Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

Briefing Paper No 18:

Visits : An Effective and Essential Pillar

Executive Summary

Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando

Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando

Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

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This Briefing Paper examines the role and effectiveness of visits as these are emerging from the current negotiations and in the light of the experience being gained in trial visits carried out by several developed States Parties and their likely infrequency based on studies of the probable size of the future BTWC Organization. It is concluded that visits are both an essential and an effective pillar of the strengthened BTWC regime which ensure accurate and complete declarations which thereby build transparency and confidence in compliance, and that their benefits far outweigh the slight additional burden on an already highly regulated and inspected industry.

VISITS

The current draft Protocol contains essentially three different types of visits -- voluntary request visits (to facilities to be declared), random visits (to declared facilities), clarification visits to declared facilities and to facilities which should have been declared -- each with a different yet important role that is directly related to declarations. It needs to be stressed that visits are concerned with declarations and with compliance with the Protocol -- and are not addressing compliance with the Convention. All are non accusatory and non confrontational and none are associated with any consideration of whether or not the facility was in compliance with the Convention.

Voluntary request visits have a role in enabling the Organization, at the request of a State Party, to assist the State Party making the request for the visit in compiling its declarations as required by the Protocol. As such they are one way of helping States Parties to meet their obligations under the Protocol. The requesting of such a visit would also add to the building of trust and confidence as it would be evidence that the State Party concerned took its obligations seriously by asking the Organization for assistance in making its declarations. In addition, it would be expected that the number of such voluntary request visits would reduce over time as States Parties gained experience in compiling their national declarations.

A regime based on declarations and voluntary visits alone would be ineffective on several grounds:

- Not all States Parties would volunteer such visits

- Those that did offer such visits would limit them to those facilities that the State Party was certain had a declaration that was consistent with the Protocol,

- Visits would be unlikely to be volunteered to all categories of facilities within a State Party

- Visits would be unlikely to be volunteered to any facility within a particular category.

The net effect of such a regime would be that over time States Parties would decide what they would include in declarations and the situation would approach that which pertains at present in regard to declarations under the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in which individual States decide how much or how little information to submit resulting in the very variable and patchy CBM responses. Thus a regime based on declarations and voluntary visits alone could well create a false sense of security and would clearly fail to build transparency, trust and confidence. Likewise any suggestions that voluntary visits should take place on a bilateral basis, outside the auspices of a future BTWC organization, are retrograde steps as such a bilateral process would add nothing to building confidence between all States Parties to the Protocol that accurate and complete declarations are being submitted.

Random visits are non accusatory and have no association whatsoever with any consideration as to whether or not the particular facility being visited is in compliance. They will clearly be infrequent, short and carried out by a small team with a mandate limited to confirming that the declaration for a declared site is consistent with the obligations under the Protocol. Given that declarations will not include commercial proprietary or national security information, random visits carried out by members of the future BTWC Organization will present no risk to either commercial proprietary information or to national security information. Random visits although infrequent and entailing the use of only a small amount of the resources of the BTWC Organization are highly effective in ensuring that declarations are accurate and complete thereby ensuring that their contributions to transparency and building confidence are maximised. Random visits are thus a highly cost effective means of strengthening the Convention and building confidence in compliance.

Clarification procedures, whether in regard to declared facilities or to facilities that should have been declared, will clearly be focussed on ensuring that declarations are free from ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions with the aim of promoting accuracy and comprehensiveness in future declarations. There is no association whatsoever with consideration as to whether or not the facility is in compliance with the Convention. They will be part of a process that starts with an exchange of correspondence which may resolve the matter. If not the next stage would be consultations in the offices of the National Authorities which may again resolve the matter. Only if these earlier stages fail to resolve the matter, will a clarification visit be proposed.

Clarification visits are thus concerned with implementation of the Protocol through promoting accurate and complete declarations. They are not addressing concerns about compliance with the Convention. Consequently, clarification visits, although likely to decrease in number over time, entailing the use of only a small amount of the resources of the BTWC Organization are highly effective in ensuring that States Parties make their initial declarations and that declarations are indeed accurate and complete thereby increasing the contribution made by declarations to transparency and building confidence in compliance. They consequently complement random visits and are a highly cost effective means of strengthening the Convention and building confidence in compliance.

CONCLUSIONS

Although doubts have been expressed by some, especially within the United States, about possible risks to commercial proprietary information as a result of visits under the future BTWC Protocol, these have not been substantiated by practice visits carried out in several European States which have a significant biotechnological and pharmaceutical industry, nor by those, both in the US and elsewhere, who have carried out analyses of the system of declarations and visits as it is emerging from the Ad Hoc Group negotiations.

It is concluded that random and clarification visits together with voluntary request visits all have different yet complementary roles, that are essential and effective, to play in ensuring that declarations are accurate and complete in the strengthened BTWC Protocol thereby enhancing the contribution that declarations make to building transparency and confidence in compliance. They are non-accusatory and non-confrontational and are not associated with any consideration of whether or not a facility is in compliance with the Convention. They are highly efficient elements of the future regime which strengthen the regime significantly through ensuring accurate declarations yet entail only modest resources.