Information about biological weapons and the BTWC

The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century

Graham S. Pearson

Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

(This article is reproduced by kind permission of the Henry L. Stimson Center. It first appeared in the Henry L. Stimson Centre Report No. 24, 'Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action' January 1998.)

Further information about biological weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century

In 1996, President Bill Clinton listed among the priorities for global action the need to do more to "protect. . . people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war."¹ The threat to human health and international security that Clinton identified was not new, for the use of disease as a weapon of war dates back centuries. American soldiers, for example, gave Indians blankets infected with smallpox. The international community has twice mobilized to attempt to curtail the threat of biological warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical or biological materials in war and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention of this entire class of weapons. Clinton’s remarks were motivated, however, by the recognition that since the BWC entered into force in 1975, the number of states proliferating biological weapons has increased to approximately a dozen, heightening international concerns about this particularly dangerous form of warfare.

The brevity of the BWC—some four pages long— is typical of Cold War treaties. The BWC shares another trait of that generation of arms control accords, the absence of verification provisions.² The international community since has begun to embrace on-site inspections and other intrusive measures to verify arms control accords. For instance, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997, contains a lengthy Verification Annex that enumerates how on-site inspections are to be executed. Although the dual-purpose nature of the chemical industry presented a challenge to devising effective verification measures, this treaty operates on the philosophy that participating states bear the burden of demonstrating compliance to inspectors. The dual-purpose nature of the biotechnology industry will present even greater challenges for the crafting of a BWC verification protocol.

Concerns about non-compliance with the BWC were sharpened when Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted in 1992 that for twenty years the former Soviet Union continued an offensive biological weapons program in breach of the BWC.³ Suspicions that the USSR was violating the BWC surfaced more than a decade earlier, when an outbreak of anthrax occurred at Sverdlovsk.⁴ Since the BWC lacked a verification protocol, members of the treaty lack an easy way to investigate these suspicions officially. Only with Yeltsin’s statement was the existence of the Soviet biological weapons program confirmed. The international community’s confidence that biological weapons were not seen as an option was further shaken in 1995 when BWC signatory Iraq was found to have a significant biological weapons program.⁵ After years of obstructing the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors, Iraq disclosed that it had produced major quantities of various biological agents and deployed agent-filled bombs and missiles during the 1991 Gulf War.⁶ Both of these situations underscored the need to buttress the BWC with a meaningful verification protocol.

In addition to these serious violations of the BWC, the international community received another wake-up call in the Spring of 1995. On March 20th, a religious cult released the nerve gas sarin in Tokyo’s subway at the height of the commuter rush hour. A dozen people were killed and over 5,500 were hospitalized as a result of this attack. To execute this attack, cult members placed several small, multi-layered, plastic containers of sarin on baggage racks or the floors of subway trains. At the designated time, the cult members punctured the bags with a sharp instrument, like the tip of an umbrella. Aum Shinrikyo clearly succeeded in manufacturing poison gas, but the cult was also closing in on a biological weapons capability. The cult was working with botulinum toxin and anthrax, and it had developed devices to disseminate such agents. The Aum sect also sent a team to Zaire in 1992 to assist in the treatment of Ebola victims, reportedly with the goal of obtaining a sample of the Ebola virus that could be cultured back in Aum’s laboratories in Japan.⁷ This group’s attacks and dogged pursuit of chemical and biological weapons made the danger that these weapons of mass destruction can be used for terrorist purposes unmistakably clear. Individual governments and the international community have begun to recognize the seriousness of this threat.⁸

Other events have also helped to increase awareness of the susceptibility of humans, animals and plants to disease. Recent headlines have reported alarming outbreaks of deadly diseases. In October 1994, a World Health Organization (WHO) team visited the Indian town of Beed to help this town cope with an eruption of the bubonic plague. Later, the city of Surat, also located in the region of Bombay, suffered an outbreak of the pneumonic plague.⁹ On another continent, the WHO reported that the Ebola virus resurfaced in Zaire in April 1995. Two months after the outbreak began, WHO records show that 93 infections and 86 deaths occurred. This 90 percent mortality rate is similar to an earlier Ebola outbreak in Zaire. In 1976, 290 died out of 318 people infected died.¹⁰ While the tendency is to focus on diseases that effect humans, animals and plants are also susceptible to outbreaks of disease and can suffer devastating losses.

One of the most disturbing side-effects of modern life is the speed with which diseases can spread around the globe. Decades ago, it was much less likely that an outbreak of infectious disease occurring on one continent could cross oceans to another. Intercontinental air travel now makes it possible for a disease to arrive in other continents before signs of the original outbreak have been recognized. The World Health Assembly attributes the problem of new and emerging diseases to the following modern trends:

With the increasing global population many are forced to live under conditions of overcrowding, inadequate housing, and poor hygiene; . . . more frequent international travel leads to rapid global exchange of human pathogens; . . . changes in health technology and food production, as well as its distribution (including international trade) and handling, create new opportunities for human pathogens; . . . human behavioural changes expose large segments of the global population to disease not previously experienced; . . . expanding areas of human habitation expose thousands of people to enzootic pathogens previously unknown as causes of human disease; and . . . microbes continue to evolve and adapt to their environment, leading to the appearance of new pathogens.¹¹

While there are clearly advantages to modern life, there are also noteworthy drawbacks. 

Given these circumstances, global health authorities are attempting to mobilize the international community for a war on infectious diseases. In May 1995, the World Health Assembly issued a resolution calling for the organization "to establish strategies enabling rapid national and international action to investigate and combat infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics." For instance, the traditional tactic of stemming the rapid spread of disease by sealing off or isolating areas experiencing an outbreak needs to be buttressed by new strategies to curtail the propagation of diseases. The WHO has also sounded the alarm. Hiroshi Nakajima, Director General of WHO, said: "We stand on the threshold of a new era in which hundreds of millions of people will at last be safe from some of the world’s most terrible diseases. . . .We also stand on the brink of a global crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe from them. No country can any longer afford to ignore their threat."¹²

The nature of the biological weapons threat is discussed in a detailed, yet lay-friendly way in the following pages. First, the basic facts are presented about biological agents, how they are made, and their military significance. A review of delivery systems and the defensive methods used to protect troops against a biological attack is next, followed by a synopsis of information about the biological weapons status of several countries of proliferation concern. The discussion then moves to a description of how advances in biotechnology have made the task of implementing a BWC verification protocol more complicated. Finally, some recommendations are made about steps that should be taken to hinder the further proliferation of biological weapons.

The ABCs of Biological Warfare

Biological warfare programs consists of several components, the main ones being research, development, and production of agent, delivery system development and testing, and storage and stockpiling. Although biological warfare was the subject of detailed examination in the 1920s, major research and development programs first emerged in the late 1930s and early 1940s. At that time, Great Britain and the United States mounted programs to enable a retaliatory capability should biological weapons be used against Allied forces in World War II. Great Britain abandoned its offensive biological weapons capabilities in the late 1950s, and the United States discontinued its offensive biological weapons program in the late 1960s.¹³ Throughout the following discussion, which also addresses the issues of military significance, examples are drawn from the US and British programs to illustrate certain points.

Biological warfare is the deliberate spreading of disease amongst humans, animals, and plants. Diseases are caused when small numbers of living micro-organisms enter into the target population of humans, animals, or plants. These micro-organisms multiply, and, after an incubation period, the symptoms of the disease become apparent. In some cases, micro-organisms produce toxins—non-living toxic chemicals—that cause symptoms. Depending upon the biological agent chosen, the resulting disease cause incapacitation or death of the target population.

Biological Warfare Agents

A would-be proliferator first needs to determine which micro-organisms would be suitable for a biological warfare program. Generically speaking, the following groups or classes of micro-organisms can cause disease:

Bacteria are single-cell organisms that cause such diseases as anthrax, plague, and tularemia. Bacteria vary greatly in their level of lethality and infectivity. Although many pathogenic bacteria are susceptible to antibiotic drugs, strains can be selected that are resistant to antibiotic and occur naturally. Bacteria can be readily grown in artificial media using facilities similar to those found in the brewery industry.

Viruses are 100 times smaller than bacteria and occur in large numbers in nature. Viruses can infect animals, crops, and humans. Among the disease-producing viruses are smallpox, Ebola, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Viruses must be grown on living tissue. They can mutate naturally or be genetically engineered to increase their effectiveness.

Rickettsiae are similar to bacteria in structure and form, but must be grown in living tissue. Diseases caused by rickettsiae include Q-fever, typhus, and Rocky Mountain spotted fever.

Fungi occur in great variety in nature. Relatively few species appear to have potential for deliberate use against humans, although many more could be used to destroy crops. Among the fungal pathogens that can cause hardship and famine are potato blight and cereal rust.

Toxins are the non-living products of micro-organisms (e.g., botulinum toxin and Staphylococcal enterotoxin B), of plants (e.g., ricin, from castor beans), or of living creatures (e.g., saxitoxin, from shellfish). Toxins can also be produced by chemical synthesis. Toxins, like chemical warfare agents, can only affect those exposed to the toxin and cannot produce transmissible diseases. Because they are non-living organisms, producing a large quantity of toxins requires more time than would be needed to make a similar quantity of other biological agents.

Article I of the BWC prohibits the misuse of "microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production," and successive Review Conferences have reaffirmed that this also includes any genetic modifications of these micro-organisms.¹⁴

A significant amount of work has already been conducted to determine what specific micro-organisms within the above-named generic categories would be useful for military purposes. In 1942 to 1943, the British conducted trials on Gruinard Island off the northwest coast of Scotland to investigate the feasibility of biological warfare.¹⁵ Great Britain developed a retaliatory capability to kill German cattle by delivering linseed meal cakes laced with anthrax through the flare chutes of aircraft. Approximately 5 million anthrax-spiked cattle cakes—about three centimeters in diameter and a couple of centimeters thick—were stockpiled. In its early years, the US retaliatory capability consisted of three anti-crop agents: stem rust of wheat, rice blast, and stem rust of rye.¹⁶ Biological weapons were not, however, used in the European theater during World War II.¹⁷

After the war, policy makers in Washington and London recognized the strategic potential of biological warfare, considering biological weapons of an importance comparable to nuclear weapons. The British and American programs broadened to explore agents that would effect humans. Some micro-organisms, such as those that cause the plague or smallpox, are transmissible from person to person and can therefore cause epidemics. US and British scientists purposefully selected diseases that could not passed from one individual to another. Prior to 1972, when the BWC was signed, the British and US biological weapons programs developed, tested, and produced several anti-human agents, including the bacterial agents Bacillus anthracis (causes anthrax), Brucella suis (causes brucellosis), and Pasteurella tularensis (causes tularemia). In addition, the rickettsial agent Coxiella burnetii (causes Q-fever), the viral agent Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and the toxins Clostridium botulinum and Staphylococcal enterotoxin B were produced.¹⁸ For humans, the exposure risk for a biological agent is rarely from skin contact with the agent. Rather, infection and ensuing illness results from inhalation of an agent into the respiratory tract. Symptoms and other characteristics of several biological agents can be found in Table 1. Bacillus anthracis and Venezuelan equine encephalitis can also be used to attack animals.

Any country or group seeking to establish a biological weapons capability is likely to select one or more the micro-organisms known from the literature to have been thoroughly tested and successfully produced in a biological weapons program. Otherwise, a government or sub-national group considering whether a particular pathogen or toxin might be used as a biological agent needs to know several things about the micro-organism in question. For example, knowledge is required about:

the infective dose of the potential agent;

the method of attack on the target population (e.g., inhalation, ingestion, or by an insect vector);

the means of dispersion of the agent;

the ability of the agent to survive until it reaches the target;

the ability to deliver an effective dose to the target population;

the practicality of an infective dose being achieved in the target population, or the amount of agent the target population retains;

the time to effect or cause disease in the target population; and,

whether the agent causes a contagious disease. 

In addition, the candidate agent also needs to be producible.

Unlike exposure to a chemical agent, where the effects are generally almost instantaneous, the effects of biological agents take time to develop. Typically, a number of days or a week or two must transpire, depending on the micro-organism and the rate at which it multiplies in the body. This time-to-effect factor can be regarded as both a disadvantage and an advantage. While the absence of an immediate effect detract from the potential battlefield application of a pathogen, a delayed effect can be advantageously used to attack fixed targets such as airbases, ports, naval task

Table 1: Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological Agents.

Sources: United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, Documents A/7575/Rev.1, S/9292/Rev. 1, 1969; Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: Their Nature and Arms Control in Nonconventional Weapons Proliferation" in The Middle East: Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin, eds. (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1993): 100–33; United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, Documents A/7575/Rev.1, S/9292/Rev. 1, 1969; David R. Franz et al., eds., Office of the Surgeon General, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997).

forces, troop assembly areas, and logistic concentrations. Additionally, the delayed effect of a biological agent makes attribution difficult, especially where an endemic disease is used. Therefore, it is plausible to both hide and deny a biological weapons attack.

In addition, the effects of a biological attack will vary across a large population. On an individual level, a person’s response to exposure to a particular biological warfare agent will depend on the concentration of the agent involved. A person’s response will also vary depending upon their natural resistance to the agent and whether they have been vaccinated—if there is a vaccine—against the disease.

Production of Biological Agents

The first and most elemental step for the production of biological agents is acquisition of a seedstock of agent, which is quite easy to accomplish. Biological agents can be isolated from their natural source. Or, a seedstock can be requested from culture collections or obtained from anyone who has the micro-organisms for medical or other research purposes. Once obtained, the next step is to grow the amount of agent desired. Actual production of agent requires simple equipment, such as fermenters and other containers, and an understanding of microbiology and how growth media work. The scientific know-how and equipment to culture micro-organisms are essential capabilities pervasive in the biotechnology industry.

Biological agents such as bacteria are living micro-organisms that cause disease through multiplication within the target human, animal, or plant. Likewise, such bacteria in a suitable medium will multiply. To illustrate the point, milk left out of a refrigerator will quickly deteriorate through the growth of microbiological organisms that are naturally present. Another well-known example of microbiological growth occurs during the fermentation of wine or beer, a process that provides the optimum circumstances under which micro-organisms can react with the growth media. Fermentation is typically initiated by adding a small amount of the microbiological species, known as a culture, to a much larger volume of a suitable media. Held under appropriate temperature conditions, the microbiological species will multiply and grow. The growth of such cultures is widely used in the commercial production of yogurt, beer, wine, antibiotics, and vaccines. Some cultures require the exclusion of atmospheric oxygen to favor growth.

Consequently, a biological warfare program requires cultures of the biological agent(s), which can either be extracted from circumstances in nature where the disease has been present (e.g., the carcases of animals that have died from anthrax) or from culture collections maintained to facilitate scientific research. Such cultures can then be used to seed the appropriate growth media either in simple flasks or in larger fermenters operated on a batch or continuous basis. Any student of microbiology knows the skills required to seed and grow a culture. As kilograms of product can be grown readily within days, less than ten people would be needed to run a small biological agent production plant.

In order for a biological agent to be inhaled and cause the effects listed above, it needs to be disseminated in such a way that it will both travel to the potential target and will be retained on inhalation. Small particles of agent in the size range of 1 to 10 microns are required because larger particles settle out of the atmosphere rapidly and are not inhaled into the lung. Agent can therefore either be dispersed as a slurry so that the droplets produce particles of the desired size or, with greater difficulty, freeze dried to produce to the desired particle size.¹⁹ Freeze drying an agent is technically more demanding, but makes the agent easier to store than a liquid slurry. While aspiring proliferators may find it relatively easy to ferment a sufficient quantity of agent, achieving the required particle size for effective dissemination is considered one of the more technically demanding aspects of weaponization.

While the above description may make the production of biological agents sounds easy, not everything is on the side of the would-be proliferator. Some fairly unusual skills are needed to mount a sophisticated biological weapons program, including specialized techniques related to the growth media and the precise conditions for producing micro-organisms; the distillation of concentrated product from the growth media, achieving the required particle size; an understanding of the factors that cause micro-organisms to decay in the atmosphere so that decay rates can be taken into account in planning the quantities needed for an attack; and tactical calculations about the dissemination point to enable a successful attack of a particular target population. However, even these more esoteric skills can be more readily obtained as the field of biotechnology continues to expand.

When compared to the cost of a nuclear weapons program, biological weapons are extremely cheap. In one analysis, the comparative cost of civilian (unprotected) casualties is "$2,000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with nerve-gas weapons, and $1 with biological weapons."²⁰ The costs of establishing a biological weapons program are being reduced further by the advances in microbiology and biotechnology that make agent production so much easier. Given their relative affordability and their relatively high effectiveness, some countries may regard biological weapons as an equalizer capable of compensating for inadequacies in their conventional forces and offsetting the otherwise superior military strength of an opponent. Not surprisingly, biological weapons have long since become known as the poor man’s atom bomb.

Biological Warfare and Military Significance

One of the questions most frequently asked about a military capability is what constitutes a militarily significant threat. When it comes to biological agents, there is no simple answer to that question. Once a pathogen infects its target population, all biological agents (except toxins) multiply inside the host. Small amounts—just a few micro-organisms of a biological agent—may therefore suffice to devastate a crop, a herd of animals, or a city’s inhabitants if the right quantity of agent is delivered precisely to the target population. In practice, however, the quantity of agent needed to create the intended effect is considerably larger than the effective dose listed in Table 1 because only a small fraction of the agent disseminated is inhaled by the target population.

The militarily significant quantity of agent depends on the concept of operations envisaged for the use of biological weapons—single overt attack, single covert attack, or multiple simultaneous attacks of either type, in which case larger amounts of agent would be required. To execute an attack on a significant military target such as a port or an air base using a missile or an aircraft with a dissemination system, at least 100 kilograms of agent would be needed. In one well-known scenario, a single aircraft leaving a trail of 100 kilograms of anthrax along a line upwind of Washington, D.C., could result in 1 to 3 million deaths. In comparison, a one megaton hydrogen bomb dropped over the US capitol would only cause some 0.5 to 1.9 million deaths.²¹ This quantity-to-effect ratio elevates biological agents to a strategic weapon, whether the pathogens are used against humans, crops, or livestock. Consequently, military and civilian leaders the world over regard biological weapons with a great deal of apprehension. "The one that scares me to death, perhaps even more so than tactical nuclear weapons, and the one we have less capability against is biological weapons," said Gen. Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²²

A few kilograms of biological agent would be adequate to carry out a smaller clandestine attack. If an aggressor opts not to stockpile agent, but rather to produce the required quantity just prior to an attack, then all that is required is a small seedstock—a vial containing just a few grams. This starter culture can be the springboard to grow even a large quantity of agent within a few days.²³

A militarily significant quantity of toxins must be calculated in a different way. As non-living chemicals, toxins achieve their effect as biological weapons primarily through inhalation. Because toxins are more toxic than chemical nerve agents (e.g., sarin, soman), the amount of toxin for an attack is somewhat less than the quantity of chemical agent required for an attack. For example, 1 to 7 tons of nerve agent would be needed to attack an air base. The amount of toxin needed for a similar attack will be about ten fold less, 100 kg to 700 kg.²⁴

Delivery of Biological Agents

Effective dissemination is challenging because the biological agent is a fragile living organism that has to survive until it reaches the target. If bombs or rockets are employed to disseminate the agent, explosives will probably be used to open the munition and to disperse the agent into the atmosphere. The detonation of the explosive produces heat and shock, which can kill the living micro-organisms. Dispersion by a spray system is thus potentially less damaging to the agent than an explosive delivery system, although both are technically challenging if the desired particle sizes are to be achieved. Once it has been dispersed into the atmosphere, the agent is exposed to the natural environment (e.g., ambient temperature, sunlight), which will cause the micro-organism to die.

The effectiveness of biological agents will also be determined by the meteorological conditions. The localized weather conditions will determine the distance downwind at which an infective dose will be delivered to the target populations. Under ideal conditions, such as a calm night with a steady wind, the agent will probably be disseminated over hundreds of kilometers. Under turbulent, sunny conditions, the distance that the agent will be carried downwind will be greatly reduced. The susceptibility of biological agents to the meteorological conditions is sometimes viewed as a drawback. If the direction of the wind were to suddenly vary, the disseminated agent could blow back over one’s own forces. However, the former US and British warfare programs demonstrated the feasibility of effectively delivering biological agents to achieve military objectives. In addition, the ability to accurately forecast weather and wind conditions has improved immensely over the past few decades.

A delivery system must have two major attributes. First, the delivery system needs to expel the agent efficiently from its container. Second, assuming an agent that attacks through the respiratory system, the delivery system must produce 1 to 10 micron sized particles of agent. During their heyday, the British and American biological warfare programs tested and evaluated a number of systems to deliver biological agents against humans, including aerial bombs, bomb submunitions, aerial spray tanks, ballistic missile warheads, artillery shells, rockets, cruise missile warheads, and clandestine systems. For example, the 4 lb. Mark I British bomb was designed to deliver anthrax and botulinum toxin, while another 4 lb. bomblet, the E-48-R2, later the M114, was developed to deliver Brucella suis. Different delivery means were used for anti-animal and anti-crop agents. For instance, in addition to the afore-mentioned anthrax-laced cattle cakes, the United States developed a "feather" bomb to deliver anti-crop agents, so called because the bomb was filled with feathers that were used to carry the anti-crop agent. One point to keep in mind is that delivery of agent using a missile or rocket has a definite signature, because of the military delivery system employed. However, biological agent can be disseminated without immediate and obvious signs that an attack is underway by using a spraying system, especially one traveling across the wind, upwind of the target.

Of course, for terrorist purposes, a sophisticated delivery system may not be required. Biological agents can be disseminated by cross-winds with few, if any, indications of hostile intent. Commercially available equipment, such as agricultural sprayers, can be used to attack broad area targets.²⁵ A single aircraft, for example, flying across the wind can disseminate a line of source agent approximately 200 kilometers long to infect an area of some 200 square kilometers downwind. Or, a vehicle driven across the wind could be used to disperse agent in a similar manner over a proportionately smaller area. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, for example, equipped a van with a fan and specialized vents. On one occasion, cult members drove this van on the streets of Tokyo, attempting to release botulinum toxin. Apparently, no one was harmed as a result of this test drive.²⁶

As long as a terrorist group has managed to achieve the required particle size, then the prevailing wind can serve as the delivery system. The United States carried out its first open-air tests in the 1950s with biological simulants to evaluate US vulnerability to a biological weapons attack in a variety of locations. Bacillus globigii was frequently used because of its similarities to Bacillus anthracis, the agent that causes anthrax. These tests showed that the wind would carry the agent downwind.²⁷ In short, terrorists could use a vehicle, a small aircraft, or simply an upwind location to disperse biological agent over a designated area.

Defenses Against Biological Weapons

Just as defensive postures can be taken to protect troops or a civilian population against a poison gas attack, so can protective measures counter the use of biological agents. The two categories of measures are active and passive defenses. Active defenses are actions taken to prevent delivery systems reaching the vicinity of the target population. The range of counter-force options runs the gamut from preemptive strikes against the potential aggressor’s biological weapons facilities to the interception and destruction of incoming delivery vehicles.²⁸ Several passive defense measures are also available, including hazard assessment, detection, physical protection, medical countermeasures, and contamination control.

Hazard assessment is the ability to evaluate the area and the size of the population at risk in the event of the biological attack, factors that are crucial to determine the appropriate operational responses to an attack. Models are used to predict the dispersion of the biological agent from the point of release, taking into account the meteorological conditions and the likely decay rate of the agent. If the time at which the hazard cloud will arrive at and pass through a given location can be predicted, people can make use of whatever physical protection is available while the hazard cloud is overhead.

A detection capability furnishes an alarm alerting officials that a biological agent attack is imminent. Ideally, detection systems are situated a sufficient distance upwind of the asset being protected to enable sufficient warning before the agent cloud arrives over the target downwind. The first objective is to detect a cloud of agent rapidly. After the initial alarm, efforts can focus on identifying the precise biological agent involved, which facilitates more accurate hazard assessment.

Physical protection refers to the use of physical barriers to protect the target population from exposure to a biological agent. The risks of illness from skin exposure to biological agents are minimal. Therefore, respirators and masks are the principal personal protective gear. Respirators designed for military personnel contain a particulate filter to prevent the 1 to 10 micron particles from entering the respiratory system. Oronasal masks also provide good protection against particles and can be useful especially for personnel at some distance downwind of the attack.²⁹ For collective protection, people can enter a building or vehicle equipped with filtration systems that capture the particles of biological agent.

Whether before or after an attack, medical countermeasures can negate or blunt the effects of some biological agents. Personnel can be vaccinated against some agents, increasing the body’s defenses against subsequent exposure to those agents. Vaccinations are available to counteract some biological agents, such as anthrax, plague, Q-fever, and tularemia.³⁰ Medical countermeasures can also be administered after exposure to a biological agent, either before or after the appearance of symptoms. However, administration of medical countermeasures such as antibiotics after the appearance of symptoms is unlikely to be very effective for several biological agents such as anthrax. The effectiveness of medical treatment will be enhanced with advance knowledge of the specific biological agent involved.

In the aftermath of a biological weapons attack, there will only be a slight continuing hazard, and, consequently, unlike chemical weapon attacks, no necessity to clean up surfaces, terrain, or other areas where biological agent may have been deposited. Such deposited biological agents do not present a persistent or continuing hazard to personnel. First, dissemination efficiencies are such that only about one percent of a biological aerosol will deposit on the surface over which it passes. Second, ultraviolet rays, sunlight, and other environmental conditions will further degrade this remaining agent. Third, even if the deposited agent were to be reaerosolized, the resulting airborne concentration would be only about one percent of the deposited agent. This quantity is well below the amount needed for an infective dose and hence is insufficient to present a hazard. Despite this, there is likely to be a perceived concern that there are some micro-organisms from the attack remaining on surfaces. Therefore, authorities may decide to decontaminate surfaces with substances, like formaldehyde, that can kill micro-organisms.

Countries of Proliferation Concern

Partly because of the availability of technology and material, a number of countries and sub-national actors have perhaps managed to acquire biological weapons. The British government stated in 1992 that "about ten countries are assessed as having biological weapons programmes."³¹ American officials have issued repeated warnings in the past few years that "at least 20 countries have or may be developing nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missile systems to deliver them."³² Great Britain has indicated that proliferation concerns, including biological weapons programs, "are largely concentrated in three regions: the Middle East, South Asia, and North Korea."³³ American intelligence officials describe the biological weapons programs of two great powers, Russia and China, as being in the process of change and have identified Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya as rogue nations seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.³⁴ Aside from such general characterizations of the threat, relatively few explicit details are offered about which countries have biological weapons and how advanced their programs may be. A handful of public sources, however, present more details about the countries of proliferation concern listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Biological Weapons Programs: Countries of Proliferation Concern.

Iraq

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) mission to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including the Iraqi biological weapons program, has been fraught with difficulty from the outset. When responding to United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which requires elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as a condition of the cease-fire, Iraq said in April 1991 that it "does not possess any biological weapons or related items."³⁵ After its first inspection of Iraqi biological weapons facilities, UNSCOM announced that Iraq had declared offensive and defensive research on Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium perfringens, and bacillus anthracis. UNSCOM added that Iraq’s Salman Pak facility had the capability to research, produce, test, and store biological agents.³⁶ Iraq quickly backtracked on some of these admissions, but UNSCOM maintained that it had collected "conclusive evidence that Iraq was engaged in an advanced military biological research programme." However, Iraq claimed to have terminated the program in August 1990 and destroyed all stockpiles of agent.³⁷

From the outset, UNSCOM and Iraq have engaged in a deadly serious game of cat-and-mouse. Iraq repeatedly purported to have submitted full, final, and complete disclosures about its biological weapons program and continued to thwart the inspectors. UNSCOM reported time and again on Iraq’s obfuscation and lack of cooperation.³⁸ Iraq eventually acknowledged an offensive biological weapons program—admitting production, but denying weaponization—in the Summer of 1995. Further developments occurred when Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan left Baghdad on 7 August 1995. Hassan, the son-in-law of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had been a key figure in Iraq’s biological weapons program. Following his departure from Iraq, the Iraqi authorities invited the executive chairman of UNSCOM to visit a chicken farm originally owned by Hassan. Over 145 boxes of documents on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs were recovered from Hassan’s farm.³⁹

The Iraqi biological warfare program disclosed to UNSCOM is said to have begun in 1975 and continued until early January 1991. Iraqi scientists worked with anthrax, botulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), aflatoxin, trichothecene mycotoxin, wheat cover smut, ricin, and viruses such as the camel pox virus.⁴⁰ Iraq produced 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin; 8,500 liters of anthrax; and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Large-scale weaponization of biological agents is reported to have begun in December 1990. For delivery systems, the Iraqis developed spray tanks, remotely piloted vehicles, aerial bombs, rockets, and missiles. Over 160 aerial bombs and 25 Al Hussein warheads were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. In early January 1991, these warheads and bombs were deployed to four locations and field commanders were delegated the authority to launch them during the Gulf War. Iraq also had an indigenous missile development program that was working on the design of missile systems capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads to the range of 3,000 kilometers.⁴¹

UNSCOM continues to investigate the Iraqi biological weapons program, attempting to confirm whether Iraqi indeed destroyed its biological warfare stocks, and Iraq persists in hindering UNSCOM’s efforts.⁴² According to UNSCOM, Iraq’s September 1997 full, final, and complete disclosure failed "to give a remotely credible account of Iraq’s biological warfare programme."⁴³ In the Fall of 1997, another show-down between Iraq and the United Nations took shape, precipitated by Iraq’s’s refusal to accept Americans as UNSCOM inspectors and his threats to shoot down the US U-2 surveillance aircraft flying missions on behalf of UNSCOM.⁴⁴ While UNSCOM has made noteworthy progress in shutting down Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, more work obviously remains to be done to eliminate Iraq’s biological weapons capability.

Russia

As revealed by Yeltsin, the Soviet Union maintained an offensive biological weapons program from 1972 until 1992. Yeltsin signed a decree in April 1992 to terminate this program.⁴⁵ In September 1992, the Russian government stated that it had terminated its offensive research, dismantled experimental biological agent production lines, closed a biological weapons testing facility, cut the number of personnel in the program by fifty percent and the funding by thirty percent, and submitted information about its biological weapons program to the UN.⁴⁶

According to its declaration, Russia maintained an offensive research and development program until March 1992 that worked with anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, typhus, and Q-fever. With respect to toxins, Russia claimed that the only natural toxin studied in its program was botulinum toxin.⁴⁷ Apparently, Russian scientists developed a genetically manipulated strain of the plague.⁴⁸ Russia provided little information about delivery systems, other than a statement that "military-technical evaluation of experimental specimens of biological formulations loaded into mock-ups of airborne and rocket-borne biological weapons and atomizing equipment were performed" as part of its program.⁴⁹

Little information is publicly available on the size of the former Soviet biological weapons program, although statements from Western governments make it evident that this program was indeed large.⁵⁰ In addition to Ministry of Defense facilities, the Soviet Union maintained an extensive network of nominally civilian research institutes know as Biopreparat. Created in 1973, Biopreparat served as a cover for the USSR’s biological weapons program. Biopreparat was a huge organization, employing more than 25,000 people at 18 or more research and development facilities, including six mothballed production plants and a major storage complex in Siberia.⁵¹

In information submitted to the UN in 1987, the Soviet Union declared some five institutes as being under Ministry of Defense control—Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Kirov, Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinberg), Zagorsk (now Sergiyev-Prosad), and Aralsk. Russia’s 1992 declaration about this program referred to Sverdlovsk, Kirov, and Zagorsk, as well as to Kol’tsovo, Obolensk, Chekhov, Leningrad, and an experimental facility on Vozrozdheniya Island in the Aral Sea. The UN confidence-building measures require declaration only about research and development programs, so these declarations could exclude production or other facilities that might also be associated with the Soviet offensive program. The 1992 declaration noted that at the beginning of the 1970s, the USSR decided to accelerate the development of molecular biology, genetics, and genetic engineering and to utilize the achievements in these fields to benefit the national economy. Consequently, the Soviet government began to establish scientific and study bases under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, the Ministry of Health, Glavmikrobioprom, and other ministries and departments. Given the size of this biological weapons program, there is clearly a need for greater transparency about this program, its facilities, and its activities.⁵²

In 1992, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States initiated a trilateral process of data exchanges and sites visits to foster more openness and transparency regarding the former Soviet biological weapons program. Russia agreed to provide, on request, up-to-date data about the dismantlement of its biological weapons facilities and to clarify information provided to the UN. For a variety of reasons, progress under this trilateral arrangement has been slow. Therefore, Washington has stated that the trilateral process "has not resolved all US concerns" about Russia’s program.⁵³

China

China, a member of the BWC since 1984, is believed to have maintained an offensive biological weapons program throughout most of the 1980s that included "development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents."⁵⁴ Within the US intelligence community there is concern that China may have revived and possibly expanded its offensive biological weapons program in recent years. The concern is based partly on evidence that China is pursuing biological research at two ostensibly civilian-run research centers controlled by the Chinese military. The research centers were known to have been previously involved in the production and storage of biological weapons. Moreover, in 1991 one of the suspected biological centers was expanded. Information that China has provided to the UN for the purposes of confidence building have not resolved US concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains an offensive program.⁵⁵

Syria

Syria has signed but not ratified the BWC. Israel has expressed concerns that Syria has biological agents for contaminating drinking water. However, no reliable information is available about the existence of biological weapons in Syria or a directed program for the creation of an offensive potential in the biological realm. Syria nonetheless remains among those countries that the United States believes to be developing an offensive biological warfare capability.⁵⁶

Iran

Iran, which joined the CWC on 3 November 1997, has been a member of the BWC since 1973. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant biological warfare program and needs little foreign assistance. Nonetheless, Western countries have noted attempts by Iranian representatives to buy, unofficially, technology and biological materials used specifically for the production of biological weapons, in particular mycotoxin. Iran conducts legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which are suspected of involvement in this biological weapons program. Iran has not provided the UN with any confidence-building measures data on its biotechnical activities.⁵⁷ The Iranian biological weapons program has been embedded within Iran’s extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education, and scientific research organizations for many aspects of biological agent procurement, research, and production. The US finding is that Iran probably has produced biological agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.⁵⁸

Egypt

Egypt, a signatory but not a member of the BWC, has a program of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons dating back to the 1960s. In the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat confirmed that a stockpile of biological agents was stored in refrigerated facilities on Egyptian soil. Egypt has been studying various toxins, and techniques for their production and refinement are presently being developed by a national research center. No publicly available data to date indicates that Egypt has produced its own biological agents.⁵⁹

Egyptian researchers have been cooperating with US military and civilian laboratories in areas related to biological defense research, specifically those based on highly pathogenic micro-organisms and dangerous vectors. The level of bilateral cooperation is such that the US Navy has a military-medical laboratory in Egypt where research is focused on defenses against particularly dangerous infectious diseases. This laboratory is recognized as one of the region’s leading medical-biological centers, equipped with the latest equipment and staffed with highly qualified American specialists. The research conducted by this laboratory is highly classified.⁶⁰ The US assessment is that it remains likely that Egypt continues to maintain a capability to conduct biological warfare.⁶¹

Libya

A great deal has been written about Libya’s chemical weapons program, particularly the "pharmaceutical" facility at Rabta and the cavernous underground production site at Tarhunah.⁶² Although Libya is thought to be attempting to weaponize biological agents, less is known about Libya’s biological weapons program. While Libya has been a member of the BWC since 1972, there is information indicating that it is engaged in initial testing of biological weapons. Presently, Libyans are expressing interest in information on work overseas involving biological agents. In contacts with representatives of other Arab countries, Libyan specialists are displaying a willingness to fund joint biological programs, including ones of a military-applied nature, provided they are not undertaken on Libyan territory. Libya has also failed to submit a confidence-building data declaration to the UN.⁶³ According to the US assessment, Libya is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce biological agents.⁶⁴

Taiwan

Taiwan, which joined the BWC in 1973, is another country suspected of proliferating both chemical and biological weapons. Taiwan is said not to have biological weapons, but it continues to manifest an active interest in conducting biological research of a military-applied nature. Taiwan has a significant scientific and technical base in microbiology and a large number of skilled biotechnology specialists, mostly trained in America and Western Europe. Taiwan is moving to upgrade its biotechnology sector, which makes wide use of technologies basic to the production of biological weapons.⁶⁵ 

Taiwan participates internationally in scientific and technical cooperation of biology, and engages actively in industrial cooperation with the United States, Japan, France, and other Western countries. Also, various joint biomedical programs are underway in such areas as immunology, genetic engineering, and tropical medicine. Taiwan’s military biological centers train personnel in medical and biological specialties. Sufficient evidence to determine if Taiwan is producing or weaponizing biological agents does not exist, but Taiwan’s advanced scientific research and industrial base would enable the country to produce biological weapons with relative ease.⁶⁶

North Korea

North Korea, a member of the BWC since 1987, is one of the most closed and heavily militarized societies on Earth. During the early 1960s, North Korea initiated an offensive biological warfare program. Presently, North Korea is engaged in applied military-biological research at universities, medical institutes, and specialized research centers. Research being conducted at these centers involves pathogens for malignant anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. Evidence indicates that North Korea has been testing biological weapons on its island territories.⁶⁷

Israel

As they are about many issues associated with a weapons of mass destruction capability, Israeli officials have been tight-lipped about any national biological weapons program. An Israeli biological weapons program is likely to be patterned, however, after those formerly maintained by the United States and the former Soviet Union. In other words, the agents likely to be involved in an Israeli program are anthrax, botulinum toxin, tularemia, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and Q-fever. Similarly, Israeli delivery systems are likely to mirror those developed by the United States, namely spray systems or missile warheads and submunitions.⁶⁸ Israel is one of the few states that has not signed the BWC.

Dramatic Changes in the Field of Biotechnology

In the past two decades, the science and business of biotechnology has burgeoned. Advances in microbiology, genetic engineering, and biotechnology have already produced immense benefits for the health of people and animals worldwide. The biotechnology industry offers the prospect of more new and improved diagnostic techniques and medical countermeasures to an increasing range of naturally occurring diseases. In order to counter diseases, the ways in which they attack target populations must be understood. As scientists dissect how diseases spread and work, they also gain an understanding of how these very diseases could be used for military purposes. Those working in the biotechnology industry are thus constantly dealing with dual-purpose materials and concepts that could be wielded to help or to devastate mankind. Increased knowledge about diseases and the availability of advanced technology have made biological weapons a more attractive option for governments seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the modernization of biotechnology has made it much easier to produce biological materials and to modify these materials to enhance their effects.

The modern biotechnology industry, based on molecular biology, has its roots in prehistoric times (e.g., brewing, baking, cheese-making). This industry developed significantly as scientific knowledge grew in the second half of the last century, and again from the mid-1900s onwards as more sophisticated processes and quality controls were developed to make antibiotics, vaccines, and other medicines.⁶⁹ In particular, the medical products of the biotechnology industry have been of high value. While emerging applications of biotechnology in the chemical, energy, and waste treatment sectors may not turn out to be commercially successful, biotechnology may have a significant impact on the agro-food sector. In the view of some experts, a new "Green Revolution" is very possible.⁷⁰ Indeed, experts reasonably estimate that biotechnology will become "a major basis for new investment and growth" in the early decades of the next century.⁷¹ Past technological/industrial revolutions have flourished because of rapid interaction between scientific and technological developments. Three other technological/industrial revolutions—in information technology, materials science, and neuroscience—are currently running alongside and interacting with the advances being made in biotechnology. The potential relevance of these scientific revolutions to the BWC can be expected to accelerate over the coming decades.⁷²

Despite the well-publicized failures of a few products during trials, the biotechnology industry continues to grow spectacularly in the developed world. One way to track the growth of the industry is via its sales. For US research-based pharmaceutical companies, sales at home and abroad increased from $4.5 billion in 1970 to $11.7 billion in 1980. By 1990, the sales of US companies had reached $38.6 billion and are estimated at over $66 billion for 1997.⁷³ In addition, a recent report stated:

In the past decade, the market value of the top ten US biotechnology companies has increased more than four times, from $6.2 bn in 1986 to $26.5 bn in 1996. . . .The London Stock Exchange quoted that the market capitalization of bioscience companies traded on this exchange shot up from £1 billion to £3.1 billion during 1995. Much of the reason for this growth was the London market’s response to certain clinical milestones being achieved by the key European [companies].⁷⁴

This report suggested that about 50 successful biotechnology products had been marketed in the last decade, but over 450 were under development, with "more than 120 in phase III clinical trials and beyond in the US."⁷⁵ The young biotechnology companies have also begun to pursue a variety of strategies to ensure their long-term sustainability, including links with major pharmaceutical giants. 

The growth of the biotechnology industry—in both the size and the number of companies—has obvious implications for the BWC protocol. More and larger companies leads to the employment of more dual-use equipment and more specialists trained in state-of-the-art skills that can be used for peaceful purposes or misused covert biological warfare programs. Thus, the compliance regime needs to be designed to cope with the expansion of this industry.

Novel technologies that have been identified in the biotechnology area include the sequencing of genes and proteins; genetic engineering; fused cell techniques in which two cells are fused to produce new cells; protein engineering altering the structure and properties of proteins; and fermentation and cell culture enabling the growth of large amounts of microbial or animal or plant cells.⁷⁶ These advances mean that there is now a much greater understanding of micro-organisms and of their interactions with other living systems, namely man, animals, and plants. These understandings offer great advances for the benefit of mankind, yet it is now possible to engineer biological agents that defeat current vaccines. Therefore, concerns about the possible misuse of human genome information led the Fourth Review Conference to confirm that the use of "any applications resulting from genome studies" for biological warfare purposes are covered by the prohibition in Article I of the BWC.⁷⁷

Conclusions 

Several factors make biological weapons attractive to countries seeking a weapon of mass destruction. Biological weapons are not costly and they are flexible in that they can be used to attack plants, animals, or humans. Furthermore, both incapacitating or lethal agents can be selected. A biological weapons program can be hidden amidst dual-purpose industries that work with microbiology and biotechnology, allowing for a rapid breakout capability. With the growth of the biotechnology industry, materials and technology that may be misused for prohibited biological weapons purposes are more widely available than ever. Recent technological and scientific advances also make it easier for a proliferator to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents. Finally, biological weapons offer the aggressor potential for deniability, especially if the agent used occurs naturally in the state attacked. All of these factors increase the prospects that the risk of biological warfare may be greater today than in the past.

Consequently, efforts to reduce disease, whether of natural or deliberate origin, should be amongst the highest priorities on the agendas of governments and industry worldwide. A number of steps that should be taken to confront the spread of biological weapons. First, protective measures against biological warfare need to be strengthened, thereby making the acquisition of biological weapons an unattractive option. Nations that invest in more robust passive and active defense measures can decrease their vulnerability to biological weapons attack in numerous ways.⁷⁸

Second, domestic laws against biological weapons should be enacted, criminalizing the mis-use of biological materials. Article IV of the BWC requires the passage of national laws, but Great Britain is one of only a relatively small contingent of countries that have illegalized a wide range of activities associated with biological weapons.⁷⁹ Other states should take similar action to deter the terrorist acquisition and use of biological weapons within their borders. The current negotiations to strengthen the BWC should seize the opportunity to require, as the CWC does, that all participating states implement penal legislation. In the longer term, attention should be given to criminalizing any biological weapons work carried out by individuals anywhere. Accordingly, anyone who uses or knowingly aides in the production, acquisition, or use of biological weapons would have committed an illegal act, subject to penalties under international law.⁸⁰ In addition, states should give serious consideration to buttressing their laws to control biological materials in ways that enhance the safety of the community and the environment.

Perhaps most importantly, the BWC should be strengthened through a legally binding instrument comprising declarations of relevant activities, routine on-site inspections, and challenge inspections. Completion of a verification protocol for the BWC should be achievable within a fairly short time frame. After all, nothing new needs to be invented for the BWC’s verification regime: All of the measures required are already incorporated in one or another of the existing agreed arms control treaties.⁸¹ As the international community works to achieve this objective, it should also make a significant effort to encourage universal adherence with this important treaty.

Additional steps that are needed to diminish the threat of biological warfare are the widespread adoption of broad export controls of pathogens and dual-purpose equipment and a determined national and international response to violations of the BWC.⁸² All of these measures are mutually reinforcing, and no one element alone can sufficiently cope with the biological weapons threat.⁸³ Governments, collectively and individually, have a great deal of work to do if they are to counter and defeat natural or deliberate outbreaks of disease.

Further information about biological weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

Home page for the Joint Bradford - SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project

Footnotes

1. William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Address to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations," UN General Assembly, 51st sess., Document A/51/PV.6, 24 September 1996, 2.

2. At this time, the United States and the USSR relied upon the use of national means of verification, namely satellites and other surveillance technologies, to monitor arms control treaties.

3. J. Dahlburg, "Russia Admits it Violated Pact on Biological Warfare," Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1992, A1. The USSR was a co-depositary of the BWC, along with the United Kingdom and the United States.

4. An unusual outbreak of anthrax occurred at Sverdlovsk, USSR, in April/May 1979. Soviet authorities claimed that contaminated meat caused the outbreak, but US officials asserted that the 64 deaths resulted from a release of anthrax from a military facility. For contending views on the Sverdlovsk incident, see Charles C. Flowerree, "Possible Implications of the Anthrax Outbreak in Sverdlovsk on Future Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: A US Perspective," and Victor Issraelyan, "Possible Implications of the Anthrax Outbreak in Sverdlovsk on Future Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: A Soviet Perspective," in Views on Possible Verification Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, S.J. Lundin ed., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, No. 12 (London: Oxford University Press, 1991): 108–24.

5. Iraq signed the BWC, but did not ratify the BWC until April 1991 in response to UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

6. United Nations, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687, Security Council Document S-1995/864, 11 October 1995.

7. For a detailed account of Aum Shinrikyo’s activities, see US Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 104th Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 104–422, Part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996). See also, David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996).

8. For example, on 27 June 1996 leaders of the Group of Seven states declared that "special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes." See the United Nations, Declaration on Terrorism, letter dated 5 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN Secretary-General, UN General Assembly/Security Council Document A/51/208, S/1996/543, Annex V, 12 July 1996. At a subsequent Group of 7/8 Ministerial conference on terrorism, BWC members were urged to confirm "their commitment to ensure, through the adoption of national measures, the effective fulfillment of their obligations under the convention to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such weapons. . . . to exclude use of those weapons for terrorist purposes." United Nations, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, letter dated 1 August 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN Secretary-General, General Assembly Document A/51/261, 1 August 1996. John Deutch, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said: "In the post-Cold War era, terrorists have become increasingly capable, lethal and wide-ranging. . . . Indeed, the prospects for chemical and biological terrorism will increase with the spread of dual-use technologies and expertise." Testimony of John Deutch, US Congress, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, 104th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 22 February 1996).

9. Declan Butler, "India Ponders the Flaws Exposed by Plague. . . ," Nature 372, no. 6502 (10 November 1994): 119. See also K. S. Juryman, "India Confirms Identity of Plague," Nature 373, no. 6516 (23 February 1995): 650.

10. "The Hobbled Horseman," and "Disease Fights Back, Economist 335, no. 7915 (20 May 1995): 83–9 and 15–6, respectively.

11. World Health Organization, Communicable Diseases Prevention and Control: New, Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases, Forty-eighth World Health Assembly, Resolution No. WHA 48.13, 12 May 1995.

12. World Health Organization, Fighting Disease, Fostering Development: 1996 World Health Report, 1996, v.

13. G.B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, "Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities," RUSI Journal 141, no. 1 (February 1996): 59–68; G.B. Carter, "Biological Warfare and Biological Defense in the United Kingdom 1940–1979," RUSI Journal 137, no. 6 (December 1992):67–74. On 25 November 1969, President Richard M. Nixon abolished America’s offensive biological warfare program with the following statement: "The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures, such as immunization and safety measures. The Department of Defense has been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological agents." Richard M. Nixon, "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs," 25 November 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971): 968.

14. For example, see United Nations, Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Document BWC/CONF.IV/9, 25 November – 6 December 1996, Part II, 15.

15. The British government decontaminated Gruinard Island in 1986 and returned the island to its original owners in 1990.

16. United Nations, Annex VI: Confidence Building Measure F, Document No. CDA/BWC/1997/CBM, 30 May 1997, 688.

17. Biological agents were used in China during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Japanese forces used plague-infected fleas to attack several areas. For more detail, Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932–45 and the American Cover-up (New York: Routledge, 1994).

18. United Nations, Annex VI: Confidence Building Measure F, 695.

19. For another discussion, see US Congress, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1993): 71–117.

20. Julian Perry Robinson, with Carl-Goran Heden and Hans von Schreeb, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: CB Weapons Today, vol. II (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973): 135.

21. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1993): 52–5; United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, Document A/7575/Rev.1, S/9292/Rev. 1, 1969; Stephen Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is The Threat; What Should Be Done," International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 5–42.

22. Testimony of Gen. Colin Powell, US Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act FYI 1994 - H.R. 2401, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., H201–33 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993): 112.

23. In contrast, the US and British programs focused on a retaliatory capability and consequently selected stable agents that could be stored for years .

24. Office of Technology Assessment, Assessing the Risks, 60. For more on toxins, see "Defense Against Toxin Weapons," in David R. Franz et al., eds.,Office of the Surgeon General, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997): 603–19.

25. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 71–117.

26. Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, 93–4. See also Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 62–4.

27. David R. Franz, C. Parrott, and E. Takafuji, "The US Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs," in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Textbook of Military Medicine, 603–9.

28. The in-air, explosive destruction of an incoming delivery vehicle filled with biological agent is unlikely to result in dispersal of the agent in the optimum aerosol particle size (1 to 10 microns). Moreover, interceptive destruction is likely to occur at a considerable altitude and distance from the target. This distant point of interception increases the unlikelihood of the agent reaching the ground level as well as the opportunity for the atmosphere to dilute the agent, and thereby decreases the likelihood of harm to the target population.

29. Karl Lowe et al., "Potential Values of a Simple BW Protective Mask," IDA Paper P-3077 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1995); Richard Danzig, "Biological Warfare: A Nation at Risk—A Time to Act," Strategic Forum, no. 58, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.: January 1996): 1–4.

30. David R. Franz et al., "Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents, Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (6 August 1997): 399–411.

31. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, "Statement of the Defense Estimates 1992," London, July 1992, 7.

32. See, for example, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, 22.

33. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, "Statement on the Defense Estimates 1995: Stable Forces in a Strong Britain," London, May 1995, 7.

34. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, 22.

35. Letter to Secretary-General from Ambassador Abdul Amir Al-Anbari of Iraq, dated 18 April 1991, as quoted in Stephen Black, "The UN Special Commission and CBW Verification," Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, no. 31 (June 1996): 1, 7–8.

36. United Nations, "Inspection Team Reports on Iraq’s BW Capacity," UN Press Release, 14 August 1991.

37. In its first report, UNSCOM stated that "No evidence of weaponization has been found." Iraq claimed to have begun the program in mid-1986. United Nations, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990–1996, Blue Books Series, vol. IX, Document 92-S/23165, 1996, 345.

38. For example, UNSCOM stated in 1993 that "The information so far provided is tailored to what the Iraqi authorities consider the Special Commission to know already, rather than constituting a frank and open disclosure of all the true facts." See United Nations Document 165-S/25977, 21 June 1993, 572. See also, UN Documents 200-S/1994/1422 and S/1994/1422/Add. 1, 15 December 1994, 699; Document 210-S/1995/494, 20 June 1995, 758.

39. United Nations, Document 214-S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, 771.

40. The reasons for the Iraqi work on aflatoxin, which is a carcinogen, are not yet evident. This situation illustrates the importance of Iraq providing UNSCOM with a complete and full account of its past biological weapons program and its objectives.

41. United Nations, Document 214-S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, 771.

42. Even though Iraq’s June 1996 declaration was 622 pages long, UNSCOM labeled the biological component of this declaration was "not credible. Major sections are incomplete, inaccurate or unsubstantiated. Expert estimates of production quantities of biological weapons agents, either by equipment capacity or by consumption of growth media, would far exceed declared amounts." UN Security Council, Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Commission Established by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9 (b) (I) of Resolution 687 (1991), Document S/1996/848, 11 October 1996. See also United Nations, "Note by the Secretary-General," Document S/1996/258, 11 April 1996.

43. UN Security Council, "Note by the Secretary-General," Document S/1997/774, 6 October 1997, 19.

44. John M. Goshko, "Inspections: U.N. Leader May Pull Mission From Iraq," Washington Post, 7 November 1997, A3; James Bennet, "Clinton Urges Strong U.N. Action on Iraq," New York Times, 10 November 1997, A1.

45. This decree stated: "The development and implementation of biological programmes in breach of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is not permitted on the territory of the Russian Federation." President Boris Yeltsin, Russian Federation Decree No. 390, Moscow, 11 April 1992.

46. Information was provided under a confidence-building measure, agreed at the Third Review Conference of the BWC in 1991, requiring declaration of past offensive and/or defensive research and development programs. Richard Boucher, US Department of State, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons," Press Release, Office of Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: 14 September 1992).

47. Boucher, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons."

48. Mark Urban, "The Cold War’s Deadliest Secret," Spectator (21 January 1993): 9–10; John Barry, "Planning a Plague," Newsweek 121, no. 5 (1 February 1993): 20–2; James Adams, "The Weapon of Special Designation," in The New Spies; Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London: Hutchinson, 1994): 270–83.

49. Boucher, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons."

50. In November 1996, British Minister of State David Davis said: "The existence of a massive offensive biological weapons programme conducted illegally for years in the Soviet Union has also recently come to light." Statement of David Davis, Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 26 November 1996. Also, the US government reported that "the Soviet offensive [biological weapons] program was massive, and included production, weaponization, and stockpiling." US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 January 1993): 14.

51. Lester C. Caudell III, "The Biological Warfare Threat," in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Textbook of Military Medicine, 451–66.

52. For more detail, see Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (April 1996): 1–79; Milton Leitenberg, "The Conversion of Biological Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses," in Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme, Erhard Geissler and John P. Woodall, eds., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, Report No. 15 (London: Oxford University Press, 1994): 77–105.

53. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Threat Control Through Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 26 July 1996): 67; Boucher, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons."

54. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1996 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 26 July 1996): 6.

55. R. Jeffrey Smith, "China May Have Revived Germ Weapons Program, U.S. Officials Say," Washington Post, 24 February 1993, A22; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1996, 6.

56. US Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg 103–208 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995): 103.

57. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's: 98; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1996, 6.

58. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1996, 6.

59. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 93.

60. Ibid., 93.

61. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1996, 6.

62. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 42; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon’s List of Threats," Washington Post, 12 April 1996, A1.

63. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 100.

64. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1996, 6.

65. Ibid., 104.

66. Ibid.

67. Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, April 1996): 7. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 99.

68. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, 65, 82.

69. D. G. Springham, "The Established Industries," in Biotechnology: The Science and the Business," V. Moss and R. Cape, eds. (Switzerland: Harwood Academic, 1994).

70. M. Sharp, "Applications of Biotechnology: An Overview," in The Biotechnology Revolution, M. Fransman et al., eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995): 163–73.

71. C. Freeman, "Technological Revolutions: Historical Analogies," in The Biological Revolution, 7–24.

72. M. R. Dando, "New Developments in Biotechnology and their Impact on Biological Warfare," in O. Thraenert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Verlag, 1996): 21–56.

73. See Table 11 in PhRMA Annual Survey: 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 1997): 66.

74. K. B. Lee and L. S. Hu, "Biotechnology: Past, Present, Future," Chemistry and Industry (6 May 1996): 334–7.

75. Ibid., 334.

76. Malcolm R. Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century (London: Brassey’s, 1994): 101.

77. United Nations, Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, Document BWC/CONF.IV/9, 13.

78. Graham S. Pearson, "Chemical and Biological Defense: An Essential National Security Requirement," RUSI Journal 140, no. 4 (August 1995): 20–7. For other commentaries on the importance of biological weapons defenses, see House of Commons, "Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby" Fifth Report, Defense Committee, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 25 May 1994, ix–xiii; Swedish National Defense Research Establishment, "A Briefing Book on Biological Weapons" (Stockholm: 1995): 2–59; Danzig, "Biological Warfare: A Nation at Risk," 1–4.

79. The BWC mandates that each participating state "shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere." For the British law, which carries a life imprisonment penalty, see the Biological Weapons Act of 1974, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Chapter 6.

80. "Criminalizing BW," Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, no. 31 (March 1996): 1.

81. Gordon K. Vachon, "Verifying the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: The Role of Visits and Inspections," in Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, 147–53.

82. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 145–62.

83. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has adopted this strategy of using multiple, reinforcing tools to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Press Release 95(124), Brussels, 20 November 1995.

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Updated 21 August 1998.