Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

Briefing Paper No 19:

The Future BTWC Organisation : Some Observations from the OPCW

Executive Summary

Daniel Feakes

Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando

Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

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This Briefing Paper draws upon the experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in order to provide some observations relevant to that aspect of the AHG negotiations which is addressing Article IX [The Organisation] [and Implementational Arrangements] in the rolling text.

The Briefing Paper begins by looking at the experience of the OPCW during its first year and a half of operations, focusing on the implementation of the CWC rather than its negotiation and preparation. The verification activities of the OPCW, including both quantitative and qualitative aspects, are studied first as these provide the baseline upon which all budgetary and structural assumptions are made. Further qualitative aspects relating in particular to administrative and political issues are then be examined to elaborate the significant role which they have played in the development of the OPCW. Finally, possible lessons for a BTWCO will be addressed.

OPCW VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

Three central aspects of the OPCWÕs verification activities - declarations, inspections and internal transparency - are examined from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view. The potential implications for a BTWCO are then considered which shows that such activities are the foundations of any verification organisation and that the OPCW has already gained experience which could be useful to the BTWCO.

By the time the BTWC Protocol enters into force, the OPCW will have had several years of verification experience from which a BTWCO can benefit. One such area will be in regard to procedures. As has been experienced with the CWC, many States Parties are likely to have difficulties preparing their declarations to the BTWCO and it would be helpful if more assistance were provided to States Parties before the submission deadlines. The BTWCO could also benefit from internal OPCW procedures such as those used for processing declarations, handling confidential information and from the inspection manual and standard operating procedures used by the Inspectorate. In order to avoid the problems which the OPCW has experienced with electronic handling of declarations, the BTWCO might consider obtaining the same system "off the shelf" which by then should be regarded as proven and accepted by States Parties rather than trying to reinvent the wheel.

In addition, the BTWCO might also benefit from the OPCWÕs experience when drafting its confidentiality policy and consider devising a less complex system, such as one having a single level of classified information, so that classification by States Parties has less of an impact. With a much smaller Inspectorate conducting fewer inspections, the BTWCO will not need as many support staff as the OPCW. However, while the actual volume of work might be less, the BTWCO Inspectorate will still need some support staff to get visas and arrange flights, for example. The BTWCO should, as the OPCW has done, be able to take advantage of discount air fares and should also be able to spend less time at inspected facilities as there will be no need to negotiate facility agreements. However, judging by the experience of the OPCW, the BTWCO could also expect its Member States to demand detailed information on verification activities and might also be faced by calls for the translation of working documents into all official languages.

OPCW -- POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Political issues will undoubtedly play a large part in the evolution of the BTWCO. The BTWCO Technical Secretariat will have to be large enough to accommodate calls for geographical balance in both its upper and lower echelons and will also have to tackle the problem of finding enough qualified candidates from the developing world to fill technical positions. Essential to the smooth implementation of the BTWC Protocol will be the establishment of a smooth working relationship between the organs of the BTWCO. Hopefully, by the time that the BTWC Protocol enters into force, both the BTWC Technical Secretariat and the Member States will be aware enough of the OPCW experience that some problems can be avoided.

The amount of work which will face the BTWCO's legal service should not be underestimated. However, ways could be found around some of the more time-consuming problems. The host country agreement and privileges and immunities agreements could be modelled on those used by the OPCW. However, the strain placed on OPCW legal resources by the requirement to conclude a separate privileges and immunities agreement with each State Party suggests that a different approach might be considered for the BTWC protocol. For example, rather than negotiating a separate agreement with each of its Member States, the IAEA drafted an "Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Agency" to which its Member States could add their signatures. The wider task of "institution-building" should also not be ignored, or left until the Protocol enters into force. For example, the lack of a tenure policy could very soon begin to impact on the work of the Technical Secretariat. Qualitative factors such as these do play a very significant role in the evolution of a new international organisation.

CONCLUSIONS FOR A BTWC ORGANISATION

There would be advantages to both the OPCW and the BTWCO from a cooperative arrangement between them because of the close relationship between the two Conventions and their objectives. A cooperative arrangement would also contribute to strengthening the coherence of the international norm against both chemical and biological weapons. Organizationally and procedurally there will much benefit that the future BTWC will be able to gain from the OPCW. Even simply imitating OPCW procedures and working methods could save the BTWCO an immense amount of time and money. Other possible areas of cooperation might be in respect of Article X of the CWC and Article VI of the BTWC Protocol which both relate to assistance and protection measures.