This Issue

Angola

Background

• 1975 Internal violence followed Angola's achievement of independence from Portugal; the USSR and Cuba supported dos Santos' MPLA government, while the US, Zaire and South Africa supported the opposition force, UNITA;
• 1989 International negotiations led to the deployment of a UN force (UNAVEM I) to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops;
• 1991 The Bicesse Accords addressed the wider issues of the conflict, including elections overseen by UNAVEM II;
• 1992 On losing elections, UNITA reverted to violence;
• 1994 UN-sponsored cease-fire negotiations led to a peace settlement: the Lusaka Protocol;
• 1995 UNAVEM III was deployed to monitor the Lusaka Protocol;
• 1997 MONUA was established to oversee the remainder of the peace process;
• 1998 Armed clashes continued between MPLA and UNITA; in response to violations of its commitments, UN sanctions were introduced against UNITA;
• 1999 The deteriorating security situation induced the Angolan government to request the withdrawal of MONUA, whose mandate subsequently expired in February; all out war ensued.

Poor Donor Response to Angola Crisis

On 22 July, UNHCR had to re-launch its 1999 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola both in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country and the poor donor response to the original appeal. By mid-July, there was only $39 million  in pledges and contributions, some 38% of what was originally requested.

Continuing besieging of major cities by UNITA was, by mid-July causing deaths and malnutrition-related diseases. The UN estimated that around two million Angolans required immediate assistance, excluding the unknown number of victims in inaccessible UNITA-held territory. The World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) all increased their food aid requirements in response to the current emergency.

However, on 22 June, the Angolan Social Welfare Minister, Albino Malungo, asserted that the relaunch meeting had failed to meet expectations, particularly as many ambassadors had sent junior diplomats as they were on holiday.

Emphasis on Transport Security

WFP increased its aid requirements not only for humanitarian reasons, but also to cover airlift operations necessitated by UNITA attacks on humanitarian aid convoys. WFP also complained that its operations were hampered by late food arrivals and a lack of additional resources: only 60,000 of its total 120,000 tonne food requirement for 1999 was forthcoming. Some 20,000 tonnes pledged by the EC, France and Germany was unlikely to have arrived before September.

Situation Likely to Deteriorate

Thousands of rural Angolans seeking sanctuary in cities consequently missed the low-altitude planting season while the September higher-altitude planting season also appeared precarious. Increasing numbers of displaced people caused much overcrowding, particularly in provincial capitals, reducing the circumstances of host communities. The military balance between government Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA was mainly static, although the FAA was pushing the opposition back in some areas.

External Involvement

Senior Angolan government officials met US military figures in the Pentagon at the end of June to consult on military co-operation. Meanwhile, an Angolan peace deal supported by a Southern African Defence Community (SADC) military guarantee was likely to be discussed at the August SADC summit, although SADC member states were unlikely to agree over its details. In July, the Chair of the UN Angola Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Robert Fowler, stated that it would be hard to stop the 5-10 flights entering UNITA-held territory daily, but did suggest AWAC planes could observe the flights and so clamp down on sanction busters. At the OAU summit in Algiers, he reportedly urged the deployment of forty UN observers in Southern Africa to supervise the embargo.

UN Role in Angola Criticised

A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report entitled Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process criticised the UN's involvement in Angola, where it had spent some $1.5 billion. The UN had ignored violations of peace agreements, thereby eroding confidence in the peace process and encouraging human rights abuses. UN peacekeepers should have been swiftly deployed and should have been proactive, reporting violations of cease-fires and embargoes abuses of human rights. There should have been an arms embargo imposed on both parties as well as an embargo on UNITA diamond trading.

UNITA had spent most of its estimated $1.72 billion diamond earnings from the previous five years on arms. Perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity from both sides should be held accountable.

HRW demanded that the government: allow humanitarian corridors and inform the UN sanctions committee of all aircraft registered in Angola and authorised signatures and stamps for certificates of origin for legitimate diamond exports. All UN member states should provide information to the UN Register on Conventional Weapons concerning previous arms exports to Angola. The SADC and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) should help the UN to prevent UNITA sanction-busting.

Central African Republic

Background

• 1979 Tyrannical leader Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa was overthrown in a French-backed coup;
• 1992 Elections led to the accession of André-Félix Patassé;
• 1996 Patassé was challenged by three successive army mutinies;
• 1997 The Bangui Agreement provided for a comprehensive solution to the conflict, including the deployment of an inter-African peacekeeping force (MISAB);
• 1998 After the withdrawal of French support, MISAB was replaced by a UN force (MINURCA).

Secretary-General's MINURCA Report

The 15 July 1999 report (S/1999/788) reviewed developments in the Central African Republic (CAR) since the end of May.

Political Developments

Several violent incidents occurred between Central Africans and members of the Chadian community. These prompted Kofi Annan's Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, to call on President Patassé to withdraw Special Force for the Defence of Republican Institutions (FORSDIR) from Bangui airport and border posts and to stop FORSDIR undertaking police and gendarmerie duties. However, Patassé asserted that, as FORSDIR was his only reliable arm of the security forces, the above measures would risk his own safety.

Elections

On 5 July, Patassé announced that the first round of elections would be held on 29 August. With the assistance of the electoral unit of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission (CEMI) eventually developed an operational plan to revise electoral lists and distribute voter cards. Only four party candidates and one independent had so far been declared. Deployment of troops to electoral sites was to start in late July. The 30 long-term observers with MINURCA were due to have arrived by 10 July. From 17 July, 21 would be deployed to the 8 permanent sites and 9 would operate in Bangui. MINURCA would also deploy 200 short-term observers starting 14 days before the first round of voting. Some 360 Central African armed forces troops were to support MINURCA: 240 to electoral sites; and 120 in Bangui.

Human Rights, Military and Security Aspects

Due to a critical shortage of available prison cells, MINURCA was to start visiting the prison in Bangui and monitoring conditions in police cells. Tension in the country rose considerably in response to the violent incidents described above and the arrival of around 5,000 Congolese government troops fleeing fighting in their own country. The troops surrendered their weapons to local military authorities. Adeniji advised that the weapons should remain under CAR control until a peace agreement was reached in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Congolese opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba asserted his forces would have pursued the government troops in CAR but for the presence of MINURCA. Annan suggested deploying an extra 148 MINURCA troops in response to the security deterioration in CAR and particularly in relation to the international electoral observers to be deployed near the DRC border, where opposition forces had enjoyed recent successes.

Restructuring the Armed Forces

Adeniji was assured that CFAF 300 million had been earmarked to facilitate the retirement of the first 300 military personnel from the Central African armed forces, from the proposed total of 630. A UNDP-convened donor meeting on 23-24 June to raise $3.1 million to facilitate the demobilisation and reinsertion of members of the armed forces had so far failed to secure any commitments.

Economic Aspects

On 2 July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that, after completing its mid-term review of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) for CAR, an extra SDR 8.24 million (around $11 million) would be made available.

MINURCA Contributions as at 15 July 1999

[Staff Observers (SO); Support Unit (SU); Troops (Tr); Total (T)] Burkina Faso 6 (SO), 120 (Tr), 126 (T); Canada 4 (SO), 25 (SU), 29^a (T); Chad 6 (SO), 120 (Tr), 126 (T); Côte d'Ivoire 10 (SO), 15 (SU), 210 (Tr), 235 (T); Egypt 8 (SO), 200 (SU), 120 (Tr), 328 (T); Gabon 8 (SO), 120 (Tr), 128^b (T); Senegal 9 (SO), 120 (Tr), 129 (T); Togo 6 (SO), 120 (Tr), 126 (T); Total 57 (SO), 240 (SU), 930 (Tr), 1 227^c (T)

^a Not including national support elements (22);

^b In addition to the Force Commander;

^c In addition to 24 civilian police observers from Benin (2), Cameroon (1), Côte d'Ivoire (1), France (7), Mali (6), Portugal (2), Senegal (3) and Tunisia (2);

The authorised strength of the military component was 1,350;

The current deployment total was 1,227. The available strength of 123 came from the withdrawal of the Mali contingent (120 troops + 3 staff positions)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Background

• 1960 An army mutiny after independence prompted Belgium to redeploy troops to the Congo; a UN force (ONUC) was then mandated to oversee withdrawal of Belgian troops and consolidate government authority;
• 1964 ONUC withdrew having largely failed to empower the government;
• 1965 Joseph Mobutu established military rule;
• 1970 Mobutu became president and subsequently renamed the country Zaire;
• 1997 An opposition military coalition, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, ousted Mobutu and Laurent Désiré Kabila took over as President; the co9untry was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DCR)
• 1998 Former members of the coalition rose against Kabila; they were backed by Rwanda and Uganda due to Kabila's efforts to free himself of dependency on external support; in the ensuing conflict, Kabila received assistance from Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; the conflict took on an ethnic element when Kabila publicly identified the opposition as Tutsi;
  1999 By the middle of the year, anti-Kabila forces controlled around half of DRC.

Negotiations Problematic

At the beginning of July, the DRC peace negotiations in Lusaka had appeared to be doomed as opposition forces attacked the country's diamond-mining centre, Kabinda. Hopes for a cease-fire had already begun to fade as news arrived in late June of 3,000 Zimbabwean troops being deployed to Mbuji-Mayi, fearing a Rwandan offensive against the town. Disagreements between the parties to the conflict attending the talks and the absence of the main opposition group further undermined chances of a deal.

However, it was the seventh such meeting since the conflict broke out in August 1998 and it was thought that the attendant governments were genuinely seeking peace, primarily due to the cost of the war effort and because foreign donors had cut aid. But, there was no consensus over the causes of nor solution to the war. The Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe militia did not attend the talks. Kigali claimed Kabila was encouraging the Interahamwe to attack Rwanda, prompting Rwanda to seek to depose Kabila.

Although Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe began to acknowledge Rwanda and Uganda's concerns, they still denied the Interahamwe formed part of the Congolese army. Kigali made agreement to a cease-fire contingent upon disarming the Interahamwe and the identification of participants in the 1994 genocide to face trial in Rwanda. It also wanted the Congolese opposition incorporated into a new government, and its fighters into the army. However, Zimbabwe asserted that any peace deal should not attempt to dictate DRC's political future.

DRC Peace Deal Precarious

The weekend of 10 July saw six African heads of state involved in the DRC conflict sign a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka, which also required the withdrawal of foreign troops. However, on arrival in Lusaka, there was disagreement whether Ernest Wamba dia Wamba represented the main armed opposition group, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Democracy (RCD), as a rival group claimed he had been deposed. The 10,000-strong Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (CLM) would only sign with both other main opposition groups. Ultimately, only the heads of state signed the deal. However, Kabila claimed the signature of the opposition groups' backers, Rwanda and Uganda, to be sufficient.

The settlement plan [see SG's Report below] appeared ambitious, but helped to clarify the various demands of the actors, particularly Rwandan and Ugandan desire to intercept the Interahamwe. However, the Interahamwe were likely to have dispersed into the jungle by the time the joint military council was organised. Moreover, a peacekeeping force capable of covering such a huge, topographically impassable area would have to be very big, while the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was considering only 500 personnel.

Secretary-General's Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Provisions of the Cease-fire Agreement

The 15 July report clarified that, under the terms of Lusaka cease-fire agreement, all air, land and sea attacks and the movement of military forces and all acts of violence against the civilian population would cease within 24 hours. Other provisions concerned: stabilising the DRC's borders, including arms trafficking and infiltration by armed groups; dialogue between the DRC government and opposition; addressing DRC and regional security concerns; opening humanitarian corridors; and disarming militias and armed groups.

Modalities for implementing the cease-fire provided for the establishment of a Joint Military Commission - to be established one week after signing - whose mandate included: locating units at the time of the cease-fire; facilitating liaison between parties; assisting in the disengagement of forces; verifying information relating to combatants; verifying the disengagement of combatants; devising disarmament mechanisms; verifying the quartering and disarmament of armed groups and civilians; and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Activities Proposed for the UN

The agreement contained proposals for an appropriate UN force, in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), whose proposed mandate would include:

a)co-operating with the Joint Military Commission and the OAU;

b)verifying the cessation of hostilities;

c)investigating cease-fire violations;

d)overseeing the disengagement of forces and their redeployment to defensive positions in conflict zones;

e)providing humanitarian assistance;

f)informing parties to the cease-fire of its peacekeeping operations;

g)disarming civilians and watching over collected weapons;

h)overseeing the withdrawal of all foreign forces in collaboration with the Commission and OAU;

i)verifying information relating to military forces of the parties.

The cease-fire incorporated "peace enforcement operations", including pursuing and disarming armed groups; investigating mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; delivering genocide suspects to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and repatriation. The armed groups mentioned above referred to former Rwandan government forces and interahamwe militia, the Allied Democratic Front, Lord's Resistance Army, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy of Burundi, the Former Uganda National Army, the Uganda National Rescue Front II; the West Nile Bank Front; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

Observations

The Secretary-General warned that an effective UN peacekeeping operation in DRC would have to be large and expensive, involving thousands of international troops and civilian personnel, and would face considerable risks. DRC's massive size, degraded infrastructure, intense climate, the intractability of the conflict, the number of parties involved, the highly suspicious atmosphere, the large displaced population and the proliferation of small arms made it a very complex environment for peacekeeping. He urged the Security Council to deploy up to 90 UN military personnel plus the required civilian political, humanitarian and administrative staff to the subregion to liaise with regional capitals and the military headquarters of the combatants. He might then recommend a further deployment of up to 500 military observers within DRC and the subregion to:

a)liaise with the Joint Military Commission;

b)assist in investigating alleged cease-fire violations;

c)assess the DRC's security situation;

d)secure from the parties guarantees of co-operation and assurances of security for the further deployment in-country of military observers;

e)determine the present and probable future locations of the combatants towards conceiving the deployment of UN military personnel;

f)observe the cease-fire and the disengagement, redeployment and eventual withdrawal of combatants;

g)facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

h)assist the DPKO conceptualise operations for subsequent deployments.

Annan would appoint a Special Representative to lead the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and was dispatching a small advance mission to the subregion. As soon as conditions would allow, a technical survey team would go to the DRC. A disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme would probably be required in the future. (UN Doc: S/1999/790, 15-7-99)

Sudan Accused of Breaking Cease-Fire

On 1 August, CLM leader Jean-Pierre Bemba signed a cease-fire with Kabila. However, on 4 August, Bemba claimed that Sudanese planes, acting on behalf of the Congolese government, had bombed the towns of Makanza and Bogbonga, killing 384 civilians and 134 opposition fighters, violating the terms of the cease-fire. At the beginning of August, the RCD was still refusing to sign the accord and had reportedly failed to garner popular support. The RCD comprised significant numbers of Banyamulenge - Rwandan Tutsis who migrated to DRC in the 1900s.

Fighting Between Rwandese and Ugandan Troops

On 16 August, Rwandan and Uganda troops fought each other in Kisangani, as the Rwandese appeared to be attempting to capture Wamba dia Wamba, killing an estimated dozens of civilians. The dispute arose because Uganda favoured a swift withdrawal from DRC, while Rwanda wanted to secure its borders.

Also on 16 August, President Bill Clinton's national security adviser for Africa, Gayle Smith, was dispatched to meet Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda's Vice-President, General Paul Kagame.

Rwandan/Ugandan Conflict Feared More Serious

The friendship between the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and Rwanda's Vice-Preseident, Paul Kagame, that had developed when Kagame served as Museveni's intelligence chief fighting the dictatorship in Uganda in the early 1980s, was beginning to fray. Although the violence between the countries' troops for control of Kisangani was ended by a 17 August cease-fire, it was feared that fighting could develop between the states themselves, who commanded two of Africa's more substantial armed forces.

In order to prevent their own opposition forces operating from inside DRC with Kabila's support, both countries had facilitated the establishment of the RCD in August 1998. However, tactical discrepancies were soon apparent. Rwandan troops' attempts to seize Kinshasa were rebuffed by Angolan and Zimbabwean troops. Consequently, Rwanda strengthened the RCD position in east DRC and backed an opposition offensive in Kasai and Katanga. On the other hand, Uganda seized control of the north-east of the DRC. Both countries then accused each other of controlling Kisangani for personal gains.

At the end of 1998, Uganda had supported Jean-Pierre Bemba's CLM in northern DRC, whom Rwanda had already rejected. Meanwhile, Rwanda backed the RCD split, whereby Wamba dia Wamba was replaced with Emile Ilunga as leader. However, Uganda helped dia Wamba establish new headquarters in Kisangani, fomenting fighting for the city's diamond resources.

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