This Issue

UNA-UN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP SEMINAR
MONDAY 26TH JULY, 1999

Has the UN Security Council Really Fallen Asleep?

Some eighty participants gathered in the House of Commons on 26th July to discuss the role of the United Nations Security Council at a seminar organised by UNA and the UN Parliamentary Group.

Morning session

Plenary session: The UN Security Council: an African Perspective

H.E. Mrs Pavelyn Musaka, the Acting High Commissioner of Zimbabwe in London, opened the seminar by pointing out that Africa's presence in the creation of the United Nations had been very limited. This remained weak when the composition of the Security Council is under review.

She outlined the many ways in which Africans have traditionally resolved conflicts. The Organisation of African Unity was involved in the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, while sub-regional structures were being, or had been, employed elsewhere - for example, ECOWAS in West Africa, SADC in Lesotho and the SADC role in seeking to broker peace in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There is a growing tradition in Africa to use African conflict resolution mechanisms first and only to go to the Security Council if regional efforts fail.

The UN's African member states were deeply dismayed when the United Nations withdrew from Somalia, ignored the horror of what was happening in Rwanda, took little serious action in relation to Congo-Brazzaville and proved unable to take serious action in the Democratic Republic of Congo - especially when compared with the seriousness accorded to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

It is widely felt in Africa that the Security Council is undemocratic in terms of its selection of members. The Council continually calls for democracy in Third World countries; but the five permanent members of the Council cling tenaciously to their permanent status and their right of veto. More and more voices in Africa are calling for permanent membership and the veto to be abolished and for elections to be held for the Council on an equitable geographical basis. If permanent members and their veto right are to be retained, then those members should have a requirement to report on their positions (and any use of the veto) to the General Assembly. There should be two permanent members from each of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

In subsequent discussion, it was stressed that the main outcry is that Africa is not (adequately) represented on the Security Council.

It is strongly felt that any new permanent members should have the same rights and status as the others. Mrs. Musaka urged that Security Council reform be put high on the UN agenda.

The High Commissioner of Lesotho stressed that peace is the responsibility of the entire world. As is well known, Africa lacks many resources. Why, he asked, in Africa should peace be the responsibility of the OAU rather than of the Security Council? He urged UNA to join with Africans to seek the recognition of the Security Council of its responsibility for peace.

One participant took the view that the OAU needs to strengthen its capacity in conflict work before the UN will take it seriously as a partner in this work. Others expressed concern that African member states were rarely consulted by the permanent members of the Security Council.  

There were several comments on the failure of the members of the Security Council consistently to fulfil their responsibilities rather than to assess responses from the point of view of narrow national self-interest.

Returning to Security Council reform, Mrs. Musaka agreed that various models could prove acceptable if there was proper consultation and, inevitably, a level of compromise all round.

The High Commissioner of Lesotho stressed that Africans were often very critical of themselves. They were becoming involved in international conflict resolution with no great experience to call on. It should be seen as a learning process for Africa - as it is for the developed world. He pointed out that the Algiers OAU Summit declared that non-democratic governments cannot be fully in the OAU. He confirmed that, in relation to Lesotho, SADC asked South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to intervene in order to disarm rebels in the army who were supporting opposition parties which had lost the general election.

Workshops

Angola

Marga Holness of the Mozambique Angola Committee led the discussion on Angola. She pointed out that, after the Security Council resolution recognising Angola's independence, no others were totally successful. She outlined the tragic history of Angola's deadly conflict over many years and the settlement which made possible the elections - accepted by the United Nations as free and fair - in 1992.

UNITA's refusal to accept the election result led to renewed conflict. At Lusaka in 1994 a Protocol was agreed between the Government and UNITA in order to bring the conflict to an end. Jonas Savimbi (the UNITA leader) persistently showed no real commitment to fulfilling the Lusaka Protocol.

The United Nations had put various peacekeeping forces into Angola. Over the years the Security Council often called for both sides to honour the agreements reached and slowly came to place the blame for the failure to implement them ever more fully on the shoulders of Jonas Savimbi. However, the Council, although imposing sanctions against UNITA, did little to secure their effective implementation.

Finally, the Government of Angola had requested the withdrawal of United Nations monitors from Angola, leading to major fighting between both sides since 1998. Although the UN World Food programme and others are still engaged in humanitarian work, nevertheless the Security Council has no significant presence in Angola and the Angola mission must be seen to have ended in failure.

However, the seminar warmly welcomed the efforts of Ambassador Robert Fowler (Canada), the chairperson of the UN's Angola sanctions committee, to secure the fuller implementation of the sanctions imposed against UNITA.

Many people saw double standards at work again - not least in the refugee area, where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had received around $1.60 per refugee in Kosovo and 11 cents per refugee in Angola.

The Great Lakes Region

Malcolm Harper, Director of UNA, introduced the workshop on the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. There was a series of crises in the region which, although deeply interlinked in part, should be seen as separate, since they did not all parallel each other.

The situations in Angola, Burundi, the two Congos and Rwanda all needed to be taken into account. So, to an extent, did the role of Uganda and the internal conflicts within that country. Each needed its own resolution mechanisms while what happened in any one of them could have profound implications on the others.

The efforts of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to broker a peace process in Burundi through the Arusha meetings appeared to be making some creative progress and should be fully supported. In Rwanda there was still a tragic level of violence and a massive need to effect a productive process of democratization and reconciliation.

The situation in Congo Brazzaville, where a democratically elected government had been overthrown illegally, with some foreign assistance, had been largely ignored by the international community. Meanwhile in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo there was, in effect, a regional war being fought involving troops from seven or more foreign countries. For several years the country had been in turmoil and the Security Council had taken little really effective action either to support OAU peace-seeking efforts or to intervene itself.

In the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, the Security Council had largely fallen asleep - from the days of the heinous genocide of 1994 in Rwanda onwards.

Sierra Leone

Josh Arnold-Forster, former Head of the UN and Conflict Programme at UNA, pointed out that the United Nations had been involved in the search for a peace process in Sierra Leone, with the 1996 Abidjan Accord having set out the framework for a peace settlement. The next year the Secretary-General had submitted a report for a 7-month process with a budget of $47m.

With the overthrow of the government of President Kabbah, UNA had visited the High Commissioner of Sierra Leone who had advocated a strong international response. An embargo was imposed on the regime and ECOMOG became involved in the search for a military peacekeeping force, authorized to do so by the UN Security Council. The UN force which latterly became operational was 10% of the size of the Force which was originally envisaged.

Many issues came to the surface in Sierra Leone, including the role of the diamond trade and the use of mercenaries and of security companies.

Ten years after the Cold War, it appears that the Security Council still cannot define a consistent use of troops. This lack of consistency has created much frustration and anger in many parts of the world over the Council's actual modus operandi. Given the UN's involvement, directly and indirectly, in European crises, is Europe special; and, if so, why?

Somalia

Alexander Ramsbotham, current Head of the UN and Conflict Programme at UNA, stated that the UN's experiences in Somalia had proved a turning point in the expansion of UN peacekeeping in the latter 1990s. Although the war in Somalia had been worsening for some time, it was not until 23rd January, 1992 that it was addressed by the UN Security Council. In part, such oversight was the result of the UN being overstretched by commitments in Bosnia and Cambodia.

Severe problems experienced by the first UN peacekeeping force, deployed in early 1992, induced the Security Council in December that year to authorise a 37,000 strong US-led task force (UNITAF) to intervene in Somalia. Many Somalis living conditions were indeed improved in the sort term by the presence of UNITAF, despite severe restrictions to its mandate. However, it had less impact on the wider issues of the war. Regardless of conditions on the ground, it was mandated to hand over to a second UN mission (UNOSOM II) after six months, which had a more ambitious mandate but was less well resourced.

Things changed when 25 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed and US Rangers were consequently authorised by the Security Council to pursue faction leader Farah Aideed. The death of 18 US Rangers and the lurid scene of their bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu created a massive reaction in the United States which led to the withdrawal of US personnel from Somalia by spring 1994. Others followed suit, leading to the complete withdrawal of UNOSOM II in March 1995.

In May 1994, US Presidential Directive 25 had laid down strict criteria for US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, whose results could be seen in the international failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda at that time. Despite its many achievements in a very wide-ranging operation, the ultimate failure of UNOSOM II to restore a national infrastructure of government or to disarm the factions caused it to be seen as a failed operation.

General Discussion

There was a discussion of how far the broad failure of the Security Council to address African issues with the seriousness that they merited was evidence of a level of institutionalized racism. The withdrawal of the UN Protection Force from Rwanda in 1994 was a dreadful mistake and may have been evidence of such an approach.

Another participant raised the complexities of the rise in ethnic and tribal conflicts which created greater problems for the deployment of external peacekeeping forces.

The presence of permanent members of the Council and their right of veto were seen by another participant as stumbling blocks, with an urgent need for a debate on the watering down of the veto and of permanent membership.

Others felt that many views of African conflicts were often over simple, as were proposals for their resolution. It was argued that elections are not a panacea for stability and that politics have to be inclusive. The UN should develop its role as a mediator.

The right of African states to have their sovereignty respected was stressed. Governments everywhere which win genuine elections have the right to govern. The attitudes of the Security Council in Angola sometimes appeared to deny this right by giving Jonas Savimbi virtually equal status with the President.                   Sanctions need to be fully implemented to be effective. This is clearly not the case in countries like Angola.

One speaker argued that she did not fully accept the thrust of many of today's comments which assumed a lack of interest in Africa within the Security Council. On the contrary, she contended, the United States remains very interested in Angola in helping everyone except the MPLA!

The charging of Jonas Savimbi with war crimes and crimes against humanity was advocated by several speakers. A special tribunal would need to be established by the Security Council to try him.  The sanctions against UNITA should also be strengthened.

The Ambassador of Burundi stated that the Arusha peace process was essentially inclusive. There were many internal needs which had to be met but which had been adversely affected by the sanctions imposed against Burundi by the OAU and the UN. He urged UNA to put pressure on the donors to renew their aid.

Another participant asked why the Uniting for Peace procedure was not used more often if a veto was used, in an effort to ensure that the UN could take effective action in conflict situations. The question was put as to why the Uniting for Peace procedure had not been seen as a way ahead if there was a veto over the deployment of a military force in Kosovo earlier in the year.

One speaker stressed the need to strengthen the authority and capacity of the Secretary-General and his staff, not to downsize.

Applause greeted the contention that the international community must find ways of ensuring that criminals cannot force their way into power.

An argument was developed that the Security Council has not fallen asleep but that the powerful can dominate and manipulate it, with more powerful people behind them. The Council did not, for example, fall asleep over Libya.

A Rwandese participant argued that the UN was not solely to blame for the tragedy which befell her country. Radio stations had called for the genocide to be perpetrated. All the people must be given a voice so that they can participate in society. The UN and others should not just deal with governments.

One Ugandan stressed that many British people are as concerned about Africa as are Africans. The problem, he felt, was largely the attitudes of Governments - including the British - in the Security Council. A key role for UNA was a continuing campaign to seek reform at the UN and to put pressure on the British Government to that end.

Afternoon Session

Workshops

The Role of the Military

Josh Arnold-Forster stated that the role of the military within the UN has changed since 1945. During the Cold War era, UN troops were essentially restricted to traditional peacekeeping principles. Then, after the end of the Cold War, international optimism over security co-operation led to the development of larger and more ambitious operations.

However, military force alone cannot effectively address contemporary conflicts. For instance, the 1995 Dayton agreement ending the Bosnian war essentially represented a cease-fire rather than a comprehensive peace settlement, reflected in the fact that although Bosnia is currently militarily stable, major political, social and economic issues remain unresolved. There are also major disagreements over whether the use of air power, the deployment of ground forces or military advances by Bosnian Moslem forces brought about Dayton. The more recent Kosovan example has raised questions over whether aerial bombardment using expensive equipment from 15,000 feet has brought genuine stability to the province. Thus, initiatives that go beyond the use of force are needed. Where armed conflicts require external input to resolve them, that input is likely to require a considerable civilian component such as police and legal professionals.

Civilian Observers and Human Rights Monitors

The Human Rights and Refugees Officer at UNA, Suzanne Long, pointed out that the deployment of civilian observers and human rights monitors is relevant both to preventive measures and to post-settlement peacebuilding and they offer a broad range of overlapping activities. For instance, civilian police in Kosovo can themselves act as police and can train local officers. However, there is a clear distinction that observers must exclusively observe and not otherwise influence events. UN-sanctioned election preparation and monitoring was first introduced in Korea in 1948; more recent examples include Cambodia and South Africa. However, this function can also be carried out by other intergovermental bodies or non-governmental organisations under a UN mandate.

Much technical electoral assistance (i.e. not observational) can be provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in response to a request from a government, without involving political decision-making, although problems arise in situations of failed states. Do such activities constitute Security Council business? This is definitely the case when they form part of a mandate of a peace operation, but can the Security Council otherwise be ignored? As with all UN affairs, more funding is required to establish missions quickly and for individual states and regional organisations to have rapid reaction capabilities. The logistic and training requirements for these could be more complex than for peacekeeping, as there are no relevant structures already in place.

Sanctions

Ros Marsden, Head of the United Nations Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, asserted that a wider range of more selective sanctions is available beyond the comprehensive measures in place against Iraq. Ad hoc regional coalitions or regional organisations can impose sanctions, as well as the UN. Sanctions represent the only coercive measure short of force. However, they are often a blunt weapon, taking a long time and risking collateral suffering. Thus, HMG has suggested some basic guidelines: better targeting; humanitarian exemption; clear objectives, including a definite exit strategy; and arrangements for implementation and enforcement.

Responsibility for enforcing sanctions lies with member states and so pressure must be maintained on governments to uphold their commitments. For instance, the Angola Sanctions Committee is considering means to enforce oil, diamond, arms and funding embargoes against UNITA. HMG suggested the oil-for-food programme in 1991 to reduce the humanitarian impact of sanctions against Iraq, although this was rejected by Baghdad until 1996. HMG is also working on a draft Security Council resolution which includes lifting the cap on the oil-for-food programme and simplifying the approval process for humanitarian items. The UN Secretariat's capacity to provide rapid humanitarian assistance also needs strengthening. Meanwhile, maintaining financial controls remains very difficult, but HMG supports the Interlaken process for targeted financial sanctions.

Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

Alexander Ramsbotham stressed that preventive strategies can address both the short and long term aspects of a crisis. Effective short term prevention relies on an influential lead actor, a coherent political-military approach, sufficient resources, and a coherent strategy ultimately to restore authority to the host country. Longer term measures include developing states' security and legal systems and conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as their economic, political, humanitarian, social and cultural amenities. Prevention can incorporate early warning and response, preventive diplomacy, economic measures, including sanctions and inducements, and forcible measures. However, its effective implementation relies on political will, which can be lacking due to insufficient resources, too great expense or the absence of vital national interests.

UN involvement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) has been the only preventive deployment to date. In December 1992, the mandate of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia was expanded to include monitoring FYRM borders with Albania and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR). The force offered a traditional peacekeeping role and, since 1994, early warning, observation and good offices, while its military component acted as a deterrent. On 31 March 1995, Security Council resolution 983 established the UN Preventive Deployment  (UNPREDEP) as a distinct entity, although it performed a similar function. However, on 25 February 1999, China vetoed an extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in response to FYR Macedonia extending diplomatic ties to Taiwan, although Beijing officially asserted that UNPREDEPs task was complete.

General Discussion

The Cold War context of East-West animosity generally restricted military training to war techniques. Therefore, should there not be an international volunteer force to use in peace operations? Some countries have developed useful training techniques in peacekeeping and deterrence, such as through British experiences in Northern Ireland, and Irish and Canadian troops (amongst many others) have a good peacekeeping record. Furthermore, earmarking national contingents for specific UN tasks already takes place, while Kosovo has shown the difficulties in mobilising civilian personnel.

Concerns over the effects of sanctions and bombing, particularly the use of depleted Uranium, on the Iraqi people contrast with the fact that sanctions were imposed as part of a cease-fire, many conditions of which Baghdad has not complied with, particularly in relation to biological and chemical weapons. Accelerating the procedure of the Sanctions Review Committee is hampered through, for instance, incomplete applications and dual-use items. More transparent Security Council procedure risked a return to the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. Substantive discussions will always take place in private and so increased transparency could make the Council more anodyne.

Keynote Address: Has the UN Security Council Really Fallen Asleep?

Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Tony Lloyd, stated that the Security Council has recently been in better shape than in the past. For instance, it has been central to events in Kosovo, particularly to post-settlement peacebuilding. Progress in the Lockerbie affair has been a success both for the Security Council and British Foreign Policy and has also highlighted the diplomatic skills of Kofi Annan in bringing the opposing parties together. The Council, and particularly the UK, has played a critical role in the Sierra Leonean peace process, where the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook vital behind-the-scenes diplomacy to facilitate dialogue.

Planning is underway for a UN role in the DRC, possibly incorporating the rapid deployment of an observer mission. This is contingent upon a lasting cease-fire, which awaits approval by opposition forces. The UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) has withdrawn from the hugely destructive conflict in Angola. However, the UN is still there, particularly in the form of sanctions against UNITA, which the efforts of Robert Fowler and the Angola Sanctions Committee should make more effective. To suggest the Security Council was sidelined in Kosovo is oversimplifying the situation. Kosovo prompted four resolutions in 1998 and Slobodan Milosevic's rejection the Council's demands left NATO with no choice but to intervene. Despite disagreements within the Council, the high level of international co-operation, notably through the Contact Group - including Russia - was essential to the peace process. NATO's military action has not been criticised by the Security Council.

However, the Security Council has experienced problems from which lessons must be learned. First, contemporary conflicts are primarily intra-state, presenting the problem of how to tackle regimes that abuse the principle of territorial integrity. While this principle should not be abandoned, state authorities must justify their claims to it. Second, the Council must become more representative of the modern world. There is need for more permanent and non-permanent seats - including from the developing world. However, prolonged deadlock over how expansion should work is damaging to the Council's credibility. Third, the Council is often blamed for failing to address the root causes of conflict - including the discrimination or denial of human rights, poverty, and access to weapons - and so it must strengthen its conflict prevention capacity.

HMG is focusing on human rights as foreign policy, transparency in arms exports and combating small arms proliferation. It is also assisting regional programmes, such as the recent ECOWAS moratorium on small arms. British armed forces are being revised, while the UK and France have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN over rapid reaction capabilities. HMG is also emphasising regional organisations through such means as the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union's Common Foreign Security Policy and the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). Finally, it is important to remember that the UN is only as effective as its members and so is reliant on their political will.

Tony Lloyd participated in general discussion following his talk, which highlighted several interesting points. Recourse to territorial integrity should not allow ignorance of atrocities; there should be no absolute argument over state sovereignty. The UK is in favour of retaining the veto, although it has not used it in over ten years. Security Council consultation should be sufficiently effective to avoid the use of the veto.

Comparison of the effectiveness of sanctions against Angola and Iraq does not imply Security Council selectivity, since Iraq was an established government whereas UNITA is an opposition movement. Nor did the level of assistance for Kosovo imply double standards, as HMG has made considerable efforts in Sierra Leone and DRC, particularly through the UN. The inclusion of the Foday Sankoh's brutal opposition movement in the Sierra Leonean peace process reflected the complexity of the situation: such decisions are difficult but are better than continuing war.

Plenary Panel: What To Do?

The Panel comprised Suzanne Long, Malcolm Harper, Ros Marsden, Alexander Ramsbotham, and His Excellency Professor Geoge Kirya - the Ugandan High Commissioner. Would war-affected African countries appreciate NATO intervention? African countries would object to both UN and NATO interference without prior consultation and there should be more UN/OAU co-operation in general. Individual NATO states could provide logistical support for African operations, while the UK already offers peacekeeping training initiatives for African troops and supports the OAU's MCPMR. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe might provide a better model of a security institution for African countries that NATO, which should not be considering a global role. Resources are a major problem for the OAU and so the UN should finance OAU rapid response capabilities. However, OAU crisis management has also been impeded by over-emphasis of territorial integrity, although this tendency is abating. The Security Council might consider restricting the veto to Chapter VII issues or prohibiting single country vetoes. However, the UK is not in favour of removing the veto as this would discourage more powerful members of the Security Council from feeling bound by Council decisions.

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