Nicholas A. Sims is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London). He is the author of The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament (1988), and other papers and articles on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol.
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Discussion of Article IV at the Third Review Conference
1. At the Third Review Conference of the BTWC held on 9-27 September 1991, the States Parties noted the importance of Article IV which states that:
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
2. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference1 also noted those measures already taken by some States in regard to the implementation of Article IV, such as the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterated its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately. Such measures should apply within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference also invited each State Party to consider the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality.
3. The Conference also noted the importance of:
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic compliance with the Convention; - Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins; - Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
4. The Conference then went on to note that some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review Conference (and before then by the First Review Conference), have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invited these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide such information and texts in the future. The Conference also welcomed the agreement by States Parties participating in the Third Review Conference to implement a new Confidence Building measure entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures." In addition the Conference invited all States Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such measures.
5. Finally, the Conference welcomed regional measures such as the Mendoza Declaration as well other initiatives dealing with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, as concrete positive steps towards strengthening the BTWC regime.
Developments since the Third Review Conference
6. Article IV obliges each State Party to ensure national implementation in the broadest possible terms, as the scope clauses at the end of the Article spell out clearly. Although the word legislation does not appear in this Article, the commonest response to this obligation among those States Parties which have made known any response whatever (and they are all too few) has been either to legislate in such a way as to give domestic legal effect to the prohibitions contained in Article I, or to determine on examination of their existing laws that no further specific legislation is necessary. National implementation also embraces government decrees, regulations and administrative memoranda to law enforcement agencies, but little is yet known of what action, if any, States Parties have taken under those headings. It is understandable, therefore, that national implementation has come to be identified closely with the adoption of new legislation.
7. Such legislation ties the Convention into national legal systems in the clearest possible way. It contributes to the strengthening of compliance by expanding the constituency with an institutional interest in the success of the Convention. It also builds the treaty regime flowing from the Convention into normative structures at the national level, in the form of rules and expectations and procedures for upholding them. These rules, expectations and procedures in turn uphold their counterparts at the international level. They shore up the international treaty regime and help, even if only marginally, to ensure its survival by constituting one more obstacle which would have to be overcome if the Convention were to come under attack.
8. The first three Review Conferences have reinforced Article IV with successive layers of consensually agreed language, as each Final Declaration built on its predecessor and added new material to the inherited paragraphs. As the Final Declaration of the G7 Ministerial meeting held in Paris on 30 July 1996 included a specific recommendation to the States Parties of the BTWC concerning the adoption of national measures: We recommend to States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to confirm at the forthcoming Review Conference their commitment to ensure, through the adoption of national measures, the effective fulfillment of their obligations under the convention to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such weapons within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere, in order, inter alia, to exclude use of those weapons for terrorist purposes.
the background to the language on Article IV in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference has been addressed in considerable detail.
9. In 1980 the United Kingdom, with Belgian and Finnish support, persuaded the First Review Conference to invite
States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific legislation or take other regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate texts to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for [the] purposes of consultation.2
In 1986 this invitation was repeated, as was the 1980 call upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the Article, to do so immediately.3 The words emphasised were added in 1986.]
10. The Second Review Conference took a modest step forward in regime-building for strengthening compliance with the Convention on the foundations of Article IV. It did so by widening, on the initiative of the then German Democratic Republic, the range of national implementation actions which were given international commendation. After repeating the invitations contained in the 1980 declaration as indicated above it added a new passage:
The Conference notes the importance of - legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention with the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; - legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material; and - inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance with their constitutional process[es] would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.4
11. In 1991 Goldblat and Bernauer reported in their UNIDIR Research Paper prepared for the Third Review Conference that Òvery fewÓ States Parties had adopted national legislative or administrative measures to implement the Convention.5
12. It was impossible to ascertain just how few had taken up the invitation to send their legislative or other appropriate texts to the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) - into which the UN Centre for Disarmament had been upgraded in 1983 - because the relevant file had been mislaid in New York.6 The United Kingdom proposal in 1980 had specified as the designated recipient of such texts, for purposes of consultation, the Research and Reference Collection in the Geneva Unit of the Centre for Disarmament (which could make copies for the CentreÕs Treaties and Resolutions Section in New York so that duplicate collections could be maintained in both cities); but at the insistence of the Secretariat this provision had been dropped during the First Review Conference - regrettably, as it turned out.7
13. The Netherlands had reported at the Second Review Conference despatch of the text of implementing regulations to the UN at the time it ratified the Convention (June 1981).8 It was thought that only four other States Parties had shared their texts in this way, and Goldblat and Bernauer were able to gather four - the United Kingdom's Biological Weapons Act 1974, Australia's Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976, New Zealand's New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 and the United States' Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989. They reproduced them in facsimile as annexes to their Research Paper9, together with France's pioneering law10 of 9 June 1972 which had anticipated the Article IV legislation of States Parties at a time when it appeared most unlikely that France would ever accede to the Convention then ready opened for signature. (It did in fact accede in 1984). Belgium's law of 10 July 1978 also deserves honourable mention as having been included in extenso in Belgium's national compliance report for the First Review Conference, the only text which was sent forward by the States Parties contributing to that 1979-80 compilation.11 The interesting process by which, over the years 1972-1978, this Belgian legislation came about has been recounted elsewhere;12 as (by another author) has the even more protracted legislative process over the period 1973-1989 in the United States.13
14. Goldblat and Bernauer expressed themselves forcefully on the lack of attention paid by the overwhelming majority of States Parties to Article IV: Since each State Party must ensure the observance of the BW Convention on its territory and anywhere else under its jurisdiction and control, it is imperative that it take the necessary national measures of legislative, administrative or regulatory nature. Such measures must specify the prohibitions and obligations to be observed by the natural and legal persons of the country concerned, and provide for the prosecution, trial and punishment of offenders. The Parties should commit themselves to send all pertinent information and documentation to the UN Secretariat, as recommended by the First and Second Review Conferences. This material, to be distributed to all Parties, might serve as an incentive as well as guidelines for those States which have not yet adopted the required national measures.14 [All emphases added.]
15. The Third Review Conference continued the process of regime-building in this area, repeating the declarations of 1980 and 1986 and adding to them, notably, a new confidence-building measure entitled ÔDeclaration of legislation, regulations and other measuresÕ.15 This in effect sought to implement the recommendations of Goldblat and Bernauer. The new CBM, labelled E, went beyond simply addressing those State Parties which had legislated or taken other implementing action in this area. It asked every State Party to complete a straightforward annual questionnaire answering four questions yes/no: - Do you have legislation? Do you have regulations? Do you have other measures? Has there been any amendment since last year to your legislation, regulations or other measures?
These four questions were applied to three areas of policy, requiring twelve yes/no answers altogether. The first area of policy was the direct concern of Article IV with domesticating the prohibitions in Article I. The second and third were export and import control respectively, specified as Òthe export and import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals or plants, or of toxins, in accordance with the Convention.Ó These export and import controls were of particular concern to the United Kingdom, which successfully proposed their addition to a CBM which would otherwise have been limited to making more universal and systematic the invitations issued in 1980 and 1986.
16. The information-sharing ambitions of the Third Review Conference in this area went further still. From 15 April 1992 States Parties, under Confidence-Building Measure E, shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations or written details of other measures on request to the United Nations Department for [now Center for] Disarmament Affairs or to an individual State Party.16 Each State Party can now, therefore, request these details bilaterally under the authority of the Third Review Conference, instead of depending solely upon the circulation of texts made available to the United Nations.
17. Future regime-building work in this area is likely to consist, at least initially, of the organisation of a coherent international response to the responses elicited by Confidence-Building Measure E. How are defaulters (i.e. non-respondents) to be chased up? Will those States Parties which conscientiously file a nil return be asked why they have no legislation, regulations or other measures to report? Will the annual reminder (through the annual reporting requirement) serve to encourage more States Parties to legislate in this area? Will there be any concerted attempt at Ôquality controlÕ applied to national implementation measures? Have States Parties done enough to ÔcriminaliseÕ BTW-related activities, whether undertaken by terrorists, ÔrogueÕ agencies of governments or independent operators? Are they sufficiently vigilant in detecting and investigating suspects?
18. There may also be a loophole to be closed, in ensuring the fullest possible legal extent to the penal legislation enacted or other measures taken by States Parties. The United States already asserts, in respect of an offence under its Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, Òextraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offence under this section committed by or against a national of the United States.Ó17 In its Final Declaration the Third Review Conference, having repeated the Convention formula that any national implementation measures taken in accordance with Article IV should apply within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control, anywhere, [emphasis added] the word anywhere (echoing Article IV itself) in this extended formulation, compared with 1986, having been restored at UkraineÕs request, went on to invite (on an initiative of the United States) each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality.18
19. This formulation corresponds closely to one drafted for (and now firmly embedded in) the national implementation provisions (Article VII) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is not just US legislation that enjoys this wider extra-territorial application; the German working paper, issued during the Third Review Conference, which describes the new War Weapons Control Act of 5 November 1990 emphasises inter alia that its penal provisions not only apply in Germany, but also to acts committed abroad by natural persons possessing German nationality. The German working paper was of particular interest for its comprehensive account, foreshadowing the new CBM, of national legislative and administrative measures against BTW and for its description of an entire regulatory framework, embracing export controls and the description of lists of pathogens as well as the new, tighter War Weapons Control Act and its supporting ordinances and schedules. This example of a full national report could well set a benchmark for other States Parties to emulate in setting out clearly the national implementation measures they have taken as a regulatory framework.19
20. The legislation reported under Confidence-Building E was not, however, at least initially very extensive or (save in one or two cases) particularly informative. Fewer than twenty States Parties had, by 1 June 1992, taken note of this new CBM even to the extent of ticking a ÔNothing to declareÕ box on the cover sheet; even fewer had completed Form E or made an equivalent declaration.20
21. Several respondents were able to report that they had legislated or regulated, or both, in respect of all three matters with which this CBM was concerned (export controls and import controls, as well as Article IV domestication of the Article I obligations). These states included Australia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.21 The level of detail varied greatly. Hungary, The Netherlands and New Zealand offered the titles of relevant laws and regulations, Australia a three-page description of seven different legal instruments (adding that it was currently considering the imposition of export controls on dual-use biological equipment as well, already the subject of non-statutory guidelines) and the United States thirty pages of texts and supporting documents reproduced in extenso. Finland, Germany (which had reported fully, as described above, in 1991), Mongolia and the United Kingdom simply ticked the appropriate yes boxes, with the UK adding a mention of its Biological Weapons Act 1974 under another CBM.22 Canada claimed that ÒUnder current legislation, Canada regulates or has the capacity to regulateÓ all three matters, but did not expand on that delphic statement, in contrast to the detail it provided elsewhere in the 52 pages of its CBM declarations.23
22. Other respondents reported that they had legislation under review and might have more information to provide later (Austria and Belarus) or reported legislation and regulations on the domestication of obligations but not on export or import controls (Sweden and Switzerland).24 Norway reported that both legislation and regulations on export controls would probably be introduced by the end of 1992; for the other two matters, both legislation and regulations were already in place.25 Japan, on the other hand, had legislated on everything except import controls.26
23. Bulgaria offered a detailed narrative. This included long lists of pathogenic strains kept in its national microbial collection and those provided over 1989-1991 to foreign laboratories, as well as relevant provisions in its domestic legislation and penal code. It added that these provisions were currently under examination in the light of other countries' legislation.27
24. Although not included in a CBM return, it was the implementing decree issued by Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation on 11 April 1992 which attracted more attention28 than the CBM returns proper. The ukase implemented the Convention in Russian law, and allocated oversight responsibility to the Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems established on 19 February 1992 under the chairmanship of Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich. This committee had recommended opening secret military research centres to international inspection and converting them to civilian use. There were reports of Òonly half-hearted supportÓ for the ukase from the head of the Directorate For Protection against Biological Weapons, General Valentin Yevstigeneyev. There were also signs of confusion in the Russian press over the extent, if any, to which the former Soviet Union had gone beyond the limits of BTW activity permitted by the Convention. At least in its headline, Izvestiya suggested that the Soviet Union had been violating the Convention and that President YeltsinÕs ukase was intended to call a halt to such non-compliance. Other Russian commentary went further. According to Komsomolskaya Pravda, Soviet work on biological weapons had only started in earnest after the signature of the Convention.
25. Accordingly the Russian FederationÕs CBM returns were eagerly awaited. Their continued absence in UN documentation led to intensive negotiations on BTW compliance issues with London and Washington and eventually to the conclusion in September 1992 of the Moscow Tripartite Agreement.
26. A quite different line of development, which was welcomed by the Third Review Conference under the Article IV section of its Final Declaration although it had little in common with other national implementation measures, is regional agreement. By means of such agreements, States Parties entrench their commitment to the Convention by tying it into a regional network, rather than (or in addition to) their domestic legal systems; this was what the Conference was invited to recognise as relevant to Article IV.
27. The event which precipitated this recognition was the agreement reached on 5 September 1991, at Mendoza in western Argentina, by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Uruguay shortly afterwards acceded to the Mendoza Agreement; and this noteworthy regional measure, embodying a Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, was formally submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay to the Conference, as evidence of the reaffirmation of their renunciation of BTW (as well as of chemical weapons). They also circulated a message from the UN Secretary-General welcoming the Mendoza Agreement.29 Point 7 of the Joint Declaration announced their Òintention to make a decisive contribution to the successÓ of the conference and Òtheir willingness to consider ways of strengthening [the ConventionÕs] verification mechanisms.Ó The same four delegations proposed an extra paragraph at the end of the Article IV section, which was agreed: The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza Declaration as well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, as concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of the BTWC regime.30
28. One of the "other initiatives" welcomed here was (in the words of a Venezuelan committee paper intended as an addendum to that of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay): the initiative of the Government of Peru dealing with the renunciation by all members of the "Rio Group" of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, with a view to encompassing all the countries of the region in the future.31
The Rio Group comprised all four Parties to the Mendoza Agreement, plus Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. Peru had made its proposal in July.32
29. A paper on regional CBMs was also submitted to the Conference by the six states of the central European Hexagonale (Poland having joined the original Pentagonale of Austria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia since the Venice Summit of July 1990).33 The Italian delegation, reflecting the relatively greater enthusiasm in Italy for Hexagonale diplomacy, took the lead in securing an extra paragraph at the end of the Article V section: Taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, neighbouring States or States belonging to the same region may also adopt measures that are consistent with the aims and objectives of the Convention in order to facilitate or complement the implementation of the decisions of the Third Review Conference with respect to Article V.34
30. Regionalism could thus be seen emerging as a new line of development, bridging Articles IV and V. It was championed in equal measure by the states of two overlapping groupings in Latin America and by those of a central Europe newly re-established in a regional consciousness and self-confidence arising out of the collapse of the East-West divide in 1989. It is, however, unlikely that this will ever (in comparison with the main areas of reinforcement and regime-building under Articles IV and V) be more than a subsidiary line of development in the overall evolution of the BWC treaty regime.
31. An analysis of the 41 CBM returns circulated by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs on 22 May 199635 shows that of those States providing more than a single page response to the CBMs, most States are now using the "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare" proforma and are also completing the proforma for CBM E. There is, however, clearly some confusion as to how to complete the "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare" proforma as some States complete this, ticking one or other of the boxes for CBM E, then include as well the CBM E proforma marking in the affirmative that something has been amended since last year. There is in general little if any information provided by any of the States on the name, title or nature of the legislation or regulations. Analysis of 41 CBM Returns in 1996 States making a short, generally one page, return 13 (Belgium, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Jordan, Kuwait, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Uganda) States using the "Nothing to declare" proforma and checking a CBM E box 20 of these those not completing a CBM E proforma 11 (Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland)
of these those completing the CBM E proforma 9 on which indicated no change since last year 7 (Belarus, Chile, Czech republic, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Turkey)
on which indicated amended since last year 2 (Republic of Korea, USA) States using the "Nothing to declare" proforma, not checking a CBM E box and completing the CBM E proforma 4 (Australia, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden)
States not using the "Nothing to declare" proforma but completing a CBM E proforma 2 (Argentina, Canada)
32. Increased attention is being paid to the possibility that biological materials may become attractive to subÐState actors, splinter groups or terrorists. The incidents in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 in which the Aum Shinrikyo sect planned36 to place some eleven small containers of the nerve gas, sarin (GB), on baggage racks or on the floor of subway trains and for these to then be punctured by Aum members to release the sarin, has heightened international awareness that sub-State actors might seek to use chemicals to further their aims. Subsequent reports36 make it clear that the Aum Shinrikyo sect had also been working on developing biological weapons and was close to completing this by March 1995; it is reported that they had been working on botulinum toxin and anthrax and had devices that might be used to disseminate such agents. The Aum sect also sent a team to Zaire in 1992 to assist in the treatment of Ebola victims - and it is claimed that their aim was to find a sample of Ebola virus to take back to Japan for culturing purposes. The Tokyo incidents show all too clearly the impact of quite limited chemical contamination and the need to take steps to counter possible use of chemical or biological materials.
33. One important counter to such possibilities is the enactment of national legislation to make the mis-use of biological materials a criminal act. Some States, such as the UK, have enacted such legislation: the Biological Weapons Act37 of 1974 makes it a criminal offence within the UK to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain any biological agent or toxin or means of delivery; any person shall on conviction be liable to life imprisonment. The United States has this year enacted an "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"38 which strengthens the provisions of its Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 and provides for both the regulatory control of biological agents and the regulation of transfers of listed biological agents. Insofar as the regulatory control of biological agents is concerned this provides for: (1) List of biological agents -
A) In General - The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall, through regulations promulgated ...., establish and maintain a list of each biological agent that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.
(B) Criteria - In determining whether to include an agent on the list under
Subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall - (i) consider-
(I) the effect on human health of exposure to the agent; (II) the degree
of contagiousness of the agent and the method by which the agent is transferred
to humans; II) the availability and effectiveness of immunizations to prevent
and treatments for any illness resulting from the infection by the agent;
and (IV) any other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate; and
(ii) consult with scientific experts representing appropriate professional
groups. On transfers, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is required
to enact regulations for: (1) the establishment and enforcement of safety
procedures for the transfer of biological agents listed .... including measures
to ensure - (A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such agents;
and
(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents; (2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for use in domestic or international terrorism or for any other criminal purpose; (3) the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety in the event of a transfer or potential transfer of a biological agent in violation of the safety procedures established under paragraph (1) or the safeguards established under paragraph (2); and (4) appropriate availability of biological agents for research, education and other legitimate purposes.
The proposed rules published in the Federal Register39 are comprehensive. Others States are to be encouraged to take similar action to criminalize BW and for the longer term, thought should be given to seeking international agreement that using or knowingly aiding in the production, acquisition or use of biological weapons is a crime under international law40. Other counters are the preparation of response plans for such incidents as well as more widespread recognition of the need to control biological materials to facilitate the safety of the community and the environment. Issues for the Fourth Review Conference
34. The principal issue for the States Parties to consider at the Fourth Review Conference will be to encourage all States Parties to enact appropriate national legislation. This will be given an added impetus by the Declaration41 agreed by the G7/8 on 27 June 1996: We proclaim our common resolve to unite our efforts and our determination to fight terrorism by all legal means. In keeping with the guidelines for action adopted by the Eight in Ottawa, we strongly urge all States to deny all support to terrorists. We rededicate ourselves and invite others to associate our efforts in order to thwart the activities of terrorists and their supporters, including fund raising, the planning of terrorist acts, procurement of weapons, calling for violence, and incitement to commit terrorist acts. Special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes. Emphasis added]
The G7/8 also decided that a ministerial meeting to consider and recommend further actions would be held in Paris in July 1996. The Final Declaration42 of that Ministerial Conference on Terrorism on 30 July 1996 included as one measure:
18) We recommend to States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to confirm at the forthcoming Review Conference their commitment to ensure, through the adoption of national measures, the effective fulfillment of their obligations under the Convention to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such weapons within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere, in order, inter alia, to exclude use of those weapons for terrorist purposes.
35. There is clearly an international determination to combat terrorism which was also shown by the final communiquŽ and resolutions adopted by the twenty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers43 of the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference held at Conakry, Republic of Guinea from 9 to 12 December 1995 included a resolution on combating international terrorism which stated inter alia that: Expressing concern over the continuation of terrorist acts in all their forms and manifestations, including those where States are involved directly or indirectly, and which spread violence and terror and constitute a serious threat to international peace, stability and security;
Proceeding from the conviction that there is an international consensus on combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, eliminating the evils and causes of terrorism directed against the life and property of innocent people and sovereignty and territorial integrity of States;
Emphasizing the importance of international and regional cooperation, especially among Member States, in combating effectively all forms of terrorism;
36. Consequently, it is suggested that States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference will wish to adopt stronger language in their Final Declaration urging all States Parties to adopt national measures. Language for the Fourth Review Conference
37. The language to be adopted by the Fourth Review Conference in its Final Declaration might be similar to that adopted at the Third Review Conference but with stronger encouragement of States Parties to enact national measures along the following lines: The Conference emphasizes the importance of Article IV under which each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention. The Conference recalling the developments during the period in respect of terrorist interest in chemical and biological materials, including toxic substances, welcomes those measures already taken by some States Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and strongly reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference encourages each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality.
The Conference stresses the importance of: - Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic compliance with the Convention - Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of microbial and other biological agents, or toxins: - Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. and welcomes the steps already taken by some States Parties in these respects.
The Conference reaffirms that such measures which States Parties might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the Convention. The Conference notes with approval that some States Parties, as requested by the Third Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide such information and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference welcomes the information provided by States Parties in response to the Confidence-Building Measure agreed at the Third Review Conference entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures." In addition, the Conference encourages all States Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such measures.
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1.United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9-27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
2.United Nations, The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 3Ð21 March 1980, BWC/CONF.I/9, 21 March 1980. The intrusive the was deleted when the invitation was repeated in 1986 (see note 3 below) "for purposes of consultation," the Australian delegation, in editing the text for the Drafting Committee, having restored the original UK language at the request of its author.
3.United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 8Ð26 September 1986, BWC/CONF.II/13/11, 26 September 1986.
4. ibid. Process seems to have been a typographic error in the Final Declaration carried through to the Final Document, (Geneva 1986). It was corrected to processes when the 1986 text was repeated in 1991. The GDR proposal of 1986 (which used the plural processes) is reproduced in BWC/CONF.II/9 (22 September 1986), Annex, pp.16-17.
5.Jozef Goldblat & Thomas Bernauer, The Third Review of the Biological Weapons Convention: Issues and Proposals, UNIDIR Research Paper No. 9 (New York: United Nations, 1991), p.22.
6.Personal communication, 4 June 1991.
7.Nicholas A Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85, (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) pp. 80-81, pp 136-137.
8.BWC/CONF.II/SR.5 (10 September 1986), paragraph 56. Barend ter Haar (The Netherlands).
9.Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., pp 62-75.
10.Law No 72-467, prohibiting the development, production, possession, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of biological or toxin weapons (9 June 1972).
11.BWC/CONF. I/4 (20 February 1980), paragraph 30, pp 17-18.
12.Sims, op.cit., pp 81-85.
13.John Isaacs, Legislative Needs, in Susan Wright (ed), Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1990) pp 291-299 and legislative texts appended at pp 406-11.
14.Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., pp 23-24.
15.BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) pp 4-5, p 7.
16.BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 3 (27 September 1991) pp 18-19.
17.Section 175(a), reproduced in Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., p 71.
18.BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 4. The Ukrainian proposal is reproduced at p 20 and the US proposal at p 21 of BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991).
19.Germany, Working Paper: Legislation in the Federal republic of Germany on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, BWC/CONF. III/7 (10 September 1991). The quotation is from p 3.
20.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) and Add.1 (12 June 1992)
21.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , pp 19-21 (Australia), p 124 (Germany), p 137 (Mongolia), p 148 (New Zealand), p 245 (UK), pp 364-394 (US); Add. 1, p 53 (Finland), p 65 (Hungary), p 94 (The Netherlands)
22.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 246.
23.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 77.
24.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 25 (Austria), p 181 (Sweden), p 210 (Switzerland); Add. 1, p 23. (Belarus).
25.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) p 167 (Norway).
26.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII/Add. 1 (30 April 1992) p 70 (Japan).
27.UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII/Add. 1 (30 April 1992) p 35-37 (Bulgaria).
28.Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 16 (June 1992) p 9, pp 18-19; Russia shuns Biological Weapons, New Scientist (23 May 1992).
29.BWC/CONF. III/14 (16 September 1991); Secretary-General's message in BWC/CONF.III/15 (16 September 1991).
30.BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 5, based on the Argentinian-Brazilian-Chilean-Uruguayan proposal of 13 September 1991 reproduced in BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 22.
31.BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 20.
32.CD/PV. 599 (25 July 1991). Peru proposed to invite the Foreign Ministers of the other ten Rio Group member states to a conference in Lima in November 1991. Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No 13 (September 1991) p 16.
3.BWC/CONF.III/15 (16 September 1991).
34.BWC/CONF.III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 12, based on the Italian proposal of 16 September 1991 reproduced in BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 44.
35.UN Document CDA/11-96/BW-III (22 May 1996)
36.United States Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations (Minority Staff), Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on Aum Shinrikyo, Staff Statement, 31 October 1995. David E Kaplan & Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum, Hutchinson, London, 1996. 7.Biological Weapons Act 1974, HMSO, 1974 Chapter 6.
38.U S Congress, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Terrorism Prevention Act, Conference Report, Report 104-518, 15 April 1996.
39.U S Federal register, Proposed Rules for Section 511 of Public Law 104-132, Vol. 61, No. 112, 10 June 1996.
40.Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Criminalizing BW, CWCB Issue No 31, 1, March 1996.
41.G7/8 Lyon Summit, Declaration on Terrorism, 27 June 1996
42.Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, Paris, 30 July 1996: Final Declaration.
43.United Nations General Assembly/ Security Council, Letter dated 17 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/50/953, S/1996/344, 10 May 1996.
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 12 November 1998.