This Issue
Indonesia
Violence in West Kalimantan
February 1999 saw violence break out on the Indonesian island of West Kalimantan. An alliance of Muslim Malays, animist Dayaks and Confucian Chinese was attempting to expel settlers from the island of Madura. Between then and the end of March, over 180 people were reported to have been killed. Some Malay and Dayak fighters smeared themselves with human blood and carried trophies cut from their victims' bodies. Madurese have been cleansed from their villages, which have been razed and their crops and livestock destroyed. Only 3,000 government troops were deployed to the area, primarily to evacuate Madurese refugees, and they made scant effort to oppose the fighters.
The Indonesian government has long been encouraging immigration to the province to ease pressure on other, more populous islands and to establish a greater sense of unity among the diverse peoples of the archipelago. The Madurese at the time of writing constituted 8% of the population. Similar events occurred on another part of the island two years previously, which were eventually stopped by a superficial peace settlement. Whilst the conflict did not appear to threaten Indonesia's integrity, it did raise the prospect that the country may remain largely intact politically, but would be racked by unmanageable social unrest and shunned by foreign investors. (Economist, 27-4-99)
East Timor
Brief History of the Conflict
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Indonesian Army Ignores Violence
Violence continued in East Timor, despite the advancing peace process there, primarily by pro-Indonesian supporters harassing pro-independence groups. Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor largely failed to intervene in acts of violence, and there were reports of them assisting in the crimes. On 6 April, reports emerged of an incident in the town of Liquica, where at least 25 people were killed and many more injured in an attack by militia using guns and machetes; when the fleeing victims sought sanctuary in a church, Indonesian soldiers forced them out of the building and back into the path of the militia.
The pro-Indonesian paramilitary groups' two primary functions were: to represent pro-Indonesian elements of the population; and to conceal the involvement of Indonesian military hard-liners. The overall objective of the campaign was to force the cancellation of the UN-sponsored consultation process to decide East Timor's status. (The Guardian, 12-4-99)
Reports attributed the Indonesian troops' behaviour to either local sympathy with the militias, in defiance of Jakarta, or to higher level subversion by Indonesian military commanders unhappy with concessions offered by Habibe. There was strong evidence of Indonesian military officers supplying paramilitary groups with weapons, although they denied conducting operations with them. (Economist, 10-4-99)
Timorese Opposition Advocates Insurrection
The East Timorese were due to vote in July on whether to accept wide-ranging autonomy and remain part of Indonesia or to opt for full independence - although the consensus was that the majority would choose independence. Opposition leader Xanana Gusmao had, until recently, been requesting the immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to guarantee the election process. However, in response to the increasing violence in the region, he subsequently demanded a popular insurrection against the militias. On 17 April, thousands of protestors rallied in East Timor's capital Dili to demonstrate their loyalty to Indonesia.
On 18 April, pro-Indonesian East Timorese paramilitaries, mainly from of the Aitarak and Red and White Iron militias, attacked pro-independence targets in Dili. Again, Indonesian soldiers and police did not attempt to stop the intimidation, and reportedly assisted the 1,500 paramilitaries. On 20 April, the Indonesian government announced that it was on the verge of securing a peace agreement between those loyal to Jakarta and pro-independence groups. Then, at the beginning of May, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement for a referendum on autonomy for East Timor to be held on 8 August.
Preparations for Referendum Delayed
However, on 20 June, diplomats warned of delays in preparations for the referendum. The first contingent of 38 UN police officers, of a total 272 recruited internationally to advise and monitor the Indonesian police in order to protect the Timorese electorate from attacks and intimidation, had not yet arrived in Dili. Furthermore, Ian Martin, head of the UN Mission in East Timor, confirmed that attacks by pro-Indonesian militia, often with the tacit support of the Indonesian military, were continuing. UN officials and visiting diplomats in East Timor predicted that Kofi Annan would postpone the vote from its scheduled date of 8 August to 29 August. However, Chief Commander of the Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, has denied supporting the militia and recently presided over a peace settlement between the principal militia and separatist opposition.
Delays to the process risked the referendum getting caught up in politics in Jakarta, where a new parliament was to be sworn in by October at the latest, and the current presidential elections. The Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, appeared to be clearly ahead. The party has opposed secession for East Timor, although Megawati has pledged to accept a vote in favour of independence. (Financial Times, 21-6-99)
Secretary-General's Report on East Timor (I)
The Secretary-General reported that on 5 May 1999 the Portuguese and Indonesian governments signed an overall Agreement entrusting the UN with organising and conducting a plebiscite over autonomy or independence for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia, including the establishment of a UN mission in East Timor to conduct the plebiscite. Two supplementary agreements stipulated 8 August 1999 as the date for the referendum, both inside and outside East Timor, and that a secure environment was a prerequisite. They also decreed that appropriate Indonesian authorities were responsible for ensuring such an environment and for law and order, and that the UN would decide whether the necessary security existed for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process. The supplementary agreements requested the deployment of UN personnel to carry out the various phases of the consultation process. They further requested the availability of a number of civilian police officers to advise Indonesian police and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of electoral material to and from the polling sites.
Annan stressed logistical and other problems related to carrying out the consultation in such a short time-frame. A high level of tension and serious incidents of political violence had recently occurred in East Timor while some political elements were reportedly opposed to the consultation.
Source: UN Doc; S/1999/513- 5 May 1999
Secretary-General's Report on East Timor (II)
The 22 May report stated that an assessment team dispatched to East Timor from 14-15 May declared that potential difficulties with the forthcoming ballot included the short time-frame and East Timor's difficult terrain and limited infrastructure. Kofi Annan proposed the establishment of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organise and conduct the referendum.
To be effective, UNAMET needed to enjoy the full confidence and support of the Security Council; the full co-operation of the Indonesian authorities; and the necessary resources. It also needed to enjoy privileges and immunities, and freedom of movement and communication. Jamsheed Marker would remain Annan's Personal Representative and Ian Martin was appointed Special Representative and Head of UNAMET. The Mission would incorporate political, electoral, civilian police, information and administrative/financial components. Human rights would be integrated in different aspects of UNAMET's components, while a small component would monitor humanitarian developments.
UNAMET at full strength was likely comprise 241 international staff members, 420 UN Volunteers, 280 civilian police, and 4,000 local staff. UNAMET deployment would commence with the establishment of a headquarters in Dili, followed by seven regional centres.
Political Component
The political component would comprise a Chief Political Officer and 15 Political Officers, as well as a Senior Political Officer to liaise with the Indonesian authorities. The political component would monitor the fairness of the political environment and ensure the freedom of all political and other non-governmental organisations. It would monitor and advise the Special Representative on political matters relating to the referendum
Electoral Component
The electoral component would be responsible for all activities related to registration and voting. It would comprise a Chief Electoral Officer, 16 regional staff and an additional 400 polling officers. External polling would be conducted by the Australian Election Commission and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). External polling would be co-ordinated through the IOM field co-ordinator, the Electoral Assistance Division of the UN Secretariat and the electoral component based in Dili. Three international experts would be appointed as the Electoral Commission, responsible for the overall assessment of the consultation process and for hearing any complaints, challenges or disputes.
Popular Consultation Modalities
The recent assessment mission estimated the population at 400,000 in 13 districts. Some 200 registration/polling centres would be established. Since the UN was organising and conducting the referendum, all arrangements for international observation were outside the responsibility of UNAMET.
Information Activities
UNAMET would include an information component to explain the terms of the main Agreement and the autonomy framework, as well as the process, procedure and implications of the vote, to the East Timorese people. The campaign would be conducted through the media, public meetings and other public outreach programmes, in the Tetum, Bahasa Indonesian and Portuguese languages.
Security Situation
The Indonesian government was to be responsible for maintaining peace and security for the plebiscite. However, Annan had continued to receive credible reports of political violence by armed militias, including intimidation and killings, against unarmed pro-independence civilians. There were further indications that the militias were operating with the acquiescence of elements of the armed forces and were also threatening moderate pro-integration supporters. There were large pro-integration militia presences in towns and at checkpoints along roads with no intervention from the army or police.
Commission on Peace and Stability
Annan declared that the aforementioned intimidation and obstruction of pro-independence representatives had hampered the operationality of the Commission on Peace and Stability, established on 21 April by representatives of the pro-independence and pro-integration sides, the local government and the local police and military commanders. In co-operation with the UN, the Commission was to establish a code of conduct for before and after the referendum.
Security Measures
UN Civilian Police
Local police were to accept sole responsibility for maintaining law and order. However, a number of constraints appeared to have prevented local police from assuming that role. The first team of UN civilian police officers, composed of headquarters staff, would be dispatched by mid-June. Annan intended to assign military liaison officers to maintain contact with their Indonesian counterparts.
Security of UN Personnel
UNAMET would adopt a clear stand against all acts of intimidation. Indonesian authorities were wholly responsible for the security of UN personnel.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The rapid deployment of UNAMET would take place in phases and was contingent upon security conditions and the prompt availability of the required personnel and other resources. The mission's effectiveness also relied upon the full co-operation of the Indonesian government and the East Timorese local authorities, which had so far been forthcoming.
Source: UN Doc; S/1999/595- 22 May 1999
Kashmir
Fighting Breaks Out in Kashmir
On 26 May, two Indian warplanes attacked an estimated 600 opposition fighters operating in the Indian part of Kashmir. Both planes were lost in the attack. The Indian government claimed the fighters were being supplied by the Pakistani army, although Pakistan officially denied this, accusing India of unprovoked shelling of civilians across the line of control separating Kashmir. By 25 May, 17 Indian soldiers had allegedly been killed and 90 injured. At the beginning of June, India intensified the offensive against the fighters.
Increasing Worries that Violence Could Escalate
At the end of May, fears that the violence could escalate increased, particularly as both countries were nuclear powers. There were worries that the outgoing Hindu nationalist government in India could use the crisis in Kashmir to rally voter support. The crisis also provided a useful distraction for Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from other domestic political problems. The crisis reinforced notions that owning nuclear weapons would not deter conventional conflict in south Asia, while the prospects of either country signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and meeting other conditions for the removal of sanctions had diminished. The countries' nuclear status would also help to internationalise the conflict. (Financial Times, 28-5-99)
India Rejects Peace Proposals
On 30 May, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee rejected Pakistan's demand for an immediate cessation of the bombing before negotiations could take place. Vajpayee also rejected an offer by Kofi Annan to dispatch his representative to both countries to attempt to broker a settlement on the grounds that Kashmir was a bilateral issue with Pakistan. The US and the European Union reportedly blamed Pakistan for the violence. (Financial Times, 31-5-99)
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