This Issue

COLOMBIA

Background

• 1998 Conservative Pastrana was elected President in place of Liberal Ernesto Samper; in November, Pastrana withdrew the army from a large area in the south of the country to facilitate negotiations; the "demilitarised" area came under de facto FARC control; FARC met with American diplomats in Costa Rica in December;
• 1999 FARC suspended peace talks, insisting that the government must crack down on its paramilitaries; FARC then killed three US nationals in March; Washington increased aid to the armed forces, ostensibly for use against drug traffickers, and withdrew official contact with the FARC until the killers were handed over; FARC launched a massive offensive during the build-up to negotiations with the government in the summer.

Massive FARC Military Offensive

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were postponed from 7 to 19 July, ostensibly to give the FARC more time to reach the meeting-place. However, on 8 July, around 500 FARC fighters attacked an army encampment near Gutierrez, during which the government claimed 36 soldiers were killed. On 10 July, FARC launched a co-ordinated attack on banks, army barracks and other targets in 26 towns across Colombia, which the government described as the largest opposition offensive in forty years and stated had seen at least 200 opposition fighters and 25 government troops killed.

The attacks were launched from the demilitarised zone, in which FARC was reportedly training fighters, holding kidnap-victims and trading drugs for arms. The offensives appeared to represent attempts by FARC to reinforce its position before the scheduled negotiations. The talks were not immediately cancelled as there was as yet no cease-fire to be broken. FARC in conjunction with the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), boasted over 20,000 fighters. President Andres Pastrana maintained his policy of negotiation, although recent opinion polls suggested the population was loosing patience with government concessions.

External Involvement

Neighbouring countries complained that the fighting could affect them. The February 1999 murder of Ecuadorian politician Jaime Hurtado was blamed on Colombian paramilitaries and thousands of refugees entered Venezuela in June in response to opposition fighting in north-eastern Colombia. Also in June, Panama dispatched 2,000 police officers to its Colombian border villagers where FARC had been receiving supplies and recuperating. Washington was also nervous over plans to hand over the Panama canal at the end of the year and announced a willingness to intervene if necessary.

Over the years, violence between left-wing guerrillas, the armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries extended throughout much of the countryside and in 1998 had claimed 3,500 lives and displaced over a million people. It undermined confidence in a comparatively healthy economy. Furthermore, many of the original grievances that sparked the war had been superseded, including a more open democracy. The violence was sustained by its own momentum and by income from kidnapping and drugs.

The intended agenda for negotiations incorporated 48 items including agrarian reform, oil policy, foreign debt and local issues. In order to maintain public support for negotiations, analysts suggested the agenda might incorporate the ELN and the paramilitaries as well as some immediate confidence boosting measures, such as discussing a cease-fire to demonstrate a genuine commitment by FARC to peace. Also, Pastrana should continue efforts to strengthen the armed forces to demonstrate that victory could not be achieved militarily. He should also reassure the opposition that demobilisation would give them access to democratic politics.

Negotiations Postponed Again

Some 36 hours before postponed negotiations were due to start on 19 July, they were again cancelled as FARC objected to a government proposal that international monitors observe its activities within the demilitarised zone. On 20 July, Pastrana warned that the army was ready for both war and peace. FARC claimed to have killed 76 government troops and captured 28 more during the recent offensive. However, the violence suggested that American defence aid was working as the Colombian security forces used fighter planes and US-supplied Black Hawk helicopters to strafe opposition fighters.

Specialised Colombian Drugs Force

On 14 September, Pastrana revealed a 1,000-strong, specialised army battalion, trained and funded by the US, to confront drug traffickers operating in the south of the country. However, observers cautioned that this represented a shift towards direct US involvement in the Colombian conflict. Although US officials maintained that military aid could only be used in relation to anti-narcotics operations, the Colombian oppositions' increasing involvement in drug production was obscuring the distinction between anti-narcotics and counter-insurgency efforts. The battalion was due to start operations in December.

The launch occurred during a surge of political violence in Colombia sparked by the foundering peace process and there were fears that more hawkish US politicians were pushing to decide the Colombian conflict by military means. Winifred Tate of the Washington Office on Latin America analysis group warned that such tactics would ultimately fuel the war and so destabilise Colombia and the surrounding region.

Colombia was the third-largest recipient of US military assistance (around $300 million) in the form of training, ammunition and helicopters primarily for the Colombian police. Washington feared that drug production in Colombia could rise by 50% over the following two years, partly as a result of protection provided by opposition forces. The Whitehouse anti-drugs chief, General Barry McCaffrey, declared that many FARC and ELN units were directly involved in the drugs trade and he had already suggested an additional $600 million for the Colombia's anti-drugs efforts. Involvement in the drugs trade had enabled opposition forces to treble in strength and had hugely increase their funds.

In some regions, the left-wing opposition forces had been badly affected by right-wing paramilitaries, whose involvement also allowed the army to improve its human rights record by taking over the dirtier aspects of the counter-insurgency efforts. However, a recent US government report still asserted that only three of the six army brigades operating in the principal drug trafficking regions had passed a human rights screening process making them eligible for assistance.

Haiti

Background

• 1990 Elections monitored by a UN observer mission (ONUVEH) returned Jean Bertrand Aristide as President after years if political instability;
• 1991 Aristide was overthrown and exiled in a coup headed by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, who appointed Marc Bazin as Prime Minister of the de facto government;
• 1993 Cedras and Bazin agreed to allow Aristide to return as president and to the deployment of a UN mission (UNMIH) to assist the peace process; however, UNMIH's military contingent was prevented from deploying and violence on the island increased, prompting a humanitarian crisis;
• 1994 The Security Council authorised the deployment of a multinational force (MNF), prompting the Haitian regime to concede to resign and co-operate with MNF; the deployment of MNF allowed Arisitide to return to Haiti;
• 1995 UNMIH presided over elections which returned René Préval to power;
• 1997 Successive evolutions of the UN presence resulted in the deployment of MIPONUH, with an exclusive police mandate; however, Haiti has been affected by continuing unrest.

Revised UN role in Haiti Proposed

US diplomats suggested that the UN would seek to extend its presence in Haiti beyond the intended 30 November expiry date and that authority would also be transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembly. First-round parliamentary and local elections were scheduled for 19 December but were likely to be postponed. China and Russia had previously been unenthusiastic about extensions, although there was general approval among other UN members.

Former Deputy Canadian representative to the UN, David Malone, suggested that the UN's presence in Haiti was perceived as primarily serving US interests in pre-emptively addressing the refugee situation. China was also upset by continuing Haitian links with Taiwan.

The current UN mission in Haiti provided for 280 civilian police observers. The proposed new GA mandate was expected to focus on economic and political development, institution-building and security training and so would involve fewer personnel.

The current Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative the UN, Michael Duval, anticipated that the new mission would cover the December 2000 presidential elections and would include civilian police and human rights-building components. He stressed the involvement of the Haitian authorities in order to be able to define their requirements. The proposals resulted from an ECOSOC mission to Haiti in the summer.

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