Graham S. Pearson is an Honorary Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. He was previously Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury. He has published several articles and papers on chemical and biological defence and arms control.

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by Graham S. Pearson

Discussion of Article V at the Third Review Conference

1. At the Third Review Conference of the BTWC held on 9-27 September 1991, the Final Declaration of the States Parties gave more attention to Article V on the provisions for consultation and cooperation than to any other Article. Article V of the Convention states that:

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference¹ addressed:

a. The Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986,

b. Improved and new Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs),

c. Implications for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (now called the Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA)),

d. Procedures for consultation and cooperation,

e. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint (subsequently known as VEREX),

f. Solution of compliance concerns, and

g. Timely investigations of alleged or threatened use of biological or toxin weapons.

2. The developments over the past five years in each of these areas is summarised in turn.

Developments since the Third Review Conference

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

3. The subject of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) is addressed in detail in a separate section in this briefing package so only the principal points are addressed here. The number of States Parties who have made at least a single annual CBM declaration has increased over the ten years since the first CBMs were agreed in 1986 to 70 in 1995 and 75 up to 22 May 1996. Some 10 States Parties have made the agreed CBM declarations every year.

4. The Third Review Conference agreed a useful simplified proforma on which States could indicate "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare" so as to facilitate increased participation by States Parties in making the agreed annual declarations.

5. Three of the four CBMs agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 were amended and extended at the Third Review Conference:

a. The exchange of data on research centres and laboratories (CBM A, Part 1 and Part 2),

b. The exchange of information on outbreaks of disease and similar occurrences caused by toxins (CBM B), and

c. The active promotion of contacts (CBM D).

The fourth CBM:

d. The encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge (CBM C) was continued unchanged. Three new CBMs were added:

e. Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures (CBM E),

f. Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes (CBM F), and

g. Declaration of vaccine production facilities (CBM G).

6. The Third Review Conference agreed to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions. The Final Declaration stated that the exchange of information and data agreed for the CBMs, using the revised forms, should be sent to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs no later than 15 April on an annual basis and should cover the previous calendar year.

Implications for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs

7. The Third Review Conference recognised that the new and the revised procedures which they had agreed to implement would add further duties to, and would make even greater demands on the time of, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Conference therefore requested the United Nations Secretary General to allocate the necessary staff resources and other requirements based in the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva to assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Third Review Conference, in particular of the confidence-building measures. In that respect the Secretary-General was requested to receive, compile, and make available to States Parties information related to the implementation of the Convention and of the decisions of the Third Review Conference. The Conference also noted that use of the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs computer database system could facilitate this work. The States Parties agree to review inter alia the requirement for, and the operation of, these additional arrangements at the Fourth Review Conference.

8. The Department of Disarmament Affairs (now known as the Center for Disarmament Affairs (CDA)) receives the declarations submitted by States Parties, collates these and circulates to States Parties copies of the declarations received. Although the Third Review Conference noted that use of the CDA computer database

could facilitate this work, it has not been possible to do this because the declarations made by the States Parties are not in a standardised format and the information provided is very variable. For the computer database to be used it would be necessary for States Parties to agree a standardised format such as that agreed in respect of the Reduction of Military Budgets² for the annual reporting by States of military expenditures.

Procedures for consultation and cooperation

9. The Third Review Conference set out procedures that could be adopted for States Parties to consult and cooperate with each other in solving any problems that may arise in relation to the object of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention. However, this procedure has not been implemented or otherwise tested during the period from the Third Review Conference.

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts

10. The Third Review Conference decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. The Group was to be chaired by Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary and to hold meetings to complete the work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 1993.

11. The mandate for the Group required that measures be identified which could determine:

- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;

- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination and were to be examined in terms of six main criteria:

- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality of information they provide, and fail to provide;

- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities; - Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;

- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;

- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;

- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information.

12. The group should adopt by consensus a report on its work which would be circulated to all States Parties for their consideration. A Special Conference of States Parties to decide on any further action would be then convened should a majority of States Parties request such a Conference.

13. The Ad Hoc Group (known as VEREX) met four times on:

a. 30 March - 10 April 1992

b. 23 November - 4 December 1992

c. 24 May - 4 June 1993, and

d. 13 - 24 September 1993

It identified and evaluated some 21 potential measures which were divided into two categories:

Off-site Measures

- Surveillance of publications
- Surveillance of legislation
- Data on transfers, transfer requests and production
- Multilateral information sharing
- Exchange visits (off-site)
- Declarations
- Surveillance by satellite
- Surveillance by aircraft
- Ground-based surveillance (off-site)
- Sampling and identification (off-site)
- Observation (off-site)
- Auditing (off-site)

On-site Measures

- Exchange visits - international arrangements
Interviewing (on-site)
Visual inspection (on-site)
Identification of key equipment (on-site)
Auditing (on-site)
Sampling and identification (on-site)
Medical examination (on-site)
Continuous monitoring by instruments (on-site)
Continuous monitoring by personnel (on-site)

14. In addition, VEREX evaluated some illustrative measures in combination. Its final report³ was prepared in September 1993 and circulated to all States Parties. The final report stated that:

The measure "Declarations" was most frequently identified for application in combination with other measures. The most frequently identified on-site measures in combination were on-site inspections (interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment, sampling and identification, auditing). This does not mean that all the measures in parenthesis above always would be included in an on-site inspection.

The final report of VEREX concluded that:

The Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts concluded that the potential verification measures as identified and evaluated could be useful in varying degrees in enhancing confidence, through enhanced transparency, that the States Parties were fulfilling their obligations under the BWC. While it was agreed that reliance could not be placed on any single measure to differentiate conclusively between prohibited and permitted activity and to resolve

ambiguities about compliance, it was also agreed that the measures could provide information of varying utility in strengthening the BWC. .....Some measure in combination could provide enhanced capabilities by increasing, for example, the focus and improving the quality of information, thereby improving the possibility of differentiating between prohibited and permitted activities and of resolving ambiguities about compliance.

Based on the examination and evaluation of the measures described above against the criteria given in the mandate, the Group considered, from the scientific and technical standpoint, that some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention, also recognising that appropriate and effective verification could reinforce the Convention. Following circulation of the VEREX Final Report to States Parties, a majority requested that a Special Conference be convened to consider the final report of VEREX and this Special Conference was held on 19 - 30 September 1994⁴.

15. At the Special Conference, States Parties agreed to establish a further Ad Hoc Group with the objective being to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context, the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia, consider:

- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;

- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;

- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;

- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.

The mandate also required that

- Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security needs.

- Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial development.

The remit for the Ad Hoc Group also made it clear that "the regime would include, inter alia, potential verification measures, as well as agreed procedures and mechanisms for

their efficient implementation and measures for the investigation of alleged use." [Emphasis added].

16. The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Toth of Hungary held a procedural meeting on 3 - 5 January 1995⁵ and then substantive meetings on 10 - 21 July 1995⁶, 27 November - 8 December 1995⁷ and on 15 - 26 July 1996⁸ ; a further meeting is scheduled for 16 - 27 September 1996. The AHG has functioned by the appointment of four Friends of the Chair (FOC) who chair the sessions concerned with the four elements of the mandate:

a. Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria - Dr Ali Mohammadi of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

b. Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures - Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary.

c. Measures to Promote Compliance - Mr Stephen Pattison of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

d. Measures Related to Article X - Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile.

17. At successive AHG meetings, the FOC have produced papers that reflect the discussions that have taken place yet are without prejudice to the positions of delegations on the issues under consideration in the Ad Hoc Group and do not imply agreement on the scope or content of the papers. These FOC papers are considered by the AHG in plenary session and amended as requested by delegations so that they reflect the views expressed before they are accepted for attachment to the procedural reports of the meetings. Thus far, the FOCs have prepared papers on:

Definition of Terms and Objective Criteria

- Summary of Views on Definition of Terms and Objective Criteria (Second AHG Annex III/6 )
- Definition of Terms (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 57-61)
- Criteria for Human Pathogens and Toxins (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 50 )
- A List of Human, Animal and Plant Pathogens and Toxins (Second AHG Annex III/8 )
- List of Human Pathogens and Toxins (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 48 )
- Criteria for Animal Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 52 )
- List of Animal Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 51)
- Criteria for Plant Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 54 )
- List of Plant Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 53)
- Summary of views on definitions and threshold quantities (Third AHG Annex III/13 )
- Threshold Quantities (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 55)
- Summary of views on list of equipment and types of activity (Third AHG Annex III/14 )
- Summary of views on equipment (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 56)
- Resource Paper on Types of Activity (Third AHG Annex III/15 )

Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures

- Paper on Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures (Second AHG Annex III/5 )
- Surveillance of Publications (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 79 )
- Surveillance of Legislation (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 80 )

- Data on Transfers and Transfer Requests and on Production (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 81 )
- Multilateral Information Sharing (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 83 )
- Exchange Visits (international arrangements and off-site visits) (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 87 )
- Confidence Building Visits - (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 89 )

Measures to Promote Compliance

- Declarations (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 10-20 )
- On-Site Measures (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 21-35 )
- Other Measures (Second AHG Annex III/3 )
- Investigation of Alleged Use (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 36-44 )
- Allegations of Other Incidents possibly requiring similar investigation (ie Accidental release/Test) (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 45 )
- Unusual Outbreaks (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 46 )

Measures Related to Article X

- Elements for Structured Discussions on Article X on the BWC (Second AHG Annex III/9 and Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 62-72)
Further Notes on the Elements for Structured Discussion of Article X (Third AHG Annex III/15 and Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 73-77)

Solution of Compliance Concerns

18. The Third Review Conference stressed the need for all States Parties to deal seriously with compliance issues and appealed to States Parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the object of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions of the Convention. Over the past 5 years, no State has submitted a compliance concern through the procedures of the Convention.

Timely Investigation of Alleged Use

19. At the Third Review Conference, the States Parties agreed to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threats of use of biological or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary General in carrying out such investigations. During the past 5 years, there have been no allegations of use of biological or toxin weapons although there have been allegations of the use of chemical weapons which have been investigated by teams of experts nominated by the UN Secretary General.

Issues for the Fourth Review Conference

20. At the Fourth Review Conference it will be appropriate to address each of the areas addressed by the Third Review Conference in respect of Article V and to consider how the statement in the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference might be phrased in order to further the objectives of the Convention and to strengthen it. Each of the areas addressed at the Third Review Conference is considered in turn.

Confidence Building Measures

21. Although the Ad Hoc Group is addressing the incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime to be the subject of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Convention, it is evident that even when the AHG has completed its work and a legally

binding instrument agreed and subsequently adopted, there is likely to be a continuing role for some confidence-building measures in parallel with whatever measures are included in the legally binding instrument. Not all of the existing politically binding CBMs will be appropriate for incorporation into the legally binding instrument. In addition, not all States Parties may choose to adopt the legally binding instrument at the earliest possible opportunity; in other words, there is very likely to be a parallel regime for at least some time in which some States remain committed as now to provision of data and information under the current politically binding CBMs and some States are committed to provide data and information under the legally binding instrument.

22. Consequently, it will be important at the Fourth Review Conference for the States Parties to reemphasise the importance of the existing confidence-building measures and avoid the risk that, through paying little attention to the existing CBMs and the fact that the Ad Hoc group is addressing which CBMs are appropriate for incorporation into a legally binding instrument, States Parties might mistakenly draw the conclusion that provision of annual information as agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences was no longer important. It is suggested that the importance of the existing CBMs can best be emphasised by the Fourth Review Conference agreeing to strengthen the existing CBMs through modifications to the modalities whilst not, on this occasion, considering the addition of new CBMs, as this is thought unlikely in view of the ongoing AHG activity.

23. Each of the existing CBMs is considered in turn and suggestions for their strengthening addressed:

a. CBM A Part 1. This requires the provision of data on "research centres and laboratories" that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual or community risk. The modalities agreed at the Third Review Conference make it clear that "data should be provided by States Parties for each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere, which has any maximum containment laboratories meeting the criteria for such maximum containment laboratories as specified in the 1983 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual such as those designated as biosafety level 4 (BL4) or P4 or equivalent standards."

It is thus clear from the agreed modalities that data should be provided for all facilities with any maximum containment (BL4, P4 or equivalent) laboratories. It is suggested that CBM A Part 1 would be clearer if the word "research" were to be deleted from the heading and elsewhere in the CBM, so removing the possible confusion arising from the incorrect interpretation that only "research" centres and laboratories are the subject of this CBM rather than all centres and laboratories with maximum containment facilities.

Improved clarity would be achieved by removing the word "research" from the title and text of CBM A Part 1 and inserting "(including research facilities)" at the end of the title.

b. CBM A Part 2. This requires the provision of information on national biological defence research and development programmes. The information to be provided includes funding, organisational structures and facilities. The limitation of the information to be provided to "research and development" needs to be reviewed as the objective of the CBM is surely to provide transparency in regard to national biological defence programmes as a whole - eg including production and acquisition - and not just to the research and development element.  This CBM would be strengthened by broadening it to include all aspects of national biological defence programmes by deleting the words "research and development" wherever they appear in the CBM and

deleting the word "research" in para 5 of Form A, part (ii) whilst adding "(including research facilities)" at the end of the title.

The Fourth Review Conference should broaden CBM A Part 2 to include all aspects of national biological defence programmes by deleting the words "research and development" from the title and text of CBM A Part 2 and "research" from the text of para 5 of Form A, part 2 (ii) whilst adding at the end of the title "(including research programmes)".

c. CBM B. This requires the provision of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins. Hitherto, this CBM has been characterised by very variable declarations as each State Party making a declaration under this CBM has judged what to declare. Increasingly there is an appreciation that this declaration is at best a duplicate of declarations being made more regularly and more efficiently by States to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and at worst the provision of some limited data.

There does appear to be an argument that it would be better to encourage States Parties to provide information on outbreaks of infectious disease through the existing channels to the WHO and to determine ways in which WHO collations and analyses of such information could be provided to States Parties to the BTWC. There would be benefits in the States Parties to the BTWC becoming more aware of the annual yearbook produced by the FAO, OIE and WHO which provides information on animal disease outbreaks, on animal disease outbreaks in the human population and an analysis of the main changes in the epidemiological situation in member countries. Such a move to simplify the CBM declaration regime would send a valuable signal that the States Parties are determined to strengthen the Convention by effective measures and are prepared to cease the provision of information already provided (to the WHO) through a more effective channel.

Should States Parties believe that they had been the subject of an attack by biological weapons, they would be encouraged to invoke the provisions of Article VI of the Convention and lodge a complaint with the Security Council.

The Fourth Review Conference should delete CBM B and urge States Parties to provide information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins to the WHO, FAO and OIE.

d. CBM C. This requires the encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge. This CBM embodies an important principle and should continue. However, as the results of most general scientific research will be available in the open literature, the Fourth Review Conference could with advantage consider limiting the scope of this declaration to publication of results of work that has been financed by Ministries of Defence (including both work carried out at Ministry of Defence facilities and carried out under contract in academic and industrial facilities) insofar as these publications have not been declared in the CBM A2 declarations. A proforma form C could be helpful to get more information on publication policies. This proforma might take the following form:

Form C

Publication of results of work funded or part-funded by the Ministry of Defence
Name of facility:.........................................................................
Responsible organization:.............................................................................
Defence proportion of total budget:.....................................................
Short description of publication policy:................................................
List of publications:.......................................................................

Adoption of such a proforma would reduce the massive amount of data provided by some States under this form.

The Fourth Review Conference should improve CBM C by adoption of a simple proforma on which States Parties could provide information on publications of the results of biological research funded or part-funded by Ministries of Defence.

e. CBM D. This encourages the active promotion of contacts between scientists, experts and facilities engaged in biological research. This CBM embodies an important principle and should continue unchanged.

f. CBM E. This requires the declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures and also provides for the provision of copies on request to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (now Centre for Disarmament Affairs) or to individual State Parties. This is an important CBM and needs to continue unchanged.

g. CBM F. This requires the declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes. This is an important CBM as it provides greater transparency about the approach adopted over the years by the State Party to offensive and defensive biological programmes. The limitation of the information to be provided to "research and development" needs to be reviewed as the objective of the CBM is surely to provide transparency in regard to past national biological programmes as a whole - eg including production and acquisition - and not just to the research and development element. This CBM would be strengthened by broadening it to include all aspects of national offensive and defensive biological programmes by deleting the words "research and development" wherever they appear in the CBM whilst adding "(including research programmes)" at the end of the title.. There are no additional changes needed.

The Fourth Review Conference should broaden CBM F by deleting the words "research and development" from the title and text of CBM F and adding the word "(including research programmes)" at the end of the title.

h. CBM G. This requires the declaration of vaccine production facilities. However, examination of the detail of CBM G shows that the requirement is limited to facilities "producing vaccines licensed by the State party for the protection of humans." Consideration needs to be given to the removal of two limitations:

- First, whether the limitation "licensed by the State Party" is necessary or can this with advantage be deleted, and

- Second, should the scope of this CBM not be extended to include declarations of facilities producing animal vaccines?

There would appear to be advantage in both modifications as these would further increase transparency. There would then be a consequential change to Form G to indicate whether the vaccines were being produced for protection of humans and/or animals.

The Fourth Review Conference should broaden CBM G by deleting the words "licensed by the State Party" and adding the word "and animals" after "protection of humans". Form G should be amended in item 3 by addition of the words "(indicating whether for protection of humans or animals)" after the words "diseases covered".

Implications for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs

24. The action taken by the CDA to receive, compile and make available to States Parties information provided by States Parties in their declarations under the CBMs is welcomed. There appears to be no potential to use the CDA computer database until such time as a more standardised format is used by States Parties in making their declarations. It is judged unlikely that States Parties would wish at the present time to make the effort available to agree a standardized data format in view of the effort being devoted to the Ad Hoc Group considering a system of measures to strengthen the Convention through a legally binding instrument. It is, however, for consideration whether there would be benefit in requesting the CDA to produce and distribute to States Parties a summary tabulation showing for each year which States Parties have made an annual declaration, recognising that this declaration need be no more than submission of the simple proforma agreed at the Third Review Conference on which States Parties could indicate "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare". Such a tabulation would require minimal effort to update annually and might with advantage be issued each year in October, six months after the due date for CBM declarations. The benefit of the tabulation would be to heighten awareness of which States have provided their declarations and encourage all States to do so.

The Fourth Review Conference should commend the United Nations Secretary General for the work of the Center for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) in receiving, compiling and making available to States Parties information provided by States Parties in their declarations under the CBMs and request him to ask the CDA to compile and issue annually on 15 October a tabulation of those States Parties who have made their annual declarations.

Procedures for consultation and cooperation

25. As the procedures set out by the Third Review Conference for States Parties to consult and cooperate with each other in solving any problems that may arise in relation to the Convention have not been implemented or otherwise tested during the period from the Third Review Conference, it is suggested that no further action is needed by the Fourth Review Conference than to reiterate these procedures using similar language.

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts

26. The work of VEREX to identify and evaluate possible verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint has been considered by the Special Conference in September 1994 which mandated the establishment of an Ad Hoc Group to consider possible measures to strengthen the Convention and to propose a legally binding instrument. As the consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group is being addressed as a separate Agenda item 12 at the Fourth Review Conference, it is judged that States Parties in their review of Article V (under Agenda item 10 (b)) will wish to take note of

the progress made through the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts who met in 1992 and 1993 and whose report was considered by the Special Conference in 1994. Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group will be addressed in Agenda item 12 although it is likely that in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, the work of the Ad Hoc Group will be covered under Article V.

Solution of Compliance Concerns

27. The Third Review Conference stressed the need for all States Parties to deal seriously with compliance issues and appealed to States Parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the object of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions of the Convention. As over the past five years, no State has submitted a compliance concern through the procedures of the Convention, it is suggested that no further action is needed by the Fourth Review Conference other than to reiterate the statement made at the Third Review Conference using similar language.

Timely Investigation of Alleged Use

28. At the Third Review Conference, the States Parties agreed to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threats of use of biological or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations. As during the past five years, there have been no allegations of use of biological or toxin weapons although there have been allegations of the use of chemical weapons which have been investigated by teams of experts nominated by the UN Secretary General, it is suggested that the Fourth Review Conference would wish to note that the topic of the investigation of alleged use is being addressed by the Ad Hoc Group and should be included in its proposals for a legally binding instrument. In the meantime the Fourth Review Conference could with advantage reiterate the statement made at the Third Review Conference using similar language. In addition, it should be noted that investigations of alleged use are also addressed under Article VI and this is addressed in greater detail in the relevant section of this briefing book.

Suggested Language for the Final Declaration

29. It is suggested that the Fourth Review Conference might adopt language for its Final Declaration which following the same sequence as at the Third Review Conference might address in turn:

a. The Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 and extended at the Third Review Conference,

b. Improved Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs),

c. Implications for the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs (CDA),

d. Procedures for consultation and cooperation,

e. The outcome of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint (subsequently known as VEREX), the Special Conference and the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group considering proposals for a legally binding instrument,

f. Solution of compliance concerns, and

g. Timely investigations of alleged or threatened use of biological or toxin weapons.

30. The language in respect of the existing and improved Confidence-Building Measures is addressed in the final paragraph of the contribution to this briefing book by Iris Hunger and might be as follows:

ARTICLE V

In accordance with the decision of the Third Review Conference, and taking into account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V, the Conference reviewed the effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and cooperation and of the cooperative measures agreed in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and considered whether or not further actions were called for to create further cooperative measures. The Conference came to the following conclusions and recommendations:

The Conference recognizing that the Ad Hoc Group considering proposals for a legally binding instrument are considering the role of confidence-building measures therein nevertheless reaffirms the importance of the confidence-building measures agreed upon at the Second Review Conference and improved at the Third Review Conference. The Conference recognizes the exchange of information that took place on this agreed basis between 1992 and 1996. The Conference urges all States Parties to submit information to future rounds of information exchange.

With a view to promoting increased participation, the Conference agrees to reaffirm those measures established at the Second Review Conference and improved at the Third Review Conference with the following improvements; to clarify the exchange of data on centres and laboratories with high containment by broadening it to include all high containment facilities; to amend and extend the exchange of information on national biological defence programmes by broadening it to include all aspects of national biological defence programmes; to avoid unnecessary duplication of reporting of outbreaks of infectious disease by deleting this confidence-building measure and instead encouraging States Parties to declare outbreaks of disease to the FAO, OIE and WHO; to amend and clarify the measure for the encouragement of the publication of results so as to limit the provision of lists of publications to those of results of work in military, academic, industrial and other facilities funded or part-funded by the Ministry of Defence to amend the declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures by providing an address from which copies can be requested; to amend and extend the exchange of information on past offensive and defensive programmes by broadening it to include all aspects of past offensive and defensive biological programmes; and to extend and clarify the declaration of vaccine production facilities by extending these to both human and animal vaccine facilities and by deleting the words "licensed by the State Party" in the modalities for this measure.

Accordingly, the Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States Parties are to implement, on the basis of mutual cooperation, the following measures, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities:

1. Declaration form on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"

2. Confidence-building measure "A"

- Part 1: Exchange of data on centres and laboratories (including research facilities)

- Part 2: Exchange of information on biological defence programmes (including research programmes)

3. Confidence-building measure "B" - deleted.
4. Confidence building measure "C"

- Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge: to be limited to providing lists of publications of the results of work in military, academic, industrial and other facilities that has been funded or part-funded by the Ministry of Defence (lists of publications of facilities declared under CBM A2 should continue to be declared in Form A2);

5. Confidence -building measure "D"

- Active promotion of contacts with information to be provided in advance together with the address of a point of contact for each conference whenever possible;

6. Confidence-building measure "E"

- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures together with an address from which copies can be requested;

7. Confidence-building measure "F"

- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological programmes (including research programmes);

8. Confidence-building measure "G"

-Declaration of human and animal vaccine production plants.

The Conference also agrees that the exchange of information and data, using the revised forms, are to be sent to the United Nations Center for Disarmament Affairs no later than 15 April on an annual basis and should cover the previous calendar year with the exception of confidence-building measure D which should to the extent possible cover the coming year.

The Conference also notes with approval the progress being made by the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994 towards completing its mandate to make proposals for a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Convention and that this mandate requires inter alia that consideration is to be given to the "incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime".

31. Insofar as the implications for the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) are concerned, it is suggested that language as follows might be adopted:

The Conference commends the United Nations Centrer for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) for the work that it has carried out in receiving, compiling and making available to States Parties the information provided by States Parties in their implementation of the agreed measures to strengthen the Convention. The

Conference in the interest of encouraging the provision of this information annually by States Parties requests that the Center for Disarmament Affairs produce on 15 October each year a list of all those States Parties from whom they have received annual declarations by that date and that an addendum to that list be produced annually on the subsequent 1 April.

32. The language for procedures for consultation and cooperation might closely follow that adopted at the Third Review Conference and take the form of:

The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation assumed by States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms the agreement reached at the Third review Conference, and agrees that in order to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V the following procedures should be adopted:

- A formal consultative meeting could be preceded by bilateral or other consultations by agreement among those States Parties involved in the problems which had arisen;

- Requests for the convening of a consultative meeting shall be addressed to the Depositaries, who shall immediately inform all States parties of the request and shall convene within 30 days an informal meeting of interested States parties to discuss the arrangements for the formal consultative meeting, which shall be convened within 60 days of receipt of the request;

- With regard to the taking of decisions, the consultative meeting shall proceed in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Review Conference;

- The costs of the consultative meeting shall be met by the States Parties participating in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the number of States Parties participating in the meeting;

- A consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the applications of the provisions of, the Convention, suggest ways and means for further clarifying, inter alia, with assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter;

- The consultative meeting, or any State Party, may request specialized assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the applications of the provisions of, the Convention, through, inter alia, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter;

- The States Parties agree that, should the consultative meeting, or any State Party, make use of any such procedures within the framework of the United Nations, including lodging a complaint with the Security

Council under Article VI of the Convention, the Secretary-General may be kept informed;

- The Conference considers that the States Parties shall cooperate with the consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the applications of the provisions of, the Convention, and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well as cooperate in appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference reaffirms that consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

33. The language concerning the outcome of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint (subsequently known as VEREX), the Special Conference and the progress of the Ad Hoc Group considering proposals for a legally binding instrument (which is considered in the contribution on Agenda item 12 elsewhere in this Briefing Package) might take the form of:

The Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, welcomes the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties which identified and examined potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint and the outcome of the subsequent Special Conference to consider that report which met in Geneva in September 1994.

The Conference notes the mandate agreed by the Special Conference to establish an Ad Hoc Group with the objective being to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. The Conference endorses the work of the Ad Hoc Group thus far towards a legally binding instrument including declarations, on-site measures and investigations of alleged use. The Conference recognizing the importance of strengthening the Convention at the earliest possible date urges the Ad Hoc Group to complete its work and to circulate its proposals by no later than the summer of 1998.

34. The language relating to the solution of compliance concerns might follow that agreed at the Third Review Conference and be as follows:

The Conference stresses the need for all States to deal seriously with compliance issues and emphasizes that failure to do so undermines the Convention and the arms control and disarmament process in general.

The Conference appeals to all States Parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the applications of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to. In this connection, the States Parties agree to provide a specific timely response to any compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention. Such responses should be submitted through the procedures provided for under the Convention. The Conference further requests that information on such efforts be provided to the Fifth Review Conference.

35. The language about timely investigations of alleged or threatened use of biological or toxin weapons might follow that agreed at the Third review Conference and be as follows:

The Conference reaffirms the importance of the United nations Secretary-General carrying out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. The States Parties agree to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations. The Conference stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called upon to take appropriate measures, which could include a request to the Security Council to consider action in accordance with the Charter.

36. Finally, as at the Third Review Conference, a final paragraph might be added relating to regional measures to implement the decisions in relation to Article V as follows:

Taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, neighbouring States or States belonging to the same region may also adopt measures that are consistent with the aims and objectives of the Convention in order to facilitate or complement the implementation of the decisions of the Fourth Review Conference with respect to Article V.

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1. United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9-27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.

2. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 40/91B, Reduction of Military Budgets, 12 December 1993. Annex to United Nations General Assembly A/50/277, Reduction of Military Budgets, Military expenditures in standardized form reported by States, 20 July 1995.

3. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.

4. United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19-30 September 1994.

5. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3,

6. January 1995. 6 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995.

7 .United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995.

8.United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31, 26 July 1996.

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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Database forms part of the Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare, which is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.

 Updated 12 November 1998.