Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Briefing Paper No 10: Article X : The Strengthened BTWC Protocol : An Integrated Regime
Executive Summary
Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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This Briefing Paper considers the current rolling text of the Protocol to strengthen the BTWC and draws together the likely elements of that Protocol in order to examine how together they will result in an integrated regime that will strengthen effectively the BTWC. It draws upon the earlier Briefing Papers Nos 1 to 9 and shows how the various elements of the regime will complement each other and together create a regime that will enhance transparency and build confidence in compliance and so "strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention" .
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR THE PROTOCOL
The central and essential elements to the future Protocol are measures which together will provide the BTWC with a compliance monitoring mechanism that will detect and deter cheaters and will build confidence over time in compliance with the Convention. These measures include:
a. Mandatory Declarations of those facilities and activities of most relevance to the Convention
b. Non-Challenge Visits, both focussed and random, to declared facilities
c. Both Facility and Field Investigations to address a compliance concern.
However, these measures in isolation will not suffice. It is recalled that the Special Conference in its Final Declaration stated that "the Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group." [Emphasis added]. It went on to say that "the objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument..."[Emphasis added]. It is thus evident that the aim of the AHG is both to strengthen the effectiveness and the implementation of the Convention.
The additional elements needed for the Protocol include:
a. Measures to ensure full implementation of Article X (peaceful cooperation)
b. Measures to improve the implementation of Article IV (national implementation)
c. Measures to improve the implementation of Article III (non-transfer)
together with an appropriate organisation to implement the Protocol. Measures in isolation without an appropriate organisation would be ineffective.
AN INTEGRATED REGIME
The way in which the various elements of the integrated regime for the strengthened BTWC will complement one another and enhance the effectiveness of the overall regime is examined. There are at least two main functions of the Protocol -- to strengthen confidence in compliance
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and to address concerns in a timely way. The building of confidence and the addressing of concerns are closely connected. Whilst the accumulation of information over time about activities and facilities within a State Party will build confidence within the BTWC Organization that they have an accurate appreciation of that State Party, the building of confidence in compliance will depend on the consistency of the information being accumulated, the quality of the declarations by the State Party and the response by the State Party to any queries whether about when declarations will arrive or about any aspect of a declaration as well as the way in which visits to that State Party by the BTWC Organization have been received. The heart of the building of confidence lies in the analysis of declarations and the carrying out of visits by the BTWC Inspectorate. In essence, the integrated regime can be represented as a combination of the two principal activities of building confidence and addressing concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
The Protocol being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva has all the key elements required for a highly effective integrated regime already in the draft text. The additional detailed measures identified in this Briefing Paper that have yet to be elaborated should not present an undue difficulty -- declarations of past BW facilities, visits to BW defence and government owned past BW facilities at about once every two years intervals, measures to improve implementation of Articles III, IV and X of the Convention designed to also contribute to strengthening confidence in compliance. This Briefing Paper has demonstrated that all the different elements are all inter-related and together will have a considerable synergistic effect that will create an effective regime building confidence in compliance with the Convention, ensuring that uncertainties, anomalies and concerns are swiftly investigated and improving the implementation of the Convention.
Such an integrated regime should achieve the required consensus support from all the States Parties engaged in the work of the Ad Hoc Group because it will achieve the necessary balance to meet the aims and objectives of both the developed and the developing world. Both developed and developing countries share a common desire to see the elimination of the use of deliberate disease to attack humans, animals and plants and a strengthening of global, regional and national counters to natural outbreaks of disease. The regime against biological weapons will be strengthened effectively so that States considering acquisition of biological weapons will judge that this is not worthwhile whilst access for peaceful purposes to materials and equipment in a transparent manner will be promoted so that States Parties can benefit from the burgeoning advances in biotechnology. The regime should be crafted so that where the biotechnology industry is already highly regulated this is taken into account and valuable commercial proprietary information protected. Additionally, assistance needs to be provided to States Parties to build the necessary infrastructure to implement the Protocol and achieve additional benefits for public health, environmental safety and increased trade.
It has become apparent that measures can be devised that will both achieve the effective implementation of Article X of the Convention and contribute directly to the enhancing of transparency and the building of confidence and thus to the strengthening of the effectiveness of the Convention. Although the final elaboration of the integrated regime has yet to occur, it does appear that the additional burden for both developing and developed countries will be modest and bring tangible benefits for security, public health, environmental safety and trade. The biotechnology industry is already highly regulated in many countries; measures that seek to harmonise such regulations will contribute both to the promotion of trade and the building of confidence that dual purpose materials and facilities are only being used for permitted peaceful purposes.
The benefits to national and international security are clear. It is also evident that a strengthened BTWC will build international confidence which will facilitate and encourage international trade safe in the knowledge that the dual purpose biological agents and toxins, equipment and facilities will not be misused for prohibited weapons. The recent political initiatives to encourage completion of the substantive negotiations of the Protocol this year are welcomed and it behoves us all to do what we can to facilitate and aid the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group during its final few months.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 21 August 98.