This Issue

BOSNIA

Background

• 1980 Nationalist tendencies promoted by the death of Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia were accelerated during the 1980s by economic decline and the end of the Cold War;
• 1990 Bosnian Serbs rejected the results of elections in Bosnia;
• 1992 Bosnian independence was recognised by the international community, spurring inter-communal violence; the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia (UNPROFOR) was extended to Bosnia;
• 1993 UN safe havens established against Serb aggression were largely under-resourced and ineffective;
• 1995 Croatia's recapture of the Krajina region from the Serbs and NATO air strikes against them, led to the Dayton agreement, ending the war. Bosnia was divided between a Muslim-Croat Federation and a Serb Republic, governed by a tripartite Presidency; a NATO-led force (IFOR) was deployed to police the agreement in conjunction with an international civilian component;
• 1999 Military stability in Bosnia has tended to contrast with nationalist political tendencies.

Confusion Over OHR Report on Bosnian Corruption

According to a 17 August New York Times article, a report by the Office of the High Representative's (OHR) Anti-Fraud Unit, established in 1998, revealed that up to $1 billion in public reconstruction funds for Bosnia - around 25% of all Bosnian aid since 1995 - were thought to have been embezzled by corrupt politicians from all three Bosnian entities and that OHR had composed a 4,000-page concerning the fraud. The majority of funds had disappeared in areas governed by the mainly-Muslim Bosnian government, although such areas had received most donor money. Several aid organisations revealed that they had lost money from accounts with the Bosnia Herzegovina (BH) bank. Some $4 billion of the $5.1 billion aid pledged by the international community for Bosnia after the Dayton Accords has been spent. The Bosnian payments bureaux, which takes care of most daily transactions and allows direct tax deductions with little auditing (despite requests by OHR), accounted for most of the losses. Complaints earlier in the year by the Senior UN representative, Jacques Klein, were rejected by Bosnian Muslim President, Alija Izetbegovic, who asserted that Bosnia demonstrated normal, post-conflict levels of corruption and accused Klein of being anti-Muslim.

An 18 August OHR press release confirmed that its Anti-Fraud Unit had launched a comprehensive campaign to promote the rule of law, transparency and accountable government. Furthermore, the new High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, cited combating corruption and fraud as a top priority, as corruption of public institutions was one of the main obstacles preventing Bosnia from joining the European Union. To this end, over the preceding year OHR had established: a witness anonymity program; judiciary training; enhanced federal prosecution powers; a federation-level first-instance court; and the removal of officials who obstructed justice.

However, the press release sought to clarify inaccuracies in the New York Times article mentioned above: the alleged 4,000-page report by the Anti-Fraud Unit did not exist; there was no evidence to indicate that $1 billion had gone missing; and local authorities were investigating allegations of corruption and fraud but exact amounts remained unclear. However, OHR nevertheless intended to intensify efforts to counter corruption. (OHR Press Release, 18 August 1999)

CYPRUS

Anniversary of Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

The 20 July was the 25^th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Kofi Annan requested the G8 to encourage Turkey to search for a solution to the conflict. The most recent proposal suggested a meeting between the presidents of the Greek and Turkish sectors of the island, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, in the US in October under UN auspices. The carrot would be the withdrawal of Greece's opposition to Turkish membership of the European Union (EU).

Analysts suggested that Greek Cypriots would be likely to accept a confederation, but Greece and Turkey would respectively withdraw troops from the island. A NATO-led force might then replace the UN force which currently monitored the Green Line separating the island, both sides of which would be eligible to join the EU at its next round of enlargement. Clerides has declared his willingness to open negotiations unconditionally but has insisted on upholding a 20-year-old UN blueprint to re-unite the island as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, whereby each community would largely remain in its own area but would have free movement throughout Cyprus. He has also supported retrieving some land in the north seized by the Turks in 1974. Denktash has vowed only to attend negotiations if the Turkish sector was given equal standing with the Greek; the Turkish-Cypriot republic was only recognised by Turkey.  He was still talking about a confederation of two independent Cypriot states.

EU Membership

However, there were still hopes that the lure of EU membership would end the deadlock. Greek Cypriots have made efforts to fulfil criteria for membership: in particular, in December 1998 they dropped a plan to deploy Russian missiles on the island as tension over Kosovo was rising. They also maintained the EU oil embargo against Serbia despite pro-Serb pressure from Orthodox Greek Cypriots. Denktash has made discussion of Cyprus joining the EU contingent upon an offer of Turkish membership. However, there was little sign of Ankara putting pressure on Denktash to soften his position.

CROATIA

Background

• 1991 As part of Yugoslav nationalist momentum, Croatia declared independence, prompting Serbs to seize eastern Slavonia and Krajina;
• 1992 A UN force (UNRPOFOR) was deployed to the area, primarily to protect humanitarian deliveries;
• 1994 A cease-fire between Zagreb and representatives of Krajina broke down over Krajina's political status;
• 1995 In March, a UN force (UNCRO) replaced UNPROFOR in the Serb-held parts of the country; a massive Croat offensive in August then recaptured Krajina and western Slavonia;
• 1996 UNCRO was withdrawn; a UN administration (UNTAES) was authorised to oversee the peaceful transition of eastern Slavonia to Croat rule; another UN presence (UNMOP) was authorised to oversee the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula;
• 1998 UNTAES was replaced by a UN civilian police presence (UNPSG) to monitor the performance of the Croatian police; later in the year, UNPSG handed over to an OSCE mission.

Ethnic Divisions Remain in Croatia

A 1991 census stated that Serbs made up some 12% of Croatia's 4.8m population. However, this was reduced to 4% after five years of war. In 1995, President Franjo Tudjman declared that Serb refugees wishing to return required unique humanitarian reasons for doing so. Then, in 1998, EU and US pressure persuaded Tudjman to accept 300,000 Serb returnees. By the time of writing, some 57,000 were back and the UNCHR hoped another 35,000 would return during 1999.

Where 90% of the 43,000 population of Knin, former capital of the breakaway "Serb Republic of Krajina", were once Serb, only a few thousand remained. Croatia's successful 1995 offensive to recapture territory lost to the Serbs forced some 180,000 Serbs Croatians to flee the country, who were largely ignored in the Dayton peace accords. Also, many of Knin's surrounding villages have since remained untouched.

KOSOVO

Background

• 1974 Marshal Tito's constitutional reform provided considerable autonomy for Kosovo;
• 1987 Slobodan Milosevic assumed power in Yugoslavia on a nationalist platform;
• 1989 Kosovo was stripped of its autonomy;
• 1991 Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of  Kosovo proclaimed independence, but their tactics remained non-violent;
• 1995 Kosovo was omitted from the Dayton agenda while the EU recognised Kosovo as part of  Serbia;
• 1998 Violence induced the UN to impose an arms embargo against Belgrade; anti-Serb demonstrations began in Pristina;
• September UNSC Resolution 1199 demanded a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Serb troops and the opening of direct negotiations;
• October, under threat of NATO air-strikes, Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal of Serb troops, a cessation of violence and the deployment of a 2,000-strong Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) under the OSCE;
• December renewed armed conflict broke out between the KLA and Serbian forces;
• 1999 Milosevic refused the terms of an agreement drawn up at a second round of talks at Rambouillet;
• March, NATO launched an air campaign against Serb forces;
• 10 June UNSC resolution 1244 confirmed the end of the war and established military (NATO) and civilian (UN) missions in the Province.

Milosevic Under Pressure

On 29 June in the Serb town of Cacak, 10,000 people protested against the rule of President Slobodan Milosevic. However, several absentee speakers on the day hinted at the weakness of Serb opposition. The protest campaign intended to build from smaller industrial towns like Cacak, where there was more potential opposition to Milosevic due to the more pronounced fallout from the war with NATO, particularly as Serb refugees from Kosovo were being kept out of Belgrade. Calls by Serb dissident Vuk Draskovic that the government be reformed suggested he was angling for a position within it, while senior bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church criticised Milosevic's tactics.

However, analysts suggested that Milosevic might adopt a more liberal stance to force western governments to provide reconstruction aid to Serbia; there were hints he might support Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic to dampen his secessionist ambitions. However, some of Milosevic's main critics have been the extreme Serb nationalists, embodied by Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party.

Bernard Kouchner

French Junior Health Minister Bernard Kouchner was appointed Head of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Previously, he had jointly founded Medecins sans Frontieres in 1971 and was instrumental in securing: the 1988 General Assembly resolution providing neutral organisations the right to free access to the victims of disasters; the 1990 resolution approving the principal of emergency humanitarian corridors; and the post-Gulf War Security Council resolution calling on Iraq to provide international humanitarian groups immediate access to those in need. He interpreted the ensuing relief operation in northern Iraq as an essential step towards the acceptance of the principle that there was a right to intervene in response to imminent disasters. Kouchner has also supported the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force, which he believed Kosovo might have helped to advance.

Koucher's hardest role in Kosovo was likely to be balancing the military and civilian sides of the international presence. This has proved the case in Bosnia, particularly where Washington has praised the US-led military role in upholding the country's internal boundaries but has criticised the slowness of European civilians attempting to dismantle them.

The military presence has also been much faster implemented in Kosovo. Nearly five weeks after KFOR troops entered the province, less than 100 of the mandated 3,000 UN police had arrived. Kouchner vetoed the idea of the KLA forming the core of a new police force. Thus, the success of Kosovo's rehabilitation would depend to a large extent upon the relationship between Kouchner and KFOR Commander General Sir Michael Jackson. (The Economist 10-7-99)

Kouchner's Main Difficulties

Five main problems would face Kouchner when he arrived in Kosovo during the week beginning 12 July. First, the dwindling aspirations to form some kind of democratic, multi-ethnic government. Second, the KLA were determined to establish their own embryo government. Third, the Albanian majority was deeply divided. Fourth, there would be no orderly refugee return. And fifth, Kouchner's staff was so far very small. Kosovo's few Serb leaders seemed likely to reject previous attempts by Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil), Kouchner's temporary predecessor, to establish a multi-ethnic transitional council due to revenge atrocities by Kosovar Albanians against Serbs. The KLA pre-emptively set up a provisional government, headed by Hashim Thaci.

Neither could the two principal Albanians groups, the KLA and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), agree on respective seats on the council. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova remained in exile in Rome, reportedly in fear of his life from the KLA, which was supposed to have been disarmed by late August/early September. Some 600,000 of the over 800,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees were believed to have  returned home by the beginning of July. KFOR was providing a makeshift administration in light of the so far scant UN presence,. However, by the beginning of July, KFOR had reached only half of its mandated strength of 55,000.

Scramble for Reconstruction Contracts

During the week beginning 26 July, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank convened the first donor conferences to raise $25 billion for Kosovo and surrounding countries, from which western companies hoped to secure many reconstruction contracts. In 1991, European companies were aggrieved that US firms procured many of the best contracts after the Gulf War. Also, German firms had complained about the lack their of big orders in Bosnia although Germany had provided much of the aid. This time, most major European and US engineering groups created special Kosovo departments while UK engineering firms formed a government-backed Balkan "task-force".

However, Kosovo was less damaged than first thought: roads, bridges and power supplies remained largely intact; also, much of the necessary work could be carried out by householders with locally bought building materials. Furthermore, donors were likely to require that work be done by former Yugoslav companies or neighbouring countries to encourage local employment and growth. However, many companies still saw Kosovo as a base to secure contracts in Serbia when it became eligible for assistance.

KLA Target Serb Community

Both Patriarch Pavle, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Kouchner appealed for accord between the Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo following the murder of 14 Serbs in Gracko on 23 July. KFOR peacekeepers, who were preparing to answer a request to protect the villagers, announced the detention of ten people in connection with the massacre. The slowness of the UN in assembling a police force made work for KFOR in controlling the province harder. By the end of July, around two-thirds of the 180,000-strong Kosovar Serb minority had left the province. The UNHCR requested $20m for the refugees.

Russia Accused of Breaking Serb Arms Embargo

On 3 August, Jane's Defence Weekly alleged that Russia had supplied between six and 10 S-300PM surface-to-air missile systems to Serbia before the start of the NATO bombing campaign, in breach of a UN arms embargo, although the missiles were incomplete. Serb attempts to make the missile systems operational by 30 May were thwarted when NATO aircraft detected and destroyed them with an F-16 missile.

Earlier, General Jackson had refused an order by NATO's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clarke (US), to dispatch forces to confront Russian troops who, on 12 June, had raced to Pristina airport in front of NATO-led forces.

Mafia Allegedly Behind Anti-Serb Activities

Investigators alleged that the Albanian mafia were posing as the KLA and hiring minors to carry out 'ethnic cleansing' as part of a housing scam. Forcibly vacated properties were being sold on to homeless Kosovar Albanians.

KLA Actions Threaten Kosovo Peace

Analysts warned that, eight weeks after the end of the NATO air campaign, Kosovo was in danger of becoming a KLA fiefdom through the persecution and expulsion of Kosovar Serb community, which by 18 August was down to 10% of its previous levels. The preceding two months had also seen a scramble to take over land, businesses, shops, apartments, and positions. There were mortar attacks on Serb villages and  the brutal treatment and violation of Serb women, primarily by the KLA.

There was also tension between the advancement of democratic principles versus dividing spoils according to connection with the KLA. Thaci had been ineffective in deterring attacks against Serbs. Meanwhile, by appointing officials, appropriating factories and mines and imposing informal taxes, the KLA was likely to clash with other Kosovar political forces such as the LDK. Thus, UNMIK and KFOR should protect all members of Kosovar society and create conditions that would allow refugees to return and also needed to prevent the democratic processes from being subverted. Thus, Kouchner's proposals to hold early elections for a provisional parliament would be welcome, provided they were free and fair. (The Guardian, 18 August 1999)

KLA Position Dubious

Disagreements between KFOR and the KLA were becoming increasingly apparent towards the end of September. Under an agreement between them, the KLA conceded to transform into a civilian protection corps, limited to using 200 small arms. The 5,000-strong protection force was intended to assist in reconstruction and neighbourhood guardianship. A new police force would also incorporate several thousand additional KLA personnel. However, there was speculation that the establishment of the protection force actually represented another step towards creating an independent and well-defended Kosovo. In keeping with this, the KLA went through the motions of enthusiastic disarmament. Before its official disbandment, it had handed in over 10,000 weapons, although many believed its arsenal to be considerably larger. Moreover, the KLA provided a de facto government in most towns.

However, the disarmament process was symbolically important as it emphasised for the international community that Kosovo was not as yet legally independent, which was particularly important in relation to other secessionist movements in the region and beyond. It also lent credibility that NATO and the UN were administering Kosovo, including for the non-Albanian population. However, the position of non-Albanian Kosovars was becoming increasingly precarious. They were reportedly congregating in sufficiently large groups to provide some security, in response to efforts to systematically remove them in what was believed to be an attempt to turn Kosovo into an all-Albanian province. Money was pouring into Kosovo from international assistance and ex-patriate Kosovars. At the same time, there were fears of severe hardship in Serbia where people were more reliant on state welfare.

Secretary-General's UNMIK Report

The Secretary-General's 16 September report on the situation in Kosovo (S/1999/987) stated that UNMIK had established the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which brought together all major political parties and ethnic groups and provided Kosovo residents direct input into UNMIK decision-making. The KTC represented an initial step towards a framework of wider democratic structures.

However, while KFOR and the over 1,100 UN police had had an important effect, KLA commitments to human rights, tolerance and diversity had failed to prevent attacks against minorities. Around 4,000 of the 10,000 registered KLA fighters were still awaiting demilitarisation in assembly areas. While opportunities to join the new police, fire and civil services offered some alternative to the KLA, they were insufficient to absorb most of its personnel, and so the KFOR demobilisation strategy currently under development offered individual members an opportunity to participate in an emergency corps.

Unresolved property rights questions were reinforcing ethnic divisions and complicating return processses. Consequently, UNMIK intended to: set up a standard registry of property claims; redress legal measures on property taken in recent years that discriminated against a particular ethnic group; and rebuild the property records.

Humanitarian Situation

As of 4 September 1999, over 770,000 refugees had returned to Kosovo, leaving an estimated 44,400 in neighbouring regions and countries, 37,000 evacuees in third countries and an unknown number of asylum-seekers, as well as a roughly estimated 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Since mid-June, around 150,000 primarily Serbs and Roma had fled Kosovo and there was only extremely limited freedom of movement for those who remained. Housing surveys in over 90% of war-affected villages revealed an estimated 50,000 houses beyond repair and 50,000 that were reparable - with up to 50% damage - which urgently required temporary rehabilitation before winter. Measures by the UNHCR should temporarily cover housing requirements in damaged housing for the winter. Those in the 50,000 irreparable houses required alternative accommodation, probably with the host families most were already living with.

UNHCR, UNICEF and international and local non-government organisations (NGOs) were implementing projects as part of a "Kosovo Women's Initiative", including psychosocial and community support; special health-care services; and micro-finance and income-generation projects.

The UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre was co-ordinating mine action activities with various partners, including UN agencies, KFOR, ICRC, NGOs and commercial companies. Some 1.1 million square metres of land had so far been demined, although complete clearance of Kosovo was estimated to take two years.

Civil Administration

Two simultaneous challenges faced UNMIK: preparing an interim administration and, in the meantime, emergency measures to restore essential services.

Provision of Public Services

Postal and waste services in Pristina had been restored and over US$ 900,000 had been disbursed for small-scale "quick impact" projects. Two-thirds of expected winter electricity demand was being met. Some 350 Serbs rejoined the workforce at the Kosovo Railway Enterprise - 120 of whom had returned from Serbia: the first Serb returnees.

Establishment of Multi-Ethnic Governmental Structures

Joint civilian commissions were operating in the health, education, energy and public utilities, and post and telecommunications sectors, although no Kosovo Serbs had yet agreed to join the two of these four.

Police

The UNMIK police component was to comprise: civilian police, special units and border police. It had expanded significantly, initially in Pristina, although it would extend into each of the four other regions in turn. There were at the time over 1,100 UNMIK police officers from 25 nations, and it should have reached full strength by 15 October. However, this would still leave the ratio of police to inhabitants well below international norms, requiring more international officers until there were sufficient Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers available.

Economic Reconstruction

Current economic activity was insufficient, threatening serious economic hardship for many people. Priority lay in the resumption of basic public utilities. Although the most pressing repairs were under way, the power, water and heating sectors remained highly precarious while restoring telecommunications would take several months to show results.

Montenegro

Momentum towards independence for Montenegro appeared to be accelerating. President Milo Djukanovic complained of the effects of international sanctions and the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). However, NATO feared a violent reaction to Montenegrin independence by FRY troops stationed there, while many Montenegrins still supported President Slobodan Milosevic. Furthermore, Montenegrin secession would compromise Western ambitions to obscure the status of Kosovo. Analysts suggested that the June Security Council resolution on the province did not describe Kosovo as part of Serbia but did maintain it was part of the FRY. Montenegrin secession would mean the FRY ceased to exist and so would further encourage Kosovar independence, which could, in turn, effect Macedonia. Thus, the West was urging Djukanovic to wait for peaceful change in Belgrade.

However, the number of demonstrators against Milosevic in Serbia were exaggerated in the Western press; Serb opposition remained fragmented, while alternatives to Milosevic could be worse than him.

Leading members of the Montenegro's ruling coalition supported a referendum on independence in September, unless Belgrade agreed to provide Montenegro with equal status with Serbia.

Milosevic was not on good terms with Djukanovic. If Milosevic conceded to some Montenegrin demands, his own security chiefs might reject it; but refusal could induce Montenegrin secession which could spell the end on the Yugoslav federation and of Milosevic's presidency.

Further Moves Towards Secession

There was increasing anxiety that conflict could break out in Montenegro. On 5 August, the Montenegrin Government approved a plan to re-design relations with Serbia as a loose association of sovereign states. However, some western diplomats believed keeping Montenegro inside the federation could facilitate Serb democratisation. Although it was promised exemptions, Montenegro remained covered by certain sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Northern Ireland

Peace Process Precarious

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) strongly denounced the announcement by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mo Mowlam, in late August that the IRA cease-fire had not broken down, despite the fact that the IRA recently killed a young Catholic man and was suspected of procuring weapons from the US. Since Mowlam's statement, evidence emerged that the IRA was continuing to force other suspected young law-breakers to leave the country or face execution. Despite demands for a postponement by UUP leader David Trimble, Prime Minister Tony Blair was determined to continue with Senator George Mitchell's review of the peace process on 6 September and expressed support for Mowlam.

Divisions were evident within the UUP. Trimble's deputy John Taylor and his security spokesperson Ken Maginnis respectively disagreed over whether or not to demand a suspension of prisoner releases. Jeffrey Donaldson declared the UUP would legally challenge Mowlam's decision. There were also disagreements over whether to attend the forthcoming review of the peace process by US Senator George Mitchell.

However, the day after Mowlam's cease-fire decision, Donaldson condemned overnight IRA violence but ignored loyalist attacks. A major cause of UUP disagreement stemmed from mistrust of the republicans and the British government, fuelled by leaked reports that Chris Patten's review of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), to be released on 9 September, would recommend sweeping reforms. Recent Republican behaviour had exacerbated Unionist fears, making it hard for Trimble to convince other Unionists to implement the 1998 Good Friday Agreement unless Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams could satisfy them that the IRA had genuinely renounced violence.

IRA behaviour stemmed from its desire to provide an alternative police force on some Catholic estates: the cease-fire applied only to British troops and loyalist gunmen. Doubts remained over the IRA's attempts to re-arm. It was suggested that this was the result of demands by republican extremists as insurance against the breakdown in negotiations, who suspected negotiations were merely a means to split and destroy the republican movement. Such suspicions were reinforced Trimble insisted power-sharing was contingent upon decommissioning. However, hope for the peace process stemmed from the continuation of discreet negotiations between middle-ranking teams of unionists and Sinn Fein.

Patten Report on RUC Reform

Analysts suggested that the Patten Commission was never likely to achieve consensus. Some 303 police officers had been killed and many thousands injured in Northern Ireland over the previous thirty years, mostly by the IRA. The IRA have contended that the RUC officers were a legitimate target in the war against British occupation while the Protestant majority largely perceived the RUC as the front-line in the struggle against terrorism. The Commission included American, Canadian, English and Northern Irish delegates and its 9 September report made 175 recommendations. These included for the police to be renamed the Northern Ireland police service and that it would be accountable to a body comprising elected representatives from across the political spectrum, including Sinn Fein. A new, 19-member police board would cover 29 local boards - from each district council and four from Belfast. Officers should operate from local areas for several years and should be given name tags.

New recruits should be selected equally from Protestant and Catholic communities which might require legislative changes and the IRA to cease attacking targeting Catholic police officers. A 1997 poll revealed that 63% of Catholics cited fear of intimidation as the main reason why Catholics were not joining the police.

Allegations of RUC involvement in extra-legal anti-terrorist activity traditionally centred on its Special Branch and so it was suggested that this should merge with the regular detective service. The RUC's oath of allegiance to the queen was to be replaced by a commitment to respect human rights while Union flags and prominent portraits of the queen would be removed from police stations.

In response to unionist criticism, government sources attempted to stress republican disappointment with the Pattern report, in particular: the failure to disband the RUC; the preservation of Sir Ronnie Flanagan as Chief Constable; that serving officers would not have to re-apply for their positions; and that the RUC would retain its arms for the time being. However, Trimble described the proposed name and symbol changes as a gratuitous insult. RUC reform would still be contingent upon the cessation of widespread paramilitary violence.

Turkey

Ocalan's Capture Suggests Shift Towards Peace

Kurdish opposition leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was sentenced to death in Turkey in June, renounced his movement's demands for a Kurdish autonomous region within Turkey and demanded his fighters' end their insurgency against Ankara and withdraw from Turkish territory. On 10 August, Ocalan declared his forces would lay down their weapons if the Turkish authorities created conducive conditions. In short, he urged  that the Kurdish struggle be transferred from the military to the political arena. Paradoxically, it could transpire that Ocalan's capture induced many Turks offer a more favourable arrangement for the Kurds.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) subsequently announced compliance with Ocalan's requests. Tough actions by Turkey may also have influenced the Kurds' position: threats against Syria had induced Ocalan's expulsion from Damascus in October 1998 and had removed Syrian support. After his capture, Ocalan described as a mistake the PKK's military campaign and offered compliance with the Turkish state in return for his life.

Turkish official scepticism of Ocalan's offers centred around: where the 3,000 Kurdish fighters would withdraw to; the integrity of the drug traffickers whose trade was facilitated by the war; the future of the 60,000 village guards funded by Ankara; and whether PKK supporters, Iran and Iraq, would re-foment violence.

However, many Turkish officials were seriously considering Ocalan's proposals as the best chance of finding a solution to the war and some of them were urging dialogue with Turkey's largest pro-Kurdish party, HADEP, which won 39 south-eastern mayoral seats during elections in April. Furthermore, US Assistant Secretary of State, Harold Koh, on a recent visit to Turkey declared that any enduring solution to the Kurdish problem needed to encourage inclusive democratic political participation for all Turkish citizens and to advance greater freedom of expression in the south-east of the country. (The Economist, 14 August 1999)

United Kingdom

British Army Overstretched

Commander of British forces in the Gulf War, General Sir Peter de la Billière, warned that British armed services were dangerously overstretched, while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) admitted to being heavily committed through involvement in overseas operations. Also, on 2 August, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, General Sir Roger Wheeler, stressed that the effect that the 4,500 and 9,500 British troops currently deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo respectively and the potential for renewed instability in Northern Ireland was having on the 96,000-strong army.

British commitments in the Balkans were being reduced: in July, Defence Secretary George Robertson announced a 5,000 troop reduction from a maximum of over 11,000, while troops in Bosnia would be reduced to 2,000 by the end of 1999, although the reduction in Bosnia was part of a planned NATO cutback. Troops from Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland and Norway would take over from the units withdrawing from Kosovo.

The Balkans crisis perhaps justified the philosophy of the Strategic Defence Review, which stressed how Britain could derive diplomatic advantages from its military traditions by maintaining certain mobile forces with peacekeeping training and experience. This was particularly true in view of US fear of casualties and the over-reliance of continental European armies on conscripts, both of which greatly reduced the total number of effective peacekeepers available to western governments.

There was speculation whether such overstretch meant that previous pronouncements of assembling a 150,000-strong ground force for the Kosovo campaign, of which Britain would supply a third of the troops, was ever actually likely to happen. Emergency measures would probably have been able to cope with such demand, although there was a time limit how long such commitment could be maintained A simultaneous deterioration of events in, for instance, Northern Ireland and Kosovo could provide some major problems for the British armed forces.

At the time of writing, some 47% of the British army was deployed in peace support operations, compared with 28% at the beginning of the year and 19% prior to deployment of the Implementation Force in Bosnia, although the forthcoming drawdown would bring the figure back to 28%. However, Wheeler asserted there would be no changes to limits on army commitments set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, which stated that the Army should be able to maintain a brigade in a war-fighting role for six months while deploying another on a permanent peace support operation. Wheeler asserted that the army should presently have 102,000 trained personnel, rising to 105,000 by 2004. Although recruitment had increased by 12%, retention of trained personnel was a problem, so over 1,100 members of the Territorial Army were currently serving on operations.

George Robertson

At the beginning of August, George Robertson was appointed as NATO's new Secretary-General. His nine predecessors included two Britons: Field Marshal Lord Ismay in the 1950s and Lord Carrington from 1984-88. The Alliance's HQ in Brussels maintained a 1,300-strong staff plus 2,000 diplomats and functionaries. The Secretary-General provided a primarily diplomatic function and Robertson would have to balance US dominance with other European interests. However, he was highly regarded in Washington and Europe as a result of his handling of the Kosovo crisis, and he was also popular in Moscow.

Robertson's first problems were likely to relate to the Alliance's continuing involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia. However, although violence could re-emerge in the Balkans, difficulties in the region were increasingly becoming political, social and economic rather than military and so outside NATO's responsibility. NATO's traditionally difficult relationship with Russia had been further damaged as a result of Kosovo, after which connections were being mended only cautiously. Previously, Moscow had only reluctantly accepted the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO in return for membership of the permanent joint council; extending membership to other east European countries would prove difficult.

Robertson was also likely to be charged with defining a distinct European role both within NATO and the European Union's defence initiative. Robertson himself agreed that Kosovo had highlighted the need for increased European co-operation to provide the region with the political will to match its international political influence. He pointed out that the European defence bill was around two-thirds of America's, but duplication and competition reduced European capability.

Analysts suggested that Robertson's replacement as British Defence Secretary would need to contribute to the UK's foreign, development, European and trade policies as well as defence, thereby acknowledging that, for instance, arms shipments into conflict areas diminished prospects for peace and so increased the likelihood of future defence expenditure. The Kosovo crisis had highlighted that security was not an exclusively military affair. Although the Labour government had cut defence spending, British outlay was still of Cold War proportions relative to other EU states. Encouraging signs for rationalising European defence spending had emanated from the December 1998 Anglo-French defence Summit at St Malo and more recent Anglo-Italian dialogue, but the proposed German budget suggested severe cuts in its capacity to contribute.

The position of NATO Secretary-General was, paradoxically, likely to be most important during calmer periods, rather than in times of crisis when powerful heads of state tended to take over. It would be difficult to balance the democratic ideals of NATO's  democratic membership, such as open accountability, with the hard necessities of a defence alliance, such as military secrecy. The power attributed to the NATO Secretary-General was intended by its membership as a means to send messages to its adversaries, making Robertson's new role highly consequential.

EUROPE GENERAL

European Security Self-reliance

On 20 July, the Italian and British Prime Ministers, Massimo D'Alema and Tony Blair, declared a major lesson of Kosovo was the need to improve European military capabilities. Although the Italian army was still dominated by conscripts, Defence Minister Carlo Scognamiglio pledged to create a more streamlined force within five to six years. However, abolition of the Italian draft was likely to be opposed by the Catholic Church, which relied on young men who opted for civilian service instead of the army, while Scognamiglio would find it hard to raise defence spending from its current level of around 1% of GDP, compared with Britain's 2.5 %.

The new European Commission (EC) chief, Romano Prodi (Italy), and the new European Union (EU) Foreign-Policy Spokesperson, former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, also declared that ideals of a genuine European foreign policy had been given a fillip by the Kosovo intervention. Furthermore, teething problems with the European single currency (Euro) should prove less of a hindrance than some pessimists had been predicting.

Despite its major role in Kosovo, the US again showed its general reluctance to intervene, particularly where casualties might be incurred through the deployment ground troops. Thus, Europe needed to increase its capacity to act independently. However, more than 80% of air strikes in Kosovo were carried out by the US while Europe was furthermore likely to rely on American money, troops and matériel during reconstruction. Also, analysts pointed out that the most influential EU body, the Council of Ministers, was still reluctant to become part of a superstate, while Prodi's potentially effective team might not run completely smoothly. Moreover, European countries were far from unified. Germany's recently increased foreign affairs involvement did not translate into a commitment for ground troops in Kosovo; Italy remained suspicious of all foreign intervention; many European countries paid more regard to commercial self-interest than common support to uphold human rights; and countries like France and Britain would soon be unlikely to bend to suggestions from other EU members.

Some EU states regarded common foreign policy as a demonstration of unified political will; others as a check on America. However, a 17 July Economist report warned that western security was still likely to rely upon NATO, preferably with the UN, for which US support was required.

Back to top of page
 

Index to Issues

[Index] [About Monitor]