The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Briefing Paper No 12: Article III : Some Building Blocks
Executive Summary
Graham S Pearson
Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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This Briefing Paper considers the provisions for the strengthening of Article III in the current version of the draft Protocol for the strengthening of the BTWC being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group in the light of some of the developments that have occurred nationally and regionally in respect of export controls of hazardous materials. Some international export control developments are considered in Briefing Paper No 13 Article III : Further Building Blocks which complements this Paper. It has become apparent that there is increasing awareness world-wide, both from security considerations and from public health and environmental concerns, that the transfer of hazardous materials needs to be controlled. These two Briefing Papers examine some of the current national export controls and regulations for such materials and the international initiatives that are ongoing to strengthen these around the world. These are seen as building blocks which might be considered from a point of view of strengthening the BTWC as well as contributing to the implementation of Article III. The challenging goal is to identify how these national, regional and international export control activities can be drawn upon to contribute to the strengthening of the BTWC.
AD HOC GROUP
The current language in the Protocol relating to measures to strengthen the implementation of Article III of the Convention in respect of declarations, transfer guidelines, investigations and confidence-building measures is outlined. This topic has received little detailed consideration in recent sessions of the AHG probably because of the sensitivity of the issue of export controls and the expressed contention that harmonization of export controls is hampering trade for peaceful purposes despite the lack of evidence to the contrary.
NATIONAL CONTROLS
Each State Party to the BTWC is required under the Convention to take appropriate national measures to implement their obligations under Article III not to provide any assistance for prohibited purposes . In this Briefing Paper, the United Kingdom is used as an example of a State Party which meets this obligation through a system of export controls.
The UK system of export controls for biological materials and equipment essentially comprises three elements:
a. The control of biological agents "adapted for use in war" through the Export of Goods (Control) Orders EG(C)O,
b. The control of a long list of human, animal and plant pathogens through the Dual Use and Related Goods (Export Control) Regulations DU(EC), and
c. A catch-all provision which controls any goods which the exporter has reason to think may be associated with a weapon of mass destruction programme.
The provisions of these various elements are described.
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REGIONAL CONTROLS
The UK export control regime has closely reflected that of the European Union for dual-use goods. In considering regional controls of transfers, the European Union regime is first addressed and then two other wider arrangements -- those of the Australia Group and of the Wassenaar Arrangement -- are considered.
European Union. The European Union has established a regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods through a Council Decision 94/942/CFSP and a Council Regulation EC 3381/94 which constitute an integrated system involving the Council, the Commission and the Member States. The preamble to the Regulation makes it clear that "an effective system of export control on dual-use goods on a common basis is also necessary to ensure that the international commitments of the Member States and the European Union, especially on non-proliferation, are complied with". The provisions of this regime in respect of biological materials and equipment are outlined.
Australia Group. Another harmonized set of export controls which includes countries beyond the European Community is that provided by the Australia Group. This first met in 1985 to constrain the trade in the technologies and materials of chemical warfare. It is known as the Australia Group because it is chaired by Australia and meets in the Australian Embassy in Paris. The Group has no charter or constitution. It operates by consensus. In 1990, its purview expanded to include biological weapons and it began to develop guidelines relevant to biological weapons and in 1991, 1992, and 1993 finalized a set of lists of controlled technologies and materials, which are detailed in the Briefing Paper. Its now annual meetings focus on sharing information about national export controls, considering proposals for "harmonization" -- the adoption of common controls by all members on chemical precursors, equipment, biological weapons related materials and considering other measures to address chemical and biological weapons proliferation and use. The Group has issued an informal "warning list" of dual-use materials and equipment. Member States develop and share the warning lists with their relevant industries and ask industry to report on any suspicious transactions. In more recent years, its work has focused on implementation and enforcement. Its membership has steadily increased since 1985 and the number of participating States is now 30, with the inclusion of a number of countries from Central Europe and one from South America.
The Wassenaar Arrangement. In 1994 the cold war-vintage Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) formally ceased to function. It had brought together the Western countries with the aim of restricting the transfer of militarily-sensitive materials to the Soviet Union. At the Vancouver Summit in 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the previous COCOM regime should be replaced by a new non-discriminatory arrangement which would include Russia as a participant. Representatives of 28 countries met in Wassenaar, the Netherlands on 18 and 19 December 1995 and agreed to establish The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. This Arrangement is designed to promote transparency, exchange of views and information as well as greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Some 33 countries participate in the Arrangement which began operations in September 1996.
CONCLUSIONS
Arrangements are clearly already in place within countries such as the United Kingdom for the monitoring and control of exports of biological materials and equipment which enable the United Kingdom to meet its obligations under Article III of the BTWC. These control regimes have been harmonized within the European Union and also more widely through the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These measures provide a useful basis which could with advantage be drawn upon in devising appropriate measures to strengthen the implementation of Article III in the Protocol being negotiated by the AHG to strengthen the BTWC.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 30 September 1998