This Issue

Bosnia

Background

• 1980 Nationalist tendencies in Yugoslavia that had been promoted by the death of Marshall Tito, were accelerated during the 1980s by economic decline and the end of the Cold War;
• 1990 Bosnian Serbs rejected the results of elections in Bosnia;
• 1992 Bosnian independence was recognised by the international community, spurring inter-communal violence; the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia (UNPROFOR) was extended to Bosnia;
• 1993 UN safe havens established against Serb aggression were largely under-resourced and ineffective;
• 1995 Croatia's recapture of the Krajina region from the Serbs and NATO air strikes against them, led to the Dayton agreement, ending the war. Bosnia was divided between a Muslim-Croat Federation and a Serb Republic, governed by a tripartite Presidency. A NATO-led force (IFOR) was deployed to police the agreement in conjunction with an international civilian component; military stability has contrasted with nationalist political tendencies.

SG's UNMIBH Report (1) (S/1999/989)

The 17 September report summarised the activities of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) since 11 June 1999.

Contribution to Peace Implementation

UN activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) were directed towards:

Establishing the rule of law through police restructuring and judicial monitoring;

Building good governance and civil society;

Promoting economic and social recovery;

Addressing humanitarian needs;

And creating an environment conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Establishing the Rule of Law

Police Restructuring

Police restructuring involved reducing the number of excess police and ensuring both ethnic representation and that the police worked within effective and legitimate organisational structures.

Recruitment of minority officers for both the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation remained well short of agreed levels and integration of police forces was also behind schedule. During the reported period, some 134 members of the former Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade had been illegally incorporated into RS civilian police forces and ineligible officers were subsequently to be demobilised.

Procedures were underway for the establishment of a multi-ethnic State Border Service to facilitate the development of state identity and to prevent illegal flows of goods and services that supported organised crime. There were also initiatives to set up a Federation-wide court police. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was monitoring, advising and training local police and was also conducting weapons inspections in local police stations. The UNMIBH human rights office was increasingly adopting an issue-specific approach to improving police practices in response to allegations of human rights violations by police.

Security

Returnee security was enhanced through IPTF patrols and local police monitoring in return areas, as well as through anticipatory security assessments prior to organised returns.

Humanitarian Aid

WFP distributed some 980 metric tons of aid to 38,700 refugees from the FRY. March 1998 saw WFP align beneficiary criteria with government social welfare programmes to facilitate the transfer of responsibility to national authorities. UNICEF provided over 3,000 child refugees from FRY with medicine, hygiene items, clothes and educational supplies and also organised educational and psychosocial support for children and pregnant women.

Building Good Governance and Civil Society

UNDP installed municipal governance computer software packages and trained local administration officials accordingly in six municipalities in north-western Bosnia. The UNDP Civil Society Development Programme facilitated the organisation of events on cultural renewal, media, protection of the environment, sports and education.

Observations

The 18 August issuance of the annex to the final arbitration award on Brcko ensured that IPTF would retain authority over the district's new law enforcement system and also meant that UNMIBH would assist the establishment of the joint police force and a unified judicial and penal system. Kofi Annan criticised the continued lack of political will to improve the functioning of the police and judiciary in the leadership of each community. These difficulties were compounded by a general lack of employment and economic development opportunities, particularly in areas of potential minority returns.

UN Report on Srebrenica Massacre

On 15 November, Kofi Annan published a report on the Serb massacre of some 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in July 1995, which the UN had declared a safe area during the Bosnian war. Annan conceded that the UN had made dreadful mistakes, including negotiating with Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic, which at times amounted to appeasement.

Annan asserted that ethnic cleansing must be countered decisively with all necessary means and the necessary political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion. The Secretary-General agreed that it had been wrong of the international community to attempt to negotiate with unscrupulous leaders in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

The report concluded that a failure to warn aggressors early and clearly of the consequences of their actions would almost inevitably either enable them to get away with their actions or would lead to armed conflict.

SG's UNMIBH Report (2) (S/1999/1260)

Police Restructuring and Reform

The 17 December 1999 report revealed that UNMIBH had begun the establishment of the Law Enforcement Personnel Registry in November which was intended, after two years, to result in the first ever register of all the approximately 20,000 authorised police officers in Bosnia.

Refugee Returns

Up to the end of October 1999, UNHCR registered the return of some 43,830 refugees and 32,695 internally displaced persons, of whom 18,604 and 9,522 were from ethnic minorities returning to the Federation and RS respectively. However, political and administrative obstruction at the local level and non-implementation of property laws presented major obstacles to the return programme in both entities.

Enhancing UNMIBH Effectiveness

The High Representative removed some 22 obstructionist local officials from office and imposed wide-ranging property law reforms to facilitate an increase in returns in 2000. The OSCE banned the obstructionist Serb Radical Party from the forthcoming municipal elections. SFOR exposed illicit interference and illegal parallel police structures in Mostar.

While there was considerable progress in police restructuring and reform, comprehensive measures were required to expose and eliminate political interference, corruption and organised crime from local police forces and the judiciary. Thus, UNMIBH implemented the co-location of IPTF with key local police managers, extensive auditing and micro-auditing of police administrations, non-compliance and de-certification policies, and the co-location of UNMIBH's judicial experts, where appropriate. However, such intrusive moves increased security risks for UN personnel.

Observations

The international community was reviewing achievements and future requirements in Bosnia following four years of engagement there. There were deficiencies in political integration, social reconciliation and economic development. On 15 November 1999 in New York, the three members of the Joint Presidency renewed commitments to achieve such goals, although subsequent statements detracted from these commitments. The gradual decline in the national crime rate and the increasingly professional work of the police and judiciary was encouraging.

IPTF Contributions, as at 10 December 1999

Argentina 34; Austria 36; Bangladesh 29; Bulgaria 34; Canada 23; Chile 11; Denmark 29; Egypt 33; Estonia 5; Fiji 15; Finland 6; France 104; Germany 167; Ghana 100; Greece 15; Hungary 38; Iceland 4; India 126; Indonesia 30; Ireland 5; Italy 23; Jordan 117; Kenya 7; Lithuania 2; Malaysia 47; Nepal 18; Netherlands 56; Nigeria 14; Norway 21; Pakistan 97; Poland 47; Portugal 16; Romania 17; Russia 21; Senegal 16; Spain 53; Sweden 55; Switzerland 6; Thailand 6; Tunisia 2; Turkey 31; Ukraine 28; UK 80; US 141; Total 1,795.

Croatia

President Tudjman Dies

According to a 17 December Financial Times report, Franjo Tudjman's extreme nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had dominated Croatian politics since, in 1990, winning the first free elections in the country since the Second World War. During his rule, power had been largely restricted to his close circle of friends. Thus, Tudjman's death was likely cause profound changes in the Croatian political system. A new government and president were to be elected over the following few weeks.

Tudjman and the HDZ had taken Croatia to independence in 1991; but, Tudjman's autocratic style of leadership left Croatia politically isolated. Tudjman intended to integrate with the west and, ultimately, join both NATO and the European Union (EU). However, international criticism of Tudjman's human rights record prevented this.

The HDZ exploited nationalist support fashioned during the Yugoslav wars to win national, local and presidential elections since 1990. While HDZ structures remained in tact, Tudjman's death transformed Croatian political prospects. Analysts suggested that reconstructing Croatia's foreign policy might involve dealing with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia over past experiences such as the operations to recapture Croatia's western Slavonia and Krajina regions, over which Zagreb denied the tribunal's authority.

Cyprus

Background

• 1960 Controversy over Cyprus' future status, as Britain sought to end its occupation, had led to violence between Greek and Turkish communities both on the island and in Greece and Turkey themselves; Cyprus achieved independence and the administration was split between Greek and Turkish communities;
• 1964 Further violence brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war over successive Turkish threats to invade; the UN ultimately deployed a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to patrol an agreed cease-fire line dividing the island;
• 1974 The Cypriot National Guard, with the support of the military regime in Athens, attempted a failed coup in Nicosia; in response, Turkey forcibly intervened and occupied the north of the island; over the next few years the effective ethnic and political division of the island was consolidated; and the island has remained divided;
• 1999 Continuing disagreement over the Greek community's plans to deploy Russian anti-aircraft missiles on Cyprus increased tension.

SG's UNFICYP Report (S/1999/1203)

The 29 November 1999 report covered developments on Cyprus from 10 June to 29 November. The situation along the cease-fire lines was largely stable, although there were numerous minor but provocative incidents. In response to an invitation by Kofi Annan, on 14 November Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash agreed to open proximity talks in New York on 3 December 1999 to prepare ground for substantive negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement.

As at 15 November 1999, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNFICYP from 16 June 1993 to 31 December 1999 amounted to $19.1 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1.7 billion.

Cyprus Proximity Talks Begin

On 3 December, Clerides and Denktash opened proximity talks in New York, with Kofi Annan and other UN officials shuttling messages between them. Denktash, having been persuaded to attend the negotiations by Turkish  Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, refused even to speak to UK and US diplomats directly.

It was anticipated that the US would suggest that Greek Cypriots somehow recognise the self-proclaimed northern Turkish Cypriot republic in return for which Turkish Cypriots could return the abandoned resort of Varosha, opening up scope for negotiations over the island's future status.

However, the forthcoming European Union (EU) summit in Helsinki on 10 December was pivotal to the Cyprus situation. Denktash asserted that Greek Cypriot efforts to negotiate EU membership for both parts of the island needed to be postponed for the proximity talks to continue. However, prospects for agreement over Cyprus would be enhanced if Athens gave up opposition to Turkish membership of the EU.

Greek-Turkish relations had improved considerably recently and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou visited EU capitals in search of a settlement. Athens suggested it would welcome Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in return for membership for Cyprus, which would facilitate negotiations between Clerides and Denktash. [See Turkey Becomes Candidate for EU Membership in Europe General Section]

EU Influences Cyprus Issue

A 15 December Financial Times report stated that, at the European Union (EU) summit in Helsinki on 11/12 December, Greece ensured that Turkey was given an explicit clear road map for its accession process to the EU. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou asserted that only such a clearly defined process would provide the necessary incentive for Ankara to improve its human rights record and strengthen its civil institutions.

There were also hopes that this would greatly improve prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus issue. At the summit, Greece further succeeded in resolving that a Cypriot settlement would not constitute a precondition for EU membership, ensuring that Denktash would not be provided an effective veto on the membership of Greek Cyprus. Also, EU leaders agreed that candidates should bring "outstanding border disputes", implicitly referring to the Greek/Turkish dispute over Aegean islands, in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by 2004.

Kosovo

Background

• 1913 Kosovo was integrated into Serbia following the Balkan Wars;
• 1974 Marshal Tito's constitutional reform provided considerable autonomy for Kosovo;
• 1987 Slobodan Milosevic assumed power in Yugoslavia on a nationalist platform;
• 1989 Kosovo was stripped of its autonomy; 1991 Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of  Kosovo proclaimed independence, but their tactics remained non-violent;
• 1995 Kosovo was omitted from the Dayton agenda while the EU recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo as part of  Serbia;
• 1998 Skirmishes in Drenica led to Serb security forces displacing 250,000 Kosovar Albanians; the UN then imposed an arms embargo against Belgrade; anti-Serb demonstrations began in Pristina;
• September, Milosevic agreed to cede some autonomy to Kosovo; UNSC Resolution 1199 demanded a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Serb troops and the opening of direct negotiations;
• October, under threat of NATO air-strikes, Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal of Serb troops, a cessation of violence and the deployment of a 2,000-strong Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) under the OSCE; then, in December, renewed armed conflict broke out between the KLA and Serbian forces;
• 1999 A second round of talks at Rambouillet saw the KLA accept a settlement involving the withdrawal of Serb forces, broad based autonomy for Kosovo leading to a referendum on independence and the deployment of a 30,000-strong NATO force; however, Milosevic refused;
• March, NATO began an air campaign against Serb forces;
• 10 June UNSC resolution 1244 confirmed the end of the war and established a NATO-led military operation (KFOR) and a UN-led civilian mission (UNMIK) in the Province.

Slow Progress Towards Kosovo Statehood

A 27 November Economist report stated that the June Security Council resolution ending Serb rule in Kosovo contained inherent contradictions which would eventually need to be addressed. The resolution recognised the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over Kosovo but also empowered the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to set up institutions pending a final settlement of substantial autonomy and self-government. However, there was confusion over the exact status of any final settlement, while Kosovar Albanians generally remained intent on full independence.

Meanwhile, UNMIK was gradually facilitating the development of the attributes of statehood for Kosovo, including the introduction of: UN Kosovo identity cards; UN customs officers controlling borders with Macedonia and Albania; new vehicle license-plates; and the effective removal of the Yugoslav dinar. Local-government elections were to be held by September 2000, after which the UN would consider the establishment of a Kosovo assembly and government.

A problem could subsequently arise if an elected assembly was not allowed to proclaim independence. Officials in the region were hopeful that the eventual removal of FRY President Slobodan Milosevic from power would facilitate negotiations between FRY and Kosovar authorities. However, there appeared no grounds to assume that a post-Milosevic government would be softer on the independence issue.

The prospect of secession by Montenegro could introduce legal questions over the status of the FRY itself, and hence the status of Kosovo within it, or could induce more violence if opposed by Milosevic.

SG's UNMIK Report (S/1999/1250)

The 23 December 1999 report covered developments in Kosovo since 16 September.

Political Situation

Kosovo Serb representatives withdrew from the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) on 22 September in response to the establishment of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) [see below] and the deteriorating security situation. On 15 December, the leaders of the Kosovo Democratic Progress Party (PPDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the United Democratic Movement (LDB) agreed to participate in the establishment of a Kosovo-UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure which would involve all Kosovo communities in the provisional administration.

Demilitarisation and Transformation of the KLA

Demilitarisation of the KLA was completed on 20 September and led to the establishment of the KPC, intended as a multi-ethnic civilian emergency corps. KPC was to operate under the authority of the Special Representative and KFOR would provide day-to-day operational direction. KPC was to comprise up to 3,000 active and 2,000 reserve members. It would not have any role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order and would be used exclusively for civil emergencies, search and rescue, demining projects and rebuilding infrastructure and housing. At least 10% of KPC would comprise people from minority groups.

Several security incidents occurred which reportedly involved former KLA members and potential KPC members and UNMIK police arrested several potential KPC members for illegal activities.

Security Situation

A number of serious security incidents increased tension in Kosovo. In particular, targets included Kosovo Serbs, members of other ethnic minorities and Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Yugoslav authorities, and members of the international community. Incidents included killings, abductions, illegal arrests, arbitrary detentions, beatings, threats, harassment and abductions of women. There was also evidence of increased organised criminal activity.

Humanitarian Affairs

At least 810,000 refugees had returned to their homes in Kosovo; it was estimated that over 25,500 refugees remained in neighbouring countries while there were an estimated 243,000 internally displaced persons from Kosovo in both Serbia and Montenegro. Although there was an increase in the number of returns of Kosovo Serbs from Serbia proper and Montenegro, UNHCR was not encouraging this for security reasons.

Civil Administration

UNMIK was not yet fully staffed, but was nearing critical mass required to accomplish vital tasks. However, the limited UNMIK presence during the Mission's early stages allowed parallel local structures, primarily affiliated to the KLA, to take root in some areas. Such structures were competing with UNMIK for interim administration authority through such illegal activities as tax collection and certification.

Sectoral Developments

Basic health care services in Kosovo had resumed. The great majority of primary and secondary schools opened in October, with over 300,000 children attending, and one third of the 700 schools targeted for reconstruction were completed before the first day of the school year. However, most schools were in Albanian-majority areas and so many Serb and Roma children had not been registered.

The transport sector remained in poor repair. Following the crash of a WFP plane on 12 November, in which 24 people were killed, all civilian flights were suspended until civilian safety standards were met. A Fuel Supervisory Board was established to: secure reliable provision of fuel to Kosovo; bring the black market in fuel products under control; control the market; and provide legitimate administration of the two publicly owned fuel companies.

Judicial Affairs

Towards establishing an effective, impartial and independent judiciary, UNIMK's Institution-Building and Civil Administration components worked on the Emergency Judicial System. However, security concerns for judges from ethnic minorities hampered the preservation of a multi-ethnic judiciary.

Associations of Serbian criminal law as an instrument of oppression led to the adoption on 12 December that the applicable law in Kosovo would be the regulations promulgated by the Special Representative and the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989. Federal law would continue to apply in situations not governed by those laws, including the law of criminal procedure.

UNMIK Police

Only 1,817 UNMIK police had arrived in the mission area by 13 December. Logistic constraints had prevented any of the 10 formed Special Police units from being deployed. However, UNMIK police had assumed full law-enforcement authority in the Pristina and Prizren regions and full investigative responsibility in Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Urosevac. UNMIK police also managed the detention centre in Mitrovica and operated 39 police stations, five border police stations, five regional headquarter facilities and the main police headquarters. At the time of writing, 70% of the population lived in areas under UNMIK law-enforcement responsibility.

UNMIK's policing resources were being stretched by a plethora of non-police tasks, including guarding official buildings and detention facilities and providing escorts to large money transfers. There was also a lack of equipment and logistic support. Annan therefore suggested increasing the number of Kosovo Police Service officers.

Institution-Building

OSCE was the lead organisation for institution-building through 14 field offices throughout Kosovo and five regional centres.

Democratisation

A Political Party Service Centre was opened in Pristina on 6 October, providing offices for 13 political parties and one coalition.

Human Rights

On 6 December, OSCE released two reports documenting human rights violations in Kosovo both before and after the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK.

Rule of Law

Within the Rule of Law Division, the Legal Community Support Section had identified relevant actors within the community, although an operational consolidated Kosovo Bar Association did not yet exist.

A review of certain criminal laws and codes was agreed by the Council of Europe (COE) which recommended that various provisions be suspended and others amended to comply with international human rights standards. Training symposia, including Kosovo Serb participants, were held for newly appointed local judges, prosecutors and defence counsel.

Elections

The Institution-Building and Civil Administration components were to form a Registration Task Force to plan, resource and execute a joint civil and voters registration for municipal elections.

Composition of the UNMIK police component, as at 13 December 1999

Argentina 38; Austria 45; Bangladesh 19; Belgium 5; Bulgaria 49; Canada 69; Czech Republic 6; Denmark 20; Egypt 61; Estonia 5; Fiji 33; Finland 2; France 78; Germany 192; Ghana 35; Hungary 10; Iceland 2; Italy 46; Jordan 49; Kenya 20; Kyrgyzstan 2; Lithuania 9; Malaysia 48; Netherlands 1; Nigeria 12; Pakistan 66; Philippines 23; Poland 9; Portugal 25; Romania 26; Russian Federation 88; Senegal 16; Spain 37; Sweden 44; Tunisia 5; Turkey 49; Ukraine 30; UK 60; US 446; Zambia 14; Zimbabwe 24; Total 1,817.

Military Lessons of Kosovo Ignored

It appeared that the large volume of analysis of military lessons learned from the allied bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 had prompted little actual response. There was broad consensus that, assuming that one agreed the war had been won, Kosovo represented the first victory: achieved exclusively through air power; where there were no allied casualties from action and very few other losses; and where only two piloted aircraft had been shot down.

However, the campaign had used much more firepower over a longer period of time than had been anticipated, denting both NATO and America's belief in their own military omnipotence. For instance, the Pentagon's claim that it could conduct two major local campaigns simultaneously was undermined by the effort it took to muster sufficient firepower in Kosovo. The Pentagon struggled to find sufficient jammer planes, which can counter enemy air defences, to allow NATO bombers to operate.

There was also general agreement that NATO success relied largely on two types of weapon. Firstly, two kinds of satellite-guided bomb proved effective: the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which cost around $20,000 and could improve the accuracy of a "dumb bombs"; and the Tomahawk, each use of which cost $1 million, and which could be launched accurately from 1,000 nautical miles at sea. Secondly, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which in Kosovo was used exclusively for reconnaissance but could have a more coercive function in the future.

Meanwhile, an 18 December Economist report suggested that tactical air power, referring to short-range fighter planes, came out badly from the campaign, although the value of large US-based bombers proved the effectiveness of longer-range air power. However, there still remained firm support for tactical air power. The Pentagon was preparing to spend over $300 billion on three new types of tactical aircraft: the F-22, the FA-18 E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Because all these aircraft-building programmes were supported by powerful military lobbies and legislators whose districts included the factories which would construct the planes, it appeared that defence planners were ignoring the main lesson from the Kosovo campaign, which would require rethinking the whole logic of personnel-intensive weapons systems.

Tactical air warfare was expensive. Each average $50 million tactical bomber used in Kosovo was accompanied by: electronic-warfare aircraft; refuelling planes; interceptors for protection from enemy fighters; and rescue teams on stand-by to recover downed pilots. Sea-based tactical aircraft required billion-dollar aircraft carriers, while maintaining overseas forces was sufficiently expensive and politically sensitive to convince the US air force to dispatch B-2 bombers direct from America. Analysts suggested that the obsession with avoiding casualties warranted investment in the development of pilotless aircraft.

Similarly, analysts suggested that, as the primary naval objective was to bomb land targets, small "arsenal ships" carrying a wide range of missiles but requiring only a 50- rather than 5,000-strong crew and which cost around $500 million presented a more efficient means than the $5 billion aircraft carriers and their fleets of support ships. However, new naval planning had so far been restricted to constructing thirty small destroyers, requiring fewer personnel than the existing type.

A military analyst suggested that some senior and junior officers supported such modernisation and that resistance stemmed primarily from middle-ranking officers who were used to the types of weapon currently in service.

Montenegro

Moves For Independence in Montenegro

Negotiations in November between representatives of Serbia's and Montenegro's ruling parties concerning Montenegro's proposal to loosen the Yugoslav federation prompted moves by Montenegro to distance itself from Belgrade, making a referendum on independence more likely. Government official Novak Kilibarda suggested that the process would only be halted in the event of Serbia becoming more democratic.

Montenegro had adopted the D-mark as its currency, pushing it towards economic independence, and there were hints that it would soon launch its own currency, pegged to the D-mark. In response, the Yugoslav national bank in Belgrade blocked all payments between the two republics, stopping the payment of pensions, military employees and civil servants in Montenegro. Food deliveries from Serbia were interrupted and there were also complaints that the Montenegrin army had been left destitute. However, recent opinion polls suggested that, while most Montenegrins were eager to relax links with Belgrade, a third of the population were still loyal to the principle of a federal Yugoslavia.

Northern Ireland

Background

• 1921 Ireland was partitioned;
• 1939 The IRA bombing campaign began in England;
• 1969 British troops were dispatched to NI following riots in Belfast and Londonderry;
• 1972 Some 497 deaths occurred, including 13 killed by British soldiers on Bloody Sunday;
• 1973 The Sunningdale agreement strove to introduce new power-sharing structure;
• 1974 Unions blocked Sunningdale and direct rule from the UK was resumed;
• 1984 The conservative party conference in Brighton was bombed;
• 1985 The Anglo-Irish agreement provided Dublin with consultative rights in NI affairs;
• 1994 The IRA and loyalist paramilitaries announced a cease-fire;
• 1996 The IRA cease-fire was suspended with bombs in Canary Wharf and Manchester;
• 1997 The Labour victory in UK elections was followed by a renewal of the IRA cease-fire and Sinn Fein re-entering negotiations;
• 1998 The Good Friday Agreement foresaw devolution of power from London to a new assembly and NI executive;
• August a bomb laid by "the Real IRA" killed 28 people in Omagh;
• 1999 The UUP accepted the IRA's agreement to appoint an interlocutor to the independent decommissioning body, allowing the advancement of the Good Friday Agreement.

Talks Resume in Northern Ireland

The week beginning 25 October saw politicians in Northern Ireland resume negotiations, brokered by ex-US Senator George Mitchell. The issues of paramilitary disarmament and a power-sharing arrangements were still the main sticking points.

Some recent events suggested a softening of positions on both sides. Arrests and arms finds within the "Real IRA", responsible for the Omagh bombing in August 1998, suggested leaked information, perhaps with the influence of other republicans' aversion to the splinter group. Also, while some unionists had reacted angrily to Chris Patten's reform proposals for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) [see Issue 5], serving RUC officers responded more moderately while attempts by some unionist politicians to initiate mass protest dwindled. Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein representatives were also finally communicating directly. Mitchell had facilitated negotiations by moving the talks out of Belfast and into London and imposing a news blackout.

De-Commissioning Central to Peace

The departure of Mitchell in early August saw the unionist leadership retreating from demands that disarmament must start begin before the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement could begin. Sinn Fein committed itself to pursuing exclusively peaceful means and acknowledged that decommissioning was essential to the peace process. The IRA pledged to liaise with the independent commission on decommissioning, Chaired by Canadian General John de Chastelain.

However, there were indications that there would not be broad acceptance of the unionist stance within the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Opponents pointed out that the IRA had not yet conceded a single weapon nor had offered a solid disarmament timetable. They questioned whether unionists should be expected to share a cabinet table with republicans who still retained a private army.

A 20 November Economist report questioned whether: decommissioning should be pivotal to the peace process; opponents' fears of the deal were likely to be realised; and what was the balance of risk between accepting and rejecting the suggested settlement?

While certain republican elements remained staunchly opposed to conceding weapons, Sinn Fein rhetoric appeared to have shifted and it would be increasingly difficult for republicans to sidestep the question of disarmament as the peace process continued.

The question remained over what would happen if the power-sharing structure began and republicans still continued to retain their weapons. In this event, analysts suggested that their position would be severely weakened and they would find it more difficult to get their way on other issues.

According to the Good Friday Agreement, Sinn Fein taking its place in the Northern Ireland executive was not conditional upon the IRA beginning decommissioning, only that the decommissioning process be completed by May 2000. Thus, UUP leader David Trimble could counter his apparent backdown on the issue by stating that the republicans were sticking to the letter of the original agreement.

North South Council Meeets

A 14 December Financial Times report stated that on 13 December the North South Council, established under the Good Friday agreement, met for the first time, bringing together the Irish cabinet as well as eight of the ten ministers sitting on the newly formed Northern Ireland executive. The event was boycotted by the two Democratic Unionist ministers.

The North South Council was to meet only twice annually in full summit format, but most of its work would occur in sectoral format on a regular and more frequent basis. Even though such a free-standing body dealt only with uncontroversial matters, it would, nevertheless, have been strongly opposed by unionists until fairly recently.

Spain

ETA Ends Cease-fire

On 3 December, the Basque separatist group Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) announced the cessation of its 14-month cease-fire. ETA accused the more moderate Basque National Party of breaking a 1998 agreement to sever relations with the Spanish government in favour of co-operating with ETA towards Basque independence. It also accused Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of collaborating with French authorities in continuing to arrest its fighters during the cease-fire, as well as capitalising on abortive negotiations with ETA in Zurich in May and failing to talk seriously about enduring peace.

In the meantime, Aznar appealed to opposition officials, the Basque regional president, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, other regional leaders and influential figures to urge ETA to reconsider. Some Basque bishops were hopeful of convincing the separatists of this. More moderate members of ETA's political wing, Herri Batasuna, would not condemn ETA's decision but asserted they still wanted peace.

An 8 December Economist report suggested there was little room for negotiation short of offering ETA full independence, as there was scant space for further concessions after the Basque region was granted considerable autonomy following the death of General Franco in 1975, which was expanded in the 1990s when regional parties began to enjoy the balance of parliamentary power. However, the majority of the Basque population wished to remain allied to Spain.

Aznar offered to transfer Basque prisoners closer to home and to release some long-term prisoners. However, in October he rejected ETA's demands that he negotiate with convicted killers and subsequently turned down its calls for the right to self-determination to be included in the constitution.

Europe General

European Defence Capability

Cold War politics had ensured Europe's strategic importance to the US as a buffer to the Soviet Union up to the end of the late 1980s, formally manifested in the NATO alliance. Although the end of the Cold War altered that relationship, security arrangements between America and Europe did not change much in form. However, analysts predicted that the recent NATO campaign in Kosovo might have been the catalyst necessary to bring about such a change.

A 30 October Economist article suggested that, from a European perspective, the imposition of American power in Europe was both frightening and chastening, as they had had little influence over both superior American hardware and command during the Kosovo operation. Consequently, European Union (EU) governments' interest in developing a common European security and defence identity was invigorated. This would incorporate organising and equipping national military capabilities to enhance compatibility for joint operations and providing Europe access to NATO resources for operations not involving the US. Furthermore, it might involve co-ordinating defence spending for reasons of economies of scale and to enable the procurement of expensive items.

Both British and American positions had altered recently to enhance prospects for such an eventuality, as Prime Minister Tony Blair announced his support, dropping previous resistance caused by fear of damaging NATO.

US insistence on maintaining clear American command had, in the past, upheld American involvement in European security issues. However, Europe's subsequent strategic decline for America undermined such an outlook, while Washington was also keen to develop Europe as a sufficiently capable partner less reliant on US resources. At the same time, analysts suggested that the shift in US perspective also emanated from a realisation that European ambitions of self-reliance, which could present a threat to NATO, were unlikely to be realised for a considerable time.

However, there was speculation that such an attitude might not be so realistic. The US had been defining a common European defence identity primarily within the context of NATO, thereby limiting scope for structural innovation. However, European states were thinking mainly within an EU context, whose previous experience of institution-building could facilitate co-operation.

EU countries had suggested incorporating the Western European Union (WEU) into EU treaty structures while European governments were sympathetic to the idea of "convergence criteria" for defence spending.

However, Europe contained serious internal divisions on foreign policy, such as British and French discord towards Iraq. But, economic arguments for a common European defence policy remained compelling: European defence spending was 60% of America's, but duplication and over-emphasis on outsized standing armies greatly reduced the return.

European Rapid Reaction Force

During the week beginning 15 November, the first ever European Union (EU) full meeting of defence and foreign ministers raised the idea of developing an EU rapid-reaction force. Britain suggested that such a force would need to be 40,000-strong. The force would only be deployed in response to crises and so would not represent a standing European army. Germany suggested 2003 as the deadline for establishing the EU defence identity.

The force would have a less permanent structure than the primarily Franco-German Euro-corps but was intended not to be reliant upon American airlift capabilities. However, such mobility might come at the cost of not being able to offer expeditionary corps with tanks.

A 20 November Economist report stated that French politicians and businesspeople had been talking about establishing the force as a common front against the anglophone world, warranting scepticism from Britain.

Negotiations were now required over criteria for battle-readiness for such a force, which could encourage more coherent European defence spending. The EU's new foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana, had already been placed in charge of the Western European Union (WEU).

However, a 9 November US Senate resolution pointed out that, while NATO states had already pledged to improve defence capabilities at the NATO summit in April, since then several Allies had actually planned to reduce defence spending. There were further American concerns that the EU's military emergence could isolate Turkey and other NATO allies awaiting EU membership.

Turkey Candidate for EU Membership

The appointment of former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as European Union (EU) High Commissioner for Foreign and Security policy had initially prompted questions over what he would actually do, as there was general consensus that a genuinely unified European foreign and security policy was at least twenty years off. However, the 10-11 December meeting of EU leaders in Helsinki saw a crucial role performed by Solana in facilitating the inclusion of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Conditionalities to make Turkish candidacy acceptable to Greece had threatened to jeopardise Turkish acceptance of the terms. [see Cyprus section]

Acceptance of Turkey brought the number of candidates up to thirteen: full accession negotiations were begun in 1998 by Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia; full negotiations could begin from February 2000 for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia; and full negotiations for Turkey were probably some way off, although no country was likely to fully join before 2004.

Conditionalities included improvements in Turkey's political and human-rights records, resolution of territorial disputes with Greece and to moves to end the division of Cyprus.

Strategic considerations made Turkish membership more desirable to the EU, including: a Greek-Turkish rapprochement after the 1999 earthquakes in both countries; Ankara's role as a diplomatic and commercial link with energy-rich Central Asian states and as a cultural link with Islam; Turkish proximity to the Balkans; Turkish membership of NATO; and Turkish links with the US. Thus, Ankara's involvement was central to the development of any European defence identity. To this end, EU leaders in Helsinki agreed to hold interim political and military committees in March 2000.

Also, the merit of Turkish membership waxed as others waned: in Helsinki, Ukraine's membership was effectively at best postponed, while strong opposition to Russian behaviour in Chechnya left Moscow as more of a threat than an opportunity.

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