This Issue

Colombia

Background

• 1998 Conservative Pastrana was elected President in place of Liberal Ernesto Samper; in November, Pastrana withdrew the army from a large area in the south of the country to facilitate negotiations; the "demilitarised" area came under de facto FARC control; FARC met with American diplomats in Costa Rica in December;
• 1999 FARC suspended peace talks, insisting that the government must crack down on its paramilitaries; FARC then killed three US nationals in March; Washington increased aid to the armed forces, ostensibly for use against drug traffickers, and withdrew official contact with the FARC until the killers were handed over; FARC launched a massive offensive during the build-up to negotiations with the government in the summer.

Peace Demonstrations in Colombia

Demonstrators marched through towns and cities across Colombia on 24 October to protest against three decades of violence in the country. Organisers claimed up to 10 million people, more than a quarter of the population, took part in the demonstrations, although observers declared the real figure to be nearer 5 million. On the same day, representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government sat down to negotiate for the first time in Uribe in the demilitarised zone, based around a broad, 12-point agenda incorporating issues from land reform, environmental policy and oil, but not a cease-fire.

Analysts pointed out that the FARC opposition fighters and the right-wing paramilitaries had been responsible for the majority of the 1,000 civilian deaths by mid-October 1999 and were primarily rural movements, and so urban demonstrations had little effect on them. In fact, increases in violence, kidnappings and extortion accompanied increased contact between the various parties to the conflict and the government had been criticised over concessions to opposition forces.

Mixed Attitudes to FARC

A 12 December FARC attack on a naval base at Jurado near the Panama border reportedly killed forty-five marines, while FARC suffered few casualties. According to intelligence sources, at least 4,000 of FARC's estimated 17,000 fighters resided permanently in demilitarised zone, although numbers increased when FARC columns passed through the area to retrain or rearm.

Within the zone, FARC was the main source of power. Some local residents complained of continued aggressive FARC recruitment, particularly of youngsters, while there were also abuses within the FARC justice system. FARC claimed its justice system was more efficient than the state's.

The majority of the local population supported FARC, but the business community and landowners were resentful at the fall in the economy. Only the cocaine industry was flourishing, and there were accusations that FARC was using the demilitarised zone for international trade in drugs and weapons.

FARC Launches Fresh Assaults

A 14 December Financial Times report stated that up to forty people were feared dead during FARC assaults on towns in northwest Colombia over the weekend of 11/12 December, which had targeted police outposts, a mayor's office and a marine base. The attacks came a month after Pastrana had appealed to all sides to put down their weapons for a Christmas truce from 15 December. FARC declared that it was considering the proposal.

Honduras

Tension Between Honduras/Nicaragua

During the first week of December, Honduras and Nicaragua requested international intervention in their maritime border dispute. On 5 December, the Honduran military fired shots along its Nicaraguan border while Nicaragua had previously protested against Honduran military manoeuvres near the border. Honduras had claimed these had formed part of an anti-crime operation.

Previously, Honduras had ratified a maritime treaty with Colombia, the Lopez-Ramirez treaty, which recognised the San Andres Archipelago as Colombian territory. However, Nicaragua maintained claims to the islands and also complained that the treaty deprived it of 130,000 km² of maritime rights in the Caribbean.

On 6 December, the permanent council of the Organisation of American States (OAS) convened an emergency meeting on the issue. It appeared that, to avoid confrontation, Honduras had withdrawn its troops from the border with Nicaragua. Also on 6 December Nicaragua approved a 50% tariff on Honduran and Colombian products, which was viewed a hostile act.

Venezuela

Unease Mounts With Neighbours

Towards the beginning of October, tensions mounted between Venezuela and its neighbours. President Hugo Chavez had upset Colombia when he sought talks with its opposition forces following the kidnapping of a Venezuelan commercial aircraft. In September, Chavez facilitated a meeting between Colombia's second largest opposition group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and a team of Colombian worthies. There was protracted instability along their common border; opposition fighters were active in the Colombian provinces of Arauca and Norte de Santander and recently several hundred civilians had fled fighting into Venezuela. Colombian President Andres Pastrana warned Venezuela against interfering in his country's affairs.

Chavez also revived Venezuela's historical claims to Guyanan territory west of the Essequibo river, which comprised two-thirds of Guyana. Venezuela had never accepted a century-old arbitrated settlement to the dispute, even after Guyanan independence from Britain in 1966. On 2 October, Chavez announced his country had begun initiatives to bring the issue to the negotiating table.

United States of America

Senate Rejects CTBT Ratification

The US Senate voted 51-48 not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in early October. This  represented a humiliating defeat for the Administration, as President Bill Clinton had previously described the treaty as one of the most important of his presidency. The Administration had argued that the CTBT would obstruct proliferation initiatives by other nuclear powers, particularly by strengthening support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, opponents of the CTBT were not convinced of its effectiveness, particularly against the burgeoning number of rogue nuclear states.

At the same time, however, the behaviour of other opponents, notably republican Senators, revealed that the decision to oppose the treaty was influenced by a desire to prevent Clinton from achieving a major foreign policy victory due to domestic political considerations. Thus, they refused to allow a postponement of the vote, as the Administration had proposed in anticipation of the rejection. Much blame was levelled at Clinton for failing to lobby sufficiently for ratification.

However, many of the 44 ratification signatures required for the treaty were still to be secured and Clinton promised both a moratorium on nuclear testing as well as continued efforts to ratify. Washington received broad condemnation for the decision, including from Britain, France, and Germany.

Administration Responds to Foreign Policy Setbacks

Officials in the US Administration responded to recent foreign policy setbacks, including the Senate refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Congressional manoeuvring over UN arrears and prevarication over financing for issues such as the Middle East peace process and debt relief.

President Bill Clinton complained of new isolationists in the Republican Party and implored Democrats to rather support responsible internationalism. On 21 October, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger spoke of America's internationalist consensus being undermined by a new isolationism, particularly through the Congress. At the end of October, Treasury Secretary Larry Summers bemoaned the consequent neglect of America's international reputation, which did not result from a particular party, agenda or issue but was being incrementally diminished.

Republicans claimed that the debate was not, in fact, about isolationism against internationalism, but rather over the relative merits of unilateral or multilateral approaches to Washington's foreign engagement.

However, it nevertheless appeared that such criticisms were having an effect. For instance, the Africa trade bill, intended to reduce trade barriers for reformist African and Caribbean states, which had been held up in the Senate, was finally passed on 3 November. There were further indications of money being made available to support peace in the Middle East, although what would happen to money for debt relief and international organisations was lass clear.

However, fears remained that the Administration's concentration on short-term foreign policy political goals could come at the expense of long-term gains. A 6 November Economist report suggested that the focus on Republican isolationism oversimplified the dynamics behind broader American attitudes to foreign policy; arguments over the CTBT, UN dues and the foreign-operations budget had induced resistance from different areas for many different reasons. Thus, the main Administrative objective should remain articulating a coherent foreign policy, which should incorporate all internationalists. The Administration's policy of universally labelling Republicans as isolationists and fuelling partisanship in foreign policy complicated the situation.

Abortion Issue Affects UN PAyments

On 12 November, the White House and Republican Congress were to launch last-ditch talks to determine conditionalities on abortion issues which were obstructing US payment of its UN dues. Failure to pay $212 million of dues by the end of December would lose Washington its vote in the General Assembly. Arrears in the UN's peacekeeping account already meant that developing countries such as India, Pakistan, Jordan and Malaysia were currently funding their own troop contributions to peacekeeping missions. UN spokesperson Farhan Haq further questioned the ability of the organisation to pay for UN troops due to take over peacekeeping duties from the Australian-led force in East Timor in 2000.

American withholding of UN funding stemmed from efforts to streamline the organisation. The UN had axed over 1,000 staff from its New York headquarters and set up an audit unit. The senate then agreed to release $926 million over three years, on condition of a reduction in the 25% US share in UN funding. However, the proposal remained blocked by a Republican group in the House of Representatives led by Christopher Smith, who incorporated an amendment stipulation that payment must be conditional upon a law proscribing US funding of family planning organisations that promoted abortion rights abroad. President Bill Clinton promised to veto such an amendment. In 1993, Clinton had overturned a 1984 executive order introduced by Ronald Reagan prohibiting funding of any international organisation promoting abortion rights.

The stalemate over payments to the UN represented one of the last obstacles to White House/Congressional agreement on the 2000 budget and so pressure to secure settlement was mounting. The Republican party itself was divided over the issue, as moderate Republicans were lobbying rightwingers to soften their positions.

Other countries in arrears to the UN were, in $ millions and in descending order:

US 1,523; Ukraine 212; Russia 115; Japan 114; Brazil 63; Belarus 53; Italy 27; France 22; Germany 19; 10 Argentina 18; Total arrears: 2,360 (of which peacekeeping budget: 1,760; regular UN operating budget: 566; Rwanda and Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunals: 34)

The main contributors to the UN, up to 31 October 1999, were, in $ millions and in descending order:

US 599; Japan 396; Germany 195; France 142; UK 111; Italy 107; Canada 55; Spain 52; Netherlands 32; Russia 32. (Source: UN)

ABM System Threatens Global Stability

An American proposal for a theatre missile defence system, to be located in Alaska, was in breach of the 1972 US-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The ABM treaty restricted both countries to one ABM site apiece to ensure their vulnerability to attack. Russia was deploying some 100 anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow, while US missiles were presently concentrated in North Dakota.

Russian government ministers complained that tampering with the ABM treaty risked destabilising the global strategic balance, while their European counterparts protested that the exclusive protection such a defence system would provide the US would allow Washington to downgrade the NATO alliance. The UK government was less vocal than other European governments, claiming quiet lobbying to be the most viable way to influence the US, particularly as Britain was Washington's closest ally and it was believed that the early warning tracking station at Fylingdales in north Yorkshire was intended to play a key role in the proposed defence system.

Washington asserted that the system would be restricted to protecting America and US troops deployed abroad against long-range missiles from so-called rogue states. However, European countries were worried that, in response, Russia would expand its missile systems; recently, senior Russian military officials cautioned that Russia might adapt Topol missiles with a capability to penetrate anti-ballistic defences. European states were also nervous that the defence system was designed to counter perceived threats from Asian states including China. Beijing at present had far fewer long-range missiles than Russia and so the system could spark an arms race in the Far East, involving Taiwan and Japan.

Chinese concerns had induced Beijing to pressurise North Korea to abandon anticipated long-range missile tests over the summer, prompting some analysts to suggest that the defence system had already had a deterrent effect. There was also speculation that European opposition to the system in fact arose from the prospect of increased European defence spending, resulting from American disengagement from Europe.

However, other observers suggested that American superiority had diminished its interest in the ABM treaty and that the land-based anti-missile system might represent a prelude to other space-based laser systems. There were fears that the ABM system revealed increasing US rejection of collective approaches to international security in favour of a unilateralist approaches.

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