A 21 August Guardian report stated that, earlier that day, the US launched two cruise missile attacks against what it believed to be terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. The attacks were in retaliation for the bombing of its embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7th August where 250 people were killed.

The report said that one attack was targeted at the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders - the terrorist group directed from Afghanistan by Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden. A spokesperson for the Taliban, the radical organisation which controls much of Afghanistan, confirmed that sites near both Khost and Jalalabad had been attacked. But he insisted bin Laden and his companions were safe. The US administration claimed it had evidence that the group had played a key role in the embassy bombings and President Bill Clinton further stated that he had compelling information that it was planning additional terrorist offensives.

The second attack struck a suspected chemical weapons facility outside the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. However, the Sudanese interior minister, Abdul Rahim, denied that his country harboured any chemical weapons and insisted that the targeted Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory produced only medical drugs.

21 August 1998

A 16 September Guardian report stated that tension was increasing between Iran and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in response to the murder of six Iranian diplomats by the Taliban in August. During the first half of September, Iran began military manoeuvres near the Afghan border involving some 70,000 troops of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. On 12 September, Iranian authorities declared that 200,000 regular troops would be dispatched to the area to participate in the biggest war games in the country's history. However, the report stated that Taliban military advances had continued in Afghanistan, as they drove the Iranian-backed Wahadat faction from its base in the town of Bamiyan, increasing the proportion of the country under Taliban control to 90%.

Both sides have been engaged in inflammatory rhetoric. On the one hand, on the fall of Bamiyan, Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned that conflict in the region could only be averted if the Taliban abandoned its current course. On the other hand, the Taliban has threatened that it would target Iranian cities in the event of Iranian military incursions into Afghani territory. According to the report, Western diplomats revealed that Khamenei's warning came before the UN Security Council was due to meet to discuss the situation [See Documentation and Sources for resolution 1193], where Iran was likely to push for a firm stance against the Taliban. Although the report acknowledged that the potential for conflict in the area did exist, it suggested that the Iranian stance might have been primarily designed for an external audience, as there appeared to be little domestic enthusiasm for war.

16 September 1998

A 12 September report in the Economist warned that Iranian attempts to intervene militarily in Afghanistan could have disastrous consequences for Tehran. According to the report, Iranians believed that they had more solid grounds for intervention than the US had had for its recent air strikes in Afghanistan. In addition to the situation with its diplomats there [see report above], dozens of Iranians - mostly lorry drivers - were also being held by the Taliban accused of transporting weapons to Afghan government forces. The report stated that Iran believed its national security was being threatened by the Taliban, which it claimed was serving Pakistani, Saudi and US interests by diminishing Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Iranians were afraid that the Sunni Muslim Taliban would launch an ethnically-based campaign against the Shia minority in Afghanistan, inducing an influx of refugees to join the 1.5 million already at large in Iran.

The report stated that many Iranian politicians were aware that, in contrast to the recent US offensive, Iranian military activity against the Taliban would be unlikely to avoid retaliation. Therefore, in an attempt to dilute public opinion against Afghanistan, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi has reminded people of the difficulties the Soviet Union previously experienced in that country. The report added that Iranian aversion to the Taliban's radical views might be related to the violent behaviour of more extreme religious-based elements within Iran.

12 September 1998

A 16 September Guardian report stated that US officials urged Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to ignore requests from his parliament to suspend cooperation with the UNSCOM inspection team. The request came a week before world leaders convened for the UN General Assembly in New York where it was feared the situation could come to a head. The report said that US and UK officials were hoping that diplomatic initiatives would pre-empt adopting more forcible measures. It further laid hopes for a peaceful solution with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He has promised a comprehensive reappraisal of UN policy towards Baghdad following the Security Council's suspension of reviews of sanctions against Iraq during the week beginning 7 September. The report asserted that both Washington and London were committed to full implementation of Security Council resolutions on the issue, and added that a diplomat had warned that both countries maintained options should Saddam attempt to raise the stakes. According to the report, the US declared it would request that the Security Council take further steps against Baghdad in the event that inspections were suspended. However, an adviser to Saddam stated that Iraq had been left with no choice but to suspend cooperation.

16 September 1998

A 20 September Sunday Telegraph report revealed the defection to the West of Iraqi businessman Sami Salih, who had been involved in operations assisting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to break UN sanctions against Iraq. Salih disclosed to British secret service officers that Iraq was avoiding UK and US naval patrols in the Gulf by illegally exporting oil through Iran in return for a percentage of the profits. Salih had employed several companies as cover to smuggle the oil to the West. He alleged that the resultant hard currency earnings were bused, via Jordanian banks, to purchase arms and support Saddam's lifestyle. The report expressed surprise over such cooperation between traditional enemies Iran and Iraq. Salih subsequently escaped from Iraq having been accused by Saddam of spying.

According to the report, Salih also revealed details of Saddam's personal security arrangements, as well as the layout of his presidential complex. He told the British secret service that missiles were concealed throughout Iraq, stored in places such as under swimming pools and on farms. A senior UN official in New York asserted that Salih's information would enable the organisation to take effective action against Iraqi attempts at sanction-busting and would reinforce US and UK determination to ensure UN sanctions against Iraq were rigorously enforced. The report further declared that the UN Secretary-General was furious with Saddam for reneging on the deal he had personally brokered in February to avoid a military stand-off with Western leaders.

20 September 1998

The Secretary-General's report covered the activities of Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and developments in the mission area since 28 May 1998 (S/1998/434). Kofi Annan stated that the international community remained deeply concerned that Haiti was still without a government more than a year after the outset of the current political crisis. Haiti continued to face formidable political and economic challenges, none of which would be met without a functioning government, and the continuing political deadlock posed considerable risks to the country's fragile democracy. It was also a serious impediment to economic development and international assistance. Annan therefore appealed to Haitian authorities and political leaders, especially legislators, to pursue current efforts to resolve the crisis so that a new prime minister could be ratified without further delay.

Annan stressed that concrete steps needed to be taken to prepare for the next local and legislative elections, including the establishment of a Provisional Electoral Council (PEC). He said that the UN was ready to provide international experts to assist the PEC if requested to do so by the Haitian authorities.

Although progress had been made in both the training and performance of the Haitian National Police (HNP), the development of an effective police force remained both a complex and lengthy task and a fundamental part of the democratic process. In this context, it was widely accepted that there would be a continuing need for international training of the HNP to strengthen its capacity and consolidate the gains it had already achieved. During the following months, therefore, consultations would need to be held with the Haitian authorities regarding the continued role of the international community in training the HNP in the medium and longer term.

Composition of MIPONUH, as at 15 August 1998:

[Key: Substantive Element (SE); Special Police Unit (SPU)]

Argentina 140 (SPU) 6 (SE); Benin 6 (SE);  Canada 24 (SE);  France 36 (SE);  India 3 (SE);  Mali 19 (SE);  Niger 5 (SE);  Senegal 8 (SE);  Togo 6 (SE);  Tunisia 1 (SE);  US 30 (SE); Subtotal 140 (SPU); 144 (SE); Total 284.

24 August 1998

On 13 August, the Secretary-General stated that the reported mandate period of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) began with a political crisis over a bill on political parties. First, the Tajik parliament voted not to confirm the cabinet appointments of the two most senior members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Akbar Turajonzodah and Davlat Usmon. Second, on 23 May, the bill on political parties, which had been agreed upon by the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR), was amended so that religiously-based political parties would have been banned. This would have effectively removed the Islamic Revival Party, the largest component of UTO, from participation in Tajik political life, thereby destroying one of the main pillars of the peace agreement. Tajik President, Emomali Rakhmonov, has since stated his intention to resubmit both names at the next, as yet unscheduled, session of parliament.

UNMOT Security

Kofi Annan asserted that the events described above were subsequently overshadowed by the murder of four unarmed members of UNMOT. He strongly condemned the murders, and hoped that the perpetrators would soon be found and brought to justice. Such incidents highlighted the continuing precariousness of the peace process, and Annan hoped that the Tajik parties remained determined to implement the general peace agreement that they had signed more than one year ago.

Since it had not been possible for either the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan, nor an armed UN infantry battalion to provide security for UNMOT, the UN proposed the establishment of a special detachment for security, using government and UTO personnel already stationed in Dushanbe. This was also seen as a confidencebuilding measure and a first step towards the reintegration of UTO fighters into the national army. The detachment has been formed after a delay of many months and has undergone training by officers brought in by the UN. However, it was still not operational, owing to a lack of essential equipment. In addition, weaknesses of cohesion and of command and control have prevented it from being the effective force required. On 16 June, the unit's deputy commander, a member of UTO, was shot and killed by unknown persons. In these circumstances, it has become necessary to limit UNMOT activities and in particular its movement in the field. It was envisaged that the mission would be provided with additional hardskinned vehicles and better communications equipment in order to give its personnel at least passive protection.

Peace Agreement

Annan reported that, on 30 July, CNR adopted a new timetable for the implementation of the peace agreement, replacing the one adopted on 29 April, which had become obsolete as a result of its deadlines having lapsed. According to the new timetable, the following deadlines were applicable: assignment of UTO personalities to positions at all levels of the executive branch by the end of September; implementation of the second stage of the protocol on military  issues by 25 August, thereafter lifting the ban on political parties and mass media; formation of the Central Election Commission by 1 September; and finalising amendments to the Constitution by 20 October. No deadlines were set for the implementation of the amnesty law, for the return of refugees, nor for the constitutional referendum and elections.

International Assistance

The Secretary-General pointed out that Tajik leaders have habitually complained about the level of assistance the country receives from international donors, and they have at times affirmed that the positive development of the peace process depended on  such assistance. He confirmed that few of the pledges made at the donor's conference in Vienna in October 1997 had been followed through. Nevertheless, he reiterated that the obstacles to the peace process were mainly political, and it remained essential to overcome them in order to ensure Tajikistan's future wellbeing. Tangible progress in the implementation of the peace agreement also provided the best way to counter the scepticism of donor countries.

Annan encouraged the Tajik parties to make good use of the continuing international backing for the peace process. In addition to the services offered by his Special Representative and UNMOT, the Contact Group of guarantor states and international organisations has provided an important source of support. He stressed that the meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers, which the Contact Group was in the process of preparing, could provide valuable impetus to the peace process.

13 August 1998

On 10 August, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana reported to Kofi Annan on the activities of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

Solana stated that there were approximately 34,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The troops were contributed by all NATO member states and twenty-one nonNATO countries. Malaysian troops withdrew from theatre at the end of June.

The NATO Secretary-General reported that SFOR continued to carry out surveillance and reconnaissance through ground and air patrols. Combat aircraft flew around 2,900 sorties, while the SFOR helicopter fleet flew approximately 117 hours.

According to Solana, SFOR continued to monitor crossing points along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It also examined government factories to ensure compliance with the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution 1160 (1998). There were no reports of noncompliance.

Solana asserted that the Office of the High Representative had concluded a restructuring agreement in February. As a result, SFOR withdrew from three transmission towers used by Republika Srpska Radio Television at Duja Nijva, Udrigovo and Leotar. The NATO force continued to guarantee two remaining towers at Veliki Zep in MultiNational Division North (MND(N)) and at Trebevic in MND (SouthEast).

Cooperation by the Parties

The NATO Secretary-General declared that the parties complied with most military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement over the entire area of operations. However, isolated instances of arson attacks and interethnic tensions were reported.

Solana stated that SFOR confiscated two Bosnian Serb military vehicles for a 30day period for noncompliance with the Common Licence Plate Programme. He further reported that SFOR troops conducted a total of 304 military weapons storage site inspections: 75 Bosniac; 57 Bosnian Croat; 144 Bosnian Serb; and 28 Federation. Only minor discrepancies were noted.

The Restructuring and Training Programme led by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and monitored by SFOR began in early June, and 405 Police AntiTerrorist Brigade (PATB) officers had completed human dignity training by 11 July.

According to Solana, SFOR monitored 1,463 training and movement activities: 505 Bosniac; 83 Bosnian Croat; 783 Bosnian Serb; and 92 Federation. SFOR troops also monitored 167 demining operations: 55 Bosniac; 57 Bosnian Croat; and 55 Bosnian Serb. A total of 29 antitank mines, 234 antipersonnel mines and 22 items of unexploded ordnance were removed.

SFOR Cooperation with International Organisations

Solana reported that SFOR continued to assist other international organisations in theatre, working routinely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), IPTF, the Office of the High Representative, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

More specifically, SFOR supported OSCE in its preparations for the September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina by ensuring a secure environment for voter registration. The subsequent registration of parties, candidates and alliances was conducted by the Provisional Elections Commission without incident. SFOR assisted the Office of the High  Representative in the field of civil air traffic, and the inaugural flight into Mostar airport took place on 7 July.

Solana said that SFOR also supported the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to set up joint institutions, particularly the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). A 2 July SCMM meeting considered the potential for combined activities between the entity armed forces and SFOR's proposals for the employment of military helicopters to cross the interentity boundary line when carrying senior government officials from the joint institutions and entity governments.

Outlook

The NATO Secretary-General predicted that tension in the area would rise in the runup to the September elections. Increasing tension and acts of intimidation and violence were also epected to result from the return of refugees. He stated that SFOR would continue to facilitate the provision of a secure environment to support and promote returns, in accordance with its mandate.

10 August 1998

The report stated that few people expected Muslim and Croat nationalist leaders to be defeated at the forthcoming elections. They had hoped external assistance would help over 1.8 million refugees return to their pre-war homes, where they might also find work, be provided with security guarantees and see a cessation of widespread corruption. The report asserted that foreign Bosnian officials claimed to have begun programmes aimed at meeting these objectives, including police retraining, anticorruption investigations and housing and road construction projects. They further pointed out that, over three years, Dayton has successfully stopped violence, established a unified currency, enabled political dialogue, and removed ethnically-based vehicle license plates.

However, the report said that critics of Dayton have complained that ethnic integration would be accelerated, at an ultimately reduced financial cost, if more resources were made available. A UN official declared that the estimated $30 million cost of the imminent election appeared to be a lot of money, but warned that the peace process was still advancing slowly, requiring an expensive NATO presence in the country for a considerable time in the future.

The Director of the International Crisis Group, Christopher Bennet, stated that the question of the Bosnian leadership presented a serious problem, compounded by the fact that politicians were reluctant to negotiate outside their own ethnic groups. Consequently, progress in the peace process occurred only when unpalatable decisions were imposed from outside. Bennett particularly criticised senior international officials for deferring revised election procedures aimed at discouraging support for extreme ethnic nationalists. However, the head of the civilian element of Dayton, Carlos Westendorp, stated that the international community's presence in Bosnia did not represent a substitute for local authority. Local leader of the OSCE, Robert L. Barry, further said that such reforms had to be accepted by a majority of voters, if not the political party leaders.

14 September 1998

On 16 September, the Secretary-General reported on the activities of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from 10 June to 11 September 1998. At the time of writing, UNMIBH was led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of the UN Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Elisabeth Rehn (Finland). Richard Monk (UK) served as Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The authorised strength of IPTF was 2,057.

UNMIBH Mandate

Kofi Annan highlighted the alterations to the UNMIBH mandate over the preceding two years, from general monitoring to the more specialised role of restructuring the police in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS).  He stated that such changes reflected the importance of peace-building activities for the security of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These included reforming the civilian police and strengthening respect for human rights and the judicial system. The Secretary-General announced that UNMIBH's mandate for restructuring the police had been expanded to include independent investigations into abuses of human rights by the local police. It also incorporated identifying technical, institutional and political hindrances to achieving a de-politicised judiciary capable of imparting unbiased and neutral justice. He cited the expiditious recruitment of qualified legal experts for the Judicial System Assessment Programme as a positive development.

Annan asserted that progress by UNMIBH on its primary objective of reforming the police largely depended on the quality, experience and professional skills of its personnel. He pointed out that repeated demands for highly qualified police officers suggested how future police peacekeeping missions should evolve in general. Senior officers with the requisite leadership and management skills and who were familiar with democratic policing practices were still needed for IPTF.  Such personnel included regional and station commanders and IPTF advisers colocated with the local police leadership. The Secretary-General stated that UNMIBH's Human Rights Office also required additional qualified IPTF monitors to undertake independent investigations. Monitors with experience in instruction and course development were needed for IPTF training units. IPTF's traditional policing skills needed to be augmented in order that UNMIBH initiatives increase emphasis on community policing in multiethnic communities.

General Framework Agreement

Annan highlighted the introduction of a universal licence plate as a significant step torward implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina was no longer divided into three distinct ethnic territories. Movement across the interentity boundary line had increased by over 100%, while interactions between members of the different communities had become commonplace. The Secretary-General stated that such progress towards forging a unified state needed to be strengthened further. The most recent meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Conference in Luxembourg requested that UNMIBH facilitate the introduction of a statelevel border police. This would replace the singlecommunity police forces that at the time controlled stretches of the country's international boundaries. He added that such a force could also reinforce Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, at the expense of the individual entities. UNMIBH planned to devote significant resources to this project over the forthcoming months and to work closely with the Office of the High Representative, the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and the Customs and Fiscal Assistance Organisation to ensure its swift implementation. Neighbouring states would be asked to assist with the implementation measures.

The Secretary-General pointed out that the period under review reflected the complex conditions under which UNMIBH was fulfilling its mandate. The entity governments needed to address large-scale returns of refugees in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina's second postwar national elections. The election campaign allowed officials to divert pressure to create multiethnic, restructured police services. These were crucial to the successful return of refugees and displaced people to their homes, particularly in areas under the de facto control of different ethnic groups. Annan asserted that advancement in these interrelated ambitions relied on UNMIBH's cooperation with UNHCR, SFOR, the Office of the High Representative and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He re-emphasised the importance of the support of SFOR in providing security arrangements for the effective implementation of the UNMIBH mandate.

Contributions to IPTF, as at 10 September 1998:

Argentina 33; Austria 38; Bangladesh 31; Bulgaria 41; Canada 29; Chile 29; Denmark 40; Egypt 34; Estonia 5; Fiji 7; Finland 27; France 125; Germany 163; Ghana 100; Greece 15; Hungary 35; Iceland 3; India 106; Indonesia 22; Ireland 35; Italy 23; Jordan 150; Kenya 11; Malaysia 47; Nepal 41; Netherlands 54; Nigeria 19; Norway 24; Pakistan 96; Poland 32; Portugal 60; Romania 10; Russian Federation 35; Senegal 18; Spain 59; Sweden 50; Switzerland 2; Thailand 3; Tunisia 2; Turkey 27; Ukraine 36; UK 70; US 193; Total 1,980.

16 September 1998

On 23 September 1998, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the activities of the UN Police Support Group in Croatia since 11 June 1998.

Activities of the Croatian Police

Kofi Annan commended the improved performance of the Croatian police over the reported period. Of particular note was the building of a multi-ethnic police force which the Secretary-General hoped would serve as a model for other areas. He pointed out, however, that more work needed to be done before the police could enjoy local confidence and prove itself capable of effectively policing a multi-ethnic community. The wide gap between the actual security provided by the police and the perception of security held by many Serb residents was viewed as an important factor in leading to the continuing departure of Serbs from the region. He also believed that the recruiting of non-Croat officers into the police force was essential to preserving the prospects for multi-ethnicity in the region.

The Secretary-General applauded the close attention paid to police operations by the Croatian Minister of the Interior but was critical of the government's inability to strengthen public confidence in the police through an active public information programme. Improved police performance was not, however, seen as sufficient to prevent a climate of ethnic hatred, intolerance and intimidation. He argued that the increase in the number of ethnic incidents by repeat offenders from 15% to 20% since June highlighted the lack of effective government action to discourage such crimes. He urged the government to take preventive action to deter such incidents and to address their outstanding root causes.

Annan criticised the inadequate follow-up procedures exercised by both the police and the courts to incidents of intimidation and harassment. He highlighted cases in which local police officers have allowed their performance to fall below normal professional standards or have breached either their instructions or Croatian law. He argued that comprehensive international police monitoring should continue in order to sustain local confidence to ensure that acceptable standards of policing were maintained.

Government Commitments

Annan confirmed that the government of Croatia had taken a number of steps towards meeting its commitments to the international community. He believed it to have generally met the employment and educational obligations outlined in various reintegration agreements with the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slovakia (UNTAES).

The Secretary-General believed that the government had made a genuine attempt to repeal some discriminatory legislation by introducing a comprehensive nationwide two-way return programme. He also commended the efforts of the international police monitors which had helped to instil confidence for the return of refugees. He cited reports from the Croatian government's Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees which stated that 22,501 Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity had returned to Croatia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, key issues related to two-way returns remained unresolved. Firstly, some discriminatory legislation continued to remain in force and the implementation of the convalidation law was incomplete. In addition, attempts to pursue the national reconciliation programme lacked drive and the government's commitments to the Joint Council of Municipalities remained unfulfilled. He warned that all of these issues and, in particular, the failure to refocus attention on national reconciliation could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the return programme. He also criticised the lack of employment, the slow progress of economic reconstruction and the lack of confidence in the future for impeding returns.

He went on to argue that, in order to secure international assistance in the economic development of areas of return in Croatia, the government would have to ensure that its future plans were comprehensive, non-discriminatory and transparent. He recommended that these plans should address the creation of employment opportunities, the stimulation of community links and the promotion of reconciliation. He believed that if such an approach were carried out it might encourage displaced persons of all ages to return to their homes throughout Croatia and help to harmonise ethnic interests.

Transition to OSCE Mission

Overall, Annan believed that the level of security in the region was satisfactory. He judged that the risk of being subject to any criminal activity was relatively low, despite the continued harassment of some Serb and minority groups as a result of property disputes and ethnic intolerance. Due to the relative stability of the security situation he concluded that the Support Group could continue with the drawdown of its personnel from 136 civilian police monitors in mid-August to 120 by the end of September. The gradual drawdown of the Support Group was intended to ease the transition to the OSCE police monitoring mission, which deployed the first of its 120 police monitors in mid-September. The Support Group was to terminate its operations on 15 October 1998.

23 September 1998

On 5 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Security-Council on the situation in Kosovo. Kofi Annan reminded people of his limited capacity to report on the situation in the region. However,  he did point out an increase in the presence of diplomatic observers from European and Contact Group countries who might be better placed to provide the Security Council with a reliable flow of information concerning the situation on the ground.

Political Situation

Annan asserted that the continuing infiltration from outside the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) of weapons and fighters remained a source of continuing widespread concern. The sharp escalation of violence and the reported use of excessive force by security forces against civilians as part of the government operations against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were cause for both distress and alarm. Annan cited the move in certain quarters away from a willingness to search for compromise on a basis of multiethnic communities as a particularly dangerous element in the situation. He added that centrifugal tendencies appeared to be gaining ground. The continuing conflict has led to a growing number of internally displaced persons and refugees, in turn causing further instability. He warned that the international community again risked being placed in a position where it was only dealing with the symptoms of a conflict through its humanitarian agencies.

The Secretary-General stressed that the situation was being aggravated by the failure of FRY authorities and Albanian Kosovars to enter into serious negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. He warned that the  continuation or further escalation of the conflict had dangerous implications for the stability of the region. Given the responsibilities of the UN in the wider region and the ethnic makeup in neighbouring countries, Annan expressed alarm at such a prospect. He pointed out that several operations in the region, mandated or authorised by the Security—Council, were playing a useful role in promoting dialogue and harmony among different ethnic groups. He hoped that the Security Coucnil would examine the question of Kosovo not in isolation but in a manner that fully took into account the broad, regional context and the principles of the  UN Charter.

Annex I

The following comprises information provided by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Bronislaw Geremek (Poland) on the situation in Kosovo and measures taken by the OSCE.

The Chairman-in-Office reported that, since midJune, there has been further escalation of the conflict in  Kosovo, with hostilities spreading through the entire southwestern part of the province. By midJuly, the fighting began to draw nearer to Pristina and KLA removed any ambiguity as to its intention to bring the province under its control. Numerous armed clashes were reported from the regions of Kosovo bordering Albania. All appeals of the international community for talks and a cessation of the hostilities remained unanswered. Geremek said that prospects for a negotiated settlement appeared dim, and that time was running out for the attainment of a peaceful solution. The Kosovo crisis entered into a phase of  unpredictable consequences for regional stability and, therefore, presented a source of deep concern for the OSCE.

Long-Term Mission

Geremek pointed out that the perceptibly deteriorating situation in Kosovo, and the relative lack of progress on issues identified by the OSCE ChairmaninOffice's Personal Representative, Filipe Gonzalez, in his December 1996 report. These factors underlined the need for a rapid reestablishment of the Longterm Missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina and the return of the Personal Representative of the OSCE ChairmaninOffice to the FRY. The Federal Republic was only prepared to consider discussing the terms of Gonzalez's mandate once the question of its participation in the OSCE had been settled. There seemed to be a general willingness on all sides within the FRY that the country should participate in the work of OSCE. But the degree of conditionality which it would have to satisfy to achieve this varied considerably.

An OSCE technical assessment mission asserted that its visit of 14-22 July 1998 had underlined the need for the return of the Longterm Mission to address issues such as the stimulation of dialogue between the two communities, to serve as an ombudsman on human rights matters, and to provide some form of  coordinating role for international activities in the area. The Chairman-in-Office said that the lack of trust between the two communities in Kosovo, against the  background of increasing violence, and the distance between the  political positions as to how the conflict could be resolved, strongly  reinforced the need for a committed highlevel international involvement  in the negotiation process.

Geremek stated that the humanitarian situation needed to be observed carefully as the supply of food to the population in winter could become very difficult, in particular if the situation in the province continued to deteriorate. Although the scale of the problems of the Muslims in Sandjak was of  a different magnitude from those of Kosovo, there was a case for a  renewed presence of a longterm mission there. The mission believed that the conditions in Vojvodina were such as  to warrant coverage by the Longterm Mission.

The Chairman-in-Office further declared that a case could be made for the Longterm Mission to have its headquarters in Belgrade, with a sizeable presence in Kosovo and perhaps a branch office in the Sandjak. Since Gonzalez's visit in 1996, the situation regarding the  media and the judiciary, legal and electoral systems did not appear to have improved significantly, apart from some progress in the field of  print media. There was a continuing lack of confidence in nonofficial circles in the legal system, including the legislation relating to the election process. Developments in these fields needed to be monitored with a view to an ongoing dialogue with the authorities, including  offering expertise on how progress could be made. The Law on the University also gave cause for concern, as it provided for government control over the administration and teaching staff and limited the possibility of political expression by students. It fell short of relevant European standards.

While the FRY indicated its readiness to accept the return of the Longterm Mission to Kosovo, it was only  prepared to do so in return for the simultaneous participation in OSCE. The mission recommended the continuation of talks between the ChairmaninOffice and the FRY on issues of relevance to FRY/OSCE relations.

Annex II

Letter dated 14 July 1998 from the SecretaryGeneral of NATO [Javier Solana] addressed to the SecretaryGeneral:

Javier Solana stated that NATO military authorities completed their assessment of  possible support for a monitoring regime in connection with Security  Council resolution 1160 (1998). Having considered a variety of options, the North Atlantic Council decided at this stage to proceed with the SFOR option to step up its efforts, within its existing mission and capabilities, to monitor the Bosnian border with the FRY. In this context, Solana confirmed that the necessary arrangements had been put in place to forward any relevant information on suspected violations in the SFOR area of operations via the monthly report to the UN, or on an ad hoc basis as necessary.

5 August 1998

The Secretary-General's 4 September report covered developments in the area since 5 August. Kofi Annan expressed alarm at the lack of progress that had been made towards a political settlement in Kosovo and by the continued loss of life, displacement of the civilian population and destruction of property resulting from the ongoing conflict. He asserted that it was essential that negotiations began to break the cycle of disproportionate use of force by the Serbian forces and acts of violence by the Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units by promoting a political resolution of the conflict. On 1 September, Kofi Annan wrote to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, to stress his concern at the excessive use of force by Serbian military and police forces, pointing out that Kosovo Albanian extremists were also responsible for acts of provocation.

Annan was also worried by persistent tensions on the border between the FRY and Albania, including reports of border violations and crossborder shelling. The Secretary-General asserted that such an escalation of tensions risked detrimental consequences for stability in the region. He reiterated that, as a result, UN operations in the region could be adversely affected by developments in Kosovo.

The Secretary-General declared that no military solution to the crisis existed, and urged both parties to demonstrate restraint and begin the negotiating process as soon as possible. He further expressed full support for initiatives by the Contact Group, regional organisations and individual states to seek an end to the fighting and to create appropriate conditions for a political settlement, offering to contribute to such efforts through all available resources.

According to Annan, recent clashes in Kosovo led to further displacement of civilian population. He urged parties in the FRY to assure unhindered humanitarian access to all affected areas and to ensure the security of the relief personnel. He also requested international humanitarian organisations to step up relief initiatives, and that the international community support such efforts by rapidly providing the necessary resources for assistance.

4 September 1998

A 7 September Guardian report stated that, at a meeting in Salzburg, a split emerged between US and EU policy towards the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, in relation to the Kosovo crisis. According to the report, European ministers collectively warned of an impending humanitarian crisis in the region as winter approached. However, they were unable to agree on details of stronger sanctions against the FRY. For instance, EU ministers claimed consensus on banning Yugoslav flights, but legal agreements with Milosevic prevented the UK from implementing the ban. US envoy to the Balkans, Christopher Hill, criticised the EU for concentrating on discussions over a united Europe at the expense of the situation in Kosovo. In response, French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, warned of a re-emergence of transatlantic disputes that had symbolised Western foreign policy during the Bosnian war.

The report suggested that senior European Commission officials had unofficially said that, as had primarily been the case in Bosnia, EU policy towards Kosovo was likely to centre round humanitarian support. It also contended that resolution of the crisis required the establishment of a cease-fire between the warring parties, the withdrawal of FRY troops from the region, followed by the deployment of international observers. EU ministers in Salzburg demanded a similar package, but revealed no means of achieving it.

7 September 1998

A report in The Economist noted that both Congress and the White House favoured the use of NATO air power to end offensives by troops and police from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in Kosovo. On 24 September, Western defence ministers issued an activation warning that forces (mainly aircraft and cruise missiles) were likely to be called up for such an operation. However, the report added that four further procedural stages were required before such action could be authorised. The progression of these stages was contingent on the content of a report from the UN Secretary-General, due on 7 or 8 October, which was intended to evaluate whether FRY President Slobodan Milosevic had upheld the terms of relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Economist report predicted that the air strikes would initially be aimed at suppressing Serb air-defences and then paralysing its communications and logistics capabilities. It argued that the only way for Milosevic to avoid this outcome was to divide the alliance through tactical concessions. The report suggested that Milosevic's 28 September announcement that armed offensives in Kosovo had ceased was an example of this tactic. It went onto speculate that, paradoxically, Milosevic might actually welcome western air strikes because they would allow him to force hard-line FRY politicians into accepting concessions which he saw as inevitable.

However, subsequent evidence of Serb atrocities was said to have reinforced Western determination to end repression in Kosovo. Over the following three days, Western diplomats reported having seen the brutalised corpses of sixteen people, including six women and four children, in the village of Gorje Obrinje, while at least fourteen men from a neighbouring village had also been killed.

The report described an American strategy, similar to the one that had brought peace to Bosnia in 1995, which aimed to secure from Milosevic a promise of substantial autonomy for Kosovo. It stated that a bombing campaign would force Milosevic to accept the cessation of violence followed by the instigation of a Western-lead peace process. However, the report was sceptical of the viability of a peace process co-sponsored by Milosevic and NATO.

3 October 1998

A 15 October Guardian report stated that the settlement reached by Western governments concerning the situation in Kosovo had successfully provided the international community with some leverage over the Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic. However, the report also highlighted some serious flaws in the deal, including the level of control retained by Milosevic over the territory. Also, Kosovar leaders, who were sceptical over any settlement that did not provide any leeway for independence, were not seriously consulted over the deal.

The report conceded that Belgrade had made commitments to enter into negotiations with the Kosovars and to develop arrangements for elections. Milosevic also promised an amnesty for Kosovar fighters, the withdrawal of Serb security forces and to deploy more representative police forces. However, the report questioned the validity of these pledges. Some of them incorporated near or medium term deadlines, but others, notably those relating to the withdrawal of Serb forces, did not. Nor was it explicit where Serb forces should withdraw to: out of Kosovo completely, or simply to barracks in the region.

The Guardian report praised the relatively large numbers of verification monitors for the agreement, but was less supportive of the fact that they would be  unarmed. Milosevic also agreed to satellite and unarmed aerial reconnaissance of the area, and to disable Serb military radar so as to allow the verification process to continue unhampered.

However, the report suggested that Milosevic has maintained his virtual military monopoly in the area and so retained the capability to restart the war. He also accepted the existence of a Kosovo government, but only within the "legal framework" of the FRY, effectively abandoning the concept of Kosovar independence. The report also highlighted the lack of cohesion within NATO over the use of air power against Milosevic. It claimed that the alliance had only been united in its reluctance to consider the deployment of ground troops. As a result, the designer of the settlement, Richard Holbrooke, was negotiating from a weaker position than NATO governments could officially concede.

The report asserted that the settlement in fact represented a redefinition of the conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians and between Western governments and Milosevic. It added that Milosevic, in the face of domestic right wing political opposition, could yet become more bellicose. However, the Guardian report pointed out that the settlement would attempt use monitors to supervise the delivery of humanitarian supplies to Kosovar refugees without Serbian interference. Milosevic would also be subject to armed sanctions in response to non-compliance.

However, at the same time, the involvement of Western personnel in the aid and verification operation risked their being vulnerable to harassment and obstruction. The report suggested that Milosevic was likely to restrict such tactics to remain within the boundaries of provocation that might revive the threat of military action. The report was also sceptical that Milosevic would enter into negotiations in good faith and warned of the probable necessity for future forcible action.

15 October 1998

The Secretary-General's report was prepared in response to a request from the Security Council of 21 May 1997 (S/PRST/1997/34).

Accession to Instruments of International Law

The Secretary-General expected member states to reaffirm, reinforce and adhere to the existing norms, principles and provisions of international law, including humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law. This would help to guarantee the safety of and assistance to refugees, displaced people and others. It would also help secure humanitarian access and the security of UN and other personnel. He urged member states that had yet to accede to the relevant instruments to consider quick accessions.

Dissemination and Advocacy of Humanitarian Principles

Annan asserted that the dissemination of norms, principles and provisions of international law was vital to fostering compliance. He suggested strengthening the information, training and advocacy capabilities of several bodies, incliding: the International Committee of the Red Cross; the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; the Emergency Relief Coordinator in collaboration with Inter-Agency Standing Committee partners (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs); and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Compliance with International Law

The Secretary-General demanded an end to the culture of impunity which at the time prevailed on violations of humanitarian norms. He stressed that all people who violated international law, either state or nonstate actors, should be brought to justice. States were primarily responsible for guaranteeing that such people were prosecuted through the national criminal justice system or, where appropriate, through international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (ICC). Annan announced that the establishment of the International Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the recent decision to set up the ICC represented significant efforts by the international community to end the culture of impunity. He suggested that additional measures should continue to be taken to broaden and reinforce the ICC's jurisdiction. The Secretary-General pointed out that the Statute identified as war crimes the deliberate deprivation from civilians of objects indispensable to their survival. These included wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.

Annan suggested certain steps to ensure the compliance of state and non-state actors with  international legal provisions. Under international law, combatants should be held financially liable to their victims in situations where civilians were intentionally made the targets of aggression. Additionally, international legal structures should be developed to facilitate efforts to locate, attach and seize the assets of transgressing parties and their leaders. The Secretary-General asserted that this recommendation had already been partially implemented in the ICC Statute, Article 75 of which held individuals financially liable for such crimes. However, the Statute was established on a general level. The specifics of reparations to victims through the Trust Fund established for the benefit of victims or through national courts and administrations, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, would have to be further elaborated by the Court.

International Cohesion and Host States' Support

The Secretary-General emphasised the importance of solidarity and burden-sharing to encouraging states to respect humanitarian principles and obligations. He urged greater awareness of the political, economic and social impact of large refugee populations on recipient countries. The international community should be prepared to assist such countries both in terms of humanitarian assistance and for rehabilitation of refugee hosting areas. However, such assistance should not be provided at the expense of regional development cooperation aid. Thus, humanitarian organisations and development agencies must work closely together.

Improving Security and Access

Annan suggested that the Security Council seriously consider establishing a range of options to maintain law and order, create a secure environment for civilians endangered by conflict and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in conflict situations. He suggested that these options should incorporate modest efforts to improve local and national capacity. These might include community-based protection, extending to greater international involvement when security problems escalated. They could also encompass a range of national, international, civilian, police and military actors.

The Secretary-General suggested that refugees be located in camps of limited size at a reasonable distance from international borders, in order to enhance their own security as well as that of humanitarian personnel. More specifically in the context of Africa, Annan cited provisions to this effect within the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

Annan highlighted armed combatants among refugee and displaced populations as a source of insecurity and suggested that they be separated from civilians. He stated that host states bore primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in and around refugee camps. However, they often lacked the will or the capacity to do this. Therefore, the Security Council must ensure that host countries received the necessary support.

According to Annan, the proliferation of arms was a major factor affecting the security of both refugees and other vulnerable populations. It also affected UN and humanitarian personnel. He therefore urged that more vigorous efforts be made to monitor and regulate the trade in arms to areas of actual or potential conflict. The Security Council could consider imposing an arms embargo in situations where civilians were targeted by combatants, or where the combatants were known to be involved in gross violations of human rights. It could further consider establishing a more effective mechanism for the implementation of arms embargoes. Annan urged member states to take the necessary steps, including domestic legislation, to penalise those engaged in illicit trade. Greater attention also needed to be paid to the role of private arms traders, including the role the UN might play in compiling, tracking and publicising such information.

Humanitarian Personnel Security

Annan stated that steps should be taken to encourage member states to ratify the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel and the Statute of the ICC so that they might enter into force as soon as possible. The application of the Convention should be extended to cover all humanitarian personnel. He continued that UN and other humanitarian personnel should be trained on security procedures prior to deployment. The UN Security Coordinator in collaboration with UNHCR have jointly developed a security training package. The Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) has approved the implementation of a mandatory security training programme for all UN personnel. However, Annan warned that none of the organisations concerned provided funds for this. Consequently, ACC has approved the establishment of a Trust Fund for Security, which was formalised in June 1998. However, only one government has responded positively so far.

Involvement of the Security Council

The Secretary-General emphasised that humanitarian activities must not be viewed in isolation from a conflict's overall social, political and economic context. Therefore, the Security Council should be kept regularly informed of the humanitarian situation in cases of potential or actual conflict so that it maintained a comprehensive picture of the problem. In situations where the Security Council authorised the deployment of UN troops or other external security forces in support of humanitarian operations, it was vital that they be provided clear, realistic and appropriate mandates, that they be deployed in a timely manner and that they be adequately resourced and supported. Annan declared that a clear mandate delineated the respective responsibilities of the military and humanitarian actors, and ensured effective and timely action.

Coordination

The Secretary-General highlighted the importance of establishing mechanisms for the effective coordination on the ground between the political and the military components of a UN operation, on the one hand, and its human rights and humanitarian components on the other. He stated that arrangements between international security forces and UN or other humanitarian organisations would be likely to ensure that the distinct nature of their respective tasks were understood and that policies and strategies were correctly coordinated. In order to better define the relationship between Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinators, as well as those of the Human Rights and other components of UN missions, a working group of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs has been established. The Special Representatives' role has been enhanced to this end to incorporate authority in the cases of multidimensional peacekeeping operations for all UN entities in the field.