Jose Eduardo M. Felicio is Minister Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York. He has previously served in Washington, D. C. at the Mission to the Organization of American States, at the Embassy of Brazil in Abidjan, at the Embassy in Vienna and the Mission to the international organizations in Vienna (in charge of IAEA matters) and at the Mission of Brazil in Geneva (member of the delegation to the Conference on Disarmament);
Roque Monteleone-Neto is Associate Professor in the Department of Genetics of the Federal University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. He is currently working for the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq in New York. He was previously Coordinator of Research and Technology Development at the Ministry of Health of Brazil and a member of the Brazilian delegation to the Third Review Conference of the BTWC, to the Special Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC (1994) and to the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX), from 1992 to 1993.
Discussion of Article X at the Third Review Conference
1. At the Third Review Conference of the BTWC held on 9-27 September 1991, the Final Declaration of the States Parties gave more attention to Article X on the provisions for exchange of information and international cooperation than to any other Article with the sole exception of Article V on consultation and cooperation. The Final Declaration of the States Parties emphasized, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, the increasing importance of Article X which states that:
(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
2. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference1 contained some 12 paragraphs on Article X which urged States Parties and the United Nations to take several measures including the following:
a. The Conference emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities. b. The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards this end, notes with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. The Conference urges all States Parties actively to promote international cooperation and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful uses of biotechnology, and urges the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.
c. The Conference urges the United Nations and States Parties to take specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest possible international cooperation in this field. Such measures could include, inter alia:
- Transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in, and greater cooperation in international public health and disease control;
- Wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment among States on a systematic and long-term basis;
- Active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical personnel on a reciprocal basis, in relevant fields;
- Increased technical cooperation and assistance, including training programmes to developing countries in the use of biosciences and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes through active association with United Nations institutions, including the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology;
- Facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional agreements providing, on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development and application of biotechnology;
- Encouraging the coordination of national and regional programmes and working out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of cooperation in this field;
- Cooperation in providing information on their national epidemiological surveillance and data reporting systems, and in providing assistance, on a bilateral level and/or in conjunction with WHO regarding epidemiological surveillance, with a view to improvements in the identification and timely reporting of significant outbreaks of human and animal diseases.
d. The Review Conference considers that a worldwide data bank under the supervision of the United Nations might be a suitable way of facilitating the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other scientific developments.
e. The Review Conference calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body, not later than 1993, a discussion and examination of the means of improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
f. The Conference requests that the Secretary-General collate on an annual basis, and for the information of States Parties, reports on how this article is being implemented.
g. The Conference welcomes efforts to elaborate an international programme of vaccine development for the prevention of diseases which would involve the scientific and technical personnel from developing countries that are States Parties to the Convention.
The complete Final Declaration on Article X is reproduced in Appendix II.
Developments since the Third Review Conference
Introduction
3. In considering the developments since the Third Review Conference, it is useful to review the historical background to arms control and access to technology. Article X of the BTWC determines that the implementation of the Convention should avoid hampering international cooperation and exchange in the field of peaceful biological activities. The trend towards the adoption of such provisions as Article X of the BTWC is a rather recent phenomenon in multilateral disarmament agreements. Negotiators became more insistent in adopting such provisions after World War II. Before that, a rather generic reference to the question of arms control and access to technology can be found in the Covenant of The League of Nations2. Paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the Covenant reads as follows:
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. [emphasis added] 4. After World War II there was a greater concern about controlling the application of nuclear energy. The atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved the devastating effect of nuclear weapons and the power of technological knowledge in that field. While the need for controls was recognized, countries were highly interested in having access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. This became clearer with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency was established with the primary task of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (see Articles II and III of its Statute3). Under the Agency's Statute, the controls (Safeguards) come as a consequence, almost as an accessory to the promotion of applications, research and exchange among Member States.
5. Over the years the IAEA Safeguards have become a more important feature. The Safeguards budget has increased proportionately more than has the budget for technical cooperation. It should be noted also that technical cooperation is funded through voluntary contributions while Safeguards are funded from the Agency's regular budget. The importance of verification at the IAEA was reinforced by the task entrusted to it by decision of the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 687(1991)4 in relation to the removal or destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
6. Other treaties that followed the creation of the IAEA were of a similar pattern, with verification becoming an increasingly more important function. The Chemical Weapons Convention5 has created the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in a totally new environment. The primary function of that Organization is to ensure the total elimination of chemical weapons. Verification of declarations pertaining to weapons and their destruction, to the chemical industry and to monitoring of trade in chemicals will certainly be the centre of attention and resources available to the OPCW will be mainly spent in verification and control activities. Transfer of technology and cooperation will likely remain at low priority. This was already known during the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Article XI of the CWC contains important commitments related to the promotion of international cooperation and exchange, but it will remain a mere declaration of intent until the OPCW puts in place appropriate mechanisms for its practical implementation.
7. Article X of the BTWC is of a similar value. It encompasses a strong wish of the States Parties to cooperate but this cannot be realized before the establishment of adequate forms of cooperation. The Fourth BTWC Review Conference offers an excellent opportunity for the discussion of ways to implement Article X of the Convention and this discussion can also take place in the Ad Hoc Group which is charged with the designing of the verification mechanism to be added to the Convention. This situation would be different from that which occurred in the context of CWC negotiations, which resulted in detailed verification provisions while the discussion of cooperation mechanisms was left to the later stage of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the OPCW.
8. Provisions for technology transfer have been included in disarmament agreements as a compensation for the acceptance of more strict export controls. Countries accepting non-proliferation commitments and inspections for verification of compliance with such commitments would be granted access to technology. It is also a common feature to disarmament agreements that their verification provisions are normally quite detailed, besides providing in some cases for sanctions and recourse to the United Nations Security Council in the event of non-compliance. Compliance with transfer of technology regulations, however, cannot be enforced in the same manner, and therefore they remain a weak obligation subject to the good will of the States Parties for implementation.
Developments
9. Since the Third Review Conference there has been progress in many of the areas relating to Article X. Part of the progress has been the result of activities undertaken under the auspices of the Conference and also by international initiatives taken in other fora. Each of the following BTWC activities and international initiatives identified below are considered in the subsequent paragraphs:
a. The BTWC VEREX, Special Conference and subsequent Ad Hoc Group,
b. The Rio Summit of 1992 and the Convention on Biological Diversity,
c. The World Health Assembly resolution of May 1995 on infectious diseases,
d. The continuing world wide aid programmes.
TWC VEREX, Special Conference and Ad Hoc Group
10. The Third Review Conference1 in its consideration of Article V on consultation and cooperation mandated an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify, examine and evaluate potential verification measures for the Convention from the scientific and technical viewpoint. The mandate for the VEREX also said that the potential verification measures could be examined in terms of six criteria which included: their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information.
11. VEREX met four times in 1992 and 1993 and produced a final report6 which evaluated 21 potential verification measures against the six main criteria. This report was circulated in late 1993 to all States Parties and the majority requested that a Special Conference be held to consider the VEREX report. The final report of VEREX included reference to Article X as follows:
The Group examined the potential verification measures in terms, inter alia, of their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities. In that context, delegations recalled Article X of the Convention according to which States Parties "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes", and the related provisions of the Final Document of the Third Review Conference, in particular those on the examination of means of improving related institutional mechanisms and those on the adoption of positive measures to promote technology transfer, consistent with all the other Articles of the Convention. Delegations recalled as well that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention.
12. The Special Conference7 was held in Geneva in September 1994 when a number of States Parties presented Working Papers and made contributions to the debate on how to take forward the work of VEREX which led to the mandate agreed by the Special Conference for an Ad Hoc Group to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the Convention.
13. Several delegations presented papers at the Special Conference on how steps should be taken to strengthen the Convention. The delegation of Brazil8,9, for instance, emphasised the necessity of integrating a package of verification measures into a coherent system. Their document8 pointed out that : "The purpose of strengthening the BTWC is to help achieve the mutually reinforcing objectives of 'excluding completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons' " (Preambular 9) and facilitating "the fullest possible exchange of equipment , materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes" (Article X) and noted that "while the first objective is the primary aim of the Convention, progress towards the second would be important for approaching the first." The document went on to say that: careful consideration of the issue demonstrates clearly that, far from hindering each other, the two tracks of the work of the organization which will be in charge of the BTWC (verification and technical development) are mutually reinforcing. The provision of technical assistance and the establishment of a cooperative relationship with national authorities is the only practical cost effective way of amassing information on the hundreds, or even thousands, of biological facilities potentially relevant to the Convention. Conversely, cooperation with the verification regime could help national authorities, inter alia, in their efforts to upgrade biological safety standards and practices and to participate in the fullest possible technological interchange for peaceful purposes.
14. The second paper by Brazil9 provided further elaboration on the way in which technical assistance and technological development would be part of a strengthened regime. It noted that because it is possible to engage in activities forbidden under the Convention with minimum equipment and resources, it would not be surprising if a large number of facilities around the world would have to be declared under a future BTWC regime. This would place a heavy burden on national authorities responsible for compiling declarations. Furthermore, the relatively low participation in the existing CBMs was seen as a good indicator of the difficulties faced by many countries - especially, but not only, developing countries - in keeping track of their industry. This was identified as a problem that will not disappear in the near future, even if national declarations are made mandatory. The suggested solution was the development of a cooperative relationship between the national authorities and the BTWC verification organisation. That organisation could usefully help national authorities to prepare declarations (which would aid transparency) and to assist national authorities in the training of personnel for monitoring national biological activities and for establishing and managing the databases needed to prepare the national declarations. Such assistance could also help in the improvement of national biological safety practices in order to upgrade them gradually in connection with multilaterally agreed standards (which would help to build confidence).
15. Such a cooperative approach was identified as having several advantages:
a. First, it would help the BTWC organisation to gain a clearer appreciation of relevant biological activity in each State Party and around the world,
b. Second, it would be of great utility to many countries that are trying to improve their national biosafety standards and practices and thereby also help to accomplish the goals of Article X,
c. Third, it would provide a framework for donor countries interested in providing additional assistance for the improvement of biosafety practices in other countries - which is a mutually beneficial form of cooperation as helps to contain the spread of diseases as well as building confidence about biosafety practices in the State Party,
d. Fourth, it would provide a strong incentive for many countries to sustain active participation in the implementation of the Convention and would thereby increase political and practical support for the overall biological disarmament regime of the BTWC.
16. These ideas were reflected in the mandate agreed at the Special Conference7 for an Ad Hoc Group "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally biding instrument". The Ad Hoc Group is required inter alia to consider:
Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
17. The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) held a procedural meeting on 4-6 January 199510 and substantive meetings on 10-21 July 199511, 27 November-8 December 199512, and 15-26 July 199613. A further AHG meeting will be held on 16-27 September 1996. The functioning of the AHG has been facilitated by the appointment of Friends of the Chair (FOC) for specific subjects. At successive AHG meetings, the FOC for Article X, Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile has produced papers reflecting his view of the discussions that took place, without prejudice to the positions of delegations on the issues under consideration. These papers were considered by the AHG in plenary sessions and were amended to reflect any views expressed by delegations before being accepted for attachment to the procedural reports of the meetings. It is also clear from the reports of the meetings that some FOC papers have gone through several iterations and have thus been refined and improved. The FOC papers clearly recognise that there are overlaps between Article X matters being considered by the AHG and closely related matters being addressed in other fora.
18. Nevertheless, a FOC paper produced at the Third AHG meeting and reproduced at the Fourth AHG meeting, while accepting the existence of such overlaps stated that "emphasis has been placed so far on the terms of the mandate (specific measures to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X)." It was also noted that the need to focus on a more specific range of activities and on "areas directly relevant to the Convention" had been stressed by many delegations. The move in the Article X FOC paper to introduce "a note of caution and a dose of realism" in respect to the possibilities identified in his first paper and to recognise the need to establish priorities and to concentrate on "core areas" relevant to the Convention is welcomed. This FOC emphasis towards focusing on potential measures relevant to the BTWC and away from measures which would duplicate unnecessarily measures being undertaken by other fora such as Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity is encouraged. There appears to be promise in measures that will implement Article X of the BTWC whilst at the same time improving transparency and building confidence. It is also very clear that any eventual BTWC organisation must be aware of and benefit from knowledge being provided by States Parties to other international organisations. The world-wide shortage of resources means that no regime can afford the luxury of measures that are not essential for the effectiveness of that regime.
The Rio Summit, Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity
19. Of particular note is the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro from 5-14 June 1992 which produced14 a Declaration of Principles and Agenda 21, a series of aspirations, relating to all aspects of the environment and development. In addition, two legally binding Conventions - the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)15 and the Convention on Climate Change (CCC) were opened for signature. Both Agenda 21 and CBD are important steps in promoting the peaceful uses of microbiology and biotechnology. They are concerned with, inter alia, all living species. Therefore, they are much more comprehensive than Article X of the BTWC which would perhaps need specific mechanisms for the promotion of international cooperation and assistance for the use and transfer of equipment and of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins16.
20. Whilst the Declaration of Principles and Agenda 21 agreed at the Rio Summit are voluntary, they represent a shared agenda by both developed and developing nations for a wide variety of topics relating to the environment and to the development (including economic and technological) of world states. The Declaration of Principles clearly promote health, protection of the environment and the right to development. The Convention on Biological Diversity which entered into force in December 1993 has several provisions relevant to peaceful uses of microbiology and biotechnology such as: cooperation, research and training, access and transfer of technology, technical and scientific cooperation etc.
21. Two recently established mechanisms to promote and facilitate technical and scientific cooperation through a clearing house mechanism and biosafety were agreed upon at the Second Annual Conference of the Parties to the CBD held in Djakarta in November 1995.
World Health Assembly Resolution on Infectious Diseases
22. Steps have also been taken to improve the epidemiological surveillance of disease by the WHO. Worldwide concern about new and emerging diseases was recognised at the May 1995 World Health Assembly which passed a resolution17 urging Member States to strengthen national and local programmes of active surveillance for infectious diseases, to enhance communications between national and international services involved in disease detection, early notification, surveillance, control and response, and to control outbreaks and to promote accurate and timely reporting of cases at national and international levels. It also urged "other specialised agencies of the United Nations system, bilateral development agencies, non governmental organisations and other groups concerned to increase their cooperation in the recognition, prevention and control of new, emerging, and re-emerging infectious diseases both through continued support for general social and health development and through specific support to national and international programmes to recognise and respond to those diseases."
23. The Division of Emerging and other Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control of the WHO is actively engaged in the implementation of this World Health Assembly resolution. Another recent decision18 taken in 1996 by the member States of WHO was to eliminate the official stocks of smallpox virus, since the disease is considered to be eradicated. It is worth noting that one of the arguments given for such a decision was to eliminate a possible agent that could be used as a biological weapon. Of course, this is a clear example of a decision made in another international forum that is directly relevant to the BTWC. This suggests the kind of working relations which will have to be established between the eventual organisation in charge of the BTWC regime and other international fora.
International aid programmes
24. In addition, there are extensive and sizeable national foreign aid programmes between the developed and developing worlds, generally on a bilateral basis, which are focused on providing assistance to developing countries to promote improved health of people, animals and plants as well as tackling environmental problems. Although these all contribute to the same objectives as those of Article X, there is no argument to suggest these existing arrangements should be changed to one involving a BTWC organisation. Nevertheless, the organisation under the BTWC should be able to gather information on such activities and conceivably establish a relationship with them in order to follow up the aspects more relevant to the Convention. Many of those programmes, specially those on a bilateral basis, were identified and summarized as working papers presented by several delegations during the Special Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC.
Issues for the Fourth Review Conference
25. It has become evident in the activities since the Third Review Conference that the States Parties have the clear intention to strengthen the BWC as a whole. While recognizing the need for designing an appropriate verification regime for the Convention, the Parties have also expressed caution regarding its possible impact on scientific research, cooperation and development of permitted activities. Article X has been recalled in this context and it has been noted that the Convention should not be used to impose limitations or restrictions to transfers consistent with the Convention. An attractive option is to consider how the States Parties might profit from the future existence of the verification regime itself to explore additional areas of cooperation and exchange among States Parties.
26. Having this in mind, the Fourth Review Conference should discuss in which ways the agency to be established in order to ensure compliance with the verification regime of the BTWC could also be entrusted with the promotion of international cooperation and assistance. Among other things, the agency should:
- bring together national authorities interested in the establishment of biological databases, in the collection and dissemination of information;
- provide technical assistance in research projects and in laboratory safety;
- promote cooperation among States Parties in identifying and controlling outbreaks of diseases;
- encourage dissemination of results of biological research directly related to the objectives of the BTWC;
- create a voluntary fund for the financing of scientific and technical cooperation and assistance projects; and
- establish a close relationship with organizations such as the WHO, FAO and IOE, with a view to keeping record of the cooperation activities promoted by those entities, coordinate with them its own promotional initiatives, thus avoiding duplication and rationalizing the use of resources.
27. In considering the sort of measures that might be incorporated in a future regime for the Convention, it is recognised that the promotion of frequent non-challenge visits among States Parties would certainly serve the purposes of enhancing confidence among experts, providing a good working relationship, improving the personal and professional knowledge among experts and ultimately favouring the acceptance of the verification regime itself. Seminars could be promoted on the occasion of technical visits, with the involvement of government officials, experts and industry representatives.
28. The aim should be that technical assistance and cooperation should create an environment for transfer of technology taking into account the need to develop human resources, train experts, acquire equipment and establish appropriate institutions. Technical assistance and cooperation provided at the government level and/or channelled through an international agency should aim at creating the necessary conditions for the intervention of the private sector to further promote the transfer of equipment and technology on a commercial basis.
29. Another improvement to the BTWC regime would be the adoption of a control regime for international transfers and trade similar to the one envisaged in the CWC. The successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrated that it was possible to negotiate multilaterally the establishment of international controls for trade of sensitive goods and technology. Rules for international transfer among States Parties and restrictions towards States not party to the Convention were established, with end-use declarations being the basis for this control regime. With the completion of both verification and trade controls, the continued application to CWC Parties of controls already in existence outside the Convention was brought to debate. The same question will certainly have to be addressed in the event of adoption of similar provisions for the BTWC. In the case of the CWC, Australia Group members issued a declaration19 at the Conference on Disarmament stating that they would "review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical weapons .....with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit to States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention".
30. A control regime for international transfers and trade pertaining to the BTWC would strengthen the Convention as a whole. It would be in line with Article X and also with Article III of the Convention under which the States Parties undertake "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any States, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention".
31. Taking into consideration all the above, it is suggested that the Fourth Review Conference should take note of and support the developments in respect of Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity and also the initiatives being taken by the WHO, with whom the agency to be eventually established for BTWC purposes will have to engage in a close relationship on matters pertaining to this Convention. It might then take note and endorse the work being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group in its negotiations aimed at proposals for the strengthening of the Convention through a legally binding instrument. The Conference could finally recommend the addition of a trade and transfer control regime to the BTWC and also that the agency to be established in the context of the Convention be entrusted with the task of promoting technical cooperation and assistance.
Suggested Language for the Final Declaration
32. The language to be adopted by the Fourth Review Conference in respect of Article X might therefore be along the following lines:
The States Parties to the BTWC recognize the need to strengthen the Convention with respect to the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities.
The Fourth Review Conference takes note of the significant steps forward in promoting cooperation taken by the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Conventions on Biological Diversity and on Climate Change. The Conference urges all States Parties to seek similar achievements in the context of the BTWC by actively promoting international cooperation and exchange in the peaceful uses of biotechnology, and urges the developed countries possessing advanced technology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis for the benefit of all mankind.
The Conference recommends that when an agency is created in accordance with the objectives of the BTWC it be authorized to promote technical cooperation and assistance, encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts and foster the exchange of scientific and technical information. The Conference also recommends that the States Parties consider the addition of a control regime for international transfers and trade in the context of the BTWC.
1. United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9Ð27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992. 2. Covenant of the League of Nations, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919, entered into force on 10 January 1920. Excerpt published in Goldblat, Jozef, Agreements for Arms Control, SIPRI, Taylor and Francis Ltd, London, 1982, p.131. 3. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, June 1980. 4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687(1991), United Nations, New York, S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. 5. United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, United Nations 93-05070, 1993. 6. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993. 7. Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Report,BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19-30 September 1994. 8. Brazil, "Strengthening the BWC: The Next Steps", Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction BWC/SPCONF/WP.5, Geneva, 21 September 1994. 9. Brazil, "Strengthening the BWC: Elements for a Possible Verification Regime", Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction BWC/SPCONF/WP.4, Geneva, 21 September 1994. 10. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3, 6 January 1995. 11. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995. 12. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995. 13. United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31, 26 July 1996. 14. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992, "Earth Summit '92", The Regency Press Corporation, London. 15. Convention on Biological Diversity opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro 5 June 1992, HMSO, Cm 2127, January 1993. 16. Graham S Pearson, Implementing Article X of the BTWC: Avoiding Duplication, Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue No. 32, June 1996. 17. World Health Organization, Forty-eighth World Health Assembly, Communicable diseases prevention and control: new, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, Resolution WHA 48.13, 12 May 1995. 18. World Health Organization, Forty-ninth World Health Assembly, Smallpox eradication - destruction of variola virus stocks, Resolution WHA 49.10, 25 May 1996. 19. Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Document CD/PV. 629, 6 August 1992.