Graham S. Pearson is an Honorary Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. He was previously Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury. He has published several articles and papers on chemical and biological defence and arms control.
1. At the Third Review Conference of the BTWC held on 9-27 September 1991, the Final Declaration of the States Parties contained a Solemn Declaration followed by a paragraph on the Preamble to the Convention. The Preamble to the Convention includes inter alia the following statements concerning the purpose of the Convention:
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,
Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons.
2. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference1 in its Solemn Declaration reaffirms the firm commitment of States Parties to the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention and in its Preamble reaffirmed the importance of the elements in the review of the Preamble to the Convention contained in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference2 [Emphasis added]. This stated that the States Parties at the Second Review Conference were:
Reaffirming their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control;
Recognizing the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives and the common interest of mankind in the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons;
Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security, would not hamper economic or technological development and, further, would facilitate the wider exchange of information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes;
Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and cooperation among States Parties;
Affirming the importance of strengthening international cooperation in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas;
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them;
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the said principles and objectives;
Recognizing the importance of achieving as a matter of high priority an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;
Noting the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
Appealing to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy;
Declare their strong determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of microbial, or other biological agents, or toxins being used as weapons and reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their legal obligation under international law to implement and strictly comply with its provisions.
Developments since the Third Review Conference
3. Since the Third Review Conference there have been a number of significant developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:
a. Progress has been made first to evaluate potential verification measures for the Convention from a scientific and technical viewpoint (VEREX)3 and then following the request of a majority of States Parties to hold a Special Conference4, an Ad Hoc Group has been mandated "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties."
b. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq has made progress in disclosing the Iraqi biological weapons programme. By October 1995, UNSCOM had determined5 that Iraq had produced large quantities of biological warfare agents and had filled a variety of weapon systems including aerial bombs and missile warheads.
c. President Yeltsin of Russia in April 1992 had stated that the Former Soviet Union had continued an offensive biological weapons programme until 1992. A Trilateral Agreement between the UK, US and Russia issued in September 19926 initiated a process aimed at building confidence that the Russian offensive programme had terminated.
5. The broader international security scene has seen the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1995 and the opening for signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993. This will enter into force 180 days after the 65th State has lodged its instrument of ratification with the United Nations; as of 1 September 1996, 61 States have done so and it is likely that the required number of 65 ratifications will be achieved soon.
6. There is also an increased international awareness of the potential costs of disease; the World Health Assembly in 1995 agreed a resolution7 requesting the Director General of the WHO "to establish strategies enabling rapid national and international action to investigate and to combat infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics" . In 1996, the WHO has issued its World Health Report 19968 in which the Director General says that this "shows that we also stand on the brink of a global crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe from them. No country can any longer afford to ignore their threat."
7. As biological warfare is the deliberate use of disease against humans, animals or plants, this greater worldwide awareness of disease together with the imminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention makes it clear that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is now of even greater importance to all States Parties than at the Third Review Conference.
Issues for the Fourth Review Conference
5. It is suggested that the Fourth Review Conference should adopt similar language to that in the Solemn Declaration and Preamble as in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference which referred back to the importance of the elements in the review of the Preamble to the Convention contained in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference. The language to be adopted by the Fourth Review Conference might therefore be along the following lines:
THE STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 25 NOVEMBER TO 6 DECEMBER 1996 TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, SOLEMNLY DECLARE:
- Their conviction that the Convention is essential to international peace and security;
- Their reaffirmation of their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and their conviction that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control;
- Their continued determination, for the sake of mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons, and their conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind;
- Their reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the preamble and provisions of the Convention, and of their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security;
- Their determination to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention and to further strengthen its authority, including through the confidence-building measures and organizational arrangements set out below;
- Their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention;
- Their conviction that the full implementation of the provisions of the Convention should not hamper economic and technological development and international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.
The State Parties recognize that the important principles contained in this Solemn Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening of the Convention.
PREAMBLE
The Conference reaffirms the importance of the elements in the review of the Preamble to the Convention contained in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
1 United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9Ð27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
2 United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 8Ð26 September 1986, BWC/CONF.II/13, Geneva 1986.
3 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.
4 United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19Ð30 September 1994.
5 United Nations, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687(1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
6 US Department of State, Office of Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, 14 September 1992.
7 WHA 48.13, Communicable disease prevention and control: new, emerging, and re-emerging infectious diseases, Forty-Eighth World Health Assembly, 1-12 May 1995, Resolutions and Decisions, WHA48/1995/REC/1, World Health Organisation, Geneva, 1995.
8 World Health Organisation, The World Health Report 1996, Fighting disease, Fostering development, ISBN 92 4 156182 3, Geneva, 1996.