This Issue

Guinea-Bissau

Background

• 1956 The PAIGC was launched, supporting independence for Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands;
• 1961 PAIGC resorted to violence in response to mounting repression by the Portuguese colonial authorities;
• 1973 Independence was unilaterally declared;
• 1980 President Luiz Cabral was overthrown in a coup by Prime Minister Vernardo Vieira,  who has ruled the country ever since;
• 1997 The Peso was replaced as currency with CFA franc, integrating Guinea Bissau into the West African francophone region (ECOWAS), inducing a cost of living rise and unrest within the army;
• 1998 In June, a mutiny erupted when Vieira attempted to arrest General Mane for smuggling arms to MFDC in Senegal; encouraged by France, both Guinea and Senegal sent troops in support of Vieira; in November, a settlement allowing foreign troops to be replaced by ECOWAS peacekeepers fell through;
• 1999 In March, less than 600 unarmed ECOWAS peacekeepers were finally deployed to uphold the agreement.

Military Regime Tries to Keep Power

According to a 27 November PANA report, in the run up to presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau on 28 November 1999, a local newspaper article contained proposals by the ruling military regime intended to protect its privileges following the ballot. It had been hoped that the elections would represent the beginning of normal constitutional order in Guinea Bissau; the Abuja agreement which brought an end to violence in the country, stipulated that the military must return to barracks after the election of a new president and national assembly. It was suggested that the proposal would be discussed by the military regime itself, the government and political parties on 27 November.

The military regime denied responsibility for a previous proposal intended to keep the military in power for ten years. The more recent proposal suggested a "Council of the Republic" to be established by the military, comprising the president, the national assembly speaker, the prime minister, the ten members of the military regime and General Ansumane Mane, as well as ministers of foreign affairs, defence and war veterans and a representative of the parties elected to the national assembly.

SG's UNOGBIS Report (S/1999/1276)

The 23 December report covered developments in Guinea-Bissau since 29 September 1999.

Political Developments

The UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) assisted in the build-up to the 28 November legislative and presidential elections. A relaxation of the media environment in Guinea-Bissau allowed increasing popular involvement in political life, while political dialogue was more tolerant. Also, the proposed amendment to article 5 of the Constitution, which intended to bar from senior public office anyone whose parents were not indigenous to Guinea-Bissau, was withheld until the new National Assembly was in place after the elections.

Elections

Presidential elections were contested by twelve candidates, including four independents. Some 102 seats in the National Assembly were fought for by candidates from 13 political parties involved in the legislative elections. The National Electoral Commission (CNE) organised and implemented the elections.

Technical and Financial Electoral Assistance

Technical assistance was provided by UNDP. Some 502,678 potential voters were registered for the elections, around 91.2% of the eligible population. CNE initiated a large civic education campaign to inform the electorate. Electoral campaigning took place between 5 and 26 November 1999.

International Electoral Observation

UNOGBIS brought in 88 short-term observers from: Angola, Belgium, Benin, Canada, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Mozambique, the Netherlands, the Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Togo and the US. They covered over 40% of the 2,003 polling stations. More than 80% of eligible voters took part in the elections and the procedure went ahead with few problems.

On 9 December, CNE announced that the legislative elections had been won by Kumba Yala, the leader of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), with 38 of the 102 seats. Guinea-Bissau Resistance (RGB) won 29 seats and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the incumbent ruling party, took 24 seats. Remaining seats were shared between five other parties and no party gained an absolute majority. Kumba Yala received 38.81% of the presidential vote, interim President Sanha 23.37%. Therefore, no candidate received the 50% plus one vote required for a majority. Consequently, a second round was scheduled for 16 January 2000.

Military and Security Aspects

There was still a significant circulation of small arms among the civilian population, while the military continued to maintain a visible public presence and carry out  routine police duties.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Aspects

In September and October UNOGBIS raised concerns over conditions in various detention centres where political prisoners were still being held. UNOGBIS assisted in the training of 20 magistrates in an effort to help speed up the judicial process. Guinea-Bissau was in a transitional phase between humanitarian relief and reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Mozambique

Mozambique Prepares for Elections

In the run up to presidential and national assembly elections in Mozambique on 3/4 December, it was anticipated that the leader of the ruling Frente del Liberaçao do Mozambique (FRELIMO) party, Joaquim Chissano, would win another presidential term. However, the outcome of the national assembly elections with FRELIMO's main rivals, the Resistancia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO), was less clear.

RENAMO's popularity had increased as memories of its atrocities perpetrated in the war which ended in 1992 had faded. FRELIMO had also been guilty of abuses, particularly religious persecution and the enforced movement of peasants into collectives. FRELIMO's election campaigners realised the national desire to move on from the war, and so had not highlighted it.

Mozambique's economy had grown at an annual rate of 10% over the previous three years and the future appeared equally optimistic. However, the benefits of such economic success were distributed disproportionately in favour of a relatively small middle class based in Maputo while people in the countryside remained impoverished, not least due to the after-effects of the war.

The rural economy was improving, however. The peace dividend had induced a 9% growth in agricultural production over the previous four years. RENAMO and FRELIMO's support was concentrated in the north and south of the country, respectively, spurring unsubstantiated suspicions of preferential treatment by FRELIMO of the south.

RENAMO headed a coalition of opposition parties while there was public resentment at governmental strong-arm methods learnt as a legacy of the wartime dictatorship. Government attempts to curb corruption were generally viewed as insufficient. There were fears that division of power between Chissano and a RENAMO national assembly would lead to political impasse.

Nigeria

Unrest in Odi

Riots erupted on 25 November in Nigeria's economic capital, Lagos, which left 100 people dead. During the previous week, President Olusegun Obasanjo had ordered troops to assume control over the town of Odi in the Niger Delta.

Obasanjo blamed violence on the extreme Yoruba nationalist group, the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), and ordered police to arrest OPC members and shoot resisters on sight. However, Lagos state officials, including Governor Bola Tinubu and Police Commissioner Mike Okiro, appeared to support OPC assertions that it had not been involved. Tinubu agreed that violence resulted from a dispute between traders from the two primary Nigerian ethnic communities, the northern Hausas and the southern Yorubas, over control of a local food market while Okiro cited unemployment and shortfalls in his police force.

There were accusations that Tinubu's stance was influenced by his alleged failure to heed warnings by the Hausa that the OPC was planning an attack and also that the Lagos police had been demanding money from passers-by to carry out their duties.

Heavy Response By Nigerian Military

In early November, 12 police officers had been kidnapped and then killed in Odi. In response, and under accusations that Tinubu had lost control, Obasanjo had dispatched around 300 troops to the region. A Nigerian Senate delegation subsequently confirmed reports that the soldiers had caused considerable damage in Odi and had killed dozens of civilians.

Obasanjo's assumption of power in May 1999 had witnessed an upsurge in violence, often manifested along ethnic and religious lines. Although political changes introduced by the civilian government were broadly welcomed, the more relaxed political atmosphere allowed greater leeway for dissident groups to express dissent violently. The more democratic nature of Obasanjo's government has meant that he has had to pay more attention to human rights issues than his predecessors, while police reform and training was also urgently required.

Rwanda

Background

• 1962 Rwanda gained independence from Belgium becoming  a Republic under Hutu rule. Tension between Hutu and Tutsi groups was already strong;
• 1964 Hutu perpetrated  a genocidal massacre of Tutsi, many of whom fled to Uganda;
• 1973 Hutu General Habayarimana replaced  Kayibanda as President;
• 1990 Opposition Tutsi in Uganda (RPF) invade Rwanda;
• 1993 Habayarimana was forced to agree to a coalition government;
• March A UN force (UNAMIR) was deployed to provide humanitarian aid and supervise the transition to an elected coalition government;
• 1994 In April, both Habayarimana and the President of Uganda were assassinated precipitating widespread violence; UN personnel were evacuated and UNAMIR was suspended; between April and June, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered in an unchecked  program of systematic killing by Hutu extremists; some 1.7 million Hutu fled to Zaire creating a serious refugee crisis; A French intervention force (Opération Turquoise) escorted the fleeing Hutu to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, which became sanctuaries for genocide perpetrators and recruitment and training grounds for the Hutu militias; 
• 1995 the UN set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try the perpetrators of the genocide;
• 1998 In September, ICTR sentenced former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda to life imprisonment, the first head of state to be convicted for the crime of genocide, originally defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention.

ICTR Chief Denied Visa To Rwanda

The Rwandan government denied a visa to Carla Del Ponte, the UN Chief Prosecutor at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and suspended co-operation with the tribunal. This came in response to the release of indicted criminal Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, accused of high-level involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, through association with an anti-Tutsi radio station and as a senior official in the foreign-ministry. Barayagwiza was extradited from Cameroun to the ICTR's headquarters in Arusha in November 1997. However, his case remained some way from being heard. Indeed, by the beginning of December 1999, ICTR had only convicted five suspects in the five years of its existence. On 3 November, the UN's appeal chamber had ordered Barayagwiza's release on the grounds of negligence by the prosecutor's office.

The prosecutor's office agreed to lobby the appeal chamber and pledged to produce fresh evidence. The Rwandan authorities urged the chamber to hand Barayagwiza over to them rather than be returned to Cameroon. They promised that conviction would not result in a death sentence, although the government had already executed 22 people with over 200 waiting on death row.

UN Report on Rwanda Genocide

An independent report on the UN's role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide commissioned by Kofi Annan, which was released on 16 December, agreed that the organisation and its member states had failed Rwanda in deplorable ways. Evidence of planned genocide had been ignored while Rwandans in need of protection had been abandoned.

The report asserted that the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda had been doomed from the start due to its inadequate mandate. The mission was further undermined by the Security Council's refusal to reinforce it once the killings had started. UN officials, including Annan, at the time Under-secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had failed to act upon information that genocide was happening.

According to the report, the principal failing had been the lack of resources and political will given to unfolding events in Rwanda and to the UN presence there. The UN peacekeeping mission deployed to Rwanda in October 1993 had not been mandated to provide military protection for investigating cease-fire violations or securing humanitarian aid.

The report particularly criticised the manner in which the peacekeepers withdrew, including pretending to refugees that they were not leaving. Annan expressed deep remorse for the UN's failings in Rwanda and declared his commitment to ensuring the UN never again failed in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter.

A 16 December report in the Toronto National Post stated that the Canadian head of UN forces in Rwanda, Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire, admitted that he had started to lose control over some of his troops. A confidential fax from Dallaire, dated 17 April 1994, asserted that in response to his order to deter an assault on refugees in a hotel, the relevant commander requested the withdrawal of his troops from the area. The UN report indicated that Ghanaian soldiers had disregarded Dallaire's orders to defend two Rwandan families from Hutu militias.

Sierra Leone

Background

• 1991 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government;
• 1992 A new government assumed power in a coup, but was still opposed by the RUF;
• 1996 Despite continued hostilities, Ahmed Téjan Kabbah was elected president; the Abidjan Accord was subsequently agreed with the RUF;
• 1997 Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); the Conakry Agreement between the parties in the Autumn was never implemented;
• 1998 Continued unrest induced ECOMOG to intervene to remove the junta with the help of Kamajor militias; Kabbah was restored to power in Freetown, but violence continued throughout the country; in the summer, the UN deployed UNOMSIL to operate alongside ECOMOG;
• 1999 Continuing atrocities, mainly by the RUF, intensified Sierra Leone's humanitarian crisis; an eventual peace agreement brokered by the UN controversially incorporated opposition forces into the government.

SG's UNOMSIL Report (1) (S/1999/1003)

On 28 September, the Secretary-General reported on the activities of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).

Challenges to the Peace Process

Since the Lomé signing, several incidents had threatened UNOMSIL and ECOMOG's security and had exposed divisions between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). These included the detention of: UNOMSIL and ECOMOG personnel and some senior RUF leaders by a group of AFRC supporters; a UNOMSIL helicopter by the RUF; and an NGO worker. AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma also issued a list of grievances about the Peace Agreement.

Concern over the Peace Agreement further centred around the delay in the start of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme and the absence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh and Koroma from Sierra Leone.

Military and Security Situation

Although the cease-fire had generally held, the security situation remained tense, primarily between the RUF and AFRC, as some AFRC supporters felt they had been marginalised during the Lomé negotiations.

The eventual participation of some RUF and AFRC representatives facilitated the functioning of the Joint Monitoring Commission, established under the Peace Agreement. However, provincial- and district-level cease-fire committees were still not operational due to the absence of RUF representatives. The recent participation of AFRC representatives from Occra Hills in the Committee had improved security around Freetown.

The government, ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Force asserted that they had released all prisoners. However, the RUF and AFRC were still believed to be holding several thousand civilians, including 3,000 children.

Human Rights

Protection of Children

After visiting Sierra Leone from 30 August to 3 September, the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, outlined an agenda for action, which proposed:

Giving special attention to child soldiers in the DDR process;

Securing access to and immediate release of children abducted by opposition forces;

Providing training to the new national army on human rights, child rights and humanitarian standards;

And giving priority attention to the special needs of children, in particular those affected by the war.

The RUF made commitments not to recruit children as soldiers.

Humanitarian Aspects

The needs of over 2.6 million people in RUF/AFRC-controlled northern and eastern regions of Sierra Leone remained largely unmet. Immediately following the 3 June statement by the parties on humanitarian access, a humanitarian assessment in several previously inaccessible key towns had revealed remarkably high levels of severe malnutrition.

Insecurity threatened humanitarian operations in some areas as a result of tension between former elements of the Sierra Leone Army and the RUF. Over a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and around half a million refugees were still waiting to be returned to their homes.

Disarmament and Demobilisation

The government developed an operational plan for an estimated 45,000 Sierra Leonean fighters. Each ex-combatant was to receive a transitional allowance and would be taken to one of an estimated 27 reception centres to surrender weapons and ammunition, while up to ten demobilisation centres were to be established throughout the country. UNOMSIL was to verify fighter eligibility while ECOMOG would account for the weapons.

Future UN Role in Sierra Leone

Co-operation with ECOMOG

Part four of the Lomé Agreement provided for:

New mandates to be approved for ECOMOG and UNOMSIL;

The creation of a neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG to disarm all combatants;

Demobilisation and reintegration;

And restructuring and training of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo agreed that a proposed UN peacekeeping force would include some Nigerian and other ECOWAS troops. On 25 August, ECOWAS adopted a new ECOMOG mandate providing for the Military Observer Group to:

Maintain the peace and security in Sierra Leone

Protect UNOMSIL personnel;

Disarm all fighters, in conjunction with UNOMSIL;

Recover hidden arms;

Protect and escort VIPs;

Deploy troops to disarmament centres and arms collection sites;

Establish safe corridors and locations for returnees and humanitarian relief operations;

Provide security for weapons and ammunition retrieved during disarmament and demobilisation;

Assist in the destruction of recovered arms and ammunition;

And carry out security patrols.

Annan suggested that a robust peacekeeping force should be deployed, comprising a substantial element of ECOMOG personnel both to economise in transportation and installation costs and to ensure the immediate availability of troops familiar with conditions on the ground.

Concept of Operations of the UN Force

The force's main purpose would be to assist in disarming and demobilising all former combatants and to facilitate the creation of the necessary conditions of confidence and stability for the smooth implementation of the peace process. Security in Freetown, the international airport at Lungi and for the government as well as any operations against rogue elements countering the peace process would remain the responsibility of ECOMOG. The UN force would deploy throughout Sierra Leone and so would require firm assurances of freedom of movement and co-operation from all parties. The envisaged mandate of the UN force would be to:

Assist the government in implementing the demilitarisation plan;

Establish a presence at key locations throughout Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilisation centres;

Ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel;

Monitor cease-fire adherence;

Facilitate the establishment of confidence-building mechanisms by the parties;

Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

Support the operations of UN civilian officials;

And support elections, as requested.

The UN Force was to comprise six infantry battalions (750-strong) and specialised support units including logistics, communications, engineering and air and other transportation (each 250-strong). The number of military observers would be increased to from 210 to 260, bringing the total number of military personnel to 6,000 The possible withdrawal of Nigerian troops, as had been announced by Obasanjo, would necessitate a reassessment of the situation for the UN force.

UNOMSIL contributions as at 21 September 1999

[Military Observers (MO); Others (O); Total (T)]

Bangladesh 2 (MO), 2 (T); Bolivia 4 (MO), 4 (T); China 3 (MO), 3 (T); Egypt 5 (MO), 5 (T); France 1 (MO), 1 (T); Gambia 2 (MO), 2 (T); India 6 (MO), 2 (O), 8 (T); Jordan 5 (MO), 5 (T); Kenya 11 (MO), 11 (T); Kyrgyzstan 1 (MO), 1 (T); Malaysia 5 (MO), 5 (T); Nepal 6 (MO), 6 (T); New Zealand 2 (MO), 2 (T); Norway 5 (MO), 5 (T); Pakistan 5 (MO), 5 (T); Russia 8 (MO), 8 (T); Slovakia 2 (MO), 2 (T); UK 15 (MO), 15 (T); Tanzania 12 (MO), 12 (T); Zambia 5 (MO), 5 (T); Total:105 (MO), 2 (O), 107 (T).

Problems in Sierra Leone Peace Process

In early December, RUF fighters gathered at a camp near Port Loko to be demilitarised. Problems with this process included the close proximity of camps both for RUF victims and for RUF's militia opponents, as well as a centre for RUF child soldiers. The camps were being exclusively guarded by Nigerian troops and overseen by UN monitors, as none of the promised government officials had arrived. Meanwhile, violent gangs attacked travellers throughout the country.

The departing UN Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, asserted that the peace process was on track. However, analysts expressed fears that the government lacked sufficient political will and an army to implement the terms of the peace agreement; a British initiative to train a new armed force was problematic and would take some time.

Some 350 Kenyan peacekeepers joined the 130 already deployed to Sierra Leone on 8 December, but there were doubts over the commitment of the Nigerian troops who were supposed to enforce the agreement.

The authority of the government was largely confined to Freetown and international efforts to rebuild Sierra Leone were meagre. The IMF refused to help in view of Sierra Leone's $11 million debt.

Sankoh's power appeared to be increasing in response to efforts to keep him in the peace process, while he made various public statements both supportive and dismissive of the agreement. There was confusion over the level of control Sankoh maintained over the various factions of his armed forces and whether delays in the demilitarisation process were the result of such lack of control or a deliberate initiative by Sankoh to retain coercive means for the planned election process.

SG's UNAMSIL Report (2) (S/1999/1223)

The 6 December 1999 report stated that Security Council resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999 [see Documentation section] had established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

Political Developments

The situation in Sierra Leone remained precarious despite some advances in the Lomé process. Sankoh and Koroma returned to Freetown on 3 October 1999 to sensitise combatants to the Lomé Agreement and the DDR programme. The composition of the Government of National Unity was announced on 20 October, including:

Twenty ministers (including four members of RUF/AFRC);

Five ministers of State;

And 13 deputy ministers (including four members of RUF/AFRC).

The Government was sworn in on 2 November, after which the new Cabinet met regularly but made few policy announcements. Also on 20 October, Sankoh was appointed Chair of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and Koroma was appointed Chair of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP).

RUF was registered with the Interim National Electoral Commission as the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) on 22 November in Freetown, although this would remain provisional until RUFP met all criteria of a political party.

Security Situation

There was an increase in cease-fire violations and human rights abuses in October and November. On 15 October, the town of Makeni was seized by RUF. There was also fighting between RUF and AFRC around Lunsar and Rogberi. Efforts to re-establish an ECOMOG presence in Makeni were unsuccessful.

The Joint Monitoring Commission became fully operational only recently after a permanent RUF member was assigned to the Commission.

Disarmament and Demobilisation

The first phase of the DDR programme began on 4 November with the opening of four new demobilisation centres at Port Loko, Daru and Kenema, as well as the long-standing camp at Lungi. Between 12 and 25 UNAMSIL personnel were stationed at each location.

Some 4,217 of an estimated total of 45,000 ex-combatants had registered at DDR sites by 2 December. Sankoh threatened to suspend RUF participation in the programme as a result of other groups' weak response. RUF Commander Sam Bockarie declared his troops, stationed around Daru, would only disarm after the withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG troops from Sierra Leone.

However, the poor security situation heightened mistrust among opposition forces, discouraging participation in the DDR programme and there were continuing doubts over RUF commitment to it. There had also been unrest due to lack of information about the programme and the lack of necessary financial assistance for ex-combatants spending extended stays at demobilisation centres.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation

From early October 1999, attacks on civilians by former opposition forces increased in the areas west of the Occra Hills, along the Lungi-Port Loko road, and around Kabala and in parts of Koinadugu, often involving rape, abduction and harassment, looting and destruction of property. There were also reports of civilian populations in RUF-controlled areas undergoing harsh civil control, including execution or threat of execution. National and international humanitarian workers were threatened and intimidated. Large numbers of children remained in captivity.

The new Inspector General of the national police initiated several human rights-related investigations and initiatives. As a result of deteriorating security conditions, previous advances in humanitarian access were reversed and further expansion of humanitarian activity halted. Humanitarian agencies were targeted for looting and harassment and many were forced to withdraw.

Deployment of UNAMSIL

Additional political affairs and human rights officers were being deployed to the civilian component of UNAMSIL, as well as the establishment of public information and civil affairs sections. At the time of writing, over 200 military observers and a 15-member medical team were deployed to mission HQ at Freetown, Hastings, Lungi, Port Loko, Bo, Kenema and Daru and a UN technical team was dispatched in late October to assist the in preparing for the deployment of the mandated 6,000 UN troops. Preparation for the deployment of military contingents progressed effectively. Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria) was appointed Special Representative on 19 November.

Demobilisation Delayed

There were reports that, during the two weeks beginning 6 December, between 1,000 and 5,000 refugees had fled Sierra Leone and two humanitarian workers were abducted. Although by mid-December four demobilisation centres had been opened, uncooperative opposition leaders and insecurity had prevented the six additional centres from opening. A 21 December report by US Committee on Refugees suggested that misunderstandings were common between Sierra Leoneans, aid workers and donors due to the lack of an effective public information strategy to explain the terms of the peace agreement.

Sudan

Moves Towards Sudanese Settlement

At the end of October, it appeared that a framework for a workable settlement to the Sudanese war was achievable while all parties to the fighting had, in principle, agreed a distinction between state and religion as well as the right to self-determination. Furthermore, the effects of over sixteen years of war had engendered general consensus between government forces and the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) that military victory was unattainable. However, violence continued in the country.

Some ten years after the National Islamic Front (NIF) had seized power in a military coup, its leader, Hassan Turabi, controlled the ruling party and had successfully undermined the real authority of President Omar el Bashir. However, Turabi had failed to establish Sudan as an Islamic state, as most Sudanese remained loyal either to well established sectarian parties, notably the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party, or to regional and ethnic orders. Government expectations that fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia would stop those countries supporting the Sudanese opposition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), had proved unfounded, while the government had also failed to capitalise on the SPLA's disorganisation. Furthermore, new-found oil exports appeared unlikely to alleviate the country's desperate financial situation.

Thus, earlier in 1999, Bashir had agreed to talk to the SPLA under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) while Turabi had met with Sadiq el Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party.

The NDA represented a broad coalition of parties with divergent agendas, comprising the SPLA and northern politicians driven from power in 1989. As peace appeared to be nearing, so the cracks within the NDA were expanding. The declaration of principles from the IGAD negotiations asserted that Sudan should either be a secular state or that the south of the country should be able to exercise the right to self-determination. While this outcome pleased the southern secular parties, el Mahdi remained ardently anti-secular and saw self-determination in terms of secession. Meanwhile, SPLA  leader John Garang failed to maintain a consistent position.

NDA divisions were emphasised by its September attack on the government's new oil pipeline, which el Mahdi subsequently apologised for, reviving speculation that he intended to make up with Turabi to force an isolated SPLA to sue for peace.

Bashir Launches Coup

On 12 December 1999, Bashir launched a coup in Sudan by announcing a state of emergency, suspending certain sections of the constitution and dispatching troops to seize parliament. Thus, Bashir aligned himself against Turabi in response to the disintegration of the political alliance between the two.

Turabi's party, the National Congress Party (NCP), boasted its own armed militia and had supporters in the military and other government bodies. However, Bashir claimed that security chiefs still backed him while it appeared unlikely there would be popular support for unrest.

Also, Bashir had recently made international advances to end Sudan's diplomatic isolation. For instance, he agreed to end a frontier war with Uganda [see Uganda section below] while Egypt and Libya opposed Turabi's Islamism and were reportedly warming to Bashir.

Sudan had been involved in internal conflict during most of the 43 years of its independence and the latest 16-year old bout of fighting had seen 2 million dead.

The northern two-thirds of the country was run from Khartoum. Turabi's imposition of Shariah law and declaration of jihad against the southern opposition had exacerbated unrest in the country. Nevertheless, Sudan enjoyed relative freedom of press and its year-old constitution, at least on paper, proclaimed western democratic ideals, for which analysts generally gave Turabi some credit.

However, an 18 December Economist report suggested that the dual government between Bashir and Turabi was always likely to lead to friction. Recent months had witnessed Turabi attempting to increase his own power and the coup occurred the day before a vote on constitutional reforms opposed by Bashir. These included removing presidential direction of provincial governors, establishing a prime minister as head of the cabinet rather than the president and enabling a two-thirds parliamentary vote to eliminate the president (the NCP controlled virtually 400 seats in parliament).

Severe Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

A 21 December report by the US Committee for Refugees stated that the 1999 World Refugee Survey estimated there to be around 30 million refugees and internally displaced people worldwide. The most recent phase of the conflict in Sudan had seen over 2 million civilians killed in war-related deaths, the largest civilian death toll in any conflict since World War II. There were over 350,000 recognised Sudanese refugees, between four and five million internally displaced people within Sudan, as well as over one million Sudanese exiles in places where they were generally not granted refugee status.

The report stated that the Sudanese armed forces regularly bombed civilian targets and denied humanitarian access. An entire generation of southern Sudanese were growing up with no formal education and a whole culture in the Nuba Mountains was being extinguished. Meanwhile, much of Sudan's infrastructure had been destroyed. While all social groups were being affected by the war, southerners remained the primary victims at the hands of the NIF government.

Tanzania

Unrest Threatens Zanzibar

Instability threatened to break out on the Tanzanian island of Zanzibar. Zanzibar had enjoyed independence between 1963-64, when then Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, had dispatched troops in response to fighting on the island in which 20,000 people were killed. Union with the mainland followed in 1964. At the time of writing, Zanzibar was ruled by the union government from Dar es Salaam and by its own president, ministries and parliament.

Nyerere's death in October had induced many Zanzibaris to hope for greater autonomy, but President Benjamin Mkapa warned of severe repercussions against people who attempted to oppose the union. The Civic United Front (CUF) had won presidential elections in Zanzibar in 1995, but subsequent intervention returned the local representative of Nyerere's Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, Salmin Amour, to office, prompting a CUF boycott of parliament for the next four years. The Commonwealth recently brokered a compromise, but CUF leader Sharif Hamad threatened civil war if Zanzibar's 2000 elections were rigged. Since 1997, 18 CUF members remained in prison, still awaiting trial, and several thousand protesters attended a CUF demonstration on the 30 November anniversary of their arrest.

Uganda

Uganda/Sudan Peace Agreement

On 8 December in Nairobi, Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Omar el Bashir of Sudan signed an agreement to cease support for opposition activity on each side of their common border, raising hopes of an end to the 15-year war in Uganda. The two leaders agreed to:

Disarm terrorist factions;

Respect borders;

Withdraw support for opposition fighters;

Return prisoners of war;

And grant amnesty to fighters who renounced violence.

Although opposition groups remained unspecified in the agreement, it was understood that Sudan wanted to see an end to support for John Garang's fighters and Uganda for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

On 7 December, the Ugandan parliament had passed an amnesty bill promising that opposition fighters who surrendered within six months would not be tried for treason. It was believed that LRA morale was low, that it had suffered desertions and that it lacked resources, while Ugandan efforts to fortify the Sudanese border had hampered LRA activities.

However, there was escalating instability in the west of Uganda, at the hands of the small but destructive Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), whose activities had created some 100,000 displaced people since 1996. Kampala alleged that ADF was supported by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). An effective settlement in the north of the country might free up government troops to address problems in the west.

Africa General

UN Warns of Food Insecurity in Africa

A 24 December Addis Tribune article stated that a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on 16 December warned that some 1.6 million people had been cut off from relief supplies in Somalia, leading to some deaths from starvation. The FAO blamed a combination of increased fighting and a recent severe drought resulting in a poor harvest.

The report further cautioned that 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa faced severe food emergencies: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

The report declared that dry periods and erratic rains reduced cereal production in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia which had left many people reliant on relief. Some half a million Eritreans displaced by the war with Ethiopia faced severe food shortages. There remained a critical food situation in much of the Great Lakes region, primarily, according to the report, because of continuing violence there: in Burundi, escalated fighting led to renewed displacement of people and forced the suspension of humanitarian assistance; in DRC, some 10 million people faced food insecurity; in Congo Brazzaville, agriculture and marketing activities had been disrupted; and, although there had been an overall increase in food production in Rwanda since the previous last season, some 900,000 returning refugees still required urgent food assistance, while there were continuing food shortages in several other areas.

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