Ethiopia and Eritrea
Brief History of the Conflict
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Violence Continues
As the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea continued, Eritreans claimed to have killed 10,000 Ethiopians during a single battle from 14-16 March. Diplomats estimated that Eritrea had 180,000 soldiers at the front, of whom 15,000 to 20,000 may have been killed. Ethiopia demanded that the Eritreans withdraw from certain areas before talks began. In mid-April, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi agreed to declare a cease-fire in return for an Eritrean commitment to withdraw. The fighting displaced hundreds of thousands of people, prompting fears of widespread starvation. There were also expulsions: about 200,000 people of Eritrean origin who remained in Ethiopia after independence have since been forced across the border. The large number of Eritreans engaged in fighting from its 3.5 million population placed a strain on the country's economy. At the beginning of May, UN envoy Mohammed Sahnoun visited both countries' capitals. However, fighting broke out again at the end of the month.
Fighting Spreads to Somalia
On 8 June, Ethiopia was accused of launching an incursion into Somalia. On 9 June, Ethiopian troops reportedly assisted in the capture of the strategic Somali town of Baidoa, previously controlled by Somali warlord and Eritrean ally, Hussein Aidid. This development suggested an intensification of the conflict, as Somali factions took sides, turning Somalia into an arena for a proxy war. Despite denials, increasing evidence suggested Ethiopia had pursued insurgents into Somalia, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front (Financial Times, 9-6-99).
Guinea Bissau
Brief History of the Conflict
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V iolent Battle Leads to End of War
Hundreds of people were killed, hundreds of thousands displaced and much of Bissau was destroyed during eleven months of fighting in the city, between forces loyal to President Joao Bernardo Vieira and those loyal to the army chief, General Anusamane Mane. Much of the killing took place in the final assault on the capital on 6 May 1999. The war ended when the opposition forces stormed the presidential palace, and compelling the president's forces to surrender. Vieira subsequently sought sanctuary in the Portuguese embassy. On 10 May, Mane pledged to hand over power to the speaker of parliament until elections in November, and that he himself would not fight the election.
External Intervention
Senegal had been induced to intervene in the conflict by suspicions that Guinea-Bissau was supporting opposition fighters in Senegal's Casamance region - the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). Thus, a consequence of this may have been to persuade Guinea-Bissau to now provide that support. As a result, the new Prime Minister in Senegal suggested a referendum to decide the future of Casamance, while opposition fighters increased attacks (Economist, 15-5-99).
The MFDC was due to open a three-day meeting in Banjul, Gambia, on 21 June to decide a unified strategy for forthcoming peace negotiations with the Senegalese government. However, opposition fighters opposed to the talks shelled Zinguinchor, capital of Senegal's Zinguinchor region during the week beginning 14 June. Among the delegations expected to attend the meeting were the political figure heads of the MFDC, Father Diamacoune Senghor and armed faction leader Sidi Badji. Senghor distanced himself from radical MFDC representative Mamadou Sane "Nkrumah", who recently declared his support for total independence for Casamance (Panafrican News Agency, 21-6-99).
Secretary-General's Report on Guinea-Bissau
The Secretary-General urged the government of President Vieira and General Mane's self-proclaimed military junta to translate commitments made under the November 1998 Abuja Agreement into concrete measures. In line with the agreement, on 3 December 1998, Francisco Fadul was appointed Prime Minister of the new transitional Government of National Unity. Members of the transitional government were appointed on 8 January 1999. However, the resumption of fighting in the country on 31 January further delayed the installation of the government.
On 17 February, President Vieira and General Mane formally agreed to reject violence. The Secretary-General described the subsequent 20 February inauguration of the transitional government as a significant step forward in the peace process, although he complained about the hampering of its effective functioning by obstacles including inadequate facilities, staff and other resources resulting from the fighting.
ECOMOG Activities
An advance ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) contingent of 110 Togolese troops was deployed to Guinea-Bissau between 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999; a further contingent of 300 troops was deployed on 4 February. At the time of writing, ECOMOG stood at 600 troops from Benin, the Gambia, the Niger and Togo. Mali intended to dispatch a contingent of 125 soldiers. Subsequent foreign troop withdrawals were expected to have been completed over the following days.
ECOMOG established its operational and command headquarters at Bissau. It was providing security at the seaport and international airport, and for the President and the Prime Minister. It also assisted humanitarian access throughout the country, although additional troops were required for deployment along the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border. ECOMOG further began the task of disarming the forces of the two ex-belligerents assisted by a special commission. It had recovered all heavy weapons nation-wide, while the collection of small weapons and light arms had also been concluded in the capital
Elections
Annan asserted that the Abuja deadline for holding of elections by the end of March 1999 would not be met: various disagreements had prevented accord between the parties over a specific date. As a first step towards considering UN electoral support, as requested by the parties, an electoral officer was to be included in the UN Peace-building Support Office to be set up in Bissau. The Secretary-General reported that the Security Council, on 3 March 1999, had approved the establishment of a UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), and he would soon announce name of his Representative to head the office [See Documentation and Sources]. Annan warned that the situation in Guinea-Bissau remained very fragile: the economy, basic social services and state institutions all needed rebuilding practically from scratch.
Source: UN Doc; S/1999/294- 17 March 1999
Liberia
ECOMOG to Leave Liberia
On 7 June, Liberian President Charles Taylor announced that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) would finally withdraw from the country on 26 July, Liberian independence day. This was to coincide with the ceremonial burning of weapons collected during ECOMOG's disarmament campaign of fighters in the Liberian civil war (P.M News - Lagos, 9-6-99).
Sierra Leone
Peace Negotiations Begin in Sierra Leone
By 13 April, as the Sierra Leonean population awaited the start of peace negotiations in Togo between the government of President Ahmed Téjan Kabbah and the opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF), some 300,000 people had been displaced in Freetown. Most of the rest of the country appeared to be under RUF control. Kabbah still had no real army and remained reliant upon the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). Nigeria had pressured Kabbah to attend the talks, while the RUF was given confidence by the prospect of diminishing Nigerian support for ECOMOG following the country's transition from military to civilian rule (The Economist, 5-6-99).
In an effort to rebuild the 5,000-strong Sierra Leonean army, 500 officer cadets were sent to Nigeria for training, while the remainder was being trained locally by Nigerian and British soldiers. The UK donated £10 million towards the cost, conditional on Kabbah pursuing a twin-track political and military solution towards a lasting political peace. The detained RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was to be allowed to travel to Lomé for consultations before the peace negotiations, and Kabbah hoped that Sankoh's release would secure a cease-fire by 27 April - Sierra Leonean independence day. Fleeing opposition fighters killed over 100 civilians in Sierra Leone during the third week of April (The Guardian, 13-4-99).
At the beginning of May, Kabbah rejected an opposition cease-fire proposal until it had withdrawn from diamond-mining areas. Then, towards the middle of the month, government and opposition forces agreed to a cease-fire to come into effect on 24 May. The cease-fire came into operation as scheduled, and talks began in Togo; however fighting continued.
On 18 June, US Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice, warned against the signing a fragile peace accord in Sierra Leone, urging ECOWAS Chair Gnassingbe Eyadema, hosting the negotiations, to establish a robust agreement. Rice advised about the need to spend more time at the negotiating table to achieve a permanent end to the 8-year conflict (The Progress - Freetown, 23-6-99).
Secretary-General's UNOMSIL Report
Political Developments
Dialogue Process
Internal consultations took place between Foday Sankoh and a delegation of 14 RUF representatives from within Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, the government had pledged undertake legal steps to grant Sankoh a pardon. Following the consultations, on 10 May, the RUF/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) requested a blanket amnesty for all personnel who had organised the coup d'état in May 1997 and that a four-year transitional government be established, whose main functions would include: drafting a new constitution; reforming national security forces and civil services; the demilitarisation of all combatants; and establishing a national electoral commission. RUF was willing to convert into a political party and suggested deploying a neutral peace monitoring group following the signing of a peace agreement, the departure of all foreign troops and mercenaries within 14 days of the signing of such an agreement, and the termination of the Status of Forces Agreement between the governments of Sierra Leone and Nigeria.
In response, on 14 May, the government challenged the unconstitutional nature of the transitional government, but pledged to consider the amnesty proposal, while taking into account gross human rights violations committed against citizens of Sierra Leone. The government endorsed the transformation of RUF into a political party. On 18 May, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the government and RUF, coming into effect on 24 May, by which both parties were to maintain their respective positions and refrain from hostile or aggressive acts. The agreement also provided for: safe humanitarian access; the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants; and the deployment of UN military observers to oversee compliance. On 2 June, UNOMSIL was asked to establish a committee to effect the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants.
Relations Between Sierra Leone and Liberia
On 8 April, ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Felix Mujakperuo confirmed the involvement of the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso in the shipment and delivery of arms to the Sierra Leone opposition on 14 and 15 March, which Liberia denied. On 26 April, ECOWAS' Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté stated that the Chiefs of Staff of ECOMOG states welcomed in principle proposals to deploy UN observers and ECOMOG forces, but stressed that topological difficulties required specialised equipment that the UN might be able to provide. However, Kofi Annan reported increased contact among civic groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while a delegation of the Liberian Senate met with Kabbah in early April.
Military and Security Situation
Mujakperuo launched an offensive to provide a larger security cordon around Lungi and Freetown, resulting in ECOMOG successfully opening roads connecting Freetown with Lungi, Port Loko and Kambia. Furthermore, a land route to Bo and Kenema was also opened up. ECOMOG's military capabilities were strengthened with a substantial increase in communications facilities and air assets.
However, RUF/AFRC continued to dominate many parts of the country, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, while their fighting capacity remained strong. Both before and after 24 May, when the cease-fire took effect, opposition activity in the north-west increased considerably.
Creation of New Security Forces
Considerable progress was made in reconstituting the police in the capital, but substantial external assistance was still required. Meanwhile, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme had been at a virtual standstill.
Human Rights
There was a resurgence in opposition atrocities against civilians, mostly in the provincial towns of Masiaka and Port Loko, including summary executions, mutilations, limb amputations, abductions, sexual abuse, the destruction of property and humanitarian deprivation, including punitive food taxes. RUF pledged to establish an internal investigation to explore allegations of abuse.
In April, Mujakperuo established a Civil/Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of human rights violations against individual members of ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). A few reports persisted of ill-treatment of civilians by ECOMOG, CDF and Civil Defence Units (CDU), while detainees from opposition-controlled areas reportedly faced a high risk of intimidation and even execution as alleged collaborators. There were reliable reports of continued widespread recruitment of children by CDF in the Southern and Eastern Provinces. On 27 April, Kabbah declared the establishment of a new Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone, for which UNOMSIL promised to provide the required technical assistance.
Humanitarian Situation
The already desperate humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone worsened. Opposition gains increased the number of people needing assistance, while at the same time limiting humanitarian access: nearly half, or 2.6 million, of the population in the Northern and Eastern Provinces was effectively out of the reach. Another 480,000 became refugees. It was estimated that over one million civilians countrywide still required humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian access remained a challenge even in government-controlled areas.
Future Role of UNOMSIL
Some sixteen observers were to join UNOMSIL in June, following which, the security situation permitting, Kofi Annan would deploy additional observers up to the limit of 70, and an additional 15 medical personnel.
Since continuing peace talks were likely to require a high level of UN involvement, the Secretary-General intended to dispatch an extra two civilian staff, while the human rights section also needed to be restored to five. A military assessment and planning team was sent to Sierra Leone at the end of May to develop a revised concept of operations for an enlarged mission. The future strength, activities and state of deployment of ECOMOG, which was as yet unknown, would also affect UNOMSIL's future status. However, UNOMSIL should be prepared to ensure the security of UN personnel, requiring the deployment of a sizeable number of infantry and additional observers, along with the necessary equipment and military logistical support. its expanded tasks were likely to include:
(a)Monitoring and supervising the cease-fire;
(b)Supervising, monitoring and assisting in the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants;
(c)Providing security to UN personnel, including military observers;
(d)Assisting humanitarian efforts;
(e)Providing planning and logistical support for an eventual election.
Annan also envisaged an expansion of the civilian personnel, including those engaged in political, human rights and logistical support functions, as well as the acquisition of a nationwide broadcasting capacity.
UNOMSIL contributions, as at 8 June 1999
[Military Observers (MO); Othersa (O); Total (T)]
China 2 (MO); 2 (T); Egypt 2 (MO); 2 (T); India 2 (MO); 2 (O); 4 (T); Kenya 2 (MO); 2 (T); Kyrgyzstan 1 (MO); 1 (T); New Zealand 2 (MO); 2 (T); Pakistan 2 (MO); 2 (T); Russian Federation 3 (MO); 3 (T); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 4 (MO); 4 (T); Zambia 2 (MO); 2 (T); Total 22b (MO); 2 (O); 24 (T); a Medical team.
b Including the Chief Military Observer.
UN Doc: S/1999/645- 4 June 1999
Somalia
Somaliland Relatively Peaceful
Although southern Somalia remained caught up in the conflict that broke out in 1991, the north-west of the country has enjoyed a basic form of government and has effectively been stable for three years as Somaliland. It has a population of around 3 million, but was not recognised as a state by the international community.
However, Somaliland remained economically and politically unsettled. The region primarily acquired foreign currency through external remittances - reportedly at least $200m-$300m a year - while the main livestock trade was only recently beginning to recover after the lifting of a Saudi import ban. The capital of the region, Hargeisa, was still shattered from conflict in the late 1980s, when President Siyad Barre led a brutal campaign against the region's Isaaq clan. The majority of Somaliland's small budget went on security services, while allegations of corruption abounded in the nascent state structures. North-east Somalia continued to contest Somaliland's eastern border.
Businesspeople and politicians complained that the region's lack of international recognition was one of the major obstacles to recovery. Although the international community remained intent on maintaining Somalia's territorial integrity, in practice, the European Commission was de facto working with Somaliland authorities, almost as if they were a recognised government. (Financial Times, 3-6-99).
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