Information about biological weapons and the BTWC
The Vital Importance of the Web of Deterrence
by Graham S. Pearson
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
(This article is reproduced by kind permission of the Sixth International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 11 - 15 May 1998. It first appeared in the Proceedings of that Symposium.)
Further information about biological weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The Vital Importance of the Web of Deterrence
Introduction
The past five years have seen significant developments in the regimes for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons with the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention on 29 April 1997, the progress being made by the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in negotiating a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Convention and the lifting of reservations to the Geneva Protocol. However, the dangers to both international and national security from both chemical and biological agents and materials continue. The web of deterrence comprising arms control, export controls, protective measures and determined national and international responses will continue to be of vital importance in ensuring future security, peace and prosperity.
This paper addresses the international developments leading to the current situation and considers the likely developments in respect of both chemical and biological agents and materials. The increasing global concern about pollution of the environment and health of humans and animals together with security concerns represent a common goal which demands the building of greater transparency and mutual confidence about national activities and trans-border transfers. International and national counters to the dangers from pollution, disease and chemical and biological weapons have much in common. The successful harnessing of the elements of the web of deterrence to counter environmental, health and security concerns is vital to achieve a safer more secure world in the 21st Century.
International Developments
Three years ago at the Fifth International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in June 1995, the importance of such protection had been thrown into sharp global focus by the Aum Shinrikyo attack using the nerve agent, sarin, in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) had opened for signature in January 1993 and by June 1995, 159 States had signed and 29 of these had deposited their instruments of ratification, almost half of the 65 ratifications needed for entry into force of the CWC. The State Parties of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in September 1994 had agreed the mandate1 for an Ad Hoc Group "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures,...to strengthen the Convention...." which had, in June 1995, yet to hold its first substantive meeting in July 1995. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) had completed four years of hard work aimed at uncovering and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; in June 1995, Iraq had yet to admit to its offensive biological weapons programme or to its significant production of the nerve agent, VX. Indeed, it was only on 1 July 1995 that Iraq admitted for the first time its offensive biological weapons programme and it was not until after Hussein Kamel defected to Jordan on 7 August 1995 that Iraq admitted its weaponization of biological warfare agents into aerial bombs and Scud missile warheads2.
The developments since 1995 have been significant and, on the whole, positive. In respect of the Aum Shinrikyo attack, it has become known that the sect had also sought biological weapons and had attempted, albeit with no reported casualties, to use them.3 The importance of countering the possible use of chemical and biological materials for terrorist purposes has been recognised by the Heads of State and Government of the G7 who in their June 1996 summit in Lyon, France declared4 that:
"Special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes"
Subsequent action included the negotiation in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings which was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/52/164 on 15 December 1997. This Convention5 makes it an offence if a person "unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device...". The definition of "explosive or other lethal device" includes
"(b) A weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage through the release, dissemination or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or similar substances or radiation or radioactive material."
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997; as of 19 February 1998, it has 107 States Parties including both the United States and the Russian Federation and 61 Signatory States who have not yet ratified6. The need here is for universality of adherence to the Convention and for full implementation of the verification regime.
The need to strengthen the BTWC was emphasised by several speakers at the Fourth Review Conference in November - December 1996 and John Holum, the Head of the US Delegation made the sobering statement7 that "Overall, the United States believes that twice as many countries now have or are actively pursuing offensive biological weapons capabilities as when the Convention went into force." The negotiations by the Ad Hoc Group to develop a Protocol to strengthen the BTWC have made significant progress with a successful transition some 10 months ago to negotiation of a rolling text. The appreciation is now more widespread that all the necessary elements for a BTWC regime are known -- nothing new is required. What is needed is for the various measures to be tailored for the particular nature of biological agents and toxins. The Ad Hoc Group has decided to intensify its negotiations and I believe that the goal declared both by the European Union and its Associated States, Australia and by the United States of completing the negotiations this year, 1998, is achievable.
The Web of Deterrence
The web of deterrence is made up of a series of strands:
* Comprehensive prohibition through international treaties and national legislation establishing the clear norm that development, production, storage, acquisition or use of CBW are totally prohibited;
* Broad monitoring and controls ensuring that materials or equipment are used only for permitted purposes thus increasing the difficulty of acquiring materials or equipment for prohibited purposes;
* Broad band protective measures, both active and passive, thereby reducing the effectiveness of CBW;
* Determined national and international responses to non-compliance with the prohibition ranging from diplomatic actions, sanctions through to armed intervention, making it clear that acquisition of prohibited weapons will not be tolerated.
which are mutually reinforcing and lead a would-be proliferator to judge that acquisition of CBW is not worthwhile.8 A single strand alone will not suffice yet together they make the benefits of CBW acquisition minimal. It is, however, vital to ensure that all the strands are strong. Each is considered in turn.
Prohibition.
The norm that the development, production, storage, acquisition or use of CBW are totally prohibited is established by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993. The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Although a number of States parties had entered reservations which would have enabled them to retaliate in kind should such weapons have been used against them, these reservations have increasingly been given up in the last few years. Now that the CWC has entered into force, all States still retaining such reservations to the Geneva Protocol should be urged to relinquish them.
The BTWC entered into force in 1975: as of 29 August 1997 it has 140 States Parties and 18 Signatory States9. The scope of its prohibition is very broad as Article I contains a general purpose criterion shown in bold below:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. [Emphasis added]
Successive Review Conferences have reaffirmed that the prohibition in Article I applies to all developments by language such as that agreed at the Fourth Review Conference in 199610 that:
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering and any applications resulting from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. [Emphasis added]
The prohibition of use is not specifically addressed in the body of the BTWC although the Preamble in stating that Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological(biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, makes it clear that the intent is to prohibit use. This intent to prohibit use was reinforced at the Fourth Review Conference by language stating that:
The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention.
The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.[Emphasis added]
The BTWC has no provisions for verification or for the monitoring of compliance. At the Third Review Conference in September 1991 following the Persian Gulf war of 1990/1991, the States Parties "determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention" established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint.11 This Group (known as VEREX) met twice in 1992 and twice in 1993. Its final report was considered by a Special Conference in September 1994 which established an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument.
The AHG commenced its work in January 1995 and has now met 10 times. In September 1996 the AHG decided to intensify its work and in July 1997 it successfully transitioned to consideration of a rolling text for the Protocol to strengthen the BTWC. All the essential elements for the Protocol are now in the rolling text -- Mandatory Declarations, Non-Challenge Visits (both focussed and random) and Compliance Concern Investigations together with measures to strengthen the implementation of Article X (cooperation for peaceful purposes) and other Articles of the BTWC. Although there is much proliferation of square brackets indicating alternatives, there is nothing new required to strengthen the BTWC.
The AHG met for 3 weeks in January and 1 week in March 1998; it will meet for 3 weeks in June/July and for 4 weeks in September/October 1998. There is consequently a real opportunity to complete the substantive negotiations this year -- particularly as President Clinton in his State of the Union address on 27 January 1998 said that "Now, we must act to prevent the use of disease as a weapon of war and terror. The Biological Weapons Convention has been in effect for 23 years. The rules are good, but the enforcement is weak -- and we must strengthen it with a new international system to detect and deter cheating." The associated Fact Sheet12 released by the White House at the same time says that "under the new initiative announced by the President today, the United States will seek to complete the framework of a strong BWC protocol by the end of 1998." In March 1998 the European Union issued a Common Position13 that is legally binding on the 15 Member States as well as the 14 Associated States which states that "Member States...shall actively promote decisive progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Group, with a view to concluding the substantive negotiations by the end of 1998, so that the Protocol can be adopted by a Special Conference of States Parties early in 1999." It is thus evident that the political will needed to complete the negotiations is there.
The CWC, as already noted, entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in conjunction with the States Parties and their National Authorities have made a good start at implementing the provisions of the Convention. By December 1997, some 70 initial declarations had been submitted to the Secretariat by States Parties; eight States Parties (including China, France, India, Japan, the UK and the USA) had declared existing or past chemical weapons programmes and this number was expected to rise to at least nine when the Russian Federation submitted their initial declaration14. It is, however, disappointing that many States have sought to regard their declarations as confidential thereby missing the opportunity through the resulting transparency to build confidence both nationally and internationally in their compliance. It is also evident that the implementation of Article X (Assistance and Protection) and XI (Economic and Technological Development) have received little attention thereby raising concern in the developing countries about whether the benefits which they anticipate as a result of the CWC will materialise.
Controls
The Australia group has continued to harmonize controls of both materials and dual purpose equipment that might be misused for chemical or biological programmes in contravention of the undertakings in the CWC and the BTWC. Some 30 States are now members of the Australia Group. Although some members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) claim that the AG controls are discriminatory, there is little if any evidence to support this.15 Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that we are living in a world in which more and more States, both developed and developing, are concerned about the possible dangers from hazardous chemicals and pathogenic or modified micro-organisms to public health and environmental safety.16 This has led to the negotiation of legally binding protocols for Prior Informed Consent (the PIC Convention) for transfers of hazardous chemicals and for Advanced Informed Agreement (the Biosafety Protocol) for transfers of living modified organisms; both of these negotiations should be completed in 1998.
In addition, the concern about the possible acquisition of such materials by terrorists has led to a strengthening of national controls. For example, the United States on 15 April 1997 introduced new rules requiring the registration and inspection of all facilities holding, using or transferring "select agents" -- a list of biological agents and toxins that closely parallel the agents generally regarded as candidates for use as biological weapons.
There are encouraging signs that dangerous chemicals and pathogens will increasingly be subject to national, regional and international controls to ensure public health and environmental safety.17 Such a framework of controls on the handling, use and transfer of such materials will, over time, build transparency and confidence that these materials are not being misused and thereby contribute to a stronger CBW security regime.
Protective Measures
Three years ago, at the 5th International Symposium I spoke on "Chemical and Biological Defence: An Essential Security Requirement"18 when I concluded that "for the foreseeable future chemical and biological defence will continue to be essential requirements to underpin both national and global security." The importance of protective measures has been reinforced recently by the work of the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP).19 The three year study20 carried out by the DGP led to the recognition that "NBC weapons are quite different from one another as are their characteristics and their potential military effect." In other words, BW must be regarded as different from CW and from nuclear weapons. This consideration led the DGP to "draw particular attention to the importance of protection for deployed forces, given NATO's new roles and missions and the regional nature of the risk." The DGP study has resulted in the definition of a series of overarching principles to guide NATO's defense response to proliferation. These include:
a. Maintain freedom of action and demonstrate to any potential adversary that the Alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of NBC weapons.
b. Reassure both Allies and coalition partners of the Alliance's ability effectively to respond to, or protect against, NBC threats or attacks.
c. Complement non-proliferation efforts with a mix of military capabilities that devalue NBC weapons, by reducing the incentives for, and raising the cost of acquisition.
d. Emphasize system mobility, given that NBC proliferation risks are expected to be primarily regional in character and that NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders.
A number of priorities are set out: to counter proliferation risks, NATO has greatest need for capabilities for the detection (both point and standoff) of biological (and chemical) agents, as well as attack identification and warning, together with NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces. A year ago, in June 1997, the meeting of the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its commitment to address proliferation risks as an integral part of the Alliance's ongoing response to the new security environment. Its final communiqué stated that "While prevention remains our primary aim, we recognize that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery…can pose a direct threat to the Alliance." 21 The Council also specifically welcomed the emphasis being put on "improving protection against biological weapons."
A similar recognition of the importance of chemical and biological defence has been shown in the United States by the Quadrennial Defense Review which stated that "In particular, the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons (CBW) is a likely condition of future warfare, including the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics." 22 It went on to argue that "Moreover, given that the United States will most likely conduct future operations in coalition with others, we must encourage our friends and allies to train and equip their forces for effective operations in CBW environments." The importance of addressing the protective measures in coalitions facing a chemical or biological weapons possessor has recently been discussed.23 It is clear that action is needed to improve these capabilities -- and that particular priority needs to continue to be placed on biological defence.
A recent perceptive article by Ake Bovallius24 on NBC in the 21st Century rightly concluded that "protection will continue to be needed through the distant future, and not only for the military, but also for the police and the medical and civil defence, and for the general public.
Determined Responses
The importance of a determined response to non-compliance with the BTWC or the CWC has to be emphasised. There is little doubt that the lack of response by the international community to the proven use of chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s sent entirely the wrong message to the leaders in the region -- that chemical weapons were apparently an acceptable form of warfare and their use would not incur significant penalties. The united stand taken against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the strong UN Security Council resolution 687 sent the clear message that the possession of weapons of mass destruction are unacceptable. However, the events of the first two months of this year when Iraq once again failed to comply with the Security Council resolutions demonstrated a disappointing lack of unanimity in the Security Council about the need to take determined action to force Iraq to comply. There is a real danger that if a firm line is not taken with Iraq, other would-be possessors of CBW may judge that such weapons can be obtained with impunity with the disastrous consequences that would entail for international peace and security.
It needs to be recognised that determined responses to non-compliance are necessary to underpin the other elements of the web of deterrence. There is little point in establishing strong rules if these can be flouted with impunity. The consequences for the global economy and stability will be costly should states judge that the norm can be broken without incurring an unacceptable penalty. States need to recognise that deliberate and determined responses to non-compliance ranging from diplomatic approaches through sanctions to the threat and ultimately the use of armed intervention is a vital element of the web of deterrence.
Conclusion
The web of deterrence -- comprising comprehensive prohibition, broad monitoring and controls, broad band protective measures, both active and passive, and determined national and international responses to non-compliance -- will continue to be of vital importance into the foreseeable future. The global moves to improve public health and environmental safety will help to strengthen the national and regional framework within which materials that are potentially harmful, such as toxic chemicals and pathogens, are handled, used and transferred will contribute over time to increasing transparency and confidence that such materials are being used for permitted purposes. There is significant complimentarity and synergy between the security and the public health and environmental safety initiatives which should together help to ensure that the 21st Century is a safer and more secure world. However, we must not relax our guard. We must maintain a strong web of deterrence.
Further information about biological weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Home page for the Joint Bradford - SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Project
1. United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19–30 September 1994.
2. United Nations, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the status of implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
3. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum, Hutchinson, London, 1996. United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Staff Statement, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, 31 October and 1 November 1995, S. Hg. 104-422, p.47 et seq., US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996.
4. United Nations, Letter dated 5 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/51/208, S/1996/543, 12 July 1996.
5. United Nations General Assembly, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, Report of the Sixth Committee, A/52/653, 25 November 1997.
6. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Technical Secretariat, Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Legal Division, S/39/98, 19 February 1998.
7. The Honourable John D Holum, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Statement, Biological Weapons Convention Fourth Review Conference, 26 November 1996.
8. Graham S Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence" – The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp 145–162.
9. United Nations, List of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/INF. 11, 8 September 1997.
10. United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 6 December 1996.
11. United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
12. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, Fact Sheet, The Biological Weapons Convention, 27 January 1998.
13. United Nations, "Working Paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on behalf of the European Union", BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 272, 9 March 1998.
14. Progress in The Hague, Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Quarterly Review No 20, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 38, December 1997, 8 - 1 5.
15. See Brad Roberts, Article III: Non-Transfer, in Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, 23 September 1996.
16. Graham S Pearson, The Complimentary Role of Environmental and Security Biological Control Regimes in the 21st Century, JAMA, 6 August 1997, Vol. 278, No. 5, 369-372.
17. Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 6, March 1998. Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 7, March 1998. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ acad/sbtwc
18. Graham S Pearson, Chemical and Biological Defence: An Essential Security Requirement, Proceedings 5th International Symposium Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 11-16 June 1995, pp 11- 23.
19. The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) was established following the decision of the NATO Heads of State and Government meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994 to intensify and expand NATO’s political and defense efforts against proliferation (see Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994). Six months later, NATO issued the Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons Of Mass Destruction at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Istanbul, Turkey on 9 June 1994 (see Press Release M-NAC-1(94)45, 9 June 1994). This framework set out various aspects of the defense dimension stating that "As a defensive Alliance, NATO must therefore address the military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations and forces".
20. NATO, NATO's Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and the Way Ahead, NATO Press Release (95)124, 29 November 1995. See also Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, "Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," NATO Review, September 1996, pp. 10-15.
21. NATO, Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Press Release M-NAC-D-1(97)71, Brussels, 12 June 1997.
22. US Department of Defense, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.
23. Brad Roberts & Graham S Pearson, Jane's International Defence Review, April 1998 (in press).
24. Ake Bovallius, NBC in the 21st Century: A widened threat spectrum, ASA Newsletter 97-6, 4 December 1997, Issue Number 63, 1,3-6.
Further information about biological weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Home page for the Joint Bradford - SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Project
The Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Preventing Biological Warfare is based in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.
Updated 21 August 1998.