This Issue
Chechnya
Russians Rely on Force in Chechnya
The Russian government declared that terrorists from the Muslim south of the country were responsible for a series of bomb blasts in Moscow and other cities which had claimed more than 300 casualties. In response to this and the recent armed incursions into Dagestan, Moscow launched a broadening of land and air attacks against Chechnya, where it believed the instability originated. Russian officials attempted to garner broad support for their actions as part of an international fight against terrorism, citing the involvement of Osama bid Laden whom Washington had accused of masterminding terrorist attacks against America.
Although the Russian offensive was waged against Chechnya as a whole, President Boris Yeltsin and other officials were careful not to classify their enemy in broad Muslim terms and Russian diplomats emphasised support from many Muslim countries, in particular Iran.
A 2 October Economist report suggested that the lessons of the 1994-6 war with Chechnya, in which an estimated 80,000 people died, should have taught Russia that continued reliance on force would not bring peace to the region and was, in fact, more likely to foment the spread of militant Islam. The article acknowledged that Moscow needed to act against both the recent terrorist attacks and the radical Muslim groups believed to be responsible, whose aim was to establish an Islamic regime in the area. Russia also had a genuine interest in preserving the remnants of its former empire.
However, the previous campaign against Chechnya had not only caused many deaths, both amongst the Chechen people and Russian troops, and had devastated the country, it had also left Chechnya effectively independent.
Factors Combine to Create Instability
A 9 October Economist report traced the recent manifestation of armed conflict in Chechnya to two contributory factors. First, a long-standing feud between Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev, an extremist with a history of violent activity. Second, the emergence of a more zealous form of Islam in the Caucasus region resulting from widespread poverty and lawlessness, largely imported from Saudi Arabia. Basaev's previous incursion into Dagestan had involved pronouncements of the establishment of an Islamic state from Chechnya to the Caspian Sea.
Terrorist activity inside Russia had fuelled anti-Caucasian prejudices amongst significant sectors of the Russian public. Meanwhile, historic mistreatment of Muslims in the Caucasus region had also encouraged anti-Russian sentiments. In the 1990s, Wahhabism entered Dagestan from Saudi Arabia, proclaiming a more extreme version of Islam. The movement eventually became militarised, although it did not enjoy universal support in the region. A clampdown on Wahhabis in the late 1990s forced some to flee to Chechnya, which became their military base under the broader Islamic radicalism of Basaev.
Wider Effects of Chechen Conflict
Russian insistence that the war with Chechnya was an internal matter could be counteracted by highlighting the regional effects of its actions, such as the estimated 200,000 Chechens displaced as a result of the fighting, many of whom had fled to Ingushetia and others into Georgia. Russian behaviour had also compounded the humanitarian situation, as it was blocking refugees from leaving Chechnya and was hampering relief efforts.
A significant factor in Moscow's desire to maintain control over Chechnya was believed to be the establishment of a pipeline to convey oil recently discovered in the region. However, there was speculation that the Russians might be ready to accept the pipeline running through Turkey to the Mediterranean, rather than across Russian territory to the Black Sea.
Popular Support for ChecheN Offensive
Analysts stated that, unlike during the 1994-6 war with Chechnya, the Russian media were now largely supportive of the Russian offensive: there were few reports of either Russian casualties or displaced people, while Chechen fighters were labelled gangsters, terrorists or religious extremists. Militarily, Russia had also apparently learned lessons against Chechen guerrilla tactics by advancing slowly, rather than driving tanks into Grozny to be blown up by opposition fighters.
While initial military gains had advanced the hawkish cause of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, by early November problems were mounting. For instance, it was becoming harder to define precise military objectives, which appeared to have evolved from isolating Chechnya to all-out victory. Furthermore, Russia's military forces contained undisciplined soldiers and corrupt officers. There were also signs of opposition to the war in the press and parliament.
Russian Political Divisions Over Chechnya
In early November, there were signs of political divisions in Russia, including threats by the military commander in Chechnya, General Vladimir Shamanov, that he and his senior colleagues would resign if they were ordered to stop the Chechen offensive. There were also suggestions that the conflict could regionalise, as Azerbaijan and Georgia were warned not offer asylum to a Chechen government-in-exile or to retreating Chechen fighters. During the week beginning 8 November, Moscow insisted Georgia close its northern border to most foreigners. Russia also warned against wider international involvement by reminding critics of its nuclear capability as it tested an anti-ballistic missile and announced it was considering fitting multiple warheads to its most modern missile, the Topol-M, in breach existing arms-control agreements.
During the week beginning 27 November, Russian forces accelerated their campaign against the town of Urus-Martan, which Russian authorities claimed housed 3,500 opposition fighters. On 23 November, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev ruled out a full-scale assault on Grozny. A Russian recent opinion poll suggested 50% of respondents were in favour and 30% against the initiative.
Russian Successes Exaggerated
On 8 December, Russia announced it had captured Urus-Martan, south-west of Grozny, leaving only Shali, Vedeno and some settlements in the south under opposition control. Russian tactics were demonstrated in its capture of Argun in early December when the town was intensely bombarded using heavy weapons and, following the Chechen withdrawal, the Russians took over.
By mid-December, Grozny was besieged and the Russians dropped leaflets warning the remaining people to evacuate the city by 11 December or face universal bombardment. However, under international (primarily Western) pressure, Moscow's demands were softened. There were unconfirmed Chechen reports of Russia using chemical weapons against Grozny, while Russian military sources alleged the Chechens were using civilians in the town as human shields.
International pressure, in the form of withholding $640 million of a $4.5 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, had little effect on Moscow, not least because of high oil prices boosting the Russian economy.
In mid-December, it was impossible to estimate the level of Russian casualties, although many unofficial sources contradicted government estimates as being too low. Weak Russian commitments to restraint and negotiation at the November Organisation for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) summit proved insincere and strong words from the US and Western Europe had generally not translated into actions.
Contrary to Moscow's claims of broad military ascendancy, there was evidence of continued Chechen activity in areas apparently under Russian control while there was little evidence of substantial Chechen military losses and disarray.
Moscow was also forced to concede that the proclaimed speedy completion of its Chechen offensive could now last several months. There was speculation that Moscow had hoped to have taken Grozny in time for parliamentary elections in Russia on 19 December. It appeared that popular Russian support for the campaign was also waning.
Russians Still Support Chechen War
In the run up to the Russian parliamentary elections in December, public opinion appeared to remain firmly in support of military victory in Chechnya. Thus, the war was not a major issue for either candidates or the voters. All mainstream Russian parties supported the war; in particular Prime Minister Vladimir Putin won popularity for his vigorous quest for military victory.
On 23 December, the Financial Times reported that the Commander of Russian Federal Forces in Chechnya, Viktor Kazantsev, pledged to establish full control over Chechnya within two to three weeks. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin further claimed that 90% of the Chechen population was already living in Russian-controlled areas.
Following talks in Moscow, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot warned that he did not believe international norms had been met by Russia in its actions against extremism and terrorism. Russian defence Minister Igor Sergeyev asserted that Russia-NATO relations were getting colder.
Tajikistan
Elections in Tajikistan
On 16 November, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov was sworn into office for another seven years having been re-elected with a 96% majority following a 98% turnout in elections. However, the obvious rigging of the elections not only angered the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), but also appeared unnecessary, as there was no UTO candidate strong enough to mount an effective challenge.
However, UTO leader Abdullo Nuri subsequently accepted the results in return for assurances of free and fair parliamentary elections in February 2000. At the time, the single-chamber parliament body effectively only rubber-stamped presidential decrees. The proposed new system would comprise two houses and so might both extract some power from the presidency and be more representative of all Tajik regions.
However, national integration would still be problematic in a country of deep regional divisions: Islamic parties received most support from the upper Garm valley and from Garmi-settled areas around Kurgan-Tyube, whereas government support stemmed primarily from the Kulyab region, historically opposed to Garm.
Around 2 million of the 6 million Tajik population were living in the Khojand region in the north, which maintained only loose connections with the rest of the country and had geographic and ethnic links with parts of Uzbekistan. Indeed, the Uzbek government supported a military offensive in Khojand in 1998.
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