This Issue
Secretary-General's UNSMA Report
The report covered developments since 19 June 1998. The Secretary-General stated that the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated significantly due to intensified fighting between the United Front (UF) and the Taliban after the breakdown of the ulema process in June. The protracted conflict had not only created a humanitarian crisis but was likely to spread, threatening regional stability. Both the UF and the Taliban abandoned their commitments not to launch major military offensives against each other during talks in the joint Steering Committee for the ulema commission, ignoring repeated appeals by the UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the international community in general. Kofi Annan asserted that the largest military offensive was launched on 12 July by the Taliban forces against the UF area. The Taliban eventually overcame Mazar-i-Sharif, the only major city it did not control. The Taliban then captured the city of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan on 13 September.
External Involvement
Annan asserted that UNSMA had received reports of large numbers of non-Afghans, primarily of allegedly Pakistani origin, fighting alongside the Taliban. Howwever, captured fighters told UNSMA they were independent adventurers fighting for a cause, without affiliation to any official institution of the Pakistani government. On the other hand, the Taliban claimed to have discovered missiles and a missile launcher owned by Ismaeli leader Sayed Mansour Nadiri, as well as 35 Iranian lorry drivers whom they accused of transporting war matériel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to UF forces. Iran described the lorry drivers as innocent civilians transporting commercial and humanitarian goods to northern Afghanistan.
The Taliban expelled all international non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers from Kabul, Annan stated. On 13 July, two local UN workers were abducted in Jalalabad. They were later found murdered in circumstances as yet unexplained by the Taliban authorities. On 21 August, one UNSMA official was wounded and one killed in Kabul. All UN agency workers were then withdrawn from Afghanistan until the security situation proved conducive to their return.
Annan declared that following the Taliban's entry into and occupation of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Iran reported that 11 of its diplomats and a press correspondent, all stationed at the Iranian Consulate in the city at the time, were missing. On 10 September, the Taliban announced that the bodies of nine of those diplomats had been recovered, having been killed by Taliban soldiers acting without orders.
The Secretary-General warned that the Taliban's advances caused alarm among Central Asian Republics, primarily in relation to cross-border refugee flows and the possible spread of the Taliban's fundamentalist brand of Islam. Transport and commercial arrangements were also threatened, although the Taliban have denied any extraterritorial designs.
Alleged Human Rights Violations
The Secretary-General received independent reports that as many as 2,000 of the Hazara Shiite population were masacred in Bamiyan by the Taliban following the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif.
Conclusions
The Secretary-General asserted that, after the collapse of the ulema process, UNSMA continued its normal programme of contacts with Afghani leaders, consultations with intergovernmental groups and activities within the community of UN agencies and NGOs. The Mission further met regularly with officials of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of the Iran government in Islamabad. On 23 July, UNSMA travelled to Jalalabad to make representations to the Governor of Nangarhar Province regarding the abduction and murder of two Afghan UN workers there. However, at the time of the writing, UN agencies were still awaiting a full report of inquiry.
Annan repeatedly appealed to Afghan warring factions, as well as inflammatory external powers, for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire followed by the resumption of political negotiations. He reiterated that military victory would merely transfer the conflict to new phase. He further appealed to all Afghan factions, in particular the Taliban, to respect the human rights of people under their control.
Annex: Meeting of the "Six Plus Two" Group, UN HQ, 21 September 1998
The Six Plus Two Group comprised Afghanistan's six immediate neighbours - China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - as well as Russia and the US.
Points of Common Understanding
The group asserted that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1193 (1998), the Taliban and other parties in Afghanistan should declare an immediate cease-fire and enter into negotiations towards a political settlement culminating in the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic, representative government. It urged all forces to immediately release non-combatant detainees, including Iranians. It advised the Taliban to quickly return the bodies of the three murdered Iranian diplomats, to cooperate with an international investigation into their murders and those of UN staff and to bring the guilty parties to justice.
The group suggested that the UN investigate reports of mass killings and mass graves in the country. The Taliban should stop harbouring international terrorists and should prevent the production and trafficking of narcotics.
The group supported Annan's decision to dispatch his Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, to the region to promote a settlement. Brahimi was to report his findings and recommendations to the
group and to seek the participation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
UN Doc: S/1998/913
2 October 1998
Afghan Killings Spread to Pakistan
A 28 November Washington Post report warned that the Taliban's mass killing of minority Shiite Muslims in northern Afghanistan had extended into Pakistan. The preceding few months had witnessed an increase in existing deep-rooted tensions between rival extremist Muslim factions in Pakistan. Police and intelligence officials suspected that the deaths of over twenty Sunni Muslim activists in Pakistan were the result of revenge attacks for murders of thousands of predominantly Shiite ethnic Hazaras by Taliban militia in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif in August.
The WP report declared that Sunni Islam, the larger of Islam's two principal branches, predominated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It further alleged that Pakistan's main intelligence agency helped organise the Taliban in the early 1990s and has supported its military campaign.
The report stated that the Punjab region of Pakistan has witnessed prolonged violent conflict between militant groups of Shiites and ultra-orthodox Sunnis. Over 500 people were killed over the previous
year and Shiite sympathy with associates killed in Afghanistan provided fresh motivation to the conflict. Security officials had so far failed to uncover evidence directly connecting the Hazara refugees to killings in Pakistan.
However, the recent murder in Islamabad of a prominent Sunni cleric close to the Taliban produced triumphant reactions in one Hazara neighbourhood of Quetta. The report added that an additional 21 Sunni militants have been
killed in Pakistan since the Taliban captured Mazar-e Sharif.
Washington Post
28 November
US Naval Exercises Aimed at Bilateral Ties With Algeria
A 12 November Washington Post report stated that the US carried out its first bilateral military exercise with Algeria. Some US diplomats and human rights activists were worried over such attempts to extend ties to a regime Washington has accused of widespread abuses of human rights during a seven-year conflict with Islamic extremists. US defence and intelligence agencies believed Algeria's military government to be defeating the extremists, in military terms. However, US officials declared the exercises to be in response to Algeria allowing investigations by both a UN human rights commission into allegations of abuses, and the Committee to Protect Journalists into press censorship. Six Algerian parliamentarians, including several from opposition parties, also attended a US-funded visit to study the American political system.
The report said that the Clinton Administration has increasingly been using military-led diplomatic initiatives in areas where its civilian foreign policy apparatus lacked access or resources. The US Navy has already helped to improve bilateral relations with, amongst others, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine and Yemen. However, US officials denied plans to assist the Algerian government's war with Islamist radicals, which has claimed between 75,000 and 120,000 casualties. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ronald Neumann asserted that such assistance would only follow genuine reform and improvement in the human rights situation.
According to the report, human rights advocates remained wary that Algerian military hard-liners could still extinguish what political pluralism has survived in the country. They were worried that such hard-liners might interpret the US exercises as implying tacit US support.
The report stated that in August 1998, then Commander-in-Chief of US Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Thomas Lopez, became the first high-ranking American officer to visit Algiers. On 4 October, the American and Algerian navies carried out their first bilateral exercise since Algerian independence in 1962. US officials have stated that the Algerian military then invited American officers to visit two air force training centres, opened negotiations on US submarine transit rights and offered use of a large training range for US warplanes.
Algerian Ambassador to the US Ramtane Lamamra confirmed the interest in a closer relationship with the US military, primarily in terms of training. The report said that private American investment in Algeria stood at $2 billion, chiefly in the oil and natural gas industries. However, until 1998 direct US aid amounted to $61,000 in international military education and training program (IMET) funds. The IMET program has since doubled to $125,000, focusing on non-lethal training for mid-level officers.
The report related that Algeria existed as a military-led, one-party socialist state for thirty years after gaining independence from France. This government promoted social welfare programmes, developed oil and natural gas industries and was largely self-sufficient in food production. During the late 1980s, the government attempted political and economic liberalisation. However, it was anticipated that Algeria's principle Islamic radical party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), would win national elections in 1992. Consequently, the government cancelled the ballot, banned the FIS and imprisoned many of its leaders, prompting internal unrest. Extremist opposition have since undertaken a terrorist campaign including the torture and mutilation of women and children and the annihilation of villages in the northern half of the country. In response, the government converted its 125,000-strong armed forces, the second-largest in Africa, and its 150,000 paramilitary troops into a counterinsurgency force. US defence analysts asserted that it constructed and armed local militia into a useful intelligence network.
Government military advances over armed opposition significantly reduced the number of killings over the preceding 18 months. However, there has been alleged Algerian military involvement in some massacres. US sources claimed early October saw 215 people killed, including 83 by government forces, during an offensive in the Ain Defla province. A January 1998 report by the State Department declared that Algerian security forces carried out extrajudicial killings, routinely tortured and abused detainees and arbitrarily arrested and detained many individuals suspected of involvement with armed Islamist groups. It added that security forces sometimes failed to intervene in massacres of civilians.
The WP report stated that Washington has refused to sell Algeria replacements for its Soviet-built MiG fighter jets, which a US official asserted have been used to mark targets for other planes to drop napalm on extremist bases. In October, Algeria acquired 12 of 39 MiG-29s from Belarus. The report suggested that France is believed to supply the Algerian military with intelligence, training and logistics.
According to the WP report, President Liamine Zeroual was thought to be in favour of pluralistic government. However, some experts believe Zeroual's recent decision to leave
office early was ordered by extremist sections of the military because of his moderate political views. Others believe that military supporters of political reform want Zeroual
gone because of associations with corruption. Elections were scheduled for April, but the government has not yet offered a candidate.
Washington Post
12 November
Israel ReConsiders South Lebanon
A 29 November Washington Post report stated that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was to convene a special cabinet meeting to reassess Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. The recent deaths of seven Israeli troops had promoted a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the area, which the report asserted had previously been virtually unthinkable.
The report declared that the annual casualty rate of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon was no longer politically acceptable. In the short term, Tel Aviv was likely to intensify reprisals against Hezbollah opposition fighters who have resisted Israeli presence in southern Lebanon to a low-intensity stalemate. According to Israeli television, the Lebanese government has appealed for American intervention to prevent additional Israeli airstrikes and artillery barrages against Lebanese targets.
The report revealed that Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechai has opposed a unilateral withdrawal from the nine-mile-deep security zone in southern Lebanon as this would leave Israel's northern border exposed to Hezbollah incursions. Netanyahu has been non-committal on the nature of the Israeli response. However, support for withdrawal had come from unexpected areas. Traditionally hawkish Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon favoured a staggered Israeli withdrawal backed by warnings that any raids into northern Israel would incur severe retaliatory strikes.
The WP report asserted that most Israeli deaths have stemmed from roadside bombs and ambushes, which Hezbollah carried out with increasing sophistication over recent months. Israel has retaliated with frequent airstrikes, artillery bombardments and ambushes. Tel Aviv claimed to have inflicted almost three times as many casualties on Hezbollah (around 60) as it sustained during 1998.
An opinion poll published by Maariv suggested that half the Israeli population still opposed unilateral withdrawal in the absence of a political solution with the Lebanese or their Syrian patrons. However, 40% did support a unilateral withdrawal, up from 16% in February 1997.
The report recalled that Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 to expel Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO relocated to Tunisia and in 1985, Israeli forces withdrew to the security zone across the border to protect northern Israel from Hezbollah attacks.
In 1997, the usual Israeli death-toll of 20-30 troops rose to 39, inducing renewed policy debate and the stirrings of a popular anti-war movement. Earlier in 1998, the government endorsed a 20-year-old UN resolution demanding Israeli withdrawal, adding the condition that Lebanon guarantee the security of Israel's northern border.
The report asserted that Lebanon would accept no conditions. However, it added that the real obstacle to a deal was Syria, which maintained 30,000 troops in Lebanon where it
wielded considerable influence. The report declared that Damascus armed Hezbollah and perceived the conflict as a means of pressing Israel into renewed talks on the return of the Golan Heights, captured by the Israelis in 1967.
Washington Post
29 November
Bombing of Iraq Averted
A 16 November Guardian report described how, on 14 November, American B-52 bombers armed with 2,000lb warheads and accompanied by fighter planes were dispatched towards Iraq from Diego Garcia, the British island base in the Indian Ocean. In the Gulf, warships with the US Gulf Fleet were preparing Tomahawk cruise missiles while aircraft carriers were ready to launch jet fighters for additional bombing raids. President Clinton ordered the attack on the advice of his National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, and his senior Military Adviser, General Henry Shelton. US officials described a sustained rolling campaign against Iraqi military bases, communications centres and factories which might have concealed weapons of mass destruction. The report asserted that the offensive would represent the largest military assault on Iraq since the 1991 Gulf war. The crisis developed from the 31 October decision by Baghdad to terminate the work of UNSCOM.
The report stated that, following the dispatch of US planes, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein then authorised a letter to Kofi Annan allowing the resumption of weapons inspections by UNSCOM. The UN Secretary-General relayed the message to Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the two main instigators of the military response to the crisis, prompting them to call off the attack.
According to the Guardian report, receipt of the actual text of the letter caused Clinton to be less convinced of the retraction of force, since an annex placed conditions on the resumption of inspections. This led to some friction with Annan over his initial positive appraisal to Clinton. Although China, France and Russia have traditionally held a sympathetic stance towards Iraq, by 13 November, Paris and Moscow agreed primary responsibility for the latest crisis lay with Baghdad. But, they both maintained that the letter demonstrated Saddam's readiness to step back from the crisis.
The report suggested that some of Clinton's advisers urged the continuation of military action to avoid again spending over $900 million deploying forces to the Gulf, only to have to withdraw them again. This had happened when Annan brokered a deal after the previous crisis in February. The report stated that the UK welcomed the opportunity to strengthen ties with US military decision-making. Although Washington maintained control of the military offensive, with British planes remaining on the ground mainly in Kuwait, London was charged with internationalising events, primarily to gain European support. The new German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröeder, wished to cooperate, which in turn influenced French President Jacques Chirac who had been nervous over the traditional French-German axis since the departure of former Chancellor Helmut Khol.
The report stated that the US and UK jointly condemned Iraq's letter as insufficient to allay the attack. In response, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Nizan Hamdoor described the
annex as containing suggestions rather than conditions, which Clinton eventually accepted. Clinton then announced that Baghdad would cooperate fully and
unconditionally with UNSCOM. However, the report stated that both Washington and London were suspicious that the same situation would be repeated in the next months, as had proved the case after the last crisis in February.
The Guardian
16 November
Annan Central to Preventing Attack on Iraq
A 16 November Guardian report identified Kofi Annan's 14 November acceptance on CNN that Baghdad had backed down as the turning point in the Iraqi crisis [see above]. At this point, both London and Washington had been sceptical of Iraqi intentions. On learning on 11 October that all UNSCOM inspectors were to be withdrawn, Annan had issued a personal appeal to Saddam to comply fully with international demands or accept a forcible response.
The report suggested that, on 13 November, the Secretary-General's role in the crisis had effectively been marginalised when Britain and the US opposed him brokering a settlement in Baghdad. Annan's public acceptance of the Iraqi climbdown reasserted the UN's position in the crisis and highlighted tension between his roles as a global peacemaker and as the representative of the wishes of the Security Council.
The report asserted that many Arab states, fearing an attack would destabilise Iraq and the whole region, had supported his position. However, UK and US hawks believed Annan may have made a slip of the tongue under pressure, or may have deliberately sought to divert the military option.
The report stated that Annan has appeared to avoid the Iraqi issue. The settlement he reached in February angered some US officials who believed that military action would end
the cycle of crises in Iraq. They interpreted the scenario as a demonstration that the UN and not Washington was running US foreign policy. The report added that the US has
subsequently urged Annan to adopt a leading role in seeking a solution to the crisis. Meanwhile, he has also had to respond to pressure from France and Russia to reduce the
British and American role in UNSCOM and to provide a tangible end point for Iraq.
The Guardian
16 NOvember
Dispute With Iraq Won't Be the Last
A 16 November Associated Press report stated that US Defence Secretary William Cohen warned that the diplomatic manoeuvring between Washington and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could not go on forever. However, the cycle of crises would continue until Saddam was removed from power, which at the time appeared unlikely.
David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security and a former weapons inspector, asserted that Saddam perceived weapons of mass destruction as vital to his survival and ambitions. However, US officials have declared that Washington would not alter its position. Some Democrat and Republican members of Congress advocated the removal of Saddam by an air campaign against his Republican Guard forces and command and control power bases, followed by US support for Iraqi opposition groups. The report recalled that during 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act authorising $97 million in US support for Iraqi opposition groups. However, such groups were not perceived as being sufficiently organised or strong to displace Saddam.
The first chief of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), David Kay, asserted that a combined military and political campaign against Saddam was the only solution to the problem. He declared that dispatching Tomahawk missiles to hit buildings would not be enough and that the people around Saddam represented his only genuine threat.
However, military analyst Colonel Harry Summers believed that the risk of political damage as a result of American casualties precluded Washington's preparedness to use sufficient
military force to oust Saddam. Furthermore, Iraqi power bases and suspected weapons sites wear often cited near hospitals, universities and industrial plants, while Saddam has
previously surrounded anticipated US military targets with women and children. The report recalled that the four previous American strikes against Iraq since the Gulf War were
pinpoint missile attacks designed to punish Saddam for misdeeds and that the US military has not gone through with strikes on as many occasions.
Associated Press
16 November 1998
Secretary-General's Report on the Humanitarian Situation in Iraq
The report provided information up to 31 October 1998 on the distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq, including the implementation of the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Secretary-General noted that the average amount of oil exported from Iraq increased from 1.3 million barrels per day for the previous 180-day period to 1.7 million barrels per day for the period up to 31 October 1998. Despite the increase in the volume of exports of oil, the financial target of the $3.1 billion required for the implementation of the enhanced distribution plan had not been met due to low oil prices. The complete implementation of the plan would have enabled a multisectoral approach to malnutrition and have helped to prevent additional deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
Food, Health and Education
However, Kofi Annan stated that the programme continued to help provide a more substantial food basket to the Iraqi population. In view of the complicated interplay between food supply, health and hygiene issues, the complete nutritional benefit of extra foodstuffs had not yet been realised. Infant malnutrition surveys revealed that the improvement previously noted from 1994 onwards in the three northern governorates had continued. However, central and southern regions of Iraq had seen infant malnutrition remain a serious concern. He regretted that as yet no applications for targeted nutrition supplies had been received by the Secretariat.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated a 15% increase in wheat and barley yields during 1998. However, domestic food production in central and southern Iraq continued to endure substantial input shortages and open market food prices rose, to the detriment of the poor. In contrast, food production in Iraq's three northern governorates increased substantially and the open market food prices continued to decline.
The Secretary-General asserted that an increasing influx of supplies in the health sector enlarged the range of treatment available. Drugs were more widely available at all levels of the health-care system. However, preventive health care failed to receive appropriate attention. The complete range of urgently required essential drugs remained unavailable on a regular basis. According to Annan, inputs in the electricity, water and sanitation sectors tended to have only a localised impact which was insufficient to offset the continuing structural deterioration of those sectors as a whole.
Although the programme was providing larger numbers of schools with furniture and educational supplies, Annan confirmed that there had been relatively little rehabilitation of school buildings throughout Iraq.
Funding Constraints
The Secretary-General warned that funding constraints in place at the time were likely to continue. Estimates placed current phase revenues at $3.15 billion. Once deductions
pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 986 (1995) had been removed, $1.98 billion would be available for the humanitarian programme, including $300 million for spare parts and
equipment, as authorised under resolution 1175 (1998). Annan remarked that Iraq's oil industry was in a lamentable state. The initial $300 million authorised for spare parts and
equipment only provided for the most urgent requirements. There had been significant price increases for many necessary items during the contracting process. In view of the
scale of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, Annan recommended that the Security Council extend the relevant provisions of resolution 1153 (1998) for an additional 180-day period,
subject to any other relevant action relating to the provisions of resolution 661 (1990).
UN Doc: S/1998/1100
19 November 1998
Iraq Denies Nerve Gas Responsibility
According to a 28 November Associated Press report, Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Riyadh al-Qaisi charged that the VX nerve agent detected on Iraqi warhead fragments discovered in May had been planted to discredit Baghdad. Iraq attributed responsibility either to the US or UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors.
The report asserted that Al-Qaisi sent three responses to inquiries about Iraqi chemical weapons and missile programmes to UNSCOM chief Richard Butler. According to UN officials, the letters pledged to facilitate investigations into the unresolved issues that Butler had cited during the week beginning 23 November. The report said that the letters appeared to demonstrate Iraqi compliance with requests it deemed legitimate. However, Baghdad would still reject requests unrelated to disarmament.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf also rejected conditions laid down by President Bill Clinton earlier in November that Iraq: resolve all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM; provide UNSCOM unfettered access to suspected sites; concede all relevant documents; accept all UN resolutions; and not interfere with the work of inspectors. However, Sahhaf declared Baghdad to be committed exclusively to the UN resolution linking the removal of sanctions to UN weapons certification.
The report revealed that Al-Qaisi had requested that teams investigate the fate of 155mm shells filled with mustard gas, verify the disposal of bombs equipped for chemical and
biological agents and inspect warhead storage areas. However, he asserted that the analysis of Iraqi-produced missile engine components extracted from the Tigris River canal
was justified neither on technical nor scientific grounds.
Associated Press
28 November
UK and US Launch Airstrikes against Iraq
A 20 December Guardian report described events leading to the launch of a combined British and American air offensive against Iraq. The report said that President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair decided on the 11 December offensive on the strength of an unseen UNSCOM report relating Iraqi non-compliance with UN resolutions. In fact, UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler related that Baghdad had refused to relinquish documents relating to chemical weapons.
The report recalled that Baghdad had failed to meet a one-month deadline for compliance imposed by London and Washington after the November standoff between the parties [see above]. At the time, Clinton's National Security advisory team had set a potential start date for attacks between Clinton's mission to the Middle East and the beginning of the Muslim festival of Ramadan. The US military then decided that an offensive would continue for four days. The report stated that US Defence Secretary William Cohen did not contradict accusations by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz that information gathered by UNSCOM was used in preparation of the airstrikes.
According to the Guardian report, US thinking was based around the assumption that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had no intention of honouring any commitments. Consequently, the State Department was considering not what but when events would come to a head.
The report further alleged that US motivation for the airstrikes stemmed from the desire to maintain its credibility after promising action in November. This claim was supported by the deployment during the week beginning 13 December of an extra eight B-52s to bring the number of US bombers on the British island base of Diego Garcia up to fifteen. This increase formed part of the rotation of US forces in the Gulf. US military numbers in the area were at their peak over the following week as incoming and outgoing forces overlapped.
The Guardian report alleged that the UK and the US had become aware of a trend developing between China, France and Russia advocating a restricted role for UNSCOM. A significant number of UN officials felt that UNSCOM had become agents more of the US than the UN and was acting in a deliberately confrontational manner. The International Atomic Energy Authority, on the other hand, had achieved greater cooperation and in October had announced that, contrary to UNSCOM's position, Baghdad's capability to develop nuclear material had been removed. The report asserted that Annan had also been in favour of a phased removal of sanctions following a comprehensive review at the end of 1998.
The report stated that on 11 December, US Ambassador to the UN Peter Burleigh told Butler to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq. It added that US authorities debated the
domestic perception of the timing of the airstrikes the day before Clinton was to be impeached. Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook on 16 December appealed to the
British public to prepare them for the imminent strikes, without actually disclosing what was happening. The air offensive was launched at ten o'clock GMT on 17 December. The first wave featured exclusively US hardware.
The Guardian
20 December 1998
Cook Justifies Offensive
Writing in the Guardian on 20 December, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook justified the UK/US offensive against Iraq. He outlined the mission's objective as to achieve the disarmament of Iraq that had been denied by the Iraqi authorities. In particular, strikes were aimed at setting back by many years Iraqi capacity to produce missiles or deploy pilotless aircraft carrying biological or nuclear weapons.
Cook disclosed information on criminal activities of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gathered through Iraqi defectors or the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He highlighted the torture (including the beating of feet) of Iraqi dissidents; the exposure of escapees from jail to rabid dogs; and the use of the death penalty to deter opposition. The Foreign Secretary declared that defection from the ruling Baath Party was punishable by death, while personnel of weapons of mass destruction programmes also had to sign agreements that leaving without authorisation was punishable by death.
The Foreign Secretary revealed that during November 1997, 568 people in one Iraqi prison and 80 members Saddam's own army were executed, while 40 of his relatives were also killed. One murdered opponent was found in Stockholm in two suitcases. Several Shia scholars and leaders have also been assassinated.
Cook cited instances of genocide by the Iraqi regime. Some 70,000-150,000 Kurds were murdered in northern Iraq. The order was given for unrestricted fire and the execution of all males between 15 and 70, while more than 1,200 villages were destroyed. The Foreign Secretary asserted that Saddam killed 5,000 people in the village of Alaja using chemical and biological weapons. He further drained the marshes in the south of Iraq, forcibly relocating 150,000 marsh Arabs.
Cook pointed out that nine of the first twelve years of Saddam's rule were spent at war; it was only the sanctions then imposed on Iraq that since prevented him pursuing the same tactics. A large part of Saddam's extensive military forces were used to protect the president from his own people. These included the 75,000-strong Republican Guard, the 8,000-strong Special Republican Guard from Takrit where Saddam originated and 2,000 men from his own Abunaza tribe.
According to Cook, the UK/US policy was now one of containment. A credible military threat would be maintained to: prevent Iraqi attempts to reassemble its weapons of mass
destruction capability; monitor Iraqi military activity; isolate the Iraqi regime; and encourage the opposition. He asserted that the military campaign against Saddam would
be followed by a diplomatic one to develop international consensus to isolate Saddam both domestically and internationally.
The Guardian
20 December 1998
Special FRench Relationship With Iraq
A 22 December Financial Times report outlined France's special relationship with Iraq. It asserted that the Middle East has played a crucial role in France's post-Second World War objective of becoming a global rather than regional political power. France perceived itself as a mediator between East and West and North and South during the Cold War and believed the Middle East to be pivotal to these relationships. Paris regarded Iraq as an ideal partner with which to exert influence in the area.
According the FT report, Baghdad was not perceived as a regional or international threat in the mid-1970s but rather as a useful balancing influence. Its leader (Saddam Hussein) appeared to be a modern, secular and enlightened ruler and the Iraqi regime's political orientation was useful for France. The Soviet Union had been Iraq's principal arms supplier; thus the French presence there was viewed in the West as a moderating influence on a potentially radical state. The report recalled that the US played a similar role in Tehran. The Iraqi secular authority was seen as a prospective model for other Arab states against the perceived negative influence of intolerant Islam. From 1979, the Iranian revolution and its indirect consequence, the Iran-Iraq war, destroyed political relationships in the area.
The report declared that Paris believed the US policy of sanctions and isolation towards Baghdad had failed: it had had little political impact; Saddam remained in power; while the enormous human cost to Iraqi citizens was unacceptable. The report urged the development of an exit strategy which would enable Iraq's reintegration into the international community. It stressed that Arab public opinion and sensitivities needed to be considered, particularly in view of perceived US foreign policy double standards: leniency towards Israel against rigour towards Iraq.
Paris viewed the humanitarian situation in Iraq as socially and culturally dangerous in the long term, while merely consolidating the Iraqi regime in the short term. Its position as a
Permanent Member of the Security Council allowed France to present itself as an alternative Western viewpoint and a self-proclaimed mediator between America and the
rest of the world. The report suggested that France needed the UN to develop its strategy and that Kofi Annan required French support.
Financial Times
22 December 1998
Tougher Iraq Sanctions Problematic
A 22 December Financial Times report pointed out that UN-authorised sanctions against Iraq had been porous even before the recent airstrikes. It added that support for UK-US policy appeared to have been severely weakened by the offensive. The Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms, Gary Milhollin, questioned whether countries sympathetic to Iraq would start breaking sanctions unilaterally, placing considerable strain on the UN system.
The report stated that the oil-for-food programme allowed $5.2bn of crude oil to be exported every six months to enable essential imports. However, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein supplemented such revenue with illegal oil exports by sea through the Gulf and by land across Jordanian, Syrian and Turkish borders. A Pentagon official asserted that only exports by through the Gulf were large enough to warrant sanctions enforcement. However, Professor of Middle Eastern history at Haifa University, Amatzia Baram, estimated that around 50,000 barrels of oil per day left via the Gulf, down from 120,000-150,000 b/d three months previously due to intensified US naval policing. Approximately 100,000b/d left via Jordan, sold effectively at half price, while the Syrian and Turkish borders accounted for 50,000 and 70,000b/d. Therefore, all outlets should be watched. The main threat to the sanctions regime would arise if either Syria or Turkey were to open pipelines over their territories outside the oil for food programme, although this prospect appeared unlikely.
Richard Murphy from the Council on Foreign Relations believed that tightening sanctions would be difficult. He suggested that opponents of the airstrikes might try to establish a
different sanctions regime to reduce chances that force would be used again. This might still restrict Iraqi capacity to import weapon technology and, by relaxing the oil for food
programme and thus allow a broader range of imports, enable better enforcement.
Financial Times
22 December 1998
Russia and the Former Soviet Union
Secretary-General's UNOMIG Report
The Secretary-General recalled that on 30 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 1187, by which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 January 1999, subject to review in the event of changes to the mandate of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The report provided an update of the situation as of 23 October 1998.
Negotiations
Kofi Annan welcomed the meeting on confidence-building measures in Athens from 16-18 October between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, particularly since both sides had been close to resuming hostilities several times in 1998. Representatives from both sides also used the meeting to engage in dialogue on issues central to settlement of the conflict. Annan urged them to implement the agreed measures and to develop a network of contacts that could help disentangle the political stalemate regarding the two core problems to the disspute - the political status of Abkhazia and the return of refugees and displaced persons.
UNOMIG Activities
The viability of UNOMIG was being threatened by its security situation. The Secretary-General stated that on 21 September, a UNOMIG bus was ambushed in the centre of Sukhumi, during which four UN staff members were injured, one of them seriously. Annan noted that the intent of the ambush was to kill UNOMIG personnel. Prior to the attack, patrolling and other UNOMIG activities had already been curtailed for security reasons. Additional measures to improve the security of UNOMIG personnel would further restrict the mission's capacity to implement its mandate. He warned that unless the parties urgently improved the security environment, he would have reduce UNOMIG's strength and consider relocating UN personnel to more secure locations. He cautioned that if UNOMIG were forced to withdraw from Abkhazia, the situation in the security and restricted weapons zones would almost certainly become more serious, including the possibility of a return to open hostilities. He therefore urged in particular member states of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General to use their influence with the parties to ensure improvement of the security environment. He suggested that the Security Council consider whether substantial increases in the number of internationally recruited security personnel - providing internal security to UNOMIG installations - might offer at least a partial solution while other alternatives continued to be explored.
Composition of UNOMIG as at 23 October 1998
Albania -; Austria 4; Bangladesh 8; Czech Republic 4; Denmark 5; Egypt 3; France 5; Germany 11; Greece 4; Hungary 5; Indonesia 4; Jordan 5; Pakistan 6; Poland 3; Republic of Korea 3; Russian Federation 3; Sweden 5; Switzerland 4; Turkey 5; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 6; United States of America 2; Uruguay 3; Total 98.
UN Doc: S/1998/1012
29 October 1998
Indian/Russian Defence Agreement
A 22 December Financial Times report described how India and Russia on 21 December reaffirmed previous Cold War allegiances by signing a 10-year military technical cooperation agreement. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was the first leader from the Permanent Members of the Security Council to visit India since the country's nuclear tests in May. Meanwhile, India was negotiating with Washington over nuclear proliferation and arms control issues.
The FT report stated that Primakov suggested developing a strategic triangle with China and India to enhance international security. However, while Indian Prime Minister Atal
Behari Vajpayee reiterated the strength of Indian/Russian relations, he added that New Delhi was still trying to improve relations with Beijing. India had cited the Chinese nuclear
threat as a reason for its nuclear tests in May. The report revealed that at least 50% of India's military hardware originated from Russia and that Russia was keen to procure more
arms orders from one of its main customers. Although Israeli and European manufacturers were also vying for Indian trade, lower prices meant Russia would remain its main supplier.
According to Indian officials, Moscow maintained its support of India's non-military nuclear programme and was committed to assist the construction of a nuclear power station in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.
Financial Times
22 December 1998
Secretary-General's UNMOT Report
The report covered developments since 13 August 1998. Kofi Annan declared that after several weeks of inertia in the peace process, on 22 September a crisis erupted following the shooting of Otakhon Latifi, the prominent member of both the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR). On 25 September, the UTO suspended activities with both the CNR and the government, making its return conditional on the arrest of Latifi's assassin and the establishment of concrete measures by the government to improve security for UTO members.
Crisis Resolution Measures
Following meetings on 26 and 28 September, President Emomali Rakhmonov and CNR Chair Abdullo Nuri outlined joint measures to resolve the crisis and expedite the implementation of the General Agreement. In particular, the parties intended: to improve the security of UTO representatives in CNR and the government; to establish a combined government/UTO commission to monitor the investigation of Latifi's murder; to accelerate government reform through the incorporation of UTO representatives; to establish a joint mobile task force to combat crime and ensure discipline in military units; to speed up the implementation of stages I and II of the military protocol; to implement the provisions of the amnesty law; to promote peace and reconciliation through the mass media; to hold regular meetings between the President and CNR; to improve logistic support for CNR; and to organise open seminars and meetings on the implementation of the General Agreement. On 29 September, UTO resumed its functions in CNR and in the government.
Annan stated that the government and UTO had since begun to adopt some of the above provisions. Rakhmonov ordered the re-verification of the status of implementation of the military protocol. A joint commission was established to monitor the government's investigation into the killing of Latifi. Also, security measures for UTO representatives were strengthened through the appointment of personal security guards.
Political Process
The Secretary-General welcomed the renewed movement in the political process towards completion of stages I and II of the protocol on military issues, notwithstanding certain deficiencies such as those relating to control over the arms of UTO fighters. Annan noted that the UTO was to announce during stage II the disbandment of its armed units, which would in turn facilitate lifting the ban on the activities of its component political parties. There was also some progress on the appointment of UTO personalities to government positions. He noted the repatriation of the last 157 UTO fighters remaining in Afghanistan from 23 to 26 September.
Annan recalled a serious a crisis in May that threatened to undermine the basis of the peace agreement. It followed the parliament's decision to amend the bill on political parties so as to exclude the Islamic Revival Party, the largest component of UTO. The crisis was eventually surmounted and the Secretary-General hoped that the parliament would consider constructively the revised bill in mid-November, taking into account the formula agreed upon by the Conciliation Commission. The parliament had made its May decision on the basis of a provision of the Constitution describing Tajikistan as a secular state. While there has been continuing debate over this provision and its meaning, there have been recent indications that both sides may be prepared to seek a solution to this issue.
Continuing Difficulties in the Peace Process
However, Annan reiterated that there were still formidable difficulties to be resolved on almost all the issues regulated in the peace agreement. Much remained to be done before elections were held and a new national government was installed, which would mark the end of the transitional period. The Secretary-General stressed that the peace process would continue to require international support, in particular through the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and the Contact Group (Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference). He therefore recommend that the UNMOT mandate be extended until 15 May 1999.
Annan warned that the precarious security situation in Tajikistan remained a significant hindrance to UNMOT and other UN agencies and programmes. He remained concerned
that no more progress had been made in establishing all relevant facts concerning the killing of the four members of UNMOT in July. Until appropriate action was taken, UN
personnel would need to operate with caution, even at the expense of the performance of their duties.
UN Doc: S/1998/1029
3 November 1998
Secretary-Generals' MIPONUH Report
The Secretary-General asserted that the consolidation of democracy and good governance in Haiti has continued to be impaired by the absence of a prime minister since 9 June 1997. This has subsequently diminished public confidence in the capability and willingness of the authorities to address the country's urgent economic and social problems. This situation jeopardised the continued provision of international assistance. Kofi Annan stressed the importance of fully operative institutions in accordance with Haiti's constitution and timely democratic elections to stability and progress.
Progress of the Haitian National Police
Annan asserted that nearly a year after its establishment, the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) had made considerable progress in fulfilling its mandate according to resolution 1141 (1997). The Haitian National Police (HNP) enhanced its capacity to maintain law and order: its officers now maintained visible presence on roads and in various communities. According to the Secretary-General, 70% of those questioned in a recent US Information Service poll voiced confidence in the HNP – an extraordinary figure for a country with no civilian police tradition. UN civilian police officers had had a positive effect on HNP conduct. However, Annan reiterated that a fully effective Haitian police force did not yet exist. It remained fragile and lacked the necessary experience, professional skills, resources and cohesion. Instances of excessive use of force by certain police officers continued while the HNP also faced increasing security challenges through drug trafficking and banditry. It further needed to carry on addressing internal cases of crime and corruption. International consultants recently stated that international investment in the HNP had proved worthwhile, but would ultimately be fruitless if not sustained.
MIPONUH Mandate
Annan stressed the importance of establishing an effective judicial system. Continued delays in judicial reform jeopardised the HNP's progress, the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights, maintenance of law and order and an end to impunity. Therefore, terminating the MIPONUH mandate would imperil the HNP's achievements and impede Haiti's efforts to reinforce its institutions. He recommended that the Security Council extend the MIPONUH mandate for one year until 30 November 1999. Annan further suggested that, in addition to verifying the HNP's field performance, MIPONUH might also be mandated to: strengthen current training for middle and senior cadres; reinforce the creation of a formal command structure and administration; and reinforce previous work on community policing. It was important simultaneously to ensure that, on MIPONUH's eventual withdrawal, the HNP's central directorate had a functioning capability to manage assistance that Annan hoped would continue to be offered. Annan's Special Representative and MIPONUH head, Julian Harston, would coordinate the work of UN agencies to achieve this and would liase with member states to ensure that bilateral and multilateral efforts remained complementary.
Composition of MIPONUH as of 9 November 1998
[Special Police Unit (SPU); Civilian Police (CP)] Argentina 140 (SPU); 6 (CP); Benin 6 (CP); Canada 24 (CP); France 36 (CP); India 2 (CP); Mali 20 (CP); Niger 5 (CP); Senegal 8 (CP); Togo 6 (CP); Tunisia 2 (CP); United States of America 30 (CP); Subtotal 140 (SPU); 145 (CP); Total 285
Cost estimates for the extension of the MIPONUH for a period of 12 months
[Thousands of US dollars]
Military personnel costs -; Civilian personnel costs 20,620; Premises/accommodation 1,430; Infrastructure repairs - Transport operations 3,500; Air operations 2,820; Naval operations
30; Communications 410; Other equipment 1,000; Supplies and services 2,190; Election-related supplies and services -; Public information programmes 70; Training
programmes -; Mine-clearing programmes -; Assistance for disarmament and demobilisation -; Air and surface freight 70; United Nations Logistics Base, Brindisi -;
Support account for peacekeeping operations -; Staff assessment 1,460; Total 33,600.
UN Doc: S/1998/1064
11 November 1998
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