The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database  

Progress at the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva, Quarterly Review no 3

by Graham S. Pearson

Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

(This review is reproduced by kind permission of the CBW Conventions Bulletin. This article first appeared in the CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 40, June 1998.)

 A further one week meeting, the tenth session, of the Ad Hoc Group to consider a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was held in Geneva from Monday 9 to Friday 13 March. As at the ninth session, held in January, negotia-tions focused on the rolling text of the Protocol. However, because this was a short session, the negotiators focused on three aspects only: compliance measures, the investigations Annex and measures related to Article X of the BWC.

 Forty-nine states parties and 3 signatory states partici-pated at the tenth session; a net total of five states parties fewer than in January as 7 states (Iraq, Jordan, Malta, Nige-ria, Singapore, Thailand and the Ukraine) did not partici-pate in March whilst 2 states (Kenya and Mauritius) which had not participated in January did in March.

 Nine new Working Papers were presented during the March session, some 24 fewer than in the three-week meet-ing in January. As usual, these were presented both by states parties (South Africa 2, United Kingdom 2, Austria 1, Brazil 1) and by the Friends of the Chair (3).

 Further progress was made in the March meeting with serious negotiations addressing the language in the square brackets. As it was a one week meeting there was some at-tempt to “put a quart into a pint pot”. Sessions began an hour earlier at 0900 and 1400 to enable informal meetings without interpretation to be held prior to the formal ones. These appeared to be useful as they enabled the issues to be ventilated and discussed prior to the formal negotiation.

 As only three aspects of the Protocol were addressed, in-stead of producing a revised version of the rolling text, re- ports were prepared of the results of the discussions in the three areas; these were attached to the procedural report of the March meeting {BWC/AD HOC GROUP/40}.

 Of the 10 meetings held, 4 were devoted to compliance measures, 2 to Article X measures, and 4 to the investiga-tions Annex. There was no change in the Friends of the Chair who were the same as in January.

 The session saw the UK, as holder of the EU Presidency, circulating on 9 March the Common Position {see News Chronology 4 March} which committed not only the 15 EU states but also the 14 associated states to:

Member States ... shall actively promote decisive progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Group, with a view to concluding the substantive negotiations by the end of 1998, so that the Protocol can be adopted by a Special Conference of States Parties early in 1999.

 An Australian statement to the Ad Hoc Group said that the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs had a week earlier announced, as part of the response to the recent crisis caused by Iraq, an initiative to strengthen the BWC. This was:

aimed at fast-tracking the negotiations on a verification system for the Biological Weapons Convention by: - calling for the convening of a high level meeting to inject into the negotiations the necessary political commitment for urgent action ... to help secure early conclusion to the negotiations.

It is likely that a meeting will be held at foreign minister level later this year or early in 1999 to give additional polit-ical impetus to complete the negotiation of the Protocol. June 1998 Page 13 CBWCB 40

 The major contentious point in the March meeting was a move by members of the Western Group to introduce sig-nificant changes to Article VII of the draft Protocol con-cerned with the implementation of Article X of the BWC. The Protocol emerging from the January 1998 session had a title for Article VII which had no square brackets, indicat-ing consensus, which read as follows:

ARTICLE VII SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The amendment that was introduced was to put the title into square brackets by introducing the alternative “Implementation Assistance” so that the title now reads as:

ARTICLE VII [SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES] [IMPLEMENTA-TION ASSISTANCE] AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

 Given that the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group explicitly requires the Ad Hoc Group, inter alia, to consider “Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementa-tion of Article X ...”, this amendment cast doubt upon the willingness of the Ad Hoc Group to address measures to im-plement Article X of the Convention. These doubts were reinforced by other amendments which placed within square brackets a whole section within Article VII entitled “Measures to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties” and the title “Interna-tional Cooperation” of another section. The Non-Aligned Movement and Other Countries (NAM) group — which has long regarded implementation of Article X as an important element of the work of the Ad Hoc Group — issued a statement on the afternoon of 13 March, just before the end of the March session, in which they expressed

their concerns at attempts to reduce the scope and importance of issues related to Article X of the Convention

and went on to say that:

Substantive progress in strengthening the application and full operationalisation of Article X is crucial to the conclusion of a universally acceptable and legally binding instrument designed to strengthen the Convention. They reaffirm readiness to work with other delegations in order to achieve an appropriate balance in the Protocol.

The same NAM statement also put down markers of con-cern about the timescale proposals for the negotiations pointing out that the decision of the Fourth Review Confer-ence that the Ad Hoc Group should complete its negotia-tions as soon as possible enjoyed consensus support from all states parties of the BWC and about any consideration of alternative texts to the existing rolling text, thereby register-ing dissent with the Australian statement which had in-cluded the mention that Australia might produce an alternative text (as Australia had done for the CWC and for the CTBT).

These are retrograde steps by the Western Group in re-gard to Article VII of the Protocol as they fail to recognise that it is possible to design measures that will aid the im-plementation of Article X of the Convention and directly contribute to the enhancement of transparency and the building of confidence in compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, such Article X measures can also promote trade and serve as a powerful incentive to encourage states to become parties to the Protocol (and to the Convention). It is to be hoped that a more positive approach is adopted at the next Ad Hoc Group session in June/July.

The Emerging Regime

Compliance measures The outcome of the discussions on compliance measures saw the development of replace-ment text for three elements of Section F [Visits and Inves-tigations] of Article III Compliance Measures:

• Visits — In the January rolling text, there had been “Re-quest” and “Voluntary” visits; in the March session these became “Voluntary” and “Voluntary Confidence-Building Visits” respectively with the text for the new “Voluntary Visits” being elaborated from 1 to 5 para-graphs. It is made clear that a “State Party may [re-quest][ volunteer for][invite][the Organization] to undertake visits to facilities” to help compile declara-tions, further the cooperation and assistance provisions, resolve specific concerns about declarations, including any ambiguity or resolve a specific concern. All the ob-jectives of the voluntary visits are in square brackets.
• BWC Article III (non-transfer) measures — The entire element has now been placed in square brackets.
• Investigations — This element of Article III. F has been tidied up and there has been a major restructuring of the information required with “requests for [field] investiga-tions [into alleged use of biological weapons]”. The rolling text for “Random Visits” and “Clarification Vists” was not considered during the March session.

Measures related to Article X As already mentioned, the title of Article VII of the Protocol was modified so as to include “[Implementation Assistance]” which was further emphasised by the inclusion of a set of alternative para-graphs for the Section A General Provisions of Article VII. These alternatives make it clear that:

the implementing organization shall provide a forum for consultation and cooperation in matters to promote implementation assistance and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes

and that:

the implementing organization should assist States Parties, on request, in obtaining implementation assistance, coordinating its efforts as appropriate with other States Parties.

The impression is left that Article VII is much more about assistance in the implementation of the Protocol rather than strengthening the implementation of Article X of the BWC.

 In Section B, Measures to Promote Scientific and Technical Exchanges, the first paragraph of which states that “each State Party undertakes to implement specific measures in order to ensure that: (a) the provisions of Article X of the Convention ... are [fully and] effectively im-plemented”, had in January only minor square brackets within its subparagraphs. Now the entire paragraph is within square brackets.

 Throughout the remainder of the revised Article VII ad-ditional square brackets have been inserted where none ex-CBWCB 40 Page 14 June 1998 isted previously. Cumulatively, the message is negative. There has been a clear failure by those introducing these changes to recognise that there are indeed Article X im-plementation measures which will directly contribute to strengthening the Convention and will bring substantial benefits to all states parties. Two University of Bradford Briefing Papers (6 & 7) which identified potential areas for such Article X measures were distributed during the March session to the AHG delegations.

Investigations Annex The discussions on Section II [Field] Investigations [of alleged use of BW] of this Annex saw the production of replacement language which has ti-died up the text, removed some square brackets and reor-dered some aspects of the Annex. Some additional timings in square brackets have, however, been introduced which result in some inconsistencies which clearly need to be re-solved. For example, two alternative durations for such in-vestigations now appear of “[30]days [84 hours]” yet later on interview requests shall be given “[not less than 48 hours before conducting it]”. This is hardly likely to be possible were the shorter duration of the investigation to be adopted.

 An Appendix was also produced of a “List of Approved Investigation/Visit Equipment” which, by comparison with the CWC, would seem to be an excessive level of detail. There would also seem to be a real danger of locking the BWC Protocol into 1990s technology as there is no sign of any provision for the inclusion of new advanced equipment which will certainly be developed in the next millennium.

 Finally, an informal working paper was prepared by the Friend of the Chair on the Investigations Annex in which language which had appeared on managed access in Annex D Investigations was forwarded to the Friend of the Chair on Compliance Measures for consideration in dealing with the text on managed access in Article III of the Protocol. Such a move should lead to a useful reordering and tidying up of the text.

Prospects

 The March meeting also saw the agreement of the pro-gramme of work for the eleventh session to be held on 22 June to 10 July. This made the following allocation of the 30 meetings to the various topics:

Compliance measures	6
Definitions	6
Investigations annex	4.5
Article X	4
Confidentiality	4
Legal issues	1.5
Organization	1.5
National implementation	1.5
Ad Hoc Group	1
Informal consultation	2
Total	30

 Since the March Ad Hoc Group meeting, there has been a flurry of meetings and occasions, notably in May, on which the importance of the strengthening of the BWC has been emphasised. The G-8 Foreign Ministers in the communiqué issued following their meeting in London on 8–9 May said that they:

are committed to action in the following areas: — the inten-sification and successful conclusion of the negotiations on measures, including for effective deterrence and veri-fication, to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention with the aim of the earliest possible adoption of a legally-binding Protocol.

 The Swedish Pugwash Group organised an international meeting on 9 May at which international cooperation and assistance were discussed and comparisons made between the OPCW experience in the early implementation of the CWC and the implementation of Article X of the BWC. Various measures that could both implement Article X of the BWC and contribute directly to strengthening the BW were identified.

 The UK, as holders of the EU Presidency, as foreshad-owed in the EU Common Position issued in March, organ-ized a seminar in Brussels on 13 May for European industry at which the various key elements of the Protocol — decla-rations, visits and investigations — were outlined by repre-sentatives of various EU countries (Austria/UK on declara-tions, Netherlands/Sweden on visits, and France/Germany on investigations) and the implications for industry exam-ined. Observers attended from Japan and Switzerland. The presentations made it clear that the numbers of facilities to be declared within an individual EU country can probably be measured in tens rather than hundreds, that such declara-tions should not seek any commercially sensitive informa-tion and that the total annual number worldwide of visits would be in the order of 50 to 100 which would be spread equably between the five or six geographical blocks.

 At the end of May, on 28 & 29, the Institute of Applied Microbiology in the University of Agricultural Sciences in Vienna organised a Conference entitled “A Strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Potential Im-plications for Biotechnology” which was attended by about 100 people from some 22 countries including several out-side Europe such as Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Korea, South Africa and the USA as well as the WHO. Partici-pants came from both biotechnology industry and academia as well as from governments. For the first time, the strengthened BWC Protocol was considered in the context of the other relevant controls and regulations relating to bio-technology; those resulting from the implementation of the CWC; those relating to health and safety within the Euro-pean Community; those likely to result from the legally binding Biosafety Protocol nearing completion under the Convention on Biological Diversity; those associated with ensuring that medicinal and veterinary products are safe for humans and animals; and those recently introduced in the United States to inspect and monitor facilities engaged in handling, storing and transferring select agents. There was a lively discussion of all the relevant issues and a clear recognition of the importance of avoiding duplication in the collection and reporting of data.

 Further indications of high level political attention to the strengthening of the BWC came towards the end of May with the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of June 1998 Page 15 CBWCB 40 the Non-Aligned Movement at Cartagena des Indias, Co-lumbia on 19–20 May when the Ministers of Foreign Af-fairs and Heads of Delegations in their communiqué said that:

The Ministers noted the progress achieved so far negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and reaffirmed the decision of the Fourth Review Conference urging the conclusion of the negotiations by the Ad Hoc Group as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and for it to submit its report ... to be considered at a Special Conference.

The communiqué also reiterated the importance of progress in implementing Article X as being crucial for the conclu-sion of the Protocol to strengthen the BWC. Later, in the same week, President Clinton on 22 May 1998 announced a major initiative to counter attacks using biological weapons. In this he said that:

we must pursue the fight against biological weapons on many fronts. We must strengthen the international Biological Weapons Convention with a strong system of inspections to detect and prevent cheating. This is a major priority. It was part of my State of the Union address earlier this year, and we are working with other nations and our industries to make it happen.

The next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group will be held in Geneva from 22 June to 10 July when further progress on the text of the Protocol can be expected.

This review was written by Graham S. Pearson, HSP Advisory Board