This Issue

DAGESTAN

Russia Attacks Dagestani Opposition

On 8 August, Russia launched artillery and air strikes against Chechen-backed Islamic militant fighters in the Russian Federal Republic of Dagestan, who were suspected of planning to establish an Islamic republic in Dagestan and Chechnya. Russian analysts believed that the Islamic offensive was being led by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, the strongest enemy of the moderate Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, and who has promoted this ambition for a long time, along with a Jordanian called Hattab. Hundreds of fighters had reportedly entered Dagestan's Botlikh district on 7 August and seized male villagers in the area as hostages.

Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin announced the launch of a limited operation to secure the border, overseen by the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, and the commander of Russia's interior ministry troops, Vladimir Ovchinnikov. However, Russian troops have historically been out-fought by Chechen fighters. Paratroopers, riot troops and some of the 102^nd Brigade of the interior ministry and the 136^th Motorised Rifle Brigade of the defence ministry were dispatched to the region. The official Chechen government denied involvement in the conflict.

Chechnya Denies Involvement in Dagestan Conflict

On 10 August, the Islamic fighters declared Dagestan to be an independent Islamic state. Moscow's counter-tactics reportedly involved clumsy artillery and air-to-ground missile attacks against opposition-held villages and thousands of civilians fled the area. Maskhadov denied the fighting was caused by Chechen fighters, accusing the Dagestani authorities persecuting mountain villagers over the previous twelve months and forcing Dagestanis to take refuge in Chechnya.

Fears of Regionalisation of Dagestan Conflict

There were fears that Russia's tactics in Dagestan could escalate what analysts described as essentially a local border problem into full-blown regional conflict. In view of the approximately three dozen different nationalities that inhabited Dagestan, analysts thought it unlikely that a small group of Wahhabi militants and Chechen fighters could hope to unify its population, particularly as their brand of Islam was not favoured in most of the republic and there was no legacy of Russian persecution, as was the case in Chechnya.

A 16 August Guardian report warned that Russian and Dagestani authorities tended to perceive the issue in largely strategic terms, ignoring social and economic problems within the province - it has one of the lowest standards of living in Russia. Some analysts suggested the instability was manufactured by external parties eager to destabilise Dagestan and Russia in order to gain control of an oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan through Dagestan. Others accused Boris Yeltsin of fabricating the crisis to declare a state of emergency in Russia.

On 18 August, 8 Russian soldiers were reportedly killed an twenty injured in fighting which saw little change in the positions of opposition forces, upholding Russian fears of deploying ground troops. Russian soldiers were alienating locals as their meagre pay had forced them into looting.

There were fears that a 20 August Russian bombing campaign against two villages in Chechnya would risk provoking the Chechen leadership into fully supporting Dagestani opposition, as Russian military officers conceded that fighting could last until December. The conflict was exacerbating established Russian racism against people from the Caucasus. Moscow's political elite were uniformly in favour of firm action and its military, aided by the fact that few journalists were visiting the region due to previous bad experiences in Chechnya, were controlling information available to the press. Neither did international aid agencies, including the UN, have any expatriate staff in Dagestan.

In late  August, Moscow was reportedly distributing weapons amongst selected groups within the Degastani population. Meanwhile, the new Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, predicted a rapid military victory. Russia also alleged that the opposition fighters were receiving support from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Taliban and the CIA. Some analysts suggested that Maskhadov's usefulness in relation to Dagestan could secure political and financial favours from Moscow, for example an agreement on quasi-independence for Chechnya, although others warned that he could be portrayed by domestic rivals as Russia's lacky.

Georgia

Tbilisi Clamps Down on Separatist Factions

In mid-July, the Georgian government was clamping down on separatist factions around the country, particularly in Abkhazia. Russia's federal border authority agreed with the Georgian government to abandon positions along the Abkhaz coastline to allow Georgia's small navy to impose a maritime blockade. Georgian ally Turkey conceded that its ships trading with Abkhazia would stop at the Georgian-controlled port of Poti to ensure only humanitarian goods were involved.

However, few of the 200,000 Georgian-Abkhaz refugees who fled Abkhazia in 1993 were ready to return, while Russia pledged to maintain the 1,500 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeepers there as well as a significant percentage of the Russian garrison in Georgia. Moscow had a strategic interest in maintaining its airfields in Abkhazia and access to the Black Sea. Georgian President Edward Shevardnadze was not in a position to get rid of the Russians. Around 18,000 Russian troops were deployed in the potentially troublesome, Armenian-speaking south of the country, while more supported local power-broker Aslan Abashidze  in the south-western mini-state of Adjaria - the largest single challenger to Shevardnadze's authority.

Shevardnadze assumed power in 1992, since when he had generally succeeded in dampening opposition resulting from the fact that significant parts of the country were out of state control. However, forthcoming elections in October and memory of tens of thousands of Georgians being expelled from the Gali region of Abkhazia in 1998 had left him politically vulnerable. He had sought official UN confirmation of Georgians suffering ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia in 1993 and a stronger mandate for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). There appeared little scope for compromise as Abkhaz separatists were still demanding independence while Tbilisi considered many of them to be guilty of war crimes.

Secretary-General's UNOMIG Report

Political Aspects

In his 20 July report, Kofi Annan stated that, during the reporting period, each party to the conflict was experiencing internal pressure related to forthcoming elections. Abkhaz "presidential" elections related to popular opinion on the leadership of Vladislav Ardzinba. In Georgian parliamentary elections in the autumn and presidential elections in spring 2000, President Eduard Schvardnadze's party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia, was anticipating challenges. Thus, the Georgian government was unlikely to take risky steps in the settlement process of for Abkhazia.

UNOMIG Operations/Situation on Ground

UNOMG's patrolling remained limited. In general, the conflict zone remained calm but unstable. The situation along the cease-fire line had improved considerably. However, terrorist activities by alleged "uncontrolled" partisan groups continued, particularly against Abkhaz militia. Criminal activities were also increasing.

Social and Economic Aspects

The Georgian lari (GEL) had strengthened in relation to the US dollar and there had been limited stabilisation in the Russian economy. However, Georgia was still suffering the negative effects of the August 1998 Russian economic crisis and global economic instability of the same year. However, the output of small and medium-sized enterprises increased while the Baku-to-Supsa oil pipeline became fully operational. In such mixed economic climate, tax collection remained low, prompting the government to announce strong countermeasures to improve it.

Observations

Although negotiations remained difficult, Annan asserted that contacts between the sides had expanded. Local-level contacts were vital to the peace process, including concrete projects that: created jobs; facilitated economic co-operation and the exchange of cultural experience; or enhanced balanced media coverage. However, the main issues of the settlement process were still unresolved: the international community expected substantive progress from both sides, particularly to agree over refugees and IDP returns to the Gali district and measures for the economic rehabilitation of Abkhazia.

UNOMIG Composition (Military Observers), as at 30 June 1999:

Albania 1; Austria 5; Bangladesh 7; Czech Republic 4; Denmark 5; Egypt 3; France 5; Germany 10; Greece 4; Hungary 5; Indonesia 4; Jordan 6; Pakistan 7; Poland 4; Republic of Korea 3; Russia 3; Sweden 5; Switzerland 4; Turkey 5; UK 7; US 2; Uruguay 3; Total 102

UNOMIG was headed by the Special Representative for Georgia, Liviu Bota, assisted by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Tariq Waseem Ghazi (Pakistan). S/1999/805, 20 July 1999

Tajikistan

Background

• 1991 Tajikistan achieved independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Tajik authorities supported an attempted Communist coup in Moscow, prompting the Communist Party to successfully implement its own coup in Dushanbe and install Rahmon Nabiev as President, subsequently consolidating his position through rigged elections;
• 1992 Tajik opposition movements combined as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the war began; the government resigned as a means to stop the fighting, but the Supreme Soviet, under Imomali Rakhmonov, seized power and installed a new government, whose crackdown on the UTO effectively ended the war; however, sporadic violence continued;
• 1993 Russian and CIS troops were deployed to deter cross-border activity from Afghanistan and to maintain stability throughout the country;
• 1994 the Tehran Agreement established a cease-fire in the country and questionable elections returned Rakhmonov to power; the UN deployed an observer mission (UNMOT) to support the agreement;
• 1997 The Moscow Protocol established principles for a political solution to the conflict; however, progress in the peace process has been very slow and sporadic violence continues.

In early August, 21 Islamic fighters, on being refused entry into Uzbekistan, seized four officials in southern Kirgizstan. Uzbek bombing raids against the group and its bases in Tajikistan had little effect and the Kirgiz army also failed to drive them back into Tajikistan. The opposition force was believed to have reached 750-strong, took control of several Kirgiz villages and was still holding around twelve hostages.

The group's leader, Juma Namangani, like many of its members, was Uzbeki, having fled to Tajikistan during the break up of the Soviet Union. The group had links with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which operated from Afghanistan. It had fought with the Tajik Islamist opposition during the 1992-97 conflict but was receiving less support as the UN-sponsored Tajik peace process provided the opposition there with a 30% share in government. The Tajik peace agreement provided that the opposition amalgamate its armed units with the army, in return for the legitimisation of various Islamist political parties, which had largely taken place by August. Armed opposition groups outside the peace process subsequently risked being pursued by government troops.

The IMU was attempting to exploit the situation by presenting the group in Kirgizstan as a vanguard for a new jihad against the Uzbek regime, and was reportedly seeking support from Afghani Uzbeks. Analysts suggested that Uzbeks in the Fergana valley could provide a fertile recruiting ground as corruption and economic mismanagement had eroded their living standards since the collapse of the Soviet Union and political repression had further fomented broad resentment. However, not many of the traditionally moderate Muslims in Central Asia agreed with the IMU's plans for an Islamic state.

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