This Issue

Eritrea/Ethiopia

Ethiopia Rejects Revised Peace Proposal

On 4 September, Ethiopia rejected a revised peace proposal with Eritrea on the grounds that the new terms contradicted the original Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formula, which required the complete withdrawal of Eritrean forces from areas governed by Ethiopia before the conflict broke out on 6 May 1998. On 1 September, Ethiopia had accused Eritrea of launching an offensive at Zalambessa, although Eritrea denied that any battle had taken place.

GUINEA

Potential Instability in Guinea

Paradoxically, peace in Sierra Leone might have encouraged instability in neighbouring Guinea. Ostensibly, Guinea was democratic, incorporating opposition deputies in a ruling assembly; there has been little violence between societal groups and never a rural uprising against the urban elite. Such stability was largely due to the strict leadership of Ahmed Sekou Touré from 1958-84, who maintained a strong centralised army, a tightly  controlled administration and pliable local leaders. His successor, General Lansana Conte, with international encouragement, eventually introduced multi-party democracy in 1993 and opened trading links and access to Guinea's mineral deposits.

However, in early 1996, the discontent of the army was revealed in an attempted coup. Conte won a second presidential term in January which was followed by a repressive clampdown: the leader of the Rally for the Guinean People (RPG), Alpha Conde, was arrested and was still in prison awaiting trial, while several party activists were also imprisoned.

Some 10% of Guineans were refugees from Liberia or Sierra Leone. Refugee camps had become targets for cross-border raids by Sierra Leonean opposition forces against rival opposition groups. They were also directed against Guineans in reprisal for operations by Guinean troops serving with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone.

The Sierra Leone peace accord could remove justification for the permanent clampdown introduced in 1996, but many refugees were likely to remain in Guinea until there was more evidence of enduring peace in Sierra Leone. Returning Guinean troops with ECOMOG would also find it hard to re-adjust to barracks life, while the problems created by the presence of Sierra Leonean opposition and Guinean dissidents in Conakry would also remain.

Nigeria

Instability Increases in Nigerian Delta

The Niger delta supplied over 80% of Nigeria's income, 8% of US oil imports and 22 million tons of oil per year for the European Union, while western oil companies made £94 billion per year from oil from the area. However, indigenous societies were rapidly disintegrating according to human rights activists, environmental organisations and the oil companies, who warned that the industry would be hit hard unless the government acted swiftly. Some campaigners cautioned that instability threatened the disintegration of Nigeria.

President Olusegun Obasanjo conceded the inequitable distribution of oil wealth and was dispatching troops to control trouble areas. However, the armed forces had reportedly carried out human rights abuses. The communities in the region had virtually no employment prospects no access to electricity or health care. Oil spills caused either by sabotage or neglect were occurring twice a week. The town of Yenagoa was patrolled by the army.

More than 2,200 people had been killed in oil-related riots or disputes between security forces over the previous year. Over the preceding six months, there were 50 kidnappings of Shell employees or contractors, its operations were disrupted daily and 150 of its installations, depots and pumping stations were occupied, shut down or halted. Attacks were primarily carried out by youth movements demanding aid, compensation for oil spills or employment.

Much unrest stemmed from the Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the region at 11 million, whose youth groups were leading a peaceable campaign to share oil proceeds. All oil companies were prohibited from operating in Ijaw territories, but several splinter groups had resorted to extortion, hijacking, sabotage and kidnapping for personal profit. Trouble was extending to all minority ethnic groups in the region and the Ijaw, Itsekari, Ogba, Ikwerre, Urhobo and Andoni were all demanding change and self-determination.

A Rivers State Police document suggested the police were preparing for a major conflict. It referred to rights activists and environmental and community groups collectively as the enemy and warned that the safety of oil workers could not be guaranteed. An army brigade was standing by and over 2,500 police were mobilised to support the oil companies' own security guards. An estimated 50 young people from the Egbesu group were reportedly killed by the security services during the week beginning 13 September. Isaac Osuoka of the youth council alleged that Nigerian troops were summarily executing people identified as Ijaw. In October 1998, several thousand people were killed at Warri in a fire resulting from a ruptured pipeline.

Rwanda

Group Trials at Rwanda Tribunal

Since its establishment in 1995 in Arusha, Tanzania, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had only convicted seven perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. The situation improved after a 1997 UN report found serious mismanagement and financial irregularities and, as a result, the ICTR was restructured and a new administrator, Agwu Okali, was appointed. However, there was still considerable scepticism that that ICTR would have fulfilled its task by the end of its mandate in 2003.

Problems for ICTR included basic issues such as lack of paper as well as more complicated ones including difficulties in bringing witnesses to the court who have to be located in remote villages, interviewed, convinced and enabled to travel to Arusha provided for in safe houses and taught how to give evidence. Some 24 witnesses had to be relocated and others were murdered.

Events at ICTR were likely to accelerate during the week beginning 16 August as the prosecution declared that five indicted military officers should be charged simultaneously with conspiracy to commit genocide and suggested that so should several politicians and three journalists whose broadcasts fomented the massacre. Some 30 people were imprisoned in Arusha awaiting trial.

ICTR defence lawyers were likely to oppose the conspiracy charge on the grounds that excesses always occured in situations of war. However, a conviction of conspiracy was essential to establish that the genocide was planned and directed.

Unlike its counterpart for the former Yugoslavia, ICTR was trying government officials. A former prime minister had already been convicted while nine ministers were awaiting trial. Okali asserted that convicting the political leaders responsible was essential to ensure ICTR was a prelude to the proposed permanent International Criminal Court. There had been suggestions to extend the ICTR remit to include other countries, such as Angola, Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. However, as in Yugoslavia, indicted criminals in those countries either remained in power, were too powerful to be tried or had been co-opted into the state structure as part of a negotiated peace process. The difference in Rwanda was that the war there had been decisively won.

SIERRA LEONE

Background

• 1991 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government;
• 1992 A new government assumed power in a coup, but was still opposed by the RUF;
• 1996 Despite continued hostilities, Ahmed Téjan Kabbah was elected president; the Abidjan Accord was subsequently agreed with the RUF;
• 1997 Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); the Conakry Agreement between the parties in the Autumn was never implemented;
• 1998 Continued unrest induced ECOMOG to intervene to remove the junta with the help of Kamajor militias; Kabbah was restored to power in Freetown, but violence continued throughout the country; in the summer, the UN deployed UNOMSIL to operate alongside ECOMOG;
• 1999 Continuing atrocities, mainly by the RUF, intensified Sierra Leone's humanitarian crisis; an eventual peace agreement brokered by the UN controversially incorporated the RUF into the government.

Peace Negotiations in Freetown

Negotiations to end the Sierra Leonean conflict in Lomé, Togo, involved, in addition to the main parties to the dispute, the UN, the UK, the US, Nigeria and other governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Human Rights Watch declared the war had claimed 50,000 dead and over 1 million displaced. Hundreds of Nigerian troops serving with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) had been killed and the Nigerian government claimed maintaining those troops cost $1 million a day.

The inhabitants of Freetown were reportedly nervous of the RUF being incorporated into a new national army, due to its previous terrible human rights record. The Kamajor militia did most of the recent fighting against the opposition and was reportedly also finding co-operation difficult.

Secretary-General's UNOMSIL Report

The Secretary-General's 30 July report (S/1999/836) outlined recommendations on an expanded UN Observer Missions in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) presence, including a revised mandate and concept of operations, in view of the recent Lomé peace agreement.

Status of the Peace Process

Main Provisions of the Agreement

The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities, monitored by Cease-fire Monitoring Committees and Joint Monitoring Committees at regional and national levels respectively. Provisions for governance included: transforming the RUF into a political party and its access to public office; establishing a broad-based Government of National Unity, including cabinet appointments for RUF representatives; creating a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to oversee the peace agreement; establishing a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, chaired by RUF leader Foday Sankoh (as Vice-President of Sierra Leone); and establishing a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders to mediate disputes over agreement.

The agreement pardoned Sankoh and provided a total amnesty for belligerents up to the agreement date; a review of the constitution; and holding elections. A proviso was included in the agreement that, as far as the UN was concerned, amnesty and pardon would not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Post-Conflict Military and Security Issues

The agreement included stipulations that the ECOMOG mandate be revised; a request for a new UNOMSIL mandate; the demilitarisation and reintegration of belligerents; the reconfiguration of a new national armed force; and the withdrawal of mercenaries.

Humanitarian, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Issues

The agreement further stipulated: releasing all conflict-related prisoners; resettling refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs); guaranteeing human rights, including the establishment of a Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; safe and comprehensive humanitarian access; and rehabilitation assistance to war victims.

A Joint Implementation Committee would undertake periodic reviews of the implementation of the agreement, including representation from the guarantors of the agreement

The ECOMOG mandate would be revised to cover four areas: peacekeeping; state security; protecting UNOMSIL; and protecting demilitarisation personnel. Meanwhile, a timetable would be drawn up for ECOMOG's phased withdrawal linked to restructuring national armed forces. There was further reference to a neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG.

Political, Military and Security Situation

The government took steps to ensure that the agreement was accepted, such as a personal address by Kabbah to persuade parliament to ratify it - which occurred on 15 July - and a sensitisation campaign by the Information Ministry, translated into local languages. The security situation had improved greatly since the 24 May cease-fire. RUF and AFRC still dominated the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but ECOMOG was still in control of the Freetown peninsula.

Humanitarian Aspects

In the wake of the agreement, co-operation between RUF, the government and aid agencies hugely improved prospects for comprehensive humanitarian delivery, which was by the time of writing happening in several opposition-controlled areas. There were still acute and widespread shortages of food and medicine, leading to malnutrition and outbreaks of disease. It was estimated that the expansion of humanitarian access would triple the caseload of those in need of assistance - currently at 500,000. At the time of writing, the 1999 $27.9 million Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for humanitarian programmes was only 26% funded. UNHCR would develop a refugee repatriation strategy over the coming months.

Future Role of UNOMSIL

As well as the major demilitarisation effort, the Lomé Agreement required the deployment of significant numbers of peacekeepers and military observers throughout Sierra Leone. Thus, the ECOMOG mandate would need to be revised, with consideration given to the division of labour between the UN and ECOWAS, credible security throughout the country, the appropriate size and composition of the force, its distribution in various regions and arrangements for logistical support.

Annan could then propose a revised UNOMSIL mandate. In the meantime, he suggested as a temporary measure increasing the number of UN military observers to 210 and deploying extra civilian staff in the fields of political and civil affairs and human rights. Additional military observers were at the time being deployed to return UNOMSIL to its authorised strength of 70 from 50.

The proposed expanded UNOMSIL military observer component would have the following responsibilities:

(a) to expand contacts with RUF troops in the countryside;

(b) to expand the geographic scope of cease-fire monitoring activities;

(c) to support the Cease-fire Monitoring Committees and the central Joint Monitoring Committee;

(d) to monitor and report on the military and security situation;

(e) to support demilitarisation in sufficiently stable areas;

(f) to co-operate with humanitarian organisations to ensure the widest possible humanitarian access;

(g) to co-operate with human rights officers;

(h) to co-ordinate with ECOMOG;

(i) to prepare for the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

UNOMSIL contributions as at 29 July 1999

Bangladesh 2 (MO); 2 (T); China 3 (MO); 3 (T); Egypt 2 (MO); 2 (T); India 2 (MO); 2 (O); 4 (T); Jordan 2 (MO); 2 (T); Kenya 4 (MO); 4 (T); Kyrgyzstan 1 (MO); 1 (T); Malaysia 4 (MO); 4 (T); New Zealand 2 (MO); 2 (T); Pakistan 5 (MO); 5 (T); Russian Federation 8 (MO); 8 (T); UK 8 (MO); 8 (T); Zambia 5 (MO); 5 (T); Total 48 (MO); 2 50 (T).

Mixed Feelings Over Peace Agreement

Human Rights groups complained over the UN-brokered peace accord in Sierra Leone which gave the RUF four cabinet posts and placed Sankoh in charge of the country's lucrative mining industry. The deal appeared to sharply contradict the new UN commitment not to allow impunity for gross human rights violations. Eight years of conflict in Sierra Leone had displaced between one and two million people, had exiled half a million to Guinea and Liberia, had seen tens of thousands mutilated by the RUF, and had virtually eliminated schools, hospitals, clinics and water supplies.

It was pointed out that the UN's consolidated Kosovo humanitarian appeal had sought $690 million, 58% of which had been met, with an extra $2.1 billion promised for regional reconstruction, contrasting with the UN's $25 million appeal for Sierra Leone, only 32% of which had been covered. The concerns of the human rights lobby provided easy ammunition for US rightwingers to justify opposition to the UN.

Some 30% of the population in the 20% of the country which had been accessible over the previous three years were suffering malnutrition. External military intervention had mainly caused further hardship. The peace process recognised the weakness of the elected government and that, therefore, the RUF needed to be included, while the leadership change in Nigeria had also had a major impact on it.

Sierra Leone Opposition Fragmented

The capture of foreign hostages in early August by the AFRC, which complained that it had been excluded from the peace agreement, emphasised divisions between Sierra Leonean opposition groups. A senior UN official warned that the demobilisation and disarmament process was too slow in starting. RUF fighters were reluctant to hand weapons over to ECOMOG as it had fought against them in the war, while insufficient funds had been pledged to finance the estimated £20-70 million project. UN officials feared the RUF might be stashing weapons in order to win 2001 presidential elections through threatening to return to war.

Sierra Leone Children Still Being Held

On 9 September, the UN Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, who had returned from a six-day visit to Sierra Leone on 4 September, declared that opposition forces there continued to hold around 1,000 of the 4,000 children they had abducted during their January offensive in Freetown. Approximately 60% of those were girls, the majority of whom were being sexually abused.

Otunnu stressed that 10,000 children had been serving as soldiers with the opposition forces and the Kamajors. He proposed a 15-point agenda for action, including: the establishment of a national commission to promote the rights and welfare of children; the rehabilitation of amputees and special programmes for sexually abused children; the incorporation of child protection in the mandate of UNOMSIL and other UN missions; access to abducted children; demobilisation of child soldiers; increased resources for relief operations for displaced children; and rehabilitation of health and educational services.

SUDAN

Sudan Government Faces Weapons Allegations

At the beginning of August, the Sudanese government announced a two-month cease-fire and that it would allow UN inspectors to investigate allegations by the SPLA and NORAID that it had used chemical or biological weapons in the Western Equatoria province on 23 July. The opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) dismissed the cease-fire as a government ruse to attack SPLA forces in the east. SPLA had already agreed with the government a humanitarian cease-fire in Bahr al-Ghazal province and in western and central Upper Nile in 1998, which effectively broke down during peace talks in Nairobi in July. The UK Foreign Office supported a UN investigation, particularly as Khartoum recently signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.

AFRICA GENERAL

An Agenda for Africa

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting in Algiers in mid-July was attended by over forty heads of state, making it the largest one to date. It was attended for the first time by Libyan President, Muammar Gadafy, who received support for a permanent end to UN sanctions against Libya in return for his concessions over Lockerbie. In September, Tripoli was also to host a special OAU meeting to review the organisation's charter, including reinforcing regional economic and security bodies and peacekeeping capacity, a firmer approach to cross-border terrorism, and the exclusion of undemocratic regimes.

However, the summit's self-congratulatory tone contrasted with political realities. A 30 July Guardian report suggested that African politics contained many contradictions. For instance, Gadafy hosting the planned summit on the 30^th anniversary of his overthrow of the Libyan monarchy and South African President Thabo Mbeki calling for Africa to run its own affairs while external assistance was required in Sierra Leone and Western Sahara. Furthermore, the summit concentrated on conflict in Ethiopia-Eritrea while ignoring the wider context of the threat of devastating famine throughout the Horn of Africa. It also made commitments to uphold human rights in the face of continuing atrocities in Angola or the DRC; the impact of official corruption on education, healthcare and debt relief; violations of women's rights in Sudan; or highly restricted political pluralism and media freedom in Zimbabwe.

Increasing Recognition of the Child Soldier Issue

A mid-1999 estimate by Swedish charity Radda Barnen suggested that there were 6,000 child soldiers (under 18 yeas old) in Sierra Leone. UNICEF estimated that up to 8,000 children had been abducted by opposition fighters in Uganda since 1995; Amnesty International declared there to be 15,000 amongst Colombia's security forces and many more in Colombian paramilitary groups. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimated there to be some 300,000 child soldiers in over 60 countries around the world. Child soldiers tended to abound during protracted internal conflicts, which currently represented the most common form of war. Furthermore, younger children were often recruited first.

Demography, poverty and persistent fighting have meant that children were often the most numerous social category in the relevant areas; for instance, half the population of much of sub-Saharan Africa was under 18. Children were easier to entice or force into the ranks than adults and, once there, were more pliable, often through the use of drugs and because they know no other way of life. Children as young as ten can use lightweight weapons and may be more willing to undertake dangerous jobs, including laying and clearing mines or suicide bombing, since they have no dependants to worry about. Child soldiers are also economically viable.

The UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, asserted that two million children were killed and six million injured in war zones since 1987. Half of the refugees from Kosovo were under 18, according to UNHCR, while UNICEF estimated in 1996 that half of Rwanda's children had witnessed a massacre. Children are also forced to commit atrocities: Sierra Leone opposition forces make abducted children attack their own villages so that their ties with their own communities were severed, strengthening allegiance to the opposition force.

Such children are very hard to demobilise as they know no other life and have no other skills. Many Taliban leaders in Afghanistan began as teenage fighters in Pakistani refugee camps.

The second of four international conferences on child soldiers was held during the week beginning 5 July in Montevideo, involving government representatives, UN staff and aid workers, to discuss the recruitment of children by armies, paramilitary groups and civil-defence bodies. There are considerable differences between these three categories. The first type are recruited legally into national armies. The second, like those with self-defence committees in Mozambique or Algerian village guards, protect their families and villages. The third are those removed from their communities by armed opposition troops. Although the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - which was not ratified by America or Somalia - established the age of 18 as the end of childhood, an exception allowed recruitment at 15. For instance, the British navy recruits at 16 and the British army at 17 - it currently has 4,991 recruits under 18. The UK argues that over half its military personnel joined before 18 and others claim the army provides good training for young people.

However, opponents asserted it was inconsistent to allow children to fight but not drink or vote. Raising the minimum age has provided many western countries with a painless means of implementing necessary reductions in armed forces. Denmark and South Africa increased their recruitment ages to 18 in 1998; Sierra Leone has pledged not to hire soldiers under 18; Burundi, Canada and the Netherlands were considering raising their recruitment age; and the Netherlands already withheld younger soldiers from combat. The UN did not use soldiers under 18 for peacekeeping. On 17 June, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) unanimously agreed to ban using children under-18 for hazardous work, including soldiering, although this only applied to conscripts and not volunteers raising, problems over definitions of voluntary.

However, unofficial armed groups were not affected by international legal agreements. Banditry and competition for resources were often as important for opposition forces as political objectives in many internal conflicts. Thus, child soldiers can receive as much training in crime as warfare. Otunnu urged foreign countries and institutions to stress to opposition forces that recognition and aid would be less forthcoming child soldiers had been used, prompting, the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Tamil Tigers to promise not to use them. Child soldiers first appeared on the Security Council's agenda in 1998. Since then, the subject has been raised several times and was now recognised in many peace processes.

UN Focus on Africa

Kofi Annan was promoting a ministerial meeting on Africa at UN headquarters in September to improve responses to UN appeals for humanitarian disasters which, he warned, were reaching irrevocable crisis proportions in Angola, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Tanzania. A 14 August Guardian article asserted that the UN was virtually the only organisation reporting on: the 200 Angolans being killed daily as a result of the war; the tens of thousands of children in Angola, DRC, Sudan and Somalia who had no chance of ordinary family life or access to schools or health care; or the huge numbers of mutilated Sierra Leonean children.

Annan cautioned that Angola was the most war-affected country, where insecurity was still intensifying. An estimated 600,000 Angolans were in acute need and up to a further 3 million were outside the range of UN agencies under current conditions. Some 300,000 Somalis already faced starvation, while the condition of an additional 1 million was fast deteriorating. Most crises resulted from prolonged insecurity or internal conflict and Annan warned peace initiatives in DRC and Sierra Leone needed external assistance.

Less than half of the $796 million the UN had appealed for to assist 12 million Africans was forthcoming. The UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, asserted that, although many donor countries were experiencing economic booms, since the early 1990s, overseas aid had dropped from $63 billion to $48 billion. Of the UN's various appeals, only: 38% of $106 million in Angola; $21.8 million of the $64 million in Somalia; none of the $14.5 million in Congo-Brazaville; and $3.3 million of the $7.7 million in DRC had materialised.

De Mello pointed out that the victims of internal conflicts seldom had any say in the politico-military leaderships who perpetuated the fighting. However, he believed geographic proximity rather than racism meant appeals like for Kosovo received better support.

Back to top of page
 

Index to Issues

[Index] [About Monitor]