsi vice-president, who would exchange leadership positions during the 10-year period. He further suggested expanding the existing parliament to accommodate expatriate leaders and that the army be streamlined, separating it from the gendarmerie (East African (Nairobi), 2-6-99).
Central African Republic
Secretary-General's MINURCA Report (I)
The 14 April report described developments in the Central African Republic (CAR) since 29 January 1999.
Political Developments
Kofi Annan stated that a team of UN electoral experts visited Bangui on 9 March. It suggested that the establishment of a proper electoral roll required a new census of voters, which was unlikely to have been completed in time for the presidential elections. The establishment of a new Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission (CEMI) took place on 2 April, comprising 27 members - nine from the Presidential majority, nine from the opposition and nine others, including independents and members of government ministries. International electoral observers were to be deployed in May to monitor CEMI at the local level in order to ensure the impartiality of the local chairmen. It was envisaged that 26 medium-term observers would be deployed three months before polling day; up to 150 observers would be deployed for the first round of the elections and up to 200 during the second round. Annan intended to request Canada and Egypt to deploy 84 additional military communications and logistics personnel.
Human Rights
A human rights information and awareness campaign took place on Radio MINURCA in French and Sango during the run up to the elections.
Military and Security Aspects
MINURCA put into effect a new deployment plan in the capital Bangui with improved accommodation for the troops; redeployment was to be completed by the end of April. There had recently been a reduction in the volume of arms and ammunition collected and MINURCA was discussing with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) increases in financial support for the disarmament programme.
Conclusions
Disagreement continued between the parties over the distribution of posts in the Bureau of the National Assembly, particularly over the vice-presidency. However, the return of opposition legislators to the Assembly on 2 March helped to reduce tension. Kofi Annan welcomed continuing progress of the government of the CAR in executing promised reforms, but lamented their slowness. Although the country was relatively stable, distrust persisted between the country's political leaders and the economic and social situation remained precarious.
Some governmental commitments outlined in Annan's 29 January report [see UN and Conflict Monitor Issue 3] had been achieved, including: opposition participation in the National Assembly; the submission for adoption by the Assembly of draft laws on the restructuring of the armed forces; and limited progress towards privatisation, particularly in relation to the state oil company PETROCA. However, additional, swift action was still required: the adoption and implementation of the draft laws on restructuring and the conclusion of the nationalisation process; more effective collection of government revenue; and the continued regular payment of salaries.
Annan noted the withdrawal of Special Defence Force of the Republican Institutions (FORSDIR) units from roadblock duties. However, continuing complaints of FORSDIR transgressions necessitated governmental action to exclude FORSDIR from all police and law-and-order functions. Such functions were the domain of the police, who were undergoing human rights and other training from the MINURCA civilian police component (CIVPOL). MINURCA would also accelerate selection and training of suitable Central African Armed Forces (FACA) personnel for electoral duties.
MINURCA Contributions, as at 9 April 1999
[Staff Observers (SO) Civilian Police Observers (CPO) Support Unit (SU) Troops (Tr); Total (T)]
Benin 2 (CPO) 2 (T); Burkina Faso 6 (SO) 120 (Tr) 126 (T); Cameroon 1 (CPO) 1 (T); Canada 4 (SO) 25 (Tr) 29a (T); Chad 6 (SO) 120 (Tr) 126 (T); Côte d'Ivoire 8 (SO) 1 (CPO) 15 (SU) 210 (Tr) 234 (T); Egypt 8 (SO) 85 (SU) 119 (Tr) 212 (T); France 7 (CPO) 7 (T); Gabon 8 (SO) 120 (Tr) 128b (T); Mali 5 (SO) 6 (CPO) 119 (Tr) 130 (T); Portugal 2 (CPO) 2 (T); Senegal 9 (SO) 3 (CPO) 120 (Tr) 132 (T); Togo 6 (SO) 120 (Tr) 126 (T); Tunisia 2 (SO) 2 (T); Total 60 (SO) 24 (CPO) 100 (SU) 1,073 (Tr) 1,257a (T).
The figures do not include national support elements (22).
b In addition to the Force Commander.
Source: UN Doc; S/1999/416- 14 April 1999
Secretary-General's MINURCA Report (II)
The 28 May report covered developments since 14 April 1999.
Establishment of the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission
The inauguration of the CEMI on 19 May was delayed due to disagreements between the Mouvance Présidentielle and the CAR opposition. On 1 May, the president had established a control mechanism to facilitate the impartial functioning of CEMI.
Human Rights
The MINURCA human rights section primarily focused on organising a national seminar on the impact of human rights in the reconstruction process, scheduled for 31 May to 2 June 1999, with a view to adopting a national plan of action for human rights education and promotion. Agreed human rights themes included: development; elections; the administration of justice; law enforcement officials and security forces; women; children; refugees; media; and trade unions.
UN Presence after the Mission
It was premature to submit detailed recommendations, but, in general terms, Kofi Annan envisaged the establishment of a small political office at Bangui following the withdrawal of MINURCA, whose functions might include:
(a)Facilitating continued dialogue and reconciliation;
(b)Supporting all efforts to reinforce the democratisation process and promote good governance and the rule of law;
(c)Helping to mobilise international political and financial support for the implementation of economic, social and security reforms;
(d)Providing the political framework for integrating UN activities in support of the government's disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, police training, human rights and culture of peace programmes.
It might also prove necessary to attach a military adviser and a civilian police adviser to the office.
UN Role in the Elections
Concept of Operations
The MINURCA concept of operations involved deploying international electoral observers in Bangui and at ten sites throughout the countryside, to observe: the electoral campaign; the distribution and operation of the polling sites; the casting of the ballots in two rounds; the retrieval and counting of ballot papers; and the announcement of the results. The MINURCA electoral unit was being re-established with a staff of three, although difficulties and delays in recruitment persisted. The CAR has a surface area of 623,000 km2 and an estimated eligible voter population of 1.5 million, requiring at least 2,500 polling stations
Source: UN Doc; S/1999/621- 28 May 1999
Congo-Brazzaville
Brief History of the Conflict
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Violence Continues
During the months leading up to April 1999, forces loyal to Pascal Lissouba (known as the Cocoyes) joined up with the Ninjas, opposition fighters supporting former prime minister, Bernard Kolelas, in a series of offensives against government troops which saw up to 250,000 people flee their homes. For the previous seven months, Congo-Brazaville's main supply route, the railway line connecting Brazzaville and the oil-producing town, Pointe Noire, had been disrupted, while the Ninjas had attacked Brazzaville twice. Denis Sassou-Nguesso has been supported by the Angolan government since 1997, who at the time of writing had troops deployed in the country. Conversely, the Ninjas held close ties with the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (Economist, 10-4-99). There were reports that Ninja militia attacked and wounded civilians and security personnel in Djambala, the regional capital of Plateaux, 300 km north of Brazzaville, on 21 June (Panafrican News Agency, 22-6-99)
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Democratic Republic of Congo
Kabila Maintains Belligerent Stance
The appointment of a new government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by President Laurent Kabila failed to include any opposition representation. Instead, Kabila maintained his stance to defeat militarily his Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed opponents. Opposition fighters made advances westwards from their eastern stronghold. Kabila's allies (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) appeared to have reduced their support from seeking to drive the opposition out of the country to merely holding strategic economic positions for their own interests. However, resentment against foreign participation was swelling the ranks of Kabila's formerly meagre indigenous forces (Economist, 20-3-99).
Peace Process and Violence Continue in DRC
According to Catholic missionaries in eastern DRC, opposition fighters killed over 250 civilians in two villages at the end of March, while 100 people had reportedly been killed in a separate massacre. In mid-May, opposition fighters in eastern DRC asserted that the government had bombed two towns, killing forty six people, and claimed to have captured two more. At the beginning of June, Rwanda, which supports the opposition, unilaterally declared a cease-fire, while Chad, which supports Kabila, withdrew its troops.
On 22 June, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Amama Mbabazi announced Uganda would not sign the planned peace accord at a summit in Lusaka on 26 June if Ugandan security concerns were not addressed. Regional leaders, the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) assigned Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to mediate peace in DRC. Heads of state of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad were due to attend the summit, along with OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim and an envoy of Kofi Annan. Since January, a technical committee of defence, security and foreign affairs officials from Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC and Namibia had worked on possible strategies for a cease-fire and deployment of a neutral international peacekeeping force (New Vision (Kampala), 23-6-99).
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