This Issue

AFGHANISTAN

Background

• 1979 The USSR invaded Afghanistan and placed Babrak Karmal in power;
• 1988 The East-West rapprochement and the successes of US- and Pakistan-backed Islamic opposition led to the signing of an accord between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and USSR
• 1989 Russia withdrew leaving the pro-Soviet government of President Najibullah in Kabul;
• 1992 Najibullah was deposed by Islamic opposition fighters who subsequently fought each other
• 1996 Radical Islamic group the Taliban seized Kabul;
• 1998 The Taliban by then controlled 90% of the country, the remainder under the authority of an alliance headed by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, whose government is still recognised by the UN.

Divisions Amongst Afghan Opposition

In May, the Taliban recaptured the city of Bamiyan from opposition forces, although the opposition continued to exploit the animosity of the local Hazaras to the Taliban. The opposition had accused the Taliban of massacring ethnic minorities in Bamiyan and Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998. However, the opposition alliance was racked by internal divisions, and each faction appeared to be supported a neighbouring power intent on exerting its influence in the country. Iran hoped its support for the opposition would facilitate relations with Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have backed Uzbek and Tajik factions in Afghanistan. Russia also worried that a total Taliban victory would encourage radical Islamists in Central Asia.

Negotiations between the Taliban and the opposition in Tashkent during the week beginning 19 July made little progress, and there were signs of an impending Taliban offensive to wrest control of the remaining 10% of Afghanistan from the forces of Ahmad Shah Masoud.

The Taliban's main supporter, the Pakistani government, was under pressure from its own Islamic radicals following defeat in Kashmir, while the US was eager to have international terrorist Osama bin Laden extradited from Afghanistan and had imposed sanctions against the Taliban. However, the Taliban asserted that it would only address the consequent economic and social difficulties when the fighting had stopped and the regime was recognised. (The Economist, 24-7-99)

Taliban Launch Offensive

On 28 July, the Taliban launched an offensive against Ahmad Shah Masoud. UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi had implored the Taliban not to attack fearing that fighting would be likely to spread. Pakistani and Arab volunteers had reportedly joined Taliban forces, while Masoud was supported by Russia and several Central Asian countries. The Taliban hoped total control of the country would induce diplomatic recognition beyond current links with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban were believed to be hoping for a speedy victory before the end of the summer when snow made the area they were attacking impenetrable. (The Economist, 31-7-99)

EAST TIMOR

Background

• 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor;
• 1976 East Timor was annexed by Indonesia, although this has never been recognised by the UN;
• 1979 Australia unilaterally recognised East Timor under Indonesian authority;
• 1991 Some 100 Timorese attending a funeral in Dili were killed and another 200 wounded when police opened fire on the crowd;
• 1998 Suharto was replaced by BJ Habibe, who conceded to a referendum over East Timor's future status as either independent or with greater autonomy;
• 1999 A 5 May agreement signed by Portugal and Indonesia and witnessed by the UN stipulated that the UN would oversee the referendum and that the Indonesian authorities were responsible for maintaining security.

Continued Unrest Amid Security Assurances

Indonesian police did not intervene when a group of aid workers and UN staff were attacked on 4 July in the pro-Indonesian town of Liquisa. Despite being advised by UN police, the Indonesian police, who were responsible for maintaining security in East Timor, had largely failed to protect the UN or the population from militia attacks. The 5 May agreement also established security arrangements. However, complaints by Ian Martin, the Head of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), to the Indonesian armed forces commander, General Wiranto, about the inaction of the police produced new security assurances including an extra 1,000 Indonesian police to replace soldiers on East Timor.

But, the actions of pro-Indonesian militias, supported by the Indonesian army, displaced tens of thousands of East Timorese. Many were moved to remote areas with at best very limited humanitarian access and many had reportedly died. This compromised Indonesia's supposed role as honest broker. In July, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas asserted that it was unrealistic to expect Indonesian soldiers to be impartial after fighting a low-level war since 1975. Indonesia alleged UNAMET favoured pro-independence Timorese. However, Timorese resistance leader Jose Ramos Horta, in exile since 1975, was allowed to attend a meeting in Jakarta of various East Timorese factions. Furthermore, he and resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, under house arrest in Jakarta, met Wiranto and Alatas.

Secretary-General's Report on East Timor

In his 20 July report to the Security Council (S/1999/803), Kofi Annan stated that voter registration began on 16 July 1999 both in East Timor and around the world. The Indonesian and Portuguese governments agreed to deploy up to 50 observers each at registration and polling sites. Rules concerning registration documentation, methods for registration and the appeal process, and other electoral issues had been implemented. UNAMET was fully operational, the deployment of international personnel was all but complete and there was nearly the full complement of 425 UN Volunteers (UNVs). The civilian police component was fully operational and they were in the process of deploying to all registration sites. As of 19 July, there were 243 civilian police. On 8 July, Chief Military Liaison Officer Brigadier Rezaqul Haider (Bangladesh) took up his functions. UNAMET's political affairs section was fully deployed.

Political and Security Issues

Annan received various assurances from the Indonesian authorities that steps would be taken to improve the security situation, including the dispatch of 14 senior cabinet members to East Timor to demonstrate the government's commitment. There were no further threats or attacks against UNAMET staff or property and the registration process had so far been peaceful. Members of the Indonesian Government Task Force and police and military authorities undertook to rein in the militias by disarming people publicly brandishing weapons, arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of violence and closing down militia roadblocks. Indonesian military commanders also ordered impartiality from all military personnel.

However, many of the militias' activities continued. The security situation remained serious in various districts and the plight of thousands of displaced people was still a major concern. UNAMET, with UNHCR, UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross, was trying to ensure adequate support reached those in need. But, many displaced potential voters were either under the control of the militias, in sanctuaries, or hiding in remote areas, thereby jeopardising the fairness of the ballot. This was compounded by the requirement that voters had to register and vote in the same place. Thus, optimal conditions did not exist for all competing political parties.

Problems in Indonesia's Other Provinces

Around fifty Indonesian troops and police had been killed by mid-August 1999 while attempting to contain separatist opposition forces in the country's western Aceh province. In response, security forces were indiscriminately targeting civilians suspected of assisting the opposition. This was in stark contrast to apologies made for previous abuses against the Acehnese by the Wiranto, after the fall of President Suharto. Acehnese students had then capitalised on the more open conditions to launch an independence campaign, encouraged by events in East Timor. Habibe's spokesperson, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, warned that the loosely determined Indonesia could disintegrate if different parts of the country were allowed to secede. Thus, Habibe arranged new laws devolving more control to the provinces. However, there were worries that this might merely allow the huge corruption evident in Jakarta to be replaced by corrupt regional officials. There were also fears over how Jakarta would be able to fund development in Java with much of its income being diverted to outlying islands. Perhaps the greatest fear, however, was that the devolution process was very slow, for which provinces like Aceh would not wait. In contrast to East Timor, Acehnese opposition appeared to have acquired foreign weapons. (The Economist, 21 August 1999)

Referendum Result Brings Increased Violence

The 30 August referendum saw a turnout of around 98%. However, in response to the anticipated result in favour of independence, violence again escalated on 31 August and continued to accelerate over the forthcoming days. Many Timorese sought sanctuary in the UNAMET compound along with the unarmed UN personnel. Indonesian security services failed to intervene.

Pro-Jakarta militias targeted pro-independence Timorese and local UN workers, displacing them and setting fire to their homes. Some international personnel and journalists were also attacked. As the levels of violence and, hence, the number of casualties rapidly expanded, there were increasing demands for outside intervention in response to the Indonesian authorities' unwillingness to address the situation. Indonesian authorities and the Timorese militias blamed UN bias over the referendum for precipitating the violence.

The UN initially reiterated Jakarta's obligation to maintain security in East Timor. Many countries stressed that no intervention could take place without the agreement of Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesia declared martial law in East Timor, although most observers were sceptical that this could significantly improve security while others suspected it was a ploy to enable Jakarta not to ratify the referendum results in November. (The Economist, 4 September 1999)

Violence Escalates Dramatically

By 8 September, a large part of Dili had been destroyed and abandoned by the civilian population. While most of UNAMET was withdrawn, a number of its personnel remained behind with some 2,000 civilians seeking refuge in its compound. Estimates placed the number of dead in the thousands while refugees flooded into West Timor and Australia. A pattern appeared to emerge from the violence. Journalists and foreign officials would be expelled, pro-independence Timorese would then be removed and finally everything else remaining would be destroyed. The aim was  either to deter other Indonesian territories with separatist ambitions or was a desperate attempt to cling on to East Timor. It was also suggested that the violence was an attempt by the security forces to discredit Habibie and to wreck his chances of remaining president, in retaliation to his allowing the referendum.

The Indonesian security-forces' complicity in the violence was clear. There was speculation whether these were rogue elements within those forces, resentful at having to yield a territory in which they had invested so much. Pro-Jakarta Timorese were also involved, but responsibility went much higher up within the Indonesian security services. Ultimate responsibility lay with Jakarta, for whom East Timor was part of a battle over the future leadership of Indonesia. On 8 September, Habibie remained adamantly opposed to allowing an armed UN presence into the province.

Also by 8 September, Foreign Minitser Ali Alatas insisted that Indonesia would retain responsibility for security in East Timor until  Jakarta ratified the referendum results in October or November. Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose party received most votes in Indonesia's first free elections in decades on 7 June, would require the army's support as her party failed to win an overall majority.

Such political machinations hampered external attempts to apply pressure to Jakarta. There were reservations over withdrawing loans by international financial institutions (IFIs) due to the economic effect on the vast Indonesia and the region as a whole. However, in view of the humanitarian imperative, Kofi Annan declared that if Indonesia could not maintain order, other means would have to be found.

Council Authorises Peacekeeping Force

Under increasing international diplomatic and economic pressure, Jakarta eventually conceded to an international military presence in East Timor. On 14 September, Jakarta agreed to place its troops in East Timor under the command of the proposed international force and also to allow Australia to play a key role in it.

Early on the morning of 15 September, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution authorising an international peacekeeping force for East Timor [see Documentation and Sources]. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer confirmed that, as requested by Kofi Annan, Australia would lead the multinational force and that initial deployment would occur within a few days.

The resolution did not stipulate the exact size of the force, the future of Timorese refugees nor a timetable for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. Details were being finalised in negotiations between senior Indonesian and Australian military officers at the UN. The Chapter VII resolution authorised the use of all necessary measures to restore peace and security and to assist with humanitarian relief efforts and required Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees. It also demanded that perpetrators of violence in East Timor be brought to justice.

The council's discussion had followed reports that the UN compound in Dili had been attacked by Indonesian military and anti-independence militias, forcing the remaining UNAMET personnel to seek refuge in the Australian consulate. According to UN estimates, as of 15 September only 200,000 Timorese - one quarter the population - remained in their homes, the rest having been displaced or killed.

Peacekeepers Arrive in East Timor

The first troops serving with the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) - which was mandated with a full strength of 7,500 and led by Australian Major-General Peter Cosgrove - arrived in Dili on 20 September. Thousands of displaced Timorese returned from the surrounding hills to welcome the force while anti-independence militias began withdrawing towards West Timor.

The arrival of INTERFET enabled the start of humanitarian assistance and its troops began to confiscate weapons and arrest suspected militia fighters. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, declared that that her office would then begin the process of resettling the 200,000 refugees and 600,000 internally displaced people. However, sporadic violence continued to occur. Ogata remained concerned over the fate of East Timorese refugees in camps in West Timor which continued to be run by militias. UNHCR teams were to enter the camps later in the week beginning 20 September to assess the refugees' immediate needs and whether they wished to return to East Timor. She cited disease and sanitation as the main problems, particularly in view of the forthcoming monsoon season.

In Jakarta, many Indonesians expressed hostility towards foreign troops arriving on what they perceived to be Indonesian territory, through demonstrations outside the UN's local headquarters and incidents at the Australian embassy. In particular, many belived Australia to harbour territorial designs over the province. Habibie was the object of much criticism as the instigator of the referendum and the man who allowed in the foreign troops.

On 22 September, Habibie defended his actions and urged Indonesians to accept the result of the referendum in order to rebuild Jakarta's international credibility which had been undermined by the military's acquiescence in the violence in East Timor. He accused Australia of overreacting to the crisis. In response, the ruling Golkar party announced it would recommend that the party nominate Habibie as its presidential candidate.

Many Indonesians expected the Timorese to be grateful for the social investment that Indonesia had made in East Timor. However, some Indonesians acknowledged the military's brutal tactics in East Timor and other separatist provinces like Irian Jaya. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, demanded an inquiry into the violence in East Timor. It was widely perceived that Wiranto had strengthened his political position.

KASHMIR

Mixed Prospects for Kashmir Peace

In June, diplomatic meetings between, amongst others, America, China, India and Pakistan offered hope that the conflict over Muslim-majority Kashmir might come to an end. The main message coming from America was that Pakistan must pull its infiltrators out from the Indian side of the territory in order that the two countries could resume negotiations over it. Fears centred around the conflict escalating into all-out war between the countries, particularly in view of their nuclear status. It was believed that the crisis was instigated by Pakistan in order to internationalise the Kashmir issue. However, India's decision in 1998 to conduct nuclear tests had damaged relations with China and the US and had encouraged Pakistan both to test itself and to internationalise Kashmir.

However, the US and China opposed Pakistan's actions, China in particular due to problems with its own Islamic regions. Thus, the situation facilitated an agreement between China and India on a new strategic dialogue. Washington's hopes of persuading India and Pakistan to ban future nuclear tests and to limit their nuclear and missile races were impeded by India's perceived threat from China. Wider regional confidence building discussions, incorporating China, might facilitate stability there, including discussions over nuclear doctrine and safety.

Kashmir Fighting Ends

During the week beginning 12 July, the Pakistan-backed fighters were reportedly retreating from the Indian side of Kashmir. The main problem for Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appeared to be dissatisfaction amongst the armed forces, who have considerable influence over Pakistani affairs and were reportedly angry over the way an apparent military victory was translated into a diplomatic defeat. They questioned why Pakistan supported the incursion if the forces deployed did not have the capacity to maintain it. Other domestic political problems suggested a difficult time ahead for Sharif.

Obstacles to Negotiations

As the country headed towards a general election, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, was emphasising military victory in Kashmir, in particular that the shooting down of a Pakistani naval reconnaissance plane during the week beginning 16 August demonstrated that India would punish breaches of its borders. Sharif responded that further aggression would receive a severe rebuttal. Thus, they were attempting exploit the situation without fomenting war. In way of appeasement, India offered to release Pakistani prisoners-of-war on Pakistan's independence day while Sharif was open to discuss peace.

However, Pakistan was nevertheless supporting independent Islamic militants to destabilise Kashmir, although there now appeared to be increased numbers - 2,000-2,500 - and they were primarily targeting Indian troops. This tactic countered Indian accusations that innocent civilians were being killed. Indian officials stressed that negotiations could not commence without tangible steps towards ending the violence, while there was unlikely to be any genuine dialogue before the Indian election. Meanwhile, a draft Indian nuclear doctrine released on 17 August promised a no-first-strike policy.

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