This Issue

IRAQ

Background

• 1968 The Ba'ath party seized power in Baghdad;
• 1979 Saddam Hussein succeeded as president;
• 1980 War broke out between Iraq and Iran;
• 1988 A cease-fire was agreed between the two sides;
• 1990 Iraq seized Kuwait; a US-led UN task force then liberated Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, although Saddam remained in power;
• 1991 The subsequent cease-fire agreement provided for a UN observer force (UNIKOM) to monitor the Iraq/Kuwait border and, as part of Baghdad's commitments to dismantle its capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, a weapons inspection team (UNSCOM) and comprehensive sanctions against Iraq; in response to Baghdad's repression of Kurdish communities in northern Iraq and Marsh Arabs in the south, the UN established both areas as safe havens and no-fly zones;
• 1997 Saddam expelled US members of UNSCOM;
• 1998 Kofi Annan brokered a peaceful solution to the resulting stand-off; continuing interruptions of inspections eventually prompted four days of air strikes by the UK and US in December;
• 1999 Baghdad confronted UK and US planes patrolling the no-fly zones, inducing reprisals against Iraqi military targets; UNSCOM has not returned to Iraq.

Butler Denounces Annan

At the beginning of August, Richard Butler, the Australian former head of the UN Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) until he resigned on 1 July, alleged that Baghdad had bribed Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov to uphold Iraqi interests, which Moscow strongly denied. Butler further accused Kofi Annan of covering up repeated deceptions by Iraq in the interests of diplomacy and ultimately attempting to destroy UNSCOM. However, Annan's UN communications director, Shashi Tharoor, asserted that the Secretary-General only intervened in UNSCOM's affairs at crucial moments to resolve specific crises.

Butler claimed that such interventions superseded UNSCOM's mission to disclose Iraq's concealed chemical and biological weapons. In particular, Annan, under pressure from China, France and Russia, tried to persuade Butler to accept Baghdad's demands to restrict US involvement in UNSCOM. However, Butler denied accusations by former inspector, Scott Ritter, that US intelligence had used UNSCOM to spy on Iraq.

Debate Continues over Effects of Sanctions

An Iraqi cargo of baby goods was discovered on the way to Dubai. The discovery fuelled accusations that Iraq's humanitarian problems resulted from greed and corruption in Baghdad rather than as a direct result of sanctions. Baghdad responded that the stock was being returned because of its poor quality. It seemed clear that Iraqi authorities themselves had successfully prospered during the sanctions regime, but that those sanctions had also left a great mass of Iraqis in a state of near-destitution.

A recent UNICEF report suggested that throughout most of Iraq the under-five mortality rate had more than doubled - from 56 per 1,000 live births in 1984-89 to 131 per 1,000 in 1994-99. However, in the northern Kurdish autonomous region, effectively run by the UN itself, the rate actually dropped from 80 per 1,000 to 72 per 1,000. The report suggested that the conditions be relaxed in the oil-for-food programme, designed to allow essential humanitarian goods through the sanctions system.

There were also question marks over the continuing efficacy of the sanctions regime. UN weapons inspectors have not been able to operate in Iraq since late 1998. Disagreement remained within the Security Council over reform of sanctions and inspections. Meanwhile, UK and US planes continued to attack sites considered threatening within Iraqi no-fly zones.

Fresh Proposals Over Iraq

A 12 September report in the official Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawra claimed that the Iraqi authorities would allow UN arms inspectors to return if weapons of mass destruction were banned from all Middle Eastern countries, including Israel.

Baghdad further criticised a planned meeting of senior representatives of the Security Council's Permanent Five in London on 15 September to discuss new Iraqi policy. Meanwhile, China, France and Russia amended original plans to suspend sanctions in response to Iraqi co-operation with a new inspection commission. They urged Annan to submit a system of financial controls over Baghdad's oil revenue once sanctions had been suspended. They also wanted Baghdad to answer key questions on disarmament once sanctions were suspended. Beijing and Moscow had initially suggested removing all import restrictions. However, the Netherlands and the UK, with US support, suggested lifting sanctions after Iraq answered key disarmament questions.

Iraqi Opposition Announce Collaboration

On 14 September in London, a coalition of Iraqi opposition announced that it was collaborating to lobby for greater efforts to remove Saddam. The main opposition umbrella group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), declared that, at the UN General Assembly, it would co-operate with the newly established Centrist Democratic Movement. The announcement represented the acceleration of a propaganda battle during the build-up to the planned Security Council meeting on 15 September. Analysts asserted that Washington was under pressure from Congress to justify the allocation of $97million to support to the INC in 1998.

ISRAEL

Background

• 1985 Israeli forces established a security zone with the South Lebanese Army militia in souther Lebanon against terrorist attacks from the area;
• 1993 Following years of disputes between Israelis and Palestinians since the establishment of Israel after WWII, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo agreement, providing for a five-year plan to hand control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip back to the Palestinians; 1995 Rabin was assassinated by Jewish extremists;
• 1996 Binyamin Netanyahu was elected Israeli Prime Minister and obstructed the Oslo process; Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian Council;
• 1998 Under the Wye agreement, Arafat and Netanyahu appeared to achieve progress over interim issues of the Oslo Accords; however, it began to break down almost immediately;
• 1999 Ehud Barak was elected Israeli Prime Minister and pledged to advance the peace process with the Palestinians, establish relations with Syria and end violence in southern Lebanon.

Disagreements over Wye Implementation

Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Yasser Arafat walked out of a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in Gaza on 11 July over disagreement about implementation of the October 1998 Wye agreement. The Wye agreement stipulated that Israel was to withdraw from a further 13% of the West Bank within twelve weeks in return for security pledges, primarily from militant Islamic groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had withdrawn from the first 2%, but then suspended the agreement, allegedly in response to PA security breaches, although Washington believed it was to appease his domestic coalition. Arafat objected to Barak's suggestion that, as full withdrawal would leave exposed a few isolated Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the last 6% of the withdrawal should be incorporated into final-status negotiations over issues including borders, Jerusalem, settlements, water and refugees, which were supposed to be concluded by May 2000. Arafat's desire that Wye be implemented alongside or before the final-status negotiations was backed by Egypt, the European Union, Jordan, and the US.

Arafat's fears resulted from the fact that Netanyahu had previously suggested bi-passing the interim phase of the Oslo treaty in favour of accelerated final-status negotiations. However, Arafat suspected Tel Aviv of wanting to keep most of the West Bank under permanent Israeli control. Although Barak was not believed to be seeking the same result, there were question marks over whether he would be able to implement an agreement signed by the Likud. Speedy implementation of Wye might also have satisfied Palestinians frustrated by the stalled Oslo process. Furthermore, implementation of the Wye agreement would provide the PA control over around 40% of the West Bank and around 98% of its Palestinian inhabitants, improving Arafat's bargaining position in relation to final-status negotiations.

US officials hoped that the arrival of Barak would allow them to take a supporting rather than lead role in the Middle East peace process. According to analysts, fears that the US electoral process could influence events were overstated as it was up to Barak how significant a role it would play. He believed that a settlement was contingent upon three conditions: leaders with sufficient political power to make concessions; a compromise formula; and an established negotiating  process. Barak stated all these existed in relation to Syria, but was more doubtful about the Palestinians.

Syrian President Hafez Assad declared himself ready to negotiate, while the US offered peacekeepers following an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. An Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese peace deal might impede negotiations with the Palestinians. However, improved Syrian-Israeli relations could also facilitate Israeli/Palestinian relations.

Barak Visits Washington

On 19 July, Syria reportedly urged armed Palestinian groups in Damascus to renounce violence. However, Hizbullah pledged to continue attacks against the Israeli forces in south Lebanon and on the same day a pro-Israeli militia fighter was killed. Furthermore, analysts suggested that Damascus-based Palestinian groups no longer presented the threat they used to, while the more ominous Hamas and Islamic Jihad had not featured in the reports. However, if Assad realised the importance of Israeli public opinion and wished to earn more generous terms for Syria, then his influence over extremist Palestinians would provide Damascus increased leverage during negotiations. Exchanging the Golan Heights for diplomatic relations and security guarantees was relatively simple in comparison with issues on the agenda between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, sporadic, third party negotiations had taken place between Israel and Syria during Netanyahu's tenure. However, Barak rejected Syrian demands that Israel withdraw to pre-1967 borders, offering to pull back to those drawn up in 1923 which, significantly, were a few hundred metres from the Sea of Galilee. Damascus appeared ready to consider this, in exchange for other concessions.

However, Barak would always have to refer any deal to a tricky referendum process and would favour a considerable interval before holding a second plebiscite over Palestine, which could explain his suggested 15-month deal.

Further Hiccups in Peace Process

On 1 August, Palestinian negotiators walked out of a meeting with their Israeli counterparts and Arafat met with the radvical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Cairo for the first time since his Fatah movement and the PFLP split from the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) after the Oslo accords in September 1993. Arafat accused Barak of attempting to avoid implementing the Wye agreement, while Tel Aviv accused the Palestinians of manufacturing a crisis to gain the attention of US Secretary-of-State Madeleine Albright before her trip to the region in mid-August. Palestinian anxiety over Barak's apparent stalling over the Wye issue could have been be a cause of Fatah's détente with the PFLP as a means to bolster the Palestinian position.

Western Sahara

MINURSO Mandate Extended

On 13 September, the UN Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate until 14 December to allow time to conclude all outstanding agreements in the settlement plan for Western Sahara, to complete the identification eligible voters and to implement confidence-building measures. The Council requested Kofi Annan to report to it on significant developments in the implementation of the settlement plan every 45 days.

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