Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Briefing Paper No 2: The Necessity for Non-Challenge Visits
Executive Summary
Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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Debate has increased in recent years over the role and value of Non-Challenge
Visits (NCVs) - defined as on-site measures in the absence of suspicions
of non-compliance - in a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This paper considers the advantages
and disadvantages of including NCVs, drawing on experience with on-site measures
in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) and on evidence and findings from VEREX and the Ad Hoc
Group (AHG) deliberations. Arguments and supporting data for the advantages
and disadvantages of NCVs are taken directly from the working papers of
delegations participating in VEREX, the AHG process, from the text of the
CWC, and from official reports of UNSCOM.
Two main types of NCVs have been proposed:
Regular visits to declared facilities, called routine inspections in the
CWC, are not under consideration by the AHG.
The principle advantages of NCVs, described by many sources, fall into several
broad categories; a number of which are dependent on the random nature of
a visit. Any regime to strengthen the BWC will be made up of a set of integrated
measures. One goal of the AHG is to devise a set of complementary measures
that reinforce one another, thereby leveraging or enhancing the benefits
of any single measure. Thus, one of the most compelling reasons to include
NCVs is to reinforce the other elements of the protocol - declarations and
non-compliance concern investigations (NCCIs) - which would be diminished
considerably without NCVs.
a) by creating an incentive to provide accurate declarations;
b) by strengthening confidence in the accuracy of declarations;
c) by deterring cheating at a declared site;
d) by clarifying and confirming declarations;
e) by identifying discrepancies or ambiguities pertaining to
facilities or activities.
a) by gathering information that could raise a non-compliance concern;
b) by allowing States Parties and inspectors to see each other in action,
to understand how and why they do things certain ways, and to understand
their sensitivities and concerns;
c) by enhancing the preparedness, experience, and effectiveness of
BTWC inspectors;
d) by lowering the risk of incorrect assessments (BOTH false negative
and false positive) during NCCIs;
e) by avoiding an extensive programme of trial inspections to prepare
and train inspectors;
f) by clarifying concerns which might otherwise lead to false judgments
or unnecessary NCCIs;
g) by providing an opportunity to pursue lower-level compliance concerns
without the intrusiveness and political implications of NCCIs.
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a) by subjecting all declared sites to continuous uncertainty regarding a
possible random visit;
b) by motivating would-be violators to remove any prohibited activities from
declared facilities;
c) by eliminating any advantage of using a declared facility as a legitimate
cover for a prohibited BW program, thereby raising the cost and difficulty
of maintaining such a program;
d) by strengthening the BW organization's capability to detect patterns that
may arouse suspicion.
a) increase transparency;
b) enhance confidence in compliance;
c) assist in building a picture over time of national norms in microbiological
activities;
d) help the BWC and States Parties keep abreast of legitimate biological
activity in each State Party;
e) provide an opportunity to assist States Parties in gathering information
for declarations, and upgrading laboratory and manufacturing standards;
f) encourage cooperation among States Parties;
g) serve the interests of health and safety.
Against this long list of advantages some disadvantages of NCVs have been raised, including:
1. increasing the risk of revealing commercial proprietary information
that could have an adverse economic effect on commercial enterprises;
2. increasing the risk of revealing sensitive national security
information that could make potential adversaries aware of vulnerabilities
that could be exploited;
3. having a low probability of finding conclusive evidence of treaty
violations.
Any measures, whether on-site or off-site, entail a risk of revealing sensitive commercial or national security information. Delegations that support NCVs and are sensitive to their potential disadvantages have conducted practice visits to identify ways to incorporate managed access techniques to minimize potential loss of sensitive commercial or security information. In doing so, many delegations gained confidence that NCVs can be conducted in a way that protects sensitive information. Furthermore, for public health and safety reasons, commercial biological facilities are currently increasingly subject to intrusive domestic and, in some cases, international, inspections, and subject to challenge inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention; they need to be ready and prepared for these inspections.
To protect sensitive information, a dedicated BW inspectorate is desirable. Inspectorate costs could be cut only by borrowing ad hoc inspectors from industry and national defense establishments, with the attendant increase in the risk of revealing sensitive information and undermining the effectiveness of NCCIs.
While NCVs alone are unlikely to detect convincing evidence of noncompliance,
their incorporation into an integrated regime will enhance the likelihood
that the regime as a whole will be successful.
The advantages of NCVs far outweigh the possible disadvantages. Random as well as focused NCVs are necessary and important for an effective regime to strengthen the BTWC.
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* Prepared by Graham S. Pearson, University of Bradford, and Marie I. Chevrier, Harvard University.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 21 August 98.