The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Briefing Paper No 16: The BTWC Protocol Implementation : Practical Considerations
Executive Summary
Graham S Pearson
Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) has now completed eleven sessions and has produced the fifth version of the draft Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Further progress was made at the June/July 1998 AHG meeting with clear signs of engagement by all participants with serious negotiations seeking to resolve language currently within square brackets. In addition, it is apparent that the AHG has turned the corner from adding reams of new text to reducing down and focussing on key issues. There was also evidence that text is now being consolidated and developed with a move towards production by the Friends of the Chair of clean texts in which language without square brackets was being prepared. This year has seen a continuing high level of political interest around the world in completing the negotiations as quickly as possible. It is thus clear that the end game has already commenced and there are reasonable expectations that the substantive negotiations will have been completed by the end of 1998.
It is therefore time to address some practical considerations relating to the implementation of the future BTWC Protocol. The cornerstone of the future regime will be the declarations and the non-challenge visits as it is the information from these measures, complemented by the additional information from the Article III and the Article X measures, that will, over time, build confidence and trust between States parties that they are in compliance with the Convention. This Briefing Paper examines some practical aspects in respect of compiling declarations and making such non-challenge visits with a view to indicating how they might be achieved by building upon existing national capabilities. The implications for the implementation of the Protocol and of Article X of the Convention are outlined.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is apparent from both cost and effectiveness grounds that any new requirements for the BTWC Protocol should, as far as possible, build upon existing regulations and controls. This is a point that has been made on several occasions by the representatives of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in considering the implications of the strengthened Protocol. There would appear to be no necessity to introduce a new national bureaucratic arrangement if the required functions can be carried out by an extant national organisation.
UK experience in respect of the implementation of another international agreement -- that for Prior Informed Consent prior to the export and import of "banned or severely restricted" chemicals -- is examined as a possible model for the implementation of the central pillar of a future BTWC Protocol -- the provision of mandatory declarations of facilities and activities of particular relevance to the BTWC.
A POSSIBLE MODEL
The Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure has been a legally binding requirement within the European Union since 1992. In the United Kingdom, although the Department of the Environment is the Designated National Authority, the PIC procedure is implemented by the Health and Safety Executive. The logic for this reflects the responsibility of the Health and
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Safety Executive to ensure that the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 is effectively implemented which gives it considerable powers to enter premises and to require the provision of information.
ANALYSIS
Briefing Papers No 6 and No 7, which considered possible building blocks for the implementation of Article X (international cooperation for peaceful purposes) of the BTWC, identified the potential benefits to the Protocol of measures involving national health and safety regulatory frameworks. The involvement of the Health and Safety Executive in the implementation of United Kingdom regulations concerning the handling, storage and use of human pathogens was outlined in Briefing Paper No. 7. There is a requirement for notification to the Health and Safety Executive at least 30 days in advance of first use of biological agents in Groups 2, 3 and 4 where there is an intention to propagate, concentrate or store such biological agents. All work including diagnostic work relating to Group 4 agents and a few specified Group 3 agents has to be so notified. The premises in which Group 3 and 4 agents are handled are inspected by specialist microbiologist HSE inspectors whose aim is to inspect all facilities working with Group 4 agents annually and all facilities working with Group 3 agents once every three years. These inspections focus on the facilities, procedures and practices as well as the management of health and safety within the facility and include reviews of the risk assessments which have been prepared by the facility as required under the regulations. As the human pathogens that are currently listed in the draft Protocol are all primarily either Group 4 or Group 3 agents, it is evident that, in the United Kingdom, facilities engaged in working with such agents are regularly inspected by specialist microbiologist HSE inspectors.
When this is taken into consideration along with the extent of the powers which the Health and Safety Executive exercise in visiting premises of all types within the United Kingdom -- and their responsibility for oversight of the safe use of both materials and equipment -- it becomes apparent that there could well be advantages in an organization such as the Health and Safety Executive being charged with the collection of the information that will be required for Declarations under the Protocol for the strengthening of the BTWC. The intimate knowledge that organizations such as the Health and Safety Executive have as a result of their repeated inspections of relevant facilities would engender confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the declarations required to be made nationally under the future Protocol if these were to be the responsibility of such organizations.
CONCLUSION
In considering how the Protocol to strengthen the BTWC might be implemented in regard to the collection of the information needed for national declarations of activities involving pathogens, there are apparent advantages from the viewpoints of both Protocol implementation and from the implementation and strengthening of Article X of the BTWC in utilising existing national health and safety agencies, such as the Health and Safety Executive in the United Kingdom, which are already engaged in examining information on and inspecting activities involving the use of pathogens. Confidence would be enhanced that declarations prepared by such agencies were both complete and accurate.
There are thus potential benefits to be gained from building upon and utilizing existing national health and safety agencies to collect the information required for national declarations under the future BTWC Protocol. These arise not only from the greater confidence that such declarations are accurate and complete but also ensure that the users of dangerous pathogens are not faced with conflicting demands which might unnecessarily inhibit research or industry. There is much to be said for "single stop shopping" in respect of the national control, regulation and reporting of dangerous pathogens. There are benefits to be gained by States Parties in building upon their national health and safety frameworks to bring them security benefits through the efficient and effective implementation of the Protocol.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 30 September 1998