This Issue
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Secretary-General's UNMIBH Report (I)
The 16 March report summarised the activities of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) since 16 December 1998.
Restructure and Reform of the Police
The Secretary-General asserted that UNMIBH followed a strategy of engaging senior police officials in the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation), through co-locating International Police Task Force (IPTF) advisers and launching a series of inter-entity meetings between officials from the Ministries of the Interior. A series of cross-inter-entity boundary line meetings of senior and regional police officials demonstrated genuine co-operative police efforts to address cross-entity crime. However, it remained unclear whether such steps represented the beginning of self-sustaining progress in police restructuring and reform and the establishment of the rule of law.
Arbitration Award for Brcko
Annan stated that the final arbitration award for the Brcko area, announced on 5 March 1999, provided that the entire territory of the pre-war municipality of Brcko would constitute the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the exclusive sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The currently divided district would be recreated as a single administrative unit with a unified police force operating under a single command structure and with complete independence from the police establishments in Bosnia Herzegovina's two entities. The Secretary-General declared that, consequently, UNMIBH would have to establish a single multi-ethnic police force in an area where three police forces were operating at the time. The IPTF in the RS-controlled area had succeeded in establishing the only multi-ethnic police force in the RS. However, political problems in the RS could hamper progress.
The Secretary-General warned of imminent difficulties presented by the establishment of a multi-ethnic border service, including, as a result of delays in the administration of justice and the execution of court decisions, inter-entity organised criminal activities, and violence related with minority returns in the Federation and the RS.
Annan emphasised challenges in establishing self-sustaining political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mid-September 1998 elections had not yet led to the formation of a government in the RS. On the same day as the Brcko award announcement, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina had dismissed RS President, Nikola Poplasen. Following this, Prime Minister Milorad Dodik resigned and the Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina suspended his participation in the joint Presidency, exacerbating tension resulting from the political crisis in the entity. Thus, prospects for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes remained bleak.
UN Doc: S/1999/284- 16 March 1999
Secretary-General's UNMIBH Report (II)
The 11 June report summarised UNMIBH's activities since 16 March 1999.
Activities of the Mission
Police Restructuring and Reform
Kofi Annan asserted that the conclusion of the police restructuring agreement meant that the RS authorities, for the first time, agreed to the principle of multi-ethnic policing within their entity and to concrete benchmarks realising this. The establishment of combined working groups for minority recruitment in each Federation canton accelerated the inclusion of minorities in the Federation police. The Federation's police academy began training on 26 April, while a provisional RS academy was to be opened at the end of June. However, the number of minority police officers remained disappointingly low, and the difficulties encountered at each stage of police reform revealed the depth of resistance towards multi-ethnic policing among some of the dominating political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
UNMIBH expanded its capacity to sustain progress towards meeting benchmarks contained in the agreement on RS police restructuring, and reviving efforts towards meeting fully the goals contained in the Bonn-Petersberg Agreement for the Federation. Co-ordination with other international agencies facilitated the return of minority police to the Federation and investigations into organised crime, and strengthened UNMIBH efforts towards police reform .
UNMIBH developed innovative monitoring methods involving both civil affairs officers and IPTF monitors, including: co-locating in police facilities and holding regular consultations with civilian authorities; working with the police in criminal investigations to uncover organised crime and terrorism; forming a new approach to auditing police services in Federation municipalities and cantons; investigating police involvement in human rights abuses in returnee areas; and new forms of judicial monitoring.
Political Developments
Progress in the RS was hampered by continuing opposition to multi-ethnic police among a significant part of the political forces, while increasing insecurity accompanied popular reaction to the establishment of the Brcko District and the dismissal of RS President Poplasen, as well as increasing tension and economic deprivation following the NATO air strikes in the FRY. There were also complications in developing self-sustaining institutions in the Federation due to: the killing of the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Leutar; scant progress in sustaining minority returns; and continued efforts, particularly by Croats, to raise the possibility of revising fundamental principles of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. However, broad sectors of the population were willing to use integration mechanisms, in particular the common licence plate and the common currency, to establish and develop contacts between the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
IPTF Composition, as at 4 June 1999a
Argentina 35; Austria 39; Bangladesh 33; Bulgaria 44; Canada 29; Chile 29; Denmark 28; Egypt 34; Estonia 5; Fiji 5; Finland 21; France 95; Germany 114; Ghana 99; Greece 9; Hungary 37; Iceland 3; India 102; Indonesia 31; Ireland 27; Italy 22; Jordan 191; Kenya 11; Lithuania 2; Malaysia 47; Nepal 41; Netherlands 45; Nigeria 22; Norway 24; Pakistan 98; Poland 49; Portugal 53; Romania 20; Russian Federation 34; Senegal 20; Spain 57; Sweden 56; Switzerland 4; Thailand 5; Tunisia 2; Turkey 18; Ukraine 32; UK 80; US 168; Total 1,919
a The number of civilian police monitors varies owing to ongoing contingent rotations.
UN Doc: S/1999/670- 11 June 1999
Kosovo
Brief History of the Conflict
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Operation Allied Force Begins
The first wave of NATO air attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Operation Allied Force), began on the night of 24 March, targeting Serb military installations, particularly their relatively modern air defence system. Both Russia and China immediately declared opposition to the NATO action. On 24 March, Kofi Annan issued a statement urging that the Security Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of force.
Serb forces in Kosovo responded to the air raids by intensifying attacks on Kosovar Albanians. Reports emerged of massacres by Serbs in Pristina and the forced displacement of Albanians, precipitating a massive refugee crisis. By the third day, NATO had escalated its air campaign to target Serb tanks, artillery and troop carriers in Kosovo. As many as half a million Kosovars (of a population of 1.8 million) had been displaced by the end of March, at least 120,000 of those outside country. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov met with FRY President Slobodan Milosevic on 28 March in Belgrade to try to find a political solution to the crisis. Primakov presented Milosevic's offer to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder: to withdraw some troops from Kosovo and let "peaceful refugees" return if NATO stopped bombing. Schröder turned down the offer, with the full support of other NATO countries.
Predicament of Kosovo Albanians Worsens
As the air campaign continued, the extent of Serb atrocities was further clarified as up to two thousand Kosovar Albanians arrived in Macedonia in one day on sealed trains, having first been expelled from their homes and forced to surrender identity papers. By the end of the first week of April, both Macedonia and Albania were struggling to cope with the massive influx of refugees; Macedonia even turned some back at the border. UNHCR had set up camps for the refugees, however numbers were fast outstripping supplies. More importantly, refugees were being forcibly moved around and families split up. Some 300,000 refugees were moved from one camp in Macedonia, allegedly by force, to be found later in Albania, although 100,000 were still reported missing.
Increasing reports were received of atrocities within Kosovo, with claims that 1,000's of men had been murdered and women raped by Serbs. On 6 April, Milosevic declared a unilateral cease-fire, supposedly to last until the Orthodox Easter on 11 April. However, NATO rejected the cease-fire; there were suspicions that the declaration was merely an attempt to expose differences within NATO over the prolonged military action. On 11 April, the German government proposed a plan based around UN proposals for an international force to replace Serb troops in Kosovo, including Russian and Ukrainian troops, and nominally led by the OSCE rather than NATO. (Economist, 10-4-99)
By 10 April, an estimated 1.1 million Kosovar Albanians had reportedly been displaced. Threats to the stability of Macedonia and Albania were becoming increasingly serious. Serb forces had allegedly been stopping refugees at the Macedonian border and forcing them back into Kosovo; it was suspected they were to act as human shields against NATO bombing. On 11 April, eleven Serb civilians were killed and sixteen injured when NATO warplanes hit a civilian train within Serbia. Reports that NATO was using depleted uranium (allegedly responsible for Gulf War Syndrome) in its bombs were released. On 13 April, a Serb ground incursion into Albania killed 120 KLA fighters. By this time, some 12,000 NATO troops had deployed to Macedonia and 8,000 to Albania. Madeleine Albright and her Russian counterpart Ivan Ivanov failed to agree on a strategy. However, Russian threats of assistance for the Serbs had eased.
EU Peace Proposal Rejected
The bombing encouraged Serb nationalism. Meanwhile, NATO governments maintained their unwillingness to deploy ground troops to Kosovo without agreement from both sides. By 13 April, some 460,000 Kosovars had been forced out of the province. A summit of EU leaders in Brussels on April 14, attended by Kofi Annan, suggested a six-point peace proposal, including provisions for a 24-hour pause in the bombing to pursue diplomatic initiatives, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and civilian monitors. However, the US rejected the proposal. On the same day, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced the discovery of rape camps in Kosovo, where Kosovar Albanian women were held and repeatedly raped. Britain announced it would send 2,000 more troops to the region, whilst still insisting that there would be no ground invasion of Kosovo.
On the night of 14 April, a NATO bomb hit a convoy of refugees in Western Kosovo, reportedly killing at least 70, bringing the estimated total of civilian deaths by NATO up to 150. On 18 April, reports emerged of NATO plans for a ground invasion at the end of May. Some 80,000 US troops had allegedly been earmarked for the offensive, some of whom were already in training in Colorado. Evidence also suggested that more than 3,000 Kosovar Albanians had been killed inside Kosovo by Yugoslav forces
G8 Agree Settlement Proposal
On 20 April, the KLA claimed that Serbian forces were shelling 35,000 refugees on the verge of starvation trapped in the mountains of central Kosovo. It demanded that NATO intervene against the Serb positions. In May, NATO bombers hit two buses, killing at least 17 civilians in the second one alone. On 6 May, foreign ministers attending a G8 summit Bonn proposed settlement that Serb forces should withdraw, refugees should be permitted to return under the protection of "an effective international … security presence" and an "interim administration" should be established for the province to be appointed by the UN [see Documentation and Sources].
At the beginning of May, US politician Jesse Jackson visited Belgrade and secured the release of three US soldiers captured by Serbian forces in March. At the same time, Milosevic issued a series of proposals for direct talks with President Bill Clinton. Milosevic was also working on a peace proposal, which would provide for a lightly armed UN police force, including a large Russian component and NATO countries not involved in the bombing, such as Greece, Portugal, Hungary and Poland. Milosevic also released Ibrahim Rugova.
Chinese Embassy Hit by NATO
Amid a rising flood of refugees fleeing Kosovo, Macedonia closed its borders to any further refugees on 5 May; many amongst Macedonia's majority Slav population feared that many of the 200,000 Albanian refugees already in Macedonia would stay, upsetting the already delicate demographic balance in the country. On 7 May, NATO planes bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and severely jeopardising hopes of a peace settlement over Kosovo involving the Security Council. Clinton apologised for the incident, blaming it on an error in CIA intelligence. Both China and Russia called for an immediate end to the NATO air campaign, which was unanimously rejected by NATO governments.
Milosevic then announced a "partial" withdrawal of Serb army units from Kosovo, but this was dismissed as a ploy; NATO declared that it would only stop the bombing on condition of the G8 proposition. In mid-May, NATO Commander General Wesley Clark (US) won Pentagon approval for the dispatch of 176 additional US aircraft and more missiles to the area. Both Hungary and Turkey offered bases for NATO aircraft. By the end of the first week of May, Milosevic was again starting to negotiate over the composition of an international military force to be deployed in Kosovo.
International Attention Focuses on UN Resolution
A 10 May report by the US State Department suggested that more than 100,000 men of military age were missing inside Kosovo, at least 4,600 of whom were almost certainly dead. By mid-May, increasing international diplomatic impetus focused on securing a sufficiently strong UN resolution to demonstrate broad international consensus against Milosevic, without destroying already flimsy relations between NATO and Russia. (Economist, 29-5-99)
Milosevic Indicted
On 27 May 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted and issued arrest warrants against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic (President of Serbia), Nikola Sainovic (Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY), Dragoljub Ojdanic (Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army), Vlajko Stojiljkovic (Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia). ICTY Prosecutor, Justice Louise Arbour, pointed out that the indictment was the Tribunal's first against an acting head of state during an on-going armed conflict. The indictment alleged that forces controlled by the accused, between 1 January and late May 1999, persecuted the Kosovar Albanian civilian population on political, racial or religious grounds. According to the UN, by the date of the indictment, approximately 740,000 Kosovar Albanians had been expelled from Kosovo; thousands more were internally displaced; indeterminate numbers had been killed by FRY and Serbian forces. The indictees were specifically charged with murdering over 340 people, with three counts of crimes against humanity and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war. (UN Press Release (JL/PIU/403-E), 27-5-99)
Many welcomed this initiative, but others were worried that it might impair negotiations with Milosevic, and hence worsen the plight of Kosovar Albanians. At the same time, NATO members accelerated preparations for a large ground force. For instance, on 30 May, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged 50,000 troops for a possible invasion of Kosovo. Negotiations for a eventual peacekeeping force for Kosovo continued to centre around its composition: Serbia was opposed to participation by NATO countries involved in the bombing and favoured a strong Russian involvement; NATO states would only consider a NATO-led force. (Economist, 12-6-99)
Milosevic Accepts Peace Plan
On 3 June, Milosevic finally accepted a peace plan agreed by NATO and Russia. However, NATO pledged to maintain the bombing campaign until there was clear evidence that Serb troops were withdrawing from Kosovo. The Serb parliament had voted 136-74 that the government accept NATO's terms. Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and EU representative Martti Ahtisaari had visited Belgrade to deliver the plan with Milosevic [See Documentation and Sources]. There were fears that Russia would control an entire sector of Kosovo, which might, due to traditional Russian-Serb links, make it a no-go area for Albanians and could even threaten eventual partition of the province. The settlement proposal suggested Kosovo would be under international administration for up to three years, during which time it would enjoy full autonomy from Serbia. However, independence was not formally envisaged. The KLA would also be disarmed, to which KLA leaders agreed (Telegrraph, 4-6-99). Then, on 20 June, NATO announced the completion of the withdrawal of regular Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the official termination of its air campaign. It also declared that the KLA had agreed to demilitarise its forces within 30 days. (Financial Times, 21-6-99)
UN Civilian Administration
Former Civilian High Representative for Bosnia and Hercegovina, Carl Bildt, described the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the most challenging peace operation ever undertaken by the UN system, for three reasons. First, was the task of enabling Kosovar Albanian refugees to return and Serbs to stay in the province in view of the highly unstable, post-war atmosphere and the level of destruction there. However, an international police force also needed to be set up urgently, providing a full-scale police operation while simultaneously training a new locally recruited police force. An impartial, interim judiciary and penal system and the framework for long-term economic development of the region also had to established. An early donors' conference would focus on immediate needs, while one in the autumn would then focus on longer-term issues. UNMIK's focus would shift gradually from refugee returns to institution-building and eventually elections.
Second, the entire region had been destabilised by the war; economic, social and political tension in the region risked rising further in the future, which could lead to further conflicts if left unchecked. Bildt urged further Europeanisation of south-eastern Europe, with European countries looking not for exit strategies from the region but for ways to integrate it into European groupings.
Third, the end of the NATO offensive brought a brief statement of international principles, but no substantial peace agreement. There were likely to be severe disagreements over details, not least because the Security Council decreed that Kosovo remain within FRY but with substantial autonomy, leaving questions over issues like what currency would be used, what rules would govern internal and external trade, and how would property ownership issues be decided. (Financial Times, 21-6-99)
Secretary-General's Kosovo Report (I)
The 17 March report addressed the comprehensive monitoring regime established under Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) and humanitarian and human rights aspects of the situation in Kosovo since 30 January 1999.
Kofi Annan was apprehensive that continuing violence against civilians and clashes between Serbian security forces and the KLA would result in further displacement of the civilian population. Victims were being created by both the actions of the Serbian security forces and terrorist bombings.
Humanitarian problems arose from the armed conflict and the political crisis in Kosovo and were difficult to separate from security issues. According to the OSCE, the security environment was characterised by disproportionate use of force by the Yugoslav authorities, including mortar and tank fire, in response to persistent KLA attacks and provocations. The fighting had largely negated the October 1998 cease-fire agreement and the Secretary-General urged the Yugoslav authorities to immediately reduce the number of troops deployed to the area to levels determined under that agreement and the KLA to refrain from any provocative actions. Annan supported efforts of the Contact Group to establish a political framework to settle the crisis.
Targeted killings of civilians, summary executions, mistreatment of detainees and fresh instances of abduction were reported by UNHCR almost daily during the period since 20 January, including over 65 cases of violent death. UNHCR further estimated there to be 211,000 displaced people within Kosovo and an estimated 25,000 in Montenegro. Relief assistance was being supplied to some 420,000 people in Kosovo and Montenegro. Numbers of returnees were impossible to estimate, but some returns continued to take place, particularly where the OSCE/Kosovo Verification Mission had established a continuing presence.
UN Doc: S/1999/293- 17 March 1999
Secretary-General's Kosovo Report (II)
The 12 June report presented a preliminary operational concept for the overall organisation of UNMIK.
Overall Structure of the Mission
Kofi Annan stated that the UNMIK structure needed to integrate all international activities in Kosovo with a clear chain of command. Accordingly, UNMIK was to be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would maintain overall managerial authority and would co-ordinate the activities of all UN agencies and other international organisations operating as part of the mission. The Special Representative would also facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future political status.
The Special Representative was to be supported by a Chief of Staff and various units, including for political and legal advice, military liaison, liaison with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and media relations. He/she would be assisted by four Deputy Special Representatives, responsible for one major component of the mission. Each component would be assigned to a relevant lead agency:
(a)Interim civil administration: UN;
(b)Humanitarian affairs: UNHCR;
(c)Institution-building: the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
(d)Reconstruction: the European Union.
To ensure that UNMIK and the international security presence co-ordinated their activities, effective arrangements would be established for regular consultations between the Special Representative and the Commander of the international security presence; the Special Representative would include a Military Liaison Unit.
Role and Responsibilities of the Components
Interim Civil Administration
The interim civil administration was to comprise three main offices: a Police Commissioner; an Office for Civil Affairs; and an Office for Judicial Affairs.
The Police Commissioner's staff would consist of the following:
(a)An International Civilian Police Unit to direct the civilian police operation and to establish and supervise a Kosovo Police Force;
(b)A Special Police Unit for crowd control and other special police functions;
(c)An International Border Police Unit.
Kofi Annan pointed out that, when the civil presence took over executive responsibilities for law and order from the international security presence, consideration would have to be given to arming the police. The Office for Civil Affairs would oversee and conduct several civil affairs functions, including the civil service and economic and budgetary affairs, and could support the short term restoration and provision of basic public services, such as public health and education. The Office for Judicial Affairs would organise and direct the judicial system.
Humanitarian Affairs
UNMIK was to ensure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons and the protection of and assistance to minority groups. The humanitarian affairs component would also co-ordinate the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief aid. UNMIK would establish a Mine Action Centre.
Institution-building
Institution-building was likely to comprise four main functions:
(a)Human resources capacity-building, in the areas of justice, police and public administration;
(b)Democratisation and governance;
(c)Human rights monitoring and capacity-building;
(d)Conduct and monitoring of elections.
Reconstruction
Reconstruction tasks would be aimed at rebuilding Kosovo's physical, economic and social infrastructure and systems and supporting the reactivation of public services and utilities. The range of tasks might include: near-term projects in the area of agriculture, markets, and commerce; re-establishing essential public services and developing economic recovery programmes; and longer-term capital projects in housing, utilities, transportation and communications. Sergio Vieira de Mello was appointed as the Secretary-General's interim Special Representative.
UN Doc: S/1999/672- 12 June 1999
Prevlaka Peninsula
Secretary-General's UNMOP Report
The 9 April report covered developments since 6 January 1999. The headquarters of the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) was relocated from Dubrovnik, where it had been based since 1992, to Cavtat, nearer to the mission's area of operations. The number of military observer was consequently reduced from 28 to 27. Additional anticipated reductions had to be reconsidered following the commencement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 March 1999. UNMOP's mandate was due to expire on 15 July 1999.
Situation in the UNMOP Area of Responsibility
Kofi Annan reported that the area remained stable until 24 March, since when tension rose, particularly in Montenegro. Consequently, UNMOP personnel in Herceg Novi were temporarily relocated to the Croatian side, but the mission continued limited patrolling on the Yugoslav side. Violations of the UN demilitarised zone ("Yellow Zone") and the UN-controlled zone ("Blue Zone") persisted, including limitations placed on the free movement of UNMOP by both parties.
The most significant violation of the demilitarised zone was the continued presence of Yugoslav Army troops in the north-eastern part of the zone. Restricted access prevented UNMOP from ascertaining the exact strength and armament of these units.
A reported agreement between the authorities of Croatia and Montenegro led to Croatia announcing on 15 January that it would keep crossing points at Debeli Brijeg, in the Yellow Zone, and Cape Kobila, in the Blue Zone, open permanently. The FRY authorities declared its opposition to the unilateral opening of border crossings between neighbouring countries since these presumed the existence of a joint agreement designating the location and regime of such crossings. However, the opening of the Debeli Brijeg crossing point did not violate the demilitarised zone and so was welcomed by the Security Council (resolution 1222 (1999)). Annan further welcomed the move as facilitating visits to the area which could constitute a significant confidence-building measure boosting reconciliation between the two communities and contributing to normalisation of relations between the parties.
However, the Secretary-General criticised the opening of the crossing point in the Blue Zone as violating the UN-mandated security regime and suggested that the crossing be closed until agreement was reached between the parties redefining the security regime to allow for the crossing.
Progress Towards a Settlement
Annan asserted that both FRY and Croatia continued to indicate their willingness to resolve the Prevlaka dispute through bilateral negotiations. The most recent of a series of four meetings between the parties took place on 9 March 1999 in Belgrade. However, the parties failed to report substantive progress towards a settlement.
Strength of UNMOP as at 1 April 1999
Argentina 1; Bangladesh 1; Belgium 1; Brazil 1; Canada 1; Czech Republic 1; Denmark 1; Finland 1; Ghana 2; Indonesia 2; Ireland 1; Jordan 1; Kenya 1; Nepal 1; New Zealand 2; Nigeria 1; Norway 1; Pakistan 1; Poland 1; Portugal 1; Russian Federation 1; Sweden 1; Switzerland 1; Ukraine 1; Total 27.
Chief Military Observer, Colonel Graeme Williams (New Zealand)
UN Doc: S/1999/404- 9 April 1999
Spain
Peace Holds Amidst Rising Tension in Basque Region
Tension appeared to be rising again in Spain's Basque region. In March 1999, a senior fighter from the Basque National Liberation Movement (ETA) was arrested in Paris, one of its main commando units was rounded up and a former ETA fighter was found dead. French and Spanish security forces carried out raids on suspected ETA fighters, who it was felt had broken a tacit truce. ETA's long running campaign of urban violence in the region intensified, but a return to its all out terrorist tactics had so far been avoided. The ETA decided to abide by the tactic agreed with the mainstream non-violent Basque parties in summer 1998: to pursue peaceful politics in the quest for Basque independence. It seemed likely that both the Spanish government and the Basque nationalists would wait for elections in June before considering fresh tactics. Both sides hoped to gain credit at the polls for the tentative peace that has held since September last year. However, a return to violence appeared inevitable if ETA's politicians did badly. At the beginning of April, the Basque regional parliament in Spain requested UN inspectors to oversee the region's peace process (Economist, 3-4-99).
On 7 June, Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar announced the first direct talks between the government and ETA since the cease-fire was declared in September 1998. However, Aznar neither offered details nor confirmation on whether further negotiations were scheduled (Financial Times, 8-6-99).
Turkey
Authorities Harass Kurdish Politicians
Turkish authorities reportedly attempted to prevent Kurdish participation parliamentary and municipal elections on 18 April. For instance, on 16 March, Turkish police arrested Salih Yalcinkaya, the candidate for the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (Hadep) to become mayor of Bismil in the Kurdish southeast of the country. Then, at the end of March, his campaign office was shut down. The actions against Yalcinkaya seemed to be part of an intimidation campaign designed by the Turkish authorities who were afraid that Hadep - Turkey's only legal pro-Kurdish party - would win many mayoral posts in the southeast region and that their success could represent first step towards Kurdish autonomy. There were suspected to be close links between Hadep and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). By mid-May, Turkish relations with Iran had worsened after Bulent Ecevit, Turkey's caretaker prime minister, accused Iran of seeking to export radical Islam and of backing Turkey's Kurdish opposition (Economist, 3-4-99).
Ocalan Goes on Trial
On 31 May, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan went on trial on terrorist charges. Analysts stated that the new Turkish government would need to be seen to give Ocalan a fair trial and to extend a fresh peace and reconciliation initiative towards its Kurdish minority to improve its stability and foreign image. However, the new three-party coalition did not appear to favour such an outcome. It included the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves (MHP) that reportedly succeeded in the April election on the back of nationalist euphoria at Ocalan's capture and advocated the death penalty, even for Ocalan. However, the government might find it hard to administer this in view of Ocalan's pledge to work for peace if allowed to live (Financial Times, 1-6-99).
United Kingdom
ILO Convention Threatens Armed Forces Recruitment
A draft International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention aimed to prohibit anybody under 18 from undertaking "hazardous" tasks, including employment or work which was likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young people. If this were accepted by the UK government, it could prevent the British armed forces, which were already overstretched by peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans, from recruiting 16-18 year olds. Although the draft convention did not explicitly refer to employment in the armed services, many governments, trade unions and non-governmental organisations were lobbying the June ILO conference to clarify that participation by children in armed conflicts was unacceptable.
ILO conventions are not binding in international law, but seek to establish minimum work standards. The American and British governments, in particular, tended to recruit 16-18 year olds; the US administration already told the ILO it was against the convention, but has stated it would accept an explicit ban on having children forcibly recruited and involved in combat. The UK government has asserted that that military service by under 18s should be dealt with in an optional protocol annexed to the convention on the rights of the child. However, supporters of he convention already included: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Italy, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Turkey (Financial Times, 5-6-99).
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