



**National Defense  
Medical College**



**UNIVERSITY OF  
BRADFORD**  
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

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**STATEMENT BY**

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**ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDICAL COLLEGE**

**AND**

**UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD**

**TO**

**THE MEETING OF STATES PARTIES IN DECEMBER 2009 OF THE STATES  
PARTIES TO**

**THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,**

**PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING**

**OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)**

**AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

**Monday 7 December 2009**

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Representatives.

It is a great honour to be invited to make a Statement to the Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which I am doing on behalf of the National Defense Medical College in Japan and the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom with the explicit endorsement of the Vice President of the National Defense Medical College and the Vice Chancellor of the University of Bradford.

Mr. Chairman

If the agreements reached at this meeting are successfully implemented they will, necessarily and properly, contribute to the world growth in global biotechnology capability “*in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases*”.

Yet, there is much evidence that few practicing life scientists are aware of the biosecurity implications of their work. Under such circumstances it is difficult to achieve effective cooperation on biotechnology amongst States Parties alongside the possible dual-use risk of proliferation of knowledge, materials and equipment.

However, States Parties last year recognized:

*the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines.*

With a view to assisting the active implementation of your agreements, we have produced a freely-available “Dual-Use Bioethics Education Module Resource” for teaching at the university level. The final design and content of the educational module resource (which is outlined on the attached document) has been based on the six specific elements of education identified by *Final Document* of the Meeting States Parties in 2008.

Firstly, States Parties recognised value of education which explains “*the risks associated with the potential misuse of the biological sciences and biotechnology*”. Therefore, our lectures in the first part of the module resource cover the history of the offensive programmes of the last century and incorporate a review of the biology of the traditional biological warfare agents as a good way to capture the interest of students.

Secondly, States Parties agreed that education should cover “*the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on those using the biological sciences*”. We strongly support this approach. Based on our surveys we have found few university-level biosecurity modules in Europe and Japan, but there are an increasing number of bioethics modules being taught. We think that the problem of dual-use can be introduced as an aspect of bioethics. For that reason, the second major section of educational module resource begins with introductory lectures on bioethics before turning to the dual-use issues that are more familiar here in Geneva.

Thirdly, States Parties agreed on the value of education that provides “*guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national laws and regulations and international law*”. Thus in the education module resource, the third major section deals with such matters and gives details of regional and country examples of biosecurity regulations.

Fourthly, States Parties agreed that education should be “*supported by accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer programmes, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual materials*”. We stress that we have placed the educational module online as an “open source” resource that is freely available on the world wide web. We hope that lecturers in many different countries find the material useful in adding biosecurity and dual-use issues to their courses. We would also like to emphasise that the educational module resource is not a module but module resource. Being mindful that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the education of scientists, our educational module resource can be modified and tailored in order to fit the module resource into various local educational contexts.

Mr. Chairman

In order to facilitate the development of best practice so that biosecurity education can be assimilated and implemented in different academic contexts in different regions, we have tested the module resource at local universities in Japan, and, in cooperation with the Landau Network-Centro Volta, the module resource has also been tested in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.

Thus, we are aiming to expand our collaboration with other countries in different regions to promote biosecurity education and facilitate our module resource being “*integrated into existing efforts at the international, regional and national levels*”.

In accordance with the *Final Document* agreed by States Parties last year, the aim of this educational module resource is to help “*leading scientists and those with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications at a senior level, as well as future generations of scientists, with the aim of building a culture of responsibility*”. This culture of responsibility under the BTWC is essential to promote capacity building “*in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases*”. We believe education is a key requirement for meeting this objective.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Representatives.