Graham S. Pearson is an Honorary Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. He was previously Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury. He has published several articles and papers on chemical and biological defence and arms control.
Introduction
1. At the Third Review Conference1 the States Parties decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. The Group was to be chaired by Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary and was to hold meetings to complete the work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 1993.
2. The mandate1 for the VEREX group required that measures be identified which could determine:
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination and were to be examined in terms of six main criteria:
- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality of information they provide, and fail to provide;
- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
- Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;
- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;
- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information.
3. The group was required to adopt by consensus a report on its work which would be circulated to all States Parties for their consideration. A Special Conference of States Parties to decide on any further action would be then convened should a majority of States Parties request such a Conference.
Mandate for the Ad Hoc Group
4. This Special Conference was held2 on 19 - 30 September 1994 at which the States Parties agreed to establish a further Ad Hoc Group (AHG) with the objective being to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context, the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia, consider:
- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;
- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
The mandate also required that
- Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security needs.
- Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial development.
In addition, the Special Conference made it clear that the regime "would include, inter alia, potential verification measures, as well as agreed procedures and mechanisms for their efficient implementation and measures for the investigation of alleged use."
The Ad Hoc Group
4. The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Toth of Hungary held a procedural meeting on 3 - 5 January 19953 and then substantive meetings on 10 -21 July 19954, 27 November - 8 December 19955, and 15 - 26 July 19966; a further AHG is to be held on 16 - 27 September 1996. The functioning of the AHG has been facilitated by the appointment of four Friends of the Chair (FOC) who chair the sessions concerned with the four elements of the mandate:
a. Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria - Dr Ali Mohammadi of the Islamic Republic of Iran
b. Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures - Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary
c. Measures to Promote Compliance - Mr Stephen Pattison of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
d. Measures Related to Article X - Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile.
5. At successive AHG meetings, the FOC have produced papers that reflect the discussions that have taken place yet are without prejudice to the positions of delegations on the issues under consideration in the Ad Hoc Group and do not imply agreement on the scope or content of the papers. These FOC papers are considered by the AHG in plenary session and amended as requested by delegations so that they reflect the views expressed before they are accepted for attachment to the procedural reports of the meetings. It is also clear from the reports of the meetings that some FOC papers have gone through several iterations and have thus been refined and improved. Thus far, the FOCs have prepared papers on:
Definition of Terms and Objective Criteria
- Summary of Views on Definition of Terms and Objective Criteria (Second AHG Annex III/6 )
- Definition of Terms (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 57-61)
- Criteria for Human Pathogens and Toxins (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 50 )
- A List of Human, Animal and Plant Pathogens and Toxins (Second AHG Annex III/8 )
- List of Human Pathogens and Toxins (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 48 )
- Criteria for Animal Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 52 )
- List of Animal Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 51)
- Criteria for Plant Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 54 )
- List of Plant Pathogens (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 53)
- Summary of views on definitions and threshold quantities (Third AHG Annex III/13 )
- Threshold Quantities (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 55)
- Summary of views on list of equipment and types of activity (Third AHG Annex III/14 )
- Summary of views on equipment (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 56)
- Resource Paper on Types of Activity (Third AHG Annex III/15 )
Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures
- Paper on Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures (Second AHG Annex III/5 )
- Surveillance of Publications (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 79 )
- Surveillance of Legislation (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 80 )
- Data on Transfers and Transfer Requests and on Production (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 81 )
- Multilateral Information Sharing (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 83 )
- Exchange Visits (international arrangements and off-site visits) (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 87 )
- Confidence Building Visits - (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 89 )
Measures to Promote Compliance
- Declarations (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 10-20 )
- On-Site Measures (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 21-35 )
- Other Measures (Second AHG Annex III/3 )
- Investigation of Alleged Use (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 36-44 )
- Allegations of Other Incidents possibly requiring similar investigation (ie Accidental release/Test) (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 45 )
- Unusual Outbreaks (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 46 )
Measures Related to Article X
- Elements for Structured Discussions on Article X on the BWC (Second AHG Annex III/9 and Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 62-72)
- Further Notes on the Elements for Structured Discussion of Article X (Third AHG Annex III/15 and Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 73-77)
Progress of the AHG
6. The progress made by the Ad Hoc Group in respect of its mandate can best be addressed by consideration of the work carried out by each of the four Friends of the Chair and then a general consideration of the overall progress to date.
7. Definition of Terms and Objective Criteria. The FOC has focused attention on the various terms identified in this element of the mandate:
- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;
Consequently attention has been paid in the first two substantive meetings to each of the specific examples listed in the mandate: lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, threshold quantities, equipment and types of activities. The FOC paper entitled "Summary of Views" (Second AHG, Annex III/6) indicated that there had been considerable debate about the role of definitions and objective criteria as two fundamentally differing views were reported: one that "the definition of essential terms in the Convention is necessary for measures to strengthen the Convention" and the other that "Article I of the Convention has clearly explained the scope of the Convention and any attempt to define the terms therein would limit the scope of the Convention. However, some technical terms outside the Convention may need definitions".
8. The mandate for the Ad Hoc Group is that definitions and objective criteria are required where relevant for specific measures to strengthen the Convention. It is also apparent that attempts to define terms in the Convention would indeed result in a reinterpretation of the Convention which has stood the test of time well with successive Review Conferences in considering Article I reaffirming - as at the Third Review Conference1 - that the undertaking given by States Parties in Article I applies to all "relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia , in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology" and that "the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, whatever their origin or method of production".
9. The FOC papers generally make it clear that the subject such as a list of agents has been developed in support of specific measures. Considerable attention has been given to the generation of lists of biological agents and toxins in respect of humans, animals and plants as well as the criteria for the inclusion of biological agents and toxins in such lists. The lists of agents and toxins (Fourth AHG, Annex III/p 48, p 51 , p 53) are clearly stated as having been discussed by the Group for "developing a future list or lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, where relevant, for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention" which echoes the wording of the mandate. Likewise the criteria for human (Fourth AHG, Annex III/p 50), animal (Fourth AHG, Annex III/p 52), and plant (Fourth AHG, Annex III/p 54) pathogens and toxins are stated as being criteria, which are proposed to be used in combination, and which were "recognised to be potentially useful for development of a list of human pathogens and toxins in support of specific measures" or similar phrases.
10. The list of criteria, which are proposed to be used in combination to develop a list of pathogens in support of specific measures, needs to be used with care as not all the criteria will necessarily apply or be relevant. For example, one criterion is "Infection or intoxication by respiratory route" would appear to exclude biological agents that might be used to attack by the ingestion route. Another is "high level of contagiousness in population" which would appear to disregard the fact that the agents developed by the UK and the US in their retaliatory BW programmes which ended in the 1950s and 1969 respectively were non-transmissible in the target population. Consequently, the criteria should be regarded as factors to be considered in determining whether to add pathogens or toxins to the list but should not be seen as being absolute in the sense that all have to be met.
11. Attention has also been given to the question of lists of equipment (Fourth AHG, Annex III/p 56) and of types of activity (Third AHG, Annex III/14/Appendix 1). In respect of equipment, a few types have been mentioned, such as aerosol test chambers, which might trigger declarations whilst some categories of key equipment have been mentioned which might need to be reported in declarations. A list of types of activity was generated which it was decided would be taken as a resource paper by the FOC on compliance measures.
12. As the work of the four FOCs has taken place in parallel, it has been apparent in the meetings thus far that there has yet to be developed a strong linkage between the work being carried out by the various FOCs although by the end of the fourth meeting it was becoming evident that the FOC on definitions and the FOC on compliance measures were working together with the FOC on definitions producing a paper on definitions (Fourth AHG Annex III/pp 58-61) which stated that "It was agreed that it would be useful to have certain terms defined to assist the work of the Compliance measures Group." As the work of the AHG progresses there should be an increasing linkage between the work of all the FOCs as the work of the AHG moves towards consolidating its work into proposals for a legally binding mandate.
13. This joint work by the FOC on definitions and the FOC on compliance measures is welcomed and could well move forward in future AHG meetings to considering detailed topics such as the purpose of the lists of agents which have been identified in some of the papers prepared by the FOC on compliance measures.
14. Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures. The element of the mandate is :
- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
The FOC on confidence-building and transparency measures has produced a paper (Second AHG, Annex III/5) which sets out a general appreciation of the situation in respect of confidence building measures (CBMs) which rightly points out that the existing CBMs are the only multilateral tools at the moment that provide some transparency between States Parties and that these will "need to be maintained until and even after a future legally binding instrument enters into force". From this FOC paper, it is clear that some of the existing CBMs could be incorporated into a framework of mandatory measures within a legally binding instrument, some of the existing CBMs could be incorporated into a framework of voluntary measures within a legally binding instrument and yet other CBMs could be retained outside the legally binding instrument. It is also clear that the existing CBMs will remain politically binding for all States Parties until such time as they ratify a legally binding instrument; if some of the CBMs are incorporated into the legally binding instrument then the obligation on States Parties in that respect will transfer to the legally binding instrument whilst any CBMs that are not incorporated into the instrument will continue to be politically binding.
15. The FOC identified several measures from the earlier VEREX work7 which "could be considered, as appropriate, for possible incorporation in a broad regime as voluntary measures" and has produced papers on six of these:
- Surveillance of Publications (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 79 )
- Surveillance of Legislation (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 80 )
- Data on Transfers and Transfer Requests and on Production (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 81 )
- Multilateral Information Sharing (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 83 )
- Exchange Visits (international arrangements and off-site visits) (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 87 )
- Confidence Building Visits - (Fourth AHG Annex III/p 89 )
These papers set out what might be involved in such a voluntary measure identifying various characteristics such as collection, survey, sources of information, information to be collected and surveyed, activities to be covered and modalities. These papers express ideas as to what might be done ; they do not focus in on what specific information of particular relevance to the Convention should be collected, nor why this should be a voluntary rather than a mandatory requirement. This lack of focus at this stage is hardly surprising as much depends on which measures are indeed proposed as the core of the legally binding instrument. It will only be when those essential mandatory core measures have been identified and broadly accepted that it will be possible to reach judgements on the benefits of the additional confidence-building and transparency measures and whether these should be mandatory or voluntary.
16. Compliance Measures. The element of the mandate being addressed by the FOC on compliance measures is:
- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
Papers have been produced on declarations (Second AHG, Annex III/1), on-site measures (Second AHG, Annex III/2), other measures (Second AHG, Annex III/3) and investigation of alleged use (Second AHG, Annex III/4). Those papers on the measures which appear to be attracting support as being central to a future regime - declarations, on-site measures, and investigation of use - have been further developed at the Third AHG (Annex III/1, 2, and 3 respectively) where a useful commentary in italics has been included on aspects requiring further consideration. These have been further developed at the Fourth AHG ( declarations - Annex III/pp 10-20; on-site measures Annex III/pp 21-35; investigation of use Annex III/pp 36-44 ) together with papers on allegations of other incidents possibly requiring similar investigation (i.e. accidental release/test) (Annex III/p 46) and on unusual outbreaks (Annex III/p 47).
17. Declarations are seen as helping to increase confidence in compliance by increasing transparency and thus helping to avoid false suspicions of non-compliance. Declarations make evasion of obligations more difficult and thus could aid deterrence. The scope of declarations is seen as requiring that activities/facilities/programmes of clear relevance to the strengthening of the Convention should be declared. Declaration requirements are recognised as needing to be precise so that there is no ambiguity as to what should be declared. Various triggers for declarations have been identified and discussed:
a. Military and military-related biodefence programmes/facilities
b. High containment facilities
c. Work with listed pathogens and toxins
d. Aerobiology/Aerosol dissemination
e. Production microbiology
f. Genetic manipulation.
18. On-site measures have been the subject of considerable debate thus far with a number of issues being addressed. Various types of visits/inspection have been discussed:
a. Non-compliance concern investigations. Such an investigation could be to investigate a specific concern about compliance, could take place at short notice and could be of a declared or undeclared facility or site. Consideration has been given to how such investigations might be initiated, what information should be supported in support of a request, measures to guard against abuse, timeframe, access, tools and post investigation review.
b. Non-challenge visits. Several concepts have been identified: (a) Some non-challenge visits could be used to provide information to States Parties about Article V and X issues; (b) Random visits could have deterrent value and take place at short notice on the basis of agreed criteria; (c) Short notice non-challenge visits could make it more difficult for a proliferator to conceal non-compliant activity within a declared site and in addition, they could help strengthen confidence in the accuracy of declarations, for example, by providing a mechanism to help resolve uncertainties. Two broad reasons for such visits were identified.
c. Visits to specifically address a concern/ambiguity. Such a concern would be one that fell short of a concern about compliance with the BTWC itself such as a concern about the accuracy of a declaration.
It would appear that another benefit of non-challenge visits not mentioned in the FOC papers would be the increased understanding that would be gained by the BTWC organisation/inspectorate about the approaches being taken by a State Party to microbiology and biotechnology thereby over time building an appreciation of the national pattern of activities in these areas that would aid the ability of the BTWC organisation/inspectorate to reach accurate judgements about activities in that State Party and so avoid false suspicions of non-compliance. There appear to be clear benefits that accrue from a regime including non-challenge visits8 as well as non-compliance investigations.
19. Investigation of alleged use has received wide support as being an important part of a legally binding instrument to strengthen confidence in compliance. Consideration has been given to how such investigations would be initiated, measures to guard against abuse, the implementation of such investigations and reports and judgement. There is also discussion about allegations of other incidents possibly requiring similar investigation such as an accidental release or test and about unusual outbreaks of disease and whether these should be included as separate elements in the compliance regime.
20. The FOC on compliance measures has made good progress and his papers on both declarations and on investigation of allegations of use have developed considerably with the paper on declarations now including an Annex on declaration formats. The paper on on-site measures has identified many of the issues of concern to delegations. It has been argued by analysts in papers issued elsewhere9 than at the AHG that on site measures are an essential part of any prospective regime. The benefits of two types of on-site visits/inspections appear to be recognised: one in the case of compliance concerns and another in the case of non-challenge visits to build confidence in compliance and in the accuracy of declarations. Part of the problem is probably a reaction to the Chemical Weapons Convention which is in the inter-regnum between signature and entry into force and which has both challenge and routine inspections. There is a need for clarity in considering what the legally binding instrument for the BTWC might entail and how this will differ because of the different nature of biological weapons from the inspection regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
21. Article X Measures. The element of the mandate being considered by the FOC on Article X measures is:
- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
A paper has been produced (Second AHG, Annex III/9 and Fourth AHG, Annex III/pp 62-72) setting out some elements that might be considered in structured discussions on Article X. These elements covered a very wide range of possible topics and a further paper was produced at the Third AHG (Annex III/15 and Fourth AHG, Annex III, pp 73-77) which did not substitute, modify or improve the previous paper but attempted to reflect the discussions of the paper. It states that "emphasis has been placed so far on the terms of the mandate (specific measures to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X)." It was also noted that the need to focus on a more specific range of activities and on "areas directly relevant to the Convention" has been stressed by many delegations.
22. It is also clear from the FOC papers that it is recognised that there are overlaps between Article X matters being considered by the AHG and closely related matters being addressed in other fora. For example, the FOC paper notes that there is double reporting of diseases and outbreaks due to toxins to the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs under CBM B of the BTWC as well as provision of a larger amount of such information to the WHO (jointly with IOE and FAO) who possess the expertise to adequately process this information.
23. The move in the final paragraph of the second FOC paper to introduce "a note of caution and a dose of realism" in respect of the possibilities identified in the first FOC paper and to recognise the need to establish priorities and to concentrate on "core areas" relevant to the Convention is to be welcomed.
24. The FOC on Article X measures has shown a move which is welcomed towards focusing on potential measures relevant to the BTWC and away from measures which would duplicate unnecessarily measures being undertaken by other fora such as Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity. There appears to be promise in measures that will implement Article X of the BTWC whilst at the same time improving transparency and building confidence. It is also very clear that any eventual BTWC organisation must be aware of and benefit from knowledge being provided by States Parties to other international organizations. The world-wide shortage of resources means that no regime can afford the luxury of measures that are not essential for the effectiveness of that regime.
The Future of the AHG
25. The AHG has made reasonable progress thus far but does not yet appear ready to make the essential transition to a rolling text of a possible legally binding instrument. By the time of the Fourth Review Conference, the AHG will have held four substantive meetings - the same time as it took for the VEREX group to meet and produce its final report - although the VEREX task was very different from that of the present AHG. The AHG needs to be given strong encouragement to complete its task by an early date.
26. Thus far, the AHG has pursued its agenda through meetings chaired by the four FOC and without merging the outcome of the four FOCs into a single composite proposal. The move at the Fourth AHG in July 1996 for the FOC on Definitions and the FOC on Compliance Measures to work together in respect of some of the terms requiring definition is to be welcomed. There would be merit in the Fourth Review Conference taking action to give additional stimulus to the AHG negotiations by actions such as the following:
a. Endorsing the work of the Ad Hoc group thus far towards a legally binding instrument including declarations, on-site measures and investigations of alleged use
b. Setting a date, such as the start of the autumn 1998 UN General Assembly, by which time the proposals of the AHG for a legally binding instrument shall have been prepared and circulated to States Parties for consideration with the aim that the UN General Assembly in autumn 1998 should adopt a resolution for a Special Conference to be held in 1999 to consider and agree the AHG proposals.
27. The developments over the past five years since the Third Review Conference in respect of the continuing world-wide concern about the proliferation of biological weapons and the possible use of biological materials by terrorists make it vitally important that the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference send a firm and clear signal that they do intend to strengthen the BTWC in a definite period of time in the near future. Failure to do so would send a message that the BTWC is not going to be strengthened at an early date and could very well encourage States to contemplate acquiring biological weapons with consequential damage to world and regional security. The biological weapons regime is the weak link in the non-proliferation regimes against weapons of mass destruction now that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been indefinitely extended and the Chemical Weapons Convention is nearing entry into force. As some have pointed out8, there is nothing needed that is new for the strengthening of the BTWC - all the elements and measures required for the regime are already out there in existing internationally agreed regimes. All that is needed is for these elements and measures to be tailored for the different nature of biological weapons. Consequently, the States Parties of the BTWC need to provide the necessary stimulus to the AHG to complete its work and for the States Parties to then adopt the legally binding instrument.
1 United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9Ð27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
2 United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19Ð30 September 1994.
3 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3, 6 January 1995.
4 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995.
5 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995.
6 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31, 26 July 1996.
7 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.
8 Gordon K Vachon, Verifying the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: The Role of Visits and Inspections, Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, Friederich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany, 6-7 May 1996.
9See, for example, papers presented at a conference entitled Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention held at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany on 6-7 May 1996.