Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Briefing Paper No 5: An Optimum Organization
Executive Summary
Series Editors, Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
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Attention is increasingly being given to the question of what sort of organization is necessary to implement a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This paper considers the lessons to be drawn from the existing international organizations addressing human, animal and plant disease (WHO, OIE and FAO), from the experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The provisions for an organization in the current draft Protocol developed by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) are analysed. The OPCW 1998 budget data is used in detail to gain an overall appreciation of the size and annual cost of a BTWC Organization -- which it is concluded could be of the order of 200 posts, well under half the size of the OPCW, and less than $30M, under half that of the OPCW.
WHO, OIE and FAO
These organizations have a principal role to help improve world public and animal health food and agriculture which includes alerting the global community to outbreaks of disease and to countering them. These organizations have developed their relationships with States to acquire and disseminate information about outbreaks of disease and to establish international global epidemiological networks. Their clearly recognised neutrality is essential for their effective operation. However, it would be inappropriate -- and indeed a retrograde step insofar as the primary roles and functions of the WHO, OIE and FAO are concerned -- for any of them to be asked to undertake a monitoring or other role on behalf of the BTWC organization as this would result in the loss of their neutral role.
UNSCOM
Although it has been possible to carry out the work of UNSCOM in Iraq by part time staff, this has worked well for UNSCOM because of its unique nature and focus on the activities of a single state. Such a dependence on part time staff would not be as effective or appropriate in implementing a multilateral arms control treaty for the following reasons:
* UNSCOM has functioned through supporting States providing specific expertise and equipment on request. This has given UNSCOM much greater flexibility and speed than would have been possible for a fully UN staffed organisation.
* The effectiveness of UNSCOM has depended greatly on those members of its staff who have been seconded to UNSCOM for several years or who have participated on a regular basis. Iraq has been quick to exploit any gaps in continuity.
* UNSCOM chief inspectors have increasingly been appointed from the UNSCOM staff especially for declaration (FFCD) verification missions.
* UNSCOM staff involved in missions to Iraq have essentially learnt on the job. Well qualified scientists are not necessarily well qualified to lead inspections.
* An efficient and effective inspection team has to be trained to work as a team.
* Part time staff have many other commitments and their availability is limited.
* Commercial proprietary information concerns have not been a particular problem.
A BTWC Organization depending on part time staff to carry out investigations is not credible.
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OPCW
The CWC is the arms control treaty that is of greatest relevance to the BTWC. The CWC provides for the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to implement a regime of comprehensive declarations together with both routine and challenge inspections as well as provisions for the investigation of alleged use and the monitoring of the destruction of declared chemical weapons and of chemical weapon production facilities.
DISCUSSION
As the BTWC Organization is unlikely to oversee the destruction of biological weapons or biological weapon facilities, the OPCW information can be analysed to use the Scheduled facility information to estimate the size of a BTWC Organization. It is assumed that the BTWC Organization will carry out about 30% of the 300 visits and investigations to be carried out by the OPCW i.e. about 100 a year. The numbers of declarations made to the BTWC organization are assumed to be comparable to the numbers made to the OPCW.
A detailed analysis has been made of the posts and functions in the OPCW which have been reviewed to assess what is required for a lean and mean BTWC organization. Any posts that are unlikely to have a direct analogue in the BTWC regime, such as the chemical demilitarization branch or specific CW related posts have been deleted, and the numbers of other posts reduced to reflect the reduced number of inspectors which have been assumed to be about a third of those in the OPCW. The outcome of the analysis gives the following broad indications of staff numbers and costs - the corresponding OPCW numbers in 1998 are included:
Post |
BTWC Organization |
OPCW |
Director-General |
42 |
85 |
Administration |
32 |
77 |
External Relations |
10 |
15 |
International Cooperation & Assistance |
10 |
11 |
Compliance Monitoring |
44 |
66 |
Visits & Investigations |
70 |
237 |
OVERALL TOTAL |
208 |
491 |
| Function | OPCW (1998 Budget) |
Factor | BTWC Organization |
A1 Executive Management |
17,991,500 |
42/85 |
8,890,000 |
A2 Administration |
13,563,000 |
32/77 |
5,640,000 |
A3 External Relations |
2,918,400 |
10/15 |
1,945,600 |
A4 International Coopn & Assistance |
4,996,400 |
10/11 |
4,542,100 |
A5 Common Services |
17,999,000 |
208/491 |
7,625,000 |
Sub-total |
57,468,300 |
--- |
28,642,700 |
V1 Verification |
18,912,100 |
44/66 |
12,128,000 |
V2 Inspection & Field Operations |
64,416,600 |
70/237 |
19,026,000 |
Sub-total |
83,328,700 |
--- |
31,154,000 |
TOTAL |
140,797,000 |
--- |
59,797,700 |
(in US $) |
65,331,050 |
--- |
29,898,850 |
CONCLUSIONS
It is concluded that the BTWC Organization would need about 200 posts and an annual budget of under $30M; it would be well under half the size of the OPCW with a budget of less than half that of the OPCW.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 21 August 98.